Police On Police Shootings Report

NewYorkStateTaskForceon
PoliceonPoliceShootings
ReducingInherentDanger:
ReportoftheTaskForceon
PoliceonPoliceShootings
ChristopherStone,Chair
ZacharyCarter,ViceChair
ThomasBelfiore
EllaM.BullyCummings
Rev.Dr.HerbertDaughtry
MichaelJ.Farrell
GeorgeGascn
ArvaRice
LewRice
DamonT.Hewitt,ExecutiveDirector
ExecutiveSummary
Since1981,some26policeofficersacrosstheUnitedStateshavebeenshotandkilledby
fellowpoliceofficerswhohavemistakenthemfordangerouscriminals.Thesefatal
shootingsaredoublytragic,firstbecauseboththeshootersandvictimsinsuchsituations
areriskingtheirlivestoenforcethelawandprotectthepublic,andsecondbecausemany
ofthesedeathsarepreventable.Thedangersthatgiverisetothesedeathsareinherentin
policing,butthosedangerscanbereducedandmoredeathsprevented.
Overthelastfifteenyears,tenofthefourteenofficerskilledinthesemistakenidentity,
policeonpoliceshootingshavebeenpeopleofcolor.Thetwomostrecentofthesefatal,
policeonpoliceshootingstookplaceinNewYorkState,andinbothcasesthevictimswere
offduty,AfricanAmericanpoliceofficers:OfficerChristopherRidley,killedinWestchester
CountyinJanuary2008;andOfficerOmarEdwards,killedinHarleminMay2009.
Thesetwomostrecenttragediesreverberatedpowerfully,notonlywithintheranksoflaw
enforcementbutwiththebroaderpublic.Inpressaccounts,publicdebate,andinformal
conversationsamongpoliceofficers,weheardwidespreadspeculationabouttherolethat
racemayhaveplayedintheseshootings,notbasedonanyspecificevidenceofbiasinthese
twocases,butemanatinginsteadfromthewidelysharedsuspicionthatraceplaysarolein
manypoliceconfrontations,asitdoesinAmericansocietygenerally.
Inresponse,GovernorDavidA.PatersonempanelledthisTaskForce,directingusto
examinetheissuesandimplicationsarisingfrompoliceonpoliceshootingsand
confrontations,especiallybetweenondutyandoffdutyofficers,betweenuniformedand
undercoverofficers,andbetweenofficersofdifferentraces,nationalitiesandethnicities,
seekingtopreventsuchincidentsinthefuture.Ourworkoffersmanylessons,from
methodstoimprovetrainingandtacticstodefusepoliceonpoliceconfrontationsbefore
theybecomefatalandimprovetheinvestigationofpoliceonpoliceshootings,to
proceduresthatcanimprovethetreatmentoftheofficersandfamiliesinvolved.Equally
important,ourworkoffersachancetobetterunderstandtheroleofraceinpolicing
decisionsgenerallyandtoidentifyspecificactionsthatpoliceagenciesandgovernmentat
everylevelcantaketoreducetheeffectofracialbias,evenunconsciousracialbias,in
policedecisionstoshootinfastmoving,dangeroussituations.
InthesixmonthssinceourTaskForceconvened,wehaveundertakenanationwide,
systematicinvestigationofmistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsthefirsttimeto
ourknowledgethatanindependentpanelhasconductedsuchaninquiry.Weidentifiedand
examined26fatalshootingsofthiskindintheperiodbetween1981and2009,looking
particularlycloselyatthetwomostrecentcasesinNewYorkState.Weinvitedcurrentand
retiredlawenforcementofficersfromacrossthecountrytoshareexamplesofmistaken
identityconfrontationsfromtheirownexperience,resultinginourcollectingandanalyzing
over300storiesofsuchconfrontations.Atthreepublichearingsandthroughwritten
submissions,weheardfrompoliceofficersofallranks,includingseveralwhosurvived
nearfatalmistakenidentityconfrontations,friendsandrelativesofofficerskilled,
ReportoftheTaskForceonPoliceonPoliceShootings
P a g e |ii
concernedcitizens,andsocialscientists.Wealsocommissionedindepthinterviewswith
tenleadingscholarswhohavestudiedpolicingformorethanadecadeeachandwe
solicitedadvicefromascoreofexpertsandpoliceveterans.
Wefoundthatfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsaremerelythetipofanicebergof
confrontationsbetweenondutypoliceofficers(usuallyinuniform)andtheiroffduty,
plainclothes,orundercovercounterparts.Theseconfrontationsoccureveryday,andwhile
mostaredefusedwithoutinjury,eachcontainstheseedofatragedy.Wheretraininghas
beenpoorornonexistent,whereprotocolsareunclear,andespeciallywheretheofficers
arefromdifferentlawenforcementagencies,theseconfrontationscanandoftendo
escalatequickly.Protectingthelivesoflawenforcementofficerswhentheyareoutof
uniformrequiresthattraining,protocols,anddatacollectionallbeimproved.
Issuesofracemustalsobeaddresseddirectly:bothperceptionsandreality.Theperception
thatracemattersintheseconfrontationsisstrong,includingamongmanyofficersofcolor.
Justasmanypeopleofcolorareawarethattheyaremorelikelythantheirwhite
counterpartstobestoppedandquestionedbypolice,so,too,manyofficersofcolorbelieve
thattheyaremorelikelythantheirwhitecounterpartstobemistakenforacriminalwhen
outofuniform,andthatthedangerismanytimesgreaterwhentheyaretakingpolice
actionwiththeirgundisplayed.
Asforthereality,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingshavetragicallykilled
undercoverandplainclothesofficerswhite,black,andHispanicwithoutanyobvious
racialorethnicpattern;buttherealityisstrikinglydifferentforoffdutyofficers.Asfaras
wecandetermine,1982wasthelastyearinwhichanoffduty,whitepoliceofficerwas
killedinamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootinganywhereintheUnitedStates.Since
then,nineoffdutyofficersofcolorhavebeenkilledinsuchshootings,includingboth
OfficerRidleyandOfficerEdwardsinNewYorkState.Distinguishingtheoffdutyshootings
fromthemistakenidentityshootingsofundercoverorplainclothesofficersisimportant
becausepolicedepartments,atleastuntilnow,havehadmoretoolsandtrainingtokeep
plainclothesandundercoverofficerssafethantheytypicallyhavehadforoffdutyofficers.
Thereisbroadconsensusamongpoliceleadersacrossthecountrythatdepartmentsmust
alwaysbeworking,asoneseniorNewYorkStatePoliceexecutiveputittous,toweedout
themostvirulentracists,instillculturalsensitivityandfairness,andfinallystrictlypursuea
policyofzerotolerancewhenitcomestodiscriminatorybiasofitsofficers.Weagree.
Butthecasesthatledtothecreationofthistaskforceraiseadifferentissue:theneedfor
policedepartmentstogobeyondtheissueofovertbiastodealwiththeunconsciousbiases
thatinfluenceallpeople,includingpoliceofficers.
Wefindthescientificevidencepersuasivethatpoliceofficerssharethesameunconscious
racialbiasesfoundamongthegeneralpublicintheUnitedStates.Specifically,weare
persuadedbyevidencethatbothpoliceofficersandmembersofthegeneralpublicdisplay
unconsciousbiasesthatleadthemtobequickertoshootimagesofarmedblackpeople
thanofarmedwhitepeopleincomputerbasedsimulationstestingshoot/dontshoot
decisionmaking.Moreover,weareencouragedthatpreliminaryevidencesuggeststhat
P a g e |iii
policetrainingmayreducethisunconsciousbias,andwecommendthosepolice
departmentsincludingtheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentthathavebegun
systematicresearch,testingtheirnewrecruitsforthisbiasbeforeandaftertheirtraining,
aswellasintheearlystagesoftheirpolicecareers.Reducinganykindofracialbiasin
shoot/dontshootdecisionshasthegreatestpotentialtosavethelivesofpoliceofficersof
colorandofciviliansalike.
Finally,wehavefoundthatthesefatalpoliceonpoliceshootingscaneasilytraumatizeand
sometimespolarizeentirepolicedepartments.Notonlyaretheindividualofficerspresent
atthesceneaffecteddeeply,buttheorganizationalroutinesthatnormallystructurean
agencysresponsetoashootingcanbethrownintoconfusionaswordofanofficerkilled
spreadsunevenlythroughadepartment,asotherofficersreactwithunderstandable
emotion,andasthedeepestofregretsgripeveryoneinvolved.Departmentsthathadnever
imaginedthatsuchatragedywouldoccurwithintheirranksfindthemselvesunprepared
tohandletheinevitableemotionandtrauma,sometimesleadingtoalossofcredibilityand
respect,notonlywiththepublic,butalsoamongswornmembersoftheirownlaw
enforcementagencies.Yet,ifrecentpatternshold,itislikelythatanotherpolice
departmentsomewhereintheUnitedStateswillfinditselffacingjustsuchatragedythis
year,anotherwillfaceonein2011,andsoonintothefuture.
Preventionandpreparationarestraightforwardandessential.NewYorkState,withtwo
suchtragicrecentexperiences,hasaspecialobligationtostrengthenitsprevention,
preparation,andresponsestatewide.Wemakeninespecificrecommendations,eachwith
implicationsforpolicedepartments,municipalities,andstateandfederalgovernment.
1. Toreducethefrequencyanddangerinpoliceonpoliceconfrontations,we
recommendthatcommonprotocolsbedevelopedbothstatewideandnationwide
regardingwhenandhowtotakepoliceactionwhileoffdutyoroutofuniform,and
howchallengingandconfrontedofficersshouldconductthemselves.
2. Tomakethoseprotocolseffectiveandtopreparedepartmentstorespond
appropriatelywhentragedystrikes,werecommendthatinteractive,scenario
basedtrainingontheprotocolsbecomemandatoryinNewYorkStateand
routinethroughoutthenation,bothfornewrecruitsandforveteranofficers,and
thattrainingbedevelopedforpoliceleadersinhowtorespondeffectivelyto
policeonpoliceshootings.
3. Toreducetherolethatracialstereotypesplayinpoliceconfrontations,we
recommendthatbothfederalandstategovernmentsacceleratethedevelopment
oftestingandtrainingtomeasurablyreduceunconsciousracialbiasin
shoot/dontshootdecisions.
4. Toreducetherolethatracialstereotypesplaywithinpolicedepartments,we
recommendthatpolicetrainingonissuesofraceanddiversitybeexpandedto
includeafocusondiversitywithinpoliceagencies,drawingontheexperiencesof
officersofcolorwhohavebeenmistakenforoffenders.
5. Toimprovethequalityandcredibilityofpoliceresponsesintherareinstances
ofpoliceonpoliceshootingsinNewYorkState,werecommendthe
P a g e |iv
developmentofaspecializedsupportteamthatwouldbequicklydeployedtoany
locationinthestatewhereapoliceonpoliceshootingoccurs,andthatcouldbe
availabletoassistdepartmentsinotherstatesuponrequest.
6. Toimproveunderstandingastohowpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsoccur,and
howtheycanberesolvedwithoutinjury,werecommendtheestablishmentofa
mandatorystatewidereportingsystemforallfirearmsdischarges,the
distributionofavoluntaryannualsurveytoindividualofficers,andenhanced
recordkeepingmeasuresbytheNewYorkDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices
andtheFederalBureauofInvestigation.
7. Toimprovethetransparencyandunderstandingofprosecutorialdecisionsin
policeonpoliceshootings,werecommendthatprosecutorsoverseeingthese
investigationspubliclydiscloseasmanydetailsaspossibleasearlyaspossible,
andthatGovernorsgivegreatweighttotheneedtoencouragepublicdisclosure
ofthecircumstancesoftheseshootingswhenweighingwhetherornottoappoint
aspecialprosecutorinanindividualcase.
8. Tosharethebenefitsofthelessonsdrawnfrompoliceonpoliceshootings,we
recommendthattheprotocolsdevelopedtoprotectofficersbeadaptedforuse
bythosecommunityorganizationsprovidingtrainingtociviliansonhowto
handlethemselvesduringencounterswithpolice,andthatthistrainingbemade
availabletociviliansofallracesandethnicities.
9. Toattendtotheconcernsofthegrowingnumbersofofficersofcolorinour
increasinglydiversesociety,werecommendthatthefederalgovernment,
togetherwithlocallawenforcementagencies,launchaprogramofdialogueand
researchontheexperiencesofofficersofcolor,especiallywhenoffduty,
deepeningthefieldsabilitytosupporttheseofficersastheystrivetobring
safetyandjusticetocommunitiesthatneedthemsodearly.
WhilenothingcanundothetragediesthathavetakenthelivesofOfficersOmarEdwards,
ChristopherRidley,anddozensofothersbeforethem,wemustactonthelessonstheir
deathshavetaughtus.Ourrecommendationsurgepreciselytheseactions,promisingto
reducethechancesthatthesetragedieswillberepeatedandincreasingthesafetyofpolice
officersandciviliansacrossNewYorkStateandacrossthenation.
P a g e |v
TaskForceMembers
ChristopherStone,Chair
DanielandFlorenceGuggenheimProfessorofthePracticeofCriminalJustice,
JohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity
ZacharyCarter,ViceChair
Partner,Dorsey&WhitneyLLP
andformerUnitedStatesAttorneyfortheEasternDistrictofNewYork
ThomasBelfiore
Chair,NewYorkMunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncil
FormerCommissioner,WestchesterCountyDepartmentofPublicSafety
EllaM.BullyCummings
FormerChiefofPolice,DetroitPoliceDepartment
Rev.Dr.HerbertDaughtry
NationalPresidingMinister,HouseoftheLordChurches
MichaelJ.Farrell
DeputyCommissionerforStrategicInitiatives,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment
GeorgeGascn
ChiefofPolice,SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment
ArvaRice
PresidentandCEO,NewYorkUrbanLeague
LewRice
FormerSpecialAgentinCharge,U.S.DrugEnforcementAdministration,NewYorkOffice
P a g e |vi
TaskForceStaff
DamonT.Hewitt,Esq.
ExecutiveDirector
JamesA.Gilmer
DirectorofResearch
Chief,CrimeResearchandAnalysisUnit,OfficeofJusticeResearchandPerformance,
NewYorkStateDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices
DeleneBromirski
ResearchAssistant
DoctoralStudent,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
KirstenChristiansen
ResearchAssistant
DoctoralCandidate,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
AmberHorning
ResearchAssistant
DoctoralStudent,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
ZacharyShemtob
ResearchAssistant
DoctoralCandidate,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
JenniferTsai
ResearchAssistant
Master'sCandidate,WagnerSchoolofPublicPolicy,NYU
P a g e |vii
TaskForceAdvisorsandContributors
GeoffreyP.Alpert,Ph.D.
Professor,DepartmentofCriminologyandCriminalJusticeUniversityofSouthCarolina
DavidBayley,Ph.D.
DistinguishedProfessor,CollegeofCriminalJusticeUniversityatAlbany,StateUniversity
ofNewYork
AnthonyBraga,Ph.D.
SeniorResearchAssociateHarvardUniversityJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment
MerrickBobb
President,PoliceAssessmentResourceCenter
HenryDeGeneste
FormerSuperintendent,PortAuthorityPoliceDepartment
JohnJackDovidio,Ph.D.
Professor,DepartmentofPsychologyYaleUniversity
DirectorofTraining,ConsortiumforPoliceLeadershipinEquity(CPLE)
JohnEck,Ph.D.
Professor,SchoolofCriminalJusticeUniversityofCincinnati
WilliamA.Geller
Principal,Geller&Associates
ErnestE.GreenIII
President,NationalOrganizationofBlackLawEnforcementExecutives(NOBLE)
PhillipAtibaGoff,Ph.D.
AssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPsychologyUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles
ExecutiveDirectorofResearch,ConsortiumforPoliceLeadershipinEquity(CPLE)
RonaldE.Hampton
ExecutiveDirector,NationalBlackPoliceAssociation(NBPA)
DeloresJonesBrown,Ph.D.
AssociateProfessorandDirectoroftheCenteronRace,CrimeandJustice
JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
GeorgeL.Kelling,Ph.D.
Professor,SchoolofCriminalJusticeRutgersUniversityNewark
P a g e |viii
DavidA.Klinger,Ph.D.
AssociateProfessor,DepartmentofCriminologyandCriminalJusticeUniversityof
Missouri,StLouis
JamesH.Lawrence
FormerCommissioner,NassauCountyPoliceDepartment,FormerChiefofPersonneland
FormerDeputyCommissionerforTraining,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment
WilliamJ.Lewinski,Ph.D.
ExecutiveDirector,ForceScienceInstitute,Ltd.
Professor,DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandLawEnforcement,
MinnesotaStateUniversity,Mankato
StephenMastrofski,Ph.D.
UniversityProfessor,ChairoftheDepartmentofAdministrationofJustice,andDirectorof
theCenterforJusticeLeadershipandManagement,GeorgeMasonUniversity
HamiltonRobinson
FormerChiefofPatrol,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandFormerChiefofNewYork
CityHousingAuthorityPolice
JonM.Shane,Ph.D.
AssistantProfessor,DepartmentofLawJohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
WesleyG.Skogan,Ph.D.
ProfessorofPoliticalScienceandFacultyFellow,InstituteforPolicyResearch
NorthwesternUniversity
WilliamTerrill,Ph.D.
AssociateProfessor,SchoolofCriminalJusticeMichiganStateUniversity
JeremyTravis
President,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
Lt.CharlesP.Wilson
NationalChairman,NationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficers(NABLEO)
P a g e |ix
Contents
ExecutiveSummary.................................................................................................................ii
TaskForceMembers..............................................................................................................vi
TaskForceStaff......................................................................................................................vii
TaskForceAdvisorsandContributors....................................................................................viii
1. RareEventsthatReverberateWidely...............................................................................1
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsastheApexofPoliceonPoliceConfrontations.......................................4
PoliceonPoliceShootingsastheExemplarsofaWiderArrayofMistakenShootings...............................9
PoliceonPoliceShootingsasaSpecialBurdenforPoliceOfficersofColor..............................................10
2. WhatWeKnowAboutPatternsandTrendsinPoliceonPoliceShootingsand
Confrontations...............................................................................................................13
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootings.................................................................................................................13
TheRidleyCase...........................................................................................................................................13
TheEdwardsCase.......................................................................................................................................16
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsSince1981..............................................................................................18
TheActionsofVictimOfficersandConfrontingOfficersinFatalEncounters............................................22
ACloserLookatMistakenShootingsofOffDutyOfficers.........................................................................24
AftermathofFatalShootings......................................................................................................................27
NonFatalPoliceonPoliceShootings.........................................................................................................31
OtherPoliceonPoliceConfrontations.......................................................................................................32
TheRoleofStereotypesinPoliceConfrontationswithPeopleofColor....................................................37
InformationGapsonPoliceonPoliceShootingsandConfrontations.......................................................41
3. TheRoleofTraining........................................................................................................43
TraininginNewYorkStateonPoliceonPoliceConfrontations................................................................44
TheContentandMethodofConfrontationTraining..................................................................................48
TrainingforOutofUniformOfficersandConfrontedOfficers..................................................................48
TrainingforChallengingOfficers................................................................................................................50
TrainingforCiviliansonConfrontationswithPolice...................................................................................52
4. Recommendations..........................................................................................................54
1.DevelopStateandNationalProtocolsforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations.........................................54
2.RequireContinuing,InteractiveTrainingonConfrontations.................................................................55
3.DevelopTestingandTrainingtoReduceUnconsciousRacialBiasin
Shoot/DontShootDecisions..............................................................................................................58
4.ExpandDiversityTrainingtoIncludeIssuesofDiversitywithinPoliceAgencies...................................58
P a g e |x
5.DesignateandTrainaSpecializedTeamtoSupportDepartmentsthatExperienceaPoliceonPolice
Shooting..............................................................................................................................................59
6.EstablishaMandatoryStatewideReportingSystemforPoliceFirearmsDischargesandaVoluntary,
AnonymousSystemforReportingPoliceonPoliceConfrontations..................................................61
7.PromoteTransparencyinProsecutorialDecisionsRegardingPoliceonPoliceShootings...................63
8.ApplytheLessonsofPoliceonPoliceShootingstoReduceMistakenPoliceCivilianShootings.........64
9.ExpandUnderstandingoftheLifeExperiencesofOfficersofColor......................................................65
Acknowledgements...............................................................................................................68
AppendixA:ListofFatalPoliceonPoliceShootings19812009...........................................71
AppendixB:NewYorkCityFatalIncidents,19302009.........................................................77
AppendixC:NewYorkCityNonFatalConfrontations,19952009........................................81
AppendixD:LetterfromNYPDCommissionerRaymondW.Kellyto
GovernorDavidA.Paterson...........................................................................................83
AppendixE:ListofRecommendationsbyGovernmentalUnit..............................................90
AppendixF:ReportsfromSelectedTaskForceAdvisors.......................................................92
AppendixG:ListofWitnessesandWrittenSubmissionsMadetotheTaskForce...............119
AppendixH:ExecutiveOrderCreatingPoliceonPoliceShootingsTaskForce....................120
AppendixI:GlossaryofTermsUsedinReport....................................................................124
P a g e |xi
1.
RareEventsthatReverberateWidely
AspecialfearhauntspoliceofficersofcoloracrosstheUnitedStates.Beyondallthe
dangersthateverylawenforcementofficerfaces,theseofficersfeeluniquelythreatenedby
another.Itisthedangerthatadaywillcomewhentheyareoutofuniformoffduty,
undercover,orinplainclothesandthecoloroftheirskinandagunintheirhandwill
promptfellowofficerstomistakethemforanarmedcriminal,andshoot.Whenanofficer
ofcolorisnotinuniformandseesacrimeinprogressoralifethreatened,andconsiders
takingpoliceaction,heorshemustoftenthinktwiceabouthowthenextpoliceofficerson
thescenewillreacttoanunfamiliarblackorLatinowithagun.
OnJanuary25,2008,OfficerChristopherRidleyoftheMountVernonPoliceDepartment
wasshotandkilledbyofficersoftheWestchesterCountyPoliceDepartmentinWhite
Plains,NewYork.OfficerRidleyhadbeenoffduty,hadseenaphysicalaltercation
betweentwociviliansandhadtakenpoliceactiontoapprehendthesuspectwhoinitiated
theassault.Whenotheruniformedofficersarrived,theysawRidley,anAfricanAmerican,
withaguninhishand.
OnMay28,2009,OfficerOmarEdwardsoftheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmenthadjust
goneoffdutywhenhesawsomeonebreakingintohiscar.Hetookpoliceaction,chasing
thethiefdown125thStreetinHarlem,withhisguninhishand.Otherplainclothesofficers
inanunmarkedcarsawOfficerEdwards,anAfricanAmerican,withaweaponchasingthe
otherman.TheplainclothesofficersgotoutoftheircarandoneofthemorderedOfficer
Edwardstodrophisweapon.Reportedly,OfficerEdwardsinsteadturnedtowardthe
plainclothesofficers,andoneofthemfiredsixrounds,killinghim.
Thesetwoincidents,describedmorefullybelow,promptedGovernorDavidA.Patersonto
createthisTaskForce.Thesewerenotaccidentalshootings.Thesewerecasesofmistaken
identity,inwhichpoliceofficersintentionallyshototherpoliceofficerswhomthey
mistakenlybelievedtobecriminaloffenders.1
Fatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsarerareevents.Eachincidentisunique;butinthetwo
casesdescribedabove,bothvictimswereoffdutyAfricanAmericanofficerswhotook
policeactionwiththeirgunsdrawn,onlytobeshotandkilledbyotherofficerswhodidnot
knowthattheywerepoliceofficers.Tragicdeathssuchasthesereverberatepowerfully
amongpoliceofficersofallcolors,races,andethnicities,aswellasamongmembersofthe
generalpublic.
