Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Sculpting God. The Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology - John N. Jones
Sculpting God. The Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology - John N. Jones
Sculpting God. The Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology - John N. Jones
Cambridge University Press and Harvard Divinity School are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to The Harvard Theological Review.
http://www.jstor.org
n recent decades, the theology of Dionysius the Areopagitel (pseudoDionysius) has recaptured the attention of a number of scholars. These
scholars address Dionysius's importance for the history of philosophy,2 for
Christian aesthetics3and liturgical and biblical symbols,4 and for postmodern
*I thank Michael Foat, Jeff Fisher, Dan Grau, Antony Dugdale, David Kangas, and Nancy
Gratton for their patient and helpful responses to this work, with special thanks to Rowan
Greer and Cyril O'Regan.
'All citations of the Dionysian corpus are numbered according to J. P. Migne, Patrologiae
cursus completus (Athens: Typographeiou Georgiou Karyophylle, 1879) 3.1, from which all
Greek quotations are taken. Except where otherwise noted, all English quotations are from the
invaluable Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (trans. Colm Luibheid; notes and additional trans. Paul Rorem; New York: Paulist Press, 1987).
2Stephen Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978).
3Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 2: Studies
in Theological Style: Clerical Styles (trans. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh, and Brian
McNeil; San Francisco: Ignatius; New York: Crossroads, 1984) 144-210.
4PaulRorem, Biblical and Liturgical Symbolswithin the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984). Although Rorem's most recent monograph
(Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993]) is an important contribution to English-language scholarship in the field, with respect to negative theology it rehearses quite precisely Rorem's
comments in Symbols and especially in the footnotes of Complete Works. When discussing
Rorem, therefore, I will refer to these earlier volumes.
355-71
356
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
theology.5 Much of this attention focuses on the brief and historically influential The Mystical Theology, written ca. 500 CE.For scholars, however,
this text, like the God of which it speaks, seems to embody contradictions.
Is there a consistent logic in the text, or is it deliberately inconsistent? In
this essay, I shall analyze passages throughout the Dionysian corpus in
order to interpret the sometimes dense expressions of Mystical Theology
and uncover the logical structure of Dionysius's negative theology.6 I shall
suggest that Dionysius's primary task is to deny that God is a particular
being.7 By identifying the patterns of language used to speak of beings,
Dionysius can identify both affirmative and negative language that avoids
such patterns and hence is appropriatefor speech about God. This interpretation demands close attention to the distinction between particular assertions or denials and the assertion or denial of all beings. By focusing on
this distinction and on the higher status of negative over affirmative theology, I shall show, against the dominant trend in Dionysian scholarship, that
this negative theology logically coheres; it is neither self-negating nor logi5Jacques Derrida, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay,
eds., Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany: SUNY, 1992) 73-142.
6There are several a priori presumptions against even the possibility of finding a logical
structure in Dionysian negative theology. First, Dionysius claims, humans cannot know God
as God knows himself (Divine Names 1.588b; for a discussion of the difficulty in Neoplatonism
of imputing knowledge to the undivided God, see Gersh, lamblichus, 267-68). The fact that
human epistemology is limited, however, does not mean that there is no discernable structure
to the highest kind of knowledge.
Second, Dionysius sometimes writes humbly about the ability of his words to describe
divine matters (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 7.568d; Celestial Hierarchy 15.340b; Divine Names
13.98 lc-84a). Even if one takes these expressions of humility at face value, it does not follow
that what Dionysius manages to say is not clearly structured. (For the view that Dionysius's
expressions of humility should not be given too much importance, see Ronald F. Hathaway,
Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius [Hague: Nijhoff,
1969] xvii).
Third, several scholars imply that since Dionysius understands theology as a prayer, a
hymn of praise, and a form of direct address, it should not be externally analyzed as an abstract
discussion of philosophical language. See Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981) 164-66; and Rorem, Symbols, 51. This merely shows, however, that identifying a coherent logical structure in Dionysian
negation is not equivalent to grasping the religious meaning of the contemplative practices
that manifest such a structure. For an example of postmodern anxiety about this question as
it applies to Dionysius, however, see Derrida, "Denials," 79, 91, 98, 111.
