FIGHTER DESIGN

FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

Richard D. Ward
General Dynamics Corporation
Fort Worth Division
Fort Worth, Texas

-.

AIAAIAHSIASEE Aircraft Design, Systems

and Operations Conference
Seattle, WA 1 July 31 - August 2, 1989
For permission to copy or republish, contact the American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, 370 L'Enfant Promenade, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20024

Table of Contents

PAGE
I. Introduction.................................................... 1

II. Military Doctrine........................................... 2

A. Objectives
B. Preparation
C. Modes
Ill.War-Fighting Approach.............................
A. Readiness
B. Sustainability

IV. Weapons Requirements...........................

A. Effectivity
B. Availability
C. Supportabilty

V. Design Criteria............................................ 12
A. Operability
B. Reliability
C. Maintainability
D. Producibility
VI. Design Approach....................................... 14
A. Design Constraints
1. Operational Constraints
2. Fabrication Constraints
B. Heredity and Commonality
C. Configuration Economy
1. Standardization
2. Modularization
3. Redundancy
VII. Comments and Conclusion................... 24
References............................................... 2 4

FIGHTER DESIGN FROM THE

SOVIET PERSPECTIVE
Richard D. Ward, General Dynamics Corporation
Fort Worth Division, Fort Worth, Texas
I. INTRODUCTION
Close observation of Soviet aircraft at recent public
displays resurrected an old controversy in the West and
provoked important considerations: how can the Soviets
achieve Western levels of performance with apparently
less sophisticated machines? And if this be the case, why
not apply Soviet developmental criteria to the design of
Western aircraft?
Instead, a more important question is why are the
design criteria different? This question has been raised
because apparently Western engineers follow weapons
design constraints quite different from those imposed on
Soviet engineers. If, when examining Soviet military systems, Western perceptions are adjusted to consider the
Soviet approach to fighting a war, then much of what is
difficult to understand about Soviet design practices become clear.

strained. To ensure minimum production disruptions, use

of advanced materials are conservatively incorporated,
and fabrication is done by semiskilled workers using relatively unsophisticated machines and processes.
Soviet designers have evolved unique methods to
increase the producibility of weapons systems such as
minimizing the number of components, and by calling for
unsophisticated fabrication techniques using standardized tooling. Coincidentally, the weapons that are simply
produced are also conducive to short-term operational reliability and minimal supportability.
The purpose of this paper is to trace the Soviet
weapons development levels necessary to meet their criteria. Starting with a comprehensive national military
doctrine, the developmental hierarchy is followed through
the Soviet approach to fighting wars; next comes the determination of the subsequent weapons requirements,
then the definition of the design criteria that meets the
weapons requirements; and lastly, the approach used by
Soviet designers to produce weapons compatible with the
military doctrine (Figure 1.I).

INTRODUCTION

Based on in-depth studies of military sciences and

history, Soviet military planners have deduced that while
the next war may be prolonged, battles will be short, intense, calling for a massive flow of replacements. The
classic Soviet war-fighting concepts are surprise, concentration, and thrusts into the operational depth. In this
context, weapons must be reliable, but only for the shortterm, with minimum support requirements. It is also important that weapons be continually available in great
numbers.
Recent conflicts have shown that aircraft, on the
average, can only survive for a short time, and therefore,
there is little point to designing-in an operational life of
several thousands of hours. Accordingly, Soviet planners
require very high numbers of weapons and correspondingly high rates of production. To the Soviet planners, this
means that simple, low-cost, reliable weapon systems
must be designed to ensure that great numbers can be
quickly produced.
To assure that large numbers of dependable, warready weapons are available at the outset of a conflict,
operational weapons, in peacetime, are periodically replaced from war reserves stockpiles with new or refurbished counterparts, and the replaced weapons are in
turn sent to overhaul factories. The equipment sent to
overhaul is actually being returned to the factories near
the peak of reliability so that, at the beginning of a war, all
operational weapons will be available for a specified, reliable combat life. Combat-life requirements, therefore, determine the design life and system redundancy of all critical components.
In meeting operational demands, Soviet engineers
design around relatively few, but highly standardized,
components produced in a manpower-intensive, but relatively low-technology manufacturing atmosphere. To expedite production, outside components suppliers are con-

J AVAlLABlLlTY
SUPPORTABILITY

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

Figure 1.1 Soviet military doctrine determines and integrates the Soviet Unions response to; the military aspects
of international affairs, the contribution of the economy to
defense, and the structure of the armed forces.
Richard Ward leads the Comparative Systems Analysis
Group at General Dynamics. He received his B.S.A.E.
from The University of Oklahoma in 1962. His engineering experience includes assignments on the XB-70A, X15, F-4, F- 15, F- 18 and several advanced design projects.
Copyright 0 1989 by General Dynamlcs Corporation
hU rights reserved.

II.

MILITARY DOCTRINE

"Military Doctrine - is a system of views,

adopted in a given state for a specfic time,
( A ) on the objectives and character of a
potential future war,
(B) on the preparation of the country and its
armed forces for such a war,
( C ) and on the modes of its conduct."

Marshal A. A. Grechko

The Soviet Union has been invaded and occupied

several times in its history. Soviet losses in World war II,
both military and civilian, approached 20 million people.
Because of its history of wars, and especially that of World
War II, the leadership resolved that the only viable approach to prevailing in future large scale conflicts lies in
the security of a highly prepared standing army and a
comprehensive national strategy.
In preparing a foundation for the organization of
such an armed force, Soviet planners meticulously studied the history and nature of warfare and defined several
universal laws governing war and armed conflict. These
laws address such criteria as the importance of political
and moral goals, relative economics and technologies of
warring nations, and the correlation of military forces. To
conform to these laws, Soviet planners have established
a comprehensive and dynamic national military doctrine
to ensure national security and the projection of the international policies of the Soviet Government. Under this
doctrine, Soviet planners rank resource allocations during
peacetime, so that under emergency conditions, combat
and reserve forces receive the highest support levels, and
non-essential peacetime functions are curtailed (Figure
2.1).

quirement for the extraordinary preparedness of the

armed forces for war, including an integrated govemmental structure to support the necessary preparations. It is,
therefore, extremely important that the threat for which to
be prepared be well-defined. Their study of past wars,
and the resultant postulation of the nature of future wars.
have disclosed that certain general characteristics can be
expected:
Enemy surprise attacks are probable.

(A.)

"On the OBJECTIVES and character of a potential

future war"
Soviet military doctrine is formulated around the re-

A war between modem armies will lead to

massive losses.

Immediately following World War II. Soviet military

planners conduded that the next war would be global in
scope involving intense nuclear exchanges with great
losses. Therefore. the Soviets developed a strategy calling for extensive nudear forces, with a corresponding
deemphasis in conventional forces. In the 1960's. however, because of the growing acknowledgement of the
unacceptable destructiveness of this type of war, the military doctrine based on global nuclear war was reevaluated. Instead. Soviet leaders considered the viability of
large scale, conventional wars being fought without resorting to the nudear option. As a result of a positive
evaluation. Soviet military doctrine underwent a radical
change. From the outset, however, it became apparent
that the enemy's nudear option must be eliminated, mandating an extremely high state of peacetime military
readiness to provide swift pinpoint destruction of the enemy's nudear arsenal. The foundation of this new strategy was to be a standing-start strike capability to ensure
the enemy's nudear weapons destruction -- a difficult, if
not impossible, task - if the former Soviet strategy of massive operations and fronts was used.
The new conventional war approach is very different from the World War IIwafighting philosophy, which involved massive armies needing extensive and vulnerable
mobilization before employment. The new approach calls
for smaller. but more flexible, armies capable of rapid and
unannounced employment. This change resulted because the smaller, more flexible army can quickly drive
into enemy formations, denying them a viable nuclear defensive choice (Fgure 2.2). The early destruction of the
enemy's nuclear arsenal is still paramount, but if well-defined targets are denied to the enemy, the Soviet armed
forces will have more time to destroy the weapons. Since
subscribing to this new war-fighting approach, the Soviets
have been reorienting national and international policies.
reorganizing military formations and redesigning military
equipment to ensure the viability of this new. more prolonged, conventional war-fighting approach.