Thesetragediesresonateinatleastthreeseparateanddistinctways,eachofwhichwe
addressdirectlyinthisreport.
First,thesedeathsstandattheapexofamountainofnonfatal,policeonpolice
confrontationsinwhichsomeofficersdonotrecognizeothersaspolice.Minor
confrontationsofthiskindoccureverydayinpolicing,andareusuallydefusedregardless
1Werefertotheseincidentsaspoliceonpoliceshootings,thoughsomeinvolvelawenforcementofficers
fromagenciesotherthantraditionalpolicedepartments.
P a g e |1
oftheraceorethnicityoftheofficersinvolvedwithoutphysicalinjury.Officerstrainfor
theseconfrontations,andlawenforcementagenciespromulgatepoliciesdesignedto
minimizetheirfrequencyandendthemsafely.Still,theseconfrontationscontinuetooccur
andcancauseinsultandharmtotheofficersinvolved,evenwhentheystopshortoffatality
orphysicalinjury.Themostseriousincidentscantraumatizeentirepolicedepartments
andshakethecommunitiesthosedepartmentsserve.Ourrecommendationsshouldmake
policeonpoliceconfrontationslessfrequentandlessdangerousforallpoliceofficers.
Second,thesedeathsareespeciallyvividexamplesofawiderrangeofinstancesinwhich
policeofficersshootandsometimeskillpeoplewhomtheymistakeforoffenders.Whether
thevictimisacivilianoranofficeroutofuniform,officersassessingdangerwithlimited
informationintenseandrapidlymovingconfrontationscanmakemistakes.Such
shootingsinvitecontroversy,especiallywhenthereisapossibilitythatconsciousor
unconsciousracialbiasmayhaveplayedevenasmallroleinthedecisiontoshoot.The
inevitabledebatesoverindividualculpabilityoftencompetewithbroadereffortsto
preventrecurrence.Theambiguitiesandthedebatestheyprovokemaybesomewhat
reducedwhenthevictimisapoliceofficer,especiallyifallagreethatthevictimofficerwas
actingwiththebestofintentions.Thesemistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootings,
therefore,provideanopportunitytoassembleabroaderconsensusforthepreventionof
futuretragedies.Ourrecommendationsshouldnotonlyreducemistakenidentityshootingsof
policeofficers,butshouldalsohelptoprotectciviliansfromsuchfatalencounters.
Third,thesedeaths,eveninadistantcityorstate,reverberatewithinthefamiliesof
officersofcolor,wheretheysurfacequestionsaboutwhethertheseofficersshouldhave
joinedlawenforcementinthefirstplace.Arounddinnertablesandingatheringsof
friends,manyofficersofcolorhavefacedskepticismabouttheirdecisionstojointhepolice,
especiallyfromfriendsandrelativeswhohavehadbadexperienceswithanypartofthe
criminaljusticesystem.Eachpoliceonpoliceshootinginwhichthevictimofficerisa
personofcolorrevivesthosequestionsincountlessconversations,strainingfamilytiesand
careercommitments.Insomecases,thesereverberationsarealsofeltbypolicerecruiters
seekingtohirenewofficersofcolor.Ourrecommendationsshouldreinforcetheconfidence
andresolveoftodaysofficersofcolorandtomorrowsaswellbystrengtheningtheabilityand
commitmentoflawenforcementagencieseverywheretoprotectandrespectalloftheir
members,aswellasthecommunitiesfromwhichtheyaredrawn.
Intheremainingsectionsofthischapter,weexamineeachofthesethreeissuesinturn;but
firstweconsidertheissueofraceintheseshootings.
Althoughpublicattentionisparticularlyattunedtoincidentswhereofficersofcolorare
mistakenforcriminals,whiteofficershavealsobeenvictimsofbothfatalandnonfatal
mistakenidentityshootings.Inourpublichearingsandthroughouronlinequestionnaire,
manywhiteofficersdescribedforussituationswheretheyaimedtheirweaponsatoffduty
whiteofficerswhomtheymistookforcriminals,andmanywhiteofficersdescribedhow
theywerechallengedbyothers.BlackandHispanicofficershavealsobeenamongthe
P a g e |2
confrontingofficersinfatalandnonfatalmistakenidentityshootings.2Inshort,thereare
manyissuesbesidesracepresentintheseshootingsandtherolethatraceplaysisnot
simpleorstraightforward.
Whileourreportreachesmanyissuesotherthanracethatcontributetothesetragedies,
werecognizethatissuesofracearecentraltothebroadpublicconcernovertheNewYork
Statepoliceonpoliceshootings.Wewerenotaskedtodeterminethepreciserolethatrace
playedinanyparticularincident,andwehavenottriedtodetermineifanyoftheofficers
involvedinthespecificincidentsthattriggeredourreviewconsciouslyheldanyparticular
biasesoractedonstereotypes.Instead,wewereaskedtolookatpatternsacrossmany
incidentsandtoexaminethescientificresearchbearingonthesetragedies.
Ourconclusionfromthatreviewisclear:inherentorunconsciousracialbiasplaysarolein
shoot/dontshootdecisionsmadebyofficersofallracesandethnicities.Therolemaybe
smallandsubtle,measuredduringsimulationsonlyinmillisecondsofactionorhesitation,
butthepatterns(describedmorefullybelow)areclearandconsistent.Equallyimportant,
training,supervision,andprofessionaldisciplinemayreducetherolethatracialbiasplays
andcanhelpofficersrespondtochallengesinwaysthatdefusetheconfrontationsbefore
theyturndeadly.Thatmakesitallthemoreimportantthatpoliceagenciesaswellasstate
andfederalgovernmentsdealdirectlywithinherentorunconsciousbiasinshoot/dont
shootdecisions.
Racialbiascan,insomeinstances,beovertratherthanunconscious,andweagreewiththe
manypoliceofficersandcommunityleaderswhoemphasizedduringourreviewthe
importanceofpressingaheadwitheffortstoeliminateovertbiasfromeverypoliceagency.
Policedepartmentsmustcontinuetodevelopmechanismstoidentifyandweedout
recruitsandveteranofficerswhoclearlyexhibitconsciousracialanimus.Asthesecondin
commandoftheNewYorkStatePolicebluntlyputtheissueinourfirstpublichearing:
Weunfortunatelystillliveinasocietythatstillhasaconsiderableamountof
racism. Many in our society will perceive a minority police officer in plain
clothes with a gun as a criminal in the very first instances, and a non
minority officer as a police officer. Thus, given that thepolice are recruited
from society at large, it stands to reason that these recruits will bring with
them their own prejudices and opinions. The question is: What can police
agenciesdotoweedoutthemostvirulentracists,instillculturalsensitivity
and fairness, and finally strictly pursue a police of zero tolerance when it
2In1968,twoblackoffdutyNewYorkCitypoliceofficers(oneamemberoftheHousingPolice)tragically
mistookeachotherforrobbersandfiredateachother.Oneofficer,DavidTurman,died.Theotherofficer
washospitalized.In2006,anoffdutyHispanicofficerintheNewYorkPoliceDepartment(EricHernandez)
wasshotandkilledbyanotherHispanicuniformedofficeroutsideofafastfoodrestaurant.Andin1999,ina
nonfatalshooting,GavinReece,ablackNYPDuniformedpoliceofficer,shotatanowretired35yearold
whiteNYPDofficerwhowastakingpoliceaction.Thewhiteretiredofficerhadfiredhisweaponattwo
suspectswhohadjustrobbedhimatgunpoint.WhenoneofhisshotsstruckthewindshieldofOfficerReeces
vehicle,OfficerReecereturnedfire.Fortunately,noneofhisthreeshotshitatargetandthetwoofficerswere
abletoidentifyeachotheranddefusethesituation.
P a g e |3
comestodiscriminatorybiasofitsofficersandtheagencyasawhole?How
doesitregainthetrustofthecommunities,officers,andfamiliesmostkeenly
impactedbythetragedyoffriendlyfiredeaths?3
Quitesimply,issuesofracepervadepoliceworkintheUnitedStates.Theyarefeltin
relationsamongofficersaswellasbetweenofficersandcivilians.Manyofourfindings
drawoutspecificissuesofraceandmanyofourrecommendationsaddressthemdirectly;
butourindividualrecommendationswillnotbeadequatewithoutleadershipfromwithin
policeorganizationsandfromcommunityorganizationsonthesematters.Policeexecutives
inparticularmustbeabletoidentifytheseissuesanddiscussthemcomfortably,both
withintheiragenciesandwiththepublic.Amongourrecommendations,weurgethatpolice
leadersreceivetrainingtohelpwiththiscrucialtask.
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsastheApexofPoliceonPolice
Confrontations
Theshootingdeathofapoliceofficermistakenbyotherofficersforadangerouscriminalis
extremelyrare,havingoccurredsomewhereintheUnitedStatesaboutonceayearoverthe
lastthreedecades.4Yet,thesedeathsarethetipofaproverbialicebergofthousandsof
confrontationseachyearthatendwithoutfatalities.Preventingevenonedeatheachyear
wouldbeworththeeffortrequired;butthebenefitswouldbefeltmuchmorewidelyifthey
helpedtoavertormoresafelydefusethesethousandsofnonfatalconfrontations,aswell.
Almosteverylawenforcementveteranwithwhomwespokeinthisinquiryhadpersonal
storiestoshareaboutpoliceonpoliceconfrontations.Indeed,theseconfrontationsare
widelyunderstoodasinevitable,leadinglawenforcementagenciesacrosstheUnitedStates
todevelopawidearrayofcreativetacticstodefusethem.Wediscusssomeofthesetactics
laterinthisreportwhenweturntotraining;buteventhebesttacticscanleadtoproblems
whentheyvaryfromagencytoagency.Onefundamentalproblemisthatthereisnosingle
protocolinplacetodefusepoliceonpoliceconfrontations,notsimplynationally,buteven
acrossasinglestate,county,orcity.
BecausetheUnitedStatesuniquelyintheworldhasliterallythousandsofseparate
policedepartmentswithnogovernmentagencyabletosetstandardsforthemall,the
varietyofpoliciesandprotocolsisvirtuallyendless,withenormousvariationinhow
thoroughlydepartmentstrainforsuchencounters,iftheytrainatall.Themultiplicityof
3TestimonyofPedroPerez,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).CharlesWilson,nationalchairman
oftheNationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficers,madeasuggestioninalmostidenticallanguage
whenheurgedpolicedepartmentstodomoretoweedoutthosewithdivisiveattitudesandbeliefsduring
initialhiring.ViewpointsofCharlesP.WilsononbehalfoftheWestchesterCountyGuardiansAssociation,
December4,2009.
4Bycomparison,policeofficersacrosstheUnitedStateskilledapproximately365personsincustodyor
duringthearrestprocesseachyearfrom2003to2005,theonlythreeyearsforwhichthesedataareavailable
nationally.SeeChristopherJ.Mumola,ArrestRelatedDeathsintheUnitedStates,20032005,U.S.Department
ofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,October2007,NCJ219534,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ardus05.pdf
P a g e |4
agenciesisasourceofmanyproblemsinpolicing,butitraisesparticularproblemswhen
officersfromoneagencyconfrontanofficeroutofuniformfromanotheragency,mistaking
theconfrontedofficerforacriminal.Ifeachagencyusesadifferentmethodforidentifying
suchofficersandthetrainingisinconsistent,evengoodprotocolsandtrainingarelikelyto
failandtheconfrontationcouldmoreeasilygowrong.
Figure1.1FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsAretheTipoftheIceberg
Thehandfuloffatalpoliceonpolice
shootingswehaveseenovertheyears
areonlythevisibletipofanicebergof
policeonpoliceconfrontations.
Virtuallyinvisiblearethescoresofnon
fatalconfrontationsoccurringevery
year,inmostofwhichnoweaponis
fired.Theseconfrontationsarisewhen
officersdonotrecognizeoutofuniform
officersaspolice.Theyarerarely
reported,evenwithintheofficersown
departments.
Thedangerisperhapsmostobviouswithpoliceofficersworkingundercover,whooften
deliberatelyposeascriminals.OneveteranLatinoofficerwiththeNewYorkStatePolice
recountedastoryofwhen,asanundercovernarcoticsinvestigator,hewasassignedto
arrestasmalltowndrugdealer.Becausethesuspecthadrelativesonthelocalpoliceforce,
theStatePolicehadnotnotifiedlocallawenforcementoftheoperation.Whenhestopped
thesuspectscar,heapproachedthedriverwithhisweapondrawn,identifyinghimselfasa
policeofficer,but,ashetellsit,Iwasdressedinplainclothesandmyfacialdescription
wasthatofalocaldrugdealer,becausethatswhatIhadbeendoing,conducting
undercoverbuys.Civiliansobservingfromtheroadsidemistookthisarrestoperationfor
arobberyinprogressandcalledthelocalpolice.Theclosestlocalofficerhappenedtobe
performingcommunityserviceinagradeschool,dressedasSantaClaus.Withoutchanging
backintouniform,thelocalofficerdrovethefewblockstothesceneandpulledupasthe
undercoverStatePoliceofficerwasplacinghissuspectontheground.Theofficerdressed
asSantagotoutofhiscarwithhisgundrawn,shoutingtotheundercoverofficertodrop
hisweapon.Theundercovershoutedbackthathewasapoliceofficer,butthenrealized
thathemustdrophisweapon,evenwhileotherofficersonhisundercoverteamwere
shoutingthathewasindeedacop.Astheformerundercoverofficertoldus,Theofficer
camewithinafewfeetofmewithhisgunpointedatmyhead.Luckily,hedidnot
P a g e |5
intentionallyoraccidentallyfirehisweapon.These[incidents]happenallthetime,and
theremustbesomethingdoneaboutit.5
Officersworkinginplainclothesassignmentsfacesimilardangers.Forexample,wewere
toldofanincidentinwhichaplainclothesofficerwasinsideabuildingwithhisweapon
drawnwhilesearchingforanarmedsuspect.Uniformedofficersweremobilizinginfrontof
thebuildingwhenoneofficersawthroughawindowanindividualwithagun.The
uniformedofficerfiredandstrucktheplainclothesofficerinthehand,mistakinghimfor
thearmedsuspect.6Severalofthepolicingscholarsinterviewedforthisreportalso
reportedthatthesetwocategoriesofofficersthoseworkingundercoverorin
plainclotheswerethemostlikelytohaveweaponsdrawnonthemorotherwisetobe
involvedinnearmissconfrontations.
Preciselybecausethedangersforundercoverandplainclothesofficersaresoobvious,law
enforcementagenciestakemanyprecautionstoavoidanddefusethelikelyconfrontations.
Anundercoverteamwilloftennotifyalawenforcementagencyintheareathatitis
operatinginitsjurisdictionandmightdescribetheofficersinvolved.7Undercoveror
plainclothesofficersmaybeaccompaniedbyuniformedofficersnearby,monitoringlocal
policeradiosandreadytointerveneifneeded.Theundercoverorplainclothesofficers
themselvesmaybewearingthecoloroftheday,anarmbandorotherarticleofclothing
inadesignatedcolor,orraidjacketswithPOLICEorthenameoftheagency
emblazonedontheback,allowinglawenforcementofficerstoeasilyidentifytheseofficers
onsight.Andbecausesomeofficersworktheseoutofuniformassignmentsregularly,they
canbetrainedtobeconfronted,tocomplywiththeinstructionsofanyofficerswho
confrontthem,andtoidentifythemselvesverballywithoutmakinganyinadvertentmoves.
Foroffdutyofficerswhodrawtheirweaponstotakepoliceaction,theseconfrontations
maybemoredangerous.Thisisespeciallythecaseiftheyareoffdutyinplaceswherethey
donotnormallyworkandarethereforeunlikelytoberecognizedbylocalofficers.Inmany
agencies,officersareunlikelytohavereceivedtraining,exceptperhapsbrieflywhenthey
firstjointhepoliceoratthefiringrange,onhowtotakeactionoffdutyandthenhowto
respondwhentheyareconfrontedbyauniformedofficer.Offdutyofficersareunlikelyto
beinradiocommunicationwithadispatcher,andtheyareusuallyunabletoalertother
unitsthattheyaretakingpoliceactionoutofuniform.Thereisnocolorofthedayforoff
dutyofficers.Moreover,theymaybemorelikelytodrawtheirgunearlyinaconfrontation,
sincetheyarenotequippedwiththeothertoolsthatplainclothesofficersusuallycarry,
suchashandcuffs,pepperspray,andotherlesslethalalternativestotheirfirearms.
Foralloftheseofficerstakingpoliceactionoutofuniform,somebasicprotocolswould
seemnecessary.Indeed,thegeneraltacticsurgedonofficersconfrontingapersonwitha
gunarewidelyagreedupon,althoughthemultiplicityofpolicedepartmentsacrossthe
5TestimonyofPedroPerez,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).
6TestimonyofRichardBellucci,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).
7Theremaybetimeswhenlawenforcementagenciesdonotshareinformationabouttheiroperations.For
example,outsideofjointtaskforceoperations,federallawenforcementagenciesmaynotasamatterof
courseshareinformationabouttheirplannedoperationswithlocalauthorities.
P a g e |6
UnitedStatesandevenwithinNewYorkStatemeansthatspecificinstructionsvaryfrom
onepolicedepartmenttoanother.Whenconfrontingapersonwithagun,officersare
typicallytrainedtoissueastrong,simplecommand,Police!Dontmove!(notmore
colloquialphrasessuchasFreeze,DropthegunorGetdown,thoughthesekindsof
commandsmayfollowshortlyaftertheoriginalDontmove!).Thisclear,initialverbal
instructionnottomovehasnowbecomecommonplaceamonglawenforcementagencies.
Confrontingofficersareexpectedsimultaneouslytotakecover(behindthedoorofapolice
car,atree,oranythingelseavailable).Coverissoimportantbecauseitprovidesafew
extrasecondsforconfrontingofficerstoassesstheactualthreattheyfacefromtheperson
withthegun.
Atagenerallevel,thereiswideagreementaboutwhatshouldhappennextwhenanarmed,
outofuniformofficerhearsthecommand,Police!Dontmove!Theconfrontedofficer
shouldobeythecommandsoftheuniformedorondutyofficer.Theconfrontedofficer
shouldnotmoveintheslightest,eventoreachforidentificationortofacetheconfronting
officer,asthatsimplemotion(whichsomecallreflexivespin)islikelytobringhisorher
weaponaroundaswell.Theconfrontedofficershouldremainmotionlessandverbally
identifyhimselforherselfasanofficer.Buthow?Incontrasttotheconsensusonthe
appropriateinitialcommandfromtheconfrontingofficer,Police.Dontmove!thereis
surprisinglylittleconsensusontheprecisewordstheconfrontedofficershoulduse.8
Inpractice,ofcourse,thingsgetmorecomplicated.Manypoliceofficers,outofuniform,
dontfullycomprehendthattheorder,Police!Dontmove!isdirectedatthem.They
knowtheyrepoliceofficers,andtheyassumeothersdoaswell.Insteadoffreezing,they
sometimesinstinctivelyturnorgetupofftheground,whichonlylookstotheconfronting
officerlikedisobedience,escalatingtheconfrontation.AsformerMountVernonPolice
Commissioner(andcurrentWhitePlainsDepartmentofPublicSafetyCommissioner)
DavidChongdescribedhisownexperienceataTaskForcehearing:
WhenIarriveonthesceneandobserveanindividualwithadrawngun,not
inuniform,withnoidentifyingfeaturesasafellowlawenforcementofficer,I
wouldtypicallyfeelthreatenedfirst.AsIclearlyscreamoutcommandsand
seekatacticaladvantage,Iconsidermyselfondutyandincharge.Iexpectto
seecompliancewithmyorders:Policedontmove,dropthegun,getdown
ontheground,etc.Noncomplianceonlyexacerbatesthesituation,andmy
perception,atthatinstantmoment,isthatIaminrealandimminentdanger.
Ihave,whileinuniform,personallydrawnmyweaponandpointeditanoff
dutyofficerarmedwithagun.Luckilytheofficercompliedwithmy
directions.Aftertheofficerwasproperlyidentified,IcantellyouthatIwas
8OneformerNYPDundercoverofficerexplainedtous,IdidntresemblethetypicalpoliceofficerasIhad
longhair,earrings,andIwasAsian.Iquicklydevelopedahabitthatwastaughttousinundercover
school[to]quicklyidentifyoneselfwithknownpolicejargonandphrasessuchasImonthejob,Ivegota
collar,orassomeoftheveteranshadtaughtme,yelloutthecodefordinner,1063,orthecodeforhelp,
1013.TestimonyofDavidChong,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).Wereceivedsimilar
testimonyfromseveralotherveteranofficers,suggestingthatthereisnostandardresponse.Wereturnto
thispointinourrecommendations.
P a g e |7
stillnothappybecauseIknewhowdangerouslycloseIhadcometoa
tragedy.9
Otherwitnessestoldusofoffdutyofficerswithgunswho,whencommandedto
freeze,insteadreachedfortheirbadgesintheirpocketstoidentifythemselves.The
confrontingofficersthinktheyrereachingforagun.Itisnothardtoseehowthese
confrontationscanturndeadly,asthefollowingstoryillustrates:
Ononeoccasion,IwasflaggeddownbyateenagerinBushwickwhotoldmy
partnerandmethathesawsomeonewhohedescribedasawhitemale,
chasinganotherpersonwithagun.Hegotinthecarwithusandbeforewe
couldradioinadescriptionhepointedouttheindividualonthestreet,a
shortdistanceaway.Thewitnessthendovetothefloorofthepolicevehicle.
MypartnerandIconfrontedthesuspect,fromapositionofcoverutilizing
ourcardoorsandrepeatedlyissuedtheverbalcommand,Police!Dont
Move!Heignoredmycommandsandinfact,reachedintohispocket.Atthat
timeIhadeveryreasontobelievethatIwasdealingwithanarmedcriminal
whowasignoringmycommandsandwasreachingforafirearm.He
proceededtopulloutofhispocketapoliceofficersshield.Thankfully,the
lightingwasgoodandIsawtheshieldbeforeitwastoolate.Butifithad
beendarkorifallIsawwasthesunreflectingoffofsomethingmetal,inthis
contextitcouldhavebeenadifferentstory.10
Forthesereasons,somelawenforcementagenciesdiscourageofficersnotinuniformfrom
takingpoliceactionthatmightrequirethemtousetheirweaponexceptinthemost
extremecircumstances,instructingthemtodefertouniformedofficerswheneverpossible.
Themostrecenttrainingprogramsencourageoffdutyofficerstohelpbybeinggood
witnesses,whileuniformedofficerstakeaction,unlessalifeisatstake.Similarly,
plainclothesofficersareencouragedtodefertouniformedofficers,pullingoutofanactive
operationonceuniformedofficersarriveonacrimescene.
