The Complete Book of Defenae Weaponry

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DEALING

TECH FIREPOWER:

lt's Fast

Furious

Finall

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KEVLAR \

HELMEY=

COMBATON
AMERICA'S
DOORSTEP
Will Central
America
Spark WW III?

IEYIID RHETIRIC
The Trans-Atlantic Cruise: Challenge to the Alliance.
By John Tillman
housands of Europeans have
taken to the streets to demonstrate
disapproval o f their governments' decisions to dep loy Amer ican cru ise and
longer-rang ed tactical ball istic missiles in Western Europe to counter the
new, highly capable SS-20 IRBMs being deployed by the Krem lin to the tune
of one a week fo r over six years now.
Signs of an ti-Americanism and

Whether you feel

deployment fuels the arms
race or makes meaningful
reductions in theater nuclear
armaments more likely,
depends on your view of
Russian psychology and
goals.
Kremlin disinformat ion are easily
traced in the motivation and argu men ts
of some groups actively fighting the
Euromissiles. Still , most opposition
A U.S. Army Pershing II missile test
launch at Cape Canaveral. The Pershing
II is the only ballistic missile with a terminal guidance system that incorporates an
all-weather radar-correlation unit which
compares the live radar return with a prestor ed radar Image of the target area.

T()MA
ON TARGET: 1And attac:k
TOMAHAW~ntionallY armeda are1ntorced
HAWK con:\le approachel e ot a warecru\1e "'':tructure, thectrnente 111and,
concrete ted on San et. The n,\11lle
t,ou1e, 1oca e warhead tel r ed iubrna
durln& a '~ed trorn a ~ur:!n\a coait,
wa1 1aunch southern a c1emente 11
nne ott t e coa1t ot san ck n,\ss\on
cro111ed thflfteW a \and ::h degree ot
land, then target wlth a
wa1 n,ore
itrikln& th;he n,\11\on ftow;oMAHAWK
accuraCY \lel wlth the
Matchtnl
than 400 "'1erraln con~r~ n,\sslle to
u1\n& ~';) sy1tern to ~ 01g1tal Scene
(TER!;.rget area an!,a:or (DSMAC) to
the
Are Cor
et
Matchln& 111\le In on tar& ad \nstalled In
xero the :'ventional warhhed n,\s11es 11 a
The eo K sea \aunc e

ror11 FAcrs

springs from the genuine fears of disPara_te Peop/es living in a cramped

cont,nent With a history of horrible
wars Who fee/ they Jack comp/ete contro/ over their own fate. Yet governments of the Western democracies
have risked being voted out of Office
(though none has been) to stay on this
controversia/ course.

Why Use Cruise?

The main function of the Euromissi/es is Politica/ and symbo/ic. Their
dep/oyment announces not that we are
Planning a Preemptive strike but that
the Western alliance Will not allow the
Soviets a monopo/y on any c/ass of
nuc/ear weaponry. The missi/es Show
continuing unity ot Purpose among the
NATO governments. They are a form of
commu~ica tion easi/y understood by
the Sov,et leadership, though some
Europeans
read
them. fear the Krem/in may mis-

ain have foregon e independent nuc/ear

armaments, and German contro/ of the
missi/es wou/d have provided the
Krem/in With more grist for its Propaganda mills. Germany is still not we11lik_ed in some corners of Europe, an
att,tude KGB disinformationists have
cashed in on by dubbing the GLCM the
German-/aunched cruise missi/e.
The military rote of the Euromissiles is as mob,Ie, hence /ess vu lnerable, longer-ranged, tactica/ (theater)
Prompt reta/iatory,or counterforce (nuclear alert) weapons. This means they
Wou/d ?e used against key mi/itary
targets 1n the Btocs rear that required
fast, accurate and re/iab/y-penetrating
attack as soon as lhe Soviets had
mounted an assau/t on Wester.r,
Europe.

Tomahawk 's two land attack computeri:ted aids to navigation are compared. o.
SMAc (Digital Scene Matching Area C orre/ation) Provides high/y accurate t erminal guidance for the conventiona/ land
attacl( Tomahawk. TE:RCOM (Terrain
The Pershings Wou/d attack hardContour Matching) is used by both nu.
Their tactica/ app/icalions are aJened, sma11 or mobile targets that
most secondary, bu t lhey do strengclear and conventiona/ land attack misneeded to be destroyed within minutes
si/es Periodical/y to correct errors in their
lhen and modernize NATos theater
for taclica/ reasons or before they
basic !ne_rtia/ syste_m. This Updating g ets
deterrent forces. The U.s. Air Force
the miss,les to the,r targets with a minimoved. Their most Obvious app/ication
(~n d Army, in the case of Pershing II)
mum of deviation from a low./eve / flig ht
is for hard command and contro/ cenw,11 operate the missi/es, Which unfo r Path Pre-programmed to take advantage
ters. but lh ey cou/d also direct1y
tuna te/y has made fearfu/ Europeans
of
natura/
terrain cover and to avoid
hosti/e
air defenses.
lhreaten any SS-20 launchers wecou/d

nervous. There really was no alternative. All our mi/itary allies except Brit-

::;,o~::~,~;~~:~::t~~t~~:::~~ E

locate WhiJe standing still, for instance

cated on San Cl~m;~MAHAWK detona head detonates

e 1)Explosion
TOMAHAWK
mlj'~j
Photo of
~.:.~
lb. """
" " ' ~!bris, lndwllng ,on,re 0 : , :::~~:~ t:~~l:g":1te, whe,d det~
(nose
m t 4) .......
of t I the
air.
5) Heavy
pact of targe
hundreds of fee f f:et in the air.
0
being scatter
d hundreds o
nates b e Ing scattere

ed

"N'~"o1D

A General Dynamics Tomahawk cruise

missile flies low over the Utah T est and
Training Range during a test flight.