(B.)
Figure 2.1 Soviet military doctrine is the systems analysis
approach to determining the optimum balance between
defense and non defense resources allocation.

Enemy forces will have highly destructive weapons.

'On the PREPARATKM of the country and its

armed forces for such a war

To understand the Soviet Union's military doctrine,

a brief explanation of its governmental system is necessary. According to the Soviet constitution, the government
is divided into three main branches: the Supreme Soviet.
the constituent assembly; the Council of Ministers, administrator of the governmental functions; and the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), director of national
policy. In military affairs, the Party controls the Ministry of

As outlined by the Soviet communist doctrine, the

Party-commissioned government administers the economy of the nation through a highly centralized planning
system. This system, additionally, ensures the integration
of industry, resources, and manpower necessary to fulfill
the military doctrine. Within the context of this system,
planners tailored the military doctrine to the particular
Soviet experiences, environment, and goals. In other
words, national military policies are prioritized to reflect
Soviet capabilities. Although their economic system now
appears to be in the process of radical change, the parts
of the system necessary to fulfill the military doctrine are
still in place and will continue to focus on a strong peacetime military posture.

Soviet planners have developed a military doctrine

that takes maximum advantage of their strengths and
minimizes their weaknesses.

(C.)

"And on the MODES of its conduct."

Section V of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

,. C O X U l "

fprnno o p r u 0 .,C,bcn"mpo o p r e l i c r o r xopnycz.

dsarma ioavsvi

' '.I

Blue Forces

flonawewe s r o p o ~ .

V. DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST

MOTHERLAND

I ~ C ~ H T R ~ P ~
* a 1.5 ca*ln6pn

Figure 2.2 Offensive operations in the enemy's operational depth during the Bundesweahr's 1981 Strake Wehr
Exercise.
Defense through the Main Political Administration and the
Defense Industries through the Defense Industry
Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU
(Figure 2.3).

COMMUNIST PARTY
MILITARY FORCES

COMMITTEE

Figure 2.3 At the pinnacle of Soviet power structure is the

Communist Party, followed by the Ministry of Defense and
then the Defense Industries. Even though the Ministry of
Defense is a member of the Council of Ministers it holds
much more influence than the other members

Article 31. Defense of the Socialist

Motherland is one of the most important
functions of the state, and is the concern of
the whole people. In order to defend the
gains of socialism, the peaceful labor of the
Soviet people, and the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the state, the USSR
maintains armed forces and has instituted
universal military service.
The duty of the Armed Forces of the USSR to
the people is to provide RELIABLE DEFENSE
of the Socialist Motherland and to be in
CONSTANT COMBAT READINESS,
guaranteeing that any aggressor is
INSTANTLY REPULSED.
As dictated bv its constitution. the focus of Soviet
rnilitary doctrine must be the maintenance of a high state
of military preparedness. However, even the strongest
nation cannot afford to maintain all its armed forces continuously at full readiness. A reasonable alternative for
the Soviets has been to keep adequate, first-echelon
forces in a high-readiness state so that at the beginning of
a war they can complete initial strategic objectives. After
the conflict is under way, second-echelon troops, in turn
reinforced by mobilized reserves, will be quickly brought
to full strength. The reinforced second-echelon troops will
be used, as needed, to augment or replace the first-echeIon forces. With this sequence of force allocation, the
armed forces can meet initial strategic requirements before the enemy can be fully mobilized, and then complete
the overall military goals, reinforced with second-echelon
forces.

The foundation of the Soviet multi-echeloned strategy is that first-echelon forces be especially equipped
and trained so they can be maintained in a high state of
readiness. The first echelon is supported by totally compatible second-echelon forces, capable of being brought
quickly to full strength to sustain the inertia achieved by
the first echelon.

Ill.

WAR-FIGHTING APPROACH

A. READINESS - Combat Forces should @

be self sufficient; manned and equipped to
perform defined missions on immediate
notice for specific periods of time.

- I \

B. SUSTAINABILITY - Sufficient forces,

weapons, military equipment, rear
installations, and control systems in
operational units and reserves should be
available to support initial war-fighting
stages and continue adequate support until
industry can be fully mobilized.
-

The current Soviet warfighting approach is the result of a realistic assessment of modern warfare:
Wide spread nuclear conflict is not acceptable.
Massive standing armies are no longer
operationally or economically practical.
Advanced technologies have introduced greatly
increased firepower - and risks.
Throughout the Soviet post-war reevaluations of
the conduct of future wars, their war-fighting approach has
always incorporated two over-riding operational factors -readiness and ~~stainability.
These factors are the principal ingredients of the classic Soviet operational concepts
of surprise, concentration, and expeditious thrusts into the
operational depth.
In Soviet terms, readiness is determined by sufficiency of ground and air forces maintained in a state of
high preparedness, capable of seizing the initiative in any
conflict. Sustainability is determined by the sufficiency
of material and troop reserves to support the army until
the conclusion of a prolonged conventional conflict.
Weapons requirements are formulated to be compatible
with both imperatives.
A. READINESS
The Soviet leadership remembers well the enormous losses following the German surprise attack in
World War II, and are determined to never again leave the
U.S.S.R. vulnerable to this type of operation. They are
resolute in their commitment to maintaining the capability
to counter or initiate surprise actions. This resolve has resulted in the organization of select elements of the armed
forces into a very high state of readiness.
The principal advantage of achieving surprise is in
the reduction of the enemy's resistance; but to capitalize
on the enemy's temporary weakness, the surprise must
be exploited -- the attack sustained. Not only must the
first-echelon forces be trained and equipped to begin operations on extremely short notice, but second echelon
and reserve manpower and material must be quickly
made available to sustain the initiative through rapid

reinforcement, with troops activated after the battle

begins.
Surprise operations can greatly amplify war-fighting effectiveness, whether in the attack or the counter-attack. In present terms, however, with the availability of
modern sophisticated detection capabilities, surprise operations following any level of preparation are almost impossible. Therefore, within the current operational environment, the only way large scale surprise operations can
possibly be achieved is by attacking (or counter-attacking)
without mobilization. In other words, the likliest way for
an army to achieve tactical, operational, or even strategic
surprise, is to start military actions using only troops and
equipment already positioned in peacetime deployment,
without any redeployment or reinforcement - standingstart-readiness. Practically, large scale standing-start
operations will necessarily limit the size of available
forces, but the speed of advance and the subsequent
seizing of the initiative should ensure that military goals
will be achieved.
The problem for any military planner using standing-start operations, however, is determination of the
smallest peacetime first echelon size, as well as sustaining manpower and material reserves that can be practically maintained and still be effective enough to first
achieve, then retain, the initiative. In view of the current
shrinkage of the Soviet military forces, this size determination becomes critical to the establishing first-echelon
readiness levels, as well as weapons operational and
technological requirements. The Soviets have chosen:
To dedicate select combined-armed forces to full
standing-start readiness.
To maintain the bulk of its armed forces on a
skeleton cadre status, which would take some time
to mobilize.
To maintain vast reserves of military equipment and
ammunition with which to equip mobilized
reserves.
B. SUSTAINABILITY
With the return of the emphasis on conventional
warfare, sustainability gains added importance. Current
Soviet peacetime sustainability preparations are the result of thorough planning, with postulated wartime operations defining reserves in terms of a specified quantity of
reserve troops and stockpiled weaponry needed in prolonged conflicts. Reserve troops must be able to be mobilized with minimum preparation to sustain the initiative
seized by the first-echelon troops. This readiness for
mobilization is perpetuated by reserve mobilization-type
training and a very important element of reserve units preparedness being in the design and operating simplicity of
the equipment. Soviet military planners have, therefore,
determined that equipment must be highly reliable at the
outset, but simple enough to be operated by newly activated reserves with minimal refresher training.
Massive material reserves are essential in the
early period of a conflict until the national economy can
be converted to wartime status. Once on a wartime basis,
materials that have been expended in battle or destroyed

by hostile action can be replaced by the defense industry.