Despitethegeneraltrenddiscouragingoffdutyofficersfromtakingpoliceaction,atleast
onerecentlyenactedfederallawriskspushingofficersintheoppositedirection.In2004,
CongressadoptedandPresidentBushsignedtheLawEnforcementOfficersSafetyAct
(LEOSA)authorizingoffdutyofficersandretiredofficersfromanypoliceagencyinthe
nationtocarryconcealedweaponswhentravelingoutoftheirhomestates.11Itssponsors
hopedthattravelingoffdutyofficers,ifmorefrequentlyarmed,wouldaddtothelaw
enforcementcapacityoftheplacestheyvisited.LEOSAhasnotyetraisedinpracticethe
problemsthatmanypoliceofficialsoriginallyexpectedbecausecountyandcityofficials,
perhapsworriedabouttheliabilitythattheymightincuriftheirofficerstravelthenation
armed,haveonlyslowlyputinplacethetrainingandidentificationprocedures
contemplatedintheAct.Still,LEOSAraisesthepossibilityofincreasingnumbersofarmed
offdutyandretiredofficerstakingpoliceactionwithoutknowinglocalprotocolsfor
9TestimonyofDavidChong,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
10TestimonyofJohnBilich,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
11Thebill,alsoknownasHR218,iscodifiedat18U.S.C.926B,926C.
P a g e |8
identifyingthemselvesaspolice.Bythesametoken,LEOSAgivesthefederalgovernment
anopportunity,andperhapsaresponsibility,totakeamoreactiverolehere,assuringthat
standardprotocolsandtrainingareestablishednationwidetopreventmistakenidentity,
policeonpoliceconfrontations.
PoliceonPoliceShootingsastheExemplarsofaWiderArrayofMistaken
Shootings
Fromtheperspectiveofthechallengingofficer,mistakingafellowpoliceofficerfora
dangerouscriminalisanextremeexampleofthewiderdangerofmisperceivingaperson
whoposesnothreatassomeonewhodoes.Suchmisperceptionsareinevitableinsome
numberofsituationsasofficersoftenhaveonlyafewsecondsinwhichtochoosewhether
toshootornot.Failingtoshootwhenthethreatisrealcouldleadtotheofficersowndeath
orthedeathsofinnocentpeople.Yetifthethreatismisperceived,theofficermaytakea
lifeunnecessarily.Becausethestakesonbothsidesaresohigh,thetimeavailablefor
decisionsoshort,andthejudgmentsinevitablyimperfect,policeorganizations,
prosecutors,andcourtsarereluctanttosecondguessquestionabledecisionsthatmight
havebeenreasonableinthemoment,atleastwhentheissueiswhethertoblameand
punishtheconfrontingofficer.
Atthesametime,thebestpolicedepartmentsstrivetolearnfromincidentswhere,in
hindsight,itisclearthatconfrontingofficersmisperceivedathreat.Thatprocessof
learningrequiressomereexaminationofshoot/dontshootdecisionsinparticular
incidents.Departmentalreviewswalkadifficultpath,tryingtoavoidcastingblameby
secondguessingreasonabledecisionstoshoot,yetencouragingcarefulanalysisofeach
stepinashootingincidenttoidentifyspecificthingsthatmighthavebeendonedifferently.
Tomanagethatdifficulty,themostsophisticateddepartmentshavecreatedspecialized
shootingteamstoinvestigateofficerinvolvedshootings,withmembersdrawnfroma
varietyofspecialties,includingtrainingdivisions.Thesespecializedteamsmakeatleast
twoseparatedeterminations:first,whetherashootingwasinpolicy(meaningitwas
justifiedinthemoment),andsecond,eveniftheshootingisjustifiedinlawandpolicy,
whetherthetacticsusedwereflawed(meaningthatvariousstepstakeninthehours,
minutes,orsecondsbeforetheshootingshouldhavebeendifferent).Publiccontroversy
understandablyoftensurroundsthedecisiontoruleanymistakenidentitypoliceshooting
asbeinginpolicy,especiallyifthevictimwasunarmed.Weaddresstheimportanceof
objectiveinvestigationofanypoliceonpoliceshootinglaterinthisreport,andour
recommendationsthereshouldhelptoimprovethepublicconfidenceinjudgmentsthat
individualshootingswereorwerenotinpolicy.However,beyondthequestionof
whethersuchshootingsareinpolicy,thereareseparatequestionsaboutthetacticsthat
shouldbeemployedtopreventthem.
Itisnotunusualtodayforpoliceshootingsofinnocentcivilianstobejudgedinpolicyeven
thoughtheofficersinvolvedarelaterreferredforatacticaldebriefingiftheyfailedto
makeuseofavailablecoveroriftheymadeothertacticalerrors.Suchanapparentlymild
responsetoanavoidabledeathisoftenfrustratingtocommunitymembersandthefamilies
andfriendsofthevictims,andtheoutrageinsomecircumstancescanreachpolitically
P a g e |9
volatileheights.Still,thesetacticaldebriefsarepartoftheefforttomanagethedifficulty
ofnotsecondguessingwhatmayhavebeenareasonablethoughmistakendecisionto
shootwhilestilllearningfromandpreventingfuturetragedies.
Policeonpoliceshootingsprovidesomeofthemostvividexamplesofofficer
misperceptions.Andbecausepolicedepartmentsfeelkeenlytheneedtopreventthe
repetitionsofthesetragedies,theimpetusforlearningisparticularlystrong,andthe
potentialtoavoidfuturemistakenshootingsofpoliceofficersandofciviliansis
especiallygreat.Therefore,creatingclearprotocolsandtacticalguidanceforchallenging
officersasaresultoftheinvestigationsofpoliceonpoliceshootingsisonewaytoprevent
mistakenshootingsingeneral.Inthisway,carefulstudy,critiqueandanalysisofpoliceon
policeshootingscanhelptoincreaseofficersafetyandoverallpublicsafety.
Itisalsoimportanttoengagedirectlytheissueofraceinthesemistakenshootings.There
isgrowingevidencethatpoliceofficerslikemembersofthegeneralpubliccarrywhat
psychologistscallimplicitracialbiaswhichrevealsitselfinsomeshoot/dontshoot
decisions.Wetakeuptheseissueswhenweaddressracialstereotypesintheseshootings.
PoliceonPoliceShootingsasaSpecialBurdenforPoliceOfficersofColor
Whenanofficerofcolorisshotandkilledinaconfrontationafterbeingmistakenforan
offender,thedeathstrikeshomewithparticularforceforotherofficersofcoloreven
thoselivingandworkinghundredsofmilesfromthepolicedepartmentsinvolved.To
understandthefullimpactofthesedeaths,oneneedstoappreciatethechoicesthatpeople
ofcolormakewhentheyjoinapoliceorganizationandtheconsequencesofthosechoices
forthemintheirfamiliesandcommunities.Peopleofcolorwhochoosetomakeacareerin
lawenforcementriskthedisapprovalandeventhescornoftheirfriendsandfamilyinways
thatmostwhitepeoplewhojointhepolicedonot.
Thedisapprovalthatmanyofficersofcolorfacefromfamilyandfriends,andindeedthe
questionstheyposetothemselves,reflectthespecialexperienceofpeopleofcolorinthe
UnitedStateswiththecriminaljusticesystem.HispanicandAfricanAmericanmen,in
particular,arefarmorelikelythanotherstobestoppedbythepolice,questioned,and
frisked.AsPresidentBarackObamahasstraightforwardlyobserved,thereisalong
historyinthiscountryofAfricanAmericansandLatinosbeingstoppedbylawenforcement
disproportionately.Andthat'sjustafact.12Beyondthestops,whichaffectmillionsof
peopleeachyearnationally,13therearethearrestsandincarcerations,leavingtheUnited
StateswithaboutoneintenAfricanAmericanmenbetween20and40yearsold
incarceratedonanygivenday,andoneinthreeAfricanAmericanmenlikelytospendtime
12HeleneCooper,ObamaCriticizesArrestofHarvardProfessor,inNewYorkTimes,July23,2009,pA20.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/23gates.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=obama+news+conference
+gates+arrest&st=nyt.
13ForNewYorkCitydata,seeNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment,Stop,QuestionandFriskDatabase,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.shtmland
DeloresJonesBrown,JaspreetGill&JenniferTrone,Stop,Question&FriskPolicingPracticesinNewYorkCity:
APrimer,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice,CenteronRace,CrimeandJustice,March2010,
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/web_images/PRIMER_electronic_version.pdf.
P a g e |10
incarceratedatsometimeintheirlives.14Withconcentrationslikethese,mostAfrican
Americanshavecloserelativeswhohavehadbadexperienceswiththecriminaljustice
system,andsurveysrepeatedlyshowthatpeopleofcolor,especiallyblackAmericans,hold
thepoliceandthecriminaljusticesysteminlowerregardthandowhiteAmericans.15
Atthesametime,victimsofviolentcrimeintheUnitedStatesaredisproportionately
peopleofcolor,asarethesuspectsinthosecrimes.Accordingtothemostrecentdata
availablefromtheNationalCrimeVictimizationSurvey,blacksintheUnitedStatesare
victimsofviolentcrimeatanannualrateof24.3perthousand,whilewhites,including
thoseofHispanicancestry,arevictimsofviolentcrimeatarateof19.9perthousand.16In
citieswithlargepercentagesofpeopleofcolor,thefiguresareoftenevenmore
disproportionate.InNewYorkCityin2009,forexample,72.8percentofshootingvictims
wereblack,23.0percentwereHispanic,3.1percentwerewhite,and0.9percentwere
Asian.Thedistributionofsuspectswhoseraceorethnicityisknownintheseshooting
incidentswasbroadlysimilar,with79.8percentblack,18.3percentHispanic,1.4percent
white,and0.4percentAsian.17
Forthesereasons,manypeopleofcolorbelievestronglythattheircommunitiesare
especiallyinneedofeffectivepoliceprotectionandthattheythemselvescanbest
contributetotheircommunitiesandsimultaneouslyimprovepoliceinstitutionsby
workingfromtheinside.Still,thechoicesetsofficersofcolorapartandoftenputsthemon
14Themostrecentdataonincarcerationnationallycombiningdatafromfederalandstateprisonsandjails
comesfromacensusconductedinthesummerof2007.WilliamJ.SabolandHeatherCouture,PrisonInmates
atMidyear2007,U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,June2008,NCJ221944,table10,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf.Morerecentdataareavailableonlyforthesentenced,
prisonpopulation.In2008,aboutoneintwelveAfricanAmericanmenfromages2540wereincarceratedin
stateorfederalprison,servingsentencesofayearormore.SeeWilliamJ.Sabol,HeatherC.West,and
MatthewCooper,Prisonersin2008,U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,December2009,
NCJ228417,appendixtable14,http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf.Fortheimpactofarrest
andincarcerationinthelifeofAfricanAmericans,seegenerally,BeckyPettitandBruceWestern,Mass
ImprisonmentandtheLifeCourse:RaceandClassInequalityinU.S.Incarceration,AmericanSociological
Review,2004,Vol.69(April:151169).
15InaJune2009GallupsurveyreportedinthemostrecentU.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJustice
Statistics,SourcebookofCriminalJusticeStatistics,31percentofblackAmericanshaveverylittleorno
confidenceinthepolice,comparedwith7percentofwhites.Thecorrespondingnumberforallnonwhites,
includingblacks,is23percent.http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2122009.pdf.
16SeeU.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,CriminalVictimizationintheUnitedStates,2007,
Table5,availableathttp://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1743.
17DataarefromNYPDandcoverthecalendaryear2009.Thetotalnumberofvictimswas1,729,withthe
race/ethnicityknownin1,719.Therewereatotalof1,511suspects,withrace/ethnicityknownof988.
EquivalentdataforallviolentcrimesuspectsarereportedquarterlytotheNewYorkCityCouncil.National
dataontherace/ethnicityofsuspectsinviolentcrimesdonotexist,butotherdatapermitestimatesofthe
rateofviolentoffendingbyrace/ethnicity,showingdisparitiessimilartodisparitiesinvictimization.See
SarahBecker,RaceandViolentOffenderPropensityinJusticeResearchandPolicy,9:2,5386(Fall2007);
YouthViolence:AReportoftheSurgeonGeneral(2000),Chapter2andTable2.2,
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/chapter2/sec12.html;andDarnellF.Hawkins,John
H.Laub,JanetL.Lauritsen,andLynnCothern,Race,Ethnicity,andSeriousandViolentJuvenileOffending,U.S.
DepartmentofJustice,OfficeofJuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPrevention,June2000,NCJ181202,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/181202.pdf.
P a g e |11
thedefensiveinconversationsintheverycommunitiestheyseektoserve,sometimesin
theirownfamilies.
Mostdays,theexperienceofpeopleofcolorwiththejusticesystemsitsunderthesurface
ofthoughtandconversationforblackandLatinoofficers;buttheshootingofanofficerof
colormistakenforanoffenderbringsthoseissuesbacktothesurface.Acrossthenation,in
thewakeofashootinglikethatofOfficersEdwardsorRidley,officersofcolorface
skepticalquestionsfromtheirfamiliesandfriendsatholidayparties,socialgatherings,and
justacrossthedinnertable.Why,theyareasked,areyouputtingyourlifeonthelineina
jobwheretherisksthateveryofficerfacesarecompoundedbytheriskyoullbekilledby
yourowncolleagues?Toignorethisaspectofpoliceonpoliceshootingsistomissan
essentialpartoftheproblem.Theseshootingscallintoquestionforcountlessofficersof
colortheirveryidentitiesaslawenforcementofficers.
OneAfricanAmericanpolicechieffromoutsideNewYorkStateputtheissueofidentityin
clearandhelpfulterms:
WhenIfirstjoinedthepolice,Iwantedtothinkthatmyracedidntmatteron
thejob.Iwasapoliceofficerwhohappenedalsotobeablackman.But
thatsnotright,becauseIwasablackmanbeforeIwasapoliceofficer,and
ImgoingtobeablackmanafterImapoliceofficer.Actually,Imablack
manwhohappenstobeapoliceofficer.Andwehavetorecognizethatmore
andmoreofourofficersofcoloraregoingtobethinkingthatway.18
18StatementofChiefRonaldL.Davis,EastPaloAltoPoliceDepartment,atExecutiveSessiononPolicingand
PublicSafety,HarvardKennedySchool,October2931,2009(quotedwithpermissionofChiefDavis).
P a g e |12
2.
WhatWeKnowAboutPatternsandTrendsinPoliceonPolice
ShootingsandConfrontations
Wemustdistinguishamongthreelevelsofseriousnessofmistakenidentity,policeon
policeencounters.Themostserious,andleastfrequent,arethefatalpoliceonpolice
shootings.Nextarenonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootings:thoseinwhichatleastoneshotis
firedbutnooneiskilled.Indeed,oftenthebulletsstrikenoone.Thirdandmostnumerous
arepoliceonpoliceconfrontationsthatstopshortofanyshooting.Theincidentsinthis
lastcategoryaregenerallytheleastseriousintermsofinjury,thoughthereareoccasional
mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceconfrontationsthatescalatetoseverebeatingsorother
usesofforce.Weconsidereachofthesecategoriesinturn.
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootings
WestartwiththetwofatalshootingsthatledtothecreationofourTaskForcethe
shootingdeathsofOfficerChristopherRidleyandOfficerOmarEdwards.TheTaskForce
didnotconductitsowninvestigationofthesecases,butwehavesoughttounderstand
whathappenedinbothinstancesinsufficientdetailtoguideourrecommendationsabout
preventingsuchincidentsinthefuture.Thesetwocasesalonecannotrevealpatterns,but
theycansuggestquestionsthatanexaminationofadditionalcasesmightbegintoanswer.
TheRidleyCase
Atapproximately4:43p.m.onJanuary25,2008,ChristopherRidley,anoffdutyMount
Vernonpoliceofficerwhowaswithinonemonthofcompletinghisprobationaryterm,
arrivedattheintersectionofCourtStreetandMartineAvenueinthecityofWhitePlains,
NewYork,inhispersonalvehicle.PoliceOfficerRidleyparkedonthesouthwestcorner
facingsouthtowardtheintersectionandwaitedforhiscousin,whomhehadarrangedto
meetatthatlocation.Aswasthecasewithmanyofthecriticaleventsthatunfoldedthat
afternoon,OfficerRidleysarrivalatthescenewascapturedonvideotaperecordedbyone
ofthenumeroussecuritycamerasthatwereaffixedtoseveralgovernmentofficebuildings
clusteredalongCourtStreet.OfficerRidleywasdressedinawhitesweatshirtanddark
pants.
ApproximatelytenminutesafterOfficerRidleyparked,anindividualnamedRobert
GadsdenwalkedwestalongMartineAvenuetowardstheintersection,havingjustlefta
nearbyPostOffice.GadsdenwasapproachedbyanindividualnamedAnthonyJacobs,a
homelessmanwithahistoryofmentalillness,whowasastrangertoGadsden.Jacobsfirst
exchangedwordswithGadsdenandthenwalkedaway.Gadsdencontinuedtoproceed
throughtheintersection.However,withinseconds,andfornoapparentreason,Jacobs
knockeddownGadsdeninthemiddleoftheintersection.Hethenproceededtobeat
Gadsdenwithhisfistswithabriefvolleyofblowsthatlastedonlyseconds,butleft
Gadsdensfacebloodyandbothhiswristsfracturedfromhiseffortstoshieldhimself.A
civilianwhoobservedtheassaultintervenedindefenseofGadsden,kickingJacobsaway.
Jacobsimmediatelybrokeofftheassault.Hecanbeseenonvideowalkingawayfromthe
intersectionwithoutparticularhasteandmakinghiswaysouthalongCourtStreet,then
P a g e |13
diagonallyacrossthestreetinthedirectionoftheDepartmentofSocialServicesbuilding,
approximatelyahalfblockawayfromtheintersection,whereavanoperatedbyVolunteers
ofAmericawasscheduledtopickupclientsat5:00p.m.
Ataboutthetimetheassaultintheintersectioncommenced,OfficerRidleycanbeobserved
onvideogettingoutofhiscar,facinginthedirectionoftheconfrontationbetweenGadsden
andJacobs.OfficerRidleycanthenbeseenturningtoopenthebackdoorofhisvehicle,
leaningintothebackseatandreemerging,closingthereardoorbehindhim.Concealed
beneathhissweatshirt,OfficerRidleycarriedaGlock9mmautomatichandguninanoff
duty,lowprofileholster,whichwastuckedintohiswaistband.OfficerRidleythenraninto
theintersection,butbythistime,thebriefassaultwasoverandJacobswaswalkingsouth
alongCourtStreettowardthemiddleoftheblock.Crossingtheintersection,OfficerRidley
ranpastthevictim,Gadsden,withoutpausing,inapparentpursuitofJacobs.Asrecorded
onvideo,OfficerRidleybrieflybrokeoffhispursuittoduckintotheentranceofthe
WestchesterCountyOfficeBuildingonthecornerofCourtStreetandMartineAvenue.As
canbeseenfromavideocamerainsidethelobbyandfromthereportofauniformed
civiliansecurityguardthere,OfficerRidleyranintothelobby,statedthatheneededpolice
assistance,andranbackoutofthebuilding,remaininginthebuildingforonlyaboutfour
seconds.Accordingtothesecurityguard,OfficerRidleydidnotidentifyhimselfasapolice
officer.
AnothersecuritycamerashowsOfficerRidleyrunningfromthelobbyinthedirectionof
theDepartmentofSocialServicesBuilding,diagonallyacrossthestreetandhalfwaydown
theblock.AcombinationofvideofootageandwitnessaccountsestablishthatOfficerRidley
caughtupwithJacobsinfrontoftheSocialServicesBuildingasJacobsapproachedthe
VolunteersofAmericavaninfrontofthebuilding.OfficerRidleywasheardtosaytoJacobs,
Yourenotgoinganywhere.Ataboutthesametime,atleastaccordingtoonecivilian
witnessinadditiontoJacobs,OfficerRidleyraisedhissweatshirtanddisplayedhis
handgun.
Byvirtuallyallaccounts,afightbetweenOfficerRidleyandJacobsimmediatelyensued
afterOfficerRidleysapproach,withbothmenultimatelywrestlingontheground.Atsome
point,OfficerRidleyendedupontopofJacobsontheground.AccordingtoJacobsand
severaleyewitnesses,JacobsgrabbedthehandgunfromOfficerRidleyswaistband.Jacobs
acknowledgesfiringoneshotandpossiblytwofromOfficerRidleysweapon.Mostcivilian
accountsandavailableforensicevidenceindicatethatitismostlikelythatoneshotwas
firedfromOfficerRidleysweapon.Videorecordedfromseveraldifferentvantagepoints
showspedestriansrunningawayfromthesceneoftheconfrontationsimultaneously,asif
respondingtothisfirstshot.Noonewasstruckbythebullet.
Afterthoseoneortwoshots,thetwomencontinuedtostruggleforcontroloftheweapon.
Inthemeantime,uniformedWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficersFrankOliveriandChristian
Gutierrez,whohadbeensummonedbythesecurityguardattheWestchesterCountyOffice
Building,arrivedatthefrontoftheSocialServicesbuildingonfoot.Videorecordedfroma
securitycamerainthecountyofficebuildinglobbyshowstheofficersbeginningtoemerge
lessthanthirtysecondsafterOfficerRidleyexitedthebuildinglobby.Andvideorecorded
P a g e |14
fromanexteriorcamerashowsthetwoofficerscrossingthestreetonadiagonalpathfrom
theWestchesterCountyOfficeBuildingtowardtheSocialServicesBuilding.Atapointin
timethatseemstocoincidewiththeinstantashotdischargedfromOfficerRidleys
weapon,theapproachingofficersbrieflyhesitated,andthensplitup,withOfficerGutierrez
approachingalongthesidewalkandOfficerOliveriapproachingfromthestreet,ultimately
takingcoverbehindapickuptruckneartheentrancetothebuilding.Bothappearedto
havetheirgunsdrawn.Ataboutthesametime,uniformedWestchesterCountyPolice
OfficerJoseCaleroanduniformedDetectiveRobertMartinemergedfromtheSocial
ServicesBuilding,apparentlyhavingbeenalertedtothedisturbancebyanemployeethere.
Atthatpoint,thetwopairsofofficerswereinpositionsflankingOfficerRidleyandJacobs
atarightangle.Alloftheofficershadtheirweaponsdrawn.
Civilianwitnesses,includingpassengersontheVolunteersofAmericavan,thoseaboutto
boardthevan,andemployeesleavingtheSocialServicesBuilding,consistentlyreported
thatthefourWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficersrepeatedlyshoutedtobothOfficerRidley
andJacobsvariously,dontmove,putupyourhands,getdown,orfreeze.Atleast
fourwitnessesreportedhearingtheofficerssay,dropthegun.Andanumberofwitnesses
reportedthatOfficerRidleythenstoodupwiththeguninhishand,leavingJacobslyingon
theground.Somereportedthat,afterOfficerRidleyinitiallystoodup,hebentoverand
stoodupagain.WitnessaccountsvaryastowhetherOfficerRidleyheldthegunathisside
orhadhisarmoutstretched.AndthosewitnesseswhoreportedthatOfficerRidleysarm
wasoutstretchedvaryastowhetherOfficerRidleyhadhisweaponpointedatanyofthe
respondingofficersoratJacobslyingontheground.Onlyoneofthenumerouscivilian
witnessestotheinitialencounterbetweenOfficerRidleyandJacobsreportedhearing
OfficerRidleyidentifyhimselfasapoliceofficer.19Onecivilianwitnessreportedthat
OfficerRidleybehavedasifhewereinadazeanddidnotrespondtoorobeytheuniformed
policeofficersdemandsthathedroptheweapon.
WhenOfficerRidleyreportedlydidnotcomplywiththecommandsoftheresponding
officerstodrophisweapon,atleastthreeofthefourofficersfiredonhim,strikinghim
onceintheheadandfivetimesinthetorso.AtleasttwowitnessesreportedthatOfficer
Ridleywasshotbyoneormultipleofficersandstartedtogodown,andwasthenshotin
theheadbyanotherofficer.However,theexactsequenceoftheshotscouldnotbe
determined.OfficerRidleywaspronounceddeadatthescene.
Asbestascanbereconstructedfromthevariousvideocamerasinthevicinityofthe
incident,approximatelytwominuteselapsedfromthetimeoftheinitialassaultbyJacobs
19TheonlywitnesswhoclaimedthatOfficerRidleyidentifiedhimselfasapoliceofficerwasthecousinwhom
OfficerRidleywasscheduledtomeetattheintersectionofMartineAvenueandCourtStreet.Inhisinitial
handwrittenstatementtopoliceontheeveningoftheincident,thecousinreportedthatOfficerRidley
screamedImacoptotheapproachingWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficers.However,inasubsequent
typewrittenstatement,hesoftenedthisassertiontostate,Imnot100%surebutIthinkIheardmycousin
sayImacop,Imacop.Moreover,videofromasecuritycameraclearlyestablishesthatatthetimeofthe
shootingthecousinwasstandingattheentranceoftheWestchesterCountyOfficeBuildingnearthecornerof
MartineAvenueandCourtStreet,diagonallyacrossthestreetandonehalfblockawayfromtheconfrontation
betweenOfficerRidleyandJacobs.
P a g e |15
onGadsdenattheintersectionofMartineAvenueandCourtStreetandthefiringofthe
fatalshotsthatkilledOfficerRidleyinfrontoftheSocialServicesBuilding.
OfthefourWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficerswhorespondedtotheincidentinfrontof
theSocialServicesBuilding,OfficerOliveriisWhite,OfficersGutierrezandCaleroare
Hispanic,andDetectiveMartinisAfricanAmerican.Eachofthefourofficerswasarmed
witha9mmSmithandWessonautomatichandgun.Shellcasingsandbulletsforensically
linkedtotheweaponsbelongingtothreeofthesefourofficerswererecoveredfromthe
sceneoratautopsy.Itappearsthateachofthesethreeofficersfiredatleasttwoshots,but
notmorethanfour.Therewerenocasingsorbulletsforensicallymatchedtotheweapon
ofDetectiveMartin.However,oneeyewitnessreportedthataWestchesterCountyPolice
Officersheknewas"Rob"shoutedatRidleytodrophisgun,andwhenRidleyfailedto
respond,firedhisweaponatRidley.AswasthecasewitheachofthefourWestchester
Countyofficers,thereweremagazinescollectedfromDetectiveMartinfollowingthe
shootingthatwerenotloadedtofullcapacity.However,nostepsweretakenwithanyof
thefourofficersaftertheshootingtoidentifywhichmagazineclipswereloadedintotheir
weaponsatthetimeoftheincident.Inthecaseofeachofthefourofficers,itcouldnotbe
determinedforensicallywhether"missing"roundsrepresentedshotsfiredorbulletsnot
loadedintothemagazineinthefirstplace.WhetherornotDetectiveMartinfiredhis
weaponduringthecourseofthisincidentcannotbeforensicallyverified.Theonly
statementsmadebythefourWestchesterCountyOfficersconcerningthisincidentwere
madeduringtheirappearancesbeforetheWestchesterCountygrandjuryinthecourseof
itsinvestigation.ThosestatementsareunavailabletotheTaskForceortothepublicby
virtueofgrandjurysecrecylaws.
TheEdwardsCase
OnMay28,2009,atapproximately10:00p.m.,OfficerOmarEdwards,aoneyearten
monthmemberoftheNYPDassignedtotheHousingBureausImpactResponseTeam,
endedhisshiftearlywiththepermissionofhissupervisor.Shortlyafterchangingfromhis
uniformintobluejeansandanoffwhitesweater,heleftPoliceServiceArea5command
locatedat221East123rdStreetinEastHarlem.Hecarriedhisserviceweaponwithhim,
butitwasnotholstered.Accordingtoeyewitnessaccounts,asOfficerEdwardsapproached
hisvehicleparkedonSecondAvenue,betweenEast124thandEast125thStreets,he
observedanindividualleaningintohiscarthroughthebrokendriverssidewindow.A
civilianeyewitnessreportedseeingthebreakinandthenseeingOfficerEdwards,withhis
firearminhand,attempttoapprehendandphysicallyrestrainthesubject,lateridentified
asMiguelGortia.Afterashortstruggle,GortiamanagedtobreakfreeofOfficerEdwardss
graspbywrigglingoutofajerseyhewaswearing,andfledonfoot.OfficerEdwardsgave
chase,stillholdinghisfirearminhishand.
GortiainitiallyrantowardtheentranceramptotheRobertF.KennedyBridge(formerly
theTriboroughBridge),butthenchangeddirection,runningoutontoEast125thStreet
towardsFirstAvenue.OfficerEdwardswasinclosepursuit.Acivilianwitnesswhowas
standingonthecornerofEast125thStreetand2ndAvenuereportedseeingGortiabeing
chasedbyadarkskinnedmaleblackinawhiteshirtwithagunwhowasyellingPolice
P a g e |16
dontmove,getthef__kdown.AsGortiaandthepursuingOfficerEdwardsraneaston
125thStreetonadiagonalfromthenorthtothesouthsideofthestreet,ananticrimeteam
consistingofthreeplainclothesofficersinanunmarkedvehiclehappenedtoturnonto
125thStreet,travelingwestboundfromFirstAvenue.Atthepointthattheanticrimeteam
arrived,theywerefacingtheonrushingGortia,withOfficerEdwardsgivingchasebehind
himwithhisguninhand.Uponseeingthetwoindividualsrunningtowardthem,Officer
AndrewDunton,sittinginthefrontpassengerseat,toldtheotherofficersthatoneofthe
meninvolvedinthepursuithadagun.Thedriveroftheanticrimevehicle,PoliceOfficer
JohnMusante,stoppedthevehicle.Accordingtohisaccount,OfficerMusantebegantoget
outofthevehicle,butimmediatelyreenteredwhenherealizedthatthecarhadnotbeen
placedinparkandwasstillrolling.SergeantJohnAnzelino,whowassittingintherearof
theunmarkedpolicecaronthepassengerside,reportedthathestartedtogetoutofthe
car,butfellbecauseitwasstillmoving.PoliceOfficerAndrewDunton,whohadbeensitting
inthefrontpassengerseat,reportedthathegotoutofthecar,andmanagedtotakecover
behindtheopenedfrontpassengersidedoorofthestillmovingvehicle.
AllthreeofficersreportthatOfficerDuntonyelledPolice!Stop!Dropthegun.Dropthe
gunasGortiaandOfficerEdwardsranby.DuntonreportedthathenoticedthatOfficer
Edwardssloweddownuponhearingthiscommand,butthenturnedaroundwithagunin
hishand,withhiselbowlocked.Neitheroftheothertwoplainclothesanticrimeofficers
reportedseeingtheshooting,apparentlyduetotheirbeingmomentarilyoutofposition,
andneitheroftheseofficersfiredweaponsthemselves.Butatleastoneofficerdidreport
seeingOfficerEdwardsfalltothegroundseveralfeetaway.
Accordingtoacivilianwitness,asGortiaandOfficerEdwardsranpasttheanticrime
vehicle,oneoftheanticrimeofficersshoutedhaltandsomeothercommandthatwasnot
clearlydiscernible.Thiswitnessstatedthatthreetosixshotswerefiredastheblackmale
withthefirearm(OfficerEdwards)turnedtowardtheanticrimevehicle.Anothercivilian
witnessbelievedthatsheheardthemalewearingwhatshethoughtwasagreysweatshirt
(OfficerEdwards)sayImPoliceastheofficersfired.Thissamewitnessmisidentified
theunmarkedanticrimevehicleasamarkedpolicecar,andwasapproximately200feet
awayfromthesceneoftheshooting.Anumberofothercivilianwitnessesheardgunshots,
butdidnotseetheshooting.
Atapproximately10:30p.m.,anEmergencyServicesUnitarrivedatthescene.Duringthe
courseofrenderingaidtoOfficerEdwards,theESUofficerdiscoveredthatOfficerEdwards
waswearinganNYPDPoliceAcademygymshirt(inscribedwithhiscompanynumberand
lastname)underhisoutergarment.OfficerEdwardssshieldwasdiscoveredclippedtothe
insideofhispantspocket.Theclipwasexposed,butthefaceofthebadgewasinsideofthe
pocketsuchthatitwasnotvisible.
AnautopsyrevealedthatOfficerEdwardshadthreegunshotwounds.Onebulletentered
hisleftfrontforearmareaandexitedhisleftelbowarea.Onebulletenteredhisleftlower
flank,traveledthroughhisabdomen,strikingnomajororgansandlodginginthebodywall
oftherightflank.Andanotherbulletenteredtheleftmidback,enteredthechestcavity
throughtherearchestwallandtraveledthroughthelowerlobeoftheleftlungand
P a g e |17
perforatedtheheart.Ultimately,thisbulletlodgedintheleftpectoralarea.Althoughthe
precisesequenceofshotsfiredwasnotclear,theMedicalExaminerfoundthewounds
consistentwithshotsfiredinrapidsuccessionatasubjectwhowasspunaroundbyafirst
shotthatenteredtheleftforearmandexitedtheleftelbow.Thisconclusionisalso
supportedbythecivilianeyewitnessaccountthatdescribedOfficerEdwardsturningasthe
shotswerefired.
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsSince1981
ToplacetheRidleyandEdwardsdeathsinnationalcontext,theTaskForceobtaineddata
fromtheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)onallpoliceofficerskilledinthelineofduty
nationwidegoingbackto1981,theearliestyearforwhichcaseleveldatawerereadily
available.TheFBIdatabaseandcorrespondingreport,LawEnforcementOfficersKilledand
Assaulted(LEOKA),wasfirstpublishedin1982using1981dataandhasbeenpublished
annuallysincethattime.Fromwithinthesedata,ourstaffidentifiedthosefewcasesin
whichanofficersdeathresultedfromamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshooting.The
staffthenverifiedandsupplementedthedetailsofthoseshootingsthroughsearchesofon
linenewsstoriesandotheropensources,aswellasthroughreportsobtainedfromseveral
ofthepolicedepartments.Thesesearchesalsorevealedadditionalcasesthatwerenot
includedintheFBIsdata.Weidentifiedatotalof26lawenforcementofficerswhodiedin
mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsduringthe29yearperiodspanning1981to
2009,orapproximatelyoneperyear.20
Whileitisdifficulttodistinguishmeaningfulpatternsfromrandomvariationinthe
circumstancesofsuchasmallnumberoffatalshootings,the26casesdorevealfivespecific
trendsoverthisperiod,andtheseinturnsuggestsomeofthefactorsthatmayturna
simplecaseofmistakenidentificationintoafatalshooting.21
TrendOne:Fatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingshaveoccurredataslow
butsteadypaceoverthepast30years.Whiletheseareinfrequentincidentsbyany
measure,withsomeyearspassingwithoutasingleinstanceandnevermorethanthreein
oneyear,thepaceissteadyacrossdecades.Therewereninefatalshootingsbetween2000
and2009,sevenbetween1990and1999,andtenbetween1981and1989.(SeeFigure
2.1).Nocomprehensivedataareavailableforearlierdecades.
TrendTwo:ForthecurrentgenerationofpoliceofficersandresidentsofNewYorkState,
fatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsareanewphenomenoninthelastfew
years.NofatalshootingsofthiskindoccurredinNewYorkStatefrom1981through2005,
buttherehavebeenthreesince2006.22Thispatternexplainswhysomeresidentsand
20AfulllisttheseincidentsappearsasAppendixAtothisreportinchronologicalorderwiththevictim
officersrank,race,anddutyassignment,alsoshowingthelawenforcementagenciesinvolved.
21Wenotethatstatisticaltestsrelatedtosamplingareinapplicabletothiscollectionofcases,asthisisthe
entireuniverseofknowncasesduringtherelevanttimeperiod,notasamplefromwhichwearetryingto
makeinferencesaboutalargeruniverse.
22Thestoryisdifferentifwegobackfurtherintime.AccordingtodataprovidedbytheNYPDDeputy
CommissionerWilburChapmanatourHarlempublichearing,therehavebeentenfatal,mistakenidentity
policeonpoliceshootingsinNewYorkCityoverthepast80years,withsevenofthoseoccurringbefore
P a g e |18
policeofficersinthegreaterNewYorkCitymetropolitanareasensethatfatalpoliceon
policeshootingsareoccurringwithgreaterfrequency,thoughtheyremainextremelyrare.
TheonlyothersuchfatalshootingsintheNortheastsince1981occurredinRhodeIslandin
2000andinPennsylvaniain1997and2004.
TrendThree:Theseshootingsoccurinallpartsofthecountryandinpolicedepartments
ofallsizes.Ofthe20fatalincidentssince1981outsidetheNortheast,thirteenoccurredin
theSouth,includingTexas(four),Florida(two),DistrictofColumbia(two),andoneeachin
Maryland,Alabama,SouthCarolina,TennesseeandVirginia.Fiveofthefatalshootings
occurredintheWest:California(three),Arizona(one)andUtah(one).Andonefatal
shootingoccurredintheMidwest(Michigan)andinaU.S.Territory(VirginIslands).The
tableinFigure2.2showsthenumberoffatalshootingsbystateandregion,andFigure2.3
showstheregionaltrendsovertworoughlyequalhalvesofourstudyperiod:19811994
and19952009.
1981.OnefatalincidentinvolvedamaleblackHousingPoliceDepartmentofficerkillingandbeingshotby,
anothermaleblackpatrolman;oneincidentinvolvedamaleHispanicofficerkillinganothermaleHispanic
officer;fourincidentsinvolvedmalewhiteofficerskillingmaleblackofficers;fourincidentsinvolvedmale
whiteofficerskillingmalewhiteofficers.Wedonothavethiskindofhistoricaldatafrombefore1981
outsideofNewYorkCity.
P a g e |19
Figure2.2Fatal,MistakenIdentityPoliceonPolice
ShootingsbyRegionandState,1981200923
Region
South(13)
State
Fatalities
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
3
1
1
West(5)
Texas
Florida
Washington,DC
Alabama
Maryland
SouthCarolina
Tennessee
Virginia
NewYork
RhodeIsland
Pennsylvania
California
Arizona
Utah
Midwest(1)
Michigan
U.S.Territory(1)
VirginIslands
Northeast(6)
Total
16
26
Figure2.3FatalMistakenIdentityPoliceonPolice
ShootingsbyRegionandTimePeriod,19812009
Region
South
Northeast
West
Midwest
USTerritory
Total
19811994
8
1
2
1
0
19952009
5
5
3
0
1
Total
13
6
5
1
1
12
14
26
23TheidentificationofregionsadoptedherecomportswiththecategorizationschemeusedbytheU.S.
DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,initsSourceboookofCriminalJusticeStatistics,availableat
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/app3.html.
P a g e |20
TrendFour:Officersofcolorweremorefrequentlythevictimsinfatal,mistakenidentity,
policeonpoliceshootingsinthesecondhalfofour30yearstudyperiodthantheywerein
thefirst.Ofthe26victimofficersinfatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootings
from1981to2009,12wereblackorHispanicand14werewhite.Inthefirsthalfofthis
period,10ofthe12victimofficerswerewhite,andonlytwowereblack.Butinthesecond
halfoftheperiod,10ofthe14victimswereofficersofcolor(8blackand2Hispanic)and
only4victimofficerswerewhite.(SeeFigure2.4)Thegradualincreaseinthediversityof
manyU.S.lawenforcementagenciescannotaloneexplainaswingofthismagnitude.
Figure2.4Fatal,MistakenIdentity,PoliceonPolice
ShootingsbyRace&EthnicityofVictimOfficers,19812009
Period
19811994
19952009
Total
White
10
4
14
Black
2
8
10
Hispanic
0
2
2
Total
12
14
26
TrendFive:Almostalloftheofficersofcolorkilledintheseincidentsweretakingpolice
actionwhileoffdutyatthetimetheywerekilled(9outof12),whereasalmostnoneofthe
whiteofficerswereoffdutyatthetime(1of13withknowndutyassignments),asFigure
2.5showsingreaterdetail.
Figure2.5VictimOfficerDutyAssignmentin
Fatal,MistakenIdentityShootings19812009
Dutyassignment
OffDuty
Undercover
Plainclothes
Uniform
Unknown
Total
WhiteOfficers
198194
199509
1
0
3
2
5
1
0
1
1
0
10
4
OfficersofColor
198194 199509
2
7
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
10
Todescribethistrendanotherway:Asfaraswecandetermine,onlyoneoffduty,white
policeofficerhasbeenkilledinamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingintheUnited
Statesoverthepast29years,whereasnineoffdutyofficersofcolor(8black,1Hispanic)
havebeenkilledbyotherofficersinthoseyears,includingbothOfficersRidleyand
Edwards.Forwhitepoliceofficers,thedangerssuchastheyarevirtuallyallliein
undercoverandplainclothesassignments.Forofficersofcolor,thedangersaregreatest
whentheydrawtheirweaponswhileoffduty.Thesestarkracialdifferencesinduty
assignmentatthetimetheofficerswerekilledareimportant,bothforunderstanding
differencesinhowtheproblemofpoliceonpoliceshootingsareviewedacrossraceand
P a g e |21
ethnicity,andforthepreventivestepsthatpolicedepartmentshavetakenandshouldtake
toreducetheiroccurrence.
Thisdifferencemayexplainwhytherehasbeensolittlescholarlyattentiontotheproblems
ofmistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootings,forthescholarshiponpolicinghaslargely
beenconfinedtothestudyofpoliceofficerswhileonduty.Ofthetenpolicescholarswe
interviewedforthisreport,allconceivedtheissueasprincipallyaboutplainclothesand
undercoverofficersactingonduty.Amongthem,thescholarsknewofonlythreeincidents
involvingoffdutyofficersbeingbrieflymistakenforcriminals:twoofficerstryingtobreak
upbarfights,andathirdwhohaddrawnhisguntoapprehendsomeonehecaught
breakingintohiscar.Noneofthesethreeincidentsresultedinanyinjury.Incontrast,the
nearmisscasesandtheinstanceswhereconfrontedofficerswereroughedupby
challengingofficersbeforebeingcorrectlyidentifiedalloccurredinplainclothesand
undercoveroperations.
Theblindspotinscholarlyresearchmaynotbeabouttheseshootings,whichareveryrare
byanymeasure,butmaybetheexperiencesofoffdutyofficersmoregenerally.Thisoff
dutyexperiencemaybequitedifferentacrossracialandethniclines.Aspolice
departmentsbecomemorediverse,withseverallargedepartmentsnowadmittingnew
classesofrecruitsinwhichthemajorityarepeopleofcolor,thisblindspotinour
understandingoftheexperienceofpoliceofficersshouldbeaddressed.
TheActionsofVictimOfficersandConfrontingOfficersinFatalEncounters
Asweexploretheactionsofofficersintheseencounters,wearemindfulthattheofficers
wererespondingtorapidlyshiftingevents,oftenundergreatstress.Officerstypicallyfeel
thattheywillfacedireconsequencesiftheydonotactquicklyinthefaceofathreat,and
theiractionsneedtobeunderstoodinthatcontext.
Regardlessofdutyassignment,nearlyallofthevictimofficersinthe26fatalincidentswere
inpossessionoffirearmsandhadthosefirearmsdisplayedatthetimetheywereshot.The
twoexceptionswereOfficerRobertPatterson(whowasinpossessionofknivesthathehad
confiscatedfromasuspect,CaseA1)andLieutenantGerryLaneIvie(whowasdrivinghis
caratthetime,AppendixA,CaseD1).Inaddition,manyofthevictimofficerswithguns
displayedreportedlyfailedtocomplywiththecommandsofchallengingofficerswho
orderedthemtofreezeortodroptheirweapons.Thisfailuretocomplyisoftensimplythe
rapidturningoftheheadandbodytodeterminethesourceofaverbalcommanda
phenomenonknowntosomepoliceofficersandresearcherswhostudythesecasesas
reflexivespin.Thisisreportedtohavehappenedinatleastsevenofthefatalmistaken
identityshootings,andthreeotherincidentsapparentlyinvolvedvictimofficerswhowere
approachingthechallengingofficers,perhapsoblivioustothedangertheyfaced.
Theapparentfailuretocomplywithachallengingofficersdemandscanresultfroma
numberoffactors.First,withtherushofadrenalineinvolvedinapursuitoreffortto
apprehendasuspect,eventhebesttrainedofficersmaynotrespondastheirtraining
P a g e |22
woulddictate.TaskForceAdvisorDr.WilliamJ.LewinskioftheForceScienceInstitute
explainsthephenomenonasfollows:
Intheseincidents,theoffdutyofficerallowshisorherfocustofunnelinon
theindividual(s)andscenariothatmayhaveservedasacatalystfortheir
armedengagementwhilefailingtotakeintoconsiderationtheobservations
andperceptionsoftherespondinguniformedofficers.Typically,thestressof
theencountercausestheoffdutyofficertolosefocusonorcompletely
ignorethefactthathe/sheisnotinuniform,isnotimmediately
recognizableasalawenforcementofficer,andisarmed.24
Exacerbatingthisinitialphenomenon,anyfirearmdischargepriortotheconfrontation
withthechallengingofficer(e.g.,whilethevictimofficerisstrugglingwiththesuspect),
maycauseauditoryblock.Thehighdecibellevelofthegunshotcaneffectivelyblock
theabilityofapersonnearbytorecognizeorprocessanapparentlyloudandclearverbal
command.Forexample,thevictimofficermighthearavoicebutnotclearlymakeoutthe
words,andmightthenturntowardthesoundofthevoiceinanefforttomakesenseofit.
Evenintheabsenceofagunshot,thesameconditioncanarisefromstress.Dr.Lewinski
notesthatitiscommonforofficersinvolvedinhighstressencounterstoexperiencea
phenomenonknownasauditoryexclusion,whichisafailuretohearcertainthingsranging
fromverbalcommentstogunshots.Thisisanormalprocessofhumanattention.Ourbrain
assistsusinfocusingbyignoringorsuppressinginformationthatcoulddistractusfrom
ourfocus.25
Whilewedeclinetospeculateonhowthesephenomenamightapplyinindividualcases,we
doknowthattherewerepriorgunshotsinsixoftheinstancesinwhichvictimofficers
reportedlydidnotcomplywithverbalcommands.
Justasweseektounderstandwhytheconfrontedofficersinsomeofthesecases
apparentlydidnotcomplywithcommands,wehavealsosoughttounderstandwhysome
challengingofficersdidnottakecoveratthestartoftheconfrontationorshoutthe
command,Police!DontMove.Wehavenoscientificanswertooffer,merelytheadviceof
virtuallyeverylawenforcementexpertwhotestifiedorwrotetous:trainingneedstobe
improvedtoingraintheseresponses,andthattrainingneedstobeinteractiveand
scenariobased.
Insomeofthesefatalcases,thevictimofficersarelaterdiscoveredtohavehadpolice
identificationdisplayedontheirperson.Whydidthechallengingofficersnotseethepolice
badgeorshieldaroundthevictimofficersneckorclippedonhisorherpocketor
waistband?Theanswerappearstobethatchallengingofficersunderstressalsoexclude
muchfromtheirfieldofvisionandfromtheirperceptiongenerally.Evenunderoptimal
conditions,somechallengingofficersaresimplyunabletoseeanythingotherthanthat
whichleadstotheperceptionofathreattheweaponinthehandofthevictimofficer.
24Lewinskireportpg.4(AppendixF).
P a g e |23
Policeofficersaregenerallytrainedtoscanasceneforcommonthreatvalues,including
gunsandedgedweaponssuchasknives.Whenofficersseesuchathreat(orevenfaintly
perceiveit),theycanexperiencetunnelvision,focusingonlyonthethreateningobject.
Dr.Lewinskiwrites,
Researchshowsthatinhighstress,lifethreateningencountershumans,inan
instinctivesurvivalresponse,typicallyrefinetheirfocusspecificallytoan
elementofthreatwhilefilteringoutseeminglysuperfluouselements.Ina
lawenforcementcontext,thisphenomenon,knownasselectiveattentionor
morecommonlyastunnelvision,wouldbeclearlyillustratedbyanofficer
zoominginonthebarrelofagunorthebladeofaknifepointedintheir
directionorzeroinginonasuspectshands,whichtheyhavebeentrainedto
watchcloselywhilesimultaneouslyfilteringoutextraneousvisualelements,
suchasclothingcolor,facialfeaturesandevensubjectraceorgender.This
tunnelorfunnelvision,althougheffectiveinallowinganofficertovery
closelymonitorthelocationand/ormovementofaweapon,canalsopose
difficulties.26
ThedifficultieshereincludewhatDr.Lewinskitermsinattentionalblindness,orthe
failuretoseeorhearimportantcontextualfactsbesidesthegunorotherobjectof
attention.Asaresult,Dr.Lewinskiquestionswhethervisualsignsthatanarmedpersonin
plainclothesisanofficer,suchasabadgeoracolorofthedayarmbandusedby
undercoverandplainclothesofficers,wouldbesufficienttopreventatragicmistake.
Otherfactors,suchasdimlighting,smoke,fogorrainalsoimpairachallengingofficers
visualcapacity.The1996fatalshootingofuniformedPoliceOfficerJamesRexJensenofthe
Oxnard,California,PoliceDepartmentbyamemberofhisownteamfollowedthe
detonationofasmokegrenade(seeAppendixA,CaseC9).Andin1987,plainclothes
DetectiveLynnRussellSutteroftheBethelPark,Pennsylvania,PoliceDepartmentwasshot
byamemberofhisownteamwhowasonadimlylitstairwaylandingandfiredafterseeing
ashadowofaman(DetectiveSutter)holdingaweapon(seeAppendixA,CaseC6).
ACloserLookatMistakenShootingsofOffDutyOfficers
Intheuniverseofthe26fatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingssince1981,ten
involvedthedeathofanoffdutyofficer.Infiveofthese,includingthedeathofOfficer
Ridley,theoffdutyofficercameacrossacrimeinprogressandcametotheassistanceof
otherofficersoranapparentcivilianvictim.Infiveothers,includingthedeathofOfficer
Edwards,theoffdutyofficerwashimselfthevictimofacrimeduringwhichhetookaction
toapprehendtheperpetrator.WehavealreadydescribedtheRidleyandEdwardscases,so
wenowturnourattentionbrieflytodescriptionsoftheeightotheroffdutycases.Allof
thesesummariesarebaseduponFBIreports,reportsfromthelawenforcementagencies
involved,publicstatements,andotheropensources.Theremaining16casesof
plainclothesandundercoverofficerskilledaredescribedinAppendixA.Thoseother
P a g e |24
incidentsinvolvedplannedoperationsoflawenforcementteamsandondutyresponsesto
crimesinprogress.
GroupA:OffDutyOfficersComingtotheAidofOthers
CaseA1:RobertPatterson(1982,WhiteMaleOfficerwiththeBirmingham,Alabama,
PoliceDepartment).Theoffdutyvictimofficerwasvisitinganightclubwherehe
sometimesworkedasasecurityguardduringhisoffhours.Afightbrokeoutandthe
victimofficerresponded,takingtwowomenintocustody,oneofwhomwasarmedwith
twoknives.Asheescortedthewomenoutoftheclub,hewasobservedbyoneoftwo
uniformedofficerswhorespondedtoapleaforassistancebyoneoftheclubpatronswho
ranoutside.Thatuniformedofficerthentoldthevictimofficertoholdit,andgrabbedthe
victimofficersarminanattempttotaketheknives,whichthevictimofficerhad
confiscated.Theuniformedofficerthendrewhisweapon;astruggleensuedandthevictim
officerwasshot.Thereareconflictingaccountsastowhetherthevictimofficerever
identifiedhimselftothechallengingofficer.
CaseA2:JamesMcGee,Jr.(1995,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeWashington,DC,
MetropolitanPoliceDepartment):Theoffdutyvictimofficerintervenedinacabrobbery
thathewitnessed.Pursuingoneofthetwosuspects,hedrewhisweaponandwas
mistakenforasuspectbytwouniformedofficersrespondingtoacall.Witnessingthe
victimofficerholdingoneoftheactualsuspectsatgunpoint,theconfrontingofficers
orderedhimtodrophisweapon.Whenthevictimofficerreportedlydidnotidentify
himself,andreportedlystartedtoturnwithoutloweringhisgun,hewasfiredupon.
CaseA3:CornelYoung,Jr.(2000,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeProvidence,RhodeIsland,
PoliceDepartment).Theoffdutyvictimofficerwasatalatenightdinerwhenanargument
betweentwopatronsescalated.Oneofthepatronsleftthediner,apparentlytoretrievea
gunfromhisvehicle,andthemanagercalledthepolice.Twouniformedofficersresponded
toaradiocall.Aftertheofficersarrived,thevictimofficerlefttherestaurantwithhis
weapondrawntoprovideassistancetotheuniformedofficersoutside.Theuniformed
officersmistookthevictimofficerforanadditionalsuspectandorderedhimtodrophis
weapon.Whenhereportedlydidnotdoso,theyfiredtheirweapons,killinghim.
CaseA4:NehemiahPickens(2005,BlackMaleReserveDeputyConstablewiththeHarris
County,Texas,ConstablesOffice).Whileworkingasecondjobasasecurityguardatan
apartmentcomplex,theoffdutyvictimofficersawasuspectcrashacarintothecomplex
andbegintofleeonfootwhilebeingchasedbyofficersfromanotheragency.Thevictim
officerdrewhisweaponanddecidedtopursuethesuspect,aswell.Whenoneoftheon
dutypursuingofficerssawthevictimofficer,hebrokeofffromtheactualsuspectand
begantochasethevictimofficer,whomheapparentlymistookforanadditionalsuspect.
Thatofficerfiredhisweaponwhenthevictimofficerreportedlyfailedtostopanddrophis
weaponandinsteadturnedtowardthechallengingofficerwithhisgundrawn.
P a g e |25
GroupB:OffDutyOfficerswhowereVictimsofCrimesorEngagedinDisputes
CaseB1:JamesL.Gordon(1987,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeWashington,DC,
MetropolitanPoliceDepartment).Onawinterevening,aneighborofthevictimofficer
called911toreportaburglaryinprogressatthevictimofficershome.Ataboutthesame
time,thevictimofficerarrivedathishomeandnoticedthatsomeoneappearedtohave
tamperedwithawindow.Hethenenteredhishomewithhisweapondrawn.Auniformed
officerwhorespondedminuteslatercircledthehousewithhisweaponandflashlight
drawnandsawanarmedman(thevictimofficer)throughthewindowofalightedroom.
Theuniformedofficerfiredonceafterthevictimofficerreportedlyfailedtodrophis
weaponinresponsetoacommandtodosoandinsteadturnedtowardthechallenging
officer.
CaseB2:RufusGates(1994,BlackMaleMajorintheMemphis,Tennessee,Police
Department).Theoffdutyvictimofficerbecameengagedinadisputewithanother
motoristafteraminorcaraccident.Whenthevictimofficernoticedthattheothermotorist
hadagun,heinstructedhissonandanotherboy(stillinhiscar)tocall911;healso
retrievedhisowngun.Whenauniformedofficerrespondedtothe911call,themotorist
toldtheuniformedofficerthatthevictimofficerhadagunandthendroveoff.Whenthe
uniformedofficersawthevictimofficerwalkingtowardshimwithaweaponinhand,he
firedfourshots,killingthevictimofficer.
CaseB3:ThomasHamlette,Jr.(1998,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeWashington,DC,
MetropolitanPoliceDepartment).Outsideanightclubcoownedbyhisfather,theoffduty
victimofficerbecameengagedinadisputewithapatronoveraparkingspace.Thedispute
escalatedandtheofficerdrewhisserviceweapon.Thetwobecameinvolvedinastruggle
fortheweaponanditdischarged.Anotheroffdutyofficerwhowasstandingnearthe
clubsentranceapproachedwithhisownweapondrawn,identifiedhimselfasapolice
officer,andorderedthevictimofficertodrophisweapon.Asthevictimofficerandtheclub
patroncontinuedtostruggle,thevictimofficersweapondischargedasecondtime.The
patronthenfled.Thevictimofficerthenreportedlyturnedtowardsthesecondoffduty
officerwithoutloweringhisweaponoridentifyinghimselfasanofficer.Thesecondoff
dutyofficerreportedlyorderedthevictimofficertodrophisweaponand,whenthevictim
officerfailedtodoso,firedthefatalshot.
CaseB4:EricHernandez(2006,HispanicMaleOfficerwiththeNewYorkCityPolice
Department).Thevictimofficerbecameengagedinanearlymorningargumentatafast
foodrestaurantandwasseverelyassaultedbyseveraloftherestaurantpatrons.
Immediatelythereafter,thevictimofficermistookaninnocentbystanderforoneofhis
assailants,andheldhimatgunpoint.Ataboutthesametime,twouniformedofficers
respondedtoa911callregardingtheincident.Whentheyarrivedatthescene,the
respondingofficerssawthevictimofficerandorderedhimtodrophisweapon.Whenthe
victimofficerreportedlyfailedtocomply,oneoftherespondingofficersfiredhisweapon.
P a g e |26
Eachofthesetragediesevolvedfromauniquecombinationofevents,misjudgments,and
reactions,yetthefactthatnineofthetenoffdutyvictimswereofficersofcolorbegs
furtherexamination.Whenofficersofcolorreturntotheircommunitiesoffduty,dothey
findthemselvesinlocationsorinsituationsthatplacetheminanygreaterriskof
misidentificationbyotherpoliceofficers?Withonlytencasesofoffdutyofficersshotand
killedbyotherofficersoverthelast29years,itisimpossibletoknow,butour
recommendationsaddresstheneedformoreresearchonquestionslikethese.
Regardlessoflocation,however,offdutyofficersofcolorseemtofacegreaterdangersthan
theirwhitecounterpartswhentheydisplaytheirweapons.Simplyput,itismorelikely
thattheywillbemistakenforacriminal.AsoneretiredAfricanAmericanpolicechieftold
us,henevercarriedaweaponwhenhewasoffdutyinhisownneighborhoodbecausein
thatpredominantlywhitecommunityheroutinelyarousedthesuspicionofpoliceofficers
whodidnotrecognizehimasapoliceexecutivefromanotherjurisdiction.27Herecounted
severaloccasionsonwhichhewasstoppedandquestionedsimplywhenoutforamorning
jog.Hetoldusthathenevercarriedhisweaponbecauseitwouldnotbesafeforhimtodo
so.Asheexplained,hebelievedthat,asablackman,hispossessionofaweaponcould
easilyescalateanotherwiseannoyingencounterintoapotentiallylethalone.
Alloftheoffdutyofficersinthefatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsweredisplayingagun
whentheywerekilled.Ourreviewoftheiragencyproceduresrevealedthatsomeofthese
lawenforcementagenciesrequiredtheirofficerstocarryweaponswiththemwhileoff
duty.Whilethisrequirementisnottoblameforanyofthesetragedies,wenotethatmany
agencieshavereconsideredsuchoffdutycarryrequirements.Thetrendtodayisto
permit,butnotrequire,officerstocarrytheirserviceweaponswhileoffduty.Police
departmentsinthecitiesofProvidence,Washington,D.C.,andDetroithaveeither
eliminatedorrelaxedtheiroffdutycarryrequirements.Neitheroftheagenciesthat
employedthevictimofficersinthethreeNewYorkfatalities(NYPDandMountVernonPD)
hadoffdutycarryrequirementswhentheirfatalshootingstookplace.Still,of30mid
sizedtolargedepartmentsrecentlysurveyedinNewYorkState,twostillrequiretheir
officerstocarrytheirfirearmswhileoffduty,andthreehavenospecificpolicyatall.
AftermathofFatalShootings
Theresponsebylawenforcementagenciestoapoliceonpoliceshootingcanhelphealor
exacerbatethetragedythatfellowofficers,relatives,andfriendsofthevictimofficers
experience.Becausethesearesuchrareevents,policeorganizationsareoftenunprepared
tohandlethecomplexcurrentsofemotionatthesametimethattheymustinitiatea
complexinvestigationintothecircumstancesoftheshooting.
Theimmediateresponseofalawenforcementagencytothemistakenshootingdeathof
oneofitsownofficersstartswithmattersasbasicaspropernotificationoffamilyand
fellowofficersandtherespectfulhandlingofthebodyofthedeceasedofficer.Chief
BarbaraDuncanoftheMountVernonPoliceDepartmentdescribedforushowheragencys
27StatementofHenryDeGeneste,January29,2010.
P a g e |27
lackofaformalprotocolforhandlingthenotificationoffamilyintheeventofthedeathof
anofficerinthelineofdutyexacerbatedthealreadygrievouslossofOfficerChristopher
Ridley.ChiefDuncan,whoheldtherankofcaptainatthetime,acknowledgedthatword
spreadsoquicklyinthedepartmentthatmanylineofficerswereawareofRidleysdeath
beforethecommandstaff.28OtherofficerscomplainedthatOfficerRidleysbodyremained
atthescenelongerthannecessary.StanleyRidley,OfficerChristopherRidleysfather,told
usthathefirstlearnedofhissonsdeathnotfromaseniorofficialbutfromoneofhissons
colleagueswhocalledtoexpresshiscondolences.Someofficersinthatdepartmentquickly
formedanimpressionthatthedepartmentwasnotrespondingwithsufficientsensitivityto
OfficerRidleysdeath.Thistensesituationunderminedmoraleandcreateddivisions,some
alongraciallines,whichhavecausedfurtherdamagetoanalreadydevastatedpolice
department.
Theemotionalscarsleftbytheseshootingscanlastforyears.Policechiefsinother
departmentsthathaveexperiencedthesefatalitieshavetoldusstoriesofofficersstill
sufferingemotionaltraumayearsaftertheincident,especiallywhenitisnotaddressedin
thefirstdaysandweeks.UnderChiefDuncansleadership,theMountVernonPolice
Departmenthascreatednewlineofdutydeathpoliciesincludingaskingeachofficerto
provideuptodatepreferencesastowhomtheywishtobecontactediftheyshouldbe
injuredorkilled.Thedepartmenthasalsobeguntoprovidepeercounselingandforums
forofficerswhocontinuetosuffergriefandresentmentaboutthelossoftheirfriendand
colleague.
Asecondsetofchallengesintheimmediateaftermathoftheseshootingsistoavoid
releasinginformationthatprematurelysuggestswhereblamemayormaynotlie.Our
reviewoftheseincidentssuggeststhattheyareoftentheresultofanaccumulationof
mistakesandmisjudgments.Intheimmediateaftermathofashooting,however,
suggestionsthatthevictimofficermayhavecontributedtohisorherowndeathcanseem
unnecessarilyinsulting,insensitive,anddefensive.
Similarly,whereanofficerofcoloriskilled,suggestionsabouthowtheofficersraceor
ethnicitymayormaynothavebeenafactor,ordrawingconclusionsbasedontheraceor
ethnicityofthechallengingofficers,canalsoexacerbateratherthancalmconcerns.Intime,
theseincidentsmustbestudiedandwidelyunderstood,butitisparticularlyimportantthat
anyreleaseofinformationbeascomplete,accurate,andrespectfulaspossible.
Thefullinvestigationofamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingisacomplicated
task,servingfourdistinctpurposessimultaneously.Asinanyofficerinvolvedshooting,the
investigationmust:
examinewhetherornotanytheconductofanypersoninvolvedwascriminaland
shouldbechargedassuch;
examinewhetheranyofficersshouldbesubjecttodepartmentaldisciplinefor
inappropriateuseofdeadlyforceorviolationofotherdepartmentpoliciesand,
28TestimonyofBarbaraDuncan,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
P a g e |28
regardlessofanydiscipline,whetheranyoftheofficersshouldreceiveadditional
instructiononappropriatetacticswhenconfrontingarmedindividuals;
revealgapsorweaknessesindepartmentpolicies,procedures,ortrainingthatcan
berepaired;and
provideacompletepublicaccountoftheshootingthatassuresthepublic,thefamily
andfriendsofthevictimofficers,formercolleaguesandconcernedlawenforcement
officerseverywherethattheinvestigationitselfhasbeenthoroughandobjective.
Iftheinvestigationisnotplannedandexecutedwithcare,thesefourpurposescanconflict
withoneanother.Andevenwiththeguidanceofexpertinvestigators,pursuingthesegoals
inconcertoftenprovesdifficult.Avarietyoflegalrulescanmakeevidencegatheredforone
purposeunavailableforothers.Forexample,whilemanylawenforcementagencies
routinelyinterviewanyofficerwhohasfiredaweaponshortlyaftertheshooting,
statementsmadeinarequiredinterviewcannotbeusedlaterinacriminalprosecution
againsttheofficer.Inpractice,prosecutorsexaminingwhethertobringcriminalcharges
againstanofficeroftenrequestthattheseinterviewsbedelayedforweeksormonths
becausetheymaycompromisetheofficersrightsatanysubsequenttrial.29Similarly,in
NewYorkandsomeotherstates,evidencegatheredinaninvestigationandthenpresented
toagrandjurycanbecomesubjecttolegalrestrictionsonitspublicrelease.These
restrictionsaredesignedtoprotectthesecrecyofbothactiveandcompletedgrandjury
proceedings.
Untilrecentyears,itwascommonforinvestigationsintoofficerinvolvedshootingsto
resolvethetensionsbetweenandamongthesedifferentpurposesbysimplygivingpriority
tothequestionofcriminalliability.Byresolvingalltacticalconflictsinwaysthatmost
benefittheinquiryintopossiblecriminalcharges,investigationsliketheseoftensacrificed
thecollectionoravailabilityofevidencethatcouldotherwisehavestrengthened
departmentaldiscipline,improvedpoliciesandtraining,andprovidedacompletepublic
accountofacontroversialshooting.Yet,becausemostoftheseinvestigationsendwiththe
decisionnottochargeanyofficerscriminally,theresultofprioritizingtheissueofcriminal
culpabilityhasoftenmeantthattheinvestigationsleadtolittleofconsequence:nocriminal
case,nodepartmentaldiscipline,fewchangesinpolicy,andanincompletepublicaccount.
Morerecently,somepolicedepartmentsandprosecutorshavecreatedspecialized
investigativeshootingteamscomposednotonlyofdetectives,butalsooftrainers,tactical
specialists,integrityinvestigators,forensicexperts,andmore.Vigorouslypursuingallfour
ofthepurposesmentionedaboveremainschallenging,evenforsuchexpertteams;butin
severalcasesthesespecializedinvestigativeteamshavemadetacticalreviewsmore
substantiveandpublicaccountsmorecredibleintheabsenceofcriminalorformal
disciplinaryproceedings.
29InGarrityv.NewJersey,385US493(1967),theU.S.SupremeCourtheldthatwhileanemployersuchasa
policedepartmentmaycompelanofficertomakestatementsinadministrativeproceedingsunderthreatof
beingfiredorfacingotherdisciplinaryaction,thesestatementsmaynotbeusedinsubsequentcriminal
prosecutionsbecausedoingsowouldviolatetheofficersFifthAmendmentrightagainstselfincrimination.
P a g e |29
OfthetwomostrecentpoliceonpoliceshootingsinNewYorkState,onewasinvestigated
bytheWhitePlainsPoliceDepartmentandtheWestchesterCountyDistrictAttorneys
Office,whiletheotherwasinvestigatedbytheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandthe
ManhattanDistrictAttorneysOffice.Neitherinvestigationhasresultedincriminalcharges
orformaldiscipline,butadministrativeandcivilproceedingswerestillinprogressatthe
timethisreportwasfinalized.Inresearchingbothoftheseinvestigations,ourabilityto
reviewrelevantmaterialwaslimitedbygrandjurysecrecylaws.Nevertheless,the
investigatingdetectivesfromtherelevantbureauswithinbothpolicedepartmentsspent
considerabletimebriefingusontheirwork.30
InNewYorkCity,wewereimpressedbytheNYPDspolicyofinvestigatingeverypolice
involvedshootingnotonlymistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootingsusinga
shootingteamcomprisedofrankingofficersfrommultipleunits.Eachofficerinvolved
shootingisinvestigatedbyanNYPDshootingteamledbyacaptain,underthedirectionofa
BoroughCommanderwhoisanAssistantChief.Theshootingteamhasatitsdisposalallof
theNYPDsinvestigativeresources:precinctdetectives,crimesceneanalysts,forensic
specialists,andofficerstrainedinpolicetacticsanduseoffirearms.Andastheshooting
teamcolletsevidenceandinterviewswitnessesandtheofficersinvolved,aspecifically
taskedgroupfromtheNYPDsInternalAffairsBureau(IAB)conductsaparallelbut
independentinvestigation.
Theshootingteamsprocessislargelydevotedtomemorializingtheeventfor
incorporationintotheNYPDslargerknowledgemanagementsystemsandforassessing
thetacticsemployedbyeachparticipant.Meanwhile,theIABsparallelinvestigationis
designedtosupporttheNYPDsdisciplinaryintegrity,assessingtheproceduralproprietyof
theofficersactions.BoththeshootingteamandtheIABgatherandpreserveevidencein
supportoftheDistrictAttorneysofficialinquiry,tobeusedintheeventofanycriminal
proceedingthatmayensue.31
InthecaseofOfficeRidleyinWestchesterCounty,localandcountyauthoritiesappointed
theWhitePlainsPoliceDepartmentastheleadinvestigativeagency.Where,asinthiscase,
thevictimofficerandchallengingofficersarefromdifferentpolicedepartments,callingina
30TheseparticularbriefingswereattendedbytheTaskForcevicechair,executivedirector,andastaff
member.
31Criminalproceedings,whentheyoccur,aredirectedbythedistrictattorneyofthecountyinwhichthe
incidenttookplace.Inmostcasesincludingnearlyeveryinstanceinwhichapolicedischargeresultsin
injuryordeaththedistrictattorneywillinitiateitsownindependentinvestigation,separatefromthepolice
investigation,andwillpresentitsevidencetoagrandjury.Ifthegrandjurydeclinestohanddownan
indictment,thedistrictattorneysinvolvementgenerallyends.Ifanindictmentresults,thedistrictattorney
willassumecontrolofthecasewhileconductingacriminalprosecution.Policedepartmentsgenerally
provideassistanceasrequestedandgenerallysuspendtheirinvestigationsuntiltheprosecutionconcludes.
Somecasesarealsoreviewedbyfederalauthorities,particularlywhenthereispotentialforfindingacivil
rightsviolation.Onceallstateandfederalcriminalprocesseshaveended,theNYPDcontinueswithboththe
shootingteamsinvestigationandtheIABinvestigationandconvenesadisciplinarybodyknownasthe
FirearmsDischargeReviewBoard.Thisentitycollectsinformationfromalloftheprecedinginvestigations
andconsiderswhethertheshootingwasinpolicyaccordingtoNYPDguidelines.Theboardthenrefersthe
mattertotheNYPDCommissionerforanultimatedeterminationandanyadministrationofdiscipline.
P a g e |30
thirdpartyagencytoconducttheinvestigationcanhelptomitigateconcernsoffavoritism
andmayimprovepublicconfidenceinthethoroughnessandaccuracyoftheinvestigation.
InNewYorkCity,themultifacetedinvestigationhassupportedamultitrackresponsefrom
thepolicedepartment,evenasthedistrictattorneyandagrandjurywereconsidering
whetherornottobringcriminalcharges.Beforethegrandjuryfinisheditsconsideration,
theNYPDhadalreadyrevisedatrainingvideoonpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsand
shownitatallrollcalls.Thedepartmentalsoincreasedtheappearanceofplainclothes
officersfromvariousdivisionsatprecinctrollcallsofuniformedofficersworkinginthe
sameneighborhoods,tomakeuniformedofficersmorefamiliarwithoutofuniform
officerstheymightencounter.And,attherecommendationofitspolicefraternal
organizations,thedepartmenthasbeguntodevelopanewhighvisibilitybadgeholderthat
willallowoffdutyofficerstakingpoliceactiontodisplaytheirbadgesmoreeasily.32
WhiletheinvestigationofOfficerRidleysdeathinWhitePlainswasmoretraditional,
withoutthebenefitofthekindofmultiskilledshootingteamdeployedbytheNYPD,a
separatepanelofexpertswasassembledtorecommendimprovementstotraining.Inits
report,thePaneltoReviewUseofForceTrainingattheWestchesterCountyPolice
AcademydidnotprovideanypublicaccountoftheshootingofOfficerRidley,butitdid
makeseveralrecommendationsthatwereimplementedattheacademylevel,andalsoat
thestatelevel.AsdiscussedinmoredetailinChapter3,theWestchesterDepartmentof
PublicSafety,whichoperatesthesametrainingacademythatprovidedbasictrainingfor
bothOfficerRidleyandthechallengingofficersinvolvedintheincident,requiredformal
changestoitsownpoliciesattheacademyandalsoplayedakeyroleincraftingthe
requirementtoaddconfrontationtrainingtothemandatedbasictrainingofnewpolice
officersstatewide.
Unfortunately,therobustresponseofthesepolicedepartmentsismoretheexceptionthan
therule.Wewereabletofindevidenceofsignificantchangesinpolicy,proceduresand
trainingbyjustahandfuloftheagenciesinvolvedinthe26fatalincidents.
NonFatalPoliceonPoliceShootings
Informationonnonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsprovednearlyimpossibletocollect
systematically.Asaresult,ourunderstandingofnonfatalshootingsreliesonsixindividual
accountswereceivedfromtheNYPD,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment,andindividual
officers.Whileanecdotalaccountsratherthanarepresentativesample,theynonetheless
raiseintriguingquestions.
Threeofthenonfatalmistakenidentityshootingswereviewedinvolvedofficerswhowere
confrontedwhileinuniform.In1997,CorvetCurley,anAfricanAmericanofficerinthe
policedepartmentofthePortAuthorityofNewYorkandNewJersey,wasinuniformwhen
heheardaradiocallaboutNewJerseyStatetrooperschasingadangeroussuspecttowards
hislocationattheGeorgeWashingtonBridge.AsOfficerCurleypreparedforthesuspectto
32TheNYPDhasalsoengagedinanumberofothermeanstopreventfuturetragedies.SeeAppendixD,Letter
fromNYPDCommissionerRaymondKellytoNewYorkGovernorDavidA.Paterson.
P a g e |31
drivetowardhim,hedrewhisserviceweapon.Shortlythereafter,thesuspectcrashedhis
vehiclenearthebridgetollplazaandOfficerCurleyrepositionedhimselftoimprovehis
tacticaladvantage.Meanwhile,awhiteNewJerseyStatetrooperwhohadbeenengagedin
thecarchasegotoutofhisvehiclewithashotgun,sawOfficerCurleywithhisgundrawn,
andshothim,causingasevere,permanentlydisablinginjury.Thetrooperlaterdescribed
OfficerCurleyasfittingthesuspectsdescriptionbecauseCurleywasatall,thin,black
male.
TheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmentshareddetailswiththeTaskForceofasecond
mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootinginvolvingauniformedofficer.InJuneof1991,
OfficerTerryGregoryandthreeotheruniformedofficersweresearchingahotelforan
assailant.Theofficerssplitintotwoteams,onetakingalongcivilianhotelemployeestoaid
inthesearch.Atsomepoint,oneofthecivilianstriedtoopenastairwelldoor.Feeling
resistance,helookedandnoticedthroughthepartiallyopendoorthehandofaman
holdingagun.ThatpersonwasOfficerGregory,butthecivilianmistookhimtobethe
actualsuspectandinformedtheotherofficers.Thoseofficerstookupdefensivepositions
andoneofthemshotOfficerGregoryashewalkedthroughthedoorwithhisguninhis
leadinghand.
Fournonfatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsoccurredwithintheNYPD
between1995and2009,includingtheshootingofoneofficerinuniform.Thevictim
officersinallfourofthesenonfatalshootingswerewhite,aswereallbutoneofthe
challengingofficers.Allofthevictimofficershadtheirweaponsvisibletothechallenging
officers.Ofthethreenotinuniform,onewasaretiredofficerinstreetclotheswhohimself
hadbeenthevictimofacrimeandwaspursuingtheperpetrators,andtheothertwowere
workingplainclothesassignments.
Wehadhoped,whenourtaskforcewasformed,tobeabletocollectdataonnonfatal,
policeonpoliceshootingsfromallpoliceagenciesacrossNewYorkStateandfroma
selectionofmajordepartmentsincitiesnationally.Unfortunately,suchdataarenot
routinelycollectedinsidelawenforcementagencies.ThedataavailablefortheNewYork
CityPoliceDepartmentwerecollectedbythatagencyinapainstakingprocessfollowing
thedeathofOfficerEdwards.Wereturntotheneedformoresystematicdataonthese
nonfatalshootingsinourrecommendations.
OtherPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
Thankfully,thegreatmajorityofmistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceconfrontationsdonot
involveshotsbeingfired.Butitispreciselyhere,inthevastnumberofconfrontations
neverformallyreportedevenwithinthelawenforcementagenciesinvolved,thatwefind
someofthemostinterestingpatterns.Thistypeofconfrontationismostsimilartothe
spectrumofinteractionsthatciviliansmayexperiencewithpoliceonadailybasis:stop
andfrisks,temporarydetention,physicalaltercations,andsometimesweaponsdrawn.
Becausetheseincidentsarerarelyreportedwhentheyoccur,whatweknowaboutnon
fatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsismostlyanecdotal,buttherearelotsofanecdotes.The
P a g e |32
informationconsideredbytheTaskForcecameprimarilyfromthreesources:apairof
NYPDsurveysofitsundercoverofficersandplainclothesanticrimeofficers,theTask
Forcesownonlinequestionnaireforcurrentandformerlawenforcementofficers,anda
pairofsurveysoflawenforcementagenciesthroughoutNewYorkStateadministeredon
ourbehalfbyDCJS(theDCJSsurveyofdepartmentsparticipatingintheStatesIMPACT
program)andtheNewYorkAssociationofChiefsofPolice(theNYSACOPsurvey).33
Thesevarioussourcessuggestthatnonfatalpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsarecommon
occurrences.
Mostoftheincidentsweknowaboutweredescribedforusinanonlinequestionnairethat
theTaskForcedesignedtoelicitaccountsofpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsfromcurrent
andretiredlawenforcementofficersnationwide.Morethanfourhundredthirtycurrent
andformerlawenforcementofficerscompletedthequestionnaire;392ofthemwere
submittedintimeforinclusionintheanalysishere.And250ofthosequestionnaire
respondentsindicatedthattheyhadbeeninvolvedinamistakenidentity,policeonpolice
confrontationatsomepointintheircareers.34Aboutathirdoftheofficerswhoreported
suchincidentsinourquestionnaireestimatedthattheyhadbeeninvolvedinthreeormore
intheircareersforsomeasmanyasten.
SeveralNewYorkStatelawenforcementagencieswecontactedwereawareofnonfatal
policeonpoliceconfrontationsamongtheirofficers.Sixteenofthe30agenciespolledin
theDCJSsurveyindicatedhavingexperiencedsomesortofmistakenidentitypoliceon
policeconfrontationsinthepastfifteenyears,andfifteenofthe54municipalpolice
departmentsthatcompletedtheNYSACOPsurveyindicatedtheirofficershadexperienced
confrontations.AmoresystematicNYPDsurveyof200undercoverofficersfoundthat
nearly1in6(18percent)ofthemhadexperiencedagunpointconfrontationwithanother
officerandasimilarsurveyof228NYPDplainclothesanticrimeofficersindicatedthat31
percenthadexperiencedgunpointconfrontationswithfellowofficers.
Inordertolearnmoreaboutwhathappensintheseconfrontations,weaskedthe
questionnairerespondentstoprovidewrittennarrativesofuptothreeoftheirmost
seriousmistakenidentityconfrontations.Thisyieldeddetailedinformationabout344
33ThefirstsurveyreviewedwasdesignedandadministeredbytheTaskForcestaffwithassistancefromthe
OfficeofPublicSafetyattheNYDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices.Theeightquestionsurveywas
distributedtothe30municipalpolicedepartmentsparticipatinginNewYorkStatesOperationIMPACT,a
crimereductionprogramthatencompassesthosepolicejurisdictionsfromthe17countiesoutsideofNew
YorkCitythatexperiencethehighestvolumeofseriouscrimeinthestate.(TheStatesOperationIMPACTis
unrelatedtothelongerestablishedNYPDprogramofthesamename.)Thesecondsurveywasconductedat
theTaskForcesrequestbytheNewYorkStateAssociationofChiefsofPolice(NYSACOP),whosemembers
includepoliceexecutivesfromvariousagenciesthroughouttheState.The54respondentswereaskedto
identifywhethertheyhadencounteredanypoliceonpoliceshootingsorconfrontationsinrecentyearsand
tospecifythedutyassignment(undercover,plainclothesoroffduty)ofofficerswhohadbeeninvolvedinany
encounters,andwhetherlethalornonlethalforcehadbeenusedinanyoftheseconfrontations.Afinal
questionaskedwhetherandatwhatpointofficersreceivetraininginhowtohandleplainclothesandoffduty
encounters.
34Wereceived149questionnaires(38percentoftotal)describingexperiencesasconfrontedofficers,and
168(43percentoftotal)describingexperiencesaschallengingofficers.Sixtysevenquestionnaires(17
percent)containedaccountsofofficerswhoexperiencedbothtypesofincidents.
P a g e |33
individualmistakenidentityincidents.Ofthe344confrontationsdescribed,welearnedthe
raceorethnicityofboththechallengingandtheconfrontedofficersin277.Mostofthe
storiesinvolvedwhiteofficersaschallengingandconfrontedofficers,thoughtherewere
manystoriesinvolvingofficersofcolorinoneroleortheother.Whiletheseaccountsdo
notconstitutearepresentativesampleoftheuniverseofpoliceonpoliceconfrontations,
theindividualstoriesreinforcewhatthescholarswhomweinterviewedalsosurmised:the
lowlevelconfrontationsthatoccurfrequentlyandthatendwithoutshotsbeingfiredbegin
forwidelyvaryingreasons,withracialorethnicstereotypesandunconsciousbiasbeing
onlyoneamongmanypossiblefactorsintheirinceptionanddevelopment.35
Perhapsthemosthopefulfindingfromthesequestionnairesisthatevenwhenthe
confrontedofficershavetheirweaponsdrawn,theconfrontationcannonethelessbe
defusedwithoutashotbeingfired.Infortytwoconfrontationincidentsdescribedinthe
responsestoourquestionnaire,theconfrontedofficerhaddrawnhisweaponbutthe
confrontationwasneverthelessendedwithoutinjury.Thisrequirescare,awareness,and
disciplineonbothsidesoftheconfrontation.Challengingofficersneedtobelookingand
listeningforcluesthatdeepentheirunderstandingoftheirsituation,whileconfronted
officersneedtocomplywiththechallengingofficerscommands,remainmotionless,and
identifythemselvesaspoliceofficers.
Inpractice,however,asthesestoriesillustrate,defusingtheseconfrontationscanrequire
strictdisciplineandnervesofsteel.OneplainclothesAfricanAmericanofficersharedthe
followingconfrontationstorythatoccurredasheandhisWhitepartnerwerepursuinga
suspect:
AsIapproachedthestepstothetrainstationrunningfullspeedwithmy
partnersomewherebehindmeIcouldseeapoliceofficerfromtheother
townpullingup.AsIwasrunningtothestairstheofficerinuniformwas
runningtowardsme.Thestairsweretohisleftbuthewasrunningtowards
me.Icouldseethatheislookingatmewithfearanduncertaintyinhiseyes.
IknewrighttherethathethoughtIwasthesuspect.Hedidnotseemyshield
onmychestormyradioinmyhand.Hesawamaleblackinhis20sandan
olderwhitemanwholookslikeaplainclothesofficer(mypartner)chasing
themaleblack.AshepulledouthisgunandbegantoraiseitatmeI
immediatelystoppedrunning.BythetimehepointedhisfirearmatmeIwas
35Thecurrentandformerofficerswhocompletedouronlinequestionnairewerenotarepresentative
sampleofofficersorofofficerswhohaveexperiencedpoliceonpoliceconfrontations.TheTaskForce
promotedthequestionnairethroughorganizationsofpoliceofficers,includingseveralorganizationsof
officersofcolor,encouragingthemtoincludelinksontheirwebsites,noticesintheirnewsletters,and
announcementsattheirconventions.Evenamongthosewholearnedofthesurvey,somemighthavebeen
morelikelythanotherstocompleteit,ormighthaveincludedsomeincidentsandnotothers.Respondents
mayhavebeenmorelikelytodescribeconfrontationsthatleftthemangryorshaken,confrontationswith
officersoutsidetheirownunitordepartment,confrontationsinwhichtheydidnotreceiveanapology,andso
on.Forthisreason,anypatternsacrossthestoriesarenotindicativeoftrendsinthewideruniverseof
policeonpoliceconfrontations;buttheaccountsthemselvescontainvaluableinsightsintothewaysinwhich
confrontationsoccur,thewaysthatofficersrespondtoeachotherinconfrontations,andthefeelingsthat
theseconfrontationscanevokeinofficers.
P a g e |34
screaming,Police,Iamapoliceofficer.Iputmybadgeupnearmyeyesso
thathecouldseeit.Heimmediatelyholsteredhisweapon.Hesaidnothing
priortomeshouting"Police,Iamapoliceofficer."Noshotswerefired.Itold
himthesuspectwasrunningonthetracksandwejoinedthefootpursuit.36
Inthiscase,theconfrontedofficerrealizedearlythatthechallengingofficerfromanother
jurisdictionhadmistakenhimforthesuspect,eventhoughthechallengingofficerhadnot
yetissuedanycommands.Inhindsightitiseasytoappreciatehowhisdeftresponse
turnedwhatcouldhavebeenatragedyintojustanotherdayonthejob.Asheexplained:
ItooktheinitiativetousemyvoiceandtellhimthatIamapoliceofficer.I
saiditloudandIsaiditclear.Iusedmyhandwhichwasemptytoshowhim
mybadgebyplacingitupnearmyfacebecauseIcouldseethatiswherethe
officerwasstaring.Iknewmypartnerwhoisolderandwhitewasbehind
meandIfiguredthechallengingofficerfeltIwasbeingpursuedbymy
partner.Iknewthatwewerechasingamaleblackinhis20sandIwasinmy
20satthetime.Iknewtherewasamistakeinsuspectidentitymadebythe
challengingofficerandIdidnotwantittoturnbad.Ididn'tyellattheofficer
todrophisweapon,orbaithimintoanargumentorchallengehim.Ijust
shoutedthatIwasapoliceofficerandIshowedhimmybadge.37
Someofthestoriesillustratehowlittlechoiceanoffdutyofficerhasabouttakingpolice
actionwhenoffenders,sometimesliterally,justrunrightintothem.Asoneoffdutyofficer
describessuchanencounter:
[I]waswalkingintoaconveniencestore"offduty"whenarobberran
throughthedoorrightintome.Hewasknockedtothegroundbyoursudden
impact.[The]clerkyelledhejustrobbedherandIdrewdownonthesuspect
andheldhimatgunpointuntilarrivalofofficers.[The]clerkhadalready
calledforpolice.WhenofficersarrivedIimmediatelybeganyellingthat"IAM
ACOP."Iwasinstructedtodropmygun.Isteppedbackawayfromthe
suspectandplacedmygunontheground.[I]advised[that]mybadgeandID
[were]inmybackpocketandwasinstructedtoremoveanddisplayit.After
doingthat,IwastoldthatIcouldpickupmygun.Allwentwell.38
Trainingtoobeycommands,andavoidturningtowardtheofficersissuingthose
commands,canbeverydifficulttofollowinthefield,especiallywhenstressorother
situationalorenvironmentalfactorspreventconfrontedofficersfromhearingthose
commandsclearly.Asoneplainclothesofficerdescribeshisownstory:
Uniformedofficerscamerunningoutofthebuildingfromapositionbehind
measIapproachedthepronedoutsuspecttoplacehandcuffsonhim.Iwas
focusedonhimwhenIheardyellingcomingfrombehindme.Istoppedand
36Questionnaireresponse#54746033.
37Id.
38Questionnaireresponse#59082179(emphasisadded.).
P a g e |35
turnedmyheadtoseeseveraluniformedofficerscomingatmewithguns
drawnyelling,"Dropthegun!"AsIstartedputtingthegundown,[one]ofthe
officersrecognizedmeandorderedtheotherofficersawayfrommeandto
takethepronedoutsuspectintocustody.Ibelieveifthatofficerhadnot
recognizedme,Iwouldhavebeenshot.39
Sometimesdetailsassimpleashowandwhenconfrontedofficersidentifythemselvesand
announcethattheyarearmedmaymakeadifferenceinhowthesituationplaysout.We
seethisinaconfrontationdescribedtousbyanundercoverofficerworkingacontrolled
drugbuyinTexas.Wearingabeardandlookingdisheveled,hewaswithhispartnerinan
unmarkedvehicleturningdownadeadendstreetwhentheywereconfrontedbyateamof
uniformedofficers:
[Two]markedunitsinitiatedvehiclestopofmyU/C[undercover]vehicle,
[the]officer(rookie)fromcityagency(IworkforState)verynervousduring
approach,maintainedhandonweaponduringentireinitialcontact.I
maintainedbothhandsonsteeringwheel,respondedtoidentificationof
reasonforstopandstatedthatIhadaguninthesmallofmyback.AsIthen
begantostatethatIwasapoliceofficer,theofficerscreamed,"GUN"and
drewhisweapon.TheotherU/Cofficerinmypassengerseatandthesenior
[uniformed]officerthathadarrivedonthepassengersideofthecarhadboth
recognizedeachotherfromtheiragencyandwerealreadytalkingcasually.
TheotherU/Cputhishandsontothefrontdashboardareaandshoutedfor
theseniorofficertostoptheactionsoftherookieofficer.Iwritethisoffto
rookienervousness,butimmediatelyrecognizedandchangedthewayIwould
respondtotheidentificationofmyselffirstbeforetheidentificationthatIwas
armed.40
Morethanhalfofthestoriesthatofficersdescribedinresponsetoourquestionnaire
concernedchallengingofficersfromdifferentagenciesthantheofficerstheyconfronted.
Thereisnoquestionthatsuchconfrontationsdohappenfrequentlyandposespecial
dangersagainstwhichprotocolsandtrainingwithinasingleagencycannotfullyprotect.
Still,theymayappearinthesestoriesbecausetheyarealsoeasierforpoliceofficerstotell,
andthishasimplicationsforanysystemofreportingthatpoliceagenciesorgovernments
putinplace.Thepolicingscholarsinterviewedforthisreportpredictedthatthe
confrontationsthatweremostlikelytobereportedinanymannerwouldbethosebetween
officersindifferentdepartments.Nextmostlikelywouldbeconfrontationsbetween
officersindifferentunits.Theleastlikelytobereported,eveninformallywithinthe
departmentitself,wouldbethosebetweenofficersinthesameunit.
Moreover,thereisareluctancetoreportthroughthechainofcommandeventhestories
wereceived.Oftheconfrontationsdescribedinourquestionnairesinwhichofficers
indicatedwhetherornottheyhadreportedthem,onlyaboutthreepercentwereformally
39Questionnaireresponse#59585405.
P a g e |36
reported,andonlyathirdwereinformallyreported,mostlyinconversationswithdirect
supervisors.
TheTaskForcestaffinterviewedofficialsattwelvepoliceagencieswithinNewYorkState
thatreportedpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsthroughtheDCJSorNYSACOPsurveys.Most
ofthelawenforcementexecutivesweinterviewedindicatedthattheincidentsthey
recountedtoushadneverbeenofficiallyrecordedorreported.Asaresult,theyhadno
reliabledataonconfrontations.Onepolicechiefrecalledhearingfromanolderofficer
whoadmittedhehadoncepulledagunonanundercoverofficer;yet,thechiefcouldfind
nowrittenrecordoftheincident,whichhappenedpriortohistenure.Asasergeantat
anotherdepartmentexplained,thevastmajorityoftheseincidentsaresimplyresolvedon
thestreet.
Mostpolicedepartmentsdonotrequiretheirofficerstoreportconfrontationexperiences.
While25ofthe30departmentssurveyedbyDCJSindicatedthatareportwouldbe
requiredforapoliceonpoliceshootingoraconfrontationinvolvingaphysicalaltercation,
only18ofthedepartmentsrequireofficerstoreportconfrontationsinwhichweaponsare
pointedandonly11requirereportsforconfrontationsinvolvingpurelyverbal
confrontationswithnoweaponspointed.Wereturntothedifficultyofconstructingany
plausiblereportingsysteminourrecommendations.
Despitetheverylowrateofformalreportingofpoliceonpoliceconfrontations,thestories
wereceivedincludednineincidentsthatresultedindisciplinaryactionagainstoneormore
oftheofficersinvolved.Themostcommonformsofdisciplineintheseincidentswere
officialreprimandsintheofficersfiles,followedbydisciplinerelatedtransferstoother
units.Itisnotclearwhetheranyofthesedisciplinaryactionsalsoresultedinadditional
trainingforthereprimandedortransferredofficers.Insevenoftheseninereports,the
disciplinaryactionwastakenagainsttheconfrontedofficers,mostcommonlyfortheir
failuretoobeythecommandsofthechallengingofficersorfortakingpoliceactioninthe
firstplace,suchasexecutingwarrantsorrespondingtocallswithoutnotifyingcommandor
dispatch.Thetwochallengingofficerswhofacedreprimandsweredisciplinedforracial
harassmentandunsatisfactoryjobperformance.
TheRoleofStereotypesinPoliceConfrontationswithPeopleofColor
Thereisnoquestionthatmanyofficersofcolorfeelthattheyareatheightenedriskof
beingmistakenforcriminalswhentheyareoutofuniformandtakingpoliceaction.A
tellinganecdotealongtheselinescomesfromoneofthescholarsinterviewedforthis
report.Thatscholardescribedhowagangunitcommanderinoneurbanpolice
departmentpurchasedspecialjacketswithGangUnitemblazonedonthebackso
plainclothesofficerscouldquicklyputthejacketsonwhenchasingasuspect.The
commanderpurchasedthejacketsafterblackofficersconfidedinthecommanderthatthey
sloweddowntheirpursuitwhileinalleystoavoidbeingmistakenforthecriminalbeing
pursued.
P a g e |37
Similarly,oneretiredAfricanAmericanlawenforcementexecutivetoldusthathehadhad
difficultyrecruitingblackofficersforundercoverassignments,widelyconsideredapath
towardcareeradvancement,becausetheyfearedbeingmistakenforcriminalsbyfellow
officers.
Manycurrentandformerofficersofcolorsharedthisperspectivethroughouronline
questionnaireandinourpublichearings.Someimpliedthattheyfeelaheighteneddanger
fromwhitepoliceofficers,asinthissubmission:
Iwasanactivestreetcopmyentirecareer,ascendedthroughtheranksto
therankofLieutenantandendedmycareerasaDetectiveSquad
commander,andthereisonefearIcarriedmyentirecareerthefearof
beingshotbyawhitepoliceofficer.41
Forothers,thehigherrisksofundercoverworkforofficersofcolorweregenerally
understoodandwidelyaccepted.Asoneofficerdescribedtheunderstanding:
IwasanNYPDundercoverinthelate80's/early90'sandwasfortunate
enoughtoworkwithandlearnfromtheabsolutebestthattheNYPDhadto
offeratthetime.Aneachone,teachoneattitudewasadaptedandwe(as
undercovers)tookafewhourseachweektogettogethertoteacheachother
necessarysurvivaltactics.BeinginNewYorkandpartoftheNYPD,itwas
understoodthatANYAfricanAmericanorHispanicundercoverwasatrisk
wheneverwesteppedontheset.42
Whilesomepoliceofficersandexecutivesdescribedthesedangersasinevitableinlightof
crimepatternsandtheuncertaintiesofpolicework,wealsoheardfromtheleadersof
somepolicefraternalorganizationswhoinsistthattheserisksaregroundedinaculture
theywanttoseechanged.AsLt.CharlesWilson,NationalChairmanoftheNational
AssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficers,explainedinhissubmissiontotheTask
Force:
Theoverallmindsetthatablackmanoutofuniformcanonlybeasuspected
criminalhasbecomeembeddedinthecultureoflawenforcement....[T]he
cultureofourprofessionmustbeindisputablychanged.Nolongercanitbe
acceptableformenandwomenofcolortobeconsideredfirstasapossible
criminal,andonlyasanafterthoughtavaluedmemberofthecommunity.43
WhiteofficersaswellasBlackofficersdescribedforushowthesestereotypescontributeto
policeonpoliceconfrontations.Thefollowingstory,forexample,wasprovidedbyaWhite
plainclothesofficerwhosepartneratthetimewasAfricanAmerican.Theywereworking
anautotheftdetail,securinganautomobilechopshopthathadbeenraidedduringthe
41SubmissionfromLieutenantWillieShaw,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(ret.)
42QuestionnaireResponse#5123056.
43TestimonyofLt.CharlesP.Wilson,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).
P a g e |38
day.Thatevening,thetwoplainclothesofficersweresittingintheirunmarkedcarwhen
confrontedbyofficersfromthelocalpoliceprecinct:
[Thechallenging]officerssnuckupon[the]carweweresittinginatnight.
[They]pointedweaponsatusand[we]weretolddon'tmove.Iputmyhands
outandstatedIwasacop,[and]Iwasinstructedtogetoutofthecar.[The]
challengingofficerhad[his]guncockedandpointedatme.Itoldhimwhere
myIDwasandhetookitfrommypocketandconfirmedmyidentitystating
"thisone'sonthejob."[My]partner(AfricanAmerican)wasstillbeingheld
atgunpointwithguncockedinhisfaceandtheyrefusedtobelievehewas
mypartneruntilhecouldproduceID.44
Thesestories,togetherwithcommonsense,suggestthatraceislikelyonefactorslowinga
confrontingofficersrecognitionofanoutofuniformofficerasacop.AsJohnBilich,
DeputyCommissionerfortheOfficeofPublicSafetyattheNewYorkStateDivisionof
CriminalJusticeServices,toldus:Itwouldbenavetothinkthatraceneverplaysarole....
Thedifficulty,howeveris:Whotrulyknowstowhatextentitplaysaroleinthecritical
adrenalindrivenandemotionallychargedfewmomentsthatprecedesuchanincident?45
Somepoliceexecutivesandscholarstoldusthat,intheirexperienceandopinion,racedoes
notplayasignificantroleinpoliceonpoliceconfrontations.Atfirstthisseemsatodds
bothwiththetestimonyweheardfrommanyofficersofcolorandwiththeresearchwe
havealreadydiscussed.Withintheseopinions,however,wecantracetwoseparate
propositions.
First,weunderstandthescholarstobesayingthattheconfrontationsthemselvesoften
beginforreasonsotherthanracialbias.Noscholarshavestudiedtherareinstancesof
policeonpoliceshootings.Insteadthesescholars,atourrequest,plumbedtheirown
experiencetoreflectontheconfrontationstheyhadobservedorhearddescribedinwhich
noshotswerefired.Indeed,thereisampleevidencethatmistakenidentityconfrontations
doindeedbeginformultiplereasons,usuallygroundedinbehavior.Itisadifferent
questionandonethescholarscouldnotaddressastowhysomeconfrontations
escalatewhileothersaredefused,andwhatroleraceplaysinthatcomplexprocess.
Second,afewoftheresearchersandpoliceofficersweconsultedwerestressingapoint
aboutthefocusofchallengingofficers,especiallywhentheconfrontedofficerisdisplaying
aweapon.Weunderstandthispointtobethatchallengingofficersmayfocusalmost
exclusivelyonthethreatthegunitselfignoringnotonlythesignsthattheperson
holdingthegunmaybeapoliceofficerbutperhapsalsothepersonsraceandethnicity.
Weacceptbothofthesepoints,yetnotethattheyareconsistentwithourbeliefthatrace
can,andoftendoes,playasignificantroleintheseconfrontationsatleastinthe
escalationoftheseconfrontationsintofataltragedies.
45TestimonyofJohnBilich,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
P a g e |39
Themostpersuasiveevidencewehavefoundonthispointcomesfromnewresearchin
socialpsychology.TaskForceadvisorsDr.PhilipAtibaGoffandDr.JohnDovidioexplain
thatblatantexpressionsofracialbiashaveconsistentlydeclined[yet]becauseofarange
ofnormalpsychologicalprocesses,suchashistoricalculturalassociations,ingroup
affinities,andselfandgroupinterest,themajorityofWhiteAmericansstillharbor
negativefeelingsandbeliefsaboutBlacks,whichareimplicitfrequentlyunconsciousand
typicallyautomaticallyactivated.46Moreover,psychologicalresearchersfindthesesame
implicitorunconsciousbiasespresentinpeopleofallracesandethnicitieswithin
Americanculture.Asanotherscholardescribesina2002article,thetendencytoseean
AfricanAmericansbehaviorasmoremeanandthreateningthanawhitepersonsdidnot
dependontheobserversethnicity.47
Thereisgrowingevidencethatpoliceofficerslikemembersofthegeneralpublic
displaywhatthesepsychologistscallimplicitracialbias,whichrevealsitselfinsimulated
shoot/dontshootdecisions.OnestudybyDr.JenniferEberhardt,Dr.Goffandothers
foundthatmerelythinkingaboutBlackscanleadpeopletoevaluateambiguousbehavior
asaggressive,tomiscategorizeharmlessobjectsasweapons,ortoshootquickly,andat
times,inappropriately.48Otherresearchshowswhenciviliansandpoliceofficersare
forcedtomakedecisionsundertimepressure,theyshowarangeofweaponsbiases
againstblacks,makingthemmorelikelytofalselyperceiveagunafterbeingprimedwitha
photographofablackthanawhiteman.49
JoshuaCorrell,apsychologistattheUniversityofChicagoandconsultanttotheNYPD,has
demonstratedthroughvideogamesimulationsthatciviliansandpoliceofficersoften
evidencesimilarformsofbiasinthespeedwithwhichtheyshootblackarmedsuspects
comparedwithwhitearmedsuspects.50Inonesuchsimulation,researchsubjectswere
shownavarietyofimagesofblackandwhiteindividuals:someholdingagunofsomekind,
othersholdinginnocuousobjectssuchasacellphone,wallet,orasodacan.51Askedto
makeadecisionwhethertoshootornotshoot,bothpoliceofficersandciviliansinthese
gamestooklongertoactontheimagesofblackpeoplewithinnocuousobjectsandofwhite
peoplewithguns,andtheywerefastertorespondtoblackpeoplewithgunsandtowhite
peopleholdinginnocuousobjects.Inotherwords,theyshotanarmedtargetmore
46Goff&Dovidioreportpg.1(AppendixF)(emphasisinoriginal).
47SeeJoshuaCorrell,etal.,ThePoliceOfficersDilemma:UsingEthnicitytoDisambiguatePotentially
ThreateningIndividualsJournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,2002,Vol.83,No.6,13141329,1315.
48See:JenniferEberhardt,etal.,SeeingBlack:Race,CrimeandVisualProcessing,inJournalofPersonality
andSocialPsychology,2004,Vol.87,No.6,876893,876.
49Goff&Dovidioreportpg.3(AppendixF).
50See:JoshuaCorrell,etal.,AcrosstheThinBlueLine:PoliceOfficersandRacialBiasintheDecisionto
ShootinJournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,2007,Vol.92,No.6,10061023.
51Drs.GoffandDovidioexplainthat[r]esearchinthisfieldtendstohaveparticipantsplayacomputer
simulationgamewhereintheyhavetodecidewhetherornottoshootarmedorunarmedtargetstheyare
supposedtoshootthearmedtargets,butnottheunarmedtargets.Participantsareplacedunderstrenuous
timeconstraintstomaketheirdecisionsinanefforttomimicrealworldcriticalincidents.Researchersthen
varytheraceofthearmedandunarmedtargetssothateachindividualmakesdecisionsaboutwhetherornot
toshootarmedandunarmedBlackandWhitetargets.Goff&Dovidioreportpg.1(AppendixF).
P a g e |40
quicklyifhewasAfricanAmericanthanifhewaswhite;andtheydeclinedtoshootan
unarmedtargetmorequicklyifhewaswhitethanifhewasAfricanAmerican.
Ontheimportantissueofaccuracyofdistinguishinglethalfrominnocentobjects,police
officersdobetterthanciviliansinthesetests.Veteranpoliceofficerstestedinthisresearch
donotshowthetypicalbiasofshootingunarmedBlacksuspectsmoreoftenthanunarmed
Whitesuspects.Despiteshowingbiasinreactiontimes,thepoliceofficersmadetheir
decisionsmoreaccuratelythancivilians.Theseresultssuggestthatpolicetrainingand
experiencemightreducetheeffectsofracialstereotypesandthatpoliceofficerscouldbe
trainedtofurthercounteractracialstereotypes.
InpartialresponsetothetragicdeathofOfficerOmarEdwards,theNewYorkCityPolice
DepartmenthasretainedDr.Correlltotakethisresearchfurther.Dr.Correllisnow
overseeinganexperimentalprogramusingcomputersimulationstotestallNYPDrecruits
whoenteredthepoliceacademyinJuly2009forimplicitracialbiasinshoot/dontshoot
decisions,particularlyunderhighstressconditions.Therecruitsaretestedatadmission,
againattheendoftheirtraining,andagainoncetheyareinthefield.Dr.Correllandthe
NYPDhopetodeterminewhetherandtowhatextentbasicpolicetraininghasaffectedthe
recruitsdecisionmakingprocessesinshoot/dontshootsituations.Iftheresearchcan
determinewhatamountandintensityoftrainingreducesracialbiasinofficers,the
Departmentshouldbeabletousetheresultstoimproveinstructionforallofficers.
Untilnow,researchonimplicitbiashasbeenconfinedtolaboratorysettings,butwehope
thefieldtestingnowunderwayinNewYorkCityencouragesotherdepartmentsto
experimentwithsimilarprogramsoftestingandtraining.
InformationGapsonPoliceonPoliceShootingsandConfrontations
Weknowlittleaboutsomanyoftheseshootingsandconfrontationsbecausesolittle
informationisreleasedlocallyorcollectednationally.Mostsmallandmidsizedpolice
departmentshaveneverexperiencedafatalshootingofthiskindanddonotregardthe
nonfatalconfrontationsasahighpriorityforattention.Yetthecollectionofevenbasic
informationonthemostseriousincidentscouldcontributesignificantlytoofficersafety
andpublicsafetymoregenerally,aswellastohelpingpoliceorganizationsdealwiththe
growingdiversityintheirranks.
TheFBIsdatabaseofLawEnforcementOfficersKilledandAssaulted(LEOKA)istheclosest
thingtoanationalrepository,butitsinformationisincompleteanditdoesnotfocuson
mistakenidentityshootings.PartoftheFBIsUniformCrimeReporting(UCR)Program,
LEOKAcollectsdetailedinformationoninthelineofdutydeathsoflawenforcement
officers,bothfeloniousandaccidental,aswellasgunandknifeassaultsthatcauseinjuryto
lawenforcementofficers.
YetLEOKAhasseverallimitationsasasourceofinformationaboutmistakenidentity,
policeonpoliceshootings.First,LEOKAdoesnotspecificallyidentifymistakenidentity
policeonpoliceshootingdeathswithinthebroadercategoryofaccidentaldeaths
P a g e |41
resultingfromcrossfires,mistakenforoffenderincidents,[and]mishaps.52Second,as
withparticipationintheUCRprogramingeneral,submissionofLEOKAreportsispurely
voluntary.53Ourownsearchofmediareportsandconversationswithpolicepractitioners
surfacedatleastthreefatalincidentsbetween1981and2007thatwerenotcapturedin
LEOKAreports,eitherbecauseinformationwasnotsubmittedorbecausetheincidentsdid
notmeetLEOKAscriteriaforinclusioninthedatabase.54Theremaybeothers.Third,the
LEOKAdatabasedoesnotincludenonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsbecausethese
incidentsbydefinitioninvolveneitherdeathsnorfeloniousassaultsonpoliceofficers.And
nonfatalshootingsgenerallydrawlessmediaattention,makingthemmoredifficulttofind
ingeneralsearchesofonlinenews.
EvenwithinNewYorkState,noagencyorofficecollectsstatewideinformationonfatal(or
nonfatal)policeonpoliceshootings.TheNewYorkStateDivisionofCriminalJustice
Services(DCJS)doescollectUCRdata;buttheUCRprogram(includingLEOKA),doesnot
requirealevelofreportingthatallowsonetoidentifypoliceonpoliceshootings.Whenwe
beganourinquiry,DCJSsimplydidnotknowhowmanyshootingsofthiskind,fatalornon
fatal,hadoccurredinNewYorkStateoverthelastdecade.
WedonotmeantocriticizeDCJSortheFBIsUCRorLEOKAprograms.Theseagenciesand
theprogramsthattheyoperatearesimplydoingwhattheyhavetheauthorityandmandate
todo.Withtheproperauthorityandresourcestocollectexpandedtypesofinformation,
theycouldprovideveryusefulanalysisandunderstandingofbothfatalandnonfatal
policeonpoliceshootingsandconfrontations.
52LEOKAclassifiesallreportedaccidentaldeathsofpoliceofficersaccordingtothecircumstancethat
describesthefatality,including:shooting,automobile,motorcycle,struckbyvehicle,aircraft,andother(fall,
fire,drowning,etc).Accidentalshootingdeathsarecapturedinthreedistinctcategories:(1)training
mishaps;(2)selfinflicted,weaponcleaningmishapornotapparentorconfirmedsuicide;and(3)
crossfires,mistakenforoffender,mishap.Thethirdcategoryissomewhatofacatchallcategory;it
combinesincidentsinwhichdeathsresultedfromacrossfiresituationandthoseinwhichthevictimofficer
wasmistakenforasuspectbyanotherpoliceofficer.Withinthiscategory,themistakenidentityshooting
deathscanonlybeidentifiedbyreviewingtheindividualnarrativesaccompanyingeachindividualreport
filedbylocalpolicedepartments,andinsomecasesthereislittleinformationinthosenarratives.
53ThereportingprocessusedbytheUCRProgramtogatherLEOKAinformationinvolvestwosteps.First,
participatinglawenforcementagenciessubmitamonthlytallytotheStateUCRprogramlistingthenumber
andtypeofofficerdeathsand/ornonfatalassaultswithinjury,ifany.Inturn,theStateUCRprogramnotifies
theFBIsLEOKAprogram,whichissuesaneightpagequestionnaire(FBIform1701)tothevictimofficers
agencyforcompletion.Inpractice,however,itismorecommonthatanFBIFieldOfficepromptstheissuance
oftheLEOKAquestionnairebydirectlynotifyingtheFBIUCRprogramofanofficerdeathorassaultinany
stateorlocalagencywithinitsgeographicarea.Wewereunabletoobtaininformationabouttheresponse
ratetothesequestionnaires,butLEOKAdidreportthatatleastonequestionnaireregardingafairlyrecent
incidentthatmayhavebeenafatal,mistakenidentity,possiblepoliceonpoliceshootinghasnotbeen
returnedbythepolicedepartmentinvolved.
54ThestrictcriteriaforinclusionofcasesintheLEOKAdatabasesometimesexcludecasesthatwould
normallybeconsideredmistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootings.Forexample,theshootingsofOfficers
JamesL.GordonandEricHernandezwereexcludedbecauseitwasnotclearatthetimewhethertheofficers
haddiedinthelineofduty.AndNehemiahPickensstatusasareservedeputyconstablewithoutarrest
powersautomaticallyexcludedhimfrominclusionintheLEOKAdatabase.
P a g e |42
3.
TheRoleofTraining
Consideringthemyriadfederal,state,county,andlocallawenforcementofficersworking
incivilianclothesorcarryingafirearmoffduty,thepotentialformistakenidentity
confrontationsisenormous.InNewYorkStatealone,thereare571individualpolice
departments,ranginginsizefromfewerthanfiveswornofficerstoover35,000inthe
NYPD.Collectively,theselawenforcementagenciesemployover69,000sworn
personnel.55
Figure3.1LawEnforcementAgenciesandPoliceOfficers,byTypeofAgency
TypeofAgency
Municipal
NYPD
CountySheriffs'Offices
NYStatePolice
OtherStateLawEnforcement
OtherLawEnforcement
TotalAgenciesandOfficers
Agencies
PoliceOfficers
450
1
57
1
4
58
571
19,674
35,844
4093
4851
1448
3449
69,359
28.4%
51.7%
5.9%
7.0%
2.1%
5.0%
100%
Ifevenasmallfractionoftheconfrontationsamongtheseofficerscouldbecapturedand
understood,theknowledgecouldproveatreasuretroveoflessonsabouthowtoprevent
moreoftheseconfrontationsinthefirstplaceandhowtodeescalatethosethatdooccur.
Moreover,someofthesameinformationmighthelppolicedepartmentsdeveloptrainingto
deescalatepoliceencounterswithciviliansaswell.
Trainingholdsparticularpromiseinreducingpoliceonpoliceshootingspreciselybecause
itispossibletotrainbothpartiesintheconfrontation.Policerecruitsandveteranpolice
officersalikecanbetrainedtoanticipatesuchconfrontationsandlearntheappropriate
responsesforboththechallengingandtheconfrontedofficers.Unfortunately,suchtraining
hasonlybeeninstitutedstatewideinNewYorkStateinrecentyears,andisonlyrequired
forofficersatthestartoftheircareers.
Inanefforttoidentifyexistingtrainingprogramsthataddressconfrontationsituations,and
tocollectotherrelevantdataandinformation,theTaskForce:
reviewedtrainingmandatescurrentlyinplaceinNewYorkStatethroughthe
MunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncilandtheStateAccreditationProgram;
examinedcurrenttrainingofferedbytheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandthe
NewYorkStatePolice;
55TotalsbasedonswornpoliceofficerslistedontheNYStatePoliceOfficerRegistryasofMarch17,2010.
P a g e |43
collectedtrainingofferedinselectedjurisdictionsnationally;and
elicitedopinionsonthebestpracticesandrecommendationsfrompoliceofficers
expertsinpolicetraining.
TraininginNewYorkStateonPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
ThroughtheMunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncil(MPTC),NewYorkStateregulateslaw
enforcementagenciesandensuresminimumpropertrainingoftheirofficers.Createdbya
1959statelaw,theMPTCsauthorityislimitedtomostmunicipallawenforcement
agencies.TheNYPD,NewYorkStatePolice,DistrictAttorneyOfficeinvestigators,and
officersfromtherailroadpoliceandotherstateagenciesarenotgovernedbyMPTC
regulations,althoughsomecomplyvoluntarilyaspartofthestateslawenforcement
agencyaccreditationprogram.Thus,theMPTCsguidelinesdonotreachthemajorityof
swornlawenforcementofficersintheState.
TheMPTCisobligatedtorecommendtotheGovernorminimumrequirementsforbasic
andsupervisorytraining.Itisalsoresponsibleformakingrecommendationsregarding
policetrainingschools,instructorqualifications,andcategoriesofinservicetraining.56
Onceimplemented,theserulesandregulationscarrytheforceoflaw.
TheMPTCmandatestwocoursesforpoliceofficersinNewYorkState:theBasicCoursefor
PoliceOfficersandtheCourseinPoliceSupervision.Thesecoursesaredesignedforpolice
recruitsandfirsttimePoliceSupervisorsandeachisgenerallytakenonlyonce.TheBasic
CourseforPoliceOfficerscurrentlyconsistsof639hoursofinstruction,whichincludes
bothclassroomandfieldtrainingcomponents.TheCourseinPoliceSupervisionconsistsof
atleast105hoursofinstructionincludingtheroleofasupervisor,legalissues,incident
management,communityrelations,andmore.
NewYorkwasthefirststateinthecountrytoestablishbasictrainingfornewlyappointed
policeofficers.57Thepoliceacademiesandtheirdirectorsarerequiredbyregulationto
meetorexceedtheminimumstandardsestablishedbytheMPTC.However,theMPTC
encouragesschoolstoexceedtheminimumstandardsbyaddingtimeandobjectivesfor
existingunitsandaddingnewtopics.Manypolicedepartmentsrequiremorethanthe
56SeeNewYorkExecutiveLaw83940.TheMPTChaseightmembers:threeareappointedbythe
Governor;twoarenominatedbytheNewYorkStateSheriffsAssociationandmusthavespecialized
experienceinpolicetraining;twoarenominatedbytheNewYorkStateAssociationofChiefsofPoliceand
mustalsohavespecializedexperienceinpolicetraining;andoneistheCommissioneroftheNYPD,orhis
delegate.Currently,theCounciliscomprisedof:thePublicSafetyCommissionerofWestchesterCounty;the
SuperintendentoftheNewYorkStatePolice;theNYPDDeputyCommissionerforTraining;theFBIAssistant
DirectorinChargeoftheNewYorkOffice;theMonroeandYatesCountySheriffsandthePoliceChiefsofthe
CityofMechanicvilleandtheVillageofBath.TheNewYorkStateDivisionofCriminalJustice(DCJS),Officeof
PublicSafety,servesasthestaffingarmoftheMPTC,coordinatingitsresearchanddevelopmentof
curriculum,andassemblingworkinggroupsofsubjectmatterexpertstoconstructandrevisecourses.DCJSis
alsoresponsibleforassistingtheMPTCintheplanningandevaluationofbasicandinservicetrainingcourses
andtoensurethatpractitionersmeettheminimumstandards.
57SeeDCJS,BasicPoliceTraining,History,http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ops/training/bcpo/index.htm.
P a g e |44
minimumand,onaverage,departmentsinNewYorkStaterequire800hourstograduate
fromapoliceacademy.TheMPTCregularlyexaminesthecoursestodeterminewhether
additionaltopicsshouldbeaddedorwhetherexistingcoursesshouldberevised.Sincethe
early1980s,theBasicCourseforPoliceOfficershasgrownbyover200hours.
IntheaftermathofthedeathofOfficerChristopherRidley,theWestchesterCounty
DepartmentofPublicSafetyconvenedadiversepaneloflawenforcementpractitioners,
academicians,andcommunityleaderstoconductacomprehensivereviewofalluseof
forcetrainingconductedattheWestchesterpoliceacademy.Amongits64
recommendations,thepanelurgedthatNewYorkState,throughtheMPTC,developand
distributeasingleprotocoltobeusedbyallpolicedepartmentsinthestatefortheproper
handlingofoffdutyconfrontations,andthatthisprotocolbeincorporatedintothebasic
entrylevelrecruittrainingcurriculum.InSeptember2008,MPTCmembersrevieweda
twohourcoursetitledOffDutyandPlainClothesPoliceEncounterspreparedforthem
bytheDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices.TheMPTCapprovedthistrainingasaminimum
standardoftrainingforallrecruits,andapproveditforuseduringoptionalinservice
training.OnNovember5th,2008,GovernorPatersonacceptedtheMPTCs
recommendationandatwohourtrainingblockonoffdutyandplainclothesconfrontations
wasaddedtotheentryleveltrainingcurriculumstatewide.
NotalloftheWestchesterpanelsrecommendationshavebeensopromptlyimplemented.
Forexample,thepanelrecommendedthatconfrontationtrainingshouldbeinteractive,
handson,andentailtheuseofliveactors,roleplaying,wellscriptedscenariosand
simulationsorsomeothertechnologytoplacethestudentofficerinasrealisticasettingas
possible,andfurtherthat[a]llofficerswhoundergothistrainingmustbecompelledto
participateasboththeconfrontingandtheconfrontedofficer.Althoughsometraining
academiesarestrivingforthislivescenariobasedtraining,therecommendationhasnot
beenadoptedstatewide.58
Severalofficerswhocontactedusindicatedthattheyfeltthattheirinitialacademytraining
wassufficient,butfeltthat,onceinthefield,officersdidnotalwaysactastheywere
trained.Inthewordsofoneofficer,thetrainingdidnotalwaysstick.Onewaytoaddress
thisproblemwouldbeunderscoreimportanttacticalconsiderationsperiodicallythrough
inserviceorrefreshertraining.However,theMPTCdoesnothavestatutoryauthorityto
requireinservicetraining.Itsmandateiscurrentlylimitedtorecommending
requirementsforbasictraining,initialsupervisortrainingandvoluntarystandardsfor
accreditation.59
Evenwithoutastatewiderequirement,mostofthestateslargerpolicedepartmentsdo
ensurethattheirofficersattendsomeformofinservicetraining,andforthosethat
58Currently,separatepanelsaredevelopingcurriculumforthebasiccourseintheareasofDomesticViolence,
HateCrimesandCulturalDiversity.Atarecentmeeting,theMPTCdirectedtheformationofapanelto
evaluateandupdatetheCourseforPoliceSupervision.Additionally,acurriculumwasdevelopedin2009for
aninservicetrainingonStreetEncounters,ConductiveEnergyDevices(commonlyreferredtoastasers),
PropertyEvidenceRoomManagementandaCrimeAnalystCertificationprogram.
59SeeNewYorkExecutiveLaw840.
P a g e |45
participateinthestateaccreditationprogram,aminimumof21hoursofinservicetraining
isrequiredforeachofficerannually,includinguseoffirearms,legalupdates,areviewof
thelawregardinguseofforceandtheuseofdeadlyforce.60Still,thetopicsofinstruction
andamountoftimededicatedtoinservicetrainingvarywidelyinbothaccreditedand
nonaccreditedagencies.LargerpolicedepartmentssuchastheNYPDtypicallyrelyonan
inhousetrainingunit,whilesmallerdepartmentsemployadesignatedtrainingofficeror
relyonaregionalacademy.Asaresult,thetraininglackscentralizedthemesandthereis
nomechanismtoidentifyprioritiesforstatewideattention.
Thevariationintrainingwasillustratedamongtheofficerswhocompletedour
questionnaire.Approximatelyfortypercentofthemreportedthattheyhadreceivedsome
typeoftrainingonpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsduringbasicpolicetraining,anda
similarpercentagesaidtheyhadreceivedadvancedorinservicetraining.Themost
commonformsofinstructionwerelectures,classroomdiscussion,androleplaying
exercises.Theleastcommonwerescenariobasedinstructionanduseofcasestudies.In
termsofactualcontent,theadmonitionstheyrecalledbestwereforofficerstocomplywith
thechallengingofficerscommandsandtheimportanceofidentifyingoneselfasanofficer.
Theleastcommonlyreportedinstructionswere(a)tobeagoodwitnessratherthan
intervening,(b)contactdispatchbeforeenteringacrimescene,(c)usespecialized
languagethatotherlawenforcementofficerswouldrecognize,(d)keephandsvisible,and
(e)neverturntowardsthechallengingofficers.TheanswersfromtheNewYorkState
officerswhofilledoutthequestionnairewerenotnoticeablydifferentfromtheothersin
theserespects.
ManypoliceexecutivesfromNewYorkStatebelieveitistimetostrengtheninservice
trainingwithgreaterrigorandstandardization.DemosthenesLong,theformerFirst
DeputyPoliceCommissionerandUndersheriffoftheWestchesterDepartmentofPublic
SafetyandtheformerCommandingOfficeroftheNewYorkCityPoliceAcademy,explained
persuasivelyatourfinalpublichearing:
Ibelievetheareaofinservicetrainingisripeforstatereview.Ibelievethere
arecoretrainingareasthatlendthemselvestoacentralizedtrainingmodel.
Centralizedtrainingensuresuniformityandconsistencyinthematerial
delivered.IwouldasktheMPTC,withtheassistanceoftheTraining
DirectorsAssociationandotherstakeholders,toidentifycoresubjectareas,
suchasfirearmsandtacticaltraining,legalupdates,domesticviolence
protocols,CPRandfirstaidrefreshercourses,todeveloplessonplansand
associatedteachingaidsandprovidethemtoregionaltrainingandother
academies,andrequirethatthesecoursesbecompletedattheregional
60TherecentlycreatedStateAccreditationCounciloverseestheaccreditationprocess,whichrequires
participatingagenciestomeetaseriesof132professionalstandardsintheareasofoperations,
administrationandtraining.Accreditationstandard33.1requiresthatallswornpersonnelreceiveatleast21
hoursofinservicetrainingannuallyforeachofficer.Whiletheaccreditationprogramnowboaststhe
participationof130agenciesaroundthestate,thisprogramispurelyvoluntary.Becausemanyagenciesfind
itdifficulttosatisfyalloftheprogramsmandates,agenciesarefrequentlydroppedfromthelistofthose
accredited.Asofthiswriting,fewerthanhalfoftheswornofficersworkingindepartmentsoutsideofNew
YorkCityworkinaccreditedagencies.
P a g e |46
trainingfacility....WhatIamsuggestingisthatshouldyourinquiryidentify
trainingdeficiencies,theremustbeameanstoinsuretherequisiteremedial
trainingisdevelopedandalllawenforcementagenciesundertheauspicesof
MPTCarerequiredtocompletethistraining.
Allofourwitnessesfromwithinlawenforcementsharedthisconsensusview
favoringuniformtrainingandanexpansionofthecurrenttwohourmandatefor
confrontationtrainingwithpolicerecruitsonly.WilliamKilfoil,Presidentofthe
NewYorkStateAssociationofChiefsofPolice,saidheissurethatrecruitandin
servicetrainingprograms...willservetohelppreventdeadlypoliceonpolice
confrontations.AllpoliceagenciesthroughoutNewYorkStateshouldbeconducting
themaspartoftheirongoingtraining.CharlesWilson,nationalchairmanof
NABEO,similarlysaid,Trainingregimensmustbechanged.Notonlymustofficers
betaughtpropermethodsforrecognitionandresponse,itmustbecontinuously
reinforced.LarryBrown,representingtheWestchesterRocklandGuardians
Association,explained,Providingamere2hourblockofinstructionduringtheir
recruittraining,regardlessofitsconfiguration,doesnot,norcaniteverproperly
prepareBlackorWhiteofficersfortheseinteractions.JohnBilich,Deputy
CommissionerofDCJS,emphasizedthatitiscriticalthatofficersbetrained
repetitivelyinscenariobased,lifelikesettingsregardingshootanddontshoot
scenariossothattheyarecognizantthattheremayalwaysbethepossibilitythat
anystreetencounterwithanarmedindividualmayinvolveaplainclothes,
undercoveroroffdutyofficerregardlessofrace.Mistakeshappenthesemistakes
needtohappenintraining.Perhapsmostimportant,MichaelHagan,presidentof
theWestchesterPBA,focusedontheimportanceofuniformtrainingthroughouta
region:
[W]emustinsistonstandardizedtrainingthroughoutthestate.Westchester
Countyalonehasover40jurisdictions,ifeachofthesejurisdictionshaseven
minordifferencesintrainingandtacticsinvolvingoffdutyorplainclothes
confrontationsitrendersallofthetrainingineffective.Thetrainingneedsto
beconsistent....Therehasalreadybeenmuchworkdoneonimproving
training,thebiggerchallengeistohavethePoliceCommunityadoptone
consistentpolicythatisuniversallyacceptedandpromoted.
Atastatelevel,thereisnorequiredtrainingonanysubjectformiddlemanagers(e.g.,
lieutenantsandcaptains)ornewlypromotedpolicechiefsorexecutives.TheMPTC
mandatedsupervisorytrainingprogramisonlyfornewlypromotedfirstlinesupervisors,
suchassergeants.Yetitispreciselythelieutenants,captains,assistantanddeputychiefs,
aswellaspolicechiefsandcommissionerswhomustguideadepartmentandits
communitythroughthetraumasthatanyuseofforceentails,especiallywhentheuseof
forceismixedwithissuesofrace.Thesearethesamepolicemanagerswhomustleadtheir
unitsandorganizationsastheyandtheircommunitiesbecomeevenmorediverseand
stretchtoreducetheinfluenceofracialandethnicstereotypesinallaspectsofpolicing.
Thisrequirestraining,yetonlytheNYPDinNewYorkStateprovidesacomprehensiveand
P a g e |47
rigorousprogramoftrainingforofficersastheyrisethroughthesemiddleandseniorranks
ofincreasingmanagerialresponsibilityandleadershipdemands.
UnderstandingthechallengeandpotentialofpolicetrainingonthisoranyissueinNew
YorkStaterequiresseparateconsiderationoftheNYPD.TheNYPD(usingitsownpolice
trainingacademy)providesfarmoretrainingateverylevelthanthestaterequiresandit
employsmorethanhalfoftheswornofficersinthestate.Inaddition,theNYPDsapproach
illustrateshowtrainingcanbeintegratedintothecareerofeverypoliceofficerandintothe
cultureofanorganization.
TheNYPDsbasictrainingfornewrecruitsexceedstheMPTCsminimumhours
requirementsbynearly250hours.NYPDrecruitsreceived97hoursoffirearms
training,includingoffdutyincidentsandconfrontationscenarios.Thedepartments
recentlyadoptedAdvancedTacticalFirearmsTrainingCourseplacesrecruitsin
highstressscenariosdesignedtosimulatesituationsthattheymayencounter
whileonpatrol.
TheNYPDrequiresalluniformedofficerstoundergofirearmsrequalificationtwice
annually,consistingofeighthoursofclassroomtrainingonconfrontationsituations
andtheappropriateuseoffirearms.Inaddition,theNYPDrequiresofficersand
detectivesannuallytocompleteitsinservice,scenariobasedInTaccourse.
Changesofassignmentoftenentailtraining.Officersmovingintoplainclothes
assignmentsreceiveafourdaytrainingcourseincludinginstructiononpersonal
weapons,arrestmechanics,teamtactics,grappling,weaponretention/disarming,
escapetechniques,tacticalhandcuffing,andlegalissues.Newlypromotedsergeants
andlieutenantsreceivetheNYPDsBasicLeadershipCourseandAdvanced
LeadershipCourse,respectively,eachofwhichincludesinstructionontheuseof
force,lesslethalalternatives,andtacticalsupervision.
Anarrayoffurthertrainingisavailableforcaptainsastheyriseintomore
responsibleleadershippositionsinthedepartment.
Thedesignoftraininginanypoliceorganizationshouldalwaysbeaworkinprogressand
anassessmentofthestrengthsandweaknessesoftheNYPDtrainingprogramiswell
beyondthescopeofourreview.WeareencouragedthattheNYPDhasalreadymade
improvementstoitstrainingspecificallyinresponsetotheshootingdeathofOfficerOmar
Edwards,andwetrustthatthiscommitmenttocontinuousimprovementoftrainingon
policeonpoliceconfrontationsandunconsciousracialbiasinshoot/dontshootdecisions
willcontinue.TheNYPDsnewpoliceacademyshouldsoonpermitthedepartmentto
furtherincreaseitsuseofscenariobased,simulationtrainingonconfrontationsituations.
TheContentandMethodofConfrontationTraining
TrainingforOutofUniformOfficersandConfrontedOfficers
Beforeapoliceonpoliceconfrontationbegins,typicallyanoutofuniformofficermakesa
decisiontotakepoliceaction,andoftenalsodecidestodisplayaweapon.Trainingonthe
decisionwhenandhowtotakepoliceactionoutofuniformisthefirststepinavoiding
P a g e |48
policeonpoliceshootings,yettrainingonthissubjectisimpossiblewithanyrigorifitis
notconsistentwithstandardpoliciesandpractices.Itturnsout,however,thatthesevary
acrosspoliceagenciesandseveralmajorpoliceagenciesinNewYorkStatehavenopolicy
atall.Ofthe30midsizedtolargepoliceagenciesparticipatingintheDCJSsurvey,11
indicatedhavingnospecificpoliciesorproceduresthatregulatewhenandhowoffduty
officersshouldinterveneinongoingcriminalactivity,andfiveoftheNYSACOPagencies
indicatedinfollowupinterviewsthattheyalsohadnopoliciesinplace.
Trainingwithintheframeworkofconsistentpoliciesisimperative,anditshouldbe
repeatedregularlyforofficerswhochoosetocarryaweaponoffduty.Wehavealready
notedtheinconsistencyacrossjurisdictionsevenacrosssubstantialpoliceagencies
withinNewYorkStateonwhetheroffdutyofficersarerequiredormerelypermittedto
carrytheirweaponsoffduty.Thosedepartmentsthatarefollowingthecurrenttrendto
permitratherthanrequireoffdutycarrying,alsohaveanopportunitytorequireannual
trainingonoffdutyuseoftheweapon.
Policeexecutives,trainers,andtacticalexpertsareremarkablyconsistentintheirviewson
theappropriatecontentoftrainingforofficerswhocouldbetemptedtotakepoliceaction
outofuniform,whetheroffdutyorworkingplainclothesorundercover.Thebroad
consensuscanbesummarizedinfourruleswhenconsideringintervention,andfourrules
whenactuallychallengedbyanotherofficer.61
Thefourruleswhenconsideringinterventionare:
1. Donottakeenforcementactionoutofuniformifthereisanyalternative.Call911or
usearadiotosummonuniformedofficers.Serveasagoodwitnessratherthan
interveningunlesssomeoneslifeorpersonalsafetyisatstake.
2. Ifyoumustinterveneortakepoliceaction,call911oruseapoliceradiotoalert
otherpoliceunitstoyourpresence,includingyourphysicaldescription,thatyouare
armed,andthatyouareinplainclothes.
3. Displayyourbadgeprominentlywhenengagedinenforcementaction,especially
whenyourweaponisdrawnandvisible,andkeepthebadgeclosetothefirearm.
4. Communicatefrequentlyyouridentityasapoliceofficerinaloudandclearvoice.
Thefourruleswhenconfrontedare:
1. Whenyouhearthecommand,Police!Dontmove!assumethecommandis
addressedtoYOU,notjustthesuspectyouarepursuing.Lockyourselfinposition.
Dontmove.
61WederivedthisparticularversionoftheappropriatecontentfromthetestimonyofDeputyChiefWilliamG.
BrooksIIIoftheWellesley,MassachusettsPoliceDepartment,whoappearedatourpublichearinginHarlem
onDecember3,2009.InadditiontoChiefBrooksotherduties,hehasbeenapoliceacademyinstructorfor
overtwentyyears.Hisviewsandrecommendationswereechoedbymanyoftheexpertwitnessesand
advisorsweconsulted,andcontradictedbynone.
P a g e |49
2. Resistreflexivespin,thenaturaltendencytoturntowardsthevoicethatis
confrontingyou,aseventheturnofyourheadmaybegintobringyourweapon
aroundcausingtheconfrontingofficertofeelthreatened.
3. Useyourvoicetoidentifyyourselfloudlyandclearlyasapoliceofficer.
4. Obeythecommandsofthechallengingofficer,includingacommandtodropyour
weapon,anddonotmakeanymovementwithoutthepermissionofthechallenging
officer;regardlessofyourrankorposition,theuniformedofficerisincommand.
Theserulesthemselvesareneithercomplicatednorcontroversial;thedifficultyisthatthey
instructpoliceofficerstoactinwayscontrarytotheirmostfamiliarpatterns.Forexample,
whileitwasoncecommonforpoliceofficerstobeconsideredalwaysonduty,todays
policeleadersoftendiscourageoffdutyofficersfromgettinginvolvedinincidentsunless
theydeemitnecessarytoprotectlife.62Policiesvarywidelyabouttheprotectionof
property.Yet,manypoliceofficerstoldusthatpartoftheirpersonalitiesandtheir
identitiesaspoliceofficersisthetendencytointervenewhenanycrimeisbeingcommitted
infrontofthem.Policeofficers,asageneralrule,getinvolved.Sothetrainingtoserveasa
witnessratherthanaherowhenoffdutyorinplainclothesisdifficulttofollowinpractice.
Similarly,whenanofficerisconfrontedandorderedtodrophisorherweapon,ones
inclinationistoholdontotheweaponandtopersuadetheconfrontingofficerofyour
identity.Itisonethingtotrainaconfrontedofficertoobeythecommandsofthe
challengingofficer,butitisanotherthingaltogetherfortheconfrontedofficertofollow
thattrainingintheheatofthemoment.Thisiswhysomanyoftherecommendations
abouttrainingonthissubjectconcernthemethodoftrainingratherthanjustthecontent.
Inresponsetoourquestionnaire,manycurrentandformerlawenforcementofficersin
NewYorkStateindicatedthattheyhadundergoneconfrontationtraininginbasicpolice
trainingorininservicetraining.Butmostofthemweretrainedonlythroughlectures,
printedmaterials,andvideos.Whilethesemethodsmaysatisfysometraining
requirements,theyarefarlesseffectivethansimulations,roleplaying,andinteractive,
scenariobasedexercises.Thereissimplynosubstituteforthesescenariobasedexercises,
bothduringbasicandinservicetraining,whichsimulatehighpressuresituations.
TrainingforChallengingOfficers
Trainingforchallengingofficersisequallyimportant.Whilemostpolicedepartment
protocolsplacetheonusfordefusingconfrontationsontheconfrontedofficer,thebest
trainingweencounteredemphasizedequallythelessonsforchallengingofficers.AnNYPD
trainingvideo,forexample,revisedaftertheshootingdeathofOfficerEdwardsandnow
beingrevisedfurther,providesanexcellentexampleoftheapproachtotrainingthatcould
benefitallofficersandsavelives,particularlywhencombinedwithscenariobased
training.63Itsmessagesforchallengingofficersaredirectandwellexplainedbyfrontline
officers:
62Theconsensusonthispointisimpressive.Forexample,theInternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolice
(IACP)recommendsthatoffdutyofficerswhowitnessacrimecallforassistanceratherthanpullinga
weapon.
63NYPDPoliceAcademy,VideoProductionUnit,PreventingFriendlyFire,versionofJune1,2009.
P a g e |50
1. Recognizethatapersonwhoappearstoyoutolooklikeacriminalsuspectmay
wellbeapoliceofficer.Asoneoftheplainclothesofficersinthevideoexplains:
Youshouldntgooutandrightawaysay,Thatpersonsaperp,thatpersonsa
perp,causetheresnosuchthingasapersonlookinglikeaperp.Justbecauseyou
workinanurbanarea,thatdoesntmeanthateveryblackpersonyouseeisaperp.
2. Takecover.Onceyougetcover,youcantakealittletimetoestablishwhothe
personisyoureconfronting.Iftheysaytheyreapoliceofficer,youcanorderthem
toshowtheirshieldslow,toputtheirgundown,andsoon.Coverbuysyoutime
itgivesyouthoseextracoupleofsecondsforanidentificationprocesstooccur.
3. Shout,Police!DontMove!
4. Broadenyourfocusfromthegun.Focusingonlyonthegunisanaturalfirst
response,buttrainingteachesofficerstolisten,look,andanalyzeawidearrayof
cluestounderstandthesituationquickly.Thatincludesknowingthecolorofthe
day.
Thesebasicrulesareanexcellentstartingpoint,buttheycanbesupplementedwith
additionaltrainingforchallengingofficers.Forexample,TaskForceadvisorWilliamGeller
arguesthatpoliceofficersshouldcollectasmuchaccurateinformationaspossiblebothin
anticipationof,andduring,aconfrontationsituation.Inthemoment,thisincludesengaging
indialogueandexchange,sizingupthesituationthroughclearverbalcommunicationand
commands.Dr.Gellerencouragespolicedepartmentstoenhancetheirsystemsfor
communicatingfullandaccurateinformationtoofficers,suchaschecklistsfor911
operatorsanddispatcherstocollectandconveythebestphysicaldescriptionspossibleof
offduty,plainclothes,andundercoverofficerswhomaybeonthescene,aswellas
similarlyaccuratedescriptionsofcriminalsuspects.
Scenariotrainingisjustasimportantforconfrontingofficersasitisforthosewhoare
confronted,andyetitremainstheexceptionintraining.Mostofficersnationwideundergo
mandatoryfirearmsrequalificationtodemonstrateproficiencywithfirearmssafetyandto
practicehowtoshoot,butnotenoughtrainingisgearedtowardmakingtheshoot/dont
shootdecisionandtohandlingthedifficultanddangeroussituationsthatmanyofficers
inevitablyencounter.AsTaskForceadvisorDr.WilliamLewinskidescribesit:
Mostofourfirearmstrainingbeginswithclassroominstructiononthe
applicationoflawandpolicytoforceanddeadlyforcesituation.Thenext
leveloftrainingisonthemanipulationofthetoolswhetherthatbea
handgunoranotherinstrumentofforce.Fewdepartmentsthengoonto
spendconsiderabletimeontherecognitionofpatternsofbehaviorandthe
strategyandtacticsofforceanddeadlyforceencounters.64
P a g e |51
Weappreciatethedifficultyoftraininginthedifficultzonewheretheuseofdeadlyforce
wouldbejustifiedbutmistaken.Considerthefollowingrealexample,describedforusby
retiredpoliceexecutiveHenryDeGeneste:
Inthelate60s/early70s,wegotacallofsomeonebreakingintocarsina
garage.Isawashadowandduckedimmediatelybehindