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The Western Front 1944 Memoirs of A Panzer Lehr Officer J J Fedorowicz Pub 1995
The Western Front 1944 Memoirs of A Panzer Lehr Officer J J Fedorowicz Pub 1995
The Western Front 1944 Memoirs of A Panzer Lehr Officer J J Fedorowicz Pub 1995
RITGEN
by
Helmut Ritgen
Oberst A.D.
Translated
by
Joseph Welsh
Published by
J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
106 Browning Blvd.
Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canada R3K 0L7
(204) 837-6080
Copyright 1995
Printed in Canada
ISBN 0-921991-28-2
Typesetting by George Bradford Type & Design
Printed by FREISEN PRINTERS
This book is dedicated to
our good friend Adrian Bowden.
PUBLISHER'S
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We wish to thank the following individuals who have contributed to the publishing of
this book.
Joseph Welsh - Translation
Richard Derkson - Proof Reading
George Bradford - Proof Reading
Brian Molloy - Signing Box Art
We also wish to thank you the reader for purchasing this book, and all those of you who
have purchased our other books, and have written us with your kind words of praise and
encouragement. It gives us impetus to continue to publish translations of the best German
books and specially commissioned books, as you can see by the additional books which are in
preparation for publication in the near future. Other titles are either being negotiated or seriously contemplated, many as a result of your helpful proposals.
John Fedorowicz & Michael Olive
iii
iv
FOREWORD
Colonel Helmut Ritgen's book "The Western Front: Memoirs of a Panzer
Lehr Officer" opens with a description of the Wehrmacht's early successes in
the West through to the Dieppe Raid and describes, as only a soldier can, the
days spent waiting for the impending Allied invasion. It continues with an
account of the events of D-Day and the ensuing American and
British/Canadian pushes on and through Caen, describing the German
actions to defend the Scheldt Estuary and delay the Allies as Hitler planned
his great counteroffensive, nicknamed the Battle of the Bulge.
Over fifty years have now passed since the Allies landed on the Normandy
coast on the 6th of June 1944 in the greatest combined naval, air and land
invasion the world has ever seen. In the summer of 1994, thousands around
the world commemorated this historic event in their own countries and especially at all the landing sites, villages, and cities in the Normandy region.
For all Allied veterans who returned to this hallowed ground it was a time of
remembrance, and for most it will be their last opportunity to retrace those
footsteps of their youth. Young people were also there to learn the horrible
mistakes which wars create. Hopefully they realized the importance of their
future dreams to create stable and peace-loving nations.
Colonel Helmut Ritgen, whose military career continued after the war in
the NATO Forces in Germany and a tour of duty in the United States until he
retired in 1976, strongly believes that the WW II Allies made a grave mistake by not inviting German Veterans back to Normandy for the 50th
Anniversary of D-Day. He argues that the changing face of Europe, the
restructuring of Germany after re-unification and the collapse of the Soviet
Union are all major factors that necessitate closer cooperation among the
NATO allies.
This book is written from the author's recollections and those of his soldiers in the Panzer Lehr Division that served in Russia and later on the
Western Front. It was one of Germany's crack Panzer divisions, and was
employed in concert with 21 Panzer Division and 12 SS-Panzer Division
"Hitlerjugend" by Field Marshal Rommel as he attempted to regroup during
the early stages of the Normandy landings to drive the British and Canadians
back into the sea. This plan proved impossible due to overwhelming naval
firepower and the incessant attacks from the air that created major losses.
He describes the various defensive operations in the Normandy campaign,
emphasizing the Allies' overwhelming air superiority, the effects of the
heavy naval guns, the great superiority in artillery and massive supply of
ammunition and war material. This assembly of power not only hampered
viii
German operations and paralyzed the movement of their troops on the battlefield, but in some places it rendered ground operations impossible. He once
told me "at first we were convinced that we would be able to throw the
Allies back from the beaches; but just moving up towards the front in
Normandy under air attack discouraged us."
Colonel Ritgen has previously written the histories of the 6th Panzer
Division and the Panzer Lehr Division, which were well documented and
cover many interesting battles of WW II on the Russian Front and against
the British, Canadians and Americans in Western Europe. An expert historian, he has guided the Headquarters 3 (British) Division, the Canadian Forces
Command and Staff College and 1 Canadian Air Division through the battlefields of Western Europe, and has been interviewed on numerous occasions
by U.S., British and Canadian media. He now focuses the reader's attention
on the Allied invasion of Europe and the operations that led up to the final
turning point and German withdrawal to their homeland, ending with the
Ardennes offensive. He dedicates his book to the memories of the brave soldiers on both sides who fell in battle in the hopes that it will close the last
chapter of past fraternal wars in Europe.
Military strategy, tactics and leadership are learned by those who study history. In the present we must look beyond ourselves and study the kind of
insight, or psychological sense, that leaders on both sides possessed to plan
and execute their battles. As Wellington aptly expressed, we need to know
what is going on "on the other side of the hill." The author has given an
excellent presentation in "The Western Front 1944: Memoirs of a Panzer
Lehr Officer" about what was happening on "his side of the hill," which I
strongly recommend is well worth reading.
Brigadier-General S.V. Radley-Walters
(retd) C.M.M., D.S.O., M.C., C.D.
Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment
(27th Armoured Regiment, D-Day 1944)
ix
PREFACE
It has been five decades since the Allied "D-Day" landings in Normandy
and the ensuing struggle for Europe that led up to the Battle of the Bulge,
Hitler's last gamble. He had predicted that the Allied landings in France
would launch "the decisive land battle of the Second World War." It was
indeed a battle as decisive for Europe as was the Battle of Gettysburg in
1863 for the United States, During the past 50 years Germany has grown
from a national state to a democratic constitutional state within the European
Union and the NATO alliance.
This book is composed of personal recollections and articles that I have
previously published in Germany. It contains descriptions of actions in other
sectors of the Western Front that I felt noteworthy in addition to the fighting
of 1944. While this is not a history book, each statement is documented. This
book is dedicated to the honourable memory of the brave soldiers of both
sides, in the hope that this will have been the very last fraternal war between
major nations in Europe. According to Western tradition, these soldiers
placed the rights and freedom of their country above their own individual
rights and freedom. They conscientiously fulfilled this natural patriotic duty
- as long ago formulated in 429 A.D. by the Athenian Statesman Pericles "to defend that which we love, even with our lives."
Following the Normandy invasion the German soldiers were overcome in
battle by the Allies' superiority in fire-power and supplies. With an unshakable sense of duty, they rebuilt their Germany from the ruins of war.
Chancellor Adenauer's request to merge the ethical values of German military tradition with democracy, originally presented to the Bundestag during
rearmament debates in December 1952, is still being thwarted by politicians
and left-wing elements. Today they slander German soldiers and try to
exclude them from the building of the new Europe.
After such a long period of peace the younger generation has completely
lost track of the threat that can be posed by an external enemy. Therefore,
they are scarcely capable today of realizing the mental and physical trials
and tribulations of those highly-motivated soldiers of 1944. Today, shirkers
and dodgers are often ignored and no longer looked upon as cowards or
undesirables. They are seldom punished.
The majority of the German panzer divisions and the best infantry divisions
were fighting at the Eastern Front in an ideological struggle of unsurpassed
brutality. The war on the Western Front showed quite a different face. Here,
the was was waged in relative fairness by both sides, as overwhelming Allied
power on land, at sea and in the air was thrust against a few poorly-supplied
x
panzer and motorized divisions. Most of the infantry divisions were "static",
unsuited for mobile warfare, they could only be fully utilized in coastal or
point defence. They were, in their training, equipment and mobility, similar
to the infantry of 1918. The capabilities of these soldiers were accurately
described by German post-war historian Hubatsch:
"With reference to training, equipment, age and combat experience, the
German soldiers of the Western Front in 1944 were inferior to those German
forces at the Eastern and Southern Fronts. They could not be considered
qualified to withstand the attackers' superior numbers or power. Lacking
adequate coastal naval and air support, the German soldiers were handicapped by fuel and ammunition shortages. Their mobility was further
restricted to road marches at night due to extensive rail and bridge damages."
It is no surprise that our former opponents were amazed by these soldiers,
whose sense of responsibility, devotion to duty and patriotism enabled them
to effectively resist the Allies for two months, delaying their breakthrough
from Normandy to the West Wall while inflicting heavy losses on them.
During this campaign they were not only vastly undersupported by their mad
Fhrer, they were also deprived of their initiative and mobility by exaggerated orders to hold that relegated them to targets of fire from the air and
ground.
No veteran of the Westfront 1944 will ever forget the bitter and horrid
fighting of the campaign. But no one will either forget the bravery, devotion
and unselfishness of their good comrades. Their fellowship did not allow
some individuals to run away while others stood and faced death and
destruction.
In 1951 General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, apologized
for his earlier incorrect assessment of the German Wehrmacht as being the
champion of Hitler's despotism. He declared that:
"the Wehrmacht did not lose its honour and continued
to fight bravely and decently for its country."
Helmut Ritgen
Oberst a.D.
November 1995
xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publication of this book in English is an honor for me. My thanks go
first to all those who have contributed to my work, but above all, to my old
comrades from the Panzer Lehr Division. Like me, they were lucky to survive the fighting of 50 years ago. Their vivid reports of the dedication, bravery and horror seen in battle have considerably enriched and completed my
own recollections. Representing them all, I would like to single out the late
Erwin Feuerpfeil, Josef Graf and Wolfgang Maas. I am also much obliged to
the late Dr. Guenter Fromm and Hermann Pieper for their many suggestions,
comments, photographs and reports.
I am most grateful to Major Dick Derkson for his incessant advice, help
and support in dealing on my behalf in Canada. Without his invaluable work
my efforts would remain fruitless.
I am deeply indebted to my publisher, J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, and
Mike Olive, who wrestled with problems in translation and editing, compounded by the miles separating us. Their layout of this book is splendid.
Finally, I have to warmly thank my dear wife for her everlasting patience,
sound advice, and performing the irksome task of correcting and polishing
my German manuscript. Without her help and support this book would not
have been possible.
Helmut Ritgen
PHOTOGRAPHIC CREDITS
All photographs have been provided from the collection of Helmut Ritgen
except for the following:
Bundesarchiv - pages; 153, 155, 157, 159, 162 and 163
ECP Armees - page 154
xii
I
FROM VICTORY TO TURNING POINT 1942
1. 1940 - Victory in the West
Dunkirk 1940
The Wehrmacht attacked in the West on 10 May 1940. According to
General von Manstein's ingenious plan, the armored forces of the 4th Army
forced the Meuse crossings and, on 20 May, reached the Somme confluence
near Abbeville after a breathtaking leap. The French-British-Belgian Armies
in Artois and Flanders were encircled. The panzer divisions then advanced
on an inverted front from the west toward Dunkirk against only weak resistance.
On 23 May Panzergruppe Kleist was able to establish several bridgeheads
across the La Bassee - Gravelines canal line. General Guderian requested
permission to launch an immediate attack through to Dunkirk in order to
deny the English withdrawal. Cassel, the headquarters of British General
Lord Gort, lay defenseless "in front of the gate." The attack launched on 24
May had to immediately be recalled due to Hitler's order to hold.
The OKH wanted to undertake the destruction of the pocket being encircled
by Generaloberst von Bock. Without Hitler's consent, the 4th Army, "including all mobile formations," was subordinated to the Generaloberst. These
forces were to form the "hammer" to strike the enemy forces, which were
tied up by the tenacity of the Army Group B armies forming the "anvil" in
the east.
Insulted, Hitler immediately overturned these subordinations and forbade
the 4th Army to cross the canal line, so that the armored forces would be
ready for the coming operations. This order left the panzer commanders
speechless. The glory of the victory was to fall to Gring's Luftwaffe. His
orders to the already weakened Luftwaffe: "Break any resistance offered by
the encircled elements and prevent the escape of British forces across the
canal," was overtaxing. Indeed, Goring ordered, "attack so that they cannot
board their ships." But these orders could not be carried out due to the
attacks launched by the Royal Air Force from bases in England, the weather
and the shortage of ammunition. There were no German fighter-bombers
available.
The eventual panzer attack across the canal line then ran into a well-constructed defensive zone. The English feverishly utilized the unexpected
breather. Hitler's "Halt Order" now had to be paid for with blood and many
panzers.
1
On 25 May, Lord Gort saw the collapse of the Belgian Army as threatening
his left flank, and even presaging an encirclement. He ordered his forces to
withdraw to Dunkirk, rather than breaking out to the southwest.
At the same time, England made preparations for "Operation Dynamo," a
combined Navy, Air Force, Army operation that included the commitment of
almost 1000 ships. The loading of the forces, without weapons and equipment, began on 27 May, at times from the harbor, at times from the beach,
and ended after the successful evacuation of over 340,000 Allied soldiers on
4 July. England had rescued the majority of its Army.
Hitler interfered greatly for the first time in the operational conduct of the
war with his "Halt Order" and forced his own brand of military leadership
down the throat of the OKH. He passed up his greatest chance. Instead of a
British "Cannae," he won in Dunkirk only a tactical victory.
Combat Report
24 May 1940
On 23 May 1940 my reinforced platoon (7th Company) - four Skoda panzers and one Pz IV - was subordinated to the 3rd Company, 4th Schtzen
Regiment, which had the mission of establishing a bridgehead across the
Neuffosse canal in Arques, at the head of Group Koll. There were approximately 20 Frenchmen at the entrance to Arques, then we ran into a fleeing
supply column, whose vehicles were partially shot up and whose men withdrew across the canal bridge on foot. I had to stop in front of the bridge
because of an obstacle. Then the bridge flew into the air with a powerful
explosion. The riflemen crawled across the remnants of the bridge under
covering fire cover from my tanks. We took fire from towed barges, but still
were able to fish a fleeing French lieutenant out of the water. That was when
I noticed the still undamaged railroad bridge 500 meters further to the south.
I immediately dispatched Feldwebel Bess and three tanks to the undamaged
2
bridge. He reported that the bridge was prepared with explosives, but he
drove away a demolition squad and destroyed a defending machine-gun. A
second machine-gun fired at intervals, but its position was still unknown.
Over the radio, I requested our engineers to disarm the bridge demolition
charges. We crossed the bridge and met our riflemen on the far side in
Arques. Oberleutnant Sltmann took out a 15cm gun with a handgrenade.
However, another gun was firing on us from Fort Rouge, a distance of 2000
meters. I offered to assault the gun. Advancing by fire and movement, my
four tanks (the Pz IV shed a track on the railroad bridge) stormed the gun
position. The gun crew fled. From the rear of the gun position I noticed
another three 15cm howitzers beside it, loaded and ready to fire at us, and a
machine-gun which we overran. With the help of the riflemen we flushed
about 75 Frenchmen from hedges and houses.
No sooner had we secured the intersection when, one after another, two
staff cars arrived, one with surprised French, the other with British officers.
They surrendered after a brief resistance.
Feldwebel Bess on horseback fetched riflemen to reinforce us, as we didn't
have radio contact with them. Two tanks reconnoitered up to La Crosse,
where they ran into a road obstacle and captured several prisoners.
Feldwebel Bess reconnoitered up to the forest north of us - we had been taking fire from that direction - but he found no enemy. Shortly after that, our
air reconnaissance aircraft dropped a report which said that he hadn't sighted
any enemy in the forest. Gradually our prisoners were brought back.
At 1700 hours I was ordered to reconnoiter toward Le Nieppe. I had to
remove two road blocks and several English vehicles. A civilian told us that
Englishmen were in positions on either side of the road leading to Cassel.
During the return trip I received new orders in La Crosse to reconnoiter to
Ebblinghem in order to look for the 5th Company, with which communications were lost. On the way I noticed movement in Le Nieppe. A 4.7cm (2
pdr) English anti-tank gun was being brought up into position. I destroyed it
and captured approximately 20 men. In the meantime my Pz IV successfully
engaged the English infantry advancing from Ebblinghem towards Le
Nieppe. Vehicles were approaching from all sides. Unfortunately the requested reinforcements had not arrived, so many of the English forces were able
to escape. The Pz IV fired at and set ablaze some anti-aircraft equipment and
ammunition north of Le Nieppe, when two trucks approached from
Ebblinghem. Their crews dismounted and took up positions, refusing to surrender, although summoned to do so repeatedly. Finally a tank round killed
three of them and wounded several others. The three remaining men were
captured and evacuated with the wounded...
Signed Ritgen, Lt. (II Bn. 11th Pz.Rgt. Combat Diary, Annex 10)
3
The attack prepared against Cassel, the army headquarters of General Lord
Gort, was suddenly cancelled "on the Fhrer's order" that afternoon; we
found this hard to understand. Instead, we had to withdraw behind the canal.
I was posted to the regimental headquarters as orderly officer and had to say
good-bye to my platoon.
On 27 May - three days too late - after two quiet days in the beautiful, but
neglected Chateau Campagne, the order to attack Cassel arrived. The
fortress-like table mountain, which rose above the Flanders plain, was to be
attacked from the west by Kampfgruppe von Esebeck and from the south
(out of Staple) by Kampfgruppe Koll. In the meantime, the 145th British
Brigade established defensive positions there and rained fire down upon us.
The rising terraced terrain could only be negotiated by the tanks using the
roads, which were controlled by the British 17 pounders (87.6mm guns)
from dominant positions on the old city wall.
The attack failed after suffering heavy losses. My old 7th Company lost ten
killed and many wounded, including its commander. At midnight the senseless attack was ordered suspended.
As we observed the defenders of Cassel openly shaving next morning,
Oberstleutnant Koll ordered an immediate pause in the fighting for morning
toilet, a cease-fire which both sides scrupulously maintained for 45 minutes.
Extract from Division Operation Order of the Day, 28 May 1940:
On 27 May 1940 the division's Kampfgruppen von Esebeck and Koll were
engaged in bitter fighting near Cassel against a particularly tenacious
enemy emplaced in favorable terrain conditions. Panzers and infantry
together penetrated into the village by evening, in spite of fierce resistance
and heavy losses, and finally broke off the combat on my order. This fighting is the heaviest that the division has experienced so far. Commanders
and troops have made an extreme effort, for which I express my special
recognition and thanks.
During the early morning of 30 May the defenders of Cassel tried to break
out to the north. On the previous day we had taken Steenvorde and Watou
with Stuka support, then turned toward Winnizeele in the dark.
We destroyed the English brigade near Droogland (northeast of Cassel) in
the early morning fog, and took 2000 prisoners. We were mentioned in the 1
June 1940 Wehrmacht Report. With this impressive success against a modern-equipped, decisively fighting and fresh enemy force, we victoriously
closed the first phase of the 1940 Western Campaign.
Diagram 1
The route of the II Bn., 11th Panzer Regiment during the 1940 Western Campaign.
A commemorative map for the members of the battalion. The panzer in the upper right is a
Czechoslovakian "Skoda 35". The light panzer companies of the 11th Panzer Regiment, the only
German element to be so equipped in 1940, were equipped with these panzers (3.7 cm main gun).
5
After England turned down all peace offerings Hitler cancelled an immediate but extremely risky naval landing (Operation Sea Lion) against the
British Isles, as the "Battle of Britain" was lost in the air. The "final victory"
over unflappable Great Britain apparently had to be sought by another, easier
indirect approach. The expansion of the German combat zone to the
Mediterranean Sea presented itself, especially since their Italian allies had
been denied any success. An attack against the Suez canal, in order to block
the decisive supply lines of England from the Middle East through the
Mediterranean, appeared very promising. Also, Italy, which Mussolini
allowed to enter the war on the side of Germany even though it was ill-prepared, had suffered serious setbacks in Albania and North Africa. This
required the Germans to send forces to help defend the Italians against
British attacks.
The security of all operations in North Africa was threatened by the rocky
island of Malta, a British naval air and supply base laying between Gibraltar,
1100 miles away, and Alexandria, 900 miles distant. Today these distances
represent no problem to air traffic, but at that time, the range of the fighterbomber was 200 miles. Malta was the thorn in the side of the German-Italian
theater of war, preventing supplies and reinforcements for the North African
theater of war from reaching the front safely. In October 1941, 63 percent of
the supplies were sunk. In November losses rose to 77 percent. The Italian
Air Force and Navy were unable to neutralize Malta, in spite of continued
attempts. Hitler believed in the invincibility of his Luftwaffe, fantasizing that
it could completely destroy the island from the air, and that its actual occupation was unnecessary. Even after the OKW, the Oberbefehlshaber [OB] Slid,
Generalfeldmarschall [GFM] Kesselring, General Rommel and the Italians
requested Malta be captured by an immediate landing, Hitler retreated from
his plans, influenced by the heavy losses suffered by the Fallschirmjgers
during the conquest of Crete. Because of the lack of Italian naval landing
forces, the main burden of conquest would fall on the German Luftwaffe,
which also had to provide protection for the German Afrika Korps and the
Italian coast.
In April 1942, much too late, due to Hitler's indecision, German support for
Operation HERKULES, a combined air and sea landing on Malta was finally
discussed, albeit half-heartedly. Although there was no combined Axis
senior command in the Mediterranean, a mixed German-Italian "Special
Staff for the Preparation of a Landing on Malta" began making plans. Its
German element was led by General Student. Oberst I.G. Trettner was his
6
chief of staff. The planning objective was to capture the island before the
start of Rommel's offensive against Egypt - Operation THESEUS - scheduled
for May/June, in order to finally eliminate the source of threat to future operations in North Africa.
In the heat of the afternoon of X-Day, an airborne operation would take
place to establish an airhead near the Luqua and Hal Far airfields, while the
naval battle group simultaneously left their Sicilian harbors in order to begin
landing forces on various beaches under the cover of darkness. Admiral
Weichhold's German-Italian naval battle group was to put ashore the 66th
Special Purpose German Panzer Company north of Kalafrana in the Bay of
Marsaxlokk, covered by fire from 88mm guns mounted aboard Siebelbarges. With the armoured support, the group was then to expand the beachhead to the west and make contact with the airhead.
The German Army was only weakly represented in this landing by a panzer
company, which, according to OKW instructions from 4 May 1942 was to
consist of a mixture of heavy tanks: 12 uparmoured Pz IVs, five VK 1801s,
five VK 1601s and all available captured Russian KV-1 tanks (at least ten).
The company was put together on 28 April at the Panzer Lehr Regiment in
Wnsdorf near Berlin under the leadership of Knight's Cross winner Hans
Bethke. Its unique armored equipment was determined by its special mission
and the difficult German armament situation in 1942. Because of the anticipated strong anti-tank defenses on the small island of Malta, fire-power and
heavy armour were more important than mobility and reliability. The transport of the landing forces to the island was a problem. Because of the shortage of landing craft and doubts as to the fighting spirit of the Italian Navy,
the attack would have to be led by the German Luftwaffe. It would not only
have to secure air superiority, but also at least suppress all defensive installations in the vicinity of the landings, and take responsibility for escorting the
airborne groups (Fallschirmjgers and transport gliders). The transport of the
airborne groups' heavy weapons was desirable, but only partially possible
because the thermals over the Mediterranean Sea made the maximum loading of the transport gliders too risky. Therefore, no panzers could be transported by the Me323 gliders, even with their 24 ton capacity. They could
only be transported by naval ferries, which were sea-going landing craft that
could carry two panzers each, or Siebel-barges from the Army engineers.
Because of the lack of ground and agent reconnaissance, the enemy situation on Malta was unclear. The guns of the coastal batteries, which were
directed by radar, had still not been fired. The infantry battalions, which
were dug into limestone hollows, approximately 200 anti-aircraft barrels,
and a squadron of heavy Matilda tanks stood ready to conduct a determined
defense, as was the hardy population.
7
Diagram 2
British Empire; it would, in the long run, have a mortal effect on the defense
of the Nile delta ... and ... would eliminate any chance for operations
against Italy and ... affect the landing in North Africa."
After Tobruk fell, Rommel, who was promoted to Feldmarschall, continued
the pursuit of the apparently defeated enemy forces toward Cairo and the
Suez canal. This was against specific orders to stop at the Egyptian border in
order to allow preparations for the attack on Malta to take place. The island,
in the meantime, had been reinforced. Hitler's blush of victory was shortlived. Much to Rommel's surprise the attack of his forces against the hills of
El Alamein was stopped by the English. His panzers had reached the end of
their advance. At the end of July, after both sides had attacked and stalled,
the front at El Alamein stabilized into positional warfare.
Hitler's incorrect decision to cancel the Malta landing, along with the failure of political agreements with Vichy France and Spain, surrendered the initiative and Germany's approaches in the south. Before long the Western
Allies would commit their fast-growing offensive potential there against
Germany. On the other hand. Hitler would scatter the bulk of Germany's
armed forces in energy-wasting gains on Russian territory. He would also
neglect his Luftwaffe.
climax, "but before us lay no chance for peace, before us lay the abyss of the
Tarpei Rock!" (The Tarpeian Rock, on the western slope of the capital in
Rome, from which in ancient times, state criminals were thrown.)
As if struck by lightning, the faces of those gathered round, which had so
recently reflected happiness, froze. A dark shadow fell over all of us as we
absorbed the bitter truth of the new commander's words. From then on, the
war presented a different face to us.
After 1 July El Alamein became an almost daily repeated theme in
Wehrmacht Reports. Oberst von Hnersdorff was born in Cairo and often
discussed Egypt and the Near East. After we were examined medically for
tropical conditions (East), we imagined commitments in Asia a la Karl May.
(Karl May was a well-known German Travel and Fiction writer.) The new
commander demanded much from himself and his soldiers. Gradually the
new panzers arrived. Their increased capabilities required different combat
methods than the old Skodas for commitments in support of "Defence in the
West" or "in the East." Company training was supplemented by planning,
sports, alert exercises, reconnaissance and terrain orientation. To protect
against air attacks, the companies had to be dispersed from the training
camps into small villages. Even in Brittany matters were getting more serious.
In December 1941 Hitler ordered the construction of the New West Wall later renamed the Atlantic Wall - in order to be able to release soldiers for
the Eastern Front and to increase security against the rapidly reinforcing
British Army. However, the alleged "impregnable fortification front" from
Narvik (Norway) to Spain remained, due to the shortage of personnel, "no
more than a thin strip with several knots tied in it," as the Oberbefehlshaber
West, Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, scoffed.
In 1942 one of these few knots, Dieppe, with its harbor on the Channel
coast, was within range of English fighters. It was protected by nature with
up to 250 feet high cliffs, as well as man-made fortifications and weapon
installations of all types. The defense of "Strong Point Dieppe" was entrusted to the commander of the 571st Infantry Regiment, Oberstleutnant Battel.
He had two infantry battalions, an engineer battalion and a reinforced
artillery battalion from the 302nd Infantry Division, which was formed in
1940, but had never been in combat. His division commander,
Generalleutnant Haase was responsible for the 70 kilometer-wide sector
from the Somme estuary to Veules-sur-Roses. However, in contrast to the
integrated commands of the Allies in England, his authority was limited to
his division, in accordance with Hitler's principle of divide and dominate.
10
Only in case of an enemy landing attempt would the local naval and
Luftwaffe forces be subordinated to him. Most important were the two
150/170mm Army Coastal Batteries, (H.K.B.) the 813th near Varengeville
and the 2nd of the 770th near Berneval, whose fire could place any landing
attempt at Dieppe into question. However, during the landing on 19 August,
two hours passed before permission to fire was granted by the naval commandant, as the Army Coastal Battery was positioned outside the Dieppe
security area. Fortunately, the battery commanders acted on their own initiative.
The attack on the city and harbour was to be conducted at daybreak by the
2nd Canadian Division ( Major General Roberts) in the strength of almost
5000 men, reinforced by tanks of the Calgary Regiment, equipped with
heavy "Churchill" infantry tanks, and with the support of strong naval and
air forces. Thirty minutes prior, two British commando elements were to
silence the two Army coastal batteries. Besides the garrison, all dry docks,
harbour installations and defensive positions were to be destroyed. In addition, detailed knowledge of the German radar equipment was to be obtained,
all before the planned withdrawal at noon.
The British air reconnaissance was conducted brilliantly and resulted in the
distribution of excellent maps. On the other hand, it appeared that local
agents had failed to locate command posts, troop designations and the positions of the Freya radar equipment of the 23rd Flugmelde Company near
Puys. Their assumed positions near Pourville were supposed to be destroyed
instead.
The success of the raid depended on complete surprise, but the landing was
dogged by bad luck. "Directive Nr, 40," which was issued in March because
of a successful English commando attack on a "Wrzburg" radar site,
ensured that the coastal forces would be particularly watchful and at constant
defensive readiness. At 0332 hours on 19 August the Freya radar near Puys
located and reported "very many targets" approaching at a distance of 35
kilometers. Then a German convoy ran into the boats of the English commandos. The ensuing fire-fight at sea brought the 302nd Infantry Division to
full defensive readiness at 0500 hours. So much for surprise!
At dawn heavy air attacks with bombs and on-board weapons, as well as
fire from naval artillery, were conducted against known and assumed positions before and on either side of Dieppe. Because of poor visibility, they
caused little damage, but they did interrupt many telephone lines. Therefore,
the two coastal batteries were isolated from the security region. Lacking any
radio equipment they were unable to report enemy attacks launched against
them.
11
Planned Attack
Actual Attack
Planned Blocking Positions
Coastal Defense Guns
Heavy Flak Guns
Light Flak Guns
Machinegun Positions
Diagram 3
Jubilee did not fail due to the lack of bravery of the Canadians, but because
of the concentrated defensive fire from all German weapons. The German
forces did no more than their duty. Knight's Crosses, therefore, were not
awarded.
One instinctively asks how could the British General Staff, which was so
experienced in conducting landings, plan a narrow frontal attack on such a
fortified Channel harbour, in light of the known strength of the Wehrmacht
around Dieppe, without anticipating failure? The reasons subsequently given
- as a reconnaissance and a probing raid for the later invasion, in order to
gather amphibious and combat experience, test new landing equipment and
learn about German armaments - shed little light. The military catastrophe at
Dieppe is only understandable politically.
Churchill was responsible for it. As the leader of the British Empire in 1942
he was being pressured from all sides to establish a second front in Western
Europe. Stalin in particular increased these pressures after the failure of the
Soviet spring operations in the Crimea and the Ukraine and the German
summer offensive to the Caucasus and toward Stalingrad was in full swing.
He threatened with suing for a separate peace with Hitler. Roosevelt and his
military staff discussed with the Russians the possibility of establishing a
second front in 1942, Operation Sledgehammer, a projected large-scale landing at Pas de Calais, which hoped for an inner collapse of the Reich, or at
least a sacrificial attack to relieve the Soviets. After the British failures in
Africa (Tobruk), the low morale in the USA and England had to be raised.
There was already a mistrust of Churchill in the lower house of parliament.
He feared the after effects of a failed major landing in France. Instead, he
strove for the defeat of Germany from another direction, where the enemy
would least expect it; an Allied landing in French North Africa, Operation
Torch. In order to convince his wavering partners and soothe the French,
however, he had to take some action. But the action he chose was more of a
sacrifice! Dieppe demonstrated convincingly to the world what the result of a
premature large-scale landing in France in 1942 would be. I should note,
however, that it was inconceivable to us Germans that the British and
Canadian generals would agree to submit their troops to such a sacrificial
defeat. A successful raid would have been catastrophic for Churchill's politics. The bloody sacrifice of the Canadians in Dieppe was not guaranteed.
They served honorably and admirably, we were impressed. They paved the
way for the successful policies of Churchill through North Africa - Sicily Italy until the invasion of France in 1944, unfortunately avoiding the
Balkans, which were promised to Stalin. Because of this oversight, the
unfortunate populations living there and all of Europe suffered for over 50
years.
14
In the technical realm, the ingenious idea of artificial supply harbours "Mulberries" - which paved the way for the surprise major landing in
Normandy in 1944, resulted from the failure of the attack on Dieppe harbour.
The reconnaissance of possible landing sites along the Brittany coast was a
welcome diversion from the constant alert readiness and immobility caused
by the fuel shortage. Thus, we came to know St. Malo and Mont St. Michel
(without tourists at that time), Brest, Quimper, Lorient and La Baule, along
with French cuisine, especially in the nearby forests, where King Artus supposedly had dined. We anxiously followed the manifold events on the far-off
fronts in the Wehrmacht comuniques. The nearby airfield made its wellstocked book store available to us. The commander, in the meantime, recommended Marshal Caulaincourt's two volumes ("With Napoleon in Russia"
and "Under Four Eyes With Napoleon"), whose books were banned from the
book market, "because of their defeatist views on Russia." We anticipated
being transferred to Russia at any time.
On 19 August, after our committment battalion returned in unfriendly
weather from an alert exercise, we received alert orders, but without any
details. An hour later we learned of the landing at Dieppe. We prepared for
commitment to "Channel Coasts A, B or C." This meant a march to the
northeast, with the departure point of St. Samson. The regiment was ready to
march at 1545 hours. English transports were sighted near the Isle of Wight
and near Brighton. The command group redeployed to St. Samson. The commander believed that the attack on Dieppe was a diversion in order to draw
off the German reserves, while a second landing with stronger forces had to
be anticipated at another location. I had a bottle of Mosel wine, Auslese,
1921. Since we could be in combat at anytime, I drank it that evening. But
the transport did it no good, it had turned, and was no more than vinegar. A
bad omen. We returned to our old quarters on the following day.
Thus the summer passed. The regiment, meanwhile, had almost become
completely combat ready. On 25 October the Wehrmacht report noted the
start of the British offensive in Egypt. We anxiously followed its course. The
fighting in Russia also increased in intensity. On 5 November we learned that
the division would be transported to Russia on 12 November, even though
we lacked winter equipment. Indeed, the equipment did arrive, but it had to
be hastily installed in the panzers.
On 8 November at 2000 hours we received an unexpected alert order! The
Americans and English had landed in North Africa! We were to redeploy to
southern France, tracked elements by rail, wheeled elements by road march.
15
Our transport trains arrived on 9 November. I was able to report the completion of the tank loading operations to the division at 1600 hours. Only the
locomotives were missing. However, three hours later this "intermission"
was over, as the transfer to Russia was now back on. The transfer to Russia
required the re-equipping of our tanks with winter equipment that had just
been removed. This caused considerable effort, especially for our maintenance personnel, who had to obtain winter equipment, winter fuel, oil and
tracks. Transport orders were then submitted to move one battalion into the
Donets Basin and the other to Belgorod.
"We can thank our beloved Fhrer for this confusion!" the commander
mocked at our departure on 14 November, "Now our enemies have seized
the initiative everywhere, in Africa they have us in a pincer, our cities are
being bombed and the Russians will be attacking at any moment!" On our
departure, the pleasant airfield commandant, an old world war one pilot who
had as much disdain for Hitler as Oberst von Hnersdorff, presented us a
title page of a journal showing a ram leading a large flock of sheep. Oberst
von Hnersdorff signed it laughingly "FHQ" (Fhrer Headquarters). It was
then passed from command post to command post in Russia for the amusement of all.
Passing Brest-Litovsk we learned about the offensive towards Stalingrad.
16
II
in a short time...
For that reason I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in
favour of other theaters of war. I have, therefore, decided to strengthen the
defenses in the West, particularly at places from which we will launch our
long-range battle against England. For those are the very points at which the
enemy must and will attack; there - unless all indications are misleading will be fought the decisive invasion battle.
The anticipated strong attacks by air and sea must be relentlessly countered
by Air Force and Navy with all their available resources.
PANZER-LEHR-DIVISION
Diagram 4
With an authorized personnel strength of 14,634 officers and men; a strong tank regiment with one Panther and one
Pz. IV battalion; two panzergrenadier regiments with a total of four panzergrenadier battalions, fully armored on
SPWs, a new type armored reconnaissance battalion, a tank destroyer (Panzerjger) and a heavy AAA battalion, a
field artillery regiment with three battalions (one self-propelled) as well as the usual combat support troops and
supply services. Panzer Lehr Division represented the best balanced and equipped German panzer division, capable
of offensive and defensive actions. It comprised in all 79 Panthers, 103 Pz. IV, 31 Jpz. IV and 674 SPW, 42 Field
Howitzers (105-152mm), and 18 88mm Flak guns.
20
contested forts and quietly inspected the charnel house of Douaumont and
the nearby huge cemeteries. The battlefield around the hill 'le Mort Homme'
was an excellent training area for tanks. Here we diligently exercised in conjunction with armored infantry. No admonishment by higher authorities was
required to keep us going..
In mid-January, I and Hauptmann Reche were assigned private quarters,
with central heating. However, we were not issued any coal and, in any case,
the heater was broken. Also, the plumbing was very unreliable. We were
supplied with gas for the hearth and even the boiler for the bath, which was
the reason we always had so many "guests." We did have electricity and we
finally received a coal ration of twenty kilograms a month. Then the evening
air raid alerts increased. Since our black-out facilities were so poor, I
wrapped my only table cloth over our lamp and it suddenly burst into flames.
We anxiously listened to all news, as depressing as it was, from the Eastern
Front, from Italy, where the Allies had also landed near Nettuno, and from
the homeland, which suffered from heavy bombing. To compensate for that,
rumors started flying. A clairvoyant had predicted that the war would be
decided in May, in our favour. This corresponded with Churchill's prophesy
that the war would be decided - by landings in France within 90 days. If it
did not succeed, then, under the circumstances, we would destroy the invasion forces! This of course was the main topic of conversation! The skeptics
and realists separated themselves from the optimists.
Our new officers mess, although sparsely furnished, offered compensation
and relaxation from the hard duties. We often gathered together for discussion, to find out the latest news or to celebrate one thing or another. The
French champagne elevated our mood from time to time. Prinz Schnburg
was temporarily posted and replaced by Major Darius as commander. During
the farewell party, we composed an epic "in open hexameter, like Homer." It
would have been accepted as world literature, if we had recorded it. Our two
division chaplains would also attend to perform services and discuss individual concerns. Church attendance was less than desirable.