For instance, it is estimated that a significant percentage
of weapons produced, such as attack aircraft, are eventually stored as material reserves. In this context, Soviet
military equipment must be:
Designed to be operated with the minimum of
retraining of reservist familiar only with much earlier
versions.
Designed simple enough to be operated effectively
in the combat environment.

The primary delivery method of the MMR, from the

strategic level stockpiles to the operational level commands, will be by heavy and medium-lift fixed-wing assault transports (Figure 3.1). MMR delivery from the operational level commands to frontal (tactical) units will be
by medium and light-assault fixed-wing transports, and
heavy and medium-lift helicopters (Figure 3.2, 3.3). To
meet the MMR concept, stockpiled items must be designed and packaged to meet airlift constraints. For instance, items such as portable roadways, field pipe, and
mobile bridging will have to be reconfigured to incorporate structural plastics and graphite composites to reduce
weight.

Designed for long-term storage

Designed to be produced in a wartime economy.
Under the past Soviet conventional war philosophy, numerous material stockpiles were prepositioned
near the areas of potential operational employment of
Soviet or client state combat units. These stockpiles included weapons, weapons and troop support equipment,
munitions, spares, tactical pipelines, mobile bridges, and
special equipment.
Under the new conventional
warfighting approach, employment of the past practice of
widespread prepositioning of war materials reserves creates several operational problems:
Drawing materials from widespread stockpiles to
support the accelerated operations of the new,
smaller, flexible and greater firepower combined
arms units presents difficult problems in transport,
vulnerability, and timeliness.
Modern h~gh-techweapons demand frequent
~nspectlon,and the subsequent complex
maintenance cycle needed to sustam stockp~lesof
t h ~ sequipment, 11w~delydeployed near potentla1
war zones, would ser~ouslydegrade read~ness
Maintaining numerous widespread and redundant
stockpiles of costly advanced technology
equipment is neither operationally nor
economically feasible..
To meet the sustainability requirements of the new
conventional war, Soviet planners are shifting from locating war reserves in numerous prepositioned stockpiles at
operational level locations to fewer stockpiles concentrated at strategic level locations. The repositioning of
these mobile material reserves (MMR) stockpiles aft,
to the strategic rear, better supports the new warfighting
approach by:

Figure 3.1 The An-124 Ruslan heavy-lift assault transport

delivering cargo containers. Maximum payload is 150,000
kg. (330,693 Ibs.)

Permitting warfighting materials to be delivered

on paths normal to the front to better focus,
concentrate, and shorten support to rapid deep
penetration operations.
Positioning high-tech equipment stockpiles near
major repair and overhaul facilities for more
efficient maintenance.
Reducing redundant high-tech equipment in
reserve, by concentrating stockpiles.
Reducing the vulnerability of stockpiles by the better
concealment and defense possible in the strategic
rear.

Figure 3.2 The Soviet Air Force Mil-24 Halo Heavy-lift

Helicopter has a payload 20,000 kg. (44,092 Ibs.)

Figure 3.3 The An- 12 Cub medium-ift assault transport

has a payload of 20,000 kg. (44,092 Ibs.)

To achieve standing-start readiness and in-depth

sustainability, the Soviet military is developing moderately
sized, highly integrated, combined arms organizations
able to effect almost immediate transition from peacetime
to wartime operations. What appears to many Western
observers to be a conscript army built around second-rate
weapons, is actually a well-conceived and effective
fighting force equipped with highly supportable
weapons, available quickly in great numbers.

IV.

WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS

A. EFFECTIVITY - The ability of people, @

equipment, and facilities to perform required
missions.
-

B. AVAILABILITY - The capacity of troops,

weapons, military equipment, rear installations or command and control systems to
preserve or quickly restore their combat
capacity.

IL

C. SUPPORTABILITY - The acquisition @

of raw materials and people, their transformation into war-fighting and warsustaining systems through their peacetime
and wartime employment.
The Soviets recoanize that since wars will involve
large scale operations and losses, weapons must be both
effective and plentiful. In this context, operational requirements for availability must be integrated with supportability and operability. To appreciate how the Soviets integrate these requirements, an understanding of their approach to operational level war-fighting is necessary,
especially the initial stage of a conflict, during the transition from peacetime to wartime posture. An example of
the character of the Soviet transition is found in a typical
frontal aviation regiment's operations in peacetime,
during the transition to war, and finally during wartime.
Peacetime Operations and Support

The foundation of the Soviet approach to readiness

resides in the peacetime operations and support (O&S)
cycle of its military equipment. The Soviet O&S cycle is
designed around the premise that, in peacetime, postulated combat life must be preserved. This preservation is
accomplished by requiring that weapons, such as aircraft,
are never used in peacetime beyond that point in which
the remaining reliable flight-hours would be inadequate
to meet what Soviet planners have projected to be the expected wartime combat life (Figure 4.1). This philosophy
was developed in response to the earlier outlined readiness requirements which state that at the beginning of a
war, all combat equipment must be available to the commander for a specified and reliable combat life.

BURN
IN

PEACEWE
TRAINING
OPERATIONS

POSTULATED
WARTIME
COMBAT LIFE

MARGIN
OF
SAFETY

PROBABILITY
OF
FAILURE

IL

READINESS CRITERIA

FUGHT HOURS

(Not To Scale)

Figure 4.1 The combat-life requirement determines the

design life and redundancy of all critical components and
therefore, the overhaul schedules.

Combat aircraft are replaced in the operational inventory while the projected combat life remains, to ensure
that all remaining operational aircraft retain the projected
combat life at the beginning of a conflict. This combat life
preservation requirement is met by a weapons support
cycle which ensures that when peacetime training hours
of the equipment have reached the point when only projected combat life remains, the aircraft are withdrawn from
service and sent to overhaul factories to be refurbished,
and in turn replaced with refurbished (or new) aircraft from
reserve stockpiles. The withdrawn aircraft that were forwarded to overhaul factories to be refurbished are then
sent to the materials reserves stockpiles (Figure 4.2). In
this way, at ?he start of a war, operational units are
equipped with reliable aircraft, supported with abundant
supplies of relatively unused aircraft retained in large reserve stockpiles.
OPERATIONS CENTER
TRAINING

LINE REPLACEABLE
UNIT REPAIR

MAIN
OPERATING
BASE
GROUND FLIGHTSUPPORT

.PtACETIME
SUPPORT
CYCLE

D-LEVEL

. COMBAT
LlFE RENEWAL
OVERHAUL FACTORIES

..

AIRCRAFT
SERVICING
FAULT ISOLATION
REMOVE AND
REPLACE

WAR
RESERVE
STOCKPILES
WARTIME RESUPPLY
SUPPORT CYCLE BUFFER

Figure 4.2 The Soviet Aviation 0&S cycle revolves

around the main operating base which contains one air
regiment of about 45 aircraft.
Also with this support cycle, most of the problems of
wartime maintenance and repair are also circumvented
because, in peacetime, operational aircraft are never allowed to accumulate enough hours to have wear-out-type
failures during the postulated combat life. In other words,
war reserve stockpiles of crated aircraft are used to maintain equipment readiness during peacetime by ensuring
scheduled replacement of operational equipment with
new or refurbished equipment before major unscheduled
repairs are required. So at the start of a war, Soviet military equipment will have few of the routine maintenance
problems inherent with equipment used in extensive
peacetime training.
Because Soviet weapons must be refurbished
while still reliable, the overhaul cycle must be quite frequent, for example, the MiG-21 Fishbed is completely refurbished before 500 flight hours (the F-4, over 3000
hours). This low-hour overhaul frequency for Soviet fighters have created a serious misconception in the West that
the equipment is assumed to have worn out in very short
order. In fact, hard-line removal schedules are based not
on when a system wears out, but ~ rthe
, effective combat
life remaining in the system. This system is important because: (1) a high degree of wartime reliability is ensured;
(2) airbase level repair frequency and troop training re-

quirements are minimal; and (3) standing-start employment is practical. Consequently, combat-life projections
are the single most important factor in the design life and
system redundancy of all critical weapons components.

