17

The Historyof
FlightSA2s5
On 27 November1987Flight SA295was scheduledto deparifrom
T ; i o e i s C h i " n g K a . S h p k A i r f n r t " t t J : 0 0l o r P l a i . a n c ;A i r p o r t .
Maudtius,on a scheduled internationalflight.Adverseweatherand
l l - pl . r t p" r r i v d o
. ' a c o n n p u t i n g ' r rd" "hlta y p d " p a , r u r"en d t h p" i r -
crafttook off an hour and 23minuLes late.On boardwere149 000 ka
n ' ' U e l . 4 12 2 " l q n f o " g g " g ea n dc a r g o .1 4 0p " r . o n g o . 'a n d " c r " r ^
of five flight crew membersand 14 cabin crew members.The cal-
culatedflight time was 10hours:14minutes.Take off was normalin
all respectsand for thefirst few hoursof theflight routinecommuni-
cationswere madewith Hong Kong radar and flight information
c€niresat Hong Kong, Bangkok,Kuala Lumpur, Colonbo, Cocos
l . a n r l sr n d M " u r i t r u s .
At 15:55:18a roulinereportwas madeto Springbokfohannesburg
RadioStationIcodename ZUR],the internationalradio commLrnica-
tionscentreadjacentlo SAA'Sbaseai Ian SmutsAirport. The flight
cre\,vconfirm€dto ZUR their take off from Taipeiat 14:23,ihaLthe
Heiderberg r,r'asflying at flight lev€l 310 and that arrival time at
Maurilius r'las estimaiedat 00:35.ZUR's radio oDeratorinformed
F r i ; n l5 A 2 q ht h a l h es , l e r l i r , p" ,l l i n g . 1 . . r nl S t L C A L l .. j ! \ h i ,h
lhe radiostationcouldcall an individualaircraft,was unserviceable
and requesteda flighl crew call at 18:00.

THE MISSINGZURTAPE
ZUR cam€underheavyfire duringthe publicheafingot the Board
of lnquiry into the Helderbefgaccideni.It was qLrestioned on its
failurc to contactthe Heiderbergh'henth€ llighl crer'\'hadnot made
th€ ZUR requ€sted call at 18:00,on the lossof ihe ZUR tapeh'hich
rvould have recorded communicationbetween ZUR and the
Helderberg and alsoon log entries.
Evidencewas given bir Eliennedu Toil, CommunicationsOffi.er
at ZUR, $'ho explainedthat ZUR'Spurposewas'. . . to assistour
aircraft,includingany otherjnternationalaircraflon the domestic
and int€rnationalroutes,r\ith taking do\,\,npositionreporlsand
also1oassistiftherearean-vtechnical snagsthai wecouldpossibl-v
pass onlo engin€ering, and anythineto assjstthesepeople.The
SELCALsyslem,t€stifiedDu Toit,hadbeenout ol opefationtor two
 accidentA log bookas $e as
rrceksat ihe lime of the Iieidr:rberg
',"r,:::., ;;;l;;" "i"ir,zui
;",'j;il;;; "o"*'"r""yli:,1':,\:pJ"I'::
;; ,'' ;: '";'ir' ''-"' ' '".,'f-:-'fl "'r'':Ll,,h:lr,i:
' " , , ' ' n s' o , \ " I . d , ' o . h "
; J , ; ' + ; " " : ; : i:l : p , . - ; . , ; ;
6a,l'gonetu*t"
HelLlerLerr
5LrJ b'1"ll " ",B"Jt o{lnquir\l
,q':" "' sF!",:h-ou'
a ion that lhere \!as a
conlronted Du Toit \'vilh '
' ,n' i ' t, ," ; '. ". : sj r rpul,".ril _l l" :
*gei?t,
: : i ; . " ; . . "- :.r : i . " "r hr. a, "\ "-, b" m hrt
Jt,h,rnr"l,',ru h'ul Tll " ", " -
:l'ii;hN"l "; , " a ' . " t " . ' p , n $ n " " r ' , t t " , l- l : : -
c.oss.:xanlnairon
ir"" *","-.""".i"J r'r""aisapPeafedrhe €nsuins

t , , ' f u ; j .l r " \ ' 1 ' t n , \ \ l d ; o t ' \ ' | ' ' r

; " , . ; . L "" , , . \ F " , , o $r \ " " l ' : '"i "" n' 'Pl'"n'P
" n l L " t r ' rrFr'\-'l rhpripe
i,,,,'.r' ,",'',,'|''""
"'l; :::"ii;l i;'i""'Tl
l.i;lr,l \ o
;r s ' u r ' "r ' " " ri:,i''
;ll, ":;,.,i' - $ r ' ' ir'on)arc
.'r".'"g "i
i'l;., in it e\cludinsrhe
oleniries
i,." il ^i it r'".r^ r-g" llumber
r e t e f e n c el o L h i s r i o n v e r s a i i o n
forser'sir'
n,, i";" o"" *-'ra l"!e rob{ian aNlullvsi'od
- 'n'it
, !DuT'|'r 'r' rl r r p , l r ' r ' ,r| ' p r h '
nl'\...,i

ll;:i;',;j;';; l;,1'ii: :,' iD-'Jl'1"- r ' '

:" nilY'l';
i'rmhrm
i . - , i . ' r " . , r - , . , . ,rp ' , , , , n , | " r ' \ u i
f
iii:i" il ;;"','i,,',:,,'il,;;, H,l:::lnml;lllt:tli:illil'"ti;
-";;:t;:ll ),,1' :ll.1'l':::il:';,i:'il':f i;T":'ll
::,J: r r r ' ' le"r"ttun'
"
ji:,r::ll
:lir;iji;,;:i' 'dr::l::
.-*",'"i,i i," r' E"l"rr''"Ir"L'
l lii'"'::, ;:,';1, 'l'''," tll'l'l
. , . r , , ' i " . r ' r i ' t - ' r " r i Ir b o L rl - F n ) '
"r'-'ta
v",, r,* .*t""'*"" 'r'hi''iJ;iiliii,:ii:;l;
l:
askrrs
Lr o i h e r a i r l i n e s i o u s e lirerf
ihrt 0oNeci?
'l ). r' L h C ' L r P c t . " 'l':rrr'
, ' r ' " . " , ' i r ' ' . " t ' " ' r ' ' ' L o r r rl -
(-'hoifllrdriWhrl is vour ans\teri
 1 q _

Dick Well I did not do that, sir. As I said I approached

the
Duly Offic€r.
Soutlwoodj Thatis what you shouldhavedoneimmedlalely.
Dick: Yes, lrut I did not do that.
Southwood: And someone-anda half to two hours later we
have a repealof this scenario,thar no communicarion is

