Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rothe Enemies - Everywhere
Rothe Enemies - Everywhere
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STEPHEN L. MUZZATTI
Ryerson University
Abstract. Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, terrorism has experienced a
prominence in discourse across the U.S. The representations of terrorists and terrorism by the news media and politi have contributed to the edice of terrorism as a
moral panic. This treatise examines the social eects that have or may occur due to
the social construction of a moral panic of terrorism. The thematic frame is situated
within Cohens stages of a moral panic. We oer an analysis of the medias depiction
and coverage of acts of terrorism, and legislative, political and legal responses in the
form of social and cultural changes occurring from the creation of a moral panic. In
addition, we oer an analysis of the states vested interest in the social construction of
this panic, leading to increased levels of fear, targeted at the general publics consciousness. This article concludes that the presentation of terrorism and terrorists by
the media and politi have contributed to unnecessary levels of panic and fear, misguided public consciousness, and the development of legislation creating negative
social ramications yet be seen.
Introduction
The American public has been inundated with highly mediated images
of terrorists and terrorism since September 11, 2001. Perceived threats
and heightened security alerts abound in daily media coverage and
political speeches, leading to what may be termed a moral panic. The
edication of a moral panic among the U.S. population has exacerbated
a culture embedded in fear. While the events of September 11, 2001 were
indeed tragic, the construction of a moral panic by the media and
politicians to support their interests is a greater social tragedy.
The concept of moral panic has been used to dene social issues for
the past 30 years (See Becker 1963; Young 1971; Cohen 1972; Hall
et al., 1978; Reiman and Levine 1989; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994;
Burns and Crawford 1999; Muzzatti 2002, 2003 (unpublished)). Young
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(1971) was the rst to coin the term, moral panic in, The Drugtakers (see
Cohen 1971; Young 1971). Young examined the ideological role the
media has in constructing social meanings as well as the amplication of
deviance. He provided linkages between the media, agents of social
control and public opinion, which could ascend to a moral panic.
Cohen (1972) was the rst to present an inclusive denition of a moral
panic. The term, moral panic was used by Cohen to depict the reactions of
the media, the public, and agents of social control to relatively minor
disturbances between the Mod and Rocker youth cultures in England. His
research illustrated how these reactions inuenced the enforcement and
formation of social policy, law, and societal perceptions of threat and the
young tribes. According to Cohen, a moral panic can occur, when:
A condition, episode, person or group of person emerges to become
dened as a threat to societal values or interests; its nature is
presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media;
the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians or
other right-thinking people . . . Sometimes the subject of the panic is
quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in
existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.
Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten . . . at other times
it has more serious and long lasting repercussion and might produce
such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way
society conceives itself (Cohen 1972: 9).
Cohens work focused on the reactions of the media, agents of social
control and the general public to relatively minor clashes between
members of youth subcultures (the mods and the rockers) in England,
and, as the above excerpt illustrates, the ways in which these reactions
inuenced the formation and enforcement of law, social policy, and
societal conceptions of the youth culture-delinquency nexus.
While many subsequent scholars have similarly applied the concept
to youth subcultures (e.g. punks, skinheads, goths, ravers etc.) others
have gone beyond the original focus to apply it to more generalised and
adult manifestations of deviant and criminal behaviour (e.g. soccer
hooligans, motorcycle gangs, immigrants (both illegal and legal), welfare mothers, Satanists, paedophiles, squeegee merchants, serial killers,
etc.). While some of the research is 30 years old, with antecedents
perhaps even a generation older, the concept of Moral Panic continued
to grow in importance in the 1990s and into the 21st century, spurring
considerable theoretical development, particularly the emergence of
critical cultural criminology.
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this new threat. Common calls include special hearings or sub-committees to deal with the problem, zero tolerance policies, tougher laws
and harsher sentences.
The nal, and some would argue ultimately the most important,
actor in a moral panic is the public. The success of the media, politicians, rule enforcers and moral entrepreneurs in generating and
sustaining a moral panic is ultimately contingent upon how successfully they enrage the public and marshal their support against the folk
devils. The vox populi is enlisted as a front-line agent in the crusade
against the designated evil. Members of the public are relied upon to
express contempt for the folk devils and support for the rule enforcers,
to consume the media coverage, and wait for the latest pronouncements from politicians and/or action groups on how the problem is to
be solved.
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) assess the dierence between a moral
panic and a normal societal concern with ve characteristics. These
include: (1) the generation of heightened concern, (2) hostility, (3) a
societal consensus that the actions are injurious, (4) disproportionate
societal reaction, and (5) volatility.