to reload . GLCMs would be assigned

more vu l nerable or fix ed targets such
as airfields, temporary or "so ft er" command, control and communications
centers. fi eld HQs and resupply or
attack staging areas. Thus cruise missiles help to conserve much more expensive strike aircraft and their irreplaceable c rews, and to supplan t those
lost in the first wave o f the Soviel
onslaught, prosecuted according to
Red Army doctrinewit h maxim al ferocity.

ls No Cruise Good Cruise?

Opponents of NA TO 's decision to
deploy Tomahaw ks and Pershing ll s in
response to the SS-20s eil e three general arguments. These are that the
Eurom issiles are preemptive first strike
weapo ns, that th ey increase c ivi lians
risks of exposure to deadly nuclear
weapon s effects and th at th eir deployment escalates the arms race.
The ground- launched Tomahawks
are tactical missiles. This means that
their programmed ta rgets do not incl ude strategic objectives. They could,
however. be reprogrammed, so must
be considered co unterforce weapons.
since they are capable of destroying
hardened strategi c targets su ch as
ICBM si lo s an d co mmand. control and
communications cen ters.
But "counter force capab ility " is
only a necessary , not a sufficient. qualification for a firs t strike weapon .
Cru ise missiles are unqu estionably too
slow and probably too vulnerabl e to air
de fenses to be used in a preemptiv e
first strik e. in which any del ivery tim e
over 30 minutes and su ccess rate short
o f 90% co uld be suicidal. Th ey are
retal iatory (second strik e) weapons.
and as such actuall y a stabilizing factor
in n uclear arms equ ations.
lt would take th e 96 G LCMs
schedul ed for deployment in G erm any

52

A General Dyna mics/ U.S. Air Force Tom ahawk Ground Launched Cruise Missile
(GLCM) is fired from its operational mobile launcher.

fou r tim es longer to reach Soviel ICB M

si lo s th an it wo uld U.S. ICBMs
launched from Ari zona. In any case,
th e 464 To mahawks in Western Europe
cou ldn 't be used by themselves agains t
th e tho usands o f strategic targets in
the Soviel Uni on. and we don 't have
anywhere near enough oth er counte rforce warheads to augment th em .
Similarly. although Pershing ll's
are fast and unsto ppable. hence usable

in a preemp tive strike. th ere are far too

few o f them to moun t such an attack
alon e. Th ere are at least 2400 primary
strateg ic ta rgets in the Soviel Union,
abo ut 1900 o f which wo uld requ ire two
counterforce wa rh eads each to be destr oyed reliably. In th e entire U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal there are presently only 900 ballistic coun terforce warheads.
Eve n with all sch eduled Pershings

Soviet and American cruise missiles are

shown appro ximately to scale and in order of appearance. SCAD is the targe t
drone from whic h the Boeing air- launched
cruise missile was developed. Some
major new Soviet deployments are not
displayed- AS-6 , SS-N-14, -22 , and -21 ,
th e latter a long-range strategic crui se
mi ss ile.

d eployed. we'd still have only 1008

" first strike" warheads. That's su bstantially fewer than one fourth o f th e
number wed need for a comprehensive
strategic counterforce at tack . let alone
th ea ter targets like SS-20s and the
short- and medium-range (560-mile
maximum) rockets (FROG s. Scud, SS12. SS-2 1. SS-22 and SS-23) that are
capab le o f leveling Euro pe. north
China and Japan.

In recent years Red Army

defe~tors have been trying
to persuade Western
analysts that the Soviets
would begin an attack on
NATO with nuclear strikes
against both military and
civilian targets.
The 27 au t11orized MX missiles and
one or two Triden t II su bs that might be
qeployed by th e end of this decade
would add on ly 654 balli sti c count erforce warheads (with 900 improved
Minuteman III and 108 Pershing II warheads) to our arsenals. still less than
40% th e number needed for a comprel1ensive coun terforce strik e o n th e
Soviel Union. In fact. wed still come up
short even in th e unl ikely event that all
100 proposed MXs were actually bui lt.
Clearly. th ese developments are meant
to strengthen our retaliatory capabi li ty
rath er than to launch a d isarming first
strik e against the Soviel strat eg ic
forces .
The Sov1ets have about 5000 more
effective coun terforce ICBM warheads, even though the U.S. has few er
primary strategic targets - abou t 1600.
o f w hich 1300 would ca ll for two warhead s. They also currently have 11 55
IRBM counterfo rce war heads. SS-20s
are th eater first strike weapons back ed
up. unlike ours. by all the co unterforce
ICBMs anyon e could ever want (the
Soviets are neverth eless building two
new varie ti es of counte rfo rce ICBM. 1n
vio lation o f SAL T II ). SS-20 is less
accurate than Pershing II . but still able
to tak e out hard targets.

