86 Race & Class The Left and revolution in Iran What role did the Iranian Left play in the 1978-9 revolution? Why was it eclipsed by Islamists and eventually eliminated from the political terrain? It may come as a surprise to learn that the Iranian revolution occurred in the absence of any political parties operating openly in the country. The parties, organisations and groups which were written about during the revolution — such as the National Front, the Freedom Movement, (the Islamic Republican Party was formed immediately after the revolution) the Tudeh Party - existed in name only. Years of underground existence and exile had left the Tudeh Party, National Front, Fedayee guerillas, Mojahedin and others without the social bases, resources, large memberships and other political means necessary for real and viable political organisation. This was especially true of the new revolutionary organisations formed during the 1970s Our interviews with past and present activists and leaders of Peykar, Fedayee, the Tudeh Party and smaller Maoist groups reveal that, on the eve of the revolution in 1977, most of their cadre were in prison Some were residing and working outside Iran, and the rest of the membership was small in number and very disorganised. A former leader of Peykar told us that his organisation had about fifty members in late 1977; a Fedayee leader estimated that there were about twenty-five remaining members. Notwithstanding the Tudeh Party's long history of political activity and the fact that it had refrained from armed struggle (and therefore had lost fewer cadre), it was only able to organise two or three cells Indeed, the student movement abroad, organised in the Confede- ration of Iranian Students, was larger than any of the internal parties. As the revolutionary situation intensified in 1978, the existing Left organisations began to disagree internally as to the proper approach, method and action to take. Expansion and contention Nonetheless, this period saw the Left’s situation transformed and gave it an open space within which to manoeuvre. With a base among university students and former political prisoners, the Left gained in stature and prestige as a result of its engagement in armed struggle against the Shah. Indeed, the moral and psychological impact of the urban guerilla movement was an important factor in attracting large numbers of radicalised youth and intellectuals to the Fedayee. As the revolution proceeded, therefore, the Left emerged as a mass force and, by 1979, represented a serious challenge to the Islamists. Its social base was principally among university and high school students,Notes and documents 87 but included teachers, engineers, and some skilled workers.' In addition, the Left was active among the national minorities, especially the Kurds and Turkomans. It is important to stress the conjunctural nature of left-wing support which was tied very much to revolutionary enthusiasm, the political space created by the dissolution of the old regime, the absence of a new central authority and the respect accorded to the guerilla organisations which grew when SAVAK torturers on trial in early 1979 recounted their horrific treatment of communist prisoners. The Left's expansion (in 1979, it a the result of years of political organising and mobilising, for this was a luxury it had never been allowed. A serious drawback to left-wing activity, however, was the absence of a long-term perspective and programme. Moreover, the Left was being challenged by a very difficult political and ideological situation. Political Islam was something that was not well understood: the Left had nothing to go on by theoretically or experientially to help it better come to grips with this new phenomenon. And, instead of building a movement, Iran’s socialists were constantly responding to regime actions. For example, any measure taken by the regime which appeared progressive, such as the nationalisation of the banks or the confrontation with the United States, would spark a discussion within the socialist organisations as to the nature of the regime and its future course of development. In this way, the totality of political Islam was ignored and a comprehensive analysis of the regime escaped them. The theoretical paradigm that the Left had adopted did not permit it to see the realities of political Islam and the course of events in Iran. Socialism was equated with nationalisation and anti-imperialism; the legacy of Stalinism prevented the Left from recognising the demo- cratic elements of socialism. In February 1979, the Fedayee Organis- ation presented its minimum programme. The main concern of this programme was the elimination of dependent capitalism, imperialism, and the nationalisation of industries and foreign trade. Thus, the nationalisation programme undertaken by the Islamic regime, and its anti-US rhetoric, confused the Iranian Left (as it did many inter- national leftists). When ‘Islam’ was seriously considered, it was done so within an economistic and reductionist discourse which viewed religion, culture and ideology as superstructural, and thereby