Societal concern about crime and deviance always exists at some level;
however, heightened concern infers an increase in public dismay about a
certain group or its impact. Assessing heightened concern can be quantied by newspaper reports, public opinion polls, and enhanced media
coverage (Good and Ben-Yehuda 1994). Increased hostility is a necessary
catalyst for a moral panic. Hostility refers to heightened levels of intolerance directed at the behavior of a group (evil-doers) accompanied by
contempt for those responsible. The third catalyst, consensus, refers to
public agreement that the evildoers are real as is the threat they impose to
society. Consensus is not meant to necessarily incorporate all of a society
merely that it is widespread. Disproportionality refers to over-reaction to
a problem and includes frequency, severity, and scope. This includes the
belief that greater harm is eminent. The nal tool for assessment is volatility. Simply stated, the precariousness of a moral panic can allow it to
appear quickly and without warning. Interestingly, even after the dissipation of a moral panic, a litany of repressive social controls strategies
and mechanisms may be left in its wake (Muzzatti 2002).
This treatise will be situated within Cohens stages of moral panic
integrated with Goode and Ben-Yehudas characteristics assessing that
a moral panic has occurred. Simply stated, we use Cohens model to
assess the stages of a moral panic accompanied with Goode and
Ben-Yehudas model illustrating that a moral panic indeed occurred.
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whether a moral panic has taken hold. We have taken the general
frames of both, Cohen and Goode and Ben-Yehudas models, and
established a model from which this analysis proceeds. In other words,
we take Cohens criteria of actors and situation with Goode and BenYehudas tools for assessing if it is indeed a moral panic or mere societal
concern. Beginning with a person or persons being dened as a threat,
the media presents this perceived threat in a consistent and recognisable
form (Erikson et al. 1989). This leads to a build-up of public concern
and the generation of hostility. A societal consensus is formed accepting
that the threat is real and injurious. This is fuelled by the moral
entrepreneurship of politicians responding with disproportionate reactions to the portrayed threat. These reactions can then lead to long
lasting and deleterious social change. We will analyze each of these steps
framed in the following sub-chapters: (1) someone dened as a threat to
values and interests, (2) Threats depicted by media in a recognisable
form, (3) a rapid build-up of public concern generating hostility, (4)
response from authorities disproportionate reactions, and (5) social
changes resulting from panic. Incorporated within the conclusion, we
use Goode and Ben-Yehudas model to ascertain that a moral panic did
occur.
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The dening of actors is the second part of Cohens rst element. The
Bush administration formally pronounced this with,
The people who did this act on America, and who may be planning
further acts, are evil people. They dont represent an ideology; they
dont represent a legitimate political group of people. Theyre at
evil. Thats all they can think about, is evil (President Bush 9/28/
2001).
The original identication of the enemy was Bin Laden and the AlQaeda network. During the gradient process of constructing and
enlarging the folk devils, the enemy became increasingly broadly dened. The Administration began their initial targeting of the enemy with
The al Qaeda organisation is not an organisation of good, an organisation of peace. Its an organisation based upon hate and evil
(President Bush 9/24/2001). The threat to U.S. values and interests
grew. A press release by the Presidents Press Secretary stated, The al
Qaeda organisation is present in, as youve heard from the President,
more than 60 countries, and its links are its links are amorphous
(Fleischer 9/18/2001).
Throughout the following year, those categorised as the enemy
continually expanded. The Administrations war on terror began with
Al-Qaeda but did not stop there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated (President Bush 9/23/2001). The State of the Union Address of 2002 set the
stage for the Axis of Evil: Iran, North Korea, and Iraq.
The second actor involved in dening someone or something as a
threat to values or interests is the media. The day of September 11, 2001,
the media began the rst stages of a moral panic by dening the evil.
The U.S. populace was presented with a barrage of newspaper headlines
that escalated the shock of the attacks. The media are the vehicle of
moral condemnation, and propagate a brutal fascination with the terrorist act (Baudrillard, quoted in Der Derian 1989) The media had
become terrorvision; a choreography of violence, fear, revulsion and
hatred. The attachment of unambiguously unfavourable symbols
(Cohen, 1972: 41) had begun; the hijackers (and by extension, as we will
later illustrate, those who allegedly supported, harboured, or defended
them) were the embodiment of evil. The identication of terrorism,
terrorists, and war were fed to the press by State information dissemination. Oddly enough, before the State had formally identied the
enemy, the media was clued in to prepare the U.S. citizens for the Bush
Doctrine that would follow. Already on September 11, 2001, media
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reports connected Bin Laden with the terrorist attacks, All eyes look to
rich Arab terrorist . . . Bin Laden is the leading candidate said a senior
intelligence ocial (Billings Gazette 9/11/2001).