and organizational level organizations are to keep operational aircraft continuously maintained in a "run-in" state,
therefore keeping the squadrons approaching full
strength and ready for wartime operations at a moment's
nntion

In peacetime, to maintain operational aircraft on a

main operating base (MOB), all airbase level maintenance and inspection are done from mobile repair shops Soviet acronym PARM (Figure 4.3). These truck-mounted
shops are on call for both scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance. If the repair is minor, the failed module is
repaired by the PARM personnel at the MOB; if the repair
is major, or even moderate, the module (or the whole aircraft) is crated by the PARM crew and sent to an off-site
intermediate-level repair depot. In this way, air bases can
be operated with only a few highly skilled personnel and
sophisticated repair facilities. Also, organizational level
(ground crew) activities are limited to simple sustaining
maintenance, inspection, and supervision of aircraft servicing. In summary, the sole responsibility of the airbase

--

FLIGHT LINE DIAGNOSTIC EQUIPMENT ARRANGEMENT

The reason for the total mobility of support facilities

is to assure that complete aviation regiments can be
transported quickly to austere dispersal sites. This deployment option is practical due to the limited maintenance responsibilities on peacetime bases resulting in
smaller support units allowing complete tactical aviation
units, including flight line support, airbase level repair
shops, inspection and armaments vans, and flight operations control vans, and towed war-ready aircraft -- to
be convoyed to remote sites (Figure 4.4). It is important to
note that towing aircraft eliminates exposed flight and radio traffic, normal during conventional dispersal operations in which aircraft must be flown to remote sites.
Incidentally, Soviet fighters are designed to be towed with
specially designed tow bars at 20 kmlhour.

Figure 4.4 The initial activities of a war are critical to attaining the initiative. If feasible, the air regiment, including
the aircraft, will be deployed by convoy under the cover of
darkness. If the conflict has started and therefore, clandestine dispersal impossible, the aircraft will be launched
on the first sortie and recovered at the dispersed base
with beacons

P
P

CALIBRATION EQUIPMENT SCHEMATIC

All the maintenance procedures and equipment

employed on the peacetime airbase are optimized for
standing-start wartime deployment. As shown in the
peacetime O&S cycle, the Soviets have developed this
capability by employing mobile support organizations, or
PARM units, with specialized weapons support equipment
to perform peacetime aircraft and airfield maintenance.

IEEE-488-TYPE BUS

-----

Transition from Peacetime to Wartime Operations

and Support

ltEE 488 TYPE BUS

Figure 4.3 Inspection and repair is conducted from mobile repair shops -PARM.

The transition from a peacetime to a wartime posture involves an important change in the O&S cycle
(Figure 4.5). The principal modification is that the overhaul factory and repair depot activities are suspended because the Soviets believe that in the "fog of war," these
operational O&S functions would only be a complicating
factor. Anyway, damaged aircraft needing repairs above
the dispersed base maintenance support level, are usually nonrepairable - a situation unique to aircraft. Instead,
of repairing aircraft with major battle damage, replace-

ments are drawn from large war reserve stockpiles, a

simpler and faster approach that also allows smaller,
lower-skilled battle damage repair crews.

portant for operational flexibility and aircraft survivability

reasons:
1. To advert attack by complicating enemy targeting

PEACETIME
OPERATING

WARTIME
OPERATING

2. To preserve aircraft when the main base is likely to

be placed under attack.

3. To evade imminent nuclear attack.

4. To ensure safe storage of ready reserve assets.

RESERVE
STOCKPILES

SUSTAINING

Figure 4.5 At outset of the conflict, the organization of the

air regiment, on a main operating base, will be converted
from a single entity to a centralized command, control,
and support unit at the hub of several small austere
aircraft air bases, each base equipped only for servicing
and sortie generation.
The principal means of dispersing the individual
aircraft is to be towed by the assigned organizationallevel aircraft support truck. Not only can this truck tow the
aircraft to the dispersal site, but maintenance can be
directed from it upon arrival. The aircraft and the aircraftsupport truck is considered a weapons system, ensuring a
successful bottom end of the "standing-start" combat
readiness. With the support truck, wartime aircraft deployment can be accomplished immediately and clandestinely, irrespective of weather or time of day (Figure 4.6).
In summary, the aircraft support truck provides
organizational level support to the aircraft on both the
MOB in peacetime and the dispersed operating base
(DOB) in wartime, and it provides towing between the two
during the transition to war.

Wartime Operations and Support

The Soviets have always relied heavily on dispersal as a means of basing combat aircraft to keep up with
the moving battlefield. Additionally, under the current
conventional war doctrine, they also view dispersal as im-

In the context of standing-start readiness, the austere site deployment mode has become more important;
and although modern technology and the accompanying
complexity of aircraft systems must impose severe restraints on operations from austere locations, current
Soviet aircraft are still designed to be operated in this
manner.
Aircraft must be designed to be compatible with
austere site deployment requirements and therefore, are
heavily influenced by the austere site environment:
The (air) bases must be dedicated to efficiently
conduct rapid and timely combat operations, but
house only limited support facilities.
Aircraft must be able to operate from semi-prepared
sod runways.
The combat support equipment must be designed to
conduct maintenance on aircraft under wartime
conditions.
For security, deployment sites must be small, so
operations must be conducted with only small
ground crews.
Aircraft inspection and repair equipment must be
rugged, compact, and mobile for on-call support of
aircraft on austere bases.
The dispersed airfield has the added function of receiving airborne deliveries of MMR from the strategic
stockpiles (note Figure 4.4). As described in the sustainability section, the primary delivery method for material reserves from the strategic-level stockpiles to the
front is by heavy-lift assault transports. These aircraft will
operate between strategic-level airfields near reserve
stockpiles, and dispersed operational level bases near
combat areas. In summary, dispersed air bases will have
dual wartime functions, to support attack aircraft and to receive material reserves from strategic stockpiles for both
tactical and operational air and ground operations.

A. EFFECTIVITY
"Each Soviet weapon is developed in relation to
the capabilities of all other weapons types, in close
relation with them and in such a way that the weak
points of one are compensated for by the stronger
points of another."
Lt. Gen. Ivan G. Zavyalov

Figure 4.6 Organizational level maintenance is conducted from assigned aircraft support trucks.

Soviet military planners have determined that each

new weapons system must be evaluated relative to its effectiveness in conjunction with complementing weapons.

The effectiveness evaluation of each weapon's contribution to the overall mission requires that a balance be
struck between cost, numbers, reliability, and war-fighting
capability. Because the aircraft is considered to be only
one of the many assets assigned to the Soviet commander, the task of aircraft and therefore, its design specifications are defined in the context of combined arms operations. Aircraft need only fulfill a complementing role in the
commander's overall mission and not a role based on
maximum possible performance. The Soviets also believe that because of the fog of battle, weapons - specifically aircraft - should be optimized to only one mission to
minimize the systems complexity, simplify support, and
allow less extensive training. In other words, single-mission criteria, in conjunction with limited performance requirements, allow weapons to be very cost effectively designed, if produced in sufficient numbers to overcome a
possible advantage of higher technology enemy equipment.

In the Soviet view, system sophistication

should be determined primarily by the technical
qualifications of maintenance personnel functioning in a wartime environment. Therefore, a reliable aircraft, easier to support and maintain, is more effective because it is more dispersible - thus, survivable and has a higher sortie rate over a longer time. This
wartime operational approach dictates certain peacetime
requirements:
Frequent scheduled inspections and over-haul.
Very simple design criteria.
Over design of all critical components.

B. AVAILABILITY
Readiness is most visible in the Soviet rhethod for
ensuring troop and weapons (aircraft) availability for rapid
transition from a peacetime to a wartime posture. In
peacetime, the availability of reliable aircraft for wartime
operations are ensured by the combat-life preservation
support cycle. Availability is also ensured by a large material reserves, incorporated to sustain the peacetime
support cycle, because in wartime the same reserves will
be available to replace combat losses.
C. SUPPORTABILITY

Successful military operations call for a discreet

balance of combat operation and combat support capability. Neither function has reign over the other because
both are interdependent aspects of war-fighting. The design of weapons should, therefore, be influenced as much
by supportability and maintainability as by performance.
In the Soviet context, supportability requires simple and
fast maintenance and servicing with minimal support
equipment and crews. Performance must be compatible
with these requirements. In fact, several past Soviet
weapons prototypes have been rejected for production
because of supportability problems, although they were
superior in performance to competitive designs.