derivat- ive. For example, in analysing the results of the elections to the Assembly of Experts, the Fedayee suggested that the people's support for Khomeini was symbolic and emotional and did not represent any class interest. Analytically oblivious to the compelling nature of political Islam, the Left was also inattentive to the theocratic, anti-modern and anti-democratic nature of the regime. One line of argument was that the Islamic fanatics were unimportant and that the88 Race & Class liberals were to be the focus of the struggle. Because the struggle against imperialism and dependent capitalism was considered paramount, the socialist organisations gave short shrift to democratic concerns, including ‘bourgeois feminism’. While socialists paid lip service to women’s rights, the freedom of the press and political freedoms, the major Left organisations, following a brief period of cooperation, ended ties with the National Democratic Front, which was making democratic rights its priority. Left discourse was strongly populist in its appeal to ‘the toiling masse: to peasants. None of the socialist groups dealt specifically with the problems and needs of women or of young people, for example. As a result, the Left deprived itself of a solid base among the modern social strata, a foundation which any socialist programme would need to realise its goal: Another missed opportunity was the construction of a Left united front. Even after the anti-democratic and anti-communist nature of the Islamist regime was obvious to all, the Left remained fragmented and sectarian and proved incapable of uniting to counter the Islamists" moves. In retrospect, it seems astounding that the many left-wing groups and organisations ignored the obvious fact that post- revolutionary Iranian society was being transformed into an Islamic- totalitarian state and made no effort to form a broad secular-radical united front to oppose this trend. Such a Left-liberal alliance could, conceivably, have altered the balance of power, but was, apparently, never even considered. In some cases, opportunism and organisation- al fetishism precluded cooperation; in other cases. dogmatic insistence on ideological and political purity not only prevented cross-party alliances but eventually split and almost destroyed certain key organisations. On the other hand, the Islamic Republican Party was extending its sphere of influence and easing out liberal control within the government and bureaucracy. The Left. lacking any perspective for the future, and informed only by a naive anti-imperialism, was, then, confronted with a serious political and theoretical challenge when pro-Khomeini students seized the US embassy in November 1979. Following this event, disagree- ments within the Fedayee organisation about the nature of the regime intensified, and the organisation formally split in early 1980. The Fedayee-Majority adopted the Tudeh Party position that the regime was ‘anti-imperialist’ and deserved left-wing support In sum, this critical period was marked by the expansion of the Left organisations and their bitter internal debates over the nature of the new regime; the efficacy of Islamic populism in mobilising popular support and challenging the received wisdom of the communist groups; errors and missed opportunities in the areas of women’s rights and democracy; electoral confusion, and the absence of a united frontNotes and documents 89 Guided by their anti-imperialist paradigm, the Left organisations frequently slid into a populist rhetoric that echoed many of the themes of the Islamists. They seemed unable to offer a distinct, separate and alternative socialist agenda. Moreover, during this period, the regime’s harassment of the Left increased: violent battles were fought in Kurdistan (August 1979) and Turkoman Sahra (January 1980). Abolhassan Bani-Sadr was elected president but joined the ‘Islamic cultural revolution’, which was spearheaded by his rival Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), to weed out communist influence in the universities (April 1980). In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, forcing the Left to face another challenge and to formulate a ‘line’ on the war. The seizure of the American embassy, the split within the Fedayee, the Iraqi invasion of Iran and the growing rift between Bani-Sadr and the IRP each presented a new and apparently overwhelming challenge to the Left. Every time a problem was resolved, or at least dealt with, a new one emerged. During this period, the Islamists gained consider- able political leverage; the programme of Islamisation in the juridical and cultural spheres continued apace without serious contestation from Liberals and Leftists. This was a period of considerable internal conflict and political confusion for the Left. The Mojahedin occupied the central position in the opposition, while the secular organisations became secondary and marginalised. The Fedayee-Majority and the Tudeh Party were keen to be the ‘legal marxists’; their only concern was that the IRP and Ayatollah Khomeini had rejected their suggestion for the formation of an anti-imperialist