7For the sake of analyzing Dionysian negative theology, it suffices to say that the denial
of all beings will deny individual existents, being itself, and the totality of all existents. For
a study of the kinds of being in Dionysius, see Bernhard Brons, Gott und die Seienden:
Untersuchungen zum Verhaltnis von neuplatonischer Metaphysik und christlicher Tradition
bei Dionysius Areopagita (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976) esp. chap. 1: "Die
Seienden: Ontologie und menschliche Hierarchie," lemma 1: "Die Ontologie" (pp. 29-52).
JOHN
N. JONES
357
cally contradictory. Against Rorem and von Balthasar, it does not negate
certain statements about God only to negate the negations; against Gersh,
it employs logical contradiction only in a highly qualified way. The positivity of this negative theology, that is, the presence of language that
Dionysius does not wish to negate, shows the appropriatenessof Dionysius's
metaphor of sculpture for theology. In the conclusion, I use the preceding
discussion to reinterpret Mystical Theology and suggest how logic and
aesthetics merge as Dionysius "sculpts" God.8
E
In large part, Dionysian theology is a critical theology, addressed polemically against what Dionysius sees as erroneous ways of speaking about
God.9 For Dionysius, the fundamental error in certain speech about God is
to confuse God with beings, that is, with things or concepts.'0 In Mystical
Theology, he writes:
But see to it that none of this comes to the hearingof the uninformed,
that,is to say, to those caught up with the things of the world, who
imaginethatthereis nothingbeyondinstancesof individualbeing and
who think that by their own intellectualresourcesthey can have a
direct knowledgeof him who has made the shadowshis hiding place.
And if initiationinto the divine is beyond such people, what is to be
said of those others,still moreuninformed,who describethe transcendent Cause of all things in terms derived from the lowest orders of
being, and who claim that it is in no way superiorto the godless,
multiformedshapesthey themselveshave made?"
According to Dionysius, idolaters confuse God with things. The other "uninformed" ones, perhaps Middle Platonist philosophers, confuse God with
concepts."2In another text, Dionysius anticipates how this latter group might
8Dionysius drawsthe metaphorof sculpting from Plotinus (Enn. 1.6.9). Aphairesis (daXaipeoTc,
"clearing aside," "removal") includes both a sculptor's carving and a logician's denial, the
"subtraction" of attributes from a subject.
9Some scholars, particularly von Balthasar, downplay or even deny this polemic tone.
Citing Letters 7.1077c-80a, von Balthasar writes (Glory, 149): "Nothing is more characteristic of Denys than his rejection of apologetic: why engage in controversy? To do so is only
to descend to the level of one's attacker." Elsewhere, von Balthasar implies that Dionysius
wishes to "adopt an irenical position" (p. 162). This is a generous interpretation of Dionysian
motives, but it is not supported by the corpus.
'0For Dionysius, both things and concepts "exist"; see Mystical Theology l.lOOO1a-b.
"Ibid.
'2Regarding such Dionysian passages, Derrida remarks "one is not far from the innuendo
that ontology itself is a subtle or perverse idolatry" ("Denials," 90). In Dionysius, this is not
merely innuendo but an explicit, definitive statement of his entire theological project.
358
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
criticize the biblical use of material images for God, preferring to liken
God to concepts.13
It could be arguedthat if the [scripturewriters]wantedto give corporeal form to what is purely incorporeal,they. .. should have begun
with what we would hold to be noblest, immaterialand transcendent
beings [for instance,WordandMind].14
Now these sacredshapescertainlyshowmorereverenceandseem vastly
superiorto the makingof images drawnfrom the world. Yet they are
actuallyno less defective than this latter,for the Deity is far beyond
every manifestationof being and of life. . every reason or intelligence falls shortof similarityto [the Deity].15
Dionysius accepts the philosophers' view that material images cannot reach
God. The philosophers' own solution, that is, to regard concepts as more
adequate for representing God, however, fails as well. Concepts and material images both fall short of Dionysius's God, and for the same reason:
God is beyond being. Thus he writes: "In the scriptures the Deity has
benevolently taught us that understanding and direct contemplation of itself
is inaccessible to beings, since it actually surpasses being."16
For Dionysius, knowing that God is beyond being (U'Oepootooc) gives
structure to theological speech. Any way of attributing being to God is
mistaken. Moreover, Dionysius suggests, such attribution follows a clearly
defined pattern. As a preface to Dionysius's discussion of this pattern, I
shall first briefly consider how things or concepts are spoken about in
ordinary language. If someone says that a thing x is white, the listener
understands as well that it is not red. To assert a characteristic of any x is
also to deny some other characteristic(s) of it. The converse is also true. If
someone says that x is not red, the listener assumes that it is some other
characteristic-perhaps white, or transparent,or invisible but audible. That
is, she understands that there is some assertion to be made about x, even
though she may not know what that assertion is. To be a thing x is to have
certain characteristics and not to have others.