I n response to the military imperatives of readiness

and sustainability, Soviet weapon requirements are
based on very specialized interpretations of availability,
supportability, and effectivity. The criteria for Soviet
weapons design is to ensure that weapons are operable
within the context of the combined arms organizations,
reliable enough for commanders to depend on high
levels of availability, maintainable in a realistic wartime
environment, and producible in great enough numbers
to preserve reliable combat life and replace wartime attrition.

V.

DESIGN CRITERIA

A. OPERABILITY - The design of weapons

to conform to the overall war-fighting
infrastructure.

11

B. RELIABILITY

- The design of equipment to perform required functions

dependably for a postulated combat life.

C. MAINTAINABILITY - The combat

servicing and repair characteristics of
weapons necessary to minimize combat
requirements for test equipment, trained
personnel, and spares.

@
D. PRODUClBlLlTY - The design of
equipment to be more easily manufactured
in both peacetime and wartime environments.
As stated over and over aaain, the Soviet warfighting ipproach emphasizing readiness and sustainability dictates that combat and support systems must be
available to the commander for a specified combat life.
This combat-life requirement establishes the aircraft design criteria.

A. OPERABILITY
Weapons operability, in the Soviet context, is the
measure of the balance between advance technology
and reliability. On one hand, there is the choice of
weapons that employ all the high-risk, advanced technologies available, which need complex support systems
and training; but if on the other hand the military planners
opt for older and familiar low-risk systems, the failure to
utilize advanced technologies will deny military forces increased firepower. In the attempt to achieve the optimum
balance of technology application, Soviet military planners have analyzed operational effectiveness by
methodically evaluating performance against readiness.
As a result, of this compromising approach, Soviet military
equipment appears to be markedly inferior when compared to its Western counterparts. In fact, one of the
principal differences between Soviet and Western
weapons is that the Soviet weapons are designed according to t he rigid combat readiness demands requiring
short-term high combat-life reliability and not maximum
performance with long-term, peacetime durability.
Criteria for designing weapons to operate in combat must be determined by a realistic view of the wartime
environment. The Soviets believe that under the intensity
of combat the operator's ability to make anything but the
simplest maintenance decisions will be greatly hindered.
If ground crew members must function while under attack,
at night, in snow, and wearing chemical protection gear,
operating efficiency will be inherently minimal. Soviet
planners require that weapons must be designed to be
operated and maintained effectively in such situations.

The extent of the attention given wartime operability of

Soviet aircraft is shown by the fact that many crew chiefs
for Soviet-built fighters in Third World air forces are unable to read, yet frequently maintain higher sortie rates
than companion Western-built aircraft needing educated
crews. Obviously, Soviet crew chiefs can read, but the
necessity to read such items as maintenance manuals
during the heat of combat should be the exception.
To ensure that each new aircraft model is compatible with the wartime operability requirement, the Ministry
of Aircraft Industry (MAP), in cooperation with the responsible prototype design bureau (OKB), builds approximately 50 preproduction aircraft. These aircraft are sent
to a typical operating base for a protracted operational
test and evaluation (OT&E) stage, where the airbase
crews operate and maintain the aircraft under the close
observation of MAP and OKB engineers. Following the
OT&E stage, the aircraft, some airbase crews, and the
engineers, return to the factory and correct problems
identified during the test. The aircraft design is correspondingly modified and then goes into production.
B. RELIABILITY

Reliability, in Soviet terms, is the measure of increased war-fighting availability and survivability while
decreasing support requirements. The Soviet goal is for
combat equipment that does not have a fabrication or
wear-out type failure for its postulated combat life.
Reliability does not mean incorporating several levels of
redundancy or adding extensive self-test systems. The
Soviets design-in redundancy and self testing, but only to
a limited extent. They also employ the universal methods
to enhance reliability of quality assurance, failure history
analysis, selection control, and viability tests. The Soviet
reliability requirements, however, rely heavily on two
other methods: highly over-designed critical components
and extensive use of parts of established reliability.
By over-designing parts, many possible manufacturing faults resulting from low-skilled manpower (such as
during wartime) and high production rates are circumvented. For instance, if a panel is designed to be overstrength then the rivet and spot weld patterns do not have
to be precise to be reliable.
By use of parts with proven reliability, such as mature components from older aircraft, the reliability has already been established. Additionally, repairs will be more
reliable because the maintenance crews are already
trained in the repair of the familiar component, using familiar repair equipment.

C. MAINTAINABILITY
Equipment maintenance in wartime is a procedure
the Soviets believe should be avoided, not made easier.
Soviet weapon requirements are based on the premise
that any maintenance in the combat zone degrades effectiveness because repairs call for additional and valuable
maintenance personnel, as well as stores of repair equipment and spare parts. Also, to make the aircraft easily repairable under combat conditions, costly on-board maintenance space must be allocated and numerous structural
degrading access doors incorporated. It must be recognized, however that Soviet weapons are subject to un-

scheduled maintenance (as are all machines), but in their

case extensive efforts are made to eliminate, but only for
the postulated combat life, as much maintenance as possible.
One of the Soviet's principal approaches to eliminating wartime maintenance would probably be unacceptable in the West, namely, scrapping combat aircraft
and major components requiring more than a few hours to
repair. The Soviets believe that replacement from reserve
stockpiles is more effective because the time and personnel needed to effect repairs would only hinder austere
deployment operations, mobility, and sortie rate.
Additionally, they believe most battle-damaged aircraft
can only be effectively repaired at major repair depots
anyway, which, to the military commander, is the same
thing as losing the aircraft. It should be noted that the outof-order aircraft will be eventually reclaimed by special
salvage units, but this will have little effect on the commander's ability to accomplish his immediate mission.
The main drawback of abandoning weapons
needing repairs during wartime is the requirement for a
large material reserve and special training to reassemble
the replacements. But, in the Soviet peacetime support
cycle, using replacements from reserve stockpiles is part
of their approach to keeping combat equipment in standing-start readiness condition. Therefore, the low level of
peacetime aircraft repairs on airbase is conducive to the
wartime requirement in which operational units should
have to make only limited field maintenance.
Coincidentally, if weapons need not be readily field repairable, many complex and costly design features can
be avoided, such as repairable parts and access panels.

To meet Soviet sustainability requirements, the

design of combat equipment must be compatible with
massive production runs, particularly undet wartime
conditions. This mandate dictates that the organization of
the national economy be compatible with defense production. Accordingly, weapons design must be compatible with the limitations and capabilities of a defense industry structured for wartime production. The designer
must balance cost against performance, advanced fabrication processes against available machinery and manpower skills, advanced technologies against production
quotas, materials against resources, and complex and
widespread manufacturing networks against concentrated
wartime production centers. These considerations rely
heavily on simplicity of design.
To balance producibility and performance, Soviet
planners require that weapons need only be adequate to
meet a specific mission for a given combat life. This performance adequacy - or limit - allows simpler and cheaper
fabrication materials and processes, which, in turn, facilitate massive production runs. One compromise to producibility, is that weapons must be producible in a
wartime environment by rejecting more efficient and
economical, industrial networks for concentrated industry
centers with less vulnerable transport infrastructure. Hence, a larger percentage of each Soviet aircraft is
manufactured at each assembly factory than in the West.
In this system, after successful prototypes are approved
for production, they must be redesigned to be compatible
with the available processes of the plant where

production is assigned. Incidentally, operational aircraft

being returned for overhaul must be returned to the
factory where they were built to be compatible with the
tools and machines.
To meet the design criteria for each new weapons
system, the Soviet ainraff designer is controlled by rigid
operational and fabrication design constraints. His
ptincipal appmach to meeting these wnstraints is by limiting additions to new models, of advanced technologies
and new components.
This design conservatism is
sustained in the f m of design heredity and component
commonality. Developing weapons with adequate
performance which still meet the design constraints, is
aoaomplished by the mububous
Wancing of resources and
requirements, or configuration economy.

VI.

DESIGN APPROACH

Sowet design constraints are divided into two basic categories - operational constraints and fabrication
constraints.

A. DESIGN CONSTRAINTS - The

design methods employed to balance
combat effectiveness and conservation of
resources.
B. HEREDITY - The design approach of
developing new systems by direct
extrapolation from previous efforts.
C. COMMONALITY - Current design
efforts utilizing components of past and
concurrent designs.

Operational Constraints
are those design
features incorporated into the aircraft to meet the combat
operations and support requirements detailed in the design criteria.

11

IZ

a. Takeoff to Landing
Austere-site-deployment suitability is a primary design consideration for Soviet aircraft causing the designer
to stress simplicity, reliability, and ruggedness. For instance, aircraft propulsion systems are designed to eliminate foreign object damage during sod field operations
(Figure 6.1).

D. CONFIGURATION ECONOMY the @

design approach which ensures equipment
compatibility with design criteria by
integrating simplicity, evolution, commonality,
and fabrication constraints to reduce preproduction development risks.
To meet the readiness criteria, the desianer must
follow a unique priority of design conskerationsT
1. Maintainability under combat conditions

2. Supportability at austere sites

3. Producibility in a wartime environment
4. Cost considerations

5. Training for conscript and reservist

6. (and last) Combat Performance

Although performance is itemized last, it is irnportant to the user. But, the Soviets have judged that the
wartime environment is so severe that reliable and simple
weapons are the only fighting equipment that have a
chance of being available to perform for the duration. The
first three Soviet design criteria, therefore, have priority to
assure that aircraft can be massively produced, widely deployed, and rapidly employed.

A. DESIGN CONSTRAINTS
Design constraints for the designer are formalized
in a series of "handbooks" supplied by applicable research offices of the Ministry of Aircraft Industry. These
handbooks itemize the approved aerodynamic shapes,
approved materials, and manufacturing processes allowed the designer. With these handbooks, the designer
has little leeway in design choices making his principal
function to apply the handbook standards as efficiently as
possible. Therefore, to the Soviet designer, the best design innovation is one that results in the simplest solution
to the handbook constraints.

Figure 6.1 Because of the austere deployment environment, foreign object damage (FOD) of Soviet frontal aircraft is a principal concern. Durmg combat operations
FOD clearance will not be practical, therefore the a~rcraft
have been designed to carry on-board FOD protection
gear.
To ensure the amraft can fly from a wider choice of
d~spersedbases, takeoff and landing should be as short
as possible. The Su-27 currently holds the short takeoff
and landing (STOL) records, a commensurate capability.
Also, the MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker are both being tested for STOL operations incorporating ski-jump
takeoff ramps. Take off ramps allow a dramatic decrease
in runway length, therefore increasing operational flexibility. A fully loaded Flanker using a portable ramp setup

can be airborne in less than 300 meters, an important capability for operating from damage runways and remote
deployment sites.

MiG-23 FLOGGER

MiG-29 FULCRUM

MiG-21 FISHBED

b. Landing to Takeoff

Towing the Su-25 Frogfoot and the Su-27 Flanker

before and after flight operations is done by attaching a
towline from the heavy-duty towbar to the main landing
gear to pull the aircraft, and attaching a special steerable
fitting to the nose landing gear. In this way, the much
stronger main landing gear takes the towing loads while
the aircraft nose wheel is steered from the tow truck
(Figure 6.2). For the MiG-23 Flogger and the MiG-29
Fulcrum, the towing system is designed so both towing
and steering is with the nose landing gear (Figure 6.3).
An interesting note is that current MIG fighters are the
same width, ensuring the same tow and hanger width
(Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4 The width of the aircraft is dictated by towing

and shelter constraints. The MiG-29 Fulcrum with the
currently detachable outer wing panel removed is the
same width as its to predecessors, the MiG-21 Fishbed
and the MiG-23 Flogger.

The logistics support of Soviet high-performance

combat aircraft during wartime calls for special design
considerations. As noted earlier, Soviets only allow very
minor repairs to be done by the aircraft ground crews with
almost all tasks limited to preflight and postflight activities.
This very limited organizational level approach to maintenance results in many significant design characteristics
of Soviet aircraft. This feature is feasible because with the
short-term, high-reliability systems required of Soviet
weapons, frequent repairs would not be needed, consistent with the wartime environment. This maintenance
philosophy also permits the use of lower-skill level ground
crews. Generally, this wartime-oriented method of maintaining aircraft ensures high peacetime readiness and efficient wartime sortie generation.

Figure 6.2 The Su-25 Frogfoot and the Su-27 Flanker

use special tow bars designed with main gear towing and
nose gear steering for cross country and rough field operations.

Figure 6.3 The MiG-29 is towed by both pulling and

steering with the nose landing gear.

To test and warm up on-board systems before each

flight, Soviet fighters have power hookups on the left side
where electrical power line from the aircraft support truck
can be connected (Figure 6.5). The hydraulic, avionic
and fuel systems can be readied for flight with this
auxiliary power source and the only task required before
take off is to start the engine.
To not jeopardize the mission, several redundant
modes are available to the ground crew for wartime servicing reliability of the current generation aircraft. For instance, refueling backup systems are required on all
combat aircraft. The primary method is by single-point
pressure refueling through NATO compatible receptacles;
the backup is with several gravity feed receptacles. For
aircraft that carry external tanks, the tank attachment fuel
ports using on-board fuel pumps are also available
(Figure 6.6).
Wartime inspection and repairs are accomplished
by dispatching PARM units, as needed, from a regimental
repair center to the dispersed base. Inspection is simplified by designing the aircraft; so that, umbilicals for diagnostic data retrieval equipment can be quickly attached
without opening large access panels (Figure 6.7). The
unprocessed data is down loaded to the truck-mounted
PARM shops for analysis. This approach reduces on-

Figure 6.5 The external electrical power receptacles of all Soviet fighters are on the left forward quadrant of the
fuselage or the left forward wing root.

MiG-29 Fulcrum-A

ngle Point Pressure

Figure 6.6 The single point refueling for the MiG-29 is located on the left side. The gravity feed refueling receptacles on the MiG-23 and Su-27 are located on top of the
fuselage and on each wing.

,,#'
%,

tg

/ 53

'$,

\i

,a!\

\i\ \

t \

0%

Su-27 Flanker

Figure 6.7 Diagnostic umbilical connectors are concentrated on the right wall of the Su-27 Flanker nose wheel well.
board processors, access time, and eliminates equipment
bay exposure. An added advantage to this approach is
that the aircraft skin can be designed with fewer access
door discontinuities, allowing more efficient and therefore,
lighter-weight structure. Incidentally, this structural continuity permits very efficient composite applications.
Soviet aircraft attrition replacement during wartime
is accomplished by replacing the damaged aircraft, or
components, from reserves stockpiles. Therefore a large
percentage of all combat aircraft in the air force inventory
are in reserve storage. To facilitate this requirement,
Soviet frontal aviation aircraft are designed to be compactly stored in a special crate and from which they can
be quickly removed and assembled. For instance, the
disassembled MiG-21 Fishbed is stored in a crate
approximately 47 feet long and 10 feet wide (Figure 6.8).
The MiG-23 Flogger crate had to be larger, about 67 feet
by 17 feet, to allow the longer fuselage, and wider for the
variable sweep wing carry-though structure. The MiG-23
replacement, the MiG-29, however, was a very different
configuration but was required to fit into the same volume
(Figure 6.9). To meet the MiG-23 Flogger size constraint,
each wing of the MiG-29 Fulcrum is designed to be disassembled into two parts and the interchangeable, vertical
tails removable. It should also be noted that all the spares
necessary until the next overhaul are stored in the crate
with the aircraft.