popular front. On the other hand, the militant Left (Fedayee-Minority, Peykar, the Kurdish organisation Komaleh, Ashraf Dehghani, Organisation of Communist Unity) adopted a hardline and rejectionist policy during this period. Attempts were made to join the Mojahedin in a front against the regime, but failed. The Mojahedin threw their weight behind the beleaguered Bani-Sadr and staged large street demonstra- tions in his support in the spring of 1981. As the political contest between the Islamists and their erstwhile liberal associates intensified, the IRP-dominated Majlis voted to impeach and prosecute Bani-Sadr. When the Mojahedin took to the streets to protest, they were violently attacked. In a rapid series of events, Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin leader Massoud Rajavi formed the National Council of Resistance and fled to Paris. The bombing of the IRP headquarters (attributed to the Mojahedin, but still mysterious in origin), in which nearly 100 of its top leaders were killed, was met with arrests and executions by the authorities. A vicious cycle of regime brutality and Mojahedin assassinations plunged the country into a situation of near civil war. The Tudeh Party and the Fedayce-Majority sided with the regime,90 Race & Class criticising ‘ultra-leftists’. At first, the secular Left organisations remained on the sidelines, unhappy with the turn of events and their own powerlessness. Eventually, though reluctantly, they elected to join the battle and subsequently suffered tremendous losses. When the mini-civil war finally ended in late 1982, the regime had won. In 1983, the Islamists then turned their attention to the Tudeh Party and the Fedayee-Majority, and a new wave of arrests, executions and repression ensued. Ironically for a party that had for so long toed Khomeini’s line, the Tudeh Party suffered even greater losses than the other organisations, mainly because it had publicised the names and addresses of its cadre, who were consequently more easily rounded up. In the wake of the repression, those Tudeh activists who were not arrested fled to Afghanistan and to Europe. where they resumed an exile existence. Conclusion It is important to note that, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, while the Left and liberal/social democratic forces and their institutions were hounded and banned by the Pahlavi state, the religious establishment expanded considerably, and its institutions proliferated.? Networks of mosques, seminaries and lecture halls, publication of religious journals and books, access to the print and electronic media, and the steady stream of mullahs (clerics) emerging from the theological schools of Qom and elsewhere provided the leaders of political Islam with an important social base, organisation and resources.’ The Shah’s political war against the Left and the liberals had resulted in a diminution of secular political discourse, left-wing organisational resources, and democratic institutions; hence, the dominant language of protest and opposition against the Pahlavi state was religious. That the Iranian Left did not appreciate the phenomenon of political Islam and did not take seriously the clerical capacity contri- buted to the latter's strength and the Left's own demise. The Islamic discourse and the pre-eminent role of clerics were explained away as superstructural manifestations, spontaneous religious expressions and temporary features of the revolutionary process. Political Islam was not treated as a political ideology, with a specific agenda, but as a symbol of something else: the spirit of the revolution, a reaction to the excessive westernisation of the Pahlavi regime, etc. This fact, along with the Left's economistic approach to religion, prevented it from recognising political Islam for what it was: a deliberate attempt to take over and control the revolution and impose a particular politico- cultural vision Thus, when the army and monarchy collapsed in February 1979, the clerics were in a far more advantageous position than any otherNotes and documents 91 political force to assume power and to command popular allegiance The absence of an effective political strategy on the part of the Left, disunity within its ranks and unwillingness to forge a liberal-Left alliance undermined the secular project and facilitated Islamist domination. VAL MOGHADAM and ALI ASHTIANI References 1 E, Abrahamian, Jran: between two revolutions (Princeton, NJ, 1982); V. Mogha: dam, ‘Socialism or anti-imperialism? The Left and revolution in Iran’, New Left Review (No. 166, November-December 1987). S.A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: the Islamic revolution in Iran (New York, 1988) S. Akhavi. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (New York, 1980); M. Fischer. Iran: from religious dispute to revolution (Cambridge, Mass. 1980); Moghadam, op. cit NEW FROM THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS The first comprehensive research in Britain on how black people have died in the custody of the police, prisons and special hospitals. 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