In cross examinationAdvocate C.E.Puokdn. SC, appearingon be-

half of SAA, madea clearerdefinitionof the drgumentswhich Ad
vocateSouthwoodhad beenaitemptinsto lead.Puckrinsaid that
Southwoodwas arguingthat the Hclde.berghad in facl calledZUR
to enquireas to the nalureofthe cargoin thEhold.ZLIR,saidPuck-
fin, did not hold flight cargo lisis bul radio operatorDick did
conlirm that the Dut)' Officercouldhavehad accessto those'.. .
a malterof metres.. .'away.
The same log book of that particular night carried entries with
intervals of far mor€ than two hours lrom other SAA flights.
fohanneste Roux,Duty Otticerat ZUR who oameon duty aL17:00
on 28 November, thentestifi€dthat h€removedbothrapes(Number
'1.which recorded
SA2S5'sdeparlurefrom Taipei,and Number2l
for safestoragelapes are kepLlor 30 days beloferc usel.These
tapes,said Le Roux,were handedoverto ConnieBooysen.SAA'S
Assistanr Manager:Flight Opefations and in chargeof Communi-
cationson his request.The tapeswere eveniuallyimpoundedby
DCA. Two weeks afterwardsBoovseniold Le Roux ihat iape
Number 2 ion which the communicationbetween the Heiderberg
and ZUR would have beenrecordedlwas ihe wrons tape and had
beenplacedin lhe wrong numberedcontainerand was therefore
Iong sinceused for re recording.This happeneddespitea complex
inlormationrecofdinBcard systematLached to eachtapeand con-

The protractedcfossexamination oam€to anendwhenAdvocaie

SoulhwoodurgcdLheChairmanandmembersofthe Board'.. . thai
this line of examinationcometo an end . . .' and staiedthar anv
possiblelink to ihe.ause of the accidentwas'tenuousio say rhe
1 " J " .1. . . l u . l : F
, C p r V . - r u g a r e h . s p r n m p pt r m r \ . i n r .
_20

At about 22:23Captain Uys calledMaLritius Air Traffic Control and

advisedthatthepositionofhis aircraftwouldbe070oEastandFlisht
. e q a v ea l u r r h e ri n d i L d t i o on l i h e
L p v e l3 5 0 \ 4 i l h i ns i x m i n u t e sH
flight's progress by informing Air lraffic Control that the Heider-
berg would rcach position 0650East at 23::t2.He confiroed that
positionprogressat 23113t27, a minute and 27 secondsbevondthe
e s l i m " l e dl i m p .A s i t c a nb ea c c e p l etdh a t t h ea i r c r a f w
l .s on track.
theposiiiongivenas065oEastwould havebeenatlatitude15040,12,,
South 6nd position 0600East at latitude 18057'54"South.

Fligit poth of ihe Helderberg,tie route whicfi S AA..rirctofrfly frcm"toipei,

Republicol Ciina, to JonSmuts Airport. TheHetd€rbergirod compleiedthe
Iorgestsiretci ol tie jou.ney wfien it plungcd inlo the Indion Oceonno.ih
eostof Mouririus
(Adapted from ihe Citizenl
 rrF

W.d , !!-.
: ;,

The Stena Workhorse, o lorge moto. vesseldesignedto support offshore

o lield work, wos ihe mothership which suppo ed the ROV operoiion
dnring the searci ond recove.yphose.Its largeo penfit wo*deck wos ideal
for the temponry stowogeof debris brought to ,he deck by lour cronesAl
 :

t!;j

T r , - P n . \ b - n r l p p t a J " dI , o n .I / . ( F ' l d V l o ^ r i r - p . L r p D \l ,. t n " t . t

t^ L\alt,n
d 4 , 0 r- d . r ' , J - er o b r . u t d a u n . o t L - d u , . . t n er c , n ,e 6 p " yj , . 6 " 6 r , . 1 , .p , , 1
'Jill ',', u'd'" 1orFrJu i' o " "t t :' "
"i' ,' :,",' ,'." ;f o;;':
IDCA]
 2.t _

Routineradio transmissionsbetweenthe Helderbergand Mauritius

ended at 23:-14.The nexi radio communicationwith plaisancewas
" 1 , 2 ' l : 4 8 : \5\1l - p nC a p t a i rU y s , a l l e dM d u r i t i u sA i r T r a l i r rC o n . r o l ,
v \ h p r ed i r l t d r l i r c o n l r o l l e\rd L o o bh n o d a b a , u sw d \ o n d L l ! . T h e
official Lranscriptionof the plaisance Air Traffic Controt Lipe as
n r . s e n l p db y l h e D s p " 1 , m . r 'o l T r a n s p o , r o t h F B o a r do l l n o u i r \
[ ! \ i r h M R U d e n o r i n g\ y ' a u r i t i Lasr d 2 9 5 d p n o t i n gt h e H . i d p ; b n , ;
cockpitlreadsas follows:

TIME SPEAKERRECORDEDINFORMATION
23148:51 295 Eh, Mauritius, Springbok Two Nine
Five.
23:49:00 MRU SpringbokTwo Nine Five,eh,good
morning, eh, go ahead.
23:491O7 295 Eh,goodmorning,we have.eh,a
snoke,ehp,eh,problemand we're
doingemergency descenlto level one
five, eh. one four zero.
23:49:18 MRU Confirm you wish to descendto flight
teveloneI0ur zero.
23:49:00 295 Ya, we havealreadycommenced, eh,
due to a smokeproblemin the
aeroplane,
23:49:25 MRU Eh, Roger,you are clearto descend
immediately to flight level one four
zefo,
23:49:30 295 Roger,we will appreciateif you can
aleri,eh,fire, ehp,ehp,eh, eh. . .
23:49140 MRU Do you wish to, eh,do you requesta
full emergencv?
23.49148 295 O k a yJ o ek, a n 1 ' y .. . v i r o n s . . .
23:49.51 MRU Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance.
23i49i54 255 Sorry,go ahead.
23:49:56 MRU Do you, eh,requesta full emerqencv
pleasea full emergencv?
23:50:00 295 Allirmative.that'sCharlieCharlie.
23:5O:O2 MRU Roger,I declarea full emergency,
Roger.
23t'OiM 295 Thank you.
-22
J
.|

23:50r40 MRU SpringbokTuu Nine five, Plai:am4

23:50i44 295 Eh, go ahead.
23:50:46 MRU i"q-,t""t fou" u.t""t Positiondcc
and your DME dlsianca
23i50:51 295 Sh,'ie hav"nt gottheDMEYeL
2 3 : 5 0 : 5 5 MRU ih, nog"" "nd -vouta"tt'"1
please.
23i51r00 295 Eh,sayagain?
23r51:02 MRU Your actualPosjtioni
2 3 : 5 1 : 0 92 9 5 Now we'velosi a lot of electrics'we
haven't got anything on the aircralt