The Soviet SS-20:

A Triple Threat
The three-warhead SS-20 began
life as a mobil e ICBM . th e SS-16. lt was
traded away under SA L T II : only later

CRUISEMISSILE BACKGROUND
ASl_~
SSC-2b~
SSNI ~
SS-N- 2 a ~
AS- 2 ~
AS-3~
SSH-3c '~

SS-H- 7 ~ =
AS- 4~==:>

---- SSC-h

U.S.S.R.

: : :

AIAOOR

= 1 :r:>

: :

1955

~RE~

AS-5 '6=== _::,,ss-H- 9 ~ _ I [ : I >

SSH-2c i,;,~,--=-=--

SS-N-J a ~

1960

1965

19/0

1915

=:J

REGULU~ 11~ 011:=-

t::c_;:; -1-
SNARK
~

~
HOUND DOG

ALCM/SCAO ~
HARPOON ~
TOMAHAWK

{:s I

AGM 868

t==-=

= ==
AGMI09h,:==

UNITED STATES
Cl1a rt cou rtesy o l U.S Jo int Crurse Mrssrle Program Of l1 ce

A ground-launched Tomahawk leaves an

entrenched TEL during a test firing.

did we determine that it was less than a

success as an ICBM. Mi nus its first
booster stage. however. it does make a
fine IRBM - accurate. mobil e and the
o nl y M IRVed th eater missil e in th e
w o rld. lts range- 3000 mil es-means it
can still be used intercontin entally. lf
deployed to the sacred bord ers of the
Soviet state. let alone tl1ose of puppet
regimes. it can reach from K enya to
Quebec and Kuala Lumpur to Cal iforn ia.
Even as present ly deploy ed. abou t
two-th i rd s of the 120 Asian SS-20s can
still hit targ ets from Sicil y to the H ebri des without being moved. The
o thers - based in th e Soviel Far East ca n reach Al as ka. In response to th e

Euro missiles. the Kremlin has threatened to deploy some in northeastern

Siberi a to let people in Seattle know
how it feel s tobe eig ht or ni ne minutes
down range o f a modern IRBM. The
feeling will not be too novel for any of
th e 120 millio n Americans six minutes
removed from the Soviel sub-launched
balli stic missiles (SLBM) on subs patrolling our coasts.
Although only live percen t as fas t
as Soviel counterforce ICBM warheads. with fifteen percent the range, a
third the explosive energy and twothirds th e odds o f survival, our less
numerous lo ng- rarig e cruise missi les
do have greater accuracy. lt is the
combinati o n of accuracy with relative53

ly low yield that makes some people

! hink were planning to light a wa r with
these "Su rgical" weapons.
The 1100-mi le range Pershing II is.
as the on ly bal l istic missile with terminal guidance. also exceptionally accurat e. This and its short !light time to
targets in the Soviel Union distu rb the
Kre mlin. Tl1ey say it can hi t Moscow in
six mi nutes. We say it goes neither that
fas t no r that far (1400 miles from Germany). Th e comp laints might be more
compelling l1ad the Soviets not been
able to hit Washin gton that quickly with
SLBMs eve r since 1960. Short of moving our capita l to North Dako ta, th eres
not hing we ca n do about it.
The Kreml in and Wes tern opponents o f the Euromissiles argue that
Pershing s grea t accuracy makes it

I
At a slig htly later stage of another test
from the sa me facility, a Tomahawk is
fired from under camouflag e cover.

What 's News About Cruise?

By John Tillman
or 40 yea rs cru ise m1 ssi les have
been in Europes backyard.
Th e first successfu l fil ght o f a
cru1se mi sslle. the German V-1 . occurred on the day before Cl,ri stmas o f
1943. Between Ju ly, 1944 and May.
1945. e1ght thousand of th ese buzz
bombs we re f1 red at England-an ave rage of th1rty a day. They killed about
2500 people. An additional l ive thousand
of H1tl er's first "Reprisal
Weapons" were launched against the
Low Cou ntnes and o ther Eu; opean
nations. In the inte rven ing four decades Europe has rarely been withou t
cruise m 1sslies.
A cruise miss1le is a p1lotless aircraft armed with chem1cal high ex plosi ves or a nL1clear wa rhead. (Some
argue th at manned suic ide planes
qual ify.) Th c V-1 was a jet b ut the
majority of subsequen t cruise missi les
have been rocket-propelled. Over th e
years they have used a variety of guidance systems and been laun ched from
every imaginable land, sea and air pla tfo rm. Their rang es have run from under
15 miles {the earl iest Soviel anti-sh 1p
m1ss1le. SS-N-2 Styx) to an estimat ed
1800 (the new Soviel strategic SS-N21).
The key distinctio n be tw een cruise
and o ther kinds o f misslles ,s the ir flight
charactenst1cs. Other long- range selfgu1ded m1ss1les are balilstic, that is
the1r !light paths descn be a parabolic
arch up and down. This trajectory is
mathematically similar to but usually
more arched than the paths o f artill ery
shells. bullets. arrows. baseballs and
rocks. All th ese pro1ectiles are subject
to gravi ty acting on an initial imparted
velocity and eleva tion, as adjusted by

54

air resistan ce and other environmental

factors.
A cru1 se m,ssile, on the other hand.
behaves like an airplane. lt obeys th e
laws of aerodynamics. The technical
defin it1on of a cru ise mi ssile is a gu ided
m1ssile that uses aerodynamic litt to
of fset gravity and propuls1on to counteract drag. l ts fl,ght path does not
need to be level. although it usually is.
The cru ise does have to stay with in the
atmosphere with its engine burning
co ntinuo usly, unlike an intercontinental ballist1c m issi le. wh1c h enters space
and whose boosters burn ou t and d irectional motors fi re ,ntermittently.
Even wi th the recent devel opmen ts
in computeri zed continuous guidance
that make cruise m1 ssiles so appealing to Ho llywood. the distinguishmg
feature remains t11at they are aircraft.
They fly rather than rise and fal l.

The Cri.lise Through

History
Turning from phys1cs to history .
let's now fo llow the forty-year development of cruise miss1les.
The V- 1 was a flying bomb 25 feet
long with a 16-foot wmgspan, powered
by an ex ternally-moun ted pulse-je!
rated at 740 pounds o f thrust. The
Tomahawk cru ise missiles curren tly
being deployed by NATO in Europe are
four feet shorter with JUS! over half the
wingspan. powered by an 1nternal 600lb.-thrust turbofan jet eng 1ne. The V-1
was usually launched from con crete
ramps on th e ground, bu t later also
from H ein kel 11 1 bombers. The Tomahawk comes in ground- and sealaunched ve rsio ns, but we've also begun deploy1ng a,r-launched cruise
missiles.

more threaten i ng to Moscow than their

SLBMs are to us o r their SS-20s to
Europe. Th e excuse is th at Pershings
can be used "surgi ca lly'. wit hout ri sking " collateral damage" -death to civi lians and destruction of c ivi lian property: thu s. th ey are more likely tobe used
than less accurate Soviel weapo ns.
Collateral dam age unacceptabl e
to German Green Part y spokeswoman
Petra Kelly probably isn't to Red Army
spokesman Marshal Ogarkov. SS-20's
greater indiscrimin ate terro r value may
be in his v iew a plu s, as much as he
wou ld regret the unnecessary co llateral destruction of facto ri es that co uld
be transported to Russia alter the conquest.
The second argumen t is founded
o n European fears of havi ng more poEarly V-1 s ranged only 152 miles,
lat er 250. The conven tionally-armed
anti-sh1p Tomahawk travels 250 to 300
miles. 1tcarri es 1000 pound s of mo dern
high explosives. while th e V-1 warhead
weighed 1870 pounds. V-1 s were over a
ton heav1er than Tomahawks. but cost
less. So mu cl1 for forty years o f research. development and progress.
Bes1des nuclear explosives, the
most signif1can t technical developments have been in guidance and consequently fli ght alt1tude. V-1 had direct1onal gyroscopes and cou ld home in
on radio or rada r bea ms, bul term inal
guidance co nsisted of shutti ng o ft its
engi ne- not a very re l1able sys tem.
Fewer th an a fi lth of the buzz bombs
a1med at England are believed to have
fou nd the1r intended targets, bu t as a
terror w eapon they worked fine. To mahawks, however. if they perform as
advertised. are highly accurate bo th i n
conven t1onal and nuclear roles (more
so in th e former). They use two older
and two newer guidance systems tha t
permit sea-skimming or groundhugging, terrain-following flight, w hile
the V- 1 cru ised hig h oft the deck.

N uclear Explosives:
What a Difference a
Device Can Make
But 11 1s nuclear explosive devices
more than a'dvances in guidance or
propuls1on that make the fun ctio nal
and po liti ca l difference between the
missiles of 1944 and 1984. Thewarhead
o f a Tomallawk has been estimated to
y 1eld 200 kilotons. The ac tual figu re is
classi fied, but this would be about
200,000 times as energetic as th e ton o r
so o f chemical h1g l1 explosive carri ed
by V-1. Yet the nuclear warhead weighs
only around 250 pounds. lts 1explos1ve
power-to-weight ratio is thus abou t 1.5
mill ion tim es greater. Since weapons
ef fects are not a linear funct1on of

tential nuclear targets in their already years ago there were 6600, not countmilitarily-crowded backyards. Aren't ing French warheads.
the 29 GLCM flights (16-missile operatFrom this standpoint. there are
ing groups) and 36 Pershing II platoons now fewer endangered backyards than
(three-missile units) going to be just in 1980, and still will be in 1989 even if
that many more grounds-zero for Sovi- all the Euromissiles are deployed.
et nuclear detonations, or at least pre- Among the weapons to be retired are
cision air strikes with high explosives? the Pershing la missiles being replaced
Won't they lead to thousands more one-for-one with Pershing l ls. (The old
and new versions are the same size, but
deaths "if deterrence fails?"
But Europe already groans under Pershing 11 has over twice the range. lt
seems improbable that the new missile
the weight of 9000 land-based, tactical
nuclear warheads deployed on inter- could go three times as far as the old
mediate, medium and short-range one, despite advances in rocketry since
bombers or strike aircraft and ballistic its initial deployment in 1962. This
and cruise missiles. free rockets over suggests that the Army is telling the
truth when it says the missile can't hit
ground, artillery shells and mines.
NATO's 4200 amount to one for every Moscow.)
23 square miles of West Germany,
In recent years Red Army defecwhere most are located. Just three
tors have been trying to persuade
:

.,'

<

Western analysts that the Soviets

would begin an attack on NATO with
nuclear strikes against both military
and civilian targets. lf so Greenham
Common. Mutlangen and other Euromissile bases are already nuclear fi rst
strike targets, along with the major
harbors and airports of the continent.
which would be destroyed in order to
seal Europe oft from American aid.
Small comfort. but another good reason for deterring Soviet designs on
Western Europe.
lt had been ttiought that NATO
would have to resrt to tactical nuclear
weapons first in an effort to stop the
avalanc;:he of Soviet armor. three times
more numerous than our tanks. But the
defectors and some Western analysts
(Continued on page 82)

; - : : , '

energy, however, and b.etavse jus~ this con;try afteb the, V-2 incident
world anctclo.s~:toathird(over150Q)o( .
the individual. rpis~iles dep!qycep;.cir~". i ,.... ': .
. abc;,ut haU. the. energy Qf a nuclear made .if.appare,:1t)19.w vulnerabl~ our
.expl_psion.goes.,n,o airs.hc,1ck. Tonia,: high~f!,Y,i,;19cr.js~)fli~silesdt,th'~tperi:.. .$oviet.This.~ha,re.J1Jcl}Cdecre~~~/J1Q.r,''':/J\'.''..,,
. hawk'would be ,"only" onJheorder.of od-Reglus I a'rfr.fll, Snark;.Matador . that somany countries, inclu.diQtj,Bra... _;';'\",
1000 times as blast effective as V-L
and Mace,.....:were to contemporary Sozil and Israel, have ~tarted makirig ahti... So while ..pryise missiles anted.ate viet air defen~es~. f.\dvances rn ballistic
ship crui~e missiles.. France has. 2000
nucl~?.r weapons by 19, months, it 'l{,8 . missHe!ech_nology,::al.~o leftne>r,eal role l;xo9ets .. on order .i11,the.~~kE;tg(:'.f=trv1s. :. , \''./.
the cpmbination'.of nuclear explosives _fortlie'!Jes$ 'Cap&bl~"Cfise'''i'tti~s.ile.s Of .. Sheffield,'; t~~ -destrqyer fatall~'\Q~fn~ .,,;;:,;{\
with rocketiy and jet propulsion that. the 'Eisen~ower :A'dministrtion. The
aged. during the.Falklands War',b~H:t'n: _:::::.
made these already fairly cheap bomb only U.$. cruise missi.te to survive in
Argentine air~launched .Exocet_~ l)ntil. ~
delivery syst~m~ even mor~ attractive . orjnveriJryJroajth~eraofEJvis Pres:Tomahawk came. along, howev~r.th,~
. to. post:,War superpowersd,9oking .tor . ley te>);Jvis qsf~Ho.,Was Hound Oog, . Soviet Union had~. monopoly, on)on.g, .:./
tt1emost bang per buck andrubble per an afr:-launched .<;rise rpissile carried. range cruise missiles.
. .. .1 i. "
rble.
as a stand.:.off weapon on B:-52s. Four
So the brand new Soviet SS.;.N-21
h d d
fit d. 1 d
t1
Strategie Cruis'e missile and our. Sea.
a.sun1. 9r8e0.. were.s ' ep oye as recen Y . launched Tomahawk have decades of
Po.st-War. D.evelopm...ent:
What Difference a .

n~va1 t11st_9ry beh.ini;f the111.

'' ... Decade Can. Make
Soviet Developments:
launcheq; cruise .(<3tCMs):. were. c1lso ..
Cruising Right Along
developed East and West .during the.
1950s, but especially ~ast.. Ail Soviet
Most work in the 'Fifties, however,
The Russians neverstoppeddevelrocket-prQp!3lled and most jet aryti;~QiP,, .
centered on ballistjc missil~s. The $Q:,missiles come in grpund-laun~h<;?d.ver-
viets were anxious to develop long~ oping .and deploying swarms, of seasions.
range rockets. capable of. delivering skimmirig cruise rriissiles for anti-ship
Our GLCMs developed in the sos
strategic warheads in order
offset use. In a way, they make up for their
were Matador and Mace. Matador, deour ,advantage .in ma11ned bombers. lack ofaircraftcarriers. Soviet anti"'.ship
Our efforts in this direcHon were. leh missiles. are both. roqke!- . and jet- . ployed ov~rseas in 1954; was a sul;>so~- .
surely until after Sputnik, the artificial propelled and have been deplyed in
ic, air-bre~thing gui_ded missile; but .it
satellite launched by the SovietUnion shore batteries, on bombers; surface
relied on ground statiqns for directiori.
in 1957.
The long_er-rangE!d rytace, deployed in
vessels and subs sinc~ the early 'Sixthe early ,'60~. had self-.contained guid:..
j'he first operational ballistic mis~ ties. The non-nuclear, transonic SS-Nsile was also the second German Re- 2 Styx was the firstsea.,-skim,mjng.misance, first electronic and later inertial. .
prisal Weapon~the V-2, a single- . sile to sink a ship io combat-the Israeli
Nuclear-ar:med, its top speed exceeded .
stage, liquid-fuel rocket deployed destroyer Elath, i)it by the Egyptian
650 mph, and it ranged over 1000 miles.
about the same time as V-:-1. Had V-2 navy in .1967.
Like Tomahawk, it qould be fired.from
been armed with a 270-lb. nuclear de:mobile launchers,
rocket"'.boosted.
Over the yeqrs, Soviet .anti-ship
on take-off arid, despite a' sorr1ewh~t
vice rather than c1 metric ton of chemi- missiles have 'g6tten more ,. soFhistical explosives, its range would have cated, but still terid to be large. Algreater diame~er arid fixed sl.an\ed .
beeri similar to that of Pershing II, the though they have decreased in length,
wings, generally modern in appear-:intermediate-range bal 1.istic missile they have steadily incr~fiseq in range,
ance. The. radar area correlation sys.;.
(IRBM). being deployed alongside and most can no.w be nuclear-armed.
tem that provides Pershing ll's te,rmi11al .
Tomhawk by NATO to counter the
guidanc;e - is essentially an improve.; ..
As recently as 1976 we had no antiment on Mace's.

SS-20 IRBMs . a.imed by the Soviet ship cruise missiies. 1n 1.977 we deUnion since late 1977 against Europe ployed HarpoQn, a 15-foot long radar-
Now the groun9-launched ~ruise
and Asi~. V:-2 wc1s five fe.et shqrter than guided .. rocket.,-propelled conventional
missile is back in vogue, reviyed by
SS-20 but thirteenJeet taller.than Per- missile with. a ma)<irn~m rf;mge of 60
guiqance :Systems aHowing lo.w flight.
shing ti'. the rarige of. which is about a miles; The first lqnger-ranged anti-ship
The Tomahawks scheduled to be .de.:.
third that of the Soviel .IRBM.
. .
ployed iq Europe this year a_re more
Tomahawks joined the fleet this year.
. T.here wasalso a vogue in the midversatile weapons than Mace, due to.
. About half ( a dozen or more) of all
Fiftie~ for cJuise missiles~. lt ended .i.n . the antt:-ship crui~e mi~sile,typ.e&.in th~ improved .capapilities'.
,, . / .

.rq~n,d(

to

w~s

i . . ;':/'. \,
"' ;~ /,:;

55

',;' '

AEROBATICS IN
GOMBAT
(Continued trom page 15)

w1th excess speed and climb or dive to

sa fety. Nex t he stopped and re-assessed t11e situation. As did many successful aces. Hartmann recognized the
unnecessary hazard of the traditional
drawn-out dogfight.
1f you can matcl1 t11e enemy and
shoo t him down by complete surprise.
the match of aircraft has little to do with
the engagement. II the enemy goes
defensive. the question becomes.
" Does your aircr aft have the ability to
conclude tl1 e action?" This decision
requires complete knowledge of the
enemy air craft's perlormance.
II you find yoursel f on the defensive. you must fly tor your life and use
every advantage your machine has. In
EI Salvador ou r Mustangs were up
against Corsairs with 20 mm cannons.
The Corsairs. 1 might add. had !arger
yvings th an our Mustang and would
turn ve ry w eil : however. our Mus tangs
were fas ter. Our tactics were to use
what World War 11 ace. General John
Meyers . cal led a "slash attack." Starling from a higher altitude. hopefully
out of th e sun. we would in i ti ate a
diving attack from behind. shoot q uickly and cl imb back to altitude. avoiding a
turning light.
Since engagement scenarios are
almost unlimited, thi s is only one of th e
hoped for setups. In our small theatre it
was also practical to use decoy aircraft
such as a low-flying B-26. Because we
knew we would engage small numbers
of aircraft our leader wanted to eliminate t11ei r leader immediately and concentrate on the scattered formati on.

Maneuverability:
The Harrier Experience
Q . Th1s brings up the issue of the
maneuverab1/ity ot the "vectored thrust
aircra ft ... the most notable of wh1ch at
this time is lhe Harr,er. This a,rplane.
by changing its nozzle directio11. can
mechan,cally achieve var,ous flighl
charac1enst1cs thal will g,ve it the advant ago. Da we now have. in lhe veclored lhrust aircraft. a machine which
can incroase lhe vanoly of manouvors
over /h at of conven/Jonal aircrafl?
A. The Hawker Harriers are loved
by their pilots. Not o ne ai r-to-ai r loss
occured in the Falklands War du ring
combat. Tl1e Argentin e pilots usual ly
avoided turning figh ts due to fuel
shortag es. When th ey did mix it up. the
Harrier would vecto r 1ts thrust downwa rd . allowing it to p1vo t around 1ts
pilch ax is and turn in side anythin g.
Commander Sl1arky Ward o r 801
Squadron engaged and shot down

56

This Boeing concept of a future supersonic cruiser and rnan euver fighter is
capable of long operational ranges
through application of advanced aerodynamic, structural and propulsion t echnologies.

tl1rec completely different types of aircraft (Mirage III. Pucara. and a C-130
Hercu les). He described the huge.
four-e ngined C- 130 as h1 s mos t d ifficult target. Aft er taking missile tiits it
flew on. trying desperately with its
large wing to turn inside t11 e Harrier
which buzzed around like a l1ummingbird behind. Cannon fire would cause
huge fl arning pi eces to tear off . making
it q ui te hazardous as tern. On his third
pass he was able to shoo t olf the
vert1cal stabi l1zer. spinning the giant
into th e sea.
Q . This now dogf,ght,ng techniquo ra,ses a quos11on as lo whether a
dogf,ght should ever be entered. I have
hoard from people ot d1fforen1 backgrounds /hat a dogtight 1s always an
error: !hat a proper a,r-to-air killer
should approach fast trom a blmd spot.
f1re. and depart: and /hat any llme he
gets 11110 a tur111ng operat,on he has
mado a mistako. ls that a true statement? ff ,t is not. is it possiblo for the
aerobat lo induce a dogf,g/Jt in which
h,s Opponent 1s not domg what he
intendod to do?
A. l t seems to me that dogfighting

against a Harrier would not be a good

idea. We now have fighters like th e F14
that can engage aircraft head-on at
ranges of over 100 miles. and squeeze
oll s1x Phoenix m1ssi les for s1x separate
ai rcra ft. N ot exactly a dog fi g l1t. but a
figl1t nevert11eless. so wl1ere do you
add the poocht? 1 figure that if both

pi lots are aware of each other and both

start turning . a dogfight is on . Mistakcs
always seem tobe apart or tl1e m ilitary
formula and. if they result 111 a dogfight.
tl11nking about what you might do 1s
worthwhil e.
orrensivcly. sin ce the scenari os
are unlimited. th e big question is how
far i nto the f1ght you should go. lt is
usually considered w1 se to have a safe
exit in mind.
After every recen t war tl1e prevailing tl1ought has been that strategic
bombing will become th e nex t phaseof
air warfare and dogfighting w ill fade
into history. As a result every tim e th e
flag flies the fi gl1ter pilots have to play
ca tcl1-up ball. Wl1en t11e Vietnam War
started. the Ai r Force did not even have
a reasonable f1ghter until it borrowed
one from the N avy. Lo and beho ld.
1egardless of the p hi losphy advanced
for the perrect rnissile air light. tl1er e
were dogf ights.
The state-of- the-art 111 aerial warfare is certainly being advanced 1n th e
M1ddle East. There is a long history of
dogfight ing in the region . The United
States is cu rr ently developing the advanced tact 1cal fi ghter for the 1990s. lt
will have f1rst- look first-shoot weapons
systems along with guns. wh1ch suggcst that dogfights of some natu re wi ll
be around for awl1il e.

Gulf of Sidra lncident:

F-14's In Action
Q. Woutd you care to comment 011
tho 1982 Gulf of Sidra mc,dent?
A. Two of our F-14 Tomcats" en-

gaged two Russian-bu1lt Sukhoi a1rcra ft appl'Ox 1mately nose-to-nose. As

tl1c four aircraf t approached each
other. a Libyan pilot fired a missile
wh1ch missed As the a1rcraft passed.
the two Tomcats executed a 180degree turn to the left. pu tt1 ng them
behind the L ibyan aircraft.
The Am erican crews l1ad beCc:n
through the advanced "Top Gun" program. and l1ad th e add 1t1onal advan tage of the variable sweep wing of the
F- 14. At this point. with the two Sukhois
pursued by tl1e two Tomcats astern. the
right hand L ibyan elected to break rigl1t

fo r an tl -airc raft defense. l ts tu rret is so

fast. and its fi ri ng system so accurate.
that its crews are confident !hat they
can shoot out o f th e air any helicopte r
which pauses lang enough to launch a
missile.
With the new g u n w ill come an
over-pressure cabin system permitti ng
the crew to operate in a poisoned
envi ronment w ithout protective clothing .
lt has become standard practice
for the leftist press to rai l agains t all
American military eq uipment as overly
expensive. badly designed, excessively
vulnerable, unreliable, inefficient or
any comb ina ti on o f the above. The
Abrams tank. however, has survived to
embarrass its detractors. lt is not only
as g ood as advertised, it is be tt er. mu ch
better. The men w ho use it are in love
with it-and to an outsider it is awesom e. My own major enthus iasms have
always been shoot ing and driving. In
the Abrams tank I discovered the ultimate shoo ti ng machine, in combination with the ultimate driving machine.
Would !hat Churchill could have enjoyed my experience with the 11th
Cavalry an d have rea lized what has
evolved from his b rainchild!

RED FLAG
(Con tinued from page 45)

tal ked . and eventually he go_t t he ear o f

Gen. Robert J . Dixon, then commander
of the Tactical Ai r Command, General
D ixon knew a good idea w hen h e heard
one. (He was later awarded the Collier
Trophy for establ ishing Red Fl ag.)
Within a very short peri od o f ti me. thr ee
or fou r mon ths. the first Red Flag was
held at Nellis AFB in November 1975.
Thal was almost ten years ago, but
Red Flag 75-1 was almos t identical in
concept to contemporary Red Flags,
showing how right the idea was. Every
Red Flag exercise then. as now, fo ll ows
this typical pattern :

Scenario
A scenario is w ritten by the Red
Fiag intelligence peop le concern ing th e

Air-t o-air top left view of the F-16 launching one of the AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles attached to its wings.

82

imminent l1 ostil ities betw een "Red ,"

"the bad guys" who live on the western
side of the Nellis range, and "Blue." the
allies. defend ing th e neigh bo rin g eas tern part of the range.
Most Red Flag exercises last six
w eeks. bu t the "Players." the Red Flag
participan ts. are rotated every two
weeks. so the war effectively lasts only
ten days w ith no fl yi ng taki ng place on
the weekend. Each Pl ayer flies ten
missions. the first mission always a
fam iliarization ride o rienting the new
Player to the Nellis range.
The Blue Forces consist of the
"core uni!" and detachments from other un its . The Red Fo rces consis t o f F5Es from the 64th and 65th Aggressor
Squadrons at Nellis. as well as detachmen ts fro m oth er air un its and the
simulated SAM and Antiaircraft artillery (AAA) batteries out on the range.
Each mission is coo rdinated by a
d i fferent "warlord." Before and alter
each mission there is a mass briefing of
a ll partici pating Players, as weil as
individual briefings among the flights
and even face-t o-face debriefings wi th
th e Red Players.
Red Fl ag is not a no- notice dep loyment d rill. The Players can know a year
and a half ahead that theyrescheduled
to come to Red Flag. A surprise invitation to come to Nellis wouldn't serve
any real purpose ot her than to embarrass th e gr ossly unprepared. Tha t
wou ld violate oneof t he unwritten rules
of Red Flag , wh ich is to take advantage
ot every action , every dep loymen t, and

learn something from it.

Red Flag is availabl e for S10.95 from Presidio Press. P.O . Box 892F3. Novato. CA
94948.

IS NO CRUISE 6000
CRUISE?
(Con tinued from page 55)

see this as nonsens1cal. The Soviets.

once they decide to take so big a
gamble. won t mess around. In th is
view, their 50.000 tanks are to occupy
surrendered territory and continue
holding down Eastern Europe alter the
West is terri fied into capitu lation.
The Euromissiles are mobi le. so if
there were su fficient wa rn ing of att ack
for them tobe w idely dispersed. additional Europeans wo uld be killed and
in jured in Soviel attempts to des troy
them. This. however . assumes the
Soviets know where the launchers are.
Certainly the dispersal of Tomahawk
fl igh ts and Pershing uni ts would in
case of war lead to th e destruct1on o f
more woodland and perhaps small
to w ns than wo ul d otherwise l1ave happened . Yet Germany. th e Low Coun-

tries. Sicily and Bri tain are denselyset tled regions in which any nuclear
con flict will cause hideous rum over
vas t tracts.
The third argument maintains !hat
deployment needlessly escalates the
arms race, scares the Russians and
increases the likelihood o f war.
The Euromissiles are obviously
not a sign ifican t escalalion in terms of
number of nuclear wa rheads. There are
now about 55,000 stra tegic and tactical
nuclear weapons in th e arsenals of the
superpowers. About 30.000 of these
are deployed, the rest stock piled. Thus,
the 572 Euromissiles consti tute a one
percen t escalation in total warheads
and less than two percent in deploymen ts. In fact, we are now d isman tl ing
as many warheads as we deploy, so
these new, accurate weapons constino
escalation
in
tute vi rtually
num bers - in the usual sense of the
term.

Euromissiles: Belligerent
Reaction
Or Bargaining Chips?
But do they escalate East-Wes t
tensions? T o a certain exten t, the missiles are intended to put pressure on
the Krem l in. The decision taken by
NATO in December of 1979 to deploy
longer- ranged and more accu rate
theater missiles was "two-tracked." lt.
alter four years. no progress was made
on the negoti ation track to ward riddi ng
Europe of long-ranged, accurate mob ile missiles (at that time possessed
exc lusively by the Sovie ts). then NA TO
resolved to start down the o ther track
by deploying comparable weapons of
its o wn. There was none. and in 1983
the alliance began to keep its ward. The
goal remains the same. however- no
such weapons on either side. Now even
the hope of balanced reduct ions seems
distant.
During those fo ur-year negoti ations the numberof SS-20 warheads
grew from 600or 700 to 1100. The initial
escalat ion in both numbers and capabil it ies was Soviel. NATO wait ed six
years to respond - from late 1977 to
December of last year. Even now. more
new SS-20 wa rheads are being deployed than Euromissiles. and th ere is
no thought of matching Soviel numbers one- for-one.
Finally . let us remember tha t the
U.S. offered to forego all Euromissile
deployments in exchange for the Soviets dismantling the SS-20's. The Soviets refus ed , and Reagan was seen as
inflexible by Europeans. strangely
more worried about 572 wa rheads tobe
pointed east against the enemies of
freedom than the approxi mately 850
now aimed at them from European
Russia.