We set up a "South Seas Bar" for NCOs and men in a large room. It was
pleasantly decorated and staffed. The Landser could buy drinks there, keeping their money in the company, instead of in town. The music of our company band and the beautiful old soldier's songs loosened the tongues and
opened the heart.
At the beginning of February our new division commander appeared,
Generalmajor Bayerlein, Rommel's former chief of staff in Africa. He made
a good impression and exuded trust and confidence. Fourteen days later we
were loaded up for Luneville, for a training exercise that was to be conducted before Generaloberst Guderian. On the evening of the firing, we had to
23
wait until 2330 hours for a messenger to bring the recently published panzer
firing manual. Thus, during the night, we struggled with the new firing commands so that we would be familiar with them when we performed in front
of the searching eyes of the inspector general. He divided up all of the officers into panzer commanders and gunners and tested each individually.
Naturally, many of them failed. Then it was the unteroffizier's turn. In closing, the Generaloberst gave a class in tank gunnery to everyone. Then he left.
We were able to breathe again. The regimental training on the following day,
in snow and an icy wind, did not go very well. Guderian exploded during the
briefing and made a classic statement: "This is the worst nonsense I have
seen in my entire military career!" Then he left. We consoled ourselves at the
officer's mess with a first class dinner. No air attacks disturbed the return trip
to Verdun.
Anxiously we followed the fighting around the Nettuno beachhead in the
Wehrmacht Reports. If this could be eliminated, then we believed the Allies
would avoid an invasion of France. But the beachhead remained.
At the end of February, every night enormous British bomber squadrons
flew over us and, as every soldier learned from letters, bombed every part of
the Reich. The air war was expanded to more and more cities. Apparently,
the enemy deployment in England was completed, they could be set loose at
any time. The Panzer Lehr Division was to be operational by 1 March, but it
still lacked formations, weapons and equipment.
A completely unexpected order surprised us: "The division will be transferred into the Vienna area. Advance parties will be dispatched by road on
the following day. The tracked vehicles will be transferred by rail!" After
everything was loaded. I was allowed to take a scheduled train through
Paderborn to visit my wife, who was expecting our first child. Without major
delays in unheated, overcrowded trains, I arrived via Vienna, at my company
at Bruck in the Leitha training area. Here two of our tank companies had
already been entrained. Did this mean commitment on the Eastern Front
after the hotly contested battle of Tarnopol? Or, perhaps, deployment to
Hungary, but as friend or foe? At the last minute, the division received
weapons, trucks and the majority of the missing units. Only the artillery and
the supply troops still had problems. Then it was to be Hungary!
In retrospect the five-week stay in Hungary seems like a beautiful dream, a
trip to paradise before the anticipated expulsion. But American bombs were
dropped on us and near Budapest, which inflicted losses on the division and
terrified the population. The railroad trip to Paderborn and the christening of
our first daughter and the return trip was delayed by detours and stops
caused by track damage. On the return trip in Vienna, I had to leave the train
for an air raid shelter. The war was also getting close to Vienna.
24
at almost all hours or had already been bombed, or the railroad workers, who
had to fulfill their duty under constant physical threat, we soldiers in the
west were living gloriously in a health resort, although we had to put up with
the nerve-wracking effects of constant alert readiness and the total cancellation of all leaves. Fortunately the field post was operating smoothly. The
mail also brought concerns about the increasing bomb damage and its
results. Because of the complete cancellation of leave, we could not help
those back home, we could only send our consolation.
Hungry for news, we followed every detail of the daily Wehrmacht
Communique. On 17 May the "Southern Front," (Italy), replaced the Eastern
Front from its number one position, which it had held since 1941. On 18
May the Allied spring offensive led to the evacuation of long contested
Cassino and, on 4 June, to the fall of Rome, which the Allies occupied
breaching the "Open City" agreement they made with the Vatican. Nearby,
we listened to the forbidden British broadcast in German "Soldatensender
Calais" (directed by Sefton Delmer) regularly. Besides lively music, it carried amusing propaganda, which ranged from slight falsehoods to out and
out lies. Strange to say I never heard a word about the mass murder of Jews
or the progress of resistance fighters, etc. I never learned why these themes
were tabu for the broadcasts. As everyone knows, England was very particular about the refugees it would accept, never allowing one person in who was
seeking asylum, even withholding support from our own "resistance fighters."
One morning we heard that a British commando element was able to kidnap a German general. Since the Germans jammed the broadcast on our side,
we misunderstood the name "Kreipe" (from Crete) for "Keitel." We generally called this feldmarschall "Lakeitel." We began to applaud spontaneously
and drank a bottle of Champagne in celebration of the abduction. To our
deep disappointment, we were informed of the misunderstanding soon thereafter.
At the end of July, the broadcasts were giving a better rendition of the military situation in France than German enemy intelligence, so we accepted its
broadcasts at face value. Mobile combat erupted after the breakthrough at
Avranches and, when the broadcasts tried to draw us into the Falaise pocket,
they again lost all credibility.
The weekly company information classes were difficult for me at that time.
I could only report what I had heard from the newspapers or radio. This was
very little. The great questions remained whether and where the Allies would
cross the Channel. There seemed to be no doubt that a strike would come.
Germany's economic situation became even more serious. With surprise we
26
heard that the mail would only be delivered once a day in the homeland,
compared to twice a day in France. Every day in France the electricity was
being turned off from 0700 to 1900 hours. The French could only cook with
gas from 1000 to 1200 hours. Film teams appeared regularly and showed
news and films to the troops in barns and other shelters. Going out into the
nearest villages, towns and pubs was no longer possible.
Bombs fell here and there in our area. We did not let the bombs bother us,
as long as we slept in deep trenches that were well-camouflaged. There were
also false alarms, because someone would mistake a flak burst for a parachute.
On 4 June the regiment received, for us, the unbelievable order to send the
Panther battalion (I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment) and the Funklenk
Company to the Eastern Front. The prinz turned over the command of the
battalion to me for the duration of his trip home.
The long-expected invasion began on 6 June! I was wakened at 0415 hours
with an alert order: "English landing in the early morning imminent!"
Although I doubted the order, I had to get the battalion ready to march.
Reconnaissance aircraft and fighters circled high above us, looking for targets. Our uncertainty lasted all day, we had to wait.
were equipped only with captured weapons. Because of the lack of primemovers, heavy weapons were immobile and depended upon being supplied
by local divisional supply organizations. They were primarily manned by
older men, who were poorly trained and lacked any combat experience. They
"were not up to facing the anticipated enemy mobility, if the fighting evolved
into mobile warfare" (Speidel). Their combat value corresponded to a 1918
positional division. Rommel's measures to strengthen the defenses along the
coast against attack came in good stead. But the mobility of an attack reserve
was not improved.
GRENZE DER HEERESGRUPPE
ARMEEGRENZE
INFANTERIEDIVISION
FALLSCHIRMJAGERDIV
PANZERDIVISION
Diagram 5
The few panzer and panzergrenadier divisions were insufficient for mobile
combat against armored and motorized formations. The ground battle would
depend upon these formations, as long as the Luftwaffe was to secure the airspace over and behind them. The reinforcement of the Luftwaffe, especially
for air reconnaissance and interdiction, was not accomplished, nor were the
Navy's coastal defenses improved. The Army stood alone and had to make it
without the Luftwaffe.
On 6 June the Western Allies landed at an unexpected location, on a 70
kilometer front of the Calvados coast, with three airborne divisions and five
infantry divisions supported by tanks in the first wave, under an enormous
screen of naval artillery fire. They immediately broke through the so-called
impregnable Atlantic Wall and advanced inland without stopping.
The Luftwaffe and Navy failed to detect the approach of the enormous
landing flotilla of almost 6000 craft. The German radar station network
between Boulogne and Guernsey was systematically reduced to 5% capability by repeated air strikes shortly before D-Day and further confused during
the landing by radio jamming and deception.
Diagram 6
Diagram 8
NAVAL ARTILLERY TARGETS ON D-DAY
surrendered his battery without a fight to the attacking 231st British Brigade.
The command authority for the coastal defense was outlined in Hitler's
Directive No. 40 (and 40a). It did not provide for integrated command and
control. The engagement of the enemy before the coast was the mission of
the Navy alone, which due to shortage of naval forces before Normandy,
could commit only the two coastal batteries, "Marcouf' and "Longues". The
sinking of the destroyer Corry by "Marcouf' was the only success enjoyed
against the enemy armada. The German Navy and Luftwaffe had long ago
been overtaken by the technical progress of the British and Americans with
their enormous research and development capabilities. They had become
hopelessly inferior, both technically and numerically.
In order to achieve his objective, of repulsing the enemy attack, if not
before, then after it reached the coast, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel had
only seven battalions of the 716th Infantry Division to defend the landing
sites Gold, Juno and Sword. They had been formed for coastal defense back
in 1942 and consisted of older soldiers lacking combat experience, who
manned an extensive chain of partially concreted nests of resistance and
strong points in the neighborhood of the beach. Some were armed with 50,
75 and 88mm guns. The division was dependent on local logistics because it
lacked vehicles and horses. The artillery lacked telephone equipment and
prime-movers, so firing missions were limited to battery-size and they could
not change their positions. The two battalions that were committed on the
beach line were so suppressed from the air, from the sea and by the landing
ships that they could seldom fire and could not issue even one report.
Meanwhile, the British and Canadians landed at low tide and overcame the
only partially completed beach obstacles and mine-fields and immediately
advanced inward, without running into any noteworthy resistance. The weak
local reserves, which were on foot, were prematurely destroyed by air strikes
and by tanks. Since the command and control nets were failing, the division
CP was not aware of the situation, and therefore the senior command was not
informed until the following day. On 6 June the Atlantic Wall was more
effectively broken through than was ever achieved in the trench warfare of
1914 to 1918. In this case, however, there was neither a secondary defensive
position nor any effective counter-fire by the artillery; which had been
silenced by air strikes. There was no effective response from the Luftwaffe.
Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt ordered the linear arm of the "Atlantic
Wall" - the "thin strip with a couple knots tied into it" - be reinforced by a
second defensive belt corresponding to German "Hindenburg Line" preparations for a strong fortified line in 1917. This construction did not take place
due to the shortage of labor. Hitler wanted every available man at the Eastern
Front and doubted any serious landing on the Channel coast until the inva32
ondary missions that it was, for all intents and purposes, unable to accomplish any offensive mission. The enemy's surprise, deception and speed were
not properly anticipated.
On the evening of 6 June I British Corps occupied a ten kilometer-long
strip of coast with sufficient depth. Fresh forces, weapons and supplies were
landed during the night. The exhausted remnants of the German defenders
waited in vain for reinforcements and supplies. Confusion dominated at the
headquarters of the 716th Infantry Division in Caen. All of the reserves from
LXXXIV Army Corps were used up. Now they had to use the operational
reserves.
Long before the landings, the so-called 'Panzer Controversy' had evolved
between Field Marshal Rommel, C-in-C Army Group B, and General von
Geyr, CG Panzer Group West, i.e. the top panzer commander of OB West. It
opposed the notion of linear defense to defense in depth, static warfare to
mobile operations, the holding of ground to battles of annihilation, the primary dependence of concrete fortification to the primary dependence on
armored striking power.
Field Marshal Rommel advocated, due to his African experience, static
defense, fearing that Allied air power would prevent a timely deployment of
operational reserves - today known as "Follow-on Forces." In contrast,
General von Geyr had mobile defense in mind, as the strength of the German
panzer divisions could only be used effectively in this way.
The weaker the forces, the more flexibility they must have to fight. By sacrificing operational ground and avoiding battle at the area of the enemy's
choosing, it is essential to keep the mobile forces concentrated and to strike
partial blows. Fighting in static lines without reserves will force armies to
retreat, even when there are only small operational break-throughs.
General von Geyr differentiated two phases of the defensive:
a. fighting for in current terminology FEBA (Forward Edge of the
Battle Area): Here part of the mobile force should be committed as soon as
the enemy shows signs of being successful. The main effort of a landing
operation could hardly be located on the first day. It is more likely that the
enemy would determine the main effort only after the course of the first
day's fighting; and
b. the main effort of the enemy's landing is taking shape, the bridgehead is growing. Now everything depends on throwing all mobile forces even those committed already at secondary fronts - concentrated into the
battle.
Hitler ended this "Panzer Controversy" with the compromise of dividing up
the few operational reserves. Therefore, their commitment in mass, which
34
units not only had strong fighter-bomber formations available, but also the
vast firepower of two battleships and seven cruisers, as well as numerous
destroyers. Their fire was directed during the daytime by observer aircraft.
Wolfgang Maas,
I was a radio operator in our SPW, which was assigned to the headquarters, 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment. I was still a "little
shaver" at 19 years old, but I learned very quickly - either one did so or
one made mistakes.
During the deployment fighter-bombers attacked from the right. I
was sitting on the right front of the SPW and saw them come at us over a
row of trees. "Fighter-bombers from the right," and the driver quickly
buttoned up as I took cover beneath the armor. The SPW suddenly
jerked. We ran into a ditch. When the fighter-bombers turned away, several trucks and other vehicles were left behind, burning. Even our SPW
was hit by a heavy machine-gun round, that penetrated directly over my
head. The shot ricocheted, but did little damage.
Neither the commander nor the operations officer of the Panzer Lehr
Division learned on 7 June what was already known by the 12th SS Panzer
Division and the senior commander, namely that the enemy had captured
Bayeux and was already fighting his way along the rail line towards Caen.
This explains why General Bayerlein ordered his units move to contact,
unorganized for battle; into an area that was partially occupied by the enemy
and partially occupied by the 12th SS Panzer Division, instead of cautiously
advancing with deployed march security. If it had done so, the division
would still have been able to turn north after attacking further to the west.
While the march groups strived to reach their objectives under constant air
attack, General Bayerlein was shaken by a fighter-bomber attack shortly
before darkness. The attack cost his orderly officer, Leutnant Graf
Pappenheim, and his driver their lives. He himself was lightly wounded, but
the shock had a paralyzing effect until the next day.
The ALA had occupied its assigned security line by 8 June at 0900 hours. It
then conducted flank reconnaissance. Obviously undetected by the enemy,
the 130th Armored Engineer Battalion and the tanks led by the author
reached their areas in the early morning. The tanks found shelter and concealment in the park of Chateau Monts-in-Bessin. They were resupplied and
remained un-harassed by artillery fire and air attack all day. The anticipated
commitment order did not arrive. The Panzer Lehr Division Panther battalion
(I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment) was still in transit, returning from the
38
one's bloodthirstiness - were the continuation of the despised chemical warfare of the First World War in another form.
The commander of the 901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment, Oberst
Scholze, ran into the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment when his I Battalion
arrived in the assigned assembly area north of Cheux. Both units were
assigned the same area. He ordered his panzergrenadiers to take cover,
reported and awaited orders. His II Battalion was still on the march. The
strong Panzer Lehr Division was, except for two panzergrenadier battalions,
assembled. It was unable to strike as ordered or to shift its sector.
Kampfgruppe Meyer, of the 12th SS Panzer Division, had for the past day
been tied up in alternating action, costly for both sides, fighting northwest of
Caen in the 12th SS Panzer Division area of operations. The 26th SS
Panzergrenadier Regiment, held up by constant air attacks and road damage,
did not reach the assembly area assigned for the 7 June attack until early on
8 June. After arriving, its three battalions attacked Brouay one after the
other. The corps order for a coordinated attack did not get through.
The extent of ignorance of the situation in the senior leadership is reflected
in the 7th Army combat diary entry for 8 June:
Since there still is no contact with I SS Panzer Corps, the C-in-C set out
to the CP of I SS-Panzer Corps in order to inform himself firsthand of the
situation in the Calvados beachhead at the I SS Panzer command post.
There were still no reports on the situation in the Caen combat area at
noon. It appears that the I SS Panzer Corps attack has still not begun.
Time was the main factor in repulsing the invasion, to assemble sufficient
forces to counterattack against the still weak beachhead. However, the strong
enemy influence from the air and from the sea led to unforeseen delays and
excessively high losses of officers and communications. In such circumstances the force commander is obliged personally to act decisively on his
own. The subordinate commanders did not know what was going on and
were unable to act for the force as a whole. Thus, the opportunity had passed
for a vigorous and coordinated counterattack with the three panzer divisions
abreast towards the north.
40
road from Bayeux to Tilly. Near Jeruzalem they ran into resistance, apparently outposts from Battalion Zwierzynski (I Battalion, 902nd Regiment) reinforced by remnants of an East Battalion from the 352nd Infantry Division.
The lead British battalion was stopped until an infantry battalion arrived to
assist the tanks and capture the position. Meanwhile, the armored brigade
escaped using a parallel road just 2 kilometers further to the west. However,
the "Desert Rats" were still not familiar with the hedge-row terrain and
would not progress without infantry. Close-in fighters continuously tried to
throw hand-grenades into the hatches of the tanks or destroy the Cromwells
and Shermans with panzerfaust or ofenrohr. In the afternoon, several
Cromwells were able to achieve a deep breakthrough. Leutnant Werner
(130th Panzerjger Lehr Battalion) was believed to have destroyed three
tanks. Two others became stuck and were abandoned by their crews.
Further to the west, the recently deployed 56th Infantry Brigade attacked
the northern flank of the 130th ALA, which received a requested Panzerjagd
kommando or anti-tank squad at 1500 hours, a Panther platoon from the 2nd
Company, 6th Panzer Regiment, whose forward elements were returning to
the division by rail transport. The Panthers secured the intersection east of
Abbaye de Mondaye, but the enemy pressure was so strong that the division
commander ordered the withdrawal to a line Bernieres-Trungy. The gap in
the front further to the west to the 3rd Fallschirmjger Division was still
open. Increased enemy reconnaissance activity was discovered there.
Cooperation with organic artillery, which still lacked experience - from
deployment until the first round was fired took eight hours - did not bring
the hoped-for relief. The ALA lost one eight-wheeled SPW, seven SPW and
one A/T gun.
The anticipated heavy British attack on 11 June changed the situation very
little, even though the English formed mixed armored and infantry battle
groups for the fighting in Bocage. The 69th Infantry Brigade attacked east of
the Seulles toward Christot on the boundary between the Panzer Lehr
Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division. The fighting in the open terrain
raged to and fro. After an enemy penetration, Oberst Scholze (commander
901st Regiment) requested Panzer Battalion Schnburg to counterattack.
Prinz Schnburg's objections to such a poorly prepared and insufficiently
supported panzer attack in unfavorable terrain against a prepared enemy who
had tanks and anti-tank weapons fell on deaf ears. He succeeded in penetrating into the enemy positions. However, two panzers, including the command
vehicle, were destroyed by the strong defensive fire. Major Prinz SchnburgWaldenburg, his communications officer, Leutnant Herrmann, and Leutnant
Finsterwalder were killed.
44
West of the Seulles, the 56th Infantry Brigade attacked Tilly and the 22nd
Armored Brigade attacked Lingvres. Contact between Tilly and the rear
was temporarily disrupted. The fighting around Tilly was decided when
Oberst Scholze personally reached Tilly with a small kampfgruppe. The
22nd Armored Brigade captured Verrieres. After a counterattack by I
Battalion, 902nd Regiment failed, the panzergrenadiers counterattacked
again at midnight. This attack also collapsed in strong defensive fire, but it
cost the British defenders approximately 150 men.
The enemy probed with strong combat reconnaissance against the positions
of the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion on the Aure, on the division's
left flank. The la belle Epine intersection was lost to superior English forces.
This enemy activity indicated that, besides preparing an attack against Caen,
the enemy was still planning to advance into the gap between the Panzer
Lehr Division and the 352nd Infantry Division. German armored reconnaissance to the west was able to repulse weaker American patrols near Caumont
and to establish contact with elements of the approaching 2nd Panzer
Division's Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the right wing of
LXXXIV Army Corps. The seriousness of the British intentions were underlined that night by 16" high-explosive shells fired from the battleship Nelson
against Hottot and other road intersections.
On 12 June the enemy resumed the attack on the division's positions with
the main effort against St. Pierre-Lingvres. In spite of the British superiority, the Panthers and panzergrenadiers were able to repulse all attacks. The
3rd Company of the 6th Panzer Regiment particularly distinguished itself.
American forces approached Caumont. In order to protect against being outflanked to the west, the Division Begleit Company was committed near
Anctoville and subordinated to Major von Fallois. The ALA harassed recognized enemy movement to the south. I SS Panzer Corps directed its 101st
Heavy Panzer Battalion (Tiger) from Beauville through Paris to the VillersBocage area.
The Battle of Villers-Bocage
After the failure of the British frontal attack through Tilly, the commander
of XXX (British) Corps ordered an attack by the 7th Armored Division
through the gap between the British and American beachheads to the Villers
Bocage high ground in preparation for a later advance to the south, as soon
as the resistance of the Panzer Lehr Division was broken. Moreover, on the
afternoon of 12 July the 7th Armored Division was withdrawn from the front
and directed across the Aure to Livry, which was reached by the advance
guard, the 8th Hussars (armored reconnaissance), at 1500 hours. On the way,
45
Diagram 9
they were fired upon by the Panzer Lehr Division Begleit Company and lost
three tanks. In Livry, the 22nd Brigade was reinforced by additional reconnaissance, infantry, an artillery battalion and an anti-tank company. The
night saw celebrations of "liberation" with flowers and wine. In the meantime, heavy naval artillery prepared the attack on Villers-Bocage with fire.
Located there were only the two medical companies and the division's ambulance platoon which had established a main dressing station and a local hospital there. The division's supply route also ran through the town. The detonations of the shells sounded like an honor guard's salute as Prinz Schnburg
and his comrades were buried in nearby Parfouru!
Early on 13 June the 22nd Brigade turned to the east toward Villers, in
order to occupy Hill 213 as flank security against Caen. The lead element
was a Cromwell company (A Squadron, 4th Company, "Sharpshooters") and
a company of armored half-tracks from the 1st Rifle Brigade, followed by
the headquarters and reconnaissance of the "Sharpshooters." When they
reached Hill 213 without further combat reconnaissance and began to establish positions, Hauptsturmfhrer Wittmann and his Tigers suddenly
46
appeared. He immediately destroyed the first and last tanks in the column on
the road from Villers. Then he destroyed all the remaining tanks and halftracks trapped along the road. In no time approximately 50 combat vehicles
were in flames, including the artillery observation tank. Almost all of the
officers who were summoned to the front to receive orders were caught in
the trap. Only the brigade commander, who had suspected trouble, was able
to escape. The survivors established a hasty, all-round defense on Hill 213
and offered brave resistance as they were being attacked by Tigers and other
soldiers in the area. Even Captain Lex, commander of the supply company of
II Battalion, Panzer Lehr Regiment in Parfouru participated in this fighting
with several damaged panzers. The battle ended at 1300 hours.
Meanwhile, Wittmann and about four or five high-spirited Tigers, without
accompanying infantry, drove, firing, along the main road into the town,
until he received a direct hit from a "Firefly." He withdrew back to the following Tigers and had to bale out. Gradually all of the Tigers and individual
Pz IVs located in the town were put out of commission by the English.
Wittmann himself escaped on foot to Chateau Orbois, the Chief of Staff
command post of the Panzer Lehr Division.
General Bayerlein was informed of the threat to his rear earlier by various
sources. Based on his reports, the corps admonished the 2nd Panzer Division
to hasten from the south. This division's forward elements, the 2nd
Panzergrenadier Regiment, soon joined in the fighting southwest of TracyBocage, forcing the English to evacuate the town of Villers-Bocage and
established an all-round defense "box" on the hills to the west.
Before 1100 hours the author received orders to advance to the area north
of Villers with every available panzer - about 15 - in order to prevent the
feared strike into the division rear. The division general staff officer, Major
Kauffmann, gathered all available soldiers from his staffs and other units in
order to cover towards the south. All elements, especially the supply
columns, were warned to avoid Villers-Bocage.
Driving along the road from Juvigny, the author received instructions
directly from General Bayerlein in Villy-Bocage. I was ordered to advance
along the road to the west, block all exits from the town at positions north of
the stream, in order to prevent an attack into the division rear. When the lead
panzer reached the road to Anctoville northwest of the town, it was
destroyed by a concealed anti-tank gun and burst into flames. We had run
into the British all-round defense west of Villers. The panzers could not
attack through the heavy underbrush without panzergrenadiers and artillery
support. General Bayerlein, who accompanied us in his command vehicle,
ordered the attack broken off and that these positions be held. At 2000 hours
the mission was accomplished and the panzers returned to their departure
47
positions.
In the morning, the lb. Major Werncke, was on his way from his command
post through Villers-Bocage to the la command post in Chateau Orbois. He
reported:
The noise of combat grew louder and louder. Shortly before reaching the
town, I ran into a stream of wounded with bandages on every part of the
body. They warned me about continuing, that the enemy had penetrated
into the town, that they had overrun the medical company and the main
first aid station. The enemy was now advancing to the east, "deep into
the flanks" of our forces. The wounded had fled through the windows.
What was I to do? I had to get to the command post, which couldn't be
that far away. I told my driver to take cover behind a hill and return to
the lb command post in thirty minutes, if I didn't return by then. I fought
my way through the bushes on foot in order to get to the main road that
led to the east and reconnoiter the situation. When I crawled over a
hedge-row, I saw four Cromwell tanks on a small lot in front of me.
Their crews were gathered around their commander; they were worrying
over a map.
The tanks were empty, their motors running. Since, as an old panzer
company commander, I was familiar with such vehicles, and it appeared
that I could use the armored protection - this time British - for my further trip through no-man's land, I crawled into the nearest Cromwell,
hidden by the other vehicles. I grabbed the steering mechanism - which
was similar to ours - and drove the tank over the road-side ditch onto the
main road, turning to the east.
The situation was curious. I passed burning British tracked vehicles,
tanks and trucks. I had to be in the Tommies' rear area. Later I heard that
Wittmann had caused this total confusion. My "advance" continued
without incident. After about two kilometers I saw a confused looking
infantryman in German uniform in a ditch, and waved him over. He was
reluctant but he came and I ordered him onto the turret to wave a white
rag if any of our own forces appeared. That was how I reached the division command post.
Since the gate was too narrow, I drove over the iron fence up to the front
of the chateau. When they saw us coming all the Staff and guards dove
for cover. That was the first time I heard the enemy radio traffic coming
from the headsets hanging inside the turret of the tank. I asked a translator to listen to the traffic. He couldn't hear much until the motor was
turned off. Ignorant of how to turn off the engine, I stalled it against a
large tree.
48
Meanwhile, the heavy attacks against the division's northern front continued all day, with strong artillery support. During a counterattack the commander of the 7th Coy, Pz Lehr Regt, Oberleutnant Freiherr Marschal von
Brachtenbrock, was killed.
Near Tracy-Bocage the enemy had orders to hold his positions at any price.
The Panzer Lehr Division order for 14 June honored our action:
Enemy attacks into the deep flank and rear of the division with armored
formations were defeated in cooperation with elements of II Bn, Pz Lehr
Regt and the Tiger Battalion from the 12th SS Panzer Division, as well
as hastily gathered together forces in the Villers area. About 40 tanks
and 20 tracked vehicles were destroyed ... I express my heartfelt thanks
to all division elements for their excellent efforts during the recent heavy
English attacks. We can be proud of your efforts. In all, 110 enemy tanks
have been destroyed by the division ...
On 14 June, in order to establish contact with the 22nd Brigade, the 50th
Division launched a bitter attack against Tilly, Lingvres and la Senaudiere.
This was the climax of the breakthrough attempt near Tilly.
The German positions, which had been improved in the meantime, were
attacked not only by strong artillery from the 50th Division and 7th Armored
Division from XXX (British) Corps and V (US) Corps, as well as naval
artillery, but also by bombs, rockets and onboard weapons of the combat aircraft of 11 RAF Squadron. Then the 151st and 231st Infantry Brigades
attacked on a narrow 3500 meter front.
"To protect themselves from the artillery fire, the panzergrenadiers used the
little cover offered by the Bocage hedgerows. However, they were doomed
by the splinters that rained down upon them from the towering poplars,"
Major Zwierzynski remembered on that day. A salvo hit his battalion command post. The commander, communications officer, orderly officer, several
NCOs and Oberleutnant von Glysczinski, the commander of the 4th
Company, were wounded. Hauptmann Bhm temporarily took over the battalion.
Fighting lasted the entire day. The 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
and 130th Armored Engineer Battalion, after suffering losses during the past
few days, could only thinly occupy the front. Battalion Mller (II Battalion,
902nd Rgt.), whose 6th Company was almost destroyed, stopped the 151st
Brigade from penetrating into the village of Lingvres. Further to the south,
the 231st Brigade took la Senaudiere.
As II Battalion, 130th Pz Lehr Rgt. prepared to counterattack against
Lingvres in the forest near Longraye, the British thought these were preparations to attack the 7th Armored Division and ordered "Pandemonium"
49
(concentrated artillery fire by all British and American guns within range)
against the forest. This indicated the high level of cooperation between the
Anglo-Americans, as concentrated artillery fire was conducted within minutes. The panzer attack was brought to a halt in the marshy forest by an enormous ammunition expenditure. As the author remembers well, his battalion
was not destroyed yet, but it could not be controlled, as antennas and vision
slots were damaged.
"But nowhere could they break the German front. The fact that 7 miles
away to the South the Seventh Armored Division had thrust an arm into the
enemy's side had not weakened his determination to hold his forward positions." (Ellis, Victory in the West, p.256)
Then the exhausted 7th Armored Division, which was also attacked on 14
June by the 2nd Panzer Division, first received orders to withdraw its outstretched arm to the south during the following night, "in order to prepare for
a larger attack within the next few days." As long as the 50th Division made
no progress against the Panzer Lehr Division and the 7th Armored Division
was not reinforced by the 33rd Armored Brigade, the unsecured positions
near Tracy-Bocage and Amaye were only a burden.
The withdrawal of the 7th Armored Division began on 15 June at 0000
hours. It was camouflaged by the noise of over 300 heavy bombers from the
Royal Air Force, which dropped over 1400 tons of bombs onto assumed
troop concentrations south and east of Villers-Bocage, near Aunay and
Evrecy. The withdrawal went according to plan. After the heavy fighting, no
element of the Panzer Lehr Division was capable of disrupting it.
The operation to capture Villers-Bocage ended with the success of the
Panzer Lehr Division and bitter disappointment for the enemy. One must
agree with Chester Wilmot that the outcome was decided by the strong
German nerves. The British suffered from bad luck, and this time the fortunes of war smiled on the Panzer Lehr Division.
Defense of Tilly
Both sides were exhausted and bloodied by the heavy fighting of the past
few days. In order to preserve the force, it was necessary to shorten the
Panzer Lehr Division front by withdrawing its left flank. Lingvres was
given up. During the evening before the 901st Rgt. had to extend its sector to
the stream one kilometer west of Tilly. The 902nd Rgt. had become too weak
to be able to hold the entire sector. Its remnants were to be reorganized near
Sermentot. The abbreviation of the front and the withdrawal of the panzergrenadiers were made possible by the arrival of the 2nd Panzer Division on
the left of Panzer Lehr.
50
earthworks. In spite of this, the constant strong artillery fire and small local
attacks cost the division approximately 60 losses per day. The losses of personnel and equipment continued unabated, especially since the quality of the
replacements fell short of that required for major combat.
A daily announcement praised the bravery of Knight's Cross winner Rudolf
Brasche, who destroyed five enemy tanks in close combat, and damaged two
others. He was promoted to Unteroffizier. Brasche fired his "ofenrohr" from
behind a hedge and was then wounded.
The anticipated new attack against Tilly started on 18 June with the commitment of strong artillery and with the support of simultaneous attacks conducted along the entire front. The fresh 49th Division attacked east of the
Seulles. It occupied Christot, which was just evacuated by the SS, and penetrated into St. Pierre from the northeast. At the same time, the 50th Division
attacked Tilly from the northwest. Tilly was held by Battalion Schne (II
Battalion, 901st Rgt.) with support from assault guns of the
Funklenkkompanie. After heavy fighting, the enemy was able to capture St.
Pierre and suppress a portion of the combat positions, formed out of the
ruins of houses, in Tilly. The counterattack conducted that evening by the
Panther Battalion made only slow progress. Its commander, Major
Markowski, was wounded by artillery fire. Hauptmann Jahnke took over the
battalion. Due to the shortage of forces, the hotly-contested Tilly was given
up, after it was mined, and the main line of resistance was withdrawn to the
Montilly-Sagy line. Further to the left, Group Gerhardt counterattacked
against enemy forces that had penetrated southwest of Longraye and captured 14 prisoners.
The morning of 19 June passed quietly. The 50th Division established itself
in Tilly, dispatched reconnaissance and prepared for another major attack. A
heavy two-hour artillery barrage was started at 1500 hours against the front
line and artillery positions. At 1515 hours the enemy attacked at the seam
between the 901st and 902nd Regiment. While Regiment Welsch (902nd)
was able to eliminate all penetrations, the enemy pushed back the German
line in the Regiment Scholze sector of operations to the edge of Hottot. The
counterattack by the reinforced Panther Battalion first swayed to and fro and
then enjoyed some success, after it was resumed during the morning. Fifteen
enemy tanks were destroyed, but friendly losses were also high.
At that point in time the division reported losses of 2300 men, mainly
panzergrenadiers. If one takes into consideration that 75 percent of these
losses were suffered by the 40 panzergrenadier and reconnaissance platoons
(altogether with a strength of 1600 men), it follows that more than the entire
compliment of these platoons became casualties. In fact, a fortunate core of
"alter Hasen [experienced soldiers]" still remained. But in the long run, only
52
Normandy, 2 July 1944 - A battle of equipment, with artillery, tanks and air
sorties in previously unheard of numbers, raged in undiminished fury after
the Allied landing on 6 June. Several days before, on 28 June, the Americans
had captured fortress Cherbourg and, almost simultaneously, the British
achieved a deep penetration west of Caen. In the meantime, the 130th
Armored Reconnaissance Lehr Battalion (ALA) secured along the border
between the American and British armies east of Chaumont, on the western
flank of Panzer Lehr. The ALA command post was located in La Mogisiere,
five miles south-southeast of Aunay-sur-Odon. There, the radio section
Derenburg with an 80 Watt transmitter on frequency 2743 khz monitored
signals on the battalion supply net.
At 1350 hours a voice that spoke German well, with an American accent,
suddenly reported in a clear voice, obviously from a powerful American
transmitter:
Attention, Attention! German commands on this frequency. This is the
American Army. I have an important message for you. Over!
German radio procedures strictly forbade any contact with the enemy. What
to do? The radio station commander called his communications officer,
Lieutenant Schultz-Balluff. Then the next American call came through. It
was the same as before, with the supplement:
We want to turn over six German Red Cross nurses to you. Over!
In spite of thoughts to the contrary, Lieutenant Schultz-Balluff made the
forbidden contact, taking a risk of severe punishment that is inconceivable
today, 50 years later. The following is a short record of the radio traffic that
was exchanged at that time:
German [G1: This is the requested German command, please reply. I
request the names of the nurses. Please reply! Over.
American [A]: This is the American Army. We want to return six German
Red Cross nurses from Pasteur Hospital in Cherbourg. Over.
G: German command here. I request the names of the German Red Cross
nurses. Please reply! Over.
Reception was poor. Apparently the German transmission was not strong
enough.
A: I don't understand you. You are coming in very weak. Please switch to
frequency 2700. Over.
G: I will remain on the same frequency. You want to locate [radio direction
finding] us. This is a trick! I am switching off.
A: Why are you no longer transmitting? I cannot understand you. Over.
55
On 9 July there was another exchange in the same location. After radio
contact could not be made with a German station, Captain Roosevelt and two
other officers under the protection of a white flag approached with nine additional women, two nurses and seven staff assistants from Cherbourg. Again
both sides immediately silenced their weapons. After the exchange, the men
returned to their respective positions.
As General Speidel reported in "Invasion 1944," these proceedings "wakened particular fury and mistrust in Hitler." Local cease-fires for humanitarian purposes were not extraordinary in the west, they were used to evacuate
the wounded or for other reasons. The author remembers a cease-fire for
morning toilet during an attack on Cassel on the morning of 28 May 1940,
when the English left their shelters to go shave. It was similar up to the end
of the war. Friend and foe utilized the same frequencies for their radio traffic
at the front and often one would overhear the other. Occasional radio contact
was unavoidable. Certainly the Americans were glad to turn over the women.
They could not guarantee their safety for very long and they could make use
of the propaganda concerning their treatment of German prisoners of war.
Nevertheless, this was still an "act of humanity" as described by General
Speidel.
"Today the invasion has been launched!" I wrote my wife on 6 June, before
marching to the front. This march and those that preceded it in 1939, 1940
and to Russia in 1941 and 1942 were recalled when, in September 1990, a
British tank with the well-known red Desert Rat designation (7th Armored
Division) passed me on the autobahn on its way for shipment to the [Persian]
Gulf War. The thoughts of the British tank crew could not have been much
different from ours at that time. The heart is always heavy. What was waiting
for you and your troops during the commitment? Did you do everything to
prepare yourself and your soldiers? I was convinced and I had great trust in
my supply company and the entire battalion. We faced the decisive engagement with our main English enemy. They formed the backbone of the enemy
resistance against the Reich and demanded unconditional surrender.
We knew that it would be difficult. But we were confident, the officers and
NCO's were well trained "alte Hasen," (old hands) most had front line experience and faith in the regiment and its weapons. Indeed, we would have preferred "Panthers" in place of our Panzer IVs, but we also had faith in and
were proud of them. During the formation period, in Hungary and up to
May, we trained closely with our panzergrenadiers. We knew and trusted
57
each other very well. The civilian population remained loyal and we had no
reason to mistrust the descriptions of the strength of the Atlantic Wall, but
we had no illusions that it could not be broken through. However, we would
be there in order to throw the enemy back. The fact that we had not seen any
German fighters in the skies over France was understandable. It was more
important for them to be committed at home. They would be there to help us
when we needed it, as they had been throughout the war; or so we believed!
All day, in clear skies, enemy reconnaissance aircraft had searched in vain
for our well-camouflaged vehicles. When we began the march to the front
that evening, it didn't take long before the first bombs fell. The fighterbombers, Typhoons and Lightnings, harassed the wheeled vehicles, but not
our panzers, whose flak platoons were well respected by the pilots.
Nevertheless, soon after we started the first deep air strikes were conducted
and we suffered some damage. Shortly after that we were able to shoot down
a fighter-bomber with an anti-aircraft machine-gun. That encouraged the
Landser!
We marched through the night without further incident, except for having to
detour around bomb damage, which we had to first reconnoiter and then
remove, so that our supply vehicles could get through. Our support vehicles
were integrated into the column and often had to be pulled out of craters or
marshes by the panzers. Thus, the march was delayed. In the north, heavy
artillery fire, flak and the slowly descending "Christmas Trees" (illumination
flares) lit up the sky.
Although we still had not reached our march objective, at daybreak we
occupied a forest near Alencon, in order to resupply.
Then a messenger gave me an order to immediately continue the march to
the north into the Villers-Bocage area, disregarding the air threat. No sooner
had the first tanks moved out onto the road then we were attacked by aircraft
and fired at with on-board weapons and rockets. A fuel truck was set on fire.
A black column of smoke rose into the sky, alerting other fighter-bombers.
Bombs fell. The noise and confusion was hellish. We were surprised. We still
had not learned to fire all available weapons, including rifles and pistols, at
the aircraft. We all sought cover until the attack was over instead of spending
our impotent rage against the pilots by shooting, like we would later. After
the war, British pilots told me that such fire in itself was seldom threatening,
but it would damage their aircraft so that their next sortie would be delayed.
Although these fighter-bomber attacks inflicted only little damage on the
men and equipment, they did make a great impression and cost time, because
we would drive more cautiously than before and the wheeled vehicles would
have to seek cover during every attack, which also delayed the panzers.
58
In order to be able to reconnoiter the assigned assembly area near Montsen-Bessin while it was still daylight, I rode ahead of the column on a motorcycle with sidecar [B-Krad]. The farther I drove, the more I could see that
the fighter-bombers had been busy. Here were the results of their work, burning vehicle wrecks on the side of the road spewing black smoke. At
times men would suddenly appear through the smoke as through a fog. At
the fall of darkness the fighter-bombers disappeared from the sky. Before
dawn, the battalion was quartered in the park of Chteau Monts. It was camouflaged and supplied, waiting for orders to attack to the coast.
My supply company settled down in and south of Parfouru-sur-Odon, the
medical company, which followed our march column, set up in and near
Villers-Bocage. We still did not know what the other march columns, the
902nd and 901st Regiments, had suffered. Their SPWs, for the most part,
were equipped with 2 cm anti-aircraft cannon, but they still lacked the necessary suspension mounts so that they were defenseless against air attack. The
SPW's did not arrive, in sections, until the afternoon.
Nothing bothered us all day, neither fighter-bombers nor any orders. During
the evening the Prinz and Captain Lex returned from Germany; I changed
quarters to the squire-house in Parfouru. The attack to the coast was planned
for the next morning. There were still no traces of German fighters in the
sky.
9 June. Unexpectedly, the attack on Bayeux was prematurely broken off.
During the evening I led the supply vehicles to the corps. The Prinz was laying on the engine compartment of his command tank. He called to me. He
was deeply depressed as he told me that the division commander ordered
him to return to the departure positions just before they were ready to
exchange fire with enemy tanks in the distance near Bayeux. The order was
probably given because of a penetration on the division right flank.
Underneath the swelling and receding thunder and lightning of the powerful
artillery in the north, we spoke of God and the world, about our present situation, which, in light of the already evident enemy superiority, there was little we could do about, and how completely different from the Eastern Front
the war would become out here. The Prinz had lost his usual composure and
confidence and I could find no words to comfort him.
10 June: In the afternoon the first Panthers from the I Battalion, 6th Panzer
Rgt. arrived from their trip through Germany. No one knew why they were
supposed to be transferred to the struggle on the Eastern Front just before the
anticipated invasion. How were we expected to throw the enemy back into
the sea? They still spoke of attacking, even though we had to stick our heads
in the sand because of the enemy air superiority. With their front line experi59
ence from Russia, the old soldiers took pains to prepare everyone for "the
phenomenon of war", - which will shock and terrify soldiers for the first
time - before they have experienced it for themselves at the front.
(Clausewitz, First Book). Even we were unprepared for such material superiority.
11 June: In the afternoon I drove forward in order to supply the panzers and
talk with the commander. When I arrived, he had been summoned to a briefing with the commander of the 901st Rgt. Before my arrival, a bomb had
slammed into the command post. It was a miracle that none of the company
commanders were wounded. Only the Prinz' old valet, Obergefreiter Fssel,
who had driven forward with the supply vehicles, was killed. A little later the
Prinz returned with an attack order to eliminate the enemy penetration. He
was very shaken by Fssel's death. He said that he had lost his best friend.
Fssel had been with him for 25 years. Moreover, his heart was not in the
ordered attack. He judged the terrain to be totally unsuitable for an armored
commitment.
With my coaxing, he drove again to Oberst Scholze to present his ideas. On
his departure, he said to me: "Who knows if we all will die!"
I returned to Parfouru unsuspecting, until 2200 hours, when the battalion
adjutant, Oberleutnant Meyer, briefed me on what had happened. After
reaching the attack objective, Hill 103, the Prinz' command vehicle was hit
in the turret. The commander and Leutnant Herrmann, the communications
officer, were killed immediately. The rest of the crew were unhurt, they
brought the panzer back and I later took it over. While breaking contact from
the enemy, Leutnant Finsterwalder was also mortally wounded. Additional
losses were suffered. The death of our beloved commander struck deep into
our hearts, but there was no time for us to mourn.
I drove forward in a B-Krad to the panzers with hastily assembled supplies.
The panzers were concealed in a forest. I spoke with Meyer and then hurried
to my regiment commander, Oberst Gerhardt, who commanded the left division sector. He temporarily entrusted me with the command of the battalion.
How often in silence had I longed for this position, but not under these tragic
and horrible circumstances. The death of the Prinz touched me deeply, but
not only me! Almost all of the members of the battalion felt as I did. During
a visit to the grave of the Prinz, 40-50 years later, all of us old soldiers still
felt great reverence for this extraordinary officer and nobleman.
I arrived at my headquarters, where our panzers were camouflaged in an
apple orchard, with only a small pack. The enemy's reaction was unfriendly
and unforgettable: I was greeted by the heavy naval guns. The 15" or 16"
shells were announced initially by deep organ tones, then high ascending
60
of the town, from well-camouflaged anti-tank guns that we could not make
out and, therefore, could not effectively engage. When my lead panzer,
Stabsfeldwebel Bobrowski, was hit and set aflame, General Bayerlein
ordered me to call off the attack. He, in the meantime, was informed of the
attack by the newly arrived 2nd Panzer Division on the English flank west of
Villers and the evacuation of the town. To my great dismay, I, meanwhile,
learned of the death of Oberleutnant Freiherr von Marschalk during a counterattack near Tilly. He had just taken over my 7th Company. We buried him
on the following day near le Mesnil Anzouf.
The next few days flew by. We had plenty to eat. Besides the good combat
rations, which the company sergeants brought forward at night, we obtained
a small butter-barrel and a cream-pot from a dairy in the combat zone - an
excellent nerve relaxer. This was, however, necessary to survive the almost
constant fire from the artillery on the ground, from the air and from the sea.
In general, one heard the detonations subliminally if they were not in the
immediate area, but one still could not sleep deeply. I and my excellent crew
slept in a deeply dug, covered trench under our panzer. Those who had no
overhead protection had it bad. The trees and bushes blocked one's vision,
but not the shell fragments from above, which were set loose by very sensitive fuzes that were ignited by the thinnest branch.
It was no wonder that I had a stomach upset and often had to go "into the
bushes." This was particularly embarrassing when one was leading an
armored column and had to stop so many times. However, opium and carbon
helped me get back on my feet.
Particularly dreadful was a heavy artillery barrage that broke over us when
we were jammed in a sunken road between other tanks. The fragments
rained down like hail onto the panzers, damaging periscopes and antennae
and covering everything in smoke. My driver lost his nerve, cried for his
mother and got us stuck. When the fire momentarily decreased in intensity,
my gunner and I had to quickly dismount in order to tie our tow cable to the
panzer behind us, so it could pull us out. We were fortunate that Tommy
waited until our hatches were sealed before starting the next barrage.
From the outside our panzers looked a mess. Antennae, vision blocks, tool
boxes, etc., as well as the 'zimmerit' were no feast for sore eyes. We could
not fight without radio communications. We had to withdraw unsuccessful,
but we also suffered no losses. The British also did not reach their objective.
But their losses were made up for during the night, ours were not. During
this senseless combat in the bushes, one vehicle was lost after another.
With all of the horrors of the front, it was a joy that my soldiers survived,
even though the commitment of our panzers in this situation ran contrary to
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all principles of armored warfare. Without the self-sacrifice and inexhaustible work of the recovery vehicles and the men from the maintenance
service, the losses would have been worse than they actually were. Many
times a vehicle could not be towed away for several days. Therefore, the
dead in the tank also could not be buried for several days.
Particularly tragic were the losses from laziness or indolence. Naturally
everyone froze in the face of fire and danger, but all officers had the obligation of forcing their people to entrench and, during attacks, to take cover by
jumping into the trenches or under the panzers. Gradually the survivors
acquired a good nose for dangerous fire and near impacts, like the sense of a
fox for danger. The war reversed a lot of our previous opinions. Before the
war we enjoyed sunshine and good weather. Now we found low-hanging
clouds and rain more to our liking and grumbled out loud when the sun was
shining, because it certainly brought with it enemy aircraft.
The Tommies had certainly fought already during the First World War in
another way and by different principles against we Germans, who always
wanted to attack and to beat the enemy. For them it mattered primarily to do
harm to their enemies and take care of themselves. In Normandy they
attacked only after precedented fire preparation and with additional tank support. Then they entrenched themselves, to wait for the enemy.
If one was able to counterstrike immediately, before they were settled in
they abandoned all their gains and one could recapture those. This of course
could not be accomplished without losses, which we could not adequately
replace, while the British received replacements during the night. The most
noticeable gaps were in the officer corps, and the panzergrenadiers suffered
the most. Fortunately, we did not suffer a shortage of brave NCO's and experienced men.
In general, we lived in the ground like foxes, under our panzers that were
surrounded with earthen walls (to protect against shell fragments). We were
able to disappear underground at a moment's notice, especially when the air
was no longer clear. We lived with danger both day and night. During the
day, with a clear sky came the fighter-bombers, otherwise there was always
artillery and mortar fire. Our command post was also set up under our
panzer, along with a shelter and sleeping area for my panzer crew. A little
room was left so visitors could conduct business. In spite of the close, stale
air, at that time we felt this was much better than the alternative. Today it
would only be tolerable with face masks.
There was a problem with water and washing. There were no nearby
streams. Undressing and bathing were excessive luxuries, but one took every
opportunity to shave. The dry summer weather and the constant strain on the
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nerves caused powerful thirst, so we drank large quantities of cider, calvados, wine and cognac, without becoming drunk. Rations could only be delivered at night. They were often taken with the nerve salve from our "dairy,"
the butter and cream. To relax ourselves we smoked cigarettes. Their blue
haze could not worsen the already unhealthy air. Nevertheless, we remained
confident, sometimes swearing profusely or with grim humor.
The strong bonds of comradeship maintained us and mitigated our misery
and distress. No one spoke of military virtues, we lived them. No one even
spoke of trust in God. One either possessed it or did not. Those who did, had
stronger support to overcome the anxiety and horror of war.
The enemy strived to kill us with artillery and mortars, with fighterbombers, tanks and machine-guns. He inflicted losses on us without gaining
ground. We had to hold as ordered, even when it appeared to make no sense
and it cost our proud division strength and nerve.
16 June: The Wehrmacht Report provided news of the "Vergeltung [retaliatory weapons]." The first "new, heavy caliber warheads" were fired, the V-1.
Maliciously, as human nature is, the report generally released in us satisfaction and relief. Why should just our major cities fall into soot and ashes? We
only wished that we had received the news earlier. It offered little comfort to
us in our defensive combat, since we were not allowed to conduct a mobile
battle. The combat elite of our division was being destroyed.
I had contact with the outside world by telephone, radio and messenger.
One of my radio operators always sat at the equipment in my panzer. The
foxholes also had telephones.
The terrain and air situation would only allow for company-sized commitments. The panzers rarely used the trails. Today walking the forest trails is
peaceful. Then, all intersections and choke points were placed under fire.
One had to move in leaps and bounds. The panzers that had been committed
in the front lines could only be reached at night. The enemy lay close by in
the opposing hedge-rows. The slightest movement would unleash fire and
the panzergrenadiers would suffer losses. Iron Crosses were rationed sparingly. I gladly issued them to the deserving.
Early on 19 June the bitterly-contested Tilly-sur-Seulles fell. It appeared
that the English had achieved their objective and went over to the defense,
abetted by dreadful rainfall, which we enjoyed because it kept the aircraft
away. I transferred my command post from a foxhole into a house that hadno windows that had not been demolished by shell fragments, but was otherwise sound. We found it somewhat better than conditions under the panzer.
However, the days of rain and the hours-long artillery fire weakened even the
strongest. The panzergrenadiers and panzer crews, who were committed for64
ward, bore the brunt of the load. The only consolation was that the Tommies
had it no better. Unfortunately, they would be relieved after a short duration,
and we would not.
It would be a godsend to be able to wash properly and sit at a table to eat.
My staff quietly took care of me. Accordingly to the radio and papers that
reached us, the Normandy Front still appeared all quiet and pleasant. This of
course reassured our relatives at home, but we were enraged at the war correspondents who protested their innocence to us. They also had to follow
orders or could not write a word.
Everyone was a aware of the eighth commandment, "Thou shalt not bear
false witness." Don't tell a lie was not valid for the media then, when Dr.
Gbbels interfered, nor today. But the situation in the Reich had become
more than serious and all men needed comfort and confidence. National
leaders easily lose lost touch with the people. Hitler's only combat experience originated from the battles of Flanders from 1916 to 1918. That was a
war of meters, at most, up to the nearest horizon. On the other hand, in 1944
one needed room to operate, hundreds of kilometers if necessary. It reflected
the mobility of air power, strong armored forces and artillery that needed to
be well supplied. The war would not be won by "Vergeltung" alone. Every
soldier knew that. Nevertheless, no one lost his cheerfulness. One could
express pleasure over the smallest detail. The news reels liked to show this.
I was named battalion commander on 22 June. I was moved when I accepted the congratulations of my men. My adjutant took responsibility for
informing my wife in Silesia. Captured English cigarettes were enclosed in
the letter. On the occasion of this appointment and the bad weather, which
kept the fighter-bombers away, I, for the first time in weeks, spent the night
in pyjamas and got a good night's sleep, following an excellent meal which
my squadron commanders had prepared. The English dinner music was limited to some distant rumbles. I also received a letter from home. In spite of
all expectations and all of the air attacks and the threatening situation on the
Eastern Front, the field post office operated exceptionally well, if often
slowly.
On the way to a commanders' briefing at division, I had to throw myself
down during a fire strike and ended up in two fresh cow patties. I looked
magnificent. Everyone laughed and stood far away from me because of my
perfume.
On 24 June the English attacked our right neighbor ("Operation Epsom"),
but their artillery fire also hit us. Usually they would not start until 1100
hours. I tried to visit my panzers at the front beforehand. I reached the rearmost panzer at 0830 hours and had only entered the men's shelter a brief
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minute before, when the Tommies covered the area and forced me to beat a
hasty retreat in my Volkswagen. Two days later we had the double pleasure
of experiencing the mention of our division in the Wehrmacht Report and
celebrating the reappearance of two feldwebels who had gone missing two
days before. Every loss, especially an irreplaceable commander, good officers and feldwebels, was painful. So, one celebrated when they returned.
A couple of days earlier there were again rumors of another German attack
to the coast, together with the newly arriving SS panzer divisions. We also
hoped that we could hold Cherbourg. Now Cherbourg had fallen and the new
divisions were tied up by the major English attack to the east of us, although,
my battalion was not affected. We were withdrawn from the front, but the
English still fired at us, at night until 0200 hours, then after 0500 hours and
later after 1400 hours. Therefore, we gave up the house in favor of the hole
under the panzer. Our panzer also suffered artillery hits. They did no damage, of course, but everything was covered in smoke. Gradually, this constant
fire even got on my nerves. We had to comfort ourselves with the thought
that our fathers had survived the even worse battles of materiel from 1916 to
1917. We were told that our division would be relieved by an infantry division within a few days.
A daring move by the British occurred in our front-lines. A bold patrol
infiltrated through the hedgerows to one of our double sentries. They overwhelmed the two Panzergrenadiers. Upright and waving merrily, they withdrew embracing each other and using them as shields, in front of the eyes
and guns of our soldiers. They would not have gotten away with this in
Russia. The Soviets shot their own people.
Rundstedt's, Rommel's and von Geyr's request to quickly remove the
panzer divisions and free them for future operations, was considered to be
ineffective by Hitler. Also, after the fall of Cherbourg, the Allies continued
to deploy fresh divisions onto the beachhead. The longed-for relief by an
infantry division began on 26 June. The division was the 276th Infantry
Division, which had been formed in the west in December 1943 and was
entirely without combat experience. It took over the former Panzer Lehr
Division sector on 5 July. My battalion remained at the front until the
grenadiers took up residence.
While the infantry replaced the division platoon for platoon, my battalion
remained to perform the duties of firemen for the poor stoppelhopser (stubble-hoppers). I was subordinated to an infantry regiment, whose commander,
Oberst Kolsfelder, was a pleasant man. One of his battalion commanders
sent me three ducks so we could live "like God in France."
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Two of my companies were now also spread across the entire front in security, like fortress bunkers behind the front lines. This was a commitment contrary to our desires, but there was nothing left for us to do because of the
weakness of the infantry. Because the English responded to every sound,
especially the sound of engines, with fire, this cost the lives of infantrymen,
so my panzer men had to persevere three to four days, sitting in the fighting
compartment, until they were relieved. Stiff and swollen limbs were the
result. The first astronauts experienced similar effects until man had learned
to get the blood flowing with local exercise.
Since the butter ration was reduced, we set up a dairy with 200 head of cattle. Subsequently there was a laundry where French women worked because
they profited from our rations. Our lightly wounded and sick members on
barracks duty also lent a hand. Many seemed to develop a special skill for
doing laundry. One of my old batmen did not recover completely until the
beginning of July, when he returned to duty. Even my staff surgeon was "fortunate" enough to break his foot and was now going to the hospital, as was
joked.
7. Hill 112
After the forces of the 7th Army, including the mobile divisions from the
OKW reserve, were unable to penetrate into the enemy beachheads and
throw the Allies back into the sea, the German panzer divisions had to go
over to the defence at the beachheads. The 15th Army waited, inactive, further to the east in Pas de Calais for the landing of additional Allied armies,
which did not even exist, but were well simulated.
On 12 June, under the pressure of the circumstances, Hitler ordered II SS
Panzer Corps, with the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, transferred back to
France. These formations had been involved in heavy fighting in Poland
since the end of March. They were transported to France by rail, but they
were delayed by fighter-bombers and damaged stretches of railroad track.
The majority of the transports had to be unloaded in the Epinal and Nancy
area. Only a few trains made it to the Paris area.
In light of the enemy air superiority, the units could only march during the
night from the unloading railroad stations. Therefore, the two divisions did
not arrive on the invasion front within the three to four days as planned, but
only after 14 days, at the end of June.
The major attack of the II SS Panzer Corps, which was ordered by Hitler,
had the objective of dividing the beachheads in the Balleroy area. The British
attack west of Caen - Operation Epsom - forced a change in the attack plan.
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vegetable gardens take up much of the acreage. In the eastern portion, the
British sector, the terrain opens to the south in the direction of Paris and the
Seine harbors. This area offered the best possibilities for large-scale armored
attacks. This was the closest route to Paris!
The major British attack hit the 12th SS Panzer Division, which had been in
sustained combat since 7 June. It was completely exhausted, bloodied and
had been reduced to only a fraction of its former strength. It had no reserves,
and was insufficiently supplied with fuel and ammunition. After several days
of fierce combat, the British were able to penetrate deep into the German
front on the afternoon of 27 June. Two bridges over the Odon were captured
and one bridgehead was established.
On 28 June Scottish troops slowly advanced against Hill 112. Hill 112
formed the western knoll of a blunt ridge that fell off to the southwest to the
northwest and southeast to the 60 to 90 meter deep valleys of the Odon and
Orne. This hill was the key to holding the important road and communications center of Caen and the Orne crossings to the south, opening the way
into the heart of France.
The hill offered good visibility to all sides and, therefore, the possibility of
detecting enemy movement early and being able to place it under fire from
favorable positions. It also hindered enemy observation of the reverse slope
and the river valley beneath. The naked, almost un-vegetated slopes considerably channeled and complicated the advance of attacking infantry and
armor, while the reverse slope provided protected positions for artillery, mortars and the air screen of the flak units.
The seriously battered 12th SS Panzer Division had orders to hold Hill 112
and prevent a British breakthrough to the Orne. On the morning of 28 June
the 5th Company, 12th SS Panzer Regiment - all that was available for this
mission (Panzermeyer) - moved into position east of Esquay. Then the
English occupied the northern slope and the grove on the eastern slope of
Hill 112. Additional companies of the 12th Panzer Regiment stood ready to
attack in the southeast and east. In the morning elements of the 53rd Flak
Regiment supported by a few tanks - probably several Tigers from the 101st
Heavy SS Panzer Battalion - stopped three British attacks, but the groves
were not in friendly hands. A battery from the 83rd Werfer Regiment
knocked out two enemy tanks at close quarters in front of the battery positions. The enemy was unable to capture the knoll. The 12th SS Panzer
Regiment held the northeastern edge and the southern edge of the hill.
Elements of the 53rd Flak Regiment and the 7th Werfer Brigade took up
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On the morning of 30 June, in a light fog, and under the protective fire of
concentrated German artillery and werfer formations, panzers and panzergrenadiers converged on the knoll from the west, south and east. The knoll
was assaulted at midday. A British counterattack supported by tanks was
repulsed. On the left flank, the division attack against Baron stalled under
massive British artillery fire. The attempt in the afternoon to attack from Hill
112 to the north to reach the Caen-Villers Bocage road also failed under
enemy fire.
The major British attack - Operation "Epsom"- did not achieve its objective of Caen and the Orne bridges. Hill 112, the key to the open terrain of
France, to the communications hub of Caen and the Carpiquet airfield,
remained in German hands. The newly deployed German forces from II SS
Panzer Corps recaptured Hill 112, the town of Gavrus and some terrain, but
was unable to completely eliminate the British penetration. Their attack
strength was already broken. Recognizing this situation, General Hausser who, in the meantime, had taken command of the 7th Army - along with all
of the other senior commanders, proposed evacuating Caen in order to avoid
the overwhelming enemy naval gun fire and save the panzer formations
before they were burned out.
Blindly, Hitler turned down the proposal and replaced Generalfeldmarschall
von Rundstedt with Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge. Hitler ordered the
holding of the present positions and "continuing the deployment for a
German counterattack." Without the Luftwaffe to conduct aerial reconnaissance and provide close air support, there was nothing left to do. Hitler had
decided in favor of "tactical patchwork," that is, for a rigid defense that left
the initiative to the enemy. The enemy reinforced his forces in the beachheads considerably faster than the Germans did. Hitler did not want to risk a
mobile defense on the grounds that he could not recoup the losses suffered
by the Luftwaffe.
The 33 day defense of Hill 112 ran its course. The forward edge of the
German defensive area ran north of Noyers-Grainville-Gavrus (north) -Hill
114-Hill 112- Maltot.
The weather on 1 July was unsuitable for flying, so once again the German
formations were to attack the British frontal salient. The attack was again
supported by the fire of division artillery and the 7th and 8th Werfer
Brigades, which occupied new positions on the reverse slope. The enemy hit
the German attack with concentrated fire and then counterattacked against
Hill 1 12 and Esquay with tanks. The 10th SS Panzer Division blocked the
penetration with its last reserves.
On that evening, Generalfeldmarschalls von Rundstedt and Keitel talked on
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that no vehicle could pass through. The actual attack - Operation Charnwood
- followed on 8 July. On 9 July OB West ordered the evacuation of the ruins
of Caen in order to occupy a new defensive position south of the city. The
British also captured Eterville and Louvigny and a crisis developed east of
Hill 112.
On 10 July the British launched a massive attack on a wide front against the
key terrain around Hill 112. At 0500 hours the ground shook under a massive barrage fire that was conducted against the German defensive area. The
British infantry followed immediately - some mounted on carriers - and was
accompanied by many tanks. They attacked from Verson and Baron against
the northern slope of the hill. In the cover of a thick fog, harassed only by
several rocket salvos, the British first wave achieved a wide penetration
between Eterville and Hill 112.
Soon twenty-five enemy tanks reached the knoll. Then Oberfeldwebel
Borrekott and his three Pz IVs (5th Company, 10th SS Panzer Regiment)
opened fire. Both he and his crew were killed but, in the meantime, his panzer battalion (II Battalion, 10th SS Panzer Regiment) was able to throw the
English from the hilltop. Hill 112 remained in German hands. Further to the
right, the Tigers of the 102nd Heavy SS Panzer Battalion restored the situation and recaptured the "Forest of Half Trees." The fiercely contested Maltot
was evacuated during the night because of the massive enemy fire.
During the night before 11 July the English returned to the knoll and the
forests. While the 9th SS Panzer Division, which was relieved by the
infantry, prepared for an attack on Maltot and Eterville, its sister division
(10th "Frundsberg"), supported by the 102nd Tiger Battalion, fought around
Maltot, Eterville and Fontaine. It was impossible to relieve the panzer division with infantry.
During the next few days, the heavy fighting around Hill 112 continued day
and night under artificial combat area illumination. The backbone of the
resistance were the Tigers from the 102nd Panzer Battalion, which were able
to hold their positions by exploiting the terrain, utilizing their great firepower and heavy armor, with the support of panzergrenadiers of the 10th SS
Panzer Division. Panzergruppe West (General der Panzertruppen Eberbach)
expected a new British large-scale attack to the east, probably in conjunction
with the expected landing in the 15th Army area of operations.
On 18 July, a hot summer day with isolated thunder storms, Field Marshal
Montgomery began the major attack ("Goodwood") of the 2nd British Army,
in order to pin the German panzer divisions and gain ground to the east. With
the unheard of carpet bombing by 1700 bombers and 400 fighter-bombers, as
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well as the fire from 720 artillery pieces, supported by naval gun fire, the
British army attacked with three armored divisions and the II Canadian
Corps launched their attack against the well-fortified German positions. Only
the usual artillery fire and local attacks were evident on Hill 112. The outpost Tiger was able to destroy three enemy tanks and one anti-tank gun.
Hitler's directive ordering the relief of the panzer divisions by infantry divisions was disrupted by "Goodwood". East of the Orne, the 1st SS Panzer
Division was relieved by the 272nd Infantry Division, whose left flank was
located near St. Martin. The 10th SS Panzer Division was adjacent. Its eastern sector was taken over by the 271st Infantry Division on 18 July. Then
came the 277th Infantry Division, closing west of the line Hill 114 - Baron.
Fortunately, the cloudy weather lasted until 21 July, hampering large-scale
combat operations, so that the grenadiers were able to get settled in their
positions. Although the British actually did not stop attacking, penetrations
were quickly straightened out with the help of the 102nd SS Panzer
Battalion. Artillery was fired in support of the neighboring units struggling
east of the Orne.
The major British attack, which commenced with such great optimism, was
stopped after the enemy lost 4000 soldiers and 500 tanks - 36 percent of all
of the British tanks in France. This German defensive success would not
have been possible without the bulwark of Hill 112 securing the flank. Once
again, the British were denied access to the open terrain of France.
On 26 July, when the American Operation "Cobra" was able to break the
German ring of encirclement around the Avranches beachhead, the first
phase of the Allied operations plan was achieved. The occupation of the hills
south of Caen lost its significance. Although Hitler still, on 30 July, demanded, "the holding of the enemy on the coast and the inflicting of heavy casualties on him, in order to exhaust the enemy and ultimately defeat him!" it was
the Allies who kept the initiative.
On 2 August, the majority of the German panzer divisions, including II SS
Panzer Corps, were transferred to the west, in order to prepare for a counterattack to the coast south of Avranches. Also, the 2nd British Army had time
to pause for breath in preparation for the coming operations. During the
night from 3 to 4 August, unhindered by the enemy, the 271st and 277th
Infantry Divisions withdrew from Hill 112. The battle, which had been so
costly for both sides, came to an end!
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Reflections
The question arises as to what was the strategic sense of the static defence
of Hill 112 by II SS Panzer Corps, with its consequent bloody sacrifices and
the subsequent lessons that could be learned..
1. Undoubtedly, it was clear to all soldiers in the west, at the end of June
1944, that the Allies "had succeeded in penetrating the German defenses and
consequences of staggering proportions would follow ..." (Directive No. 51)
and that, in Hitler's own words, the war would be lost. The Allied foothold
in France and their air superiority were secured, a German breakthrough to
the coast was no longer possible, the commanders of the German armies
considered a withdrawal with a return to a "flexible response, that would at
least regain a portion of the initiative" (General Geyr von Schweppenburg).
At that point in time, such a withdrawal would, indeed, have demanded
much sacrifice. However, it most likely would have been considerably less
costly than the later gutting of the German forces. The relative strengths of
the German divisions were favorable. The effects of air attacks and artillery
fire would have been diminished in the open terrain. German fighting principles and combat experience in mobile warfare could have been fruitfully
employed against a delaying enemy.
2. Also, if there was a German withdrawal, a rapid British breakthrough to
the Orne and, therefore, into the heart of France, would have to be prevented,
and Hill 112 would have had to be held until the areas further to the west
were evacuated. The German withdrawal route to Paris had to be kept open.
Field Marshal Montgomery would have undoubtedly exploited such a breakthrough, even if the Allied operations plan had not provided for it. Operation
"Goodwood," which was so costly for the British, and Operation "Cobra,"
which led to the American breakthrough, would not have occurred. The war
in the west would have taken another course. The successful defense of Hill
112 and the massing of German forces near Caen were essential until the
withdrawal began.
3. Key terrain, such as Hill 112, even with today's effective weapons,
remains decisive for combat. Even with the enemy's air dominance and manifold superiority, it can be held if the commanders and forces fight decisively
and steadfastly, reinforcing the terrain by obstacles and are screened by air
interdiction and their artillery.
4. Many critics have correctly found fault with the use of the panzer divisions for a static defense instead of infantry divisions. It must not, however,
be forgotten that the unarmored German infantry divisions, which were
equipped only with horses and man-power and lacked sufficient anti-tank
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and anti-air defenses, were not up to the massed enemy fire from the ground,
the sea and the air. The infantry could never have withstood an attack at that
time without the support of panzers, panzerjgers and artillery. Wherever
they were able to stand for any time was due only to British fighting methods
and equipment.
British fighting principles were too rigid and systematic. They allowed the
junior commanders too little initiative. Cooperation of the all-arms-team left
much to be desired. The shortage of armored transports and combat vehicles
for the infantry and artillery observers led to heavy losses from enemy fire
and very high casualties during attacks. The British tanks were either tied to
the tempo of the infantry attacking on foot, or were separated from them.
They suffered corresponding losses and, in spite of the bravery of their
crews, achieved relatively minor successes in relation to their numbers.
5. In contrast to the British, the Germans were forced to conserve their
forces. In the German panzer divisions, one learned early how to fight the
all-arms-battle even in small kampfgruppen (battle groups/teams), in order to
be prepared for all events and round the clock.
6. German artillery was too weak. Only the German werfer brigades were
able to match the superior British fire-power. These carpet fire weapons,
nicknamed "moaning minnies" by the Allies, proved to be particularly effective against unarmored British targets and were, therefore, feared. Some
reports attributed 75 percent of infantry losses to the nebelwerfer.
7. The British were masters at using artificial smoke for the attack and the
defense, in order to avoid observation and the effects of long-range enemy
weapons. This is also significant today.
8. The British seldom succeeded in detecting the positions of German
panzers prior to an attack. Single outpost panzers were often sufficient in
alerting the companies located under cover further to the rear. Thus, time for
vehicle maintenance and crew rest was available.
9. Electronic intelligence often revealed British intentions and respective
warnings could be issued within a short period of time. Thus, surprise and
losses could be avoided.
10. The successful defense of Hill 112 by a few Tiger tanks fighting as
tank destroyers proved that fire-power and protection was as important as
mobility and numbers.
11. Above all stood the bravery and devotion to duty of the defenders.
Whether in such a hard battle the conviction alone is sufficient that the current democratic state is worth defending? Hopefully, this will never again
have to be proven. Logic and conviction disappear quickly under the influ76
ence of fire and stress. Without the soldierly virtues of the German soldier,
the war would have turned out otherwise.
South of Caen, east of the Orne, the terrain rose in several stages to the
south. South of the St. Martin - St. Andre-sur-Orne depression the ridges of
Verrieres stretched to May-sur-Orne, the scene of the bitterest Canadian
fighting on 25 July 1944. Colonel Stacey in his Official History of the
Canadian Army, The Victory Campaign, states:
"Three miles or so south of CAEN the present-day tourist, driving
down the arrow-straight road that leads to FALAISE, sees immediately
to his right a rounded hill crowned by farm buildings. If the traveller be
Canadian, he would do well to stay the wheels at this point and cast his
mind back to the events of 1944; for this apparently insignificant eminence is the VERRIERES RIDGE. Well may the wheat and sugar-beet
grow green and lush upon its gentle slopes, for in that now half-forgotten
summer the best blood of Canada was freely poured out upon them.
The ridge is kidney-shaped, with one end close to the road just north
of the farm hamlet from which it takes its name, and the other descending towards the ORNE above the village of MAY. It is an important tactical position, rising as it does to a height of 88 metres and dominating the
lower ground to the north."
The major attack by the 2nd British Army - Operation "Goodwood" which was conducted on 18 July to pin the German armored forces and
expand the Allied beachhead to the Cintheaux high ground, failed with both
sides suffering heavy casualties. After additional see-saw combat, I SS
Panzer Corps had to withdraw its main combat line on 23 July to a line
Bourguebus-Troteval Farm-Beauvoir-reverse slope of Hill 64 (north of St.
Martin)-St. Andre (center)-Orne railroad crossing. This sector was supposed
to be held by the Niedersachsen 272nd Infantry Division, which arrived from
southern France on 16 July. However, the insufficiently trained and equipped
troops, in spite of a combat experienced cadre, suffered heavy casualties.
Two of its six infantry battalions were left with only remnants and the others
were also battered. Therefore, its sector was reduced to a line BeauvoirOrne. On 25 July a battle group from the 2nd Panzer Division (Major Sterz)
was subordinated to the infantry division as combat reserve. Contact with the
battalion had to be made through the corps chief of staff, because the
infantry had no radio equipment that would allow it to communicate with the
panzer formation.
The division committed the 981st Grenadier Regiment (right), 982nd
Grenadier Regiment (left) and remnants of the 980th Grenadier Regiment
around Fontenay-le-Marmion with the artillery. Battle Group Sterz was committed near Laize-la-Ville. The division command post was located at
Fresnay-le-Puceux. The light platoon from the 3rd Panzer Regiment (four PZ
IVs), Leutnant Prien, was located in May in support of the 982nd Grenadier
Regiment. The Bourguebus-Troteval Farm sector was taken over by the 1st
SS Panzer Division. I SS Panzer Corps reserve consisted of the 9th SS
Panzer Division, 116th Panzer Division and 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion.
The weather improvement on 24 July hinted that the anticipated major
enemy attack was at hand.
On 25 July II (Canadian) Corps was ordered to conduct an attack Operation Spring - in order to capture the terrain up to Cintheaux and pin
the German panzer forces. The corps leadership and troops had little combat
78
experience. The 2nd (Canadian) Division was to attack with the 4th and 5th
Infantry Brigades, one behind the other, west of National Road N 158 to
Falaise under the protection of overpowering fire support from artillery and
tactical air. The attack was to be conducted in three phases: after the preliminary attack to clear the starting line (St. Andre-Hubert-Folie road) with the
6th (Canadian) Brigade at midnight, under "artificial moonlight" - a searchlight platoon shining its lights against the clouds - the 2nd (Canadian)
Division was to capture:
a. capture the line May-sur-Orne-Verrires-Tilly-la-Campagne;
b. capture the line Fontenay-le-Marmion-Rocquancourt (=Verrieres
R) followed by that of Point 122 (supported by tanks) and;
c. exploit as ordered by 2nd Canadian Corps, supported by 22nd
Armored Brigade, and seize Cramesnil Spur (Cintheaux).
During the preliminary attack a company of the Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
(Major Dextraze) threw the 1st Company, 1st SS Reconnaissance Battalion,
the 1st SS Panzer Division's outposts, out of Troteval Farm before midnight.
The farmstead exchanged hands hours later, until the Hamilton Light
Infantry was able to capture Verrieres by storm, behind a powerful wall of
fire.
The continuation of the attack against Rocquancourt by the Royal
Regiment of Canada, with the support of the British 1st Royal Tank
Regiment, failed in the morning with heavy losses inflicted by fire from the
1st SS Panzer Division. C Squadron, 1st R.T.R. lost eight tanks here, in spite
of help from Typhoon fighter-bombers.