23i51:12 MRU Eh, Roger,I declarea lull

immediatelY.
2 3 : 5 1 : 1 52 9 5 Affirmative
23i51:18 MRU Roger.
23:52:19 MRU Eh, SpringbokTwo Nine
ha\e an EchoTangoAlla
please?
23:52:30 MRU SpringbokTwo Nine
23152t32 295 Ya, Plaisance
23i52:33 MRU Do vou havean EchoTango Alfa Ph
sanceplease?
23:52:3ti 2 S 5 Ya. eh,zerozero.eh tsben t €e
23t52t4l MRU Roqer, zero zero three zero' tltilt
2 3 : 5 2 r 5 0295 He-v loe, shr.rtdown the oxYgen
231-12:52MRU Soiry saYagainPlease
00r01:34 2S5 lUnintelliEiblctransmrssron'l
00:01:3ti 295 lUnintelligibletransmrssron l
00:01:45 295 lUnintelhgibletransmlsslonl
00:01:57 295 l U n i n l e l l i g j b lt er a n s m i s s i ol n
00i02::10 295 lUninlelligibl€trdnsmrssLon l
iUnint€lligible transmission l
00r02:14 295
"""'9'
[Carrier wave onty.]. - o Niaf
00i02:25 295
00:02:38 295
;"":'sp;i;cbok rrr

00:02:4'l MRU
l::ii,*.*, I
i';1"::,\i:1''\i:
againplease,s.]Y-dgarn.
00:02i43 2 S 5 Were now si\l\ tive mlles'
00:02:45 MRU Confirm sixtYfive miles'
 23

OO:02i47 295 Ya, affirmativeCharlieCharlie.

00rLl2:5{l MRU Eh, Roger,Splingbokeh Two Nine
Five,eh re you'rereclearedfiight level
live zero.Reclearedllight levelfive

00:02:58 2 9 5 Roger,live zero.

{J{Ji03:Uu]\,IRU And, SplingbokTrvo Nine Five copy
aclualu,eatherPlaisancecopy actual
r,vealher Plaisance. The wind oneone
zelo degreeszerofive knots.The vis-
ibility aboveonezerokilometres.Ancl
w-" havea precipitationin sightto th€
north.Clouds,five oclasone six z€ro
zero,on€octafive thousandfeet.
'I
emp€rature is lv,'entytwo. two t\,vo.
And the QNH onezeroone eighthec-
lopascals,onezero0neeightover,
0{l:03:28 2 9 5 R0ger,one zerooneeight,
U0:0:l:ll1 MRU Affirmative,€h and bolh runwavs
availableif you wish.
00i03:43 N,IRL] And Tra'oNine Five,I requestpilot's
lntenlr0n.
00:03:4ti 2 9 5 Eh rve'dlike to track in eh,on eh one
three.
00:0ll:51 MRU Confirmrunway on-"four.
0{l:03:5,1 295 CharlieCharlie.
{10:0llr5fi N,1RL] Affirmative and you'recleared,eh
dir'€ctto FoxtrotFoxlrot.You report
approachingfive zero.
00r0,1r02 255 Ka-r.
00r08r00 MRU T$,o Nine Five,Plaisance.
00:08r11 MRU SpringbokT!vo Nine Fiv€,Plaisance.
00r08:35 \IRU SpringbokTrvo Nin""Five,Plaisance.

Additionalhistoryof the llight tas r.etrie,.'ed

from the miraculously
.e(jovefedCockpitVoiceRecofderlCVRl.Onlv lhelast 1 minuteand
14seconds of thc 30minuter-"cordingcycleof theCVRn'hichfe{rords
cockpil (ionversationlr,as reasonablvclear..Sullicient data '"vas
recover""dduringthc analysisol the CVR tapeto determin€that ihe
-24

cockpitcolversationpriorto the souldingofthe smokewarningbeli

'Joe',
referredto in thetranscripiion'
had 6eenon generaitopicsonly.
was the senlor flight-engineet Guiseppe Michele Bellagarda The
followingtranscript is onceagaintheolficialversionaspresented by
DCA to the Board of InquirY:

TIMEIN
MINi]TESAND
SECONDS
FROMSTART
OFTAPE ORIGIN CONVERSATION/REMARKS
2813'I Fire alarm
bell IStoppeda]mostimmediately.l
28:35 lntercom
chime
28:36 Ioe What'sgoingon now?
28:37 ! Huh?
28..40 Joe Cargo?
28142 loe It cameon afierwards.
28145 IStrongclick sound.]
? And where is ihat?
28:46 ? (Clicksound.l
28148 Ioe Iust to the right.
28149 ! Say again[?].
28i52 Ioe Main deckcargo.
28157 loe Then the otheronecameon as well.
I've got two,
29:O1 Ioe ShallI lget/push]the [bottle/button]
overthere?
291O2 la,
29:05 Captain Leesvir ons die checklist daar hoor'
IDoubleclick sound.]
29:08 ? Die buik [?] se lig is af [?].
29:09 Huh.
[Two click sounds.)
29:11 ? Checkiistmain deckcargolight
29i12 Captain Ja.
Isoundsof movementcan be heard
with clicks and clunks.l
 2i

2g:33 Captain [CURSE]dis die feit dat altweeaan-

gekomhet - dit sleurmens.
29r36 Intercom
chime [Whi]ecapiainis speakins.J
29:38 ? Aag shit.
29:40 ||I [800Hz Test Tonesigna]
commences,l
29t41 Captain Wat de donnergaannou aan?
{Saidin a surprisedtoneof voice.J
29tA {Suddenloud sound.l
29146 (Largeand rapid changesin ampli-
tude of test tonestarts.J
29:5'I (Endof test signal,very irregular
nearend.l
29t52 IEnd of recording.]
Accordingto ihe 30-minutecyclecockpitvoicerecordingwhich had
no timecoding,muchof thefirst 28 minuteperiodwas uninte)ligible.
TwenLy-eightminutesand 30 secondsafter commencement of lhe
recordingcycle,the smokewarning bell sounded.Somebody,prob-
ably lhe piloi,inquiredwhereit was from and receivedthe replv that
i' r.ame l r o m i h p m a i r d c rl . , a r 8 o T
. h en i l o rt h e na s k e df o r t h r , h p 'k
list to be read.Some30 secondslater somebodvon the flipht deck
u r l c r p d" n o ; t h . T h i s w o r d w a s l o l l u v \ " db \ t h ; L V R 8 0 0 " H 2T e s l
Tone and endedin a warble at 29 minutes52 secondsafter com-
mencement of the recording.It is assumedthat the recordedcockpit
conversationhad commencedvery shortlv after communication
with Plaisanceai 23:14:00 and endedshortlv after the communica
l i o n w i l h M aLf i l i u sA i r T r al l i ' . C o rt r L ,dl , 2 3 : 4 8 : 5 1 .