'3Dionysius's discussion of biblical names in chapter 2 of Celestial Hierarchy begins with
the issue of names for angels. As Rorem notes (Symbols, 86), however, it is clear that the
discussion is also about the use of names for God.
4Celestial Hierarchy 2.137b-c.
15Ibid., 140c-d. Among other interpreters of Dionysius, Aquinas was uncomfortable with
the apparent sense of this passage. Appealing to common sense, Aquinas denied that Dionysius
regarded all affirmations concerning God as equally defective. For example, Aquinas emphasized (S.th. la.13.2) how much better it is to say that "God is good" than to say "God is a
body."
16Divine Names 1.588c.
JOHN
N. JONES
359
In The Divine Names, Dionysius writes, "It is not that [the Cause of all]
exists here and not there. He does not possess this kind of existence and
not that.""7Thus, Dionysius characterizes the way that assertion and denial
are ordinarily juxtaposed when speaking about things, and rejects this juxtaposition in the case of the Cause of all.18 Later in the same chapter,
Dionysius adds that the Cause of all "is not any one thing"; therefore the
language one uses only for a particular being-"it is this and not that"is not appropriatefor the Cause.19 Although Dionysius rejects the juxtaposition of assertion and denial for speech about the Cause of all, he does
permit some kind of role for multiple assertions or multiple denials.
E
'7Ibid., 5.824a-b.
'8Particularly on the basis of Mystical Theology 4-5, almost all interpreters agree that
denials occur when Greek nouns, and adjectives of both positive and negative form (such as
"in motion" and "motionless"), are said not to apply to a subject. Thus, in Mystical Theology
5.1048a, Dionysius writes that God is not "in motion," not "motionless," and neither error nor
truth.
19Inother words, for Dionysius any of the "names" for God, such as "mind" or "life" or
"lifeless," are privative, since they refer to particular being and therefore imply a lack of
perfection.
Letters 6 may also address the juxtaposition of assertion and denial. Dionysius writes
(Letters 6.1077a) that "what is not red does not have to be white. What is not a horse is not
necessarily a human." Although this letter does not discuss denial or assertion explicitly, there
are three reasons for linking this passage with Divine Names 5.824a-b. First, both discuss that
false conclusions are drawn from incorrect assumptions about the relation between negative
and positive claims. Second, the letter's overall message, that the addressee has merely traded
one mistake for another, correlates well with the Dionysian view of ambiguous denials. Third,
according to Hathaway (Hierarchy, 71), Letters 6 contains terms that "one would normally
associate with a treatise on logic." If Letters 6 addresses denial, then Hathaway's provocative
suggestion about the relation between the numbering of the Parmenidean hypotheses in
neoplatonism and the numbering of the Dionysian letters would find support. He writes (Hierarchy, 80), "the sixth hypothesis represents (the absurdity of) relative not-being, and the
Sixth Letter connects the problem of falsehood and appearance with relative not-being (no one
should attack a particular religious belief or practice as not being good, since not-being-X
never necessarily implies being-Y, i.e., it is the being, the positive nature of a thing, which
must be known or recognized)."
20Divine Names 5.824b.
360
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
For speech about God, assertions belong together and denials belong together, thus forming distinct ways to name God. Because they function
differently, however, one should not combine assertions and denials. The
former articulate God as Cause of all; the latter articulate God as transcendent. Combining the two yields language that may apply equally to God
and to things, thus failing to show that God is unique and separate from
beings.
