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Reconsideration.: NAPOCOR Vs CA, GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993
Reconsideration.: NAPOCOR Vs CA, GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993
Reconsideration.: NAPOCOR Vs CA, GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration. Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial
rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which
such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration
upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order
is contrary to law. (1a)
Section 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice
thereof. The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds
therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse
party.
A motion for new trial shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motion.
A motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph (a) of the preceding section shall
be supported by affidavits of merits which may be rebutted by affidavits. A motion
for the cause mentioned in paragraph (b) shall be supported by affidavits of the
witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly
authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence.
A motion for reconsideration shall point out a specifically the findings or
conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings or conclusions.
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary
period of appeal. (2a)
Section 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration. The trial court
may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms
as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the
evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly. (3a)
Section 4. Resolution of motion. A motion for new trial or reconsideration shall
be resolved within thirty (30) days from the time it is submitted for resolution. (n)
Section 5. Second motion for new trial. A motion for new trial shall include all
grounds then available and those not so included shall be deemed waived. A
second motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when
the first motion was made, may be filed within the time herein provided excluding
the time during which the first motion had been pending.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate
complaints., filed against NPC and a particular Chavez.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of
lives and destruction of properties due to the negligence of the
latter in releasing water from Angat dam during the typhoon
Kading
Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multipurpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in
monitoring the water level at the dam.
NPCs allegations were as follows:
HELD:
We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and
damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein who were
similarly situated as the private respondents herein was the
negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978
"early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected
municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was
insufficient.
The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of
foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and
operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of
the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all
but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness,
slovenliness, and carelessness."
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the
Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God,"
the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the
event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must
be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to
the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553;
Section 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. The judgment and orders
of the court hearing the land registration case are appealable to
the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same manner
as in ordinary actions:
ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS S. YUJUICO vs. Republic of the
Philippines
Facts:
1. In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration
and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land with an area of
17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in
Paraaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance
(CFI).The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
Mercedes Dizon, a private party. Trial court ruled in favor of
Castro.
2. The Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from
the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for
the issuance of a decree of registration became final, and a
Decree was issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC).
An Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Fermina
Castro by the Register of Deeds.
3. Land was then sold to Jesus Yujuico. The OCT of Castro was
cancelled and a TCT was issued in Yujuicos name over Lot1 while
another TCT was issued in favor of herein co-petitioner Augusto
Carpio.
4. Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was issued and asserts that Land
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
became the properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a
government corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or
the acquisition of reclaimed lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in
favor of PEA. The PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels
of land along the Manila Bay coast which were subsequently sold
to the Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC).
5. The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal
Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered
that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road
directly overlapped their property, and that they owned a portion of
the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC.
6. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Paraaque City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the Removal of Cloud and
Annulment of Title with Damages.
7. Respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land
was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of
Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision
adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was
void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from
a void title, were likewise void.
8. Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and states that after 28
years without being contested, the case had already become final
and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had
participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the
validity of the decision but did not.
9. On appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court asserting
that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public
use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of
private ownership or confer title upon the registrant. Further,
according to the appellate court res judicata does not apply to
lands of public domain, nor does possession of the land
automatically divest the land of its public character. HTP.
Issues: Whether CAs decision was correct.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED.
While it may be true that estoppel does not operate against the
state or its agents, however, Equitable estoppel may be invoked
against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already
alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not
undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of
time.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent
purchaser for value who relied on the clean certificates of the title
was sought to be cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to
the Government, we ruled that it is only fair and reasonable to
apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the
government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value
Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic
v. Umali, where, in a reversion case, we held that even if the
original grantee of a patent and title has obtained the same
through fraud, reversion will no longer prosper as the land had
become private land and the fraudulent acquisition cannot affect
the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the
lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action
for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by laches.
While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public
domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by laches or
estoppel. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an
innocent purchaser for value over and above the interests of the
government. Section 32 provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value.The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised
by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall
such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent
purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree,
it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrances for value.
of Deeds. OCT No. 10215 does not show any annotation, lien, or
encumbrance on its face. Relying on the clean title, Yujuico bought
the same in good faith and for value from her. There is no
allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire
the land fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens
System that every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same
free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate
and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting. The same
legal shield redounds to his successors-in-interest, the Yujuicos and
Carpio, more particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot from
Jesus Y. Yujuico for value and in good faith.
Likewise protected are the rights of innocent mortgagees for value,
the PISO, Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC, PCIB, and DBP. Even if the
mortgagors title was proved fraudulent and the title declared null
and void, such declaration cannot nullify the mortgage rights of a
mortgagee in good faith.
Another contention of the respondent Republic:
The plain import of Municipality of Antipolo vs Zapanta is that a land
registration court, the RTC at present, has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the application which respondent Republic claims
is public land.
Firmly entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. Consequently, the proper CFI (now the
RTC) under Section 14 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
has jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land.
The applicant in a land registration case usually claims the land
subject matter of the application as his/her private property, as in
the case of the application of Castro. Thus, the conclusion of the CA
that the Pasig-Rizal CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the application of Castro has no legal mooring. The land
registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land applied for
at the time of the filing of the application. After trial, the court, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, can determine whether the title to
the land applied for is registrable and can be confirmed. In the
event that the subject matter of the application turns out to be
inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of the land and perforce must dismiss the application.
Fil-Estate Management v. Trono
An application for registration of a parcel of land already covered
by a Torrens Title is actually a collateral attack against the Title not
permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
A Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on the
validity of title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
for the purpose.
It is too late to question petitioners titles considering that the
Certificates of Title issued have become incontrovertible after the
lapse of one year from the decree of registration.
Section 96. Against whom action filed. If such action is brought to
recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any
estate or interest therein arising wholly through fraud, negligence,
omission, mistake or misfeasance of the court personnel, Register
of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective duties, the action shall be brought
against the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land is situated and the National Treasurer as defendants. But if
SO ORDERED.
On Sept. 1980, Cicero Gaffud died survived by his wife Demetrian and
sons Romulo and Adolfo, private respondents herein.
On March 9, 1982, private respondents filed a complaint for nullity of
sale andreconveyance against petitioner Felicisima Pino. (During
the pendency of the case before the trial court, Rafaela Donato, who
was not a party to the case, died on November her 26, 1982.)
The RTC ruled and this was sustained by respondent CA that
petitioner Pino is not a purchaser in good faith, so (a) the Deed of
Absolute Sale made by Rafaela in favor of Pino null and void insofar as
the shares of Cicero and Raymundo are concerned, (b) cancellation of
TCT No. 49380 in the name of Pino and (c) reconvey one-half of Lot-6B to plaintiffs withing 10 days.
ISSUE:
1. WON Felicisima Pino is a purchaser in good faith
2. WON the filing of an action for reconveyance has already prescribed
HELD: 1. The rule applicable to this controversy is well-settled. Where
the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold,
the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the
certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse
suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of said certificate.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record discloses that when
petitioner purchased the subject property on June 10, 1970, the title
was in the name of her vendor Rafaela Donato alone.
There was no allegation, and much less any evidence, that the transfer
of the subject property from the original owners (Rafaela, Cicero and
Raymundo) to Rafaela Donato was fraudulent.
3. TCT No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato
on March 2, 1967. The present action for reconveyance was filed only
on March 9, 1982. Clearly then, the action has already prescribed
because it was filed fifteen (15) years after the issuance of TCT No. T32683
If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach
an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is
to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or
were instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now wellsettled that such action prescribes in ten years from the issuance of
the Torrens Title over the property. (Armerol v. Bagumbaran, 154
SCRA 396, 407; Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 407;
Walstron v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431, 442).
Ruling: The Court ruled that the Spouses Libi were not the realparties-in-interest to annul the TCT of Figuracion, since they are not
themselves claiming title to or possession of the lot. Libi alleged that
they bought the adjacent lot in the belief that they had an outlet to N.
Escario Street through the lot owned by the Cebu City
government. Clearly, they have no interest in the title ofthe lot.
Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands
of the public domain through the cancellation of private title
erroneously or fraudulently issued over it. The action should be in the
name of the State. Thus, Spouses Libi cannot be considered the
proper parties therein.
If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already been executed
the court may issue such orders of restitution or other relief as justice and equity
may warrant under the circumstances. (n)
Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts.
An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be
treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule
shall be applicable thereto. (n)
RULE 47
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property.
Section 3. Period for filing action. If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must
be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (n)
Section 4. Filing and contents of petition. The action shall be commenced by
filing a verified petition alleging therein with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies, together with
sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents. A certified true
copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original
copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses
or documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn certification
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof,
or any other tribunal or agency if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or
agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (n)
Section 5. Action by the court. Should the court find no substantial merit in the
petition, the same may be dismissed outright with specific reasons for such
dismissal.
Should prima facie merit be found in the petition, the same shall be given due
course and summons shall be served on the respondent. (n)
Section 6. Procedure. The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be
observed. Should trial be necessary, the reception of the evidence may be
referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. (n)
Section 2. Parties. All persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration shall be made parties; and no declaration shall,
except as otherwise provided in these Rules, prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the action. (2a, R64)
ville Dev't and Housing Corp. vs Bonifacio, et al., G.R. No. 167391,
June 8, 2011)
What does the cloud on title consist of?
The cloud on title consists of:
1. any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding;
2. which is apparently valid or effective;
3. but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable; and
4. may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. (Phil-ville Dev't
and Housing Corp. vs Bonifacio, et al., ibid)
Can this action be filed by a person other than
the registered owner?
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper
party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has
been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a
person other than the registered owner because, in the
Article reproduced above, title does not necessarily refer
to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of
an actual certificate of title to a property does not
necessarily bar an action to quiet title. (Portic vs.
Cristobal, ibid.)
"Title" to property does not necessarily mean the original
transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive
prescription by possession in the concept of an owner
thereof. Indeed, one who has an equitable right or
interest in the property may also file an action to quiet
title under the law. (Mamadsual vs Moson, G.R. No. 92557
September 27, 1990)
Does an action for quieting of title prescribe?
It depends.
1. If the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the
action does not prescribe.
Reason: There is settled jurisprudence that one who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be
owner thereof may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
only by one who is in possession. No better situation can
be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on
equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother,
Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for
no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a
claim that the land she had been occupying and
cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a
third person. We hold that in such situation the right to
quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance
and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only
from the time in possession was made aware of a claim
adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory
period of prescription commences to run against
possessor. (Faja vs CA, G.R. No. L-45045, February 28,
1977)
2. If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, the
action may prescribe.