These examples were only the rst stage in an ongoing process of
identifying someone or something as a threat. The depiction of the
threat of the folk devil by the media continued as stage two of Cohens
model asserts: threat is depicted in a recognisable form by the media.
Throughout the process of creating and maintaining a moral panic, the
media and politi have continuously re-enforced this identication of
terrorists to the embodiment of evil that threaten U.S. values and
interests.
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books written about terrorism in response to the event. Similarly, following a brief respite from its standard fare of exploding buildings and
vehicles, Hollywood aired weekly drama shows with themes of terrorism
and terrorists, always depicting the evil and horrors of the folk devil
(The Shield, Third Watch, 24, and Law and Order). Conversely, movie
reviewers wrote that this or that lm was a welcome antidote to the
events of September 11, 2001 (Parenti 2002). Travel agents encouraged
domestic vacations as a healing experience and often, not so subtly,
suggested that they were a patriotic way to aid a sagging economy.
Everywhere the U.S. populace turned, a reminder of the terrorists
and their evil doings was present. Repeated reminders of the fear that
people in the U.S. should be experiencing echoed through the terrorvision. CNN journalists broadcasting from live from Kosovo remarked,
I probably feel safer here than you do back home in the states (CNN
News, 2/2/2001). The terrorist and terrorism had been reied to a new
reality. It had become a necessary truth, requiring no further evidence:
the terrorists sought the violent transformation of all the things we
stand for while they only stand for apocalyptic nihilism (Ignatie,
quoted in Chomsky 2001:117). The production and reproduction of
such pieties are an important discursive practice insofar as they serve to
re-establish order and meaning by reinforcing State hegemony.
The interests of the media and entrepreneurs reect self-interest
(economic interests), but also the narrow conformism of the media to
the State (Chomsky 1988). The media has two competing and contradictory roles. They control the ow of information (guided by the
dissemination of information by the State) while making the news
entertaining to sell (White 2003). The media serve their function by
dening the range of expressible views, framing the news reporting
within assumptions laid down by the State, and excluding coverage
deemed inappropriate (Chomsky 1988). In a dark parody of the
general narrowness of debate on a host of social, political and economic issues in the U.S. media, over 75 percent of terrorist stories
come from State sources (Paletz 1982). This is in part a response to the
State propaganda system, to wit guarantees the eectiveness of the
State to ensure a moral panic, thereby serving the political interests of
the Administration.
The restrictions imposed on the medias coverage included maintaining control over media access to information about the investigation
into the hijackings and Counterterrorism operations. The media were
not only limited by the political reigns, but high level executives, fearing
State reprisals (i.e., being cut out of the loop) ordered correspondents
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to remind viewers that the Taliban were evil and harboured terrorists
that killed thousands of Americans whenever they broadcast reports or
footage of civilian deaths, hunger, or devastation in Afghanistan as a
result of the U.S. war on terrorism (CNN Chair, Walter Isaacson,
Quoted in Parenti 2002: 51). Such media subservience and the
unquestioning reproduction of the States political economy of terrorology exemplify its role as an ideological State apparatus. The outcome
of these restrictions has ensured that the media would feed the consuming audience the propaganda necessary to create a moral panic.
Creating a generalised fearfulness gives State leaders greater freedom of
action to advance and justify exceptional legislation, encroach on civil
liberty rights, and accomplish their geo-political agendas (Herman and
Sullivan 1989).
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of canned goods, bottled water, and a rst aid kit they keep in a
cardboard box in their home, the media continued to feed the
consuming public safety tips generated by the Administration.
The general public is one of the key actors in a moral panic. The
success of the politicians and media in generating and sustaining a
moral panic is contingent on how successfully they enrage the public
and marshal their support against the evil-doers (Muzzatti 2002). The
crusade against evil requires the public to express contempt for the folk
devil and support for the decisions from politicians on how the problem
is best solved.
Initially, public concern was not limited to domestic concerns.