Disassembly, of Soviet aircraft for storage, calls for

special structural design considerations, such as limiting
disassembly attachments to a few simple lugs, three for
the MiG-29 winglfuselage attachment (Figure 6.10). This
approach requires concentrating load paths at these few,
very high stress points. The Soviet design solution has
been to make the center fuselage box, which carries wing
and landing gear loads, out of steel, a nonstrategic metal
that is easy to weld and has high bearing strength.

Fabrication Constraints are those design features incorporated in the aircraft configuration compatible
with the resources, machines, and manpower available in
a wartime industry. Additionally, these constraints must
facilitate massive and high-rate production runs necessary to meet peacetime material reserve requirements
and prolonged conflict attrition replacement requirements.
An example of fabrication optimization is in the design of
the horizontal stabilizer of the Mi-26 Halo, the world's
largest helicopter (Figure 6.11). The materials are steel
tube spar, plywood ribs, balsa wood leading edge, and
canvas skin therefore, the component is extremely easy to
build and therefore, very inexpensive. This method of
construction was chosen because of the part's location (it
receives frequent damage from flying debris), and with
this design, it could be simply and economically replaced.

Figure 6.8 The MiG-21 Fishbed is stored in a sealed shipping crate including all the
dollies, fixtures, tech manuals, and tools necessary for assembly. Anticipated spares
needed until the next overhaul are also included.

Cover for Win

Figure 6.9 To meet standardized storage requirements,

the disassembled MiG-29 Fulcrum fits in the same volume
as its predecessor, the MiG-23 Flogger. In fact, the length
constraint on the Fulcrum caused the RD-33 engine afterburner to be less than optimum length, causing extensive
development problems.

Figure 6.10 To facilitate disassembly for storage,

wing/fuselage attachment loads are concentrated at no
more that three lug points. To carry these concentrated
loads the center fuselage structure of current MiG fighters
incorporates large welded steel assemblies.
To ensure simplicity in production, minimum
assembly and finishing standards are used -- where not
critical. Examples of aircraft construction practices on the
MiG-29 show that:
Little emphasis is placed by Soviet designers on
tolerances in noncritical areas such as the gaps
around access and landing gear doors, flushness
of fasteners, and alianment of rivet includina
continuous and spoiweldment patterns ( ~ i h r e
6.12).
Soviet equipment shows the extensive use of
welded fittings in combination with numerous
castings and forgings in order to limit complex
machining (Figure 6.13).
Airframe structures are designed around materials
that work at low stresses and are assembled
through use of both spot and continuous welding
(Figure 6.1 4). Western aircraft designers seldom
use spot welding because of its limited fatigue life,
but if aircraft are frequently overhauled weldments
can be inspected and replaced in a timely manner.
Because of the liberal use of weldments, Soviet
aircraft have several nonrepairable parts, however,
and these are replaced by exchanging entire
subassemblies during the frequent overhauls.

Figure 6.1 1 The Mil Mi-26 Halo horizontal stabilizer is a

low-cost design, easy to replace.

Figure 6.12 This weld-bonded MiG-29 Fulcrum access panel is typical of most doors on the aircraft. Note the
misaligned spot weld pattern.
18

Su-27 Flanker

Figure 6.13 Landing gear struts are typically fabricated of several small welded forgings to facilitate required non
aligned placement of lugs and the trunnion.
Simple designs are inherently more reliable and
rugged; for instance, in systems with low arts count. For
example, the R-11 turbojet engine that pokers the M~G-~I
Fishbed fighter has a little over 5000 parts - impressive
when compared to the 30,000 parts in the F-4 Phantom's
J-79, an engine of the same era and thrust class (Figure
6.15).

B. HEREDITY AND COMMONALITY

Soviet designers develop each new system by the
careful metering of modifications to the previous design.
In this way, the Soviet designer can minimize development disruptions bv allowina onlv limited amounts of ad-

uU

PARTS COUNT FOR SEVER WESTERN

I/

40.

50
100
500
1000
ENGINE INLET AIRFLOW -LB/SEC

Figure 6.15 Soviet engines are designed with derated systems and easy removal of modularized high failure parts.
Premium castings are extensively used to reduce parts
aircraft. In the MiG family evolution, each design incorporates many design features and components of its predecessors, or even several predecessors (Figure 6.16). One
possible drawback to design heredity is the necessity for
the continuity of a single design team to sustain the corporate knowledge. This long-term team continuity has the
possibility of causing design stagnation resulting from the
continuing restraints of the older designers. This mind-set
possibility, however, is seen by the Soviets as less a
problem than organizing a new design team bringing only
limited corporate knowledge to each new design.

Fishpot; and the RP11 (Skip Spin) radar from the Yak-28P
Firebar - with the only original development being the
fuselage (Figure 6.17). In the same lineage, the swept
wing counterpart to the Su-9/11 Fishpot, the Su-7 Fitter,
was improved by adding a variable sweep wing and renamed the Su-7 IG; the aircraft went to production as the
Su-17/20/22 Fitter- C/H.

Design commonality is closely related to heredity

since the designer applies actual components of concurrent and previous aircraft to current prototypes, to reduce
new, therefore higher risk, systems per program. This
concept can apply to complete aircraft assemblies, such
as wings or empennages, or to smaller compon'ents such
as instruments, pumps or actuators. The smaller components could actually be considered standard parts however, Soviet standard parts lists usually are compilations
of simple parts such as fasteners, fittings, extrusions, etc.
The classic example of the application of common
aircraft assemblies to a new design is with the development of the Su-15 Flagon intermediate-range interceptor
in early 1970's. The Flagon prototype was a marriage of
two R13-300 engines from the MiG-21 Fishbed; the wing,
horizontal and vertical tails, and canopy from the Su-9/11

1945

Figure 6.17 The last example of extensive configuration

commonality was the Su- 15 Flagon, a combination of existing wings, tails, cockpit, radar, and engines. Only the
fuselage was all new.

1950

1955

1965

1975

Figure 6.16 Heredity is apparent in MiG fighter designs, however configuration heredity is decreasing.
20

Interestingly, with each new generation of aircraft,

Soviet designers are relying less on heredity and commonality as principal design tools. Soviet aircraft designers are actually increasing the percentage of new technologies and components introduced into each new
model (Figure 6.18). The current generation of fighters,
including the Su-27 Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum, incorporate new airframes, engines, guns, radars and missiles,

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

YEAR

Figure 6.18 The emphasis on heredity as a principal design approach is inversely decreasing in proportion to the
time between new models.
the first time these systems have been concurrently developed for new aircraft models - definitely a higher risk, nonheredity approach.
Heredity, however, still influences Soviet aircraft
design, but in more subtle forms:
The MiG OKB incorporates several welded internal
structural assemblies while Sukhoi prefers riveted
assemblies.
MiG prefers constant radius canopy layout; Sukhoi,
the teardrop shape.
MiG prefers wing attachment lugs to be outside the
wing and fuselage lines; Sukhoi, inside.
MiG prefers external surfaces to be lofted with
straight line elements and circles and straight lines
in cross section; Sukhoi employs more complex
surface shapes.
In commonality, as with heredity, an increasing percentage of major components are unique to each design
however, small parts commonality is still widespread. The
common use of the same components are most evident to
the Western observer in Soviet cockpit instruments. The
Sirena II radar warning system in the MiG-29 Fulcrum, the
Su-25 Frogfoot and the Su-27 Flanker is the same one
developed for the 1950's vintage MiG-21 Fishbed (Figure
6.19).

C. CONFIGURATION ECONOMY
To ensure that production meets national objectives and assets, the Soviet designer must balance perfor-

Figure 6.19 The communally employed Sirena radar

warning system cockpit instrument still retains the MiG-21
Fishbed planform.
mance against producibility. Whereas heredity and commonality are design methods employed to reduce development risks before production, the performance/production balance is the measure of program
cost effectiveness -- configuration economy. One example of design economy is found in the Soviet approach to
temperature-related, parameter-variations control in solidstate equipment. The accepted method is to design circuits that are self-compensating. The Soviets chose to
provide microclimate enclosures in which the component
environment was protected from temperature and humidity variations with on-board miniature air-conditioninglheating systems. In this way, a more complex, higherrisk circuit design was avoided by incorporating a rnechanical solution.
Important elements of configuration economy are in
the judicious application of standardization, rnodularity, and redundancy.

Standardization ensures the minimum variety

of equipment, optimizes the ability to interchange assemblies and components, and reduces training and logistics
requirements. Standardization involves the use of approved parts lists of components, assemblies, and subsections wherever possible. An example of materials
standardization is the way the Soviets chose extrusions
for their designs. The available shapes and size of the
standard extrusions to the Soviet designer are very limited when compared to the variety available in the West.
The ones available are especially configured to overcome
that apparent shortcoming. Built-up structures are
reduced by incorporating skins and stringers, extruded as
one part, throughout the aircraft as wing and tail skins, access panels, and, as fuselage skins (Figure 6.20).
Another special feature of the Soviet extrusion design is the cross-sectional geometry of several beams to
facilitate nesting with other extrusions or even rolled steel
bands. In this way, the designer has the choice of either a
standard extrusion to meet a particular structural need, or
if the strength of the available sections are not optimum
then he can build up a near-optimum part by bonding
nested sections (Figure 6.21). In fact, the designer has
the choice of nesting such materials as an aluminum extrusion with a steel band. What would be a problem of
attaching dissimilar metals with the resultant corrosion is
not of great concern to the designer because he is designing a relatively short-lived weapon, and even if a

Figure 6.20 Among the standard parts available to the

Soviet designer is skinkitringer extrusions. These extrusions are employed extensively as fuselage and wing
surfaces as well as access panels and wheel doors.

I.

--

TOTAL ENGINE REMOVAL REQUIRES COMPLEX SUPPORT PROCEDURES

HOWEVER

--

LL?

- - -

THE AFTERBURNER CONSTITUTES OVER 5 0 0 0 OF ALL TURBOJET MAINTENANCE ACTIONS

Figure 6.21 The Soviet designer has a limited but very

flexible choice of extruded members.
problem develops it can be corrected during the frequent
overhauls.

Modularity quantifies the size and complexity of

nonrepairable components. In the Soviet context, modularity eliminates airbase-level type repairs and ensures
low parts count. For instance, with the Su-27 Flanker
engine, damaged modules can be replaced in the field
without replacing the whole engine. The Soviet military
press reported that in one air defense unit a modular lowpressure compressor had been replaced at the regimental (intermediatetbase) level. On previous models,
the complete engine would have to be removed, crated,
and sent to a repair depot. The replacement would have
to be drawn from the material reserves.
An added design feature to meet the austere repair
environment of the dispersed airbase is that component
definition is based on failure frequency. In the Soviet jet
engines, the afterburner component can be removed
while the turbine component is still in the aircraft. In this
way that part of the engine which requires over 50% of all
repairs -- the afterburner -- can be removed and replaced
in the field without having to disconnect the fuel, electrical,
or hydraulic lines (Figure 6.22). With the failure-priority
design approach, field-level repairs are greatly simplified
and expedited. This design approach is especially effective in the repair of electrical, electronic, and hydraulic
systems components.

AND IF OtlLY THE AFTERBURNER IS REMOVED. THEN ONLY FLIGHT LINE SUPPORT IS REQUIRED

Figure 6.22 Typically the replacement of a complete

Soviet fighter engine is a very time consuming process;
however, the principal components are modularized so
the high failure rate items can be easily replaced-- even in
the field.

Redundancy is usually defined as the provision

of duplicate, backup, or equivalent systems or components to improve survivability, availability, and operability.
In Soviet terms, redundancy is defined as systems designed to meet required tasks, not to optimum performance. In other words, equipment degradation, not failure, is the primary design for redundancy consideration.
In avionics, circuits are designed to degrade before failure. This approach calls for frequent inspection and calibration, but fewer backup systems are required. This
same approach is also applied to mechanical systems
with the overdesign of all critical components to reduce
redundant and emergency systems. In mechanical systems, redundancy calls for very simple backup systems for
survivability and inflated margins of safety in the primary
systems for reliability.
The Soviet designers' mandate is to ensure simplicity in layout, simplicity in production, simplicity in

VII.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The foundation of Soviet weapons acquisition is a

comprehensive and dynamic military doctrine that defines
how future wars must be fought to be won and how the
nation's civilian and military sectors must be structured
and prepared in the eventuality of such a war.
Soviet military doctrine, the strongest influence on
the design characteristics of Soviet weapons, stresses
that future battles will be intensive and probably prolonged, with very high attrition rates needing a steady flow
of replacements. Consequently, Soviet planners require
that reliable weapons be quickly available in great numbers while being effectively operated and maintained by
conscripts in the extreme environment of war.
In peacetime, the Soviets maintain a unique form of
standing-start readiness with which they are able, at the
outset of a conflict, to immediately deploy operational
aviation units to, and employ from, austere dispersal
bases.
To meet the operational requirements, Soviet aircraft are designed for a highly reliable, predetermined
(though relatively short) combat life to reduce wartime
maintenance on austere deployment bases. Some quarters have questioned the viability of this concept because
of the apparent support complexity of modern weapons
however, Soviet aircraft and their support systems have
always been designed to achieve this capability. The
question is in assumptions of the questioner. The problem is possibly in demanding "mirror images" and ignoring the extreme vulnerability of all fixed basing.
Soviet military thinkers have determined that, to be
effective, weapons must be available in massive numbers
(reserves) and be highly supportable in a wartime environment. Additionally, the Soviets have concluded that
while weapons need only be adequate for a given mission, they should be highly reliable for their postulated
combat life.

REFERENCES:
This paper is based primarily on personal contacts
with several Soviet designers, pilots, and technicians including close inspection of several of their current military
and civilian aircraft. Not only did the Soviets readily furnished extensive information on their aviation industry but
they also supplied confirmation of several earlier postulated design and operational features of Soviet aircraft.
Several published sources were also used in the
research for this paper; including some of mine. The following are several of the more useful.

Books:
Aviaexport; Aviation Metallurgy of the USSR
Baxter, W. P.; The Soviet Way of Warfare, Brassey
Eyermann, K. H.; MiG Flugzeuge, Transpress
IGDR)
blaglev, A. N.; Construction of the Aircraft
Handbook for the Aviation Rear Specialist
Hemsley, John; Soviet Troop Control, Brassey
Matveyenko, A. M.; Airfield Braking System of
Aircraft, Moscow Press
Soviet Military Encyclopedia
Taylor, John W. R;Jane's All the World's Aircraft,
Jane's Publishing
US Army FM100-2-2
Vigor, P. H.; Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, St. Martin's
Press
Reports and Papers;
Bodansky,Yossef; The Soviet Threat to NATO Air
Bases, General Dynamics, 1989
Brower, K.S. and Kehoe, J.W.; US and Soviet
Weapons Systems Design Practices,
International Defense Review 6/1982
Director A/S Studies, Kirkland AFB, Strike Option
Comparison Study, ASCMDJSA
Lowy, S. H.; Impact of Soviet Logistics Concerns
on Aircraft and Gas Turbine Design, Center for
Strategic Technology
Savkin, V. Ye. ; Basic Principles of Operational
Arts and Tactics, (USAF)
Soviet Army Studies Office; The Soviet Conduct
of War, Fort Leavenworth, US Army
Magazines;
Air Force Magazine, Aviatsia i Kosmonautika (Soviet Air
Force Magazine), International Defense Review, Jane's
Defense Weekly, Lettecvi i Kosmonautika (Czechoslovakian Air Force), Military Logistics Forum, Soviet Military
Review, Tyl i Snapzheniye (Soviet Military Logistics),
Tekhnika i Vooruzheniye, Vozdushny Transport

operations, and simplicity in support. In other words, the

designer must satisfy production constraints and operational requirements with minimum complexity. Simplicity is found in all aspects of Soviet weapons acquisition
and operation because Soviet military planners believe
that, to be effective, weapons must first be simple.
Simple systems are inherently lower risk to develop, less
costly to manufacture, easier for conscripts to service and
repair, and operators to use.