THE'ALTERNATIVE'
TAPETRANSCRIPTS
As had beenthe casewilh olher internaiionalair disasters,lhe
contentandcorrectness oftransoriptsofthe Heldcfbcrg's CVRrape
as well as the MauritiusAir'l'rallic Controltape wefe disputed.
Olficial and non-otficial versionslvere debatedbeforc LheBoard of
Inquiry.Readtogelher thoughpefhapsnot at all iimesvalid -
lhe transcriptsfill in cfucialgapsin ihe historyof thedisaslerflighi.
- 2Fj

DCA contracted[Brigadier]Dr l-eendertJansen,formerlv with

lhe ForensicS.ienceLaboratorl'and now a privateconsultanl'Lo
transcribeboih th€ CVR and Air Tfaffic Control lapes He madeuse
'machine'
of a self designe.l Ihis own modesi descriptionl]to
transcribe ihe CVR recording. uses a computer-tvpememory to
lt
."ioin tn" lnfo.t"ation und is coupled to a tape recorderin such a
wav ihal lhe momentthe Stopbuttonis pressed, the machinego€s
into LepeaL mode of the past 4 ol
seconds tape to faciLitat€iran-

hiter exte.sive oompuier analysis synthesis m€thods an'i

computerfilleringmethodslansenlinallv' compl€iedthe transcrlpt
.n.l;lescribedth; CVR transcripLion as as goodas one coLrl!l
o o s s i Lr ' e " rn d, I p r F o F d s o "n'' pl' ul Lhp
b r n " o " " ,' n e r n s h i ' h l ' P o " ' r ' d l ' o a " ur"'' "nd dtt"
..-..l ,rr "no " . p c o n . l
i n s h r \ n - u n d .rli". "^ro. " d
onra,es,h.'o r " . o s . o lw l ' r r h l ' " h a d r n d o u u r ' d b o' u" l l f o '
ihe transcripl ofthe Plaisance AirTfaffic Controltapehe madeuse
o a L o m D u t por. F r , udi h u m s . \ o ' o i n r o \ \ n h p l i r\ u r l l
t"n*n.:n,c,.'F\dmndr'on b P o f p n F B ' d r do l I n q L ' r \
m i n i o n e o r l - "h e w a - , J - \ , n L F o nd " r e a n s d l " d . r | \ F d i l t P r F n l
"-l
\ r - r e nd D a ' l r o m ' \ " ' u l h F L " p l an d r d ' h " ' p n r " rI l i g h " n g i
o n " " c i R r a p " . O n " o .h p s " r -p r F d o F a r n pb - r l h P o h " r \ $ F r p
nol identifiable
One of lansen'sintereslingcommenlson the ATC lapewas.thal
'. . . there'wasair llcwin:l in or out of the cockpitwjlh quile a loud
noise. .. il he [the caplain]had an orygen mask on thesenorse
'
soundswouLdnol be as loud lon ihe tape]'
Durins lhe publicheafingof the tsoardot lnquifv all ot the CVR
tapeaninot only the last l minuteand 1'1secondswefe debated
V l l r , ' : " C " ' , t M " . g " . i r r " r p o n " Fr u d p l p dL , vr \ P 5 ' u r h A f r i L d n
A i t \ d \ s P i l os q s s o , . " r i ornu l " d n " r l h FC V R l r d n s r r i o' a 1 -
-
r " . - n g i n , o ' . " i " n o a 1u r e l vp ' c ' o n a l r r e ' r d
n Fi - \ " . , i H d to n . n u d n o rL e n , d " p u L , l ' r .
The fulliecordingwas th€relorconlv plavedto lhe membersoI
the Boardand the transcript of lhe lasl 1 minule and 1il secondswas
feadoui in DUblic
what DCA notedas unintellisible conversation'in the ifanscfipt
of the Air Traffic Control lape \aas amplified upon bv Jansenin his
€videncebefor€ ihe Boatd of Inquirv. The recordinSs on the Arr
iraffic ContLoltape from 00:0ir34 to 00r02:1'r were generallv
acceDtednot to hive been intended for Maurilius but to be
uninienlional lransmissions on the VHF channel intended fol
cockpitcommunication.
 27_

Jansens interprelalionof the unintelligible

conversation'
Iwhich
DCA couldnot concurwilhl included:

00r01r34 295 PlaisanceSpringbokTwo Nine Five,

w€ ve openedih€ door to seeif we 0an

01r36r00 295 : . .
00:02:10 295 Prcssuretwelve Lhousand.
00:02::14 2S5 . . . genoegiF . . . and€rstekan ons vlLrg
verongeluk. lTranslatedby Jansenas
'.
. . is enough.. . otherwisewe could
havean a.cidenl. . .'.1

Dr Lecnd..t.ld,sen. o
loferstc erpe.i, wos
.r0ni.ocied 1o tr0ns.rribc
ih.r..co.diDgs oI li.l
cocApll vonxr fecorder
0 n o c o r v r i . s - . o r i o nD e
tween tlre Hclde.bers
fJjsi,r crew drd Ai.
T.dlfic Contro/ or Pldj
s a n . e A r r y r o d .A l t i r n r s
Ils inlcrp.ctolion of
c o n v e . s o l ( ) nc o n l l i c l e d
wrri tie opi"iims ol

Y0(rx,b Klodocdbus wds ri. dn

lrniini drnt(tl-". on dLrry 0r Plo;
sonce arrporl wh.rn coni.rct rvas
Josi r.1,ltl tld Hcld€.befs. He !r.rs
l i . l d n p . f s o n t o s p e r k l o l i r cc r c r ' .
I l . m j s j n l e i p f e t e dC o p t 0 i n U y s s
comnlunnidlnD th.i the Hel.lerbers
wos 65 nri/es Irun 'rs .exl cfieck
poinlosh.jng 6i nllesi.om Mau.i
lius. Tltr Helderberg wos ir loct ot
ilot s10geft firll 1,lrl lril.s froJn 1Ie

{Th{r Sta4
_28

In th€ statement of Ai. Traffic Controller Yacoob Khodacabus

preseniedto the Board,additional commentarynot noted by Jansen
was ins€rted,suchasl

23i52:51 295 I tell you pui down the oxygen ther€.

00102127 295 l o e . . . q u i c k l y. . . w e a r e . . . ? t h o u -
s a n d . . . o n g e l u k[ a c c i d e n.t.].

As regardsthe CVR tape,Advocate SouthwoodsubmirtedJansen's

tree'translationof the first 28 minutes of the CVR tape to the Board
only. Som€of that commentary however did come to lighr in the
public crossexaminationby AdvocateSoLrthwood of fansenand
may thereforebe published. This includedsuchCVRcommenlsasl
'11.22
.,.ons,.,andeas,,
'14102 l...we...otherwise
Who is going to cook?
14:05 Th€y are coming to felch him at around
midnight.
74:14 This is a good thing if you tell him that.

Further input as regardsconversationrecordedon the Air Traffic

Conlrol tape was made during the formal inquest by Roy Downes,
DCA's lnvestigator: Operationall

00101:34 2S5 We. . . position. . . We shouldbe okay.

00:01:57 295 Joe,switch up quickly. . .

The Helderbergcrashedinto the Indian Ocean at a position deter

minedto be about19o10'Sand 5go3B'E - roughlyai a point within
a triangle formed by theislands of Mauritius, Rodriquesand Carga
dos/SiBrandon- just after midnight,at about00:07.
 17
The Historyof
FlightSA2s5
On 27 November1987Flight SA295was scheduledto deparifrom
T ; i o e i s C h i " n g K a . S h p k A i r f n r t " t t J : 0 0l o r P l a i . a n c ;A i r p o r t .
Maudtius,on a scheduled internationalflight.Adverseweatherand
l l - pl . r t p" r r i v d o
. ' a c o n n p u t i n g ' r rd" "hlta y p d " p a , r u r"en d t h p" i r -
crafttook off an hour and 23minuLes late.On boardwere149 000 ka
n ' ' U e l . 4 12 2 " l q n f o " g g " g ea n dc a r g o .1 4 0p " r . o n g o . 'a n d " c r " r ^
of five flight crew membersand 14 cabin crew members.The cal-
culatedflight time was 10hours:14minutes.Take off was normalin
all respectsand for thefirst few hoursof theflight routinecommuni-
cationswere madewith Hong Kong radar and flight information
c€niresat Hong Kong, Bangkok,Kuala Lumpur, Colonbo, Cocos
l . a n r l sr n d M " u r i t r u s .
At 15:55:18a roulinereportwas madeto Springbokfohannesburg
RadioStationIcodename ZUR],the internationalradio commLrnica-
tionscentreadjacentlo SAA'Sbaseai Ian SmutsAirport. The flight
cre\,vconfirm€dto ZUR their take off from Taipeiat 14:23,ihaLthe
Heiderberg r,r'asflying at flight lev€l 310 and that arrival time at
Maurilius r'las estimaiedat 00:35.ZUR's radio oDeratorinformed
F r i ; n l5 A 2 q ht h a l h es , l e r l i r , p" ,l l i n g . 1 . . r nl S t L C A L l .. j ! \ h i ,h
lhe radiostationcouldcall an individualaircraft,was unserviceable
and requesteda flighl crew call at 18:00.

THE MISSINGZURTAPE
ZUR cam€underheavyfire duringthe publicheafingot the Board
of lnquiry into the Helderbefgaccideni.It was qLrestioned on its
failurc to contactthe Heiderbergh'henth€ llighl crer'\'hadnot made
th€ ZUR requ€sted call at 18:00,on the lossof ihe ZUR tapeh'hich
rvould have recorded communicationbetween ZUR and the
Helderberg and alsoon log entries.
Evidencewas given bir Eliennedu Toil, CommunicationsOffi.er
at ZUR, $'ho explainedthat ZUR'Spurposewas'. . . to assistour
aircraft,includingany otherjnternationalaircraflon the domestic
and int€rnationalroutes,r\ith taking do\,\,npositionreporlsand
also1oassistiftherearean-vtechnical snagsthai wecouldpossibl-v
pass onlo engin€ering, and anythineto assjstthesepeople.The
SELCALsyslem,t€stifiedDu Toit,hadbeenout ol opefationtor two
 accidentA log bookas $e as
rrceksat ihe lime of the Iieidr:rberg
',"r,:::., ;;;l;;" "i"ir,zui
;",'j;il;;; "o"*'"r""yli:,1':,\:pJ"I'::
;; ,'' ;: '";'ir' ''-"' ' '".,'f-:-'fl "'r'':Ll,,h:lr,i:
' " , , ' ' n s' o , \ " I . d , ' o . h "
; J , ; ' + ; " " : ; : i:l : p , . - ; . , ; ;
6a,l'gonetu*t"
HelLlerLerr
5LrJ b'1"ll " ",B"Jt o{lnquir\l
,q':" "' sF!",:h-ou'
a ion that lhere \!as a
conlronted Du Toit \'vilh '
' ,n' i ' t, ," ; '. ". : sj r rpul,".ril _l l" :
*gei?t,
: : i ; . " ; . . "- :.r : i . " "r hr. a, "\ "-, b" m hrt
Jt,h,rnr"l,',ru h'ul Tll " ", " -
:l'ii;hN"l "; , " a ' . " t " . ' p , n $ n " " r ' , t t " , l- l : : -
c.oss.:xanlnairon
ir"" *","-.""".i"J r'r""aisapPeafedrhe €nsuins

t , , ' f u ; j .l r " \ ' 1 ' t n , \ \ l d ; o t ' \ ' | ' ' r

; " , . ; . L "" , , . \ F " , , o $r \ " " l ' : '"i "" n' 'Pl'"n'P
" n l L " t r ' rrFr'\-'l rhpripe
i,,,,'.r' ,",'',,'|''""
"'l; :::"ii;l i;'i""'Tl
l.i;lr,l \ o
;r s ' u r ' "r ' " " ri:,i''
;ll, ":;,.,i' - $ r ' ' ir'on)arc
.'r".'"g "i
i'l;., in it e\cludinsrhe
oleniries
i,." il ^i it r'".r^ r-g" llumber
r e t e f e n c el o L h i s r i o n v e r s a i i o n
forser'sir'
n,, i";" o"" *-'ra l"!e rob{ian aNlullvsi'od
- 'n'it
, !DuT'|'r 'r' rl r r p , l r ' r ' ,r| ' p r h '
nl'\...,i

ll;:i;',;j;';; l;,1'ii: :,' iD-'Jl'1"- r ' '

:" nilY'l';
i'rmhrm
i . - , i . ' r " . , r - , . , . ,rp ' , , , , n , | " r ' \ u i
f
iii:i" il ;;"','i,,',:,,'il,;;, H,l:::lnml;lllt:tli:illil'"ti;
-";;:t;:ll ),,1' :ll.1'l':::il:';,i:'il':f i;T":'ll
::,J: r r r ' ' le"r"ttun'
"
ji:,r::ll
:lir;iji;,;:i' 'dr::l::
.-*",'"i,i i," r' E"l"rr''"Ir"L'
l lii'"'::, ;:,';1, 'l'''," tll'l'l
. , . r , , ' i " . r ' r i ' t - ' r " r i Ir b o L rl - F n ) '
"r'-'ta
v",, r,* .*t""'*"" 'r'hi''iJ;iiliii,:ii:;l;
l:
askrrs
Lr o i h e r a i r l i n e s i o u s e lirerf
ihrt 0oNeci?
'l ). r' L h C ' L r P c t . " 'l':rrr'
, ' r ' " . " , ' i r ' ' . " t ' " ' r ' ' ' L o r r rl -
(-'hoifllrdriWhrl is vour ans\teri
_20

At about 22:23Captain Uys calledMaLritius Air Traffic Control and

advisedthatthepositionofhis aircraftwouldbe070oEastandFlisht
. e q a v ea l u r r h e ri n d i L d t i o on l i h e
L p v e l3 5 0 \ 4 i l h i ns i x m i n u t e sH
flight's progress by informing Air lraffic Control that the Heider-
berg would rcach position 0650East at 23::t2.He confiroed that
positionprogressat 23113t27, a minute and 27 secondsbevondthe
e s l i m " l e dl i m p .A s i t c a nb ea c c e p l etdh a t t h ea i r c r a f w
l .s on track.
theposiiiongivenas065oEastwould havebeenatlatitude15040,12,,
South 6nd position 0600East at latitude 18057'54"South.

Fligit poth of ihe Helderberg,tie route whicfi S AA..rirctofrfly frcm"toipei,

Republicol Ciina, to JonSmuts Airport. TheHetd€rbergirod compleiedthe
Iorgestsiretci ol tie jou.ney wfien it plungcd inlo the Indion Oceonno.ih
eostof Mouririus
(Adapted from ihe Citizenl
 rrF

W.d , !!-.
: ;,

The Stena Workhorse, o lorge moto. vesseldesignedto support offshore

o lield work, wos ihe mothership which suppo ed the ROV operoiion
dnring the searci ond recove.yphose.Its largeo penfit wo*deck wos ideal
for the temponry stowogeof debris brought to ,he deck by lour cronesAl
 :

t!;j

T r , - P n . \ b - n r l p p t a J " dI , o n .I / . ( F ' l d V l o ^ r i r - p . L r p D \l ,. t n " t . t

t^ L\alt,n
d 4 , 0 r- d . r ' , J - er o b r . u t d a u n . o t L - d u , . . t n er c , n ,e 6 p " yj , . 6 " 6 r , . 1 , .p , , 1
'Jill ',', u'd'" 1orFrJu i' o " "t t :' "
"i' ,' :,",' ,'." ;f o;;':
IDCA]
 2.t _

Routineradio transmissionsbetweenthe Helderbergand Mauritius

ended at 23:-14.The nexi radio communicationwith plaisancewas
" 1 , 2 ' l : 4 8 : \5\1l - p nC a p t a i rU y s , a l l e dM d u r i t i u sA i r T r a l i r rC o n . r o l ,
v \ h p r ed i r l t d r l i r c o n l r o l l e\rd L o o bh n o d a b a , u sw d \ o n d L l ! . T h e
official Lranscriptionof the plaisance Air Traffic Controt Lipe as
n r . s e n l p db y l h e D s p " 1 , m . r 'o l T r a n s p o , r o t h F B o a r do l l n o u i r \
[ ! \ i r h M R U d e n o r i n g\ y ' a u r i t i Lasr d 2 9 5 d p n o t i n gt h e H . i d p ; b n , ;
cockpitlreadsas follows:

TIME SPEAKERRECORDEDINFORMATION
23148:51 295 Eh, Mauritius, Springbok Two Nine
Five.
23:49:00 MRU SpringbokTwo Nine Five,eh,good
morning, eh, go ahead.
23:491O7 295 Eh,goodmorning,we have.eh,a
snoke,ehp,eh,problemand we're
doingemergency descenlto level one
five, eh. one four zero.
23:49:18 MRU Confirm you wish to descendto flight
teveloneI0ur zero.
23:49:00 295 Ya, we havealreadycommenced, eh,
due to a smokeproblemin the
aeroplane,
23:49:25 MRU Eh, Roger,you are clearto descend
immediately to flight level one four
zefo,
23:49:30 295 Roger,we will appreciateif you can
aleri,eh,fire, ehp,ehp,eh, eh. . .
23:49140 MRU Do you wish to, eh,do you requesta
full emergencv?
23.49148 295 O k a yJ o ek, a n 1 ' y .. . v i r o n s . . .
23:49.51 MRU Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance.
23i49i54 255 Sorry,go ahead.
23:49:56 MRU Do you, eh,requesta full emerqencv
pleasea full emergencv?
23:50:00 295 Allirmative.that'sCharlieCharlie.
23:5O:O2 MRU Roger,I declarea full emergency,
Roger.
23t'OiM 295 Thank you.
-22
J
.|

23:50r40 MRU SpringbokTuu Nine five, Plai:am4

23:50i44 295 Eh, go ahead.
23:50:46 MRU i"q-,t""t fou" u.t""t Positiondcc
and your DME dlsianca
23i50:51 295 Sh,'ie hav"nt gottheDMEYeL
2 3 : 5 0 : 5 5 MRU ih, nog"" "nd -vouta"tt'"1
please.
23i51r00 295 Eh,sayagain?
23r51:02 MRU Your actualPosjtioni
2 3 : 5 1 : 0 92 9 5 Now we'velosi a lot of electrics'we
haven't got anything on the aircralt

23i51:12 MRU Eh, Roger,I declarea lull

immediatelY.
2 3 : 5 1 : 1 52 9 5 Affirmative
23i51:18 MRU Roger.
23:52:19 MRU Eh, SpringbokTwo Nine
ha\e an EchoTangoAlla
please?
23:52:30 MRU SpringbokTwo Nine
23152t32 295 Ya, Plaisance
23i52:33 MRU Do vou havean EchoTango Alfa Ph
sanceplease?
23:52:3ti 2 S 5 Ya. eh,zerozero.eh tsben t €e
23t52t4l MRU Roqer, zero zero three zero' tltilt
2 3 : 5 2 r 5 0295 He-v loe, shr.rtdown the oxYgen
231-12:52MRU Soiry saYagainPlease
00r01:34 2S5 lUnintelliEiblctransmrssron'l
00:01:3ti 295 lUnintelligibletransmrssron l
00:01:45 295 lUnintelhgibletransmlsslonl
00:01:57 295 l U n i n l e l l i g j b lt er a n s m i s s i ol n
00i02::10 295 lUninlelligibl€trdnsmrssLon l
iUnint€lligible transmission l
00r02:14 295
"""'9'
[Carrier wave onty.]. - o Niaf
00i02:25 295
00:02:38 295
;"":'sp;i;cbok rrr

00:02:4'l MRU
l::ii,*.*, I
i';1"::,\i:1''\i:
againplease,s.]Y-dgarn.
00:02i43 2 S 5 Were now si\l\ tive mlles'
00:02:45 MRU Confirm sixtYfive miles'
 23

OO:02i47 295 Ya, affirmativeCharlieCharlie.

00rLl2:5{l MRU Eh, Roger,Splingbokeh Two Nine
Five,eh re you'rereclearedfiight level
live zero.Reclearedllight levelfive

00:02:58 2 9 5 Roger,live zero.

{J{Ji03:Uu]\,IRU And, SplingbokTrvo Nine Five copy
aclualu,eatherPlaisancecopy actual
r,vealher Plaisance. The wind oneone
zelo degreeszerofive knots.The vis-
ibility aboveonezerokilometres.Ancl
w-" havea precipitationin sightto th€
north.Clouds,five oclasone six z€ro
zero,on€octafive thousandfeet.
'I
emp€rature is lv,'entytwo. two t\,vo.
And the QNH onezeroone eighthec-
lopascals,onezero0neeightover,
0{l:03:28 2 9 5 R0ger,one zerooneeight,
U0:0:l:ll1 MRU Affirmative,€h and bolh runwavs
availableif you wish.
00i03:43 N,IRL] And Tra'oNine Five,I requestpilot's
lntenlr0n.
00:03:4ti 2 9 5 Eh rve'dlike to track in eh,on eh one
three.
00:0ll:51 MRU Confirmrunway on-"four.
0{l:03:5,1 295 CharlieCharlie.
{10:0llr5fi N,1RL] Affirmative and you'recleared,eh
dir'€ctto FoxtrotFoxlrot.You report
approachingfive zero.
00r0,1r02 255 Ka-r.
00r08r00 MRU T$,o Nine Five,Plaisance.
00:08r11 MRU SpringbokT!vo Nine Fiv€,Plaisance.
00r08:35 \IRU SpringbokTrvo Nin""Five,Plaisance.

Additionalhistoryof the llight tas r.etrie,.'ed

from the miraculously
.e(jovefedCockpitVoiceRecofderlCVRl.Onlv lhelast 1 minuteand
14seconds of thc 30minuter-"cordingcycleof theCVRn'hichfe{rords
cockpil (ionversationlr,as reasonablvclear..Sullicient data '"vas
recover""dduringthc analysisol the CVR tapeto determin€that ihe
-24

cockpitcolversationpriorto the souldingofthe smokewarningbeli

'Joe',
referredto in thetranscripiion'
had 6eenon generaitopicsonly.
was the senlor flight-engineet Guiseppe Michele Bellagarda The
followingtranscript is onceagaintheolficialversionaspresented by
DCA to the Board of InquirY:

TIMEIN
MINi]TESAND
SECONDS
FROMSTART
OFTAPE ORIGIN CONVERSATION/REMARKS
2813'I Fire alarm
bell IStoppeda]mostimmediately.l
28:35 lntercom
chime
28:36 Ioe What'sgoingon now?
28:37 ! Huh?
28..40 Joe Cargo?
28142 loe It cameon afierwards.
28145 IStrongclick sound.]
? And where is ihat?
28:46 ? (Clicksound.l
28148 Ioe Iust to the right.
28149 ! Say again[?].
28i52 Ioe Main deckcargo.
28157 loe Then the otheronecameon as well.
I've got two,
29:O1 Ioe ShallI lget/push]the [bottle/button]
overthere?
291O2 la,
29:05 Captain Leesvir ons die checklist daar hoor'
IDoubleclick sound.]
29:08 ? Die buik [?] se lig is af [?].
29:09 Huh.
[Two click sounds.)
29:11 ? Checkiistmain deckcargolight
29i12 Captain Ja.
Isoundsof movementcan be heard
with clicks and clunks.l
 2i

2g:33 Captain [CURSE]dis die feit dat altweeaan-

gekomhet - dit sleurmens.
29r36 Intercom
chime [Whi]ecapiainis speakins.J
29:38 ? Aag shit.
29:40 ||I [800Hz Test Tonesigna]
commences,l
29t41 Captain Wat de donnergaannou aan?
{Saidin a surprisedtoneof voice.J
29tA {Suddenloud sound.l
29146 (Largeand rapid changesin ampli-
tude of test tonestarts.J
29:5'I (Endof test signal,very irregular
nearend.l
29t52 IEnd of recording.]
Accordingto ihe 30-minutecyclecockpitvoicerecordingwhich had
no timecoding,muchof thefirst 28 minuteperiodwas uninte)ligible.
TwenLy-eightminutesand 30 secondsafter commencement of lhe
recordingcycle,the smokewarning bell sounded.Somebody,prob-
ably lhe piloi,inquiredwhereit was from and receivedthe replv that
i' r.ame l r o m i h p m a i r d c rl . , a r 8 o T
. h en i l o rt h e na s k e df o r t h r , h p 'k
list to be read.Some30 secondslater somebodvon the flipht deck
u r l c r p d" n o ; t h . T h i s w o r d w a s l o l l u v \ " db \ t h ; L V R 8 0 0 " H 2T e s l
Tone and endedin a warble at 29 minutes52 secondsafter com-
mencement of the recording.It is assumedthat the recordedcockpit
conversationhad commencedvery shortlv after communication
with Plaisanceai 23:14:00 and endedshortlv after the communica
l i o n w i l h M aLf i l i u sA i r T r al l i ' . C o rt r L ,dl , 2 3 : 4 8 : 5 1 .

THE'ALTERNATIVE'
TAPETRANSCRIPTS
As had beenthe casewilh olher internaiionalair disasters,lhe
contentandcorrectness oftransoriptsofthe Heldcfbcrg's CVRrape
as well as the MauritiusAir'l'rallic Controltape wefe disputed.
Olficial and non-otficial versionslvere debatedbeforc LheBoard of
Inquiry.Readtogelher thoughpefhapsnot at all iimesvalid -
lhe transcriptsfill in cfucialgapsin ihe historyof thedisaslerflighi.
- 2Fj

DCA contracted[Brigadier]Dr l-eendertJansen,formerlv with

lhe ForensicS.ienceLaboratorl'and now a privateconsultanl'Lo
transcribeboih th€ CVR and Air Tfaffic Control lapes He madeuse
'machine'
of a self designe.l Ihis own modesi descriptionl]to
transcribe ihe CVR recording. uses a computer-tvpememory to
lt
."ioin tn" lnfo.t"ation und is coupled to a tape recorderin such a
wav ihal lhe momentthe Stopbuttonis pressed, the machinego€s
into LepeaL mode of the past 4 ol
seconds tape to faciLitat€iran-

hiter exte.sive oompuier analysis synthesis m€thods an'i

computerfilleringmethodslansenlinallv' compl€iedthe transcrlpt
.n.l;lescribedth; CVR transcripLion as as goodas one coLrl!l
o o s s i Lr ' e " rn d, I p r F o F d s o "n'' pl' ul Lhp
b r n " o " " ,' n e r n s h i ' h l ' P o " ' r ' d l ' o a " ur"'' "nd dtt"
..-..l ,rr "no " . p c o n . l
i n s h r \ n - u n d .rli". "^ro. " d
onra,es,h.'o r " . o s . o lw l ' r r h l ' " h a d r n d o u u r ' d b o' u" l l f o '
ihe transcripl ofthe Plaisance AirTfaffic Controltapehe madeuse
o a L o m D u t por. F r , udi h u m s . \ o ' o i n r o \ \ n h p l i r\ u r l l
t"n*n.:n,c,.'F\dmndr'on b P o f p n F B ' d r do l I n q L ' r \
m i n i o n e o r l - "h e w a - , J - \ , n L F o nd " r e a n s d l " d . r | \ F d i l t P r F n l
"-l
\ r - r e nd D a ' l r o m ' \ " ' u l h F L " p l an d r d ' h " ' p n r " rI l i g h " n g i
o n " " c i R r a p " . O n " o .h p s " r -p r F d o F a r n pb - r l h P o h " r \ $ F r p
nol identifiable
One of lansen'sintereslingcommenlson the ATC lapewas.thal
'. . . there'wasair llcwin:l in or out of the cockpitwjlh quile a loud
noise. .. il he [the caplain]had an orygen mask on thesenorse
'
soundswouLdnol be as loud lon ihe tape]'
Durins lhe publicheafingof the tsoardot lnquifv all ot the CVR
tapeaninot only the last l minuteand 1'1secondswefe debated
V l l r , ' : " C " ' , t M " . g " . i r r " r p o n " Fr u d p l p dL , vr \ P 5 ' u r h A f r i L d n
A i t \ d \ s P i l os q s s o , . " r i ornu l " d n " r l h FC V R l r d n s r r i o' a 1 -
-
r " . - n g i n , o ' . " i " n o a 1u r e l vp ' c ' o n a l r r e ' r d
n Fi - \ " . , i H d to n . n u d n o rL e n , d " p u L , l ' r .
The fulliecordingwas th€relorconlv plavedto lhe membersoI
the Boardand the transcript of lhe lasl 1 minule and 1il secondswas
feadoui in DUblic
what DCA notedas unintellisible conversation'in the ifanscfipt
of the Air Traffic Control lape \aas amplified upon bv Jansenin his
€videncebefor€ ihe Boatd of Inquirv. The recordinSs on the Arr
iraffic ContLoltape from 00:0ir34 to 00r02:1'r were generallv
acceDtednot to hive been intended for Maurilius but to be
uninienlional lransmissions on the VHF channel intended fol
cockpitcommunication.
 27_

Jansens interprelalionof the unintelligible

conversation'
Iwhich
DCA couldnot concurwilhl included:

00r01r34 295 PlaisanceSpringbokTwo Nine Five,

w€ ve openedih€ door to seeif we 0an

01r36r00 295 : . .
00:02:10 295 Prcssuretwelve Lhousand.
00:02::14 2S5 . . . genoegiF . . . and€rstekan ons vlLrg
verongeluk. lTranslatedby Jansenas
'.
. . is enough.. . otherwisewe could
havean a.cidenl. . .'.1

Dr Lecnd..t.ld,sen. o
loferstc erpe.i, wos
.r0ni.ocied 1o tr0ns.rribc
ih.r..co.diDgs oI li.l
cocApll vonxr fecorder
0 n o c o r v r i . s - . o r i o nD e
tween tlre Hclde.bers
fJjsi,r crew drd Ai.
T.dlfic Contro/ or Pldj
s a n . e A r r y r o d .A l t i r n r s
Ils inlcrp.ctolion of
c o n v e . s o l ( ) nc o n l l i c l e d
wrri tie opi"iims ol

Y0(rx,b Klodocdbus wds ri. dn

lrniini drnt(tl-". on dLrry 0r Plo;
sonce arrporl wh.rn coni.rct rvas
Josi r.1,ltl tld Hcld€.befs. He !r.rs
l i . l d n p . f s o n t o s p e r k l o l i r cc r c r ' .
I l . m j s j n l e i p f e t e dC o p t 0 i n U y s s
comnlunnidlnD th.i the Hel.lerbers
wos 65 nri/es Irun 'rs .exl cfieck
poinlosh.jng 6i nllesi.om Mau.i
lius. Tltr Helderberg wos ir loct ot
ilot s10geft firll 1,lrl lril.s froJn 1Ie

{Th{r Sta4
_28

In th€ statement of Ai. Traffic Controller Yacoob Khodacabus

preseniedto the Board,additional commentarynot noted by Jansen
was ins€rted,suchasl

23i52:51 295 I tell you pui down the oxygen ther€.

00102127 295 l o e . . . q u i c k l y. . . w e a r e . . . ? t h o u -
s a n d . . . o n g e l u k[ a c c i d e n.t.].

As regardsthe CVR tape,Advocate SouthwoodsubmirtedJansen's

tree'translationof the first 28 minutes of the CVR tape to the Board
only. Som€of that commentary however did come to lighr in the
public crossexaminationby AdvocateSoLrthwood of fansenand
may thereforebe published. This includedsuchCVRcommenlsasl
'11.22
.,.ons,.,andeas,,
'14102 l...we...otherwise
Who is going to cook?
14:05 Th€y are coming to felch him at around
midnight.
74:14 This is a good thing if you tell him that.

Further input as regardsconversationrecordedon the Air Traffic

Conlrol tape was made during the formal inquest by Roy Downes,
DCA's lnvestigator: Operationall

00101:34 2S5 We. . . position. . . We shouldbe okay.

00:01:57 295 Joe,switch up quickly. . .

The Helderbergcrashedinto the Indian Ocean at a position deter

minedto be about19o10'Sand 5go3B'E - roughlyai a point within
a triangle formed by theislands of Mauritius, Rodriquesand Carga
dos/SiBrandon- just after midnight,at about00:07.