Much more difficult was the nighttime house-to-house fighting conducted
by the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, supported by tanks, against the
well-established and bravely defending grenadiers of the 981st Grenadier
Regiment in St, Martin and the 982nd Grenadier regiment in St. Andre. It is
alleged that the defenders skillfully used a labyrinth of underground tunnels
of the coal mines for movement and sudden appearance. Reports that flanking fire from the east of the Orne disturbed the attackers appeared unreliable.
After midnight, in spite of nests of resistance holding out in St. Martin, a
"partial" occupation of the departure line was reported. The complete occupation of the line was reported at 0330 hours, even though there was still
resistance and the attackers were disorganized and confused.
Nevertheless, the Calgary Highlanders attacked May, as ordered, at 0330
hours in the "artificial moonlight" of St. Andre. The grenadiers of the 982nd
Grenadier Regiment prepared a hot welcome for them, as the artificial light
favored the defenders in the village rather than the attackers.
79
Lt. Prien, the light tank troop commander of 3rd Panzer Regt. at May that
night stated:
"I myself with tanks was hidden among deserted houses at MAY, concealed by twigs and hay in a flanking position to the expected ground
attack. On 25 July the infantry alerted me with the news that strong
infantry elements had been observed north of the village, apparently
preparing for attack. The sky was bathed in sallow light, caused by artificial moonlight. It was frightening, but sufficient to illuminate the ground
in front of us. I was however unable before dawn to engage the enemy
with my tanks, as targets could not be pin-pointed by the gunners. At
dawn small enemy elements infiltrated into MAY. Obviously fighting at
ST. ANDRE was still going on ..."
As reported twice during the morning, elements of the Calgary Highlanders
penetrated into the northern outskirts of May but were pushed back on each
occasion to St. Andre with heavy casualties. Their battalion commander,
who was well back, did not have a clear picture of what his companies were
doing because of bad wireless links and lost control. He was unable to exercise effective command or to report the correct situation. Hence without any
adverse reports the Commander of 5th Infantry Brigade assumed that May
had been captured after the noises of battle from that area petered out. He
therefore committed the Black Watch to Phase 2, the capture of Fontenay-leMarmion. Had the Calgaries fallen back to St. Andre using the cover of the
Orne valley without any means of reporting their move?
The Black Watch was marched into the assigned St. Martin assembly area
at 0330 hours in order to attack at 0530 hours. However, much time was lost.
While it was still dark, costly house-to-house fighting erupted. The battalion
commander and his deputy were mortally wounded by machine-gun fire.
After 0500 hours a company commander, Major Griffin, took command of
the battalion. In order to conduct combat reconnaissance toward May and
arrange a new fire plan with the artillery, he first withdrew the battalion out
from under the fire to St. Andre. The officer of the reconnaissance element
sent to May reported they had to operate, for the most part, on foot. They
were unable to find either the Calgaries or the Germans, except for machineguns. Now the brigade commander urged Major Griffin to hurry.
The attack was ordered for 0930 hours. His messenger platoon leader was
ordered to take a couple of soldiers and eliminate the "only" German
machine-gun in May. Apparently, the artillery could only fire on pre-planned
targets, not by observation. Shortly before the attack the irritated brigade
commander appeared at Major Griffin's command post. In order to gain
time, the Black Watch was not to attack Fontenay through May, as first
ordered, but to bypass the town and climb the ridge after crossing open ter80
rain. Apparently, these changes were never made known to the armored company commander, who arrived later. Meanwhile, his tanks, without accompanying infantry, ran into an ambush in May, set up by Leutnant Prien's Pz IVs
and the panzerjgers of the 272nd Infantry Division. They waited until they
"saw the whites of their eyes" and then opened fire, destroying a total of six
tanks.
Meanwhile Major Sterz, the kampfgruppe commander of 2nd Panzer
Division had received orders to counterattack. Now he was advancing with
his AFV from Laize via May to St. Martin. Lt. Prien again:
"Meanwhile it had cleared up and we noticed that from the ST. MARTIN
area a body of infantry of considerable strength - I assume about 300 to
400 men - advanced south. This was most impressive and perplexing.
The soldiers were marching upright holding their rifles across their
breast in readiness, as if on the drill square. Despite the strong fire
immediately initiated on them from MAY and the south scarcely anybody looked for cover. It looked like waves of men rolling steadily forward - no sign of panic despite their visible losses. They did not get
forced into cover but kept on marching upright.
To us, soldiers with four or five years experience, this was a most unreal
sight. I still know exactly that after the first rounds from our 75mm guns
had left, we actually got scruples about firing upon these Canadians
lacking cover and defence weapons. It was, I repeat, an unreal sight but
thus is war.
After a short while Kampfgruppe Sterz appeared with Panther tanks,
tank destroyers and APCs. The attack of the Canadians faded out before
the ridge as actually there was nobody left left to attack. It had been you'd almost have to call it - sheer butchery. Until this moment the
enemy artillery had fired three to four km to our rear."
Leutnant Prien
It seems Major Griffin had put aside his objections. He ordered his battalion to deploy two companies abreast, the other two behind. They attacked
across the field. The defensive fire hindered their advance, so that the creeping barrage sped way ahead. Leutnant Kohler, the adjutant of the I Battalion,
272nd Artillery Regiment in the vicinity of the Laize bridge, was impressed
by the fire. Nevertheless Major Griffin continued the attack to his death. His
radio set was put out of commission from the very start, and without artillery
observers he was unable to either report or request fire support.
Only 15 men from the brave Black Watch returned to St. Andre, approxi81
mately 100 were captured by the Germans. The rest, more than 200 men,
were either killed or severely wounded. It is hard to understand the brigade
commander's inability to avert his battalion's fate. When the Canadian
artillery finally fired smoke and conducted destructive fire against May and
Battle Group Sterz, it was too late.
This attack by the Black Watch resembled the assault of the Prussian
Guards Corps against St. Privat on 18 August 1870. It was conducted over
rising, open terrain, without artillery support, against strong French positions. One can read about it in Generalfeldmarschall Graf Schlieffen's
"Cannae Study." History repeated itself. In both cases the failure of leadership caused the losses, but the incomparable bravery won the respect of the
world.
The counterattack of Kampfgruppe Sterz stalled south of St. Martin in concentrated defensive fire from artillery pieces of all calibers and from the air.
German fire, however, also ended the attempt by Le Regiment de
Maisonneuve to occupy May that evening.
At midday Panzergruppe West reported: enemy forces, which have captured St. Martin and are turning to the east, north of the town in an advance
on May, were pinned in the flanks by German counterattack and an encircled
battalion headquarters was freed on Hill 88.
At 1700 hours elements of the 9th SS Panzer Division launched a counterattack on either side of the Bretteville-Fontenay road. The attack first stalled
in front of a strong enemy anti-tank front, but was continued after regrouping. After being relieved by the 9th SS Panzer Division, Battle Group Sterz
was directed to rejoin its 2nd Panzer Division. In the evening Panzergruppe
West reported to the commander of Army Group B:
... May was captured during a counterattack by elements of the 272nd
Infantry Division and contact with the old main line of resistance on the
Orne, southeast of St. Martin, was reestablished. The attack gained ground
further to the north and reached Mine, directly south of St. Martin, at 2100
hours. ...
The 272nd Infantry Division was mentioned in the Wehrmacht Report. Its
remnants were relieved on 26 July. The Canadians suspended their attack on
26 July. The occupation of Verrieres, along with the surrounding hills, was
an important tactical success. Operation Spring ended with the loss of 1500
men, 450 of them killed, the most costly day for the Canadian Army during
World War Two, with the exception of Dieppe!
82
Major Bodsch
I Battalion (remnants)
II Battalion
980th Grenadier Regiment
Oberst Burian
I Battalion (remnants)
II Battalion (remnants)
272nd Panzerjger Company (twelve 75 mm anti-tank guns (motorized))
272nd Artillery Regiment
I Battalion
II Battalion
III Battalion
Usual division troops
Attachments: Battle Group Sterz (from the 2nd Panzer Division),
Organization: 38th Panzerjger Battalion (self-propelled) (75 mm
Jagdpanzer IVs); I Battalion, 304th Panzergrenadier Regiment (armored), I
Battalion, 3rd Panzer Regiment (12 to 15 panzers) and the light platoon from
the 3rd Panzer Regiment (four Pz IVs)
84
III
NORMANDY - THE AMERICAN SECTOR
9. Defense West of St. Lo
Costly Counterattack
After the Allies, with their overpowering material superiority in the air, on
the sea and on the ground, forced the weak German forces in Normandy
onto the defensive, the emphasis of the fighting in June lay in the British
area of operations. The route to the open terrain leading to Paris led from
Caen. Near Caen eight of the available German panzer divisions (1st SS,
2nd SS, 9th SS, 10th SS, 12th SS, 2nd, 21st and Panzer Lehr Divisions)
were robbed of their strength and mobility in the unsuitable terrain, pinned
and subjected to constant fire of such ferocity that they were systematically
worn down, thanks to Hitler's irresponsible order to hold.
Indeed, the German forces were able to inflict losses of over 110,000 men
onto their enemies. However, they could not prevent the Allies from deploying 1,600,000 men and masses of equipment onto the beachheads. On the
other hand, the German personnel losses were only partially replaced, and
materiel not at all.
On 26 June, on the western side of the beachhead, the Americans captured
the fortress of Cherbourg and then began to systematically wear down the
thin German defensive front at the foot of the Cotentin peninsula with
freed-up and newly deployed divisions. On 7 July the 30th (US) Division
crossed the weakly defended Vire-Taute canal, formed a bridgehead near St.
Jean-de-Daye and advanced from there between Taute and Vire further to
the south, in order to capture St. Lo and the area to the west up to St. Gilles
as a departure area for a breakout. The Germans immediately recognized
the threat posed to the important communications hub of St. Lo, but the
thought of a breakout from the beachhead through the difficult bocage terrain was not considered.
In light of the threat, the immediate German countermeasures consisted of
deploying panzer forces - led by Battle Group Wisliceny of the 2nd SS
Panzer Division, then the Panzer Lehr Division - for a counterattack to
eliminate the bridgehead.
Since 26 June the Panzer Lehr Division was being relieved platoon by platoon by the 276th Infantry Division, except for the Panzer IV Battalion, and
transferred into the area around Aunay as army group reserve, but it
received little rest as a result to the constant harassment from the air. By 30
85
Diagram 12
on the evening of 7 July. The units were immediately sent forward on two
roads, but only the 130th ALA and the subordinate panzerjger company
reached the assigned line, Hebecrevon-Lozon, by the next morning. They
were to reconnoiter and determine the location of enemy and friendly units,
and to secure the deployment of the division. It was an impossible mission
under the circumstances, in the unsurveyable bocage terrain, which no one
from the hastily assembled elements had any familiarity with. They were
also poorly armed and lacked combat experience. The mission was also
complicated by the air situation.
Although the Americans were unaware of the arrival of the Panzer Lehr
Division until 10 July, bombing attacks on the deployment routes and road
sections destroyed by large bomb craters delayed the departure of the 902nd
Pzgdr. Lehr Rgt. until the 8th at 2230 hours. It had to march on two roads,
instead of the one northern route it was assigned. "The vehicles had to stop
constantly during this difficult night march, in order to detour around bomb
craters," remembered the commander of the 7th Company, 902nd Rgt.,
Leutnant Graf. "Only the bad weather made it possible to occupy positions
near Pont Hebert, which was under heavy artillery fire, by 9 July at 1900
hours."
LXXXIV Army Corps, commanded by General von Choltitz, who came
fresh from the Eastern Front replacing the mortally wounded General
Marcks, ordered the attack of the Panzer Lehr Division, which was now
subordinate to the corps, to restore the old main combat line on the Vire
canal on 9 July. On General Bayerlein's urging, the attack was postponed
for forty-eight hours. Nevertheless, the available elements of the 2nd SS
Panzer and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Divisions attacked on the 9th as
they had lost contact with the corps.
After alleged initial success, which had put the enemy to flight, the attackers had to return to their departure positions. After reconnoitering the terrain, General Bayerlein is said to have urged the corps commander to withdraw the order for the senseless attack of his exhausted division in this terrain without effective reconnaissance and support. His concerns fell on deaf
ears, as did those of the Canadian General (Maj. Gen. Roberts) at Dieppe
two years previously.
The attack terrain, which was reconnoitered only by the existing poor
maps and hearsay, not by air reconnaissance or air photos, consisted of, in
the south, bocage terrain, as near Tilly. Further to the north it reflected
"wide, flat, areas broken by many narrow water courses and ponds." It was
also very marshy and impassible to vehicles of all types. In the division
attack sector, only the sandy hills on either side of the St. Jean-de87
Daye-Pont Hebert road were passible by tanks. Then there was the narrow
dam across the Le Desert, if one dared to use it.
On the evening of 10 July Panzer Lehr took command on the sector
between Vire and Taute with its exhausted and weak troops. Included was a
21 cm howitzer battalion that, because of the shortage of ammunition, could
only fire preplanned missions. The three organic artillery battalions and the
heavy infantry weapons of the panzergrenadiers were not much better off.
Where were their targets? Where should they fire? In the interests of surprise and the air situation, which excluded a daytime attack in flying weather, the attack was shifted to the nighttime, when even the American artillery
pieces would be blind. However, no sooner would it get light, when their
eyes, the artillery observer flights, were already in the air.
The attack against the Vire canal, which was launched by four assault
groups on 11 July at 0145 hours, surprised the Americans for only a short
time. In light of their superior forces and the narrow terrain, it was easy for
them to effectively block the few positions and then continue their attack, as
planned, from these bases to the south. They fought in the same manner that
they had learned in France in 1918.
II Battalion of the 902nd Pzgdr. Lehr Rgt. did not attack near Hauts Vents
(Hill 91) until 0400 hours, because the individual companies could not be
relieved fast enough from the heavy defensive fighting of the day before and
reorganized for an attack. Leutnant Graf, the commander of the 7th
Company, remembered:
The panzer advance was only possible on the road, because the fields
had become too marshy from the heavy rainfall of the past few weeks.
No sooner had the panzers driven off, with a flame-thrower panzer in
the lead, followed by the rest of the panzers, my 7th Company to the
left of the road, then we had to attack. The infantry worked their way
through the underbrush from one hedge to the next ... After advancing
about 1000 meters, we ran into the main American attack. The forward
panzers were hit, these were the flame-thrower and a few Panzer IVs. I
lay behind some bushes, when the panzer next to me suffered a direct
hit. The flash of the detonation momentarily illuminated my surroundings and forced us to take cover.
Battalion Philipps (I Bn., 901st Rgt.) advanced farthest, attacking from Le
Hommet toward St. Jean. It surprised American artillery positions, severed
wire communications, overran the 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment
(9th US Division) command post in Le Desert, caused considerable confusion and captured many prisoners. Then the two lead Panthers (1st Co., 6th
Panzer Rgt.) were destroyed on the dam. When the last Panther was also hit,
88
the rest were blocked. There was raging defensive fire everywhere. The
unsuitable terrain did not allow the separated assault groups to provide
mutual flanking fires. At 1100 hours XIX (US) Corps launched a counterattack with two full infantry divisions (30th and 9th) each reinforced by a
combat command from the 3rd Armored Division. The advance was irresistible, particularly when supported by the strong artillery of two corps, as
well as by numerous fighter-bombers.
Only three of the four assault groups were able to return to the departure
positions, after suffering heavy losses in men and equipment. The reinforced I Bn, 901st Rgt, which was cut off near Le Desert, was completely
destroyed, a total strength of 214 men, 35 machine-guns and ten Panthers.
The total loss was later estimated by General Bayerlein at 500 to 700 men,
but it was probably higher, because 344 wounded alone were treated at the
main first aid station on that day. Besides the ten Panthers, eight Panzer IVs
with a portion of their crews, including two officers, Leutnant Peter and
Leutnant Sthr, as well as the 902nd Flammpanzer Platoon and its commander, were lost; a good portion of the division's combat strength.
The attack, which was accompanied by so much momentum and bravery
and with such hope, failed due to the lack of reconnaissance and the marked
disparity between the opposite forces, both on the ground and in the air.
Although causing no more than four weak stings to stir up a hornets' nest,
it had determined the relative strengths of both opponents.
With the arrival of the Division Order for going over to the defense on 11
July began a 14 day battle of attrition, which exceeded the ferocity of the
fighting near Tilly. Similarly to Tilly, the German forces here also lacked
any operational reserves to relieve the panzer division, which was ill-suited
for fighting in the hedgerows that favoured the infantry.
The division sector stretched from the bank of the Vire near Pont Hebert
through Hauts Vents up to Hommet and was split by the Terrette stream.
Between the Vire and Terrette stretched a ridge whose highest point (Point
91) was near Hauts Vents and whose flanks were visible from the far side of
the water courses. Otherwise, the combat area was covered with thick
bocage hedgerows, which limited visibility and movement, especially that
of the panzers.
The sector was defended on the right, up to the Terrette, by Kampfgruppe
902; Kampfgruppe 901 was on the left. The right flank east of the Vire was
89
held by the 352nd Infantry Division, on the left was the 17th SS
Panzergrenadier Division "Gtz von Berlichingen".
Opposite the division in the right sector lay the 30th (US) Division, reinforced by Combat Command B from the 3rd Armored Division, which
came under XIX (US) Corps until 5 July. The 9th (US) Division attacked on
the left sector, with Combat Command A from the 3rd (US) Armored
Division, under VII (US) Corps. Again Panzer Lehr had to fight against
almost three fresh divisions that were supported by strong artillery from two
American corps. The 11th of July, and the weight of the American attack on
the following day, cost the Division heavy casualties, especially among the
panzergrenadiers, as the artillery fire continued with unabated intensity. The
corps could not ignore Generalleutnant Bayerlein's request for reinforcements.
Diagram 13:
Defense near St. Lo.
90
tanks joined in the fray. When we had to evacuate the command post, I
dispatched my Volkswagen command vehicle back through enemy lines
with several lightly wounded and the medic, as well as a red Cross flag.
They were apparently taken captive ... Then I was able to withdraw the
company to a new line 300 meters south of Mesnil-Durand. We reestablished contact with the right flank. A Fallschirmjger company was
inserted as reinforcement ... At 1900 hours we heard American requests
for defection over loudspeakers. My company and I were specifically
mentioned and asked to cross over and surrender, otherwise we would
be placed under barrage fire at 2000 hours. However, it was still quiet at
2000 hours.
16 July: At 1230 hours we counterattacked with four Panzer IVs.
Thirty Fallschirmjgers also participated. They had earlier suffered
heavy casualties during an artillery fire mission. We penetrated into the
American positions and became involved in close combat. Suddenly the
Fallschirmjgers surrendered. An American took aim at me, but a comrade from my company was faster. I saw the American fall, mortally
wounded. Our attack had failed - our tanks guided us back ...
At 1930 hours we launched another counterattack. This time with
eight Panthers. At the very beginning several panzers were hit from the
flanks. The rest fired as they took cover behind a hedge. Again we lay
alone in our positions. Then a very powerful two-hour-long barrage fire
was conducted. No sooner had it grown quiet then the Americans
attacked. The attack collapsed in the fire of our machine-guns and
machine-pistols. I lay in front of a Panther with two men and a
machine-gun. The Panther could no longer fire. As we crawled forward,
we saw the Panther's crew had been killed. They were lying beside their
tank, which showed a lot of AP shot penetrations.
A stabsfeldwebel had a nervous breakdown at the battalion command post. Several soldiers were unable to subdue him. He was sent to
the hospital.
(from the memoirs of Oberleutnant Graf)
On 17 July the Americans were able to capture the hotly contested Pont
Hebert Vire bridge, the key to St. Lo. Later, they were also able to capture
St. Lo, which had endured many carpet bombings. Its ruins blocked the
streets. Because it was in ruins, it was no longer considered a communications hub for upcoming operations.
Because of the disproportion of strength, the loss of terrain was unavoidable in the long run. On 15 July a crisis developed with Battle Group
93
platoons - that, in spite of the severity of the fighting and the lack of supply,
so many tanks could still be maintained at the front. The cushion of a full
vehicle consignment at the start had its advantages.
During the fighting the effectiveness of our artillery in the defense against
the American attacks was notable. Further reinforcement by corps artillery
was desirable, because the heavy field artillery battalion (III Battalion,
130th) suffered from a shortage of ammunition for its captured Soviet howitzers. Therefore, the 311th Army Flak Battalion had to "take up positions
so that they could be as effective in the ground fighting as they were against
air targets" (division order from 12 July). In spite of the fierce fighting, the
130th Artillery Regiment still had 66 percent of its guns operational on 21
July:
16- 105 mm
12 - 150 mm (German) or 152 mm (Russian) pieces.
Even worse than the acute ammunition shortage was the fuel situation.
Because of the destroyed Seine bridges, fuel had to be fetched east of Paris.
A column that started out on 13 July had still not returned on 18 July. On 17
July the fuel shortage - in spite of the static front - was so bad that "the little
fuel available was sufficient only to redeploy a mortar battery and several
tanks."
On 18 July the enemy had advanced in the Panzer Lehr sector up to the St.
L-Priers road. On the same day, the enemy penetrated into St. Lo with
armor and infantry. St. Lo was evacuated beforehand. Heavy bombers had
destroyed the city so badly that first bulldozers had to clear the debris and
fill craters in order to open the routes for combat troops. During the next
few days, enemy pressure was relaxed, although the units committed forward were still being subjected to strong artillery fire and local attacks, and
continued to suffer losses. Since the enemy withdrew to his departure positions in the evening, our troops gained new self-confidence, especially since
the weather limited air activity.
The situation allowed Panzer Lehr to free-up Battle Group Wisliceny for
the 2nd SS Panzer Division. The exemplary commitment of its commander
was particularly praised in a division order.
The awarding of the Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross to
Generalleutnant Bayerlein on 20 July indicated a renewed recognition of the
efforts of Panzer Lehr. Because of the pressure of combat, the members of
the division were not fully conscious of the events that took place on 20
July. (The assassination attempt on Hitler)
Because of the lack of infantry divisions, the relief of the exhausted Panzer
95
Lehr Division from the front could not even be considered. Battalion Bohm
(II Battalion, 902nd) and the 130th ALA were withdrawn from the front for
several days. Rumors of the upcoming transfer of the division to Caen were
afoot. The Allied desire to convince the Germans that the main attack would
occur further to the east, near Caen, was achieved.
teenth officer we lost, including those from illness or wounds, in the battalion since the start of the invasion. Of the old Leutnants we left Fallingbostel
with, there remained no one. It wasn't much better with the Feldwebels and
tank commanders.
This was bad for the spirit and combat effectiveness of the battalion, especially since the old company commanders were cracking up. I suffered very
much, but I had to maintain my decorum in front of the men, who, with few
exceptions, remained excellent soldiers until the very end. The mail
received at the front was a great support.
If bad weather prevented the launching of the enemy air forces, attacks on
the ground were also not feared. However, the Americans still gave up terrain. We could not understand them. With their material superiority they
could have broken through our lines after the fall of St. Lo on 19 June. Most
evenings they returned to their departure positions. They were trained completely different from us. We were trained to strike the enemy, they, as we
learned previously during the First World War, had to wear us down before
they attacked.
Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge had taken over in the west on 3 July. I
remembered him from my time as escort officer to the then Generaloberst
Model in spring 1942, near Smolensk/Rzhev. We all knew of von Kluge's
great energy, although I never met him myself.
We heard the news of the assassination attempt against Hitler on 20 June
in between American artillery barrages that evening. We were so absorbed
with our own problems at the front that we had no idea of what was taking
place back home, especially the aftermath. It was unclear to us which
Stauffenberg had set the bomb. Was it our old, highly regarded lb of my 6th
Panzer Division in 1940? Although I loathed Hitler, his death would have
been for us, at least temporarily, a disaster and caused such confusion that
the enemy would have been confirmed in his goal of the destruction of
Germany. Guderian's appointment as the Chief of the General Staff was
calming.
We now hoped that our operations would be better than before, especially
with his panzer background. The spreading of denunciations was feared,
especially against the nobility and officer corps, after Himmler took command of the Home Army. Fortunately, we knew nothing of the plot at home.
We fought shoulder to shoulder with the brave soldiers of the Waffen SS.
They were different, but a man couldn't wish for a better comrade. I was
more concerned for my wife and baby. In spite of the threatening news from
the Eastern Front, they tarried for a while in Silesia and then had to return
by rail to the bomb-threatened Paderborn. I could still imagine the "flight
97
from Berlin," according to Gbbels' appeal from 12 months before, and the
chaos of the over-crowded refugee trains.
From the beginning, the Americans claimed the credit of the breakout for
themselves, while the British were given the task of tying up the German
panzer forces by simulating the main Allied attack toward Caen.
On 10 July - before Panzer Lehr was transferred into the area west of St.
Lo - General Bradley had designated the location and course of the breakout - Operation "Cobra". In place of a long artillery preparation, a carpet
Diagram 14:
C o b r a Carpet Bombing.
98
Panzer Lehr Rgt., on the left by 130th Panzerjger Bn. The regimental commander of Panzer Lehr Rgt. was charged with fortifying the YELLOW
LINE, along the railroad St. Lo - Coutances, by committing all available
divisional forces.
On 24 July, 1140 hrs, initially, many fighter-bombers attacked, followed
by "about 600 four-engined bombers" (Division Operation Order of 24
July). The division area was carpet bombed. The panzers, situated near the
front-line, rocked so much that Leutnant Freiherr von Ladsberg-Velen
reported at night, "he had felt like being in a gale at sea with wind speed of
Force 10". As low clouds and poor visibility prevented accurate bombing,
the operation was cancelled just after it started. Nevertheless 55 tons of
bombs fell. They inflicted more losses on the American - 25 killed and 131
wounded - than on the German side. In the afternoon, when American
infantry reoccupied their previously evacuated positions, General Bayerlein
was right to count the day as a defensive success.
In the Division Operation Order for 25 July the units were instructed;
"because of the anticipated continuation of the major enemy attack,
supported by superior air-strikes, and to minimize the effects of carpet
bombing, the units, primarily reserves, vehicles and staffs, will be quartered and entrenched sufficiently distant from the major roads."
During the night of 25 July, I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment, with about
16 Panthers, relieved the committed Panzer IVs. These, about 12, were
withdrawn to Dangy to be available at the division's disposal. During this
night only minor harassing fire fell on the division's sector, primarily on
supply routes. The old main line of resistance was reoccupied without
exception.
About 0800 hours German outposts observed American infantry leaving
their positions. At 0940 hours about 50 Thunderbolts (P 47) appeared from
the east, followed by six more waves, each at two minute intervals. They
dropped bombs and napalm, which covered the ground in dust and smoke.
A little later 400 medium bombers bombed crossroads and identified positions in the southern target area with 500 lbs bombs. Then 1500 "Flying
Fortresses" and "Liberators" appeared from the north in endless waves.
They opened their bomb-bays.
Again bombs dropped too far north within the American lines. The bombardment killed 11 of the American troops and wounded 490. Among the
dead was Lt. General McNair, commanding general of the Army Ground
Forces, who was participating only as an observer. Finally, another 300
Lightnings attacked with bombs and napalm. In all 4,200 tons of bombs
were dropped, as was a good deal of napalm. The earth shook.
100
With it we even escaped from the Falaise Pocket at the last minute."
The extent of the losses suffered by Panzer Lehr during the bombing has
not been established. The 14th Fallschirmjger Regiment was hit the heaviest, losing its commander. The panzergrenadiers and Kampfgruppe Heintz
also suffered heavy casualties, but the troops in position (not including the
subordinate elements) lost no more than 500 to 700 men because of their
diminished combat strength and the forewarning. Equipment losses were
relatively minor. No Panzer IVs were destroyed. However, several Panthers
and panzerjgers were buried in the bomb craters or burned. Percentagewise, these losses were considerable for the division.
The carpet bombings looked spectacular and had great propaganda value
but had little military value under the circumstances. With its enormous
material and personnel superiority (artillery, armor and infantry), supplemented by fighter-bombers in never-before- realized numbers, VII (US)
Corps could have broken through without the bombing attack, perhaps even
faster and with fewer losses. The cratering and destruction of the roads considerably delayed American mobility! While the Americans were completely inexperienced in the conduct of mobile warfare, they quickly grasped it
(especially General Patton), and took advantage of the good road network in
France and Germany. Supported by their air forces, they employed mobile
warfare until the end of the war, as long as their supply lines would reach.
As the smoke from the carpet bombing caused delays and the American
infantry hit the German positions on a wide front after a barrage from 1000
artillery pieces, they had to learn the same lessons as did their fathers in
1918. They immediately ran into astonishingly strong defensive fire and
stalled. However, the loss of all telephone communications forward of regiment, together with the shortage of reserves, which, due to the air situation,
could not be moved during the daytime, distorted the leadership's view of
the situation.
German artillery was limited to conducting planned fires, especially since
direct fire support was impossible due to the interlocking of friend and foe.
They fired until they ran out of ammunition.
During the attack on Hebecrevon - St. Gilles, the 120th (US) Infantry
Regiment was stopped by a blocking position shortly after crossing the St.
Lo - Periers road. The core of the block consisted of by three Panthers. A
frontal attack conducted by three enemy companies with armored support
ended with the destruction of three Shermans. A subsequent attempt to
bypass the block also failed. It wasn't until much later that the enemy was
able to knock out the Panthers and overcome the resistance.
102
The entrance to Hebecrevon was blocked by a mine-field that was tenaciously defended by Kampfgruppe Heintz. They prevented the mines from
being removed and, therefore, the commitment of tanks. An air attack was
also frustrated by the thickly shrubbed terrain. It was not until after dark
that any progress was achieved. Hebecrevon did not fall until midnight.
The 8th (US) Infantry Regiment from the 4th Division attacked la
Chapelle-en-Juger in the middle of the sector. At first, a German strong
point north of the St. Lo - Periers road was bypassed, then the attack of one
battalion stalled before an apple orchard. Only after the commitment of 18
Shermans did it progress. A little later two panzers (panzerjgers?) stopped
the battalion attack at another German strong point. By nightfall la
Chapelle-en-Juger was still in German hands. The 9th Infantry Division
attacked on the left flank from Point 40 along the road to Marigny. In the
moonlight, they ran into bitter resistance from the Fallschirmjgers.
An attempt to bypass further to the south failed in the face of strong defensive fire from still intact German positions. During the evening, almost all
of the penetrations were blocked without the need to deploy fresh forces.
Two to three kilometer terrain gains were only achieved at a few locations.
During the night, the attackers withdrew in some places to better-secured
positions and evacuated, among others, St. Gilles, which was peacefully traversed early in the morning by the two Panzer IV companies on their way to
support the infantry.
After recognizing the seriousness of the situation and receiving instructions from OB West ("Do not voluntarily give any ground to the enemy"),
the corps ordered the deployment of the last reserves on 26 July, in order to
hold or reestablish the former line instead of withdrawing to the partially
prepared "Yellow Line" on the St. Lo - Coutances rail line, which would
have spared forces. This order gave the enemy the possibility of overrunning and destroying the positions and reserves of Panzer and the 5th
Fallschirmjger Division.
The following brief combat report from the commander of the 7th
Company, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment, Leutnant Freiherr von LandsbergVelen, speaks volumes:
"In the early morning of 26 July, at 0300 hours, I and my company
(7th Co., 130th Pz. Lehr Rgt.) were ordered into the area north of St.
Gilles as the 785th Grenadier Regiment (Oberst Scheele) attack reserve,
together with a stormtroop company. After reporting to the battalion
commander, Hauptmann Schulz, at the regimental headquarters, my
panzers occupied covered positions on either side of the St. Yaast 103
order to be briefed on the situation and pass on instructions that the St.
Lo - Periers road had to be held. A powerful explosion at the nearby
Dangy ammunition dump ended the conversation.
Not far away, in Canisy, a battle for the railroad embankment began
between lead elements of Combat Command A and the Panthers of the
4th Company, 6th Panzer Regiment. While the Panthers were being suppressed, the American tanks were able to bypass. Leutnant Schfers
(4th Company, 6th Panzer Regiment) was killed. The Panzer Lehr command post had to hastily redeploy to Le Pont-Peint, six kilometers west
of Soulles. The American advance guard was deployed south of Canisy.
During the evening, one column advanced against St. Samson, the other
against Le Mesnil-Herman. Incomprehensibly, the Americans stopped
their advance at the fall of darkness.
In the rear of the broken-through forces, the Yellow Line along the
St. Lo - Coutances rail line between Canisy and Carantilly was occupied by hastily assembled groups of soldiers obtained from staffs and
supply units. "... their strength is so weak that a breakthrough is expected at any time ..." and "... division losses are so heavy that there is no
infantry or panzer strength to speak of ..." the division evening report
noted.
The only help that could be promised by the corps was the deployment of
the Panther battalion (strength: 14 Panthers) from the 2nd SS Panzer
Division. Army Group B ordered the XLVII Panzer Corps, with the 2nd and
116th Panzer Divisions, to reach the Torigny-Tessy area from the Caumont
area as quickly as possible in order to attack the penetrating enemy forces in
the flank. Their move had not yet taken place by 27 July.
During the night, isolated German forces in the area north of the St. Lo Coutances road broke out to the south. In the early morning, after an adventuresome march, hindered more by bomb craters than by the enemy, the
remnants of Battalion Bohm and five Panzer IVs made it to Quibou.
Additional groups followed.
The 27th of July was a decisive breakthrough and breakout day. Although
still combat capable, the exhausted groups of Panzer Lehr were splintered.
They had lost cohesion and communications and no longer had any comprehension of the overall situation. Orders seldom reached them. They were far
outflanked in the east. Nevertheless, they offered the American infantry
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tenacious resistance.
Their desperate fighting could only gain time. The enemy rolled through
Canisy to the south. Since dawn, combat aircraft swarmed in the sky. There
was fighting on the Yellow Line.
During the previous night all Panzer Lehr elements incapable of combat
that could be contacted were moved into the Percy area. The lb command
post was, therefore, transferred to Montbray. During the past few hours the
Diagram 15:
108
the 275th Infantry Division, but these were only remnants lacking communications with each other or with higher authority. The attack conducted
with the subordinate Panther battalion from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, to
recapture Pont Brocard, was repulsed after a brief initial success.
The ordered construction of a new line of resistance further to the west,
from St. Ebremont-Dangy-Savigny, was to be initiated with an attack to the
west by XLVII Panzer Corps, which was released from Panzer Group West.
The attack was not conducted because the German command and control
network was destroyed and strong enemy forces had already broken through
the Villebaudon-St. Martin-de-Cenilly line to Hambye. The 130th ALA,
which was reinforced by several Panthers, was able to hold off the CCA,
2nd Armored Division attack from its line of resistance near Villebaudon
until evening. During the night before 29 July all of the remnants of the
Panzer Lehr Division took over security on the Percy hills. There was contact on the left with Battle Group Wisliceny from the 2nd SS Panzer
Division and on the right with the just-arrived 116th Panzer Division. The
XLVII Panzer Corps, to which Panzer Lehr was also subordinated, took
over between Vire and Percy.
In spite of its weakness, on 29 July Panzer Lehr reported a defensive success. The attack conducted by the 2nd (US) Armored Division, with a reinforced armored battalion, against Percy was repulsed, the enemy suffering
heavy casualties. Leutnant von Knebel (I Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment)
and his Panthers knocked out 13 Shermans. The enemy tanks had to retreat
to the foothills and request reinforcements. A German counterattack severed
the American lines of communications. Even the German artillery fire
enjoyed considerable success. The American battalion was withdrawn.
The thick Bocage terrain opened up to the south into gently rolling hill
country, which permitted off-road movement, observation and long-range
firing. At the same time, the enemy's fighter-bomber commitment weakened, because the breakthrough increased in breadth and depth.
Meanwhile, the division la command post, which, after losing all of its
office equipment on 27 July, could not issue written orders for two days,
was completely reequipped.
On 30 July the situation in the XLVII Panzer Corps area of operations
remained relatively unchanged. The remnants of Panzer Lehr, reinforced by
a battle group from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, held a line Percy - Le
Laurier to southwest of le Bignon. Here, other stragglers from the fighting
around Quibou and Dangy were able to withdraw to the west.
On 31 July the enemy was able to break through near Avranches. Now the
decisive commander of the 3rd (US) Army, General Patton, who was initial111
Although I agreed with the postponement, I also had the disquieting feeling that some danger was approaching. However, the morning passed as
usual. At 1200 hours an artillery barrage broke loose as I wrote in my command post near St. Gilles. Shortly thereafter, the air was suddenly filled
with large four-engined bombers, like swarms of flies. They circled around
us several times, so to us, they appeared to be numbered in the thousands. It
was oppressive. Something that none of us had ever experienced.
The screaming of the bombs was like a downpour and seemed to be endless. We made ourselves small and hid in our farmhouse. Our cows stuck
their thick heads through the empty window frames seeking cover, ostrichlike, while the fragments tore through their bellies until they collapsed. We
would have to do without whipped cream in the future!
My tanks in their front-line positions were spared from losses, and were
able to effortlessly repulse the subsequent enemy attack. The Wehrmacht
Report only noted that the enemy attacked with strong forces after a heavy
fire preparation and rolling air attacks, but they were repulsed after suffering heavy casualties.
After some hesitation, the Panther Battalion relieved us at night. On 25
July the bombings were continued by two and four-engined bombers. We
counted more than 1000 aircraft. We correctly assumed that the American
breakthrough was achieved.
On 23 July, when I congratulated General Bayerlein for receiving his
award (on 20 July) of the Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross,
he still thought that it was better to be here than near Caen, since there was
no fear of carpet bombing here. And now we had one! There was no trace
of our Luftwaffe. We only heard occasional enemy flak fire at night. The air
war had completely changed since 1940.