Immediately after the event of September 11, 2001, the international
society united in condolences and support. The response to terrorism
and terrorists was felt throughout the world. Of course, each nation/
state had its own vested interests in sharing the immediate concerns of
the U.S. populace and politi. It is these vested interests that stood in the
shadows of international society as they grasped, used, or objected to
the Bush Administrations public and private reactions (e.g. Israeli PM
Sharon implemented Bushs jargon to diract his actions against the
Palestinians). Condemnation after condemnation of terrorism and terrorists were publicly stated, domestically and internationally, while
counter-terrorism actions escalated. State criminality (and/or encouragement for human rights violations) was neutralised, and ceased to be
of concern; in fact, it disappeared through discursive strategies. What
international society had previously viewed as a state in violation of
human rights became redened as a State using self-defence against
terrorism. While international terrorism had been at the forefront of
many nations problems, after September 11th many utilised Bushs
jargon to transmogrify their own State criminality into a defence against
terrorism.
While overwhelmingly sympathetic and supportive of the U.S. in the
immediate wake of terrorist attacks, international society became
increasingly uneasy with the U.S. plan for addressing the evil-doers. In
the U.S., the concept of unilateral actions necessary to ensure victory
over the folk devil was being portrayed to the public as natural and
necessary; however, international society began to worry about the
hidden Imperialist agenda of the Bush Administration. Still, the propaganda at home continued: We are in imminent danger and preemptive measures are now necessary. Through prohibitive reliance on
State sources and terrorologists (who themselves are often substantially
supported by federal funding sources), the media reied terrorism
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abouts of Osama bin Laden, and radio scripts. The radio scripts,
according to Rumsfeld, counter the lies that this was a war against the
Afghan people or a war against the Muslims, which it isnt (Washington Post 2/25/2002). When a leak exposed this department, the
Administration shut it down. It was replaced, however, with the Coalition Information Center (CIC). The CIC coordinates the public
information output by the State, providing sound bites for international
society (Bennis 2002).
The aforementioned examples of legislation and disproportionate
responses by the State to September 11, 2001 are not exhaustive. However, they do provide examples of the States use of terrorism to: (1) ensue
alternative political interests (the war on Iraq), (2) maintain legitimacy
for public concern, and (3) continue the generation of a moral panic
through intimidation, coercion, and induced fear. Just as the Communist
Boogeyman role aided US imperialism and military supremacy (and
while generating tremendous prots for military contractors, did little to
enhance national security) during the Reagan administrations, the Terrorist Boogeyman is aiding the Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz
Doctrine of Imperialism and military supremacy.
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Conclusion
The use of a moral panic by the media and polity has been illustrated
according to Cohens (1972) stages; however, an argument could be
made that it is less a moral panic and more normative concerns. Goode
and Ben-Yehudas (1994) have provided ve characteristics that determine if a moral panic has taken hold which re-enforces our position: a
moral panic does exist. Indeed, heightened concern has been illustrated
by societal reactions and media coverage. The second characteristic,
hostility, abounds. Political agents and individual responses have successfully generated intolerance, and contempt for terrorists and terrorism, and indeed even dissenters. The third characteristic, consensus that
the evildoers are real and pose a serious threat has been fullled. Again,
the consensus does not need to incorporate all of society, merely be
widespread in nature. The mass amount of media coverage coupled with
the Bush Administrations constant reminder to the U.S. public that we
are under a real and imminent threat has ensured a large proportion of
society unquestioningly accept this moral panic.5 The fourth characteristic, disproportionality, or over-reaction to a problem by severity,
frequency, and scope has undoubtedly been met. The scope of the
political decisions, war on terrorism, and overly stated imminent threats
meets this criterion. The mass mobilisation for a call to war concurrently
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respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and
religious tolerance. America will take the side of the brave men and
women who advocate these values around the world, including the
Islamic world, because wee have a greater objective than eliminating
threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful
world beyond the war on terror (State of the Union Address, 2002).
Between the lines of propaganda and rhetoric, the generation of public
fear stands to suppress opposition to the legitimacy of a war against
enemies that have been so broadly dened, the end is not in sight.
Today, the moral panic continues: the Olympics of terror. Regrettably,
future research on negative latent and manifest social implications may
well abound with information.
Notes
1. The 50 days was added to encompass the coverage of the one-year anniversary of 9/
11 and the following days.
2. The three newspapers used in the content analysis were searched via the computer
database LexisNexis.
3. The social changes that occurred will include a detailed look at the eects of social
concern in the form of hate crimes.
4. Just blocks from ground Zero this store opened to sell survival tools (e.g. gas
masks).
5. Mass movements have begun to surface showing support for the administration and
admonishing protesters as dissidents and anti-American.
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