Assertion (Oicnc): In order to avoid using language that does not reflect
God's uniqueness, one hastens to qualify any assertion about God in a way
that implies no denial. For example, one juxtaposes several assertions that
cannot in ordinary language apply to any one thing. The multiplicity of
names for God in Divine Names, such as "power itself' and "truth,"typify
this kind of speech.21 Since these names, in combination, clearly do not
refer to any particularbeing, the way of assertions, or what Dionysius calls
affirmative theology, adequately distinguishes God from beings. As a result, the "is" of an expression such as "God is power itself' takes on a
metaphorical sense; any asserted name both is God and is not God, depending upon the sense in which it is used. This double sense, identity and
difference, follows from the role of assertions in articulating God's causality: for Dionysius as for Greek Neoplatonists, a cause is both immanent to
its effect and distinct from it. The "not" of "is and is not" is part of how
affirmative theology articulates divine causality. Discussing the sense of
biblical names in Dionysius, Rorem correctly calls attention to the negative
element, the "not," of names understood in a metaphorical sense.22 I do
not, however, agree with his claim that this kind of negativity emerges only
when negative theology corrects affirmative theology. Affirmative theology
has a kind of negativity proper to itself; for Dionysius, affirmative theology
in its own right is metaphoricaldiscourse distinguishing God from all beings.
Individual Denials and the Denial of All Beings: The case of denials,
which articulate God's transcendence, is more complicated logically than
the case of assertions. If one says that God is both power and truth, one
avoids any confusion between God and thing or concept, since no thing or
concept that exists in a particular way is both power and truth. If one says
that God is neither power nor truth, however, one has not excluded much:
21"Power":ibid., 11.953c; "truth":ibid., 7.872c-73a.
22Rorem, Symbols, 89. Although the "symbols" in the title of Rorem's monograph suggest
material images for God, such as those discussed in chapter 2 of Celestial Hierarchy, Rorem's
analysis applies equally to non-material, conceptual names, such as those in Divine Names.
Hence I prefer to speak of "metaphors."
JOHN
N. JONES
361
God could still be a "lion," a "drunkard,"or several other things.23 One can
use denial (dctaipeotc) adequately to distinguish God from beings by making
contradictory denials about God, denials that cannot both be true of any
being. Thus, as Dionysius writes in the conclusion of Mystical Theology,
God neither "lives" nor is "lifeless," neither "possesses speech" nor is
"speechless."24 This way of speaking is unusual, imparting to Mystical
Theology its paradoxical character. It does not, however, imply that one has
abandoned all rules for speech about God. It is only the case that God is
both y and not-y because other statements about God are true without being
negated in any way; the equivalence of y and not-y does not hold for all
y.
One can also deny all possible names of God simultaneously. In the first
chapter of Divine Names, Dionysius writes that:
since the union of divinized minds with the Light beyond all deity
occurs in the cessation of all intelligentactivity, the godlike unified
mindswho imitatethese angels as far as possible praiseit most approenpriatelythroughthe denial of all beings. Truly and supernaturally
after
this
blessed
that
it
the
discover
is
union,
lightened
they
although
cause of everything,it is not a thing since it transcendsall things in a
mannerbeyondbeing.25
This passage is central to Dionysian negative theology. It shows that the
highest articulation of God that humans can achieve is through "the denial
of all beings" (8td trc av vcovT3v
There is noth6v d0tpOVO pc<o).
This
for
the
all
denial
of
ing higher.26
high regard
beings has a close
in
the
from
parallel
following passage
Mystical Theology:
I pray we could come to this darknessso far above light! If only we
lacked sight and knowledgeso as to see, so as to know, unseeingand
unknowing,that which lies beyondall vision and knowledge.For this
would be really to see and to know:to praisethe TranscendentOne in
a transcendingway, namelythroughthe denial of all beings (t&a Tijc
TCOv
OvTov doatlpoecOX).
mdvTcoV
362
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
JOHN N. JONES
363
beyond the God who is reached through the denial of all beings. This
passage, therefore, does not mean that the highest God is beyond denials
considered as a whole. Here iCavdoes not mean "all together" but "each":
the highest God exceeds what any individual denial expresses. Although the
denial of all beings adequately and unambiguously expresses that God is
not a being, individual denials do not do so. This is the first main point of
this study: there is a difference between individual denial(s) and the denial
of all beings at once; this difference is central to Dionysian theology.
This difference underscores the ambiguity of individual denials and the
importance of using them correctly. Dionysius elsewhere implies that denials have both an ordinary sense and a sense appropriateto God as transcendent.32 Individual assertions and denials, therefore, are inadequate for the
God spoken of in terms of "the assertion of all things, the denial of all
things, that which is beyond each assertion and denial."33 Divine Names
2.641a may illuminate another phrase in the conclusion of Mystical Theology: "[The Cause of all] is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it."34If consistent with
the previous passages, this phrase does not mean that one does not employ
assertion, and neither does one employ denial, since one must deny all
beings of the highest God. The phrase means that God exceeds what can
be expressed by each individual assertion and each denial.35
The Subordinate Role of the Assertion of All Beings: For Dionysius,
the highest God is correctly known or sculpted through the denial of all
beings, through multiple denials not conjoined with assertions.36On purely
logical grounds, Dionysius might have given the assertion of all beings the
same status, since assertions together suffice to distinguish God from paraphairesis of all beings, agnosia, and henosis are not successive moments. They are simultaneous.
Although Vanneste rejects the idea of temporal succession (Mystere, 49), his discussion
of logical succession still introduces a division not found in the text.
32Divine Names 2.640b.
33Ibid., 2.641a. Here, Luibheid and Rorem translate inv as "every."
34Mystical Theology 5.1048b.
35Thisreading shows other apparently contradictory phrases in the corpus to have a straightforward meaning. For instance, in Mystical Theology 3.1033c, Dionysius discusses how to
"deny that which is beyond each denial" (Complete Works: "every denial"). Despite its paradoxical appearance, this phrase means simply that Dionysius will show how to employ some
kind of aphairesis to articulate the transcendent God, "that which is beyond every denial."
This is done through the denial of all beings.
36This denial applies to the three persons of the Trinity as well (for example, Mystical
Theology 5.1048a).
364
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
JOHN
N. JONES
365
366
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
JOHN
N. JONES
367
368
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
JOHN
N. JONES
369
E SculptingGod: a Reinterpretation
of TheMystical Theology
In light of the previous discussion, I shall attempt a summary of Mystical Theology. This short treatise opens with Dionysius's address to the
selon le pseudo-Denys [Paris: Aubier, Montaigne, 1954] 206-7) understands the negations of
Celestial Hierarchy 2 as quite similar to "monstrous," dissimilar images for God from scripture, such as eagle or drunkard. Both fall short of God, but at least both leave the intelligence
unsatisfied, so that the mind knows not to dwell on them as adequate representations of God.
In my reading, Dionysius juxtaposes negations and monstrous images not because they have
the same status but because negations are the rationale for the value of dissimilar images.
Dionysius's God is indeed "ungraspable." If one must use images, therefore, it is better to use
images that are less likely to appear adequate for depicting God.
59In other words, as Celestial Hierarchy 2.141a in particular shows, Dionysian negative
theology requires that some predicates are not conceptual.
60According to Derrida, Dionysius wishes to gesture to a hyperessentiality beyond predication, negation, and conceptualization ("Denials," 74, 77). I would respond that, for Dionysius,
negations proper are so stripped of conceptuality that they do not risk delimiting God.
370
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
JOHN
N. JONES
371
it.66 The conclusion of Mystical Theology, that God is beyond each individual assertion and denial, serves an aesthetic and a logical function. It
shows that in Dionysius's view no more carving (denial) is necessary.
Moreover, by repeating the language of chapter one, it shows that the
project of (non-)predication announced in chapter one is completed.
Nonetheless, the work of sculpting this statue may not be as finished as
Dionysius believes. To some, the stone remaining on the pedestal appears
indistinguishable from the stone pieces carved away. Artists taking Dionysius
as their master may both appreciate the beauty of his creation and wonder
if it must be sculpted still further, and what form, if any, would represent
its consummation.
66C. E. Rolt, trans., Dionysius the Areopagite: "The Divine Names" and "The Mystical
Theology" (8th ed.; London: SPCK, 1977) 195 n.1.