Before the bombings occurred, I drove to Oberst Gerhardt, my regimental
commander. I thoughtlessly wore my good black uniform. On the return trip
the road was constantly circled by fighter-bombers, making us dive into the
dirt like a pair of oversized rabbits.
We were alerted at 0040 hours on 26 July for the mission of blocking the
feared breakthrough on the road through St. Gilles. The bombs had turned
the town into rubble. Nevertheless, several roofs remained undamaged, as
could be still seen during a visit in 1989. There were still examples of the
old colored brick roofs. At dawn all of the panzers stood in their assigned
positions, approximately 1500 meters further to the rear as those from the
previous day.
113
27 July on the St. Lo - Coutances rail line, in front of our "Yellow Line,"
thus allowing the backbone of Panzer Lehr, staffs, artillery and all of the
supply units, to escape. Had they advanced even their lead elements south
of the Soulles sector that evening, nothing would have been able to stop
them. Nevertheless, they appeared unexpectedly at 2130 hours in the neighborhood of my quarters, forcing us to hasten to St. Denis. The 901st Rgt.
was encircled for one night, but it was able to break out to the south on the
next day.
On 28 July the army mail also found its way to St. Denis. There I waited
for the trickle of arriving panzers and stragglers. Then I had to go to an
afternoon command briefing at the division headquarters. In light of the air
threat, my good dispatch rider Paus' sidecar motorcycle seemed to be most
suitable, since up to now motorcycles did not seem to interest the fighterbombers. The fighter-bombers swarmed like hornets in the clear sky, but we
rode along rather carelessly until, just before reaching a village, looking
back from my pillion seat, I noticed a pair of Thunderbolt fighter-bombers
descending to attack us.
It was too late to dismount. I could only shout something, like: "Go left!"
A transformer housing offered shelter there. Paus jerked the machine to the
left. I still believe that I saw the eyes of the pilot as he fired the on-board
weapons, before he zoomed above us. At such a moment seconds appear to
be hours. Our lives were in higher hands. Fireworks and smoke sizzled just
in front of us and to both sides. The rounds from the aircraft's heavy
machine-guns slammed into the plaster above us. Now and then I can still
smell that unbearable stench of TNT. But I heard no explosion. Apparently
the ear is slower than the eye and nose.
When the second fighter-bomber fired, we were already behind the housing. Contrary to our expectation, nothing had happened to us. The machine
was undamaged. We were given our lives back. We had a good guardian
angel. However, our hearts were pounding and threatening to explode and,
when a passing SS officer yelled loudly to me, I was so exhausted that I
silently allowed his harsh words to roll over me. The scolding was not
unfounded. Instead of us, a poor old woman was mortally wounded when
carelessly crossing the street. She was being mourned by her family.
I was supposed to assemble the battalion in Fresne - Poret (12 kilometers
south of Vire), about 50 kilometers to the rear. Personnel-wise we had gotten off lightly. We were capable of combat missions after we received new
panzers. I had to prevent my valuable panzer crews from being utilized as
infantrymen or turned over to other panzer units. The headquarters and sup115
ply companies were able to completely make up for those they had given
up.
As ordered, the main body of the division was assembled under the leadership of Oberst Gerhardt (Panzer Lehr Regiment regimental staff) in the
army rear area, first near La Fert - Mace, then south of Alencon, in order
to be "refitted." From this core, two battle groups were formed under
Oberstleutnant Freiherr von Hauser and Major von Fallois.
Thus ended the month of July. The last few days were the worst that I had
experienced during the war, perhaps with the exception of Vassilevka, 48
kilometers before Stalingrad, in December 1942.
116
IV
WITHDRAWAL TO THE SEINE
11. Recollections of August 1944
rained down upon us. It was a wonder no one was hurt. One fragment
slammed through the cup and saucer directly in front of my hand. Everyone
stared and breathed deeply. Even the man in the moon looked down in disbelief upon us through the holes in the roof. We again had reason to drink to
our health and no one was particularly upset, except my driver. He spent the
night in the brick fireplace.
The night was brief. At 0500 hours, we had to set out with other kampfgruppen, in order to eliminate the American penetration to the left of us. We
were able to attack and recapture Maisoncelles-la-Jourdan and Hill 232.
After this success, the commanders left unnecessarily in the forward areas
were permitted to return to their formations in the refitting area. Four damaged panzers were also sent to the east. Two days later, the entire
Kampfgruppe Hauser was supposed to follow.
We made the trip through Tinchebray - Flers - Sees to Mortagne-au-Perche
(about 120 kilometers) in an overcrowded Volkswagen with the adjutant, driver and signaller. We could initially see that the front was to the left and then
to the rear of us. As we drove on I indicated where, according to the map, we
left the range of the field artillery and then that of the long-range artillery.
We still had no experience of night fighters, so we felt relatively secure. In
the early morning we reached the battalion supply point. Our combat units
were supplied from there. This was where we hoped to get our first proper
sleep.
There I learned that early on 9 August General Bayerlein organized all of
the combat capable elements of the division in the refitting area into
Kampfgruppe Kuhnow and committed it to against the Americans advancing
from the south. This group also included a few of our panzers. The non-combatant elements were immediately ordered further to the east, into the area
around La Fert - Bernard and to Fontainebleau on 10 August.
So much for my sleep. In the afternoon someone woke me unceremoniously with the news that the enemy had advanced even closer. We already could
hear the sounds of fighting. We scratched the sand from our eyes and, with
great speed but some difficulty, drove further via Verneuil-Dreux to
Versailles, which was temporarily assigned to us as a quartering area. The
advance party had searched out splendid quarters for the staff. The trip was
depressing. Everywhere were the signs of flight of those agencies that had
been billeted here for years and had made themselves comfortable and
grown fat. But now they had left in a panic. In one fuel dump we requested
refueling, but we arrived too late. The fuel dump commander had ordered the
supplies blown up just before we arrived. He blew the dump shortly after. We
also went to a large rations dump nearby, where we figured we could take
some of the valuable goods with us, especially cigarettes and spirits, which
119
Corps, had begun detailed planning from the end of July for 8 August (in
1918 a lucky day for the Canadians, whose breakthrough at Amiens was a
"black day" for the German Army).
The mission was not an easy one. The attack had to be launched across a
carefully concealed defensive system in depth, which was covered by tank
and anti-tank guns with a longer range than that of the Shermans. Simonds
sought to achieve surprise by attacking at night, without an artillery preparation, and with a massive commitment of armor on an unprecedented scale.
His infantry was to overcome the defensive system in improvised armoured
vehicles, made from stripped-down "Priest" self-propelled howitzers. These
"Priests" were converted into "Kangaroos," each able to carry a rifle squad.
The flanks of the attack were to be protected by carpet bombing conducted
by Bomber Command. Simonds had three reinforced infantry and two
armored divisions with about 1000 tanks. The two armored divisions, the
2nd Canadian and the 1st Polish, were well trained, but had never been in
combat. They were guaranteed constant strong close air support.
The planning for Operation "Totalize" was conducted down to the smallest
detail. Nevertheless, neither the organization and composition of the formations, nor the equipment of the attacking forces, was sufficient for the high
requirements of such a massive operation. Never before had small armored
and infantry battle groups needed to coordinate so closely with artillery and
the Air Force. Instead of providing direct radio communications to Bomber
Command in London and to the close air support squadrons, the targets were
preplanned. This was an overtaxing of the system at the start of a mobile
warfare operation.
On 2 August Hitler ordered all of the panzer forces available in Normandy
to participate in Operation "Lttich," the attack from Mortain to the western
coast, "in order to cut off the lead enemy armored elements and throw them
into the sea." Field Marshal Montgomery was informed of the withdrawal of
the panzer divisions through ULTRA. However, in order to maintain the
secret of ULTRA, he did not disseminate this to the Canadians. In their intelligence report of 7 August they still took all the panzer divisions into
account. In fact, the German front was being held by only the 89th Infantry
Division, which had been formed early in 1944 in Norway and arrived in
France only a few days earlier. It consisted of older men, insufficiently
armed and without combat experience. It was only supported by strong flak
formations and the exhausted 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend,"
which, after unbroken commitment, was finally to be withdrawn from the
front-line. The panzer division had only 50 tanks and was reinforced by the
101 Heavy SS-Panzer Bn. with 13 Tigers. Hauptsturmfhrer Wittmann
belonged to this unit.
122
Diagram 16: The Breakout from the Falaise Pocket from 16 to 20 August 1944.
Rabet, with many bombs falling short, inflicted further losses on the
Canadians and Poles. Also, apparently through a breakdown in communication, the bombers recognized the yellow smoke as designating targets, not as
air recognition signals indicating Canadian troops. The more the Canadians
set off the yellow smoke canisters to mark their positions, the more they
were bombed, while not a single bomb fell on Kampfgruppe Meyer.
On that morning the Swords [to the Knight's Cross] winner SS Hauptsturmfhrer Wittmann was killed near Cintheaux.
The two Canadian armoured divisions extracted themselves from the confusion and continued the attack before evening. They were again stopped north
of Langannerie by 8.8 cm flak. Indeed, the Canadians did gain 10 to 11 kilometers on that day, but 20 kilometers to Falaise still lay in front of them and
German resistance stiffened. That evening, German staff officers arrived at a
battery of the 8th Werfer Brigade near Soignolles. They provide an indication of what hell the soldiers had experienced:
"They said that there was no reason for us to hold. Leutnant
Niemeyer was sorry for the infantrymen, but he couldn't let his battery
panic and lose control, even if summoned by a higher rank. He was able
to chase the group away under threat of force of arms and brought his
battery under control with the sharp order "Fire mission!" Dashing to
their guns the battery received two fire missions from the battalion. The
missions directed them to fire at the Canadians on the left as well as the
Poles on the right ..."
as Leutnant Niemeyer described his experience.
I SS Panzer Corps was able to hold the hills north of the Laizon [stream].
During the evening of 9 August a battle group from the 4th (Canadian)
Armored Division, under Lieutenant Colonel Worthington, received orders to
take Hill 195 west of the national road. Advancing in the dark through high
wheat fields, he lost his orientation and set up a hasty defense on Hill 141,
five kilometers further to the west, after suffering heavy casualties. He was
convinced that he had taken his objective. On 10 August, without radio communications and support, they were destroyed, except for a few survivors,
partially by their own troops and aircraft.
To the deep disappointment of Montgomery and the Canadians, not only
did "Totalize" fail, but so did the similar Operation "Tractable" on 14
August, as a result of the resistance of I SS Panzer Corps, which had no
more than 15 battle-worthy Pz IVs, five Panthers and 15 Tigers. This northern front was pushed back further toward Falaise.
Meanwhile, all German attempts to encircle or cut off the enemy in the
beachheads failed on 7 August, including Operation "Lttich," under the
125
command posts to retreat hastily. While the corps command post was being
evacuated southeast of Alencon, it remained quiet in front of the Panzer Lehr
sector. Nevertheless, in order to shorten the front, the division withdrew
behind Merdereau stream.
On 11 August the enemy continued to advance to the north up to Mortagne
and Nogent-le-Rotrou and drive the supply troops, which were still located
around Alencon, into undisciplined flight to the north and east. There was
only reconnaissance activity to the front of Panzer Lehr. The newly deployed
331st Infantry Division was ordered to secure the line Gac - L'Aigle to the
south. It was subordinated to Kampfgruppe von Hauser, which was released
from commitment near Vire.
On 12 August the enemy attacked with strong forces along the entire front,
accompanied by rolling air strikes, in order to encircle the two German
armies. The 2nd (French) Armoured Division attacked through from
Alencon across and around the Ecouves forest toward Argentan, thereby
blocking the advance of the 5th (US) Armored Division further east via Sees
towards Argentan for hours. The Allied forces attacking to the north were
supposed to be cut off by an attack conducted by Panzergruppe Eberbach out
of the Carrouge area to the east. West of Mortre, the attack of the 116th
Panzer Division, reinforced by Battle Group Eltrich (commander 130th
Armored Engineer Battalion from Panzer Lehr), ran into enemy forces. After
suffering considerable losses, including Major Eltrich, they were able to
delay the American advance on Argentan enough so that the German forces
still located to the west were given some time. Battle Group Panzer Lehr
was withdrawn to Carrouges.
On 13 August the weight of the enemy attack and air activity increased in
the area south of Argentan. The threatened encirclement in the ever decreasing assembly area and the difficult supply situation forced the withdrawal of
the front-lines. There were gaps in the command and control and reporting
system. During the evening communications were lost between Panzer Lehr
staff and the LXXXI Army Corps. Since the main body of the division, which
had been scheduled for refitting, had already fled to the east and the enemy
pressure on the weak kampfgruppe securing near Carrouges was decreased,
General Bayerlein turned over his sector to the 708th Infantry Division, along
with his committed elements (henceforth Kampfgruppe Kuhnow). General
Bayerlein, his staff and supply elements marched to the east from Ecouch
through Habloville-Trun, in order to avoid the encirclement.
Luckily, on 14 August General Bradley halted all American movements, in
order to strengthen Field Marshal Montgomery's pressure east of the Orne to
the south, up to the Dives, and especially toward Falaise. Nevertheless, the
enemy attack was essentially stopped by the Germans' fierce fighting.
127
On 15 August the 1st (Polish) Armored Division forced the crossing of the
Dives near Jort. Falaise fell on the following day. The 4th (Canadian)
Armored Division captured Trun on the 17th. While the German Fifth
Panzer Army tenaciously defended the northern front, without being able to
prevent penetrations, the mission of covering the rear of the pocket in the
west fell to the 7th Army. The stubborn Hitler still refused to make a clear
decision and order the immediate retreat through the "bottleneck" to the east,
as was urgently proposed by Kluge's chief of staff, General Blumentritt, in
his absence. In his search for a scapegoat to blame the disaster on, Hitler
replaced Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, whom he suspected of treason
and considered a traitor, by Generalfeldmarschall Model, who took command in the west on the evening of 17 August. Generalfeldmarschall von
Kluge voluntarily took his life on 19 August. In a farewell letter to Hitler, he
explained the failure in the west, for which he took full responsibility, and,
hoping that Model would master the situation, Kluge concluded:
"Should the new weapons, in which you place so much hope, especially those of the Air Force, not bring success, then, my Fhrer,make up
your mind to end the war. The German people have suffered so unspeakably that it is time to bring the horror to a close."
Hitler's revulsion to withdrawal of any type, which he acquired in Flanders
during the First World War, gave the Allies an opportunity to achieve a
"Stalingrad in the West." The fact that the Falaise pocket turned out to be only
a smaller German version of Dunkirk was thanks to Feldmarschall von Kluge.
Model's initial plan on 18 August, proved at once to be unworkable. He had
planned to establish a new front behind the Dives in a north-south direction
forward of the Seine and conduct a planned withdrawal to that line. There was
only one road still available for the retreat through the bottleneck and it was
under constant fighter-bomber attack. After the previous experience with
Allied carpet bombing, which inflicted almost as many Allied losses as
German, this type of bombing was not a factor. Meanwhile, the Americans
took up their advance to the north and made it to Chambois. The Poles were
committed against this village on 17 August. It was not until 18 August that
they captured Mount Ormel and Hill 262. The attack of II SS Panzer Corps
ordered from out of the Vimoutiers area against Trun, in order to open the
pocket, was delayed by the air situation, lost radio communications and the
lack of fuel.
The decisive breakout from the pocket was achieved during the night of 19
and morning of 20 August and was conducted by the combined forces of
XLVII Panzer Corps and II Fallschirmjger Corps. Attacking from the west,
mostly without weapons and ammunition, but with the help of II SS Panzer
Corps attacking from the east, they were able to overpower the Poles and
128
130
Endless columns of British soldiers gather on the beach at Dunkirk under the protection of the RAF, waiting for the rescue ships.
Deployment of the II Bn., 11th Panzer Regiment on 27 May, 1940 against the Cassel mountain fortress, which already lay under artillery fire. Swastika flags on the rear decks of the
panzers served as air identification.
131
On 30 May, as we foiled the breakout of the Cassel defenders, I was filmed by a war correspondent. This photograph later
appeared on the Wochenschau and the film "Victory in the West."
132
Captured Russian KV lis (152mm howitzer) outfitted with German command cupolas were
scheduled to be used for the Malta landing.
View of Puys (1992) from the Freya radar positions. The Royal Regiment of Canada was
destroyed here.
133
134
Oberst Scholze (next to Generaloberst Guderian) could be pleased with his regiment during a
training exercise in the summer of 1943.
A 150 mm Infantry gun on the chassis of a Czech tank 38(t) of 901 Panzer Grenadier
Regiment. It was known as the "Cricket".
135
A Mercedes Radio Car (Kfz 23) of 130 Signal Bn. of Panzer Lehr Division, with
roof antenna and its crew.
The 3rd (medium) Bn. 130 Panzer Lehr Rgt. was equipped with captured 155 mm Soviet
Cannon-Howitzers, Mk. 433/1. This gun was very effective with an increased range (16,500
m) but 30% heavier than the equivalent German field howitzer, and with a limited ammunition supply it was slowly being phased out.
136
AA defense of tanks was provided by their coaxial 7.92 mm MG on a tripod. During rail
transport side skirts were stored in front or underneath the tank, as they exceeded the maximum loading width.
During rail transport the trains were protected by the unit's AA guns. Here a quadruple
20 mm gun on a trailer.
137
Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein (1899 - 1963) commander of the Panzer Lehr Division.
138
139
Hungary, April 1944. Bridge building with new equipment on one of the Danube's tributaries.
Crossing is a Panther Ausf. A with what looks to be a full compliment of external equipment.
140
Each panzergrenadier regiment had some flame throwers, mounted in Sd Kfz 251/16
tracked armored personnel carriers.
142
The 8 x 8 armored car, PUMA, (Sd Kfz. 234/2), armed with a 50 mm gun L/60, (here a prototype) was a remarkable reconnaissance vehicle. 1st Sqn of ALA was equipped with them.
A major landing on the Calvados coast was considered to be unlikely because it lacked any
operational supply harbors. The "artificial harbors" which were, in the meantime, developed
in England, solved that problem. Their existence had been hidden from German reconnaissance until approximately 23 June. Therefore, they were never targeted. Seen here is the remnants of the "Mulberry Harbor" at Arromanches (1979).
144
145
146
Generaloberst Dollmann,C-in-C 7th Army and Generaloberst von Salmuth, C-in-C 15th Army.
147
The I SS-Panzer Corps commander, Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Sepp Dietrich, with escorting officers, visiting the headquarters of the Panzer Lehr Division with Generalleutnant
Bayerlein and his la, Major i.G. Kauffmann. SS Sturmbannfhrer Weiser is on the far left.
148
The Panzer Lehr Division's two general staff officers, Major i.G. Kauffmann the la
and Major i.G. Werncke the lb.
CP of Panzer Lehr Division in a sunken road near Cheux on 8 June. General Bayerlein
(back to camera) talking to Major Kauffmann.
150
The C-in-C Panzergruppe West, later Fifth Panzer Army, General Freiherr Geyer
von Schweppenburg. In the background, Generalmajor of the Waffen-SS
Lammerding, CO of 2. SS-Panzer Division.
151
On 10 June, at 1600 hours, the forward-most Panther platoon from the I Battalion, 6th Panzer
Regiment arrived as a panzerjger kommando at the 3rd Company, 130th ALA near Abbaye
de Mondaye. Leutnant Gerstmann at far left (with field cap).
152
General of Waffen-SS Hausser reported arrival of his II SS-Panzer Corps to Field Marshal Rommel. Here Rommel
accompanies Hausser to his staff car showing a square flag (black-white red) of a corps commander and the grey
General's flag with a gold rim and the national marking.
153
Another day in Villers-Bocage. To the left is a destroyed Mk. IV (634), and on the right an
enemy Cromwell tank.
154
The bitterly contested Hill 112, scene of some of the most savage fighting of the Normandy Campaign.
155
Three tank commanders of Heavy SS-Panzer Abteilung 102 (of II SS-Panzer-Corps) in front
of a Tiger tank. On the far left is Knight's Cross winner Will Fey.
157
Monument to the 43rd British Wessex Division on Hill 112. They fought around the hill,
Chateau Fontaine, Eterville and Maltot for nineteen days.
158
The Canadian attack terrain from the German point of view. The Black Watch had to attack
out of the Orne valley from St. Martin-de-Fontenay, overcoming the reverse slope to the south
(left) toward Fontenay. On the horizon are (from right to left) Caen, Carpiquet airfield and
Hill 112 (far left).
The Troteval Ferme farmstead (1993), which was so hotly contested by the 1st SS Panzer
Division and the 2nd Canadian Division. The city of Caen is in the background.
159
Destroyed Panthers from the 1st Company, 6th Panzer Regiment on the elevated road near Le
Desert on 11 July 1944.
162
163
Among the widely feared enemy anti-tank weapons in the west, against which we had no
counter, were the fighter-bombers Typhoon (British) and Thunderbolt P-47 (U.S.). They were
not only armed with on-board weapons (20 mm cannon, British) and (12.7 mm machinegun,
U.S.), but alternatively had available 450 kilograms of bombs, or eight 75 mm rockets with
anti-tank, high explosive warheads, which were very accurate and able to penetrate any armor
when fired in pairs.
This stamp (1990) showed (arrows) the route of the 1st Polish Armored Division under
General Maczek from Caen to the battle on Mont Ormel on 20 August 1944, under German
attack from all sides.
164
Road bridge from Pontobault across the Selune (south of Avranches). The American forces
broke into Bretagne and into the French countryside across this bridge. The attempt of the
100th Kampsgeschwader to destroy this bridge with radio guided bombs from Toulouse, 700
kilometers away, failed. However, thirty-six DO 217 bombers and their crews were lost trying
to destroy it.
Plaque on the chapel at Verrieres for the 2nd Canadian Division in Operation "Totalize'
on 8 August 1944.
165
HQ 902 Panzergrenadier Rgt next to its armored command vehicle. Behind the table Major Welsch (with Knight's Cross), the
regimental commander, at his right Hauptmann Boehm, CO 2nd Bn.
166
View from Mont Ormel to the northwest toward the breakout area north of St. Lambert on 20
August. The hills in the background were occupied by the enemy.
Panzer IV, No. 602, was one of the very few tanks of Panzer Lehr Division to make it back to
the German border from Normandy (but not without taking a few hits!).
168
Leopold-Canal near Strobrugge seen from Moerhize. Soldiers of the 64th Infantry Division in
the pill-box on the left hand bank repulsed the Canadian attack.
169
At the beginning of October, the last panzer men returned from their commitment on the West
Wall with a captured American M8 armored reconnaissance vehicle.
171
172
View of the central fortifications (from the northwest), and below, a close-up view of Fort
Driant's fortified ditch.
173
174
This bunker on the Maginot Line in Domfessel became a mouse trap for the staff of the I
Battalion, 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment.
175
Soon after their initial commitment at the Sarre one of the Panthers was hit by a rocket from a
Thunderbolt on the barrel near the muzzle.
176
Oberleutnant von Poschinger and his staff celebrate over shooting down one of the enemy
fighter-bombers.
The 60 ton combat bridge across the Our River near Gmnd.
177
A Jagdpanzer IV (Sd.Kfz. 162/1) of 130 Panzerjger Bn. This turretless tank destroyer on the
Mk. IV chassis mounted the same powerful 75mm L/70 gun as the Panther, with a combat
weight of only 24 tons. This earlier variant is armed with the 75mm L/48 gun.
A Jagdpanther (Sd.Kfz. 173) on the Panther chassis, armed with the high performance 88 mm L/71
gun as on the King Tiger, making this vehicle perhaps the finest tank destroyer of WW2.
178
General Bayerlein with Oberst Gerhardt. CO of Panzer Lehr Rgt. 130 (centre) during a meeting with CG LVIII Panzer Corps
General Walter Kruger (1892 - 1976) on 19 December at Longvilly.
179
Schtzenpanzerwagen (Sd.Kfz. 251) had been in short supply, merely equipping one instead
of four panzergrenadier battalions in Panzer Lehr Div. This is an engineer vehicle mounting
bridging equipment.
A burnt out Sherman and Schtzenpanzerwagen near the chapelle and railway station of
Neffe, in front of Bastogne.
180
This late model Panther G of Feldwebel Dette hit a German mine and was immobilized on 19
December 1944, at the western exit from Neffe.
The last Jagdpanzer IVs (Sd.Kfz. 162/1) of 130 Panzerjger Lehr Bn. were lost near Houffalize. These
are the IV/70 (A) interim development versions, manufactured by Alkett.
181
Oberleutnant Kues, commander of the 7th Company, Panzer Lehr Regiment, in front of his
Panzer IV, which in spite of the air threat, was laden with gasoline canisters.
At the capture of Wardin, U.S. infantry passes incapacitated Mk. IV tanks of 6th Company,
Panzer Lehr Rgt., attached to 901 Panzergrenadier Rgt.
183
The farmyard south of Bastogne, where the German summons to surrender was handed to
Col. Harper, and where Lt. Henke received the famous answer "Nuts".
184
The author and his adjutant, Lt. Freiher von Landsberg-Velen in January 1945.
185
The author with his adjutant, Ltn. Meyer, and a guest behind his triangular (= battalion) CP pennant, white pink - white. In the lower portion the Schnburg shield.
186
Bayeux British Military Cemetery. Here German soldiers lie shoulder to shoulder with their
British counterparts.
188
The families of the fallen Oberstleutnant Prinz von Schonburg-Waldenburg, his trusted comrade Fssel and his communications officer, Leutnant Hermann, erected monument stones in
the Parfouru-sur-Odon (east of Villers-Bocage) town cemetery.
A total of 39,000 German dead rest in the Lommel/Limburg German Military Cemetery.
189
15,418 German soldiers who died in Alsace and Lorraine during the Second World War
buried in the Bad Niederbronn Military Cemetery.
6,785 German soldiers, the majority killed during the Battle of the Bulge, were laid to rest i
Recogne-Bastogne.
190
The grave cross of Hauptmann Fritz Lex, II Battalion, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment, at the
Sandweiler Military Cemetery.
Before the gates of the city of Luxembourg lie, next to each other, the German Sandweiler Military
Cemetery for 10,913 WW2 dead and the Hamm American Military Cemetery with 5,076 dead.
Among them, amid his soldiers from the 3rd (US) Army, also rests General Patton
191
The memorial stone of Panzer Lehr Division in the commemoration grove of the German
Armor School Munster.
A replica of the author's command tank in the Panzer-Museum at Munster, the present
German Armour School.
192
V
BEFORE THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE REICH
13. From Paris to the West Wall
After the Americans were able to batter the German Normandy armies in
the Falaise pocket, they crossed the Seine on both sides of Paris and pursued
them on a wide front to the Reich. On 20 August the enemy established a
bridgehead below Paris, near Mantes. Others followed on the next day above
Paris, near Montreau and, on 25 August, near Melun. Further to the south of
the Seine, they advanced and crossed the Yonne toward Sens - Troyes.
Hitler had long harbored suspicions about the Army's hated officer corps
and their concept of operations in the West. They had urged him to replace
his "tactical patchwork" with "elastic fencing" and operational freedom. Up
to 28 July, preparations for a withdrawal, in case of an enemy breakthrough,
were forbidden. An order from the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations
Staff to all commands to construct the "Somme-Marne-Sone Line"
remained in the planning stages due to the shortage of labor and was overcome by events after the enemy unexpectedly switched to mobile warfare.
On 20 August Hitler ordered the construction of the "Deutsche Westellung"
(Scheldt -West Wall-Mosel). Instead of facilitating an organized retreat to
these positions, he ordered the holding of Paris as being "of particular importance." However, this depended entirely on quickly gaining distance from the
enemy to win back freedom of operation and to lead back the remaining
forces..
Under these circumstances it was no longer possible to think of refitting the
Panzer Lehr in France. As were five other panzer divisions, it was supposed
to be deployed as a mobile attack reserve in the area between the Seine and
Somme and "simultaneously refitted."
On 23 August, Hitler again explicitly ordered "Paris must not fall into
enemy hands unless as a field of ruins." The next evening, the enemy drove
strong armoured forces from Versailles and Sevres across the Seine, up to the
center of the city and the Palais Luxembourg. In order to save the city's population and monuments, the Wehrmacht commander assigned to Paris by
Hitler, General von Choltitz, made arrangements with the resistance movement for a cease-fire. In his support, Panzer Lehr was ordered from the east
during the night before 25 August to fight its way into the center of the city.
A kampfgruppe under Hauptmann Hennecke was entrusted with this mis195
sion. He had available the refitted I SPW Battalion, 901st Rgt, which was
reinforced by a weak Panther company and a platoon of infantry guns. No
more could be committed on such short notice. Indeed, after 21 August three
"Schelle Abteilungen" - the 509th, 510th and 511th (essentially bicycle battalions) - were redeployed from the Netherlands, and were incorporated as
replacements into both panzergrenadier regiments. However, there was no
chance to merge them quickly with the exhausted troops.
On the early morning of 25 August, Kampfgruppe Hennecke reached the
area around the Gare du Nord [Paris North Railroad Station] via Le Bourget,
while the Americans occupied the eastern portion of the city and the French
the western. The closer the kampfgruppe approached the center of the city,
the more the streets were barricaded and the more difficult they were to traverse. The panzergrenadiers in open vehicles suffered heavy casualties due
to the fire from the buildings. Then General von Choltitz ordered the surrender of the city. Hauptmann Hennecke broke off the fruitless mission and
withdrew to Villeparisis.
There, on the following day, Kampfgruppe Hennecke was outflanked by the
French armored division, which marched into Paris and was reinforced by
Diagram 17: Retreat of the Panzer Lehr Division from France, August 1944.
196
ing the night (or did not want to?), was captured, including the entire 6th
Company. Hauptmann Mller and his vehicles from I Battalion tried unsuccessfully to merge with the American columns without being noticed. After
blowing up the vehicles, he ordered his soldiers to break out and reach
friendly lines on foot. After much effort and heavy casualties, Mller and his
last 12 men were captured by the French near Sedan, on 14 September after 18 days!
During the night, the remnants of the regiment crossed the Aisne east of
enemy occupied Soissons. On 28 August it was supposed to be committed to
delay the enemy near Breine and later, together with elements of the 9th
Panzer Division, east of the Soissons-Laon-Vervins road. On 30 August it
was presumably on the Serre near Montcornet.
On 31 August the kampfgruppe was supposed to prevent the American
armored forces from crossing the Oise near Hirson. The attempt failed, as
mentioned in the corps daily report. This was its last commitment in France.
On order of OB West, all of the units of Panzer Lehr were to be relieved
from the front for refitting. The 902nd Regiment crossed the German border
via Neufchteau-Arlon-Echternach, for refitting in Baden-Wrttemberg.
In the fast changing situations during retreats, it is difficult to maintain
cohesion of the unit. The formations became jumbled. Three Panzer IVs
from Kampfgruppe Kuhnow did not cross the Seine on the pontoon bridge
near Elbeuf until 22 August and had to have their damage repaired by a tank
workshop company near Laon. After that, the route back to their battalion in
the south was cut off. So they drove on their own to the east, in the direction
of Rethel, where they assumed their battalion to be. The division had issued
a standing march order to each armored vehicle, protecting them from being
requisitioned by other formations. Feldwebel Feuerpfeil (7th Company)
remembered:
We were attached to an SS unit and committed at a road as an outpost against enemy tanks expected there. I took a couple of soldiers and
reconnoitered forward on foot. Then I suddenly detected Americans
sneaking up. I cried out to my comrade: "Open fire!" but he was so
bewildered that he didn't fire. But the Americans were also taken by surprise and withdrew. We waited in our panzers for an hour, then strong
artillery fire forced us to redeploy. On the next day we were ordered to
guard a staff. Allegedly the enemy had captured the nearby village. At
1000 hrs a motorcycle approached from there. After a burst of fire from
our MG the driver fell, his comrade escaped into the bushes. Up to the
afternoon all was quiet, then I with two men sneaked forward to two
buildings. From there two Germans with two French girls met us. They
said that a few hours before Americans had been there and captured a
200
came to a deserted German Police Station, its windows nicely decorated with
flower boxes.
Here I hoped to catch the armour patrol in an ambush. The flower boxes put
across the street with a large sign: "Achtung, Minen!" (attention, mines)
would stop any armor. Upon arrival, the enemy would be knocked out by
two of my tanks, concealed between the houses. A foolproof plan, - but ...
Within minutes the first armored car arrived around the corner. Noticing
our foliage barrier, it stopped and immediately reversed. Fortunately for it,
through a misfire from the first tank it made a narrow escape. This armored
car patrol of 3rd (US) Cavalry Group had nearly succeeded in clearing the
Lorrain industrial area of Germans.
Continuing our advance we soon arrived at Thionville. Not a soul in the
streets. On the marketplace suddenly two German generals and a German
female clerk appeared from two houses, more than glad to be rescued again.
One had been appointed Field area commander of Verdun, unaware that it
was in American hands. On arrival at Thionville, they had been threatened
by some people, but luckily had managed to escape into a house upon arrival
of the American patrol. We took them across the Moselle bridge, which was
guarded by some engineers. I attached my three panzers to the engineers for
the time being.
During the next few days the German defense in this sector stabilized with
the arrival of new forces and the exhaustion of the Americans, due to a shortage of gasoline and supplies. The Moselle sector from north of Thionville to
south of Metz was commanded by General Sinnhuber (LXXXII Corps) of
the First Army. In spite of the shortage of forces. Hitler insisted on holding a
bridgehead west of Thionville. It was defended by the remnants of the 48th
Infantry Division, which had acted as a covering force of the First Army during its retreat from the Seine. Now it was being relieved by the arrival of
some units of the new 559th Volksgrenadier Division, primarily at Briey.
Short of anti-tank weapons, we were happy when General Sinnhuber
attached three Mk IV tanks to the Moselle bridge with the mission of relieving elements of the 48th Infantry Division being attacked at Briey. Tank driver Reinhold Schneider of tank 602 remembered:
"Led by the commander of the infantry company in Volkswagen
amphibious cars (presumably of the Recon Battalion) we proceeded to
Briey on 7 September at 0100 hrs. A few kilometers before the last village in front of Briey we paused for a short meeting of tank and platoon
commanders. Then we advanced towards Briey. My tank, without its
radio set, in the centre. As the Americans had not noticed us, they were
quite surprised when we shelled them. Again and again my commander
204
ment was the primary reason for the successful elimination of the
Wallendorf penetration."
15. Fighting Around the Scheldt Estuary
Only a few of the thousands who visit the vacation paradise of Zeeland
every year know of the enormous efforts made by German soldiers, who fulfilled their duty to the people and the Fatherland in Flanders and on the
Scheldt.
While British and American authors stress Allied successes during the
Second World War and minimize the failures, the Wehrmacht and its efforts
are being increasingly ostracized in Germany. Even the dead are being forgotten. Who now visits the large German military cemetery from the Second
World War in Lommel, near Hechtel (south of Eindhoven), with almost
40,000 dead? A revision of history is urgently needed at this time. As Moltke
noted, as time passes, it becomes more difficult to correct the errors and
myths made in the description of historical events.
211
In 1944 hopes were awakened (by Gbbels) with the whispers and mysteries surrounding the "secret miracle weapons." Indeed, the inventions were
astounding - jet aircraft, rockets, electronics, etc. However, none of these
could alter the outcome of the war. The real "miracle weapon" was the
German infantry. They made super-human efforts during these times of
emergency. No matter that they were burned out, no matter that they lacked
weapons, ammunition and equipment, no matter that they were hungry, without a chance to catch their breath, physically and emotionally exhausted,
They did their duty and amazed their enemies.
Retreat from France
At the end of August 1944 the burned-out German armies withdrew fighting in front of the cautiously pursuing Allies into the assigned "German
Weststellung", a defensive line running from the Scheldt to the Vosges. This
retreat in the north was conducted according to the old principle, "Whoever
wants to leave had better leave fast." The Allies, who were inexperienced in
mobile warfare, misinterpreted the retreat as flight and came to incorrect
conclusions, as in one report:
The German Western Army is no longer a cohesive fighting force,
but a number of fleeing battle groups ... It is unlikely that organized
resistance under the leadership of the OKW will last past 1 December...
it can even collapse beforehand ...
(SHAEF, beginning of September, 1944)
The Allies saw the opportunity for a quick, final victory. On 4 September,
when the 2nd (British) Army in a bold attack captured Antwerp with its
almost undamaged harbour, and almost cut off the 15th German Army, it
appeared that the way to the Rhein, to the industrial Ruhr region and to
Berlin lay open. However, Field Marshal Montgomery overlooked a couple
of key considerations - as did Rommel on the Egyptian border. Montgomery
failed to take into consideration both the difficulty of supplying his attack
forces and the German combat spirit..
Meanwhile, the majority of the 15th Army's infantry divisions, which
marched on foot accompanying horse-drawn vehicles, increased the distance
from their motorized pursuers. The First Canadian Army's priority was to
clear the coast with its harbours and fortifications. This time-consuming mission allowed their enemy to get away. Thus, for example, the 711th Infantry
Division, which was initially committed on 6 June against the British air
212
landings, was able to reach the "Ghentriegel" (Ghent Block - Zeebrgge Ghent Canal to south of Ghent - Schelde to Antwerp) after a 20 day retreat
of more than 600 km. This was achieved under debilitating conditions. They
were short of rations and equipment, under a heavy physical and emotional
burden, constantly hunted by fighter-bombers, tanks and artillery; and yet
they never panicked.
Eisenhower and Montgomery had underestimated the difficulty of supplying their armies from Cherbourg, across France, with almost all of the railway communications destroyed. They overlooked the importance of
Antwerp, to which Admiral Ramsay, the Supreme Commander's Naval
Commander-in-Chief, had addressed in a telegram to SHAEF and
Montgomery's 21st Army Group on 6 September:
"It is essential to open the Antwerp port quickly. The enemy must be
prevented from mining and blocking the Scheldt. Furthermore, it will be
necessary for the coastal batteries to be captured before an approach
channel to the river route can be established, otherwise, the harbour will
not be useable for some time."
However, Montgomery's wishful thinking took the upper hand.
Unlike the Allies, the German leadership immediately recognized the
importance of Antwerp harbor for the Allies. As the 15th Army and its six
divisions found their retreat through Leuwen blocked, it was ordered to safeguard the Ghentriegel to:
- establish a bridgehead to protect the Breskens coastal batteries;
- ferry across the southern Scheldt from this bridgehead; and
- hold the island of Walcheren and from there commit strong forces
to establish a defensive front along the Albert canal.
On 6 September, while the Allies were still celebrating in Antwerp and had
not yet established a bridgehead across the Albert canal nor conducted air
reconnaissance, the LXXXVIII Army Corps was able to construct a thin
defensive front on the Albert canal east of Antwerp and blow the bridges. On
the previous day, aside from the coastal artillery, there had been one single
infantry battalion available to defend the Scheldt estuary and Walcheren
from enemy attack, as the 70th Infantry Division was temporarily committed
from Walcheren to the Ghentriegel.
Between 4 and 8 September, under the technical supervision of the Naval
Ferry Staff, 9,900 men were ferried across the five km stretch from Breskens
to Flushing. The operations were commanded by the headquarters of dis213
order to hold the island against attack from sea and land to the very last
man."
The backbone of the Scheldt defense was formed by the 203rd Marine
Artillery Abteilung (Battalion) (M.A.A.), commanded by Korvettenkapitn
Hopmann, located south of the Scheldt, and the 202nd M.A.A. on
Walcheren. Both of these had several concrete-emplaced (for all-round
defense) coastal batteries with 105 mm and 280 mm guns, several coastal
batteries with 105mm to 280mm guns and several coastal flak batteries. The
fire of the 203rd M.A.A., including its 203mm rail gun battery, was directed
by the sector fire control near near Cadzand. To be able to fire in a 360
degree arc at targets on the ground, the guns had to be taken out of their
bunkers and deployed in hastily-constructed concrete emplacements.
Later on, M.A.A. soldiers reconstructed Cadzand harbour, which had previously been demolished after the fall of Breskens. The urgently-needed
ammunition was brought in through Cadzand, and the wounded were evacuated through there to the mainland. The batteries were finally lost when they
were demolished as the enemy was attacking. There were numerous bombing missions conducted against the batteries, but few scored direct hits. The
commitment of the naval batteries was exemplary.
The Enemy
Temporarily, the Western Allies splintered their forces because of
Eisenhower's policy of "broad front objectives." Montgomery's "Bridge Too
Far" at Arnhem failed. It was difficult for the Allies to decide which operational objective took priority. Jealousy and unclear orders delayed the preparation of the forces for an attack against the Scheldt estuary for more than
four weeks, even though Eisenhower, as had Hitler before him, recognized
the importance of the port of Antwerp. Despite this, it was not until 9
October that he unmistakably announced that "all operations must come to
a standstill, otherwise we will be unable to initiate operations in Antwerp
until mid-November." Thus, the most important missions were: for the
Allies, the opening of the Scheldt estuary; for OB West, the blocking of the
Scheldt estuary.
On 15 September, II Canadian Corps, commanded by LtGen Simonds, was
ordered to break the German resistance on the Scheldt. This meant three separate operations:
- eliminate the Breskens bridgehead south of the Scheldt;
- block and capture South Beveland to the north;
- capture the island of Walcheren in an amphibious operation.
215
In favour of directing their attack toward Nijmegen, the Allies dropped the
thrust towards Moerdijk bridge, across the Waal. OB West feared such an
attack, as this would presage the destruction of all German forces further to
the west.
Breskens - Southern Scheldt Bridgehead
The terrain in the Breskens bridgehead was mainly polder, (flat, reclaimed
marshland below sea level) except for the embankments built for the road
and canal. Besides the many trenches and smaller canals, the area was crisscrossed by four larger canals, which could not be crossed by vehicles:
The Ghent Canal, running east-west, tied Zeebrgge with Ghent via
Brugge. The soon-to-be-evacuated Ghentriegel was along its course;
The Terneuzen Canal, running from Terneuzen south to Ghent;
The Leopold Canal, running from Zeebrgge to the Isabella-polder; for
the first 25 km it parallelled the Canal de Derivation de la Lys. The Leopold
was the southern front of the German bridgehead; and
The Abwasser Canal (Canal de Derivation de la Lys), which drained the
Belgian industrial area, and was also called the "Stinkkanal" by the Flemish.
Near Strobrugge it turned to the southeast toward Ghent and Lys.
During the Second Century, the Romans built a fortified camp in this region
to secure against the "Germani." However, this region was determined
"gnralement impropre aux operations militaire (generally unsuited for military operations)." It could easily be flooded by opening the locks and
sluices, which was in fact ordered by OKW in order to assist the defense.
On 6 September preparations commenced to defend the future Breskens
bridgehead by evacuating the western foreground (Zeebrgge) and ordering
the initial flooding. As during a retreat, many installations, weapons and
much ammunition were blown without plan, instead of being evacuated.
On the evening of 8 September the Canadian "Argyll & Sutherland
Highlanders" Battalion (4th Canadian Armored Division) tried to overcome
the Ghent Canal (five km south of the Leopold Canal) in a coup-de-main
near Moerbrgge on the boundary between the 245th and 711th Infantry
Divisions. They suffered heavy casualties as a result of German defensive
fire and could not establish a stable bridgehead until 10 September.
The ordered German withdrawal to the Leopold canal was only made possible by a counterattack. The 64th Infantry Division received its baptism of
fire as it occupied positions on the Leopold canal between the flooded area
south of Sluis and the Braakman inlet (just west of Terneuzen).
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South Beveland
South Beveland was assigned to the 2nd (Canadian) Infantry Division. On
17 September they relieved the British east of Antwerp. The 2nd (Canadian)
Division would attack north and then west towards Walcheren, while the 4th
(Canadian) Armored Division on the right flank would push north to attack
Bergen op Zoom across the Albert canal. The weak forces of the LXVII
Army Corps opposed them with the 346th, 711th and 719th Infantry
Divisions and defended the northern suburbs of Antwerp until the end of the
month. Further to the east, the front was pushed back to the northeast in the
direction of s'Hertogenbosch. There the terrain consisted mostly of heaths
and sandy plains interspersed with clumps of woods and brush.
The fighting began on 8 October around the Beveland isthmus, near
Woensdrecht and its embankments, and increased in ferocity against bitter
resistance. To relieve the struggling infantry, on 17 October, the
Fallschirmjger Regiment von Heydte, and, two days later the 85th Infantry
Division from Bergen op Zoom, were deployed "in order to clear the south
Beveland isthmus and hold it open." In vain! After initial success, the
defenders and their artillery positions were covered with bombs and artillery
fire, day and night. They had to withdraw to the north, and the land connection to Walcheren and the 70th Infantry Division was lost on 23 October.
The continuation of the attack across the isthmus had to be conducted by
the Canadian infantry without the support of tanks, many of which had been
shot up. On 26 October the attack had to be stopped, as the Canadian
infantry was completely exhausted. Their situation had been compounded by
the critical shortage of adequately-trained reinforcements.
Only on 28 October, after the 156th Infantry Brigade, 52nd (Lowland)
Division was landed from Terneuzen on the southeastern tip of southern
Beveland, in the rear of the Beveland Canal, could it be taken. Goes fell on
the following day, and on 30 October the 70th Infantry Division evacuated
the isthmus except for a small bridgehead, east of Arnemuiden. There were
also enemy penetrations on 31 October. On that day, OB West reported:
"Enemy attacks against the pass itself were repulsed. The causeway
to Walcheren was severed by a 25 meter wide and 10 meter deep crater."
The battle for South Beveland was at an end.
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Walcheren Island
Even with the occupation of South Beveland and the southern Scheldt, the
Scheldt estuary was still not passable. There was still fighting on Walcheren
Island with its strong coastal batteries. An air landing, which was initially
considered, was excluded because of the unsuitable terrain and strong flak,
which had shot down 40 aircraft by 22 September. Instead, LtGen Simonds
planned to open the dyke by bombing and turn the island, most of which lay
below sea level, into an atoll, - making it difficult to defend and easily captured from the sea.
After General Eisenhower had granted permission for Operation Infatuate,
preparatory bombings (a total of 2,600 tons of HE bombs) were conducted
on 3, 7, 11 and 17 October against the centuries-old dykes near Westkapelle,
Flushing and Veere to flood the island to the upper plain in the north and
around Middelburg. In spite of previous warnings from air-dropped pamphlets and radio announcements, the local population suffered 125 killed
during the first attack. Bomber Command attacked the coastal batteries with
about 6020 tons of bombs.
On 1 November, while the fighting in Festung Scheldt Slid was coming to
an end, 550 men from the British 4th Commando Group (followed later by
the 155th Infantry Brigade) landed from Breskens on the harbour jetty in the
fishing town of Flushing. They entered the town supported by irregulars. The
last guns there were ordered destroyed after firing all of their ammunition.
A short time after the landing in Flushing a flotilla of 181 ships, including
the battleship "Warspite" with its 15-inch guns, appeared before
Westkapelle. In spite of a barrage of gunfire conducted by the ships and 300
guns of all types of artillery from positions around Breskens against the
coastal batteries, the attacking Royal Marines (4th Special Service Brigade)
ran into heavy resistance. The fighting raged all morning and after suffering
heavy casualties, the Marines were ordered to withdraw. Then the page
turned. On the next day the attack made progress. On 3 November
Generalleutnant Daser surrendered in Middelburg, which was surrounded on
three sides. The Domburg Battery (5th Battery, 202nd) was the last to give
up on 8 November. The conquest of the island cost the Allies 7,700 men; the
landing operation 26 ships.
Both banks of the 130 km-long harbour exit from Antwerp were in Allied
hands. Now began the tedious minesweeping operations, which was hampered by attacks from small German combat craft. It lasted for weeks, until
the first coastal ships were able to unload on 26 November, the first Liberty
convoy on 28 November - 86 days after the fall of the city.
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Reflections
The durable German resistance on the Scheldt estuary came as a surprise to
the Allies and thwarted their plans for a quick end of the war in the west.
Although the leadership of the Allied High Command missed an opportunity
in the Scheldt to cut off and destroy the 15th German Army, it in no way
diminishes the glory and the great efforts of the newly-created infantry divisions that were committed there.
The Germans were not only able to occupy the Breskens bridgehead and
Walcheren, to evacuate the 15th Army and to prevent the Allies from bringing the harbour of Antwerp into operation, they were also able to furnish and
arm the German Westellung and rebuild the German Army. This made it possible to keep the area of the Reich, in particular to the East, free of the
enemy for a longer period.
This exemplary trial of the infantry, under similar conditions to those experienced by German soldiers in the battles of Flanders during the First World
War, proved again the worth of the German military education and training
based on the principles of discipline and mutual confidence. They resulted in
steadfast camaraderie in the fighting for the homeland, for the people and the
Fatherland - not for Hitler.
220
Kaserne
Citadel
X
Gun Batteries
MG Positions
Concrete Blockhouses
Hidden Entrenchments
Firing Positions
Armored Observation Turrets
Connecting Tunnels
Bunkers
MOSELLE
BATTERY
Barbed-Wire Entanglements
Plappeville (Alvensleben). In general, all of these fortifications were neglected by the French in favor of the Maginot Line and, during the Second World
War, disassembled by the Germans to construct the Atlantic Wall and to provide air protection for the Rhein and Ruhr industrial area.
Only Fort Driant could be refitted and manned quickly by the officer candidate school with guns from the fortress museum - some manufactured in
1903 and 1904 - and with French ammunition, to become combat-ready
before the Americans advanced. Hauptmann Weiler, a Company Commander
in the Fahnenjunker School, was appointed Commandant of the Fort.
The Allied advance through France resulted in the OKW order on 20
August for the "Construction of the German Western Positions," with antitank obstacles and a deeply echeloned defensive system. The "Moselle line"
(Diedenhofen-Thionville) - Metz line belonged to this defensive system.
The 462nd Infantry Division, under Generalleutnant Walther Krause was
charged with the defense of Metz. It was hastily thrown together from garrison troops and stragglers coming from France. The defense was set up as
follows:
VI Infantry Fahnenjunker School (cadre and 1800 fahnenjunkers with an
infantry gun company), called Kampfgruppe von Siegroth, at the
Amanvillers-Fort Driant-Ars-sur-Moselle sector,
1010th Security Regiment, the St. Privat-Fort Canrobert positions,
SS Unterfhrer School (a non-commissioned officers school) and
Waffen SS Communications School with training troops (= a regiment),
the northern sector from the banks of the Moselle-Maizieres-les-Metz.
All fortification troops and flak units were subordinated to the division, but
it still lacked all kinds of support, especially supply units.
On 6 September, as the Americans approached the main German combat
line, west of Metz, from Verdun, to their surprise, they ran into bitter resistance from Battle Group von Siegroth. General Patton's 3rd (US) Army
attack on the Saar broke against the exemplary bravery and self-sacrifice of
the fahnenjunkers, who were promoted to leutnant during the fighting. The
commitment of the fahnenjunkers from Metz was rewarded by mention in
the 24 September Wehrmacht Communique and the awarding of a cuff title:
"Metz 1944." This tenacious defense also made a deep impression on the
Americans, who had never run into such resistance now that they had to do
without close air support because of supply shortages and bad weather. After
a combat pause, the attack was supposed to be continued through the Pfalz to
the Rhein. First, however, Metz had to either fall or be screened, otherwise
fire from the forts would frustrate American attempts to either capture Metz
from the south or bypass it. Because of the fire from the forts, on 7
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Schlacht um Metz
Groups of Fortifications
Single Forts
with over-age and poorly-trained troops from fortress battalions, sick battalions and the like, known in the slang of the Wehrmacht as "Halb-Soldaten".
The elderly Generalleutnant Lbbe took over command of the division on 18
September, and was soon to be relieved on 14 Nov. by the younger
Generalleutnant Kittel.
In ignorance, the 5th (US) Division began its first attack on 27 September
under clear skies, committing the 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment
after a preparation conducted by fighter-bombers with 1000 pound highexplosive bombs, napalm and on-board weapons, as well as two barrages by
American artillery from eight batteries of 105 mm to 240 mm caliber. There
was no apparent effect on the installation. Under the protection of artificial
smoke, two infantry companies, supported by 90 mm tank destroyers,
attacked the southern wall of the fort, but they stalled against the unexpected
wire obstacles in withering defensive fire. The tank destroyers were unable
to approach the well-camouflaged gun ports. At 1800 hours the attacking
elements, after losing 18 men, withdrew to their departure positions.
The new attack was better prepared. After a detailed search in Paris, Verdun
and Nancy, the Americans were able to find hidden in Lyon the 1940
detailed ground plan of the fortifications. They now studied the details of the
installation. The division commander, General Irwin, thinking of his troops,
proposed a siege. However, he had to follow the army's orders. He ordered
new equipment deployed, tank dozers and vipers (long lines of explosives for
blowing lanes through wire and mine obstacles). All of the corps artillery
was supposed to support his attack. However, already on the eve of the
attack, it was obvious that in contrast to the forts of Lttich and Longy in
1914, which completely collapsed under the fire from 42 cm mortars, even
modern artillery would have little effect on this steel and concrete. Eight
observed hits by 203 mm shells (weight about 130 kilograms) on an armored
turret had little effect.
On the day of the attack, 3 October, bad weather frustrated the Air Force's
planned carpet bombing. After an enormous fire preparation by all of the
corps and division artillery, including rocket launchers, the 2nd Bn, 11th
Infantry Rgt, reinforced by an additional company, engineers and tanks,
launched a new attack under the protection offered by fog, at 1200 hours.
The tank dozers broke down prematurely. It proved difficult without them.
They were only able to cross the fortification trenches at one location. After
that, they were able to blow a lane through the wire obstacle. The left company stalled in defensive fire on the north. The right company, only with a lot
of luck, made it inside of the fort with four tanks, but they could not break
226
the resistance of the defenders, who unexpectedly appeared from their shelters. The accompanying flame-throwers did not function, or were quickly
eliminated. Likewise, the blowing of casemates also failed.
At night the reserve company entered the breach in the southwest with
tanks, but strong defensive fire and quickly reacting troops completely dispersed the Americans in the fort. Four Sherman tanks were destroyed with
panzerfaust. Even the fresh infantry companies were unable to expand the
penetration into the fort. After the first 24 hours, there were already one hundred men lost. Finally several soldiers reached the large steel gate at the neck
of the central fortifications. However, they were unable to place any explosives because of a steel grill.
The second night also saw little progress. Every man clung to the cover he
had found. The completely exhausted Americans were unable to reorganize
and were constantly kept busy by the combat experienced Germans. In the
early morning of 5 October the neighboring German forts placed Feste
Driant under fire. This had a murderous effect. In the afternoon the
Americans inside the fort had melted down to less than one hundred men.
Then the battalion S 3 sent a message to the rear:
"The situation is critical! A couple more barrages and another counterattack and we are sunk. We have no men, our equipment is shot and
we just can't go. The troops in G Co are done, they are just there what's
left of them. Enemy has infiltrated and pinned down what is here. We
cannot advance nor can K Co, B Co is in the same shape I'm in. We cannot delay any longer on replacement. We may be able to hold till dark
but if anything happens this afternoon I can make no predictions. The
enemy artillery is butchering troops until we have nothing left to hold
with. We cannot get out to get our wounded and there is a hell of a lot of
dead and missing. There is only one answer the way things stand. First
either to withdraw and saturate it with heavy bombers or reinforce with a
hell of a strong force ... All our charges have been useless against these
reinforced concrete walls. The few leaders are trying to keep what is left
intact and that's all they can do ... The troops are just not sufficiently
trained and what is more they have no training in even basic infantry
skills. If we want this damned fort let's get the stuff required to take it
and then go. Right now you haven't got it."
During the evening an angry General Patton exclaimed: "No attack by my
army will fail, even if it takes the last man from the XX Corps!"
During the night before 6 October the exhausted companies in the fort were
replaced by the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry Regiment. The Germans, who
were also exhausted, likewise were relieved, but the relief was difficult.
227
Americans evacuated the fort on 13 October. In all, the battle of Driant had
cost them 64 killed, 547 wounded and missing, including 21 officers. It was
the first defeat for Patton's army.
On 17 October the German OKW announced:
For several weeks the enemy has been conducting individual attacks
against the flanks of the Metz bridgehead with little success. After an
enemy penetration, Fort Driant on the Moselle, southwest of the city, is
again completely in our hands ...
A supplement to the communique of 19 October stated that "in the successful combat for Fort Driant Hauptmann Weiler, together with Leutnants
Woesner and Hohmann, have distinguished themselves by exemplary bravery. With their raiders they encircled strong enemy forces in the casemates of
the fort and destroyed them."
Hauptmann Weiler was awarded the Knight's Cross. He was relieved from
the fort on 30 October, and the name of his successor remains unknown.
The American combat pause also allowed for the relief of the German elements, especially the schools, by fresh formations from the 462nd Division,
which was "promoted" to the status of a Volksgrenadier division. On 8
November General Kittel relieved the wounded General Krause. The positions between Fort Jeanne d'Arc and Fort Driant were taken over by the
1217th Grenadier Regiment. Fort Driant was resupplied and took a deep
breath for the start of the major attack against Metz on 8 November. Hitler
declared Metz to be a "festen platz that is to be held to the last man."
This final battle in snow and rain led to the encirclement and then capitulation of Festung Metz on 22 November. The Wehrmacht Communique on 24
November noted: "In the Metz area, the defenders continue to hold several
fortified installations against heavy enemy attack." And, on 30 November,
OKW reported that some fortifications were still offering brave resistance.
Then silence. Communications were lost. Forts St. Quentin and Plappeville
surrendered on 6 and 7 December. Fort Driant gave up on 8 December to the
5th (US) Division, which had cut its teeth on this bulwark. Fifty-nine officers
and 1516 NCOs and men were taken prisoner from these forts. The last fort
to fall was Feste Jeanne d'Arc on 13 December, more than three months
after the start of the attack!
In exemplary military tradition, the brave defenders of Fort Driant and
other fortifications did their duty. They tied up a good American division and
prevented it from the attacks on the Saare. Their example and sacrifice carried weight. Without hope for relief or recognition, in ignorance and burning
229
concern for the fate of their homeland and their loved-ones, they stood in
constant readiness in the passes, in the cold, damp rooms, for days, without
relief, and withstood the unbelievable test of their physical and emotional
strength. How could they maintain their trust and sense of responsibility for
so long in these cramped combat conditions, instead of fleeing with their
wounds and illnesses to the security and relative comfort of captivity?
They were soldiers!
17. On the Saare Front
Panzer Lehr Division Counterattack
The weak defensive position of Army Group G (General Balck) on the
southern wing of the Westfront was threatened by two offensives at the same
time in November 1944. The 7th (US) Army was advancing from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Upper Rhine and the 3rd (US) Army was advancing from Normandy to the Palatinate. On 21 November forces from the 7th
Army reached Sarrebourg and, two days later, Strassburg. Advance detachments from both armies reached Bettborn (6 kilometers south of Fntrange)
on 22 November and linked up.
The German 1st Army was thrown back to the Saare, although some elements were still fighting on the western bank. Stormy weather helped the
weak, poorly equipped and completely exhausted German divisions hold
their positions. The Americans had to do without their usual close air support
because of the constant bad weather. They suffered from a fuel shortage.
Movement of all types of their vehicles was considerably complicated by
roads that were easily defended by mines and obstacles, and by the constant
rain which flooded the terrain.
A serious situation emerged in northern Alsace due to the advance of
enemy forces. It was so serious that OB West feared the destruction of its
southern wing and had to alert Panzer Lehr against strict orders from the
OKW.
Panzer Lehr was, in the meantime, refitted, as well as the personnel and
equipment situation in the Reich would then allow. It was then transferred
into Hunsrck. The panzer regiment was reduced from two battalions to one,
with four tank companies, for a total of 34 Panthers and 34 Panzer IVs.
Twenty-one Jagdpanzer IVs were still missing. Of the previous four armored
(APC) panzergrenadier battalions, there were only three, mechanized with
Steyr trucks and Raupenschlepper Ost fully tracked vehicles. From the only
remaining SPW battalion - I Bn, 901st Rgt - the 1st Company had to be left
behind, in order to await additional equipment and graduation of the ongoing
230
The prisoners were immediately sent to the rear, but they were again liberated in Baerendorf.
On the supposition that there was no threat coming from the west, because
the 361st Volksgrenadier Division would prevent a crossing of the Saare, the
Panzer Lehr Division did not pay any attention to its flank. Nevertheless,
Combat Command B from the 4th (US) Armored Division crossed the Saare
on that morning in two places (Gosselming and Fntrange). The northern
group - Task Force Churchill - took the 1st Battery, 130th Armored Artillery
Regiment, which was redeploying, by surprise from the hills west of Postroff
and destroyed it. All six guns, half of the fire-power of I Bn, 130th Armored
Artillery Rgt, were lost.
Further to the south. Task Force Jaques overcame the resistance of the
volksgrenadiers near Kirrberg, after a brief fight, and advanced from there
toward Baerendorf into the flank of Kampfgruppe von Poschinger. Under the
cover of fire from their tanks, the American infantry waded through the cold
stream west of the town and took I Bn, 902nd Rgt by surprise as it awaited
supplies and further orders in Baerendorf. Before the commander could
organize an all-round defense, the Americans were already fighting in the
town. The battalion staff was able to flee into the coal cellar of a school,
where they had to pass the day in darkness, because the enemy had occupied
the school above them. The fire-fight between individual companies cost
both sides heavy casualties. For most of the young, insufficiently trained
panzergrenadiers, this was their baptism of fire.
While it was dark, the Americans again withdrew from Baerendorf, without
destroying or taking away their captured vehicles. The battalion staff, which
was already listed as missing, was able to get back to the division headquarters in Postroff with their own vehicles, and reorganize the battalion.
In the afternoon, an attempt to regain Hirschland and Baerendorf failed due
to the lack of combat experience of the young soldiers and the shortage of
gasoline.
The fighting around Rauwiller continued without pause all day, but, at 2200
hours, II Bn, 902nd Rgt was ordered to withdraw through Hirschland to
Postroff. Hauptmann Bohm, the Battalion Commander, was later awarded
the Honour Roll clasp for the fighting around Rauwiller.
The division order for 25 November took the new situation into account.
The attack to the south on Schalbach was to be continued by the panzerkampfgruppe, Kampfgruppe von Poschinger went over to the defense in the
west.
The attack on Schalbach, which was planned as a night attack, did not
begin until 1000 hours, because assembly was delayed by the difficulty of
234
the terrain and supply. While overcoming the unprotected slope north of the
town, the attackers were hit with a withering defensive fire from two artillery
battalions and a heavy tank destroyer battalion that had been deployed on the
previous day. German artillery could not suppress the enemy. The panzergrenadiers were separated from the panzers, several panzers were knocked
and the author was wounded. The attack had to be suspended.
The newly-deployed American 90 mm tank destroyers inflicted heavy
losses. Feldwebel Dette remembered:
"We received a hit on the right side of our Panther. The track flew
off and the driving wheel was damaged. I must give high praise to our
maintenance squad. They wanted to immediately repair the damage, but
they had to give up because we were under heavy fire. However, the
panzer could be towed away.
This fire also mortally wounded the radio operator of the company
commander's tank. However, the driver, Unteroffizier Willi Schack,
although also wounded, was able to place the vehicle in reverse and find
the gas pedal. So, the vehicle rolled backwards for some time into cover,
then the crew was able to escape ..."
The strong 4th (US) Armored Division forced both kampfgruppen from
Panzer Lehr onto the defensive. The division counterattack, which was started with such hope and motivation, failed against the superiority of the
enemy. The division reorganized for the defense along the WolfskirchenEywiller-Durstel road during the night before 26 November.
Army Reserve
On the Saare front. The 1st Army was in crisis due to the double American
offensive. The length of its front had doubled without it essentially being
reinforced with the required forces. Until the arrival of anticipated large formations, Panzer Lehr was attached to the 1st Army as its only reserve. On 26
November it was ordered to screen the forming of a new defensive line from
Sarre-Union to Wingen. The 401 Volks Artillery Corps was placed under its
command.
During the morning, the 4th (US) Armored Division probed the division's
security with four combat elements side by side. However, they were all
repulsed, even though all of the panzers had been withdrawn from the front.
The construction of the new defenses in the 1st Army area continued on 27
November. In the north, west of Forbach, the enemy caused a problem with
several penetrations. This situation forced a withdrawal to a shorter line in
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objections voiced by all division commanders to the 1st Army had no effect
on this order.
On 4 December another critical situation faced Kampfgruppe von
Poschinger near Domfessel. I Bn, 902nd Rgt, which had established an allround defense, was broken through due to a flanking attack with strong
artillery support. It was divided into several groups, which were encircled.
When the battalion command post, which was located in a bunker from the
Maginot line, was persuaded to surrender by the use hand-grenades, the
commander capitulated. With him, 140 men went into captivity.
Sarre-Union was also captured by the enemy. The II Bn, 902nd Rgt had to
block near Lorentzen. On the urging of General Bayerlein, the army group
gave its permission to withdraw the front. Nevertheless, Kampfgruppe von
Hauser still had to hold Ratzwiller until dark. In spite of the confusion, all of
Panzer Lehr formations were withdrawn that night. According to a report
from XIII SS Corps, the forward elements had already arrived in the
Pirmasens-Hombourg area early on 5 December. In spite of the shortage of
fuel, the division reached the Eifel by road march, perhaps because the railroads were overloaded and more easily reconnoitered by the enemy than a
road march by small groups at night. Only the tracked elements were transferred by rail.
The railroad loading up was placed in question on 6 December by an
enemy breakthrough toward Singling. The panzer battalion was ordered to
combat readiness. Nevertheless, the 4th (US) Armored Division stopped its
advance because it was completely exhausted. Thus, the railroad transport
could be conducted as ordered on 7 December.
We must still report on the kampfgruppen that were assigned to the other
corps.
Armored Eingreifgruppe (Special Assault Group) Monz
As ordered, Oberleutnant Monz and his 29 SPWs reported to XIII SS Corps
in Bous on the morning of 28 November. The corps commander had expected panzers for the counterattack and was disappointed to see only panzergrenadiers. The corps anticipated an enemy attack from the west and southwest against Felsberg and Saarlouis. Indeed, the regiments of the combat
inexperienced and exhausted 347th Volksgrenadier Division were still committed in the Felsberg-Altforweiler area.
They were, however, only inadequately armed and without anti-tank
defenses. Oberleutnant Monz was ordered to hold the Sauberg (Hill 377) and
238
"I led two platoons (one with mortars and on-board cannon) in an
attack around Altforweiler, where an anti-tank gun failed to fire and a
squad of overrun infantry surrendered. In light of the lack of resistance, I
continued on to Berus, where we ran into dispersed infantrymen, who
ran from the houses and tried to withdraw on foot and in vehicles. Our
considerable fire-power was brought to bear. At that time, I estimated the
enemy to be no larger than a company. We had to tow two SPWs and
suffered several killed and wounded during the return trip back to the
rest of the company. We remained camouflaged on the road west of
Felsberg."
On that 29 November the 95th (US) Division continued its attack against
Saarlouis with two regiments. The 1st Bn, 378th Inf Rgt captured Merten,
the 2nd Bn crossed the unoccupied Saare hill positions and captured Berus,
where it was immediately hit by a counterattack conducted by Group Monz:
"After a bitter engagement in which the battalion lost heavily and
became much disorganized, it fell back towards Merten, reorganizing
during the night behind cover offered by a group of farm buildings."
(Cole).
This according to an American general's staff work.
After passing a quiet night in Felsberg, only outposts were left on the
Sauberg. In the morning, when strong sounds of fighting were heard in the
north, Monz attacked the apparently weakly occupied Dren. Under the protective fire of all available 75 mm KwKs and mortars, the right platoon
advanced dismounted from Oberfelsberg to the north, while the left platoon
in Ittersdorf reported an enemy tank column rolling from Schreckling without accompanying infantry. The attack was immediately broken off. All vehicles were ordered back to Felsberg and the prepared trenches were occupied
on the Sauberg. One of the two tank destroyer squads were left on the edge
of the road. The element was formed by NCO candidates.
After withdrawing the drivers and co-drivers of the combat and supply
vehicles to Picard, along with the dead and wounded, the company commander still had 50-60 men available on the vast crest of the hill. Apparently they
were the only German soldiers within a radius of several kilometers - without artillery and long-range anti-tank weapons. Fortunately, overcast skies
kept the fighter-bombers away, but everywhere there were enemy infantry
with supporting tanks advancing to the east. In the afternoon enemy infantry
(377th Inf Rgt) diverted from St. Barbara toward Felsberg.
Then, two infantry battalions (378th Inf Rgt) with tanks approached the
Sauberg from the west and southwest on a broad front. The tank fire inflicted
240
losses. The tanks remained outside of panzerfaust range. A radio call for
help to the corps went unanswered. In the afternoon, when additional
infantry climbed from the south and the north, Felsberg was taken and the
company commander had to evacuate the Sauberg, withdrawing to the eastern edge of Felsberg. There, the rear guard - "a particularly stubborn knot
from the assault group" - was able to stop the further advance of the 377th
(US) Inf Rgt. After darkness fell, the Americans stopped their advance. The
group held the eastern edge of Unterfelsberg through the night, with security
in Picard and Lisdorf.
The will to fight of the young soldiers under good leadership was astounding. An "ofenrohr" was set up on the left of the railroad embankment in
Felsberg by an "alte Hase," a machine-gun on the right, manned by a young
rookie. After a Sherman tank was hit, the commander jumped into the trench
next to the rookie and slapped him on the shoulder. Confidently, he said:
"after the third one we'll take a cigarette break."
With clearing skies on 1 December came the bombers. They bombed
Saarlouis, Fraulautern and the Saare bridge in Ensdorf. Subsequently, the
95th (US) Division began its attack against Saarlouis and the Saare crossings. Saarlouis was defended by the remnants of three exhausted infantry
divisions, some still on the western bank, the main body on the edge of the
city in the West Wall bunkers and to the east. After 1500 hours Group Monz
was allowed to withdraw under cover of ground fog from the eastern edge of
Felsberg into positions on the northern edge of Lisdorf. There, machine-guns
and mortars were emplaced, all ofenrohrs were lost trying to provide antitank defense. In order to deceive the enemy of the German weakness, two
motorcycles with side-cars drove up and down the lines, firing at various
positions.
During the night before 2 December the army group ordered the evacuation
of the western bank of the Saare north of Saarlouis, due to troop and ammunition shortages. Oberleutnant Monz did not learn of this because he had lost
radio communications with corps. The company secured Lisdorf until early 3
December. They did not evacuate their positions until the corps ordered them
to do so, when the Americans were already approaching the bridge. The
company was ordered to immediately return to Panzer Lehr through
S aarbrcken-Habkirchen.
After reporting back to Oberst von Hauser in Butten on 4 December, the
severely decimated 1st Co. was immediately re-committed near Volksberg.
Nevertheless, a messenger on foot brought the order to withdraw and assemble on the early morning of 5 December. In the afternoon, the company
marched through Pirmasens-Kaub to Cochem/Moselle.
241
third of what was required. A majority of the panzers and wheeled vehicles
were immobilized due to the lack of spare parts. Nevertheless, the morale of
the troops remained good. General Bayerlein evaluated them as conditionally
qualified for attack operations.
246
VI
The Battle Of The Bulge
Meuse between Huy and Givet in order to then screen the flanks and rear of
the 6th Panzer Army against enemy attempts from the west, on a general line
Brussels-Dinant. Forces: three panzer divisions, four other divisions (Volksgrenadier).
7th Army - Was to force a crossing of the Our and Sauer on either side of
Echternach in order to then secure the panzer army's attack against enemy
forces coming from the south. Forces: no panzers, four other divisions, - 1
Parachute and 3 Volksgrenadier.
Army Group reserve: one volksgrenadier division.
OKW Reserves: two panzer divisions, five other divisions.
one panzer brigade, one panzergrenadier brigade.
Total German strength: 28 large formations.
Enemy forces:
21st (British) Army Group: five armored divisions,
eight infantry divisions
9th (US) Army:
two armored divisions,
four infantry divisions
three armored divisions,
1st (US) Army:
11 infantry divisions
one armored division,
USAREUR Reserves:
four airborne divisions
Total strength:
40 divisions.
The apparent equality between these forces was false. Wars are won, in the
long run, by the side that is stronger in numbers and equipment. Today, it is
generally accepted that a three-fold superiority is required for a successful
attack. In this case, the German forces were inferior from top to bottom. The
temporary superiority in the penetration area would quickly vanish because
the Americans were able to deploy one division after the other, due to their
their great mobility.
The disposition of these forces was also wrong. The main effort of the
operation should have been in the center, but it lay to the right, because the
SS divisions were supposed to earn the laurels. However, the infantry divisions committed there ran into a simultaneous American attack and were
unable to break through. The 7th Army, which was charged with flank protection on the left, had no panzers or assault guns. Because of the shortage of
forces, other American frontal sectors could not be pinned. The Americans
249
Air Situation: The previous German defeat in France was ascribed, for the
most part, to the technical and numerical superiority of the enemy tactical air
forces. The prime prerequisite for a German offensive success was, therefore, maintaining a favorable air situation over the combat area for an
extended period of time. The German Luftwaffe had to protect the German
deployment and, later, the supply of the Army, against bombing attacks in
the rear area and prevent the enemy's tactical air forces from providing close
air support to its own forces. Otherwise, it had to prevent the deployment of
Allied operational reserves by blocking the interior (interdiction) or, at least,
delay their deployment and make it more difficult.
Operation "Bodenplatte" was planned as a surprise Luftwaffe attack operation targeting 15 enemy airfields. Because of the lack of training and insufficient navigational equipment, the German aircraft could only conduct the
attacks if they visually acquired the target. The weather did not allow for this
until 1 January 1945. By then, the enemy had already destroyed so many of
the 1800 aircraft assigned to the offensive that only 1035 could take off for
the attack. Indeed, they achieved surprise. However, not only the enemy, but
the German squadrons also suffered bitter losses, some from German flak,
who had not been advised of the attack beforehand.
The Allied strategic bomber formations were able to fly their missions
regardless of weather. From 16 December they changed the rear Army area
and the cities on the Rhein and in the Ruhr into a wasteland, apparently without facing any competition from the Luftwaffe, although they must have suffered considerable losses from German flak.
After the period of bad weather ended, the attacking formations no longer
saw any traces of their own Luftwaffe, but they saw a lot of the enemy's.
German air reconnaissance did not make it through to clarify the situation
for attackers, such as Group Peiper, as the US Air Force did for its ground
elements. (Group Peiper from the 1st SS-Panzer Division [6th Panzer Army]
achieved a deep breakthrough toward Stavelot, but was cut off and
destroyed.)
Transportation Situation: The Ardennes was considered impassable until
1940, when the Wehrmacht was able to overcome it in good weather, under
the protection of the Luftwaffe, against a weak enemy with horse-drawn
equipment and relatively defenseless. Now, exhausted formations lacking
sufficient supply were supposed to break through a tenaciously defending,
highly mobile and well equipped enemy, in difficult terrain, in winter, under
an air threat. Movement off the few poor, often winding roads, through the
heavily forested and hilly terrain, was impossible. Therefore, any resistance
on the roads and in the passes could not be bypassed in vehicles, but only on
foot. The occupation of the transportation hubs of St. Vith and Bastogne
253
These high command reserves were able to hold the two transport hubs, St.
Vith and Bastogne. St. Vith, which lay in a valley pocket and was almost surrounded, was ultimately evacuated. Field Marshal Montgomery agreed with
the proposal of his concerned 7th Armored Division commander and suspended the hold order from the corps commander. Otherwise, this American
armored division would have been completely destroyed.
Bastogne, on the other hand, defied all attacks. As long as our 7th Army
secured the flank of the 5th Panzer Army to the south, encircled Bastogne
could have little effect on the attack across the Meuse. That was the operational objective, not the capture of Bastogne.
While the 5th Panzer Army continued to push to the Meuse, only limited by
the fuel shortage, Hitler ordered Bastogne be taken. This, in fact, marked the
end of the operation! OB West reported on 24 December that the offensive
had reached its climax. It had to be broken off since the German forces were
urgently needed in the east in order to block the anticipated Soviet offensive.
Instead, an operationally senseless battle flared up around Bastogne.
However, the Allies were as much to blame as was Hitler. Realizing the difficult German supply situation, they could have achieved a less-costly success and, once and for all, destroyed both German panzer armies, if they had
allowed the attackers to reach or cross the Meuse, where they would have
become immobile. They also could have built an enormous pocket by conducting an outflanking operation north and south of Dasburg. Instead, they
tried to throw Army Group B back by attacking it frontally.
The German attack formations, which were forced onto the defensive,
defended bravely and successfully for about fourteen days, favored by the
difficult terrain, the cold, the snow and their extensive winter and nighttime
combat experience. During the following planned withdrawal, they lost a
great deal of their equipment due to the shortage of fuel and terrain conditions, not because of enemy pressure. Unfortunately, these German losses, in
contrast to those suffered by the Allies, were irreplaceable. General
Wagener, the Chief of Staff for the 5th Panzer Army, assessed the fighting
with the words: "The Germans lost the Ardennes offensive, the Allies did not
win it!"
In spite of all the failures, the commanders on both sides saw the Ardennes
offensive as an immortal monument to the best German military tradition
during the Second World War.
19. Forward to the Meuse
The Ardennes offensive would be the only time that the Allied leadership
would be forced onto the defensive in the West.
256
After its unexpected relief from the fierce and costly fighting in the 1st
Army area of operations on the Saar front on 5 December, Panzer Lehr
assembled in the Cochem an der Mosel area, after a seven-day, strenuous
night march conducted in small groups. It received the required personnel
and material replacements - approximately 600 panzergrenadiers, panzers,
guns and vehicles. This improved the equipment situation, but the units had
no time to incorporate the personnel replacements and check the equipment.
Superficially, the combat strength of the division, with a total of 63 Panzer
IVs and Vs, as well as 15 Panzerjger IVs, appeared to be favourable when
compared to other divisions. However, the panzer regiment still had no more
than one mixed panzer battalion instead of two. Instead of I (Panther)
Battalion, which was fighting in Hungary, it was promised the 559th Heavy
Panzerjger Battalion, equipped with Jagdpanthers - a weaker replacement
for the offensive. It did not arrive until after Christmas. The 243rd Assault
Gun Brigade, which was also promised to the division, never did show up.
Apparently, it had, in the meantime, received other orders. The Panzerjger
Lehr Battalion was only able to commit two companies with Jagdpanzer IVs.
Its anti-tank gun company fought with the unarmored 75 mm anti-tank gun.
The 130th ALA was relatively well replenished with equipment.
The great gaps in the ranks of the panzergrenadiers were numerically filled
with replacements - some splendid, but retrained cavalrymen from
Mecklenburg and very young recruits, still capable of enthusiasm, as well as
older, discontented Luftwaffe soldiers. There was a great shortage of NCOs.
Nevertheless, it had been possible to reconstitute 1st Bn 902, - which had
been destroyed - in Domfessel on 4 December by combining the two battalion supply companies into one regimental supply company. Only one battalion, the I Bn, 901st Rgt, remained equipped with armored SPWs, even if the
1st Company had only 16 SPWs instead of 22. The three other battalions
were partially motorized with unarmored Steyr personnel carriers and
Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO). In general, the panzergrenadiers lacked their
earlier fire-power, because they possessed neither gun APCs nor heavy
infantry guns. Moreover, the considerable lack of training also could not be
overlooked.
The 130th Armored Artillery Regiment was "armored" only in name. After
loosing its guns in Lorraine, I Battalion had to hand over what was left over
to the other two battalions. The regiment now consisted of only a light battalion (4th, 5th, 6th Batteries) and III (heavy field howitzer) Battalion with two
batteries. The supply troops were in even worse shape.
On 13 December the commanders first learned of the upcoming attack. On
15 December the units were read the daily order of Feldmarschall von
Rundstedt and Feldmarschall Model. They listened with deep anxiety.
257
The remaining roads and trails were narrow and unsuitable for heavy traffic. For the movement of panzer formations and their supply, it was very
important that the large road intersections - in the Panzer Lehr Division sector Bastogne - be occupied.
The enemy in defensive positions was the 28th (US) Infantry Division, a
National Guard Division originating from Pennsylvania with the nickname
Keystone. It had already met the Panzer Lehr Division near Percy and
Kampfgruppe von Hauser at the West Wall. After suffering heavy casualties
in the Hrtgenwald, it was transferred to this apparently "quiet" frontal sector for refitting. It was reinforced by Combat Command A from the 9th (US)
Armored Division, and an additional tank battalion.
The Panzer Lehr Division was organized as follows for the attack:
Advance Guard:
Commander: commander of the 130th ALA
Troops: 130th ALA
8th Co, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment (15 Pz IVs)
3rd Co, 130th Panzerjger Lehr Battalion
4th Battery, 130th Armored Artillery Regiment
(four light field howitzers)
One armored engineer company
901st Kampfgruppe Commander: commander of the 901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
Troops: 901st Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
6th Co, 130th Panzer Lehr Regiment (Pz IVs)
II Bn, 130th Armored Artillery Regiment
902nd Kampfgruppe Commander: commander of the 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
Troops: 902nd Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment
II Bn, 130th Panzer Lehr Regt
(two Panther companies)
- Division Reserve
difficulty on the steep and muddy forests trails. Stuck and abandoned motorvehicles, interspersed among horse-drawn ammunition wagons, blocked the
roads. Enemy fire blanketed the forest and exacted considerable loss and
congestion ...
Thus Generalmajor Kokott placed the blame for the delays.
The engineers could only slowly pave the way for the wheeled vehicles.
The lead company - 3rd Company, 130th ALA reinforced by a Panzer IV
platoon - had to constantly stop, so they did not reach enemy-occupied
Wahlhausen until dawn was breaking. The lead panzer, commanded by
Unteroffizier Wippich, destroyed two American reconnaissance tanks, then
in the twilight nothing more was seen. The rest was a job for the infantry.
The lack of training in the young soldiers became evident. A flare was fired
prematurely next to the panzer, which was illuminated in the bright light. A
high-explosive round from an enemy tank cost Unteroffizier Wippich an
arm. The attack came to a standstill.
The objective for 16 December in the XLVII Panzer Corps area of operations was not achieved, but the Our sector was in German hands, two 60 ton
bridges spanned the river and additional forces were rolling over it to the
western bank.
On 17 December the units of Panzer Lehr set in march to the Our. Rain protected them from air attack. Because of traffic problems near Gemnd,
Kampfgruppe 902 was diverted across the Dasburg bridge. They reported a
refueling stop near Marnach at 1830 hours. Reconnaissance elements committed to Hosingen reported enemy there. The village did not fall until the
next day. Based on the unfounded report that the 14th Fallschirmjger
Regiment had captured the Clerf River crossing south of Kautenbach and,
therefore, opened another route for the continuation of the advance to the
Meuse, the corps ordered the advance detachment not to advance, as
planned, through Drauffel, but through Kautenbach. The 39th Fusilier
Regiment was already committed there. However, the tenacious resistance in
Holzthum could only be broken that evening with the help of the von Fallois
advance guard. Because the exhausted volksgrenadiers could not open the
way through Consthum for the advance detachment, General Bayerlein committed Kampfgruppe von Hauser instead of the advance guard. That night,
volksgrenadiers advanced through the forest and reached the outskirts of
Drauffeld, with its undamaged Clerf bridge. That was where the advance
guard was able to attack out of the bridgehead to the west, reinforced by the
26th Reconnaissance Battalion and followed by Kampfgruppe von
Poschinger on 18 December at 0900 hours; more than a 24 hour delay.
As could be expected, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was only able to
261
achieve the penetration into the enemy defensive positions in the difficult terrain with the help of Panzer Lehr. However, this preyed upon the limited
strength of Panzer Lehr. It was splintered and over- extended for the continuation of the advance.
Artillery and mortar fire harassed and delayed the climb out of the Clerf
valley. The lead elements received fire in front of Erpeldange. In the meantime, Kampfgruppe 901 was fighting around Consthum, which could not be
cleared until the afternoon. The continuation of the attack in the direction of
Wiltz failed, when the 5th Fallschirmjger Division was unable to support it
from the southeast.
Meanwhile, Kampfgruppe 902 captured Eschweiler by advancing on the
serpentine road. The breakout of the defenders failed in front of the guns of
the panzers from the Advance Detachment near Erpeldange. Eight armored
personnel carriers and four tank destroyers were captured. Kampfgruppe 902
reached Derenbach before the advance guard, in spite of being held up by a
road block three kilometers in front of the village.
The advance guard was stopped first by the enemy, who did not evacuate
Erpeldange and the northern bank of the Wiltz until 1600 hours.
Kampfgruppe 902 had to let them bypass in Derenbach. The advance guard
(II Bn, 130th Panzer Lehr Rgt), in the meantime, pressed to the west during
the night. An impressive show to the right held their attention. Resounding
gunfire, muzzle flashes, tracers and reflections from fires illuminated the low
cloud cover. Tank gunfire indicated the fighting of the 3rd Panzer Regiment
against Task Force Harper near Allerborn.
At 1900 hours they reached Nieder-Wampach without enemy interference.
The tanks had to refuel. Unfortunately, the fuel they brought was only sufficient to fill the panzers half-way. Meanwhile, the corps order for 19
December arrived. Panzer Lehr was supposed to advance across the
Mageret-Wardin line from the east toward Bastogne and, if possible on the
same day, through it to the west. On its right, the 26th Volksgrenadier
Division was supposed to attack through the Bois Jaques with the objective
of penetrating into Bastogne from the north. Generalleutnant Bayerlein then
had to decide on the subsequent march route.
The Corps had been previously warned about using the small field trails
through Benonchamps-Mageret during a thaw and advised to use the better
road through Bras. Reconnaissance results and resident interrogation indicated that the route through Benonchamps, however, appeared passable. It was
the shortest route and the enemy would never expect them to use it. Surprise
favored this point of view. However, the panzer tracks turned the field trails,
that were flooded by the thaw and continuing rain, into mud within a short
262
and castle of Neffe for Americans. The innocent young soldiers allowed
themselves to be deceived by the residents and found nothing in the basements. They reported the town and castle of Neffe enemy-free at 0800 hours,
a grave mistake.
Shortly before the continuation of the attack on Bastogne, the fog lifted and
allowed for observation into the city. An endless column of infantry - the
501st Airborne Regiment - was approaching. After receiving fire, they at
once deployed for an attack towards Neffe. A short time later, the town lay
under mortar fire. The raid on Bastogne had failed.
In light of the enemy's strength and the German weakness - the newly created I Bn, 902nd Rgt lacked combat experience and the panzers fuel, the
artillery still lagged far behind - Oberstleutnant von Poschinger ordered a
postponement until a second battalion (Bohm) arrived. It was supposed to
quickly advance through Neffe to the town of Mont on the enemy's flank. At
1000 hours, when the 5th and 6th Companies approached the castle of Neffe,
which had been reported to be free of enemy forces, in route-march, they
were met by heavy machine-gun fire, which inflicted considerable loss and a
great amount of confusion on the combat inexperienced young panzergrenadiers. The 5th Company commander, Oberleutnant Pauletto, and another officer were immediately killed. Oberleutnant Graf, the 7th Company
commander, reported:
"No sooner had I approached the gate to the castle park, when we
received murderous machine-gun fire. The castle was occupied. Many
were killed, many others wounded. I was lucky and was able to seek
shelter behind a 60 cm thick tree. A sharpshooter had me in his sights,
any movement resulted in a shot. Our panzers arrived and opened fire. It
had no effect. While the 6th Company set up on the edge of the park, the
5th and the 7th Companies were supposed to attack the castle from two
sides. It was fruitless. The attack had to be suspended and, by evening,
the castle was still occupied by the enemy. By shouting I was finally able
to resume command of my company. A stream was our rescue. Jumping
into the ice-cold water protected us from enemy fire ..."
By holding out until dark, the American castle defenders frustrated the
German attack against Mont, which was then occupied by the enemy. At
1000 hours strong American artillery joined in, while the Germans weren't
ready to fire until after noon. By midday, the enemy had also occupied
Bizory and isolated the 26th Reconnaissance Battalion from Battle Group
902 and threatened to outflank it on both sides.
At thewithdrawing
same time, from
enemyLongvilly.
tanks approached
the eastern
exit commander
from Mageret
while
Oberleutnant
Ebner, the
of
264
worn down.
Kampfgruppe von Fallois was committed against Wardin-Marvie in order
to advance on Bastogne from the south and avoid being outflanked from
there. At 1300 hours the reconnaissance entered Wardin from the east with
panzer and artillery support, at the same time as the 1st Company, 501st
Airborne Regiment entered from the other side. A fierce fight ensued. The
paratroopers had to be attacked house by house. By evening they had lost
four officers and 45 men killed; only 83 men from the company returned to
Bastogne. However, the forces from the Armored Reconnaissance Lehr
Battalion were so exhausted that they couldn't attack the weakly-occupied
Marvie at that time.
In the early morning the over-tired General Bayerlein was wounded by a
shell fragment. He was well-treated at the American Mageret first aid station, which had been captured, and soon returned somewhat recovered.
In the afternoon the corps commander, General Freiherr von Lttwitz,
appeared at the Panzer Lehr command post in Nieder-Wampach. He exuded
optimism, even though Bastogne had not fallen and the troops, who had been
committed for more than 72 hours, were at the end of their strength.
On the northern flank, the 2nd Panzer Division advanced impetuously to
the west. They were ready, if need be, to capture Bastogne. The 26th
Volksgrenadier Division, in the middle, attacked Foy and Bizory. On the left
flank closed the Panzer Lehr Division. Their left neighbor, the 5th
Fallschirmjger Division, reported capturing Wiltz. When deciding about
how to continue the operation, the corps faced the dilemma of choosing in
favour of a rapid advance to the Meuse over the capture of Bastogne, or conduct another costly attack against Bastogne. The skeptical General Bayerlein
emphatically drew attention to the importance of Bastogne and the strength
of the fresh enemy airborne division there. In such difficult road and terrain
conditions, the occupation of the traffic hub was indispensable for any further
operations. If the enemy continued to occupy the town, it would become a
boil on the flesh of the corps, especially because of the concern over flank
protection to the south if the recently refitted 5th Fallschirmjger Division
failed in its will to fight. On the other hand, the corps commander noted that
they had already lost more time than could be justified in light of the agility
of the enemy command. The enemy had already moved faster than expected,
deploying strong reserves, one armored and two airborne divisions. One had
to anticipate a further strengthening of enemy resistance, not only in
Bastogne, but also behind the Meuse. The forces of the corps were ill-suited
for an urban fight in and around Bastogne. As long as the southern flank was
secure, Bastogne, as well as St. Vith further to the north, would have to fall
266
tion, which ran counter to his impression of the enemy situation. He proposed, instead, to relieve the Panzer Lehr Division in the Neffe area with the
39th Fusilier Regiment, thereby allowing the mobile forces to bypass and
attack from the southwest. The proposal was turned down because the relief
would take too long. The objective would be achieved more quickly if the
39th Rgt were diverted in the new direction."
As a result of poor communication between the Corps Command post (still
located east of the Our) and subordinate divisions, the Corps Order for the
Bastogne operation was confusing and difficult to understand. It was issued
based on individual, sometimes conflicting, reports and the diverging
impressions of the corps commander and his chief of staff, Oberst i.G. von
Bernstorff derived from their visits to the front before telephone communications were established. The objective, the Meuse near Dinant, had been easy
to reach during the violent assault in 1940. Now, due to the difficult fuel situation and superior enemy forces, rapid and decisive action was even more
important. But the exhausted troops of 1944 were not up to the level of those
in 1940.
The Allies had constantly-updated information on the German situation
from their sophisticated intelligence systems, especially Ultra. The German
soldier deserves recognition, being capable of such effort after being so battered. The Panzer Lehr mission for 21 December was to attack with its main
body across the Ourthe to the Meuse, and to detach Kampfgruppe von
Hauser, which was fighting in the southeast of Bastogne, to the 26th
Volksgrenadier Division. They were to complete the encirclement of
Bastogne and capture it.
While 2nd Panzer Division captured the Ourthe bridge near Orthwuville
further to the north, the stronger one of Panzer Lehr Division's kampfgruppen, von Poschinger (902nd) had to wait for 24 hours for its relief near Neffe
by volksgrenadiers and then for fuel. Therefore, only Kampfgruppe von
Fallois (ALA), reinforced by 8th Company Panzer Lehr Regiment and 130th
Panzer Engineer Battalion, could immediately take up the advance to the
west. They initially followed the 26th Reconnaissance Battalion up to
Hompr, then turned to the west and reached the area around Tillet, where
they severed the supply road of VIII (US) Corps and captured 60 to 80 trucks
loaded with American Christmas mail and packages. Against light resistance, during which two armored cars were lost, they were able to encircle
the 58th (US) Field Artillery Battalion that night and repulse their breakout
attempts.
On 22 December the advance towards St. Hubert was continued, but
delayed as the direct route via Pirompr was reportedly blocked by some cut
269
down trees. Major von Fallois chose the route further to the north via the
Ourthe bridge at Amberloup, which was captured intact without any losses.
In this moment the outposts at the eastern edge of Amberloup seized and
searched four civilians approaching from the east. Finding arms with them,
they were brought to the platoon commander, a young 2nd Lieutenant, who
immediately prepared to execute them as guerillas.
This was the scene of a story, which an "Anonymous WWII Veteran"
reported to President Reagan, 38 years later (1982):
"Our division, the 101st Airborne, was encircled but holding
Bastogne. I was a battalion intelligence and reconnaissance officer. Early
in the morning on December 22, 1944, three of my men and I went on a
mission behind German positions southwest of Bastogne. Four hours
later we were captured ... They were from the foreward element of the
famed Panzer Lehr Division ... Immediately after we were captured, a
German lieutenant ordered his men to take us into the woods. We were
stripped of our weapons and personal effects. The lieutenant became
furious when he discovered that besides my carbine I had a German officer's pistol. He kept demanding to know where and how I had obtained
it. Understandably he refused to accept the explanation that I had found
it. Finally he concluded that I had killed a German officer and taken the
side arm from his dead body. Thus he ordered our execution. We were
ordered to face the other way, raise our arms over our heads, and to pray.
A German soldier manning a machine-gun mounted on a halftrack, rotated and cocked the weapon. Fortunately my German is very bad.
Meaning to say in German "Don't shoot!", I said something else; specifically "Don't shit!" All the Germans standing around in the forest and
within ear shot, broke out in huge guffaws. The resounding belly laughs
must have attracted the attention of that battalion's commanding officer.
He discovered the unlawful intended summary execution and sent a messenger to the still-furious lieutenant, ordering that our personal effects be
returned to us and that we be sent up front to him and his staff for "interrogation".
From having used the same ploy in Normandy to save a captured young
German paratrooper from summary execution, I anticipated that the
questioning would just be a facade. And indeed that's all it was. Several
German officers were standing in a small meadow at the side of the road
... The commander smiled at us, waving at a captain to question me. The
captain asked me in English, where we came from, the name of our organization and the nature of our mission. I quickly replied that he knew
that my men and I would only give our ranks, names and serial numbers.
A conversation with the commander followed ..."
While these events were confirmed by the since retired Oberst von Fallois,
the report was followed by a touching but imagined story of an unknown
American hero on the west bank of the Ourthe, who succeeded in delaying
the German advance for six hours before he was killed. This is contrary to
several statements that the lead tanks crossed the Ourthe at Amperloup without resistance.
As a matter of course Major von Fallois prevented the unlawful presumed
execution of the Americans, although they had violated the Hague
Convention of 1907 by wearing civilian clothes and keeping their arms hidden, so that they could not be distinguished from a distance as soldiers. They
in any case could only be executed after a court-martial. Major von Fallois
acted correctly to treat and evacuate the Americans to the rear as Prisoners of
War.
On 22 December the rest of the Panzer Lehr Division - minus
Kampfgruppe 901 - broke out, with St. Hubert as the day's objective. At
1200 hours the lead company of Kampfgruppe von Poschinger crossed the
Bastogne-Arlon road near Hompr. Hatrival was reached in a rapid advance
against only weak resistance and the attack continued from there to St.
Hubert by dark. The enemy consisted only of armored reconnaissance ele271
272
Because of this order and the heavy losses, the attack was ordered suspended. The fighting in Marvie did not diminish until the early morning. The
town had almost completely fallen into German hands. Brigadier General
McAuliffe had sacrificed his last reserves, which could barely hold at the
edge of town.
On 24 December it was important for Kampfgruppe von Hauser to hold the
achieved positions and take a breather before the major attack. In addition,
the main road to the south was supposed to be secured by panzers and effectively blocked by mines and obstacles. The major attack began on 25
December. The anxiously awaited arrival of the 15th Panzergrenadier
Division proved disappointing as it turned out to be only a kampfgruppe with
one and a half panzergrenadier battalions and 20 panzers. In spite of the
bravest of commitment and sacrifice, almost all of the panzers were lost during the attack. Battle Group 901 reported:
One assault group - approximately a company in the strength of 20
to 30 men - had fought their way through to the road fork at the southern
entrance to Bastogne. There, they were cut off and destroyed. The regiment did not have sufficient strength to reinforce the assault group. The
few attacking elements came under heavy enemy fire and were as good
as destroyed.
During the evening of that day it was clear that, without the deployment of
considerable forces, Bastogne could not be captured and the relief attack
from the south could not be parried. For the next day, the mission of the
901st Rgt had two objectives: to hold and reinforce on either side of the main
road leading to the south. From the clearing skies, bands of fighter-bombers,
just like at Normandy, fixed all movement on the German side. The enemy
attacked through to Bastogne with tanks and infantry, west of the main road.
The encirclement was broken. On the next day the 4th (US) Armored
Division, reinforced by the 26th (US) Division, attacked on a wide front and
pushed the cold and exhausted panzergrenadiers back to the northeast.
During the next few days, all of the terrain west of the main road and
Remoifosse was lost.
On the evening of 29 December command in the sector south of Wiltz was
turned over to the XXXIX Panzer Corps - General der Panzertruppen
Decker. Battle Group von Hauser was attached to the 167th Volksgrenadier
Division, which, during the past few nights, had been marching from unloading points on the Rhein. The corps - which also had a battle group from the
1st SS Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) - was ordered to attack
through Lutrebois on 30 December, in order to block the main road and deny
Bastogne supplies. The Panzer IVs of Kampfgruppe von Hauser were to sup275
port the attack of the volksgrenadiers south of the Bras - Bastogne road.
After initial success, the XXXIX Panzer Corps attack also collapsed.
Hauser's panzer company was badly mauled.
On 2 January the enemy went over to the offensive on a wide front near and
south of Neffe. They temporarily penetrated into Wardin, Neffe and Mageret
and were able to hold for 24 hours. During a snow storm on 3 January, which
kept the enemy air force from the skies and prevented observed artillery fire,
the 26th and 167th Volksgrenadier Divisions, in cooperation with
Kampfgruppe 901, counterattacked and pushed the Americans back, almost
to their departure positions. By 6 January, no major combat operations
occurred in the Kampfgruppe 901 sector. During the evening of that day, the
regiment, which in the meantime had shriveled to a combat strength of a few
officers and one hundred men, as well as five Panzer IVs, received orders to
return to Panzer Lehr, after being relieved. It arrived on 8 January, after two
night marches.
As a countermeasure against presumed German attempts to sabotage the
American rear area and conduct commando operations in Allied uniforms,
General Eisenhower issued orders similar to Hitler's during the Eastern
Campaign:
Punishable by death:
1. anyone who conducts acts of sabotage against combat equipment
and Allied installations,
2. anyone who impersonates Allied soldiers in uniform,
3. anyone who offers support to the enemy's armed forces (The
Wehrmacht) in order to protect them from being captured.
This order was not only directed against effective "spies and saboteurs," for
example "Operation Greif" (Skorzeny), but also doomed unassuming
Germans who were taken prisoner in captured American jeeps and warm
winter jackets, etc. Even Hauptmann Lex and two officers from the 130th Pz
Lehr Rgt were captured in a jeep during an ambush south of Bastogne on 30
December. According to their grave-stone inscriptions in Sandweiler, they
died on 2 January. Possibly they were shot "as spies."
20. Turning Point and Withdrawal
The two kampfgruppen from Panzer Lehr had to await fuel until the early
afternoon of 23 December. Only then could they resume their attack to the
Meuse through Rochefort.
Kampfgruppe von Fallois marched through Fourrieres; Kampfgruppe von
276
During the night before 26 December a battle group from the 9th Panzer
Division arrived to relieve us at Humain. In the early morning our reconnaissance battalion was allowed to return to Rochefort.
On 26 December the kampfgruppe from the 9th, as well as one from the
2nd Panzer Division, hastened to help the encircled troops near Celles and
Foy - Notre Dame. The German attacks were repulsed by tanks, artillery and
fighter-bombers. The withdrawal of the immobile kampfgruppen near Celles
was ordered too late. Only by abandoning all of their equipment were 600
men able to reach friendly lines in Rochefort the following night. Because of
the lack of sufficient forces, the Panzer Division had been unable to help its
sister division, as it was employed piecemeal around Bastogne.
"The offensive had run its course and failed to achieve the desired effect,"
General Freiherr von Lttwitz summed up the situation. The enemy's successful relief of Bastogne has already been mentioned. It cost the Panzer
Lehr Division its former supply route. From then on, all German forces west
of Bastogne had to be supplied over a single road, on which fighter-bombers
concentrated and pinned every movement in flying weather. During the night
and later when there was snow and ice, the road was unable to cope with the
traffic.
In the Panzer Lehr status report from 1 January, the division reported losses
of 2465 men, and an additional 1475 wounded and sick that remained with
their units within the period of eight weeks. The combat strength of the
panzergrenadiers sunk rapidly and the NCO shortage was compounded by
the status of training, which was evaluated as insufficient. The artillery regiment still had 20 guns, but it was impossible to move them without the loan
of 12 prime movers and a truck tonnage of 21 tons detached from the 15th
Nebelwerfer Bde. The supply situation was critical. Only 43 percent of the
tonnage capacity was road worthy. Therefore, only 50 percent of the services
were mobile. The bombing of Birresborn at Christmas reduced the capacity
of the tank workshop to 75 percent. This caused a great shortage of spare
parts complicated by the poor transport situation. Nevertheless, the morale of
the troops remained positive and they were aggressive, although they were
physically exhausted from unbroken commitment under difficult combat and
weather conditions.
Defense on the Southwestern Flank of the German Bulge
The enemy had the initiative once again. The XLVII Panzer Corps went
over to the defense and organized its defensive alignment for 27 December:
- right: 9th Panzer Division in the Charneux-Hargimont-Abbaye de
St. Remy sector,
280
ment, the 347th (US) Infantry Regiment. However, it still suffered casualties
during the relief from German mines, which were uncovered from the snow
by vehicle traffic.
New Year's morning first brought snow mixed with rain, then snow, then a
dry, bitter cold. In spite of this, the 347th US Infantry Regiment resumed its
attack with the objective of severing the Morhet-St. Hubert road and capturing Amberloup. The Americans fought their way forward through deep snow
drifts. Reconnaissance elements infiltrated north of Remagne across the road
into the thick forest, followed by a battalion with supporting tanks. During
the daytime, Kampfgruppe Neumann could only harass them with infantry
and directed artillery fire. In the evening, after the fighter-bombers disappeared, the few panzers attacked and pushed the Americans back to
Remagne. Meanwhile, another battalion, 3rd Bn, 347th Rgt, attacked out of
Moircy to the North. At midday Jenneville was captured, where the 347th
Infantry Regiment's sister regiment had been so bloodied just two days
before. Advances were made against the Pironpr intersection. It was
defended by six Panthers and only 30 men, mostly crews of disabled
panzers. The panzers stood in carefully prepared positions with wide fields
of fire, unrecognizable from the road, because they were hidden behind the
wood piles of a sawmill. As the enemy left Jenneville, the German defensive
Diagram 29: Defense on the Southwestern Flank of the German Frontal Salient.
284
fire increased and the Panthers from Pironpr joined in the fighting. The
American attack came to a halt.
On 2 January the Americans prepared to attack with two battalions across
the road to the north. They cut into the Pironpr hornet nest, which held until
11 January, in spite of numerous, almost daily, attacks. The Americans
advanced through the forest on the right and left. Kampfgruppe Neumann
could not prevent the loss of Gerimonts. Bonnerue fell on the other flank,
even though four Shermans were destroyed by the panzers of Pironpr. For
the time being the 87th Division could report that the St. Hubert-Morhet
road was severed. This success was only temporary. On the next day
Bonnerue was again in German hands. The hotly contested town exchanged
occupiers several times on 8 and 9 January, when panzergrenadiers from the
901st Rgt counterattacked after they had been relieved from the Bastogne
area on 9 January. Conducting prepared fire during the night, the artillery
regiment was able to provide essential support for the recapture of Bonnerue.
The massive barrage helped capture 80 prisoners in contrast with the loss of
only a few German attackers.
On the evening of 2 January a wide, threatening gap had yawned between
the two American attack groups. The third battalion was supposed to clear
out Prionpr and the surrounding forest. Against this threat to the cornerstone of the defense, Generalleutnant Bayerlein committed Kampfgruppe
von Poschinger. Its counterattack brought the desired breathing space and
recaptured Bonnerue, as already described. However, in the long run the
enemy could not be prevented from infiltrating into the forest. On the next
day the engineers had to be committed as infantry, against standing orders.
Extensive and fierce forest fighting began against the numerically superior
and well-equipped enemy. In the course of the fighting, the enemy advance
was halted along the general line one kilometer north of the St. HubertBastogne road until the general retreat commenced on 11 January.
Even though the German artillery suffered from an ammunition shortage
due to the extraordinary transportation difficulties, it functioned well in the
defense. In the search for ammunition, a store of American 105 mm rounds
was uncovered in the forest. A portion was ruined from dampness, but many
of the rounds were still usable. Oberst Dr. Bartenwerfer reported:
"Thus, for as long as these shells that had been captured by our division lasted, we were able to return them to the Americans with our guns.
The observed fire worked well, even if the ballistics were somewhat off.
After two to three days, the Americans radioed us and asked whether we
were firing gas shells, since it seemed so to them. We replied in the negative with a clear conscience."
285
On 3 January the thermometer fell during a snow storm. The roads were
obscured, aircraft were driven from the skies and observed artillery was
impossible. On that day, the Allies attacked from the north and northwest
with the 1st American Army, from the south with the 3rd American Army, in
order to cut off the German frontal salient on a line Houffalize-Bastogne.
The anticipated major attack in the Panzer Lehr area did not occur, for the
time being. The fight against the cold, ice and snow was more serious.
The strong enemy pressure along the entire bulge, initially near Rochefort,
which was evacuated on 30 December, and the withdrawal of the 6th Panzer
Army for the Hungarian front, forced Hitler to give in to the urging of the leadership and approve the withdrawal of the German frontal salient. The
American attack indicated an encirclement and destruction of the German
forces in the West, if countermeasures were not taken immediately. First the
weather caused a delay. On 4 and on 7 January snow storms raged. The
American tanks slipped off of the icy roads and blocked the infantry for hours.
The American artillery was hindered by poor visibility and by the forests.
Initially Panzer Lehr still had to hold the western tip of the frontal salient. It
wasn't until 8 January that Hitler approved the withdrawal to the line
Dochamps-Longchamps. Operation "Veilchen" (Violet) was to begin with
the movement of the right neighbours, the 9th and 2nd Panzer Divisions,
and, during the following night, St. Hubert was to be evacuated. On grounds
no longer discernible, perhaps because of the lack of fuel and the traffic
jams on the only withdrawal route, the evacuation of St. Hubert was postponed for 24 hours.
St. Hubert was evacuated during the night of 11 - 12 January. Shortly
thereafter, reconnaissance elements from the 6th British Airborne Division
and the 87th (US) Division linked up. Elstob wrote: "Since the separation
caused by the German offensive, it was the first contact between the 21 st and
12th Allied Army Groups." A reconnaissance element from the 2nd French
Paratroop Regiment also participated in the re-occupation of St. Hubert.
The enemy only cautiously pursued the German withdrawal. As before, they
had to do without their air forces. The obstacles and mines placed by the engineers could not be quickly removed in the cold and from the icy roads, especially since the artillery harassed the removal efforts, wherever they could be
observed. Thus, the division was able to repulse all enemy advances, even
when the English bypassed the strong points on the Champion intersection
and penetrated into the towns behind it. Most unpleasant was the incessant
harrassing fire against villages, intersections and passes.
During the night before 13 January the withdrawal was continued as
planned. After the 2nd and then the 9th Panzer Divisions were withdrawn,
286
Panzer Lehr formed the right flank of XLVII Panzer Corps. The right neighbor, the exhausted 116th Panzer Division, was north of the Ourthe and had
suffered heavy casualties in difficult, but successful fighting against III (US)
Corps in the north and against XXX British Corps to the south of the Ourthe.
During the daytime, Panzer Lehr was able to hold out against all attacks by
the 51st British Highland Division, even though the Scots took Lavaux. After
withdrawing further, Panzer Lehr received orders on the evening of 13
January to direct a battle group to secure the flank with the right neighbor,
north of the Ourthe. The assigned Kampfgruppe von Poschinger penetrated
into Nadrin during the night, without being able to make contact in the dark
with the units of the 116th Panzer Division. Kampfgruppe von Hauser withdrew to a line Thimont - Cens, south of the Ourthe. Reconnaissance elements
from the 87th (US) Division reached the Ourthe on the same day.
As 14 January dawned, the panzergrenadiers north of the Ourthe experienced not only frontal attacks from the north by superior enemy forces (1st
Battalion, 334th (US) Infantry Regiment), but also from the south. Nadrin
and Filly were captured during the afternoon. Suffering heavy casualties, the
panzergrenadiers were still able to mine the roads and, at the last moment,
blow the Ourthe bridge. However, this also blocked the withdrawal route for
many German soldiers. Only a few were able to wade through the icy river.
The few fords were blocked by vehicle wrecks. Many panzergrenadiers were
captured. South of the river, the weakly defended Warempage fell into the
hands of the Scots and Nisramont had to be given up.
GERMAN FRONT
on
on
on
on
on
on
11
12
13
14
15
16
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
3rd American Army, advancing from the south, linked up with the 2nd
Armored Division from the 1st Army, advancing from the north, near
Chouffe. The trap was snapped shut, but it was empty. It was thanks to the
enemy's systematic advance and the weather that the formation of a pocket
around German forces was avoided.
Panzer Lehr had fulfilled its mission during the evacuation of the frontal
salient and had avoided the encirclement and destruction. The considerable
sacrifice of personnel and equipment had torn irreplaceable gaps within the
unit structure. The elements were extremely exhausted.
On 16 January Panzer Lehr held a position east of Houffalize. At the same
time, it was to prepare a rallying position along a line Cetturu-Tavigny.
Enemy pressure had decreased, tanks did not probe near Cetturu until 18
January. The outposts broke contact and fell back to the rallying position.
A fearful snow storm on 19 January stalled all combat operations with the
Nachtruppe
7.Armee
exception of artillery activity. The withdrawal up to the rail line west of the
Luxembourg forest was not hindered by the enemy. During the night before
20 January the rear guard elements from the Panzer Lehr Division reached
the new line of resistance near Biwisch-Asselborn and were rallied by the
15th Panzergrenadier Division and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division.
Rear Guard in the Sector of Seventh Army
After the German frontal salient west of Houffalize was compressed, the
3rd US Army attacked from the south in order to collapse the German
bridgehead west of the Our. On 18 January two divisions conducted a surprise crossing of the weakly defended Sauer below Diekirch and advanced to
the north. The advance of the 5th (US) Infantry Division along the hill road
posed a danger to LIII Army Corps, threatening to cut off its three divisions
in the Wiltz area.
As a countermeasure, the 7th Army deployed a volksgrenadier division on
the hill road. Feldmarschall Model intervened. On 19 January he ordered
first a kampfgruppe, later the entire Panzer Lehr Division - as far as these
remnants could be called a division - and finally the XLVII Panzer Corps'
2nd Panzer Division transferred into the 7th Army sector. The XLVII Panzer
Corps was to set up a blocking position west of Vianden, in order to secure
the retreat of LIII Corps from the Ardennes across the Our to the West Wall.
The heavy snow storm on 19 January delayed movement on both sides, but
also prevented any air activity. Kampfgruppe 902, reinforced by a panzer
company (8th Co, 130th Rgt) and II Bn, 130th Armored Artillery Regiment,
plowed its way through the snow drifts toward Hoscheid, which formed the
fulcrum of the withdrawal and, therefore, had to remain in German hands.
On the morning of 20 January Kampfgruppe von Poschinger occupied its
assigned positions southwest and south of Hoscheid. The 9th Volksgrenadier
Division was adjacent on the right. In the meantime, the LIII Corps began its
withdrawal. The bridging sites near Gemnde and Vianden had, meanwhile,
come into enemy artillery range. Enemy fire hindered the retreat of the
closely-packed columns over the icy and curving bridge entrances and exits
in the deeply-cut Our valley.
On 21 January the 5th US Division attacked near Hoscheid after a strong
artillery preparation. Kampfgruppe von Poschinger could only repulse the
attack with great effort. On the next day, the skies cleared and brought flying
weather with hundreds of fighter-bombers, similar to those days in
Normandy. Indeed, Kampfgruppe von Hauser was inserted to the right, but,
290
due to the air and artillery activity, could not prevent the loss of Hoscheid on
25 January. Now they had to hold the bridgehead on the western bank of the
Our until all equipment was withdrawn. Gradually, the kampfgruppen were
pushed back to Wahlhausen. Meanwhile, the divisions of the LIII Corps,
which had been attacking from the west since 23 January, fled across the
Clerf and Our. On 26 January Panzer Lehr rear guard also received permission to evacuate the western bank of the Our. Again Panzer Lehr could look
with pride on its contribution in preventing the encirclement of German divisions west of the Our.
The result of the battle of the Ardennes was a great success for the Allies,
even though General Eisenhower had to delay his planned offensive to the
Rhein for approximately six weeks.
"The decisive Allied success lay in the fact that Germany no longer
had any operational reserves after the Ardennes offensive." (Jung)
These operational reserves were also missing in the east, as the Soviets
began their offensive. It led to the loss of all territory east of the Oder. The
gambler Hitler had lost on his throw of the dice!
(5) Because the Allies on every day can count on 6000 combat aircraft
for close air support of their forces.
WHY must the soldier decide for himself?
Because, after this last effort, even recognized by the enemy as excellent,
the German military leadership has proved to the world and the German
soldier that further fighting would be senseless.
This British leaflet was dropped on the troops as part of a psychological operations campaign. In it even the British paid tribute to the German soldier. He loyally performed his duty
to the bitter end
ANNEX A:
THE OPPOSING ARMED FORCES ENGAGED ON THE
WESTFRONT 1944
COMMAND ORGANIZATION
While the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower (through a
combined staff), had command and control of all armed expeditionary
forces, including those of the Allied Navies and the two Tactical Air Forces,
Hitler, as Supreme German Commander, stuck to the principle of separation
of powers. The position and authority of the OB West remained fragmentary.
German air and naval forces remained under control of their high commands.
ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES
Army Groups = Headquarters + Armies + Army Group reserves
(Heeresgruppen = (Oberkommando + Armeen + Heerstruppen)
Armies
= Headquarters + several Corps + Army troops
(Armeen
= Armeeoberkommando + Korps + Armeetruppen)
Corps
= Headquarters + several Divisions + Corps troops
Armee Korps (AK)
or PanzerKorps = Generalkommando + Divisionen + Korpstruppen
Divisions
= Smallest formation composed of all arms and logistics,
capable of command & control of a combined arms battle
Infantry Division
Usually simply called "Division" (motorized)
292
(Infanterie Division
Infanterie Division (bo)*
Volksgrenadier Division
Panzergrenadier Division
Armored Division (US) or
Armored Division (BR/CDN)
(Panzer Division)
Airborne Division
(Fallschirmjger Division)
*bo = Bodenstaendig (static). Organized for coastal defence, with reduced strength, mobility
and logistical support.
293
294
AIR WARFARE
At the outbreak of the war the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) looked quite
different than the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The Luftwaffe, under strict
command of the old fighter pilot Goring, was formed and trained primarily
as a tactical close support weapon for the army in mobile campaigns against
limited forces, such as those in Poland in 1939. The limited availability of
raw materials and production capabilities of Germany in turn limited combat
formations to close and medium range. An offensive strategic Luftwaffe with
heavy long-range bombers was never developed. Additional missions of the
Luftwaffe were also ground defence against air-strikes by Flak (AA) artillery
- at the end of the war the majority of 5,000 AA batteries - and air signal
and warning formations.
The Luftwaffe was not at all prepared for a war against England. Its initial
numerical and technological superiority, e.g. the fighter Me-109 among others, disappeared faster than expected, when Hitler failed to appreciate the
decisive importance of air superiority for ground operations. After the lost
battle for England he temporarily stopped new equipment development.
Later in the war new weapons were developed, specifically the "revenge
weapons" - the V-1, V-2 and the first jet bomber the Arado 234
"Blitzbomber". Thus the brave German pilots had to fly until the end of the
war those 1939 models, which had been overtaken several times by the enormous development potential of the Allies. The Luftwaffe was almost no help
on the Western Front in 1944.
By 1935 England had already divided the RAF into several major commands and prepared for war against Germany. The mission of ground
defence fell to the Army. Bomber Command developed heavy four-engined
long-range bombers for an air offensive against military targets and residential areas in Germany, in accord with the US Air Force. Fighter Command
took over air defence of Great Britain. Its early development of radar with
warning and fighter direction networks provided it with a great advantage
over the Luftwaffe. From Fighter Command later grew the Tactical Air
Forces attached to the Allied Army Groups. These Tactical Air Forces had
the mission of achieving air superiority above the battle area (offensive
counter air), interdiction of rear areas and, wherever possible, provision of
close air support. Their backbone was the fighter-bomber.
295
GUN
Model
KwK 40 L748
KwK 42 L/70
KwK 36 L/56
KwK 43 LV71
Armour Penetration
(at 30 obliquity)
500m
1000m
Muzzle
Velocity
(m/sec)
100m
PzGr39AP
790
106
96
75
HEAT
450
100
Pak 40
75
PzGr40
990
Pz V
75
PzGr39AP
PzJ 40
75
Pz VI
1800m
Date in
Service
85
66
1942
100
100
100
1943
143
120
97
77
never
925
138
128
110
100
1943
PzGr40/42
1120
194
174
150
127
never
88
PzGr39AP
773
120
112
100
88
1942
Flak 36/37
88
PzGr40
930
171
156
138
123
never
Tiger II
88
PzGr39AP
1000
203
187
165
137
July 1944
JPanther
88
PzGr39AP
1000
203
187
165
137
June 1944
Used In
Calibre
(mm)
Projectile
Pz IV
75
PzJ 38t
For defeating enemy tanks with heavier armour, more powerful Kinetic Energy (KE) rounds with higher muzzle velocities for better penetration were required. Instead of increasing calibres, which would have rendered existing tanks and ammunition obsolete, Germany increased muzzle velocity by increasing the barrel lengths of guns wherever possible. Barrel length was measured in calibres, i e. from L/40 to U70 for the 75mm tank gun (KwK - Kampfwagenkanone). All German tank guns were capable of firing High
Explosive (HE) rounds against soft targets. A round with increased KE was the PzGr 40, similar to the British Armour Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR) or American HyperVelocity Armour Piercing (HVAP) rounds. The lack of Tungsten restricted its use on the Western Front. KwK 40/L48 could also fire a High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) round,
using a shaped charge with chemical energy.
Pak = Panzerabwehrkanone (towed anti-tank gun)
Flak = Fliegerabwehrkanone (anti-aircraft gun)
297
Table 2: British and American Tank and Anti-Tank Guns and Ammunition
GUN
Model
Used In
AMMUNITION
Calibre
(mm)
Projectile
Muzzle
Velocity
(m/sec)
100m
Armour Penetration
(at 30 obliquity)
500m
1000m
1800m
Date in
Service
BRITISH
75mm Mk V
Cromwell IV
75
APCB M61
625
74
68
60
47
1942?
6-pdr Mk V
AT Gun
57
APBC M86
904
93
87
80
67
1942?
APDS
1158
143
131
117
92
Sept 1944
17-pdr Mk II
AT Gun
76.2
APCBC Mk.8
884
149
140
130
110
Aug 1942
Firefly
76.2
APDS
1204
221
208
192
160
Sept 1944
57mm M1
AT Gun
57
APC M86
822
81
64
50
1941
75mm M3
M4
75
APBC M61
625
74
68
60
47
1942?
3-Inch
TD M10
76.2
APC M62
793
109
99
89
73
Jun 1942
76mm M1A1
TD M18
76
APC M62
793
109
99
89
73
Nov 1944
76mm M1A1
M4A3
76
APC M62
793
109
99
89
73
Nov 1944
90mm M3
TD M36
90
APC M82
807
140
129
122
114
Nov 1944
AMERICAN
AP = Armour Piercing
APC = Armour Piercing, Capped
APCBC = Armour Piercing, Capped, Ballistically Capped
298
Combat
Weight (t)
Armour (mm)
Front Side
Gun Caliber
and Length 1
Max Engine
BHP/RPM
Engine Make
HP to Weight
Ratio (tonnes)
Pz IV H/J
25
80
30
75/48
300 / 3000
Maybach
12.0
JPz IV
23
80
40
75/48
300 / 3000
Maybach
13.0
JPz IV2
24
80
40
75/70
300 / 3000
Maybach
12.5
Pz V/G (Panther)
44.8
80
50
75/70
700 / 3000
Maybach
15.4
Pz VI E (Tiger)
56.9
100
80
88/56
700 / 3000
Maybach
12.3
JPanther
45.4
80
60
88/71
700 / 3000
Maybach
15.4
' Barrel length measured relative to calibre of gun, i.e. a gun of 75mm whose barrel is 48 calibers would be
3.6 meters in length.
2
299
Combat
W e i g h t (t)
Armour (mm)
Front Side
Gun Caliber
and Length'
Engine
BHP/RPM
Engine
Make
HP to Weight
Ratio (tonnes)
BRITISH*
Firefly2
33
76
51
76.2/58
370 / 2400
Chrysler
11.2
Cromwell
28
75
63
75/40
600 / 2550
Rolls-Royce
21.5
Sherman M4A3
31
76
51
75/40
450 / 2600
Ford
14.0
Sherman M4A3E2
38
150
100
75/40
450 / 2600
Ford
11.8
TD M10A1
29
51 3
253
76/53
375/2100
G.M.
11.5
T D M 1 8 Hellcat
18
13
13
76/53
400 / 2400
Continental
22.2
TD M36
28
51 3
90/53
450 / 2600
Ford
15.9
AMERICAN
1
2
38
Barrel length measured relative to caliber of gun, i.e. a gun 7 5 m m whose barrel is 40 calibers would be 3,0 meters in length.
T h e Firefly w a s a n a d a p t a t i o n o f t h e U . S . M 4 A 4 S h e r m a n t a n k f i t t e d w i t h a B r i t i s h 7 6 . 2 m m ( 1 7 - p o u n d e r ) g u n . S p a c e for s t o r i n g t h e
larger ammunition was f o u n d by eliminating the hull m a c h i n e g u n n e r position. In N o r m a n d y the Firefly w a s the only tank w h o s e round could
penetrate the G e r m a n Panther and Tiger tanks of that time, but there were only e n o u g h Fireflies available to equip 2 5 % of British
Armoured Regiments.
Some Tank Destroyers were re-worked and armor thickness may vary. Maximum thickness is shown.
* NOTE: British and Canadian units used the M4A1, M4A2 (Canadians) and M4A4 variants of the M4 Sherman.
300
Model
Projectile
Diameter
Weight
(mm)
(kg)
Gross
Weight
(kg)
Effective Range
(meters)
Remarks
GERMAN
Panzerfaust
130
3.2
4.1
30 - 50
Ofenrohr
88
3.2
9.3
100 - 150
rocket launcher
BRITISH
PIAT: (Projector, Infantry,
Anti-Tank)
100
1.1
15.7
30 - 50
60
2.8
60 - 80
rocket launcher
AMERICAN
Bazooka
301
Caliber
(mm)t
Projectile Weight
(kg)
Range
(m)
Rate of Fire
(rounds per min.)
Gun Weight
L.F.H. 18
105
14.8
10,600
4-6
2,040
S.F.H. 18
150
43.5
13,325
5,512
S.F.H. (r)
152
46-48
16,500
7,128
87.6
11.3
12,250
1,800
Pack Howitzer
75
6.4
8,700
1,340
105mm Howitzer
105
15
11,100
2,250
155mm Howitzer
155
43
16,100
5,700
(kg)
GERMAN
BRITISH
25-Pounder
AMERICAN
302
Table 7: Mortars
Model
Calibre
(mm)
Projectile
Weight (kg)
Range
(m)
Rate of Fire
(rpm)
Used In
Remarks
GERMAN
m . G r a n a t w e r f e r 34 1
80
3.5
2,400
15
Infantry C o y s
s. G r a n a t w e r f e r 42 1
120
12.2
6,150
15
Infantry Bns
le. Inf G u n 18
75
5.45
3,550
4 - 6
Infantry Bns
s. Inf G u n 3 3
150
38
4,700
2 - 3
I n f a n t r y & PG R e g t s
N e b e l w e r f e r 41 1
150
34
6,700
3 6 p e r bty 2
Werfer Bns
6 barrels
7,850
bty 2
Werfer Bns
5 barrels
Nebelwerfer
42 1
210
112
36 per
r e p l a c e d I.Inf G u n i n 4 4
BRITISH
2-Inch Mortar
50
450
10
3-Inch Mortar
76
4.5
2,500
10
4.2-Inch Mortar
106
4,430
81
3.2
3,000
18
1,800
battlefield illumination
3,750
battlefield illumination
AMERICAN
8 1 m m Mor M1
6 0 m m Mor M19
60
4.1-Inch Mor M2
106
' The numbers behind the designations of the German mortars indicate the initial year of production. Mortars were developed for trench warfare, infantry
guns for pinpointing covered targets; m. designated "medium" and s. "heavy." As a new arm, separate from artillery, the light-weight, multi-barrelled rocket
launchers, or Nebelwefers,firing sudden concentrations of HE or smoke (nebel), were extremely effective against the Allies, who nicknamed them
"Moaning Minnies."
Nebelwerfer batteries could fire a salvo in about 10 seconds. A six-barrelled Nebelwerfer 41 could be reloaded in less than a minute; the heavier, fivebarreled Nebelwerfer 42 in about two and a half minutes
303
304
EPILOGUE
During the Battle of the Bulge the last remaining German operational
reserves were lost. Only exhausted and severely strained forces were left to
conduct the final battle inside the Reich on widely-stretched fronts. This battle ended, after several dreadful months, on 8 May 1945, when the
Wehrmacht unconditionally surrendered.
The last Wehrmacht communique read:
"Faithful to his oath by exerting all his vigour for his people, the German
soldier has achieved great results, forever unforgettable. The homeland has
supported him up to the end with all its strength and the greatest sacrifices.
This brilliant feat of front and homeland will be recognized in the end in a
fair judgement of history."
Today, the 12 years under Hitler are commonly regarded as a period of
German crimes. However, the Allies demanded Germany's "Unconditional
Surrender", with threats filled with hatred to destroy Germany politically,
economically and culturally, and convert it into an agricultural country
(Morgenthau Plan of 1944). These demands enraged all Germans and made
them determined to hold out at all costs. It destroyed all of the efforts of the
German Resistance, thwarted any chance for partial surrender and thus
lengthened the war. Unfortunately, during this unrestrained struggle for the
life and death of the German Reich, crimes, atrocities and murders were
committed and charged against our people.
The sacrifice of over four million German soldiers killed in action and
another five hundred thousand civilians killed by enemy action and bombing,
has more than atoned for these misdeeds. Their blood has washed away the
crimes committed by Hitler's henchmen, without even a memorial to commemorate their deeds. For our soldiers we may claim that taken for granted
by soldiers throughout the world, namely utter pride in their sacrifices, their
bravery, comradeship and their super-human efforts.
With the Unconditional Surrender of the Wehrmacht, the weapons on all
fronts were silenced. The final say passed over to the politicians to reestablish the peace so ardently desired by all sides.
"VE-Day", 8 May 1945, was no "Day of Liberation" for we Germans!
Indeed, the Allies had declared expulsion a crime against humanity (London,
8 August 1945). Nevertheless, after the Wehrmacht had surrendered, about
three million German civilians suffered death during flight, expulsion, or
from outright crimes, sometimes under horrible circumstances. Contrary to
international law, after the war, about 1.6 million German Prisoners of War
305
starved to death. Thus, the German war losses, including soldiers and civilians, during and after the war, total about ten million.
All of them lost their lives for their country.
Official post-war losses registered to 1984 with the Federal Agency for Statistics
(Statistisches Bundesamt) total 4,777,000. This figure is rising (now approximately
5,000,000) as a result of data available with the partial opening of Russian archives in
Moscow.
306
ANNEX B
EXEMPLARY SOLDIERS
Obedience is the basis of the Wehrmacht, trust the basis of obedience.
Military leadership rests on responsibility, superior efficiency and indefatigable welfare.
Self-assured but modest, upright and faithful, god-fearing and truthful, discrete and incorruptible, the soldier will be an example of manly strength for
the people. Only accomplishments justify pride.
Greatest reward and highest happiness the soldier will find in the conviction of cheerfully accomplished duty. Character and performance determine
his career and value.
Guiding principles of the Allgemeinen Pflichten des deutschen Soldaten
(Universal Duties of the German Soldier), on 25 May 1934, which were
formulated by Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg.
The more elsewhere the pursuit of luxury and good living are spreading,
the more seriously is an officer obliged never to forget that it is not material
wealth that has won him and will keep him his highly respected position in
the state and society.
From the Royal Decree by Kaiser Wilhelm of 2 May 1874 (Allerhchste
Verordung ber Ehrengerichte) for the courts of honour of officers in the
Prussian Army.
To act decisively remains the first requisite in war. Everyone, from the
highest commander to the youngest soldier must continually bear in mind,
that negligence and omission incriminate him more than making mistakes in
the choice of means.
From field manual HDv 300 "Truppenfhrung" (Operations, Part I, or 17
October 1933, No. 15, para 2.
307
Stalingrad. His actions there, always leading his troops, have been described
frequently.
When the old division commander departed, it was clear that only Colonel
von Hnersdorff could succeed him. Dressed in the black panzer uniform,
always with a cheerful word, he led his 6th Panzer Division in an exemplary
manner, dashing and cool, in his command tank. When on 8 July 1943, during Operation Citadel, northeast of Belgorod, he had broken through a tenaciously defended anti-tank position with his division, which trusted him
blindly, death tore him from a soldier's life not yet accomplished. He did not
witness the award of the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross and his promotion
to Generalleutnant. He died on 17 July 1943 of his wounds. With his death
also ended considerations to appoint him as chief of staff of a C-in-C East
under Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein.
At all times General von Hnersdorff was both a fanatical enemy and
despiser of national socialism. He made no secret of his feelings. He was
completely open and fearless and he judged each man by the same human
standard of value; be it a subordinate, officer of equal rank or superior. No
one was spared his often biting wit or his hard criticisms, but never forgetting military obedience. In his command post always on display was a picture, showing a flock of sheep following a ram with the caption: "FHQ"
(Fhrerhauptquartier).
General von Hnersdorff, in best tradition tied to the great values of
Prussian soldiership, but unbound by the spirit of the times, was far ahead of
his age and still has a lot to teach today; he continues to live in the memory
of all who knew him. German panzer troops simply owe him a great deal.
Leutnant Colonel Wilhelm Prinz von Schnburg-Waldenburg
Born on 3 April 1913 in Guteborn, and killed in action on 11 June 1944
near Vendes.
Prinz Wilhelm descended from an old dynasty, subject to the emperor only.
He attended school at Dresden, then the Secondary School of
Ritterschaftliches Internat at Bautzen, where he passed the final examination.
He was no exemplary student. His interests lay primarily in hunting, not in
school.
In April 1933 he joined the 12th Cavalry Regiment in Dresden as an
ensign. He was commissioned as 2nd lieutenant on 20 April 1935 and came
to Kamenz in the autumn of 1935 with detachments of his regiment, which
formed I Bn, 3rd Panzer Regiment. A year later he became the battalion
309
adjutant. The Prinz participated with his regiment in the march into Austria
during 1938, where it was garrisoned at Moedling, for several happy months.
With the detachments of his regiment in autumn 1938, Prinz Eilhelm was
charged with the command of 1st Company, 31st Panzer Regiment, which he
commanded until August 1941. With the 5th Panzer Division he went to the
field in Poland in 1939. Subsequently, on 27 September 1939 he married
Elizabeth Prinzessin zu Stollberg-Roia, then 17 years old. Soon after, at the
end of November, his division was relocated into the Rhineland. During the
French Campaign, after the tank battle of Flavion, on 15 May, he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class, and a short while later, on 12 June, 1st Class.
One of his tank commanders, later Lt.Col. Noekel, wrote of these times:
"The Prinz has always been an example of courage, bravery and decency. While reporting to him as ensign of the reserve, he gave me the following wise advice, which I adhered to to this very day: Be a soldier, a
comrade and a gentleman!"
After returning from France, and before the birth of his son, the 31st
Panzer Regiment was relocated to the Bescides. After January 1941 the regiment went as advisors to Rumania. In March, during the advance to
Bulgaria, the Prince was promoted to captain. The situation in the Balkans
remained strained. On 31st March 1941 the 5th Panzer Division invaded
southern Serbia, broke through the border positions and struck through
Albania towards the Greek border, which was crossed on 16 April. On 24
April the Prinz heroically stormed the pass of Thermopylae, well known
from ancient history.
In the after-action-report it was stated:
The 1 st Company, 31 st Panzer Regiment broke through the initial battery
positions and suppressed the secondary battery positions, so that the
enemy fled the positions during darkness, after suffering heavy casualties and prisoners... The daring commitment of the panzer company
resulted in the loss of 12 of the 18 committed panzers. Of the 70 officers,
non-commissioned officers and men, the company lost seven killed and
22 wounded.
When Prinz Schnburg was awarded the Knight's Cross for this action, he
went to visit the severely wounded and told them: "I wear this Cross for all
of you!"
From September 1941 to June 1942 the Prinz received a new and interesting assignment as commander of the 1st Company, Panzer Lehr Regiment at
Wnsdorf. As such, he was evaluated: "Excellent, solid and unassuming
character. Command personality, very good company commander, very
smart and capable. Proven in war."
310
Many have died or were seriously wounded for the regiment, I thank
them in silence. To those comrades, officers, clerks, non-commissioned
officers and men still living I extend my hand in thanks for the efforts
you have made and will make in the future."
After a short appointment in the German Rumanian Military Mission
(AGrp F), Scholze took command of the (Hamburg) 20th Panzergrenadier
Division on 1 January 1945. The division fought its way from the Baranov
bridgehead through Lodz and Sagan back to the Oder, where its remnants
had to defend Berlin. Its commander was promoted to Generalmajor on 20
April 1945.
With the imminent fall of the Reich and the loss of his wife and four sons
during the bombing of Potsdam, his world collapsed. He voluntarily took his
own life in Berlin.
One of his earlier officers wrote:
"The members of his old regiment remember him as an exemplary
commander. The name "Father Scholze" indicates his untiring concern
for and camaraderie with members of all ranks. The Prussian virtues of
duty and preparedness were ingrained within him. His strict demeanor
never broke down, even in the most difficult situations. He never had any
illusions during the invasion fighting, but he still demanded every ounce
of commitment and military bearing from himself and the regiment..."
Oberstleutnant Joachim Ritter Von Poschinger
Born: 20 June 1913 in Frankfurt am Main
Killed in action: 5 April 1945 at Silbach/Sauerland
Joachim, a descendant of a knightly soldier's family, grew up in his parents' house in Berg at Lake Starnberg until he passed his examinations from
the Pasing Gymnasium and then, on 1 April 1933, joined the 17th Cavalry
Regiment in Bamberg as a fahnenjunker (ensign). After completing military
training in Dresden, he was commissioned as 2nd Leutnant on 1 April 1935
and assigned to the 2nd Schtzen Regiment in Meiningen. The motivated
and concerned platoon leader quickly surpassed those from his year group
and, at the beginning of 1937, became battalion adjutant. He was gifted mentally and physically, and also successfully competed in motor races - even
internationally.
After the march into Austria, in April 1938, his 2nd Panzer Division was
transferred there, while the 2nd Schtzen Regiment went to Vienna. There he
quickly met his wife, Sophie Grfin Seyssel d'Aix, whom he, now an
314
Oberleutnant, married at the age of 25, at that time considered the minimum
wedding age for professional officers.
As commander of the 10th (heavy) Company he proved himself during the
Polish Campaign. Immediately after the start of the Western Campaign in
1940, he attracted his brigade commander's attention and was quickly
appointed brigade adjutant. On 30 May 1940 he received the Iron Cross First
Class and was destined for promotion by the end of the year. On 1 January
1941 he was promoted to Hauptmann. The Balkan Campaign led the 2nd
Panzer Division to Athens and, after refitting at home, it was sent to southern
France as an occupation unit. There, in summer 1941, the framework for the
new 22nd Panzer Division had to be laid. Hauptmann von Poschinger
became its division adjutant (today G-l).
When the young division was completely outfitted with an SPW schtzen
battalion, Poschinger became its commander, since he was the only one with
the necessary experience to quickly train the young SPW companies in combat. In February 1942 the 22nd Panzer Division was hastily transferred to the
Eastern Front and, just as hastily, committed in the Crimea. After initial failures, the young formation quickly solidified. The exemplary battalion commander, with his solid character and irreproachable demeanor, became an
example for his troops; concerned, strong, but fair. On 1 August 1942 he was
awarded the German Cross in Gold and, on 15 February 1943, he was promoted to Major because of his extraordinary bravery in the face of the
enemy.
Shortly after that, he was wounded repeatedly, until finally he sustained a
serious head wound. After his convalescence, he became the head of the
panzergrenadiers courses at the panzer troop school until March 1944.
However, the excellent front-line officer and experienced instructor of panzergrenadiers hated theory. While he was serving as commander of the panzergrenadier training battalion at Weimar, which was considered the senior
school for new combat tactics, both mounted and unmounted, the war situation forced the school to be disbanded in the summer of 1944.
On 2 October 1944 Poschinger took command of the refitted 902nd
Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment, which, on paper, was supposed to be fully
armored. In fact, it was only motorized, because the enormous SPW losses
suffered in the west could not be replaced. Within a short period of time,
after working hard at training, he was able to gain the attention and complete
trust of his officers, non-commissioned officers and men. The regiment,
which was previously in complete disorder, was solidified and instilled with
a new spirit. The regiment displayed its new spirit at the end of November
during bitter fighting on the Saare, which led to heavy casualties, the loss of
315
316
Annex C
Military Cemeteries
"I do not speak to the delusion that the dead are costly for the enemy. I
speak to the fact that it is inescapable for all time that one must defend what
he loves. Even with his life."
(Pericles for the fallen of the Peleponnesian War, 432 BC)
From ancient times until today, all peoples have honored the dead. They
built monuments, especially if they died for the living.
Only in Germany of today the published opinion thinks differently. During
celebrations on the Day of National Mourning and the inauguration of new
memorials the fallen and the civilian sacrifices for Germany that stand as a
reminder and example for future generations, are covered up and pushed into
the background by the shame and guilt for the victims of tyranny, those murdered by Hitler's regime. Mourning however does not harmonize with shame
and guilt. For Germany's reputation in the world they should be divided from
each other, as they are in all the other countries.
It is different in the military cemeteries! The many dead from the 1944
Western Front rest together in military cemeteries in the French, Belgian,
Luxembourg, Netherlands and German soil, cared for by the Volksbund
Deutsche Kriegsgraberfrsorge and the "Commonwealth War Graves
Commission" in Great Britain. Both keep alive the memory of the war's
dead. On the Western Front in 1944/1945 died:
German
82,000 soldiers
American
120,000 soldiers
British/Canadian
50,000 soldiers
French
13,000 soldiers
National distinctions are noticeable in the layout of the military cemeteries.
The German graves, with their dark-colored stone or crosses, often under big
trees, compel one to silence in awe of the devotion and sacrifice of the dead.
The radiating white rows of stone in the Allied cemeteries, most dominated
by a powerful cross, remind one of the pride and victory of their soldiers. All
of the military cemeteries succeed in honoring their dead. They are an
admonishment for peace and reconciliation.
Buried in the lovely landscape of Normandy are a total of approximately
80,000 German dead in six large military cemeteries. The largest of these is
317
318
GLOSSARY
AAA
Abn
Abt
Adjutant
AGp
ALA
AOK
armd
Bailey Bridge
bazooka
Begleit Coy
Bn
bodenstaendig
BR
Buffalo
CCA, B or R
CDN
C-in-C
CG
CO
COBRA
coy
COS
CP
div
Ehrenblattspange
"88"
anti-aircraft artillery
airborne
abteilung (equivalent to battalion in panzer units and
other mobile arms)
in battalions and regiments, the assistant to the Commander
(SI to S4 functions performed by one person); in divisions
and higher echelons, the G1
Army Group
130th Panzeraufklarungslehrabteilung
Army Command
armoured or armored
portable steel bridge
American 2.36-inch rocket launcher
independent infantry coy, reinforced with heavy weapons
such as AAA or anti-tank guns, placed at the disposal of the
Combat Group of a panzer division. Its mission was to
accompany and secure the division staff, and was often the
last reserve of the Group
Battalion
static, units dependent on local installations and transport
British
a tracked amphibious assault vehicle capable of carrying 30
soldiers
Combat Command of an armoured division, usually containing one-third to one-half of the division's strength. R denotes
reserve.
Canadian
Commander-in-Chief
Commanding General
Commanding Officer
American breakout operation
company
Chief of Staff
Command Post
division
Honour Roll clasp
German 88mm high-velocity dual-purpose anti-aircraft and
anti-tank gun
French
319
FA
FHQ
Fla
Flail
field artillery
Fhrerhauptquartier
Flugabwehr (anti-aircraft defence)
British tank with heavy chains on a revolving drum, used for
land mine clearance
Flak
anti-aircraft gun
FM
Field Marshal
FSJ Div
Fallschirmjger
(Airborne) Division
Funklenkkompanie A panzer coy with remote-controlled charge carriers with
1000 lb explosives or detonating liquid
G1
General Staff Officer Personnel
G2
General Staff Officer Intelligence
G3
General Staff Officer Operations
G4
General Staff Officer Logistics
Gren
Grenadier (infantryman on foot)
half-track
combination wheeled and tracked armoured troop carrier
HE
high explosive
HQ
headquarters
HKB
Army Coastal Battery
HGr
Heeresgruppe (Army Group)
Hiwi
volunteer auxiliaries (mostly Russians)
Hvy
heavy
I, II, etc.
Roman numerals used to identify Corps, or battalions within
a regiment
ID
infantry division (non-static)
ID (bo)
Infantry division (bodenstandiger, or static)
la
1st General Staff Officer at Division level or higher
(equivalent of G3 today)
lb
2nd General Staff Officer at Division level or higher
(responsible for supply; equivalent of G4 today)
Ic
3rd General Staff Officer at Division level or higher
(responsible for intelligence; equivalent of G2 today)
Jabo
jagdbomber (fighter-bomber)
Jagdpanther
turretless 88mm tank destroyer on a Panther chassis
Jagdpanzer IV
turretless 75mm (L-71) tank destroyer on a Pz IV chassis
Kampfgruppe
combined arms task force of variable size
KTB
Kriegstagebuch (war diary)
Landser
soldiers
Lw
Luftwaffe
Mot
motorized (not horse-drawn or armoured)
320
MAA
Marine-Fahr-Prahm
MG
M-4
MFP
Nebelwerfer
OB
OB West
ofenrohr
OKH
OKW
O1
02
O3
OP
Pak
Panther
Panzer Corps
Pz
Pz IV
Pzgren
Pzjg
Panzerfaust
Rgt
RTR
Schtzen Rgt
Seekampfgruppe
SP
Siebelfhre
SPW
Stuka
SS
Tagesbefehl
TD
Tiger
TOTALIZE
V-1
V-2
VAK
VGD
Volksgrenadier
V-Kp
VK 1601
VK 1801
werkstatt
werfer
WFSt
zbV
322
KC
OL
Sw
KC
OL
KC
26 Dec 41
06 July 43
26 July 44
25 Jan 43
28 Oct 44
17 Dec 42
Uthe, Konrad
Major and CO 2nd Bn 901 PzgrenLehrRgt
Wagner, Werner
Hauptm. and O.C., 130 PzjgLehrAbt
Welsch, Willi
Oberstltl and CO 902 PzgrenLehrRgt
Legend:
KC = Knight's Cross
OL = Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross
SW = Swords to Oakleaves of Knight's Cross
324
KC 12 Aug 44
KC 14 Apr 45
KC 29 Sep 41
German Army
Offiziere
Generalfeldmarschall
Generaloberst
General der Infanterie
Artillerie
Kavallerie
Panzertruppen
Major General
Brigadier General (US)
Brigadier (BR)
Generalmajor
Oberst
Oberstleutnant
Major
Hauptmann
Oberleutnant
Leutnant
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Captain
First Lieutenant
Second Lieutenant
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS
Warrant Officer
Sergeant Major
Master Sergeant
(NCO) UNTEROFFIZIERE
Stabsfeldwebel
Hauptfeldwebel
Oberfeldwebel
Feldwebel
Stabsunteroffizier
Staff Sergeant
Sergeant (US)
Corporal (BR)
Unteroffizier
OTHER RANKS
Corporal (US)
Private 1st Class (US)
Lance Corporal (BR)
Private
MANNSCHAFTEN (Landser)
Obergefreiter
Gefreiter
Schtze
Grenadier, Volksgrenadier
Panzergrenadier, Panzerschtze
Kanonier
Pionier
325
Gann
Geyr von
Schweppenburg, Frh, G
Gerhardt, 0
Glyczynski, v., L
Goller,
Gort, Lord, G
Graf, OL
Griffin, M
Guderian, GO
Gutmann, O
Haase, GL
Harper, GL
Hauser, v., 0
Hausser, G
Heinrich, L
Heintz. O
Henke, OL
Hennecke, H
Hennig
Herrmann, L
Dr. Herrmann,
Heydte, v.d., 0
Hopmann
Hbner, H
Hnersdorff. v., O
Kauffmann, OTL
Keichel. Fw
Keitel, GFM
Kempf, G
Keelring, GFM
Kluge, v., GFM
Kluge, v., OTL
Knebel, v.. L
Kohler
Knig, G
Kokott, GM
Koll, O
Kozub. L
Krause, GL
Kreipe. GM
Kues, L
Kuhnow, M
Lex
Lttwitz, Frh, G
Luxenburger, 0
Sander, L
Schacht, L
Schack, GL
Schfers,
Scheibe, Fw
Siegroth, v., 0
Simonds, GL
SchnburgWaldenburg, Prz, M
Scholze, 0
Schulz-Balluff, L
Schwalbe, GL
Skorzeny
Speidel, GM
Stauffenberg, Graf, O
Sterz
Sthr
Sltmann
Maa
Maczek, GL
Manteuffel, v., G
Marcks, G
Markowski, M
Marschalck von
Bachtenbrock, Frh, H
McAuliffe, GM
McNair, G
Meyer (Panzermeyer), 0
Meyer, OL
Model, GFM
Montgomery, FM
Monz, H
Mller. H
Neumann, OL
Niemeyer, Ol
Oehmichen, 0
Oppeln-Bronokowski,
v., GM
Patton, G
Pauletto, L
Peiper, O
Philipps
Poschinger, Titter
v., OTL
Prien, L
Ramsay, Adm
Rauch, O
Ravenstein, v., 0
Reid,
Ritschel. H
Roberts. GM
Rommel, GFM
326
Trettner
Trumpa
Uthe
Wagener, GM
Warnock, GM
Welsch, Otl
Werner. L
Werncke, M
Williamson, LTC
Wippich,
Wisliceny. Otl
Wittmann, H
Zeisler. M
Zitzewitz, v., L
Zwierczynski, M
TROOPS
Deutsch - Heer
Waffen-SS
1. SS-Panzerdivision
2. SS-Panzerdivision
9. SS-Panzerdivision
10. SS-Panzerdivision
12. SS-Panzerdivision
17. SS-Panzergrenadier Division
2. Panzerdivision
6. Panzerdivision
9. Panzerdivision
11. Panzerdivision
21. Panzerdivision
116. Panzerdivision
PanzerLehrDivision
Fhrergrenadierdi vision
15. PanzergrenadierDivision
19. Volksgrenadier Division
25. PanzgrenadierDivision
26. Volksgrenadier Division
48. (bo) Infantry Division
64. (bo) Infantry Division
70. (bo) Infantry Division
85. Infantry Division
89. Infantry Division
167. Volksgrenadier Division
245. (bo) Infantry Division
271. (bo) Infantry Division
272. (bo) Infantry Division
275 Infantry Division
277. Infantry Division
302. (bo) Infantry Division
331. (bo) Infantry Division
344. (bo) Infantry Division
346. (bo) Infantry Division
347. (bo) Infantry Division
352. Infantry Division/VGD
361. Infantry Division/VGD
462. Infantry Division
708. (bo) Infantry Division
711. (bo) Infantry Division
712 (bo) Infantry Division
716. (bo) Infantry Division
719. (bo) Infantry Division
Werferbrigade 7
Werferbrigade 8
British Army
7. Armoured Division
11. Armoured Division
6. Airborne Division
43. Division
49. Division
50. Division
51. Division
Canadian Army
2. Armoured Division
4. Armoured Division
2. Infantry Division
4. Infantry Division
1. Polish Armoured Division
French Army
U.S. Army
2. Armored Division
3. Armored Division
4. Armored Division
5. Armored Division
7. Armored Division
9. Armored Division
10. Armored Division
11. Armored Division
4. Infantry Division
5. Infantry Division
9. Infantry Division
28. Infantry Division
30. Infantry Division
45. Infantry Division
80. Infantry Division
84. Infantry Division
87. Infantry Division
95. Infantry Division
100. Infantry Division
106. Infantry Division
82. Airborne Division
101. Airborne Division
Luftwaffe
3. Fallschirmjgerdivision
5. Fallschirmjgerdivision
17. LW-Feld-Division
Kampfgeschwader 100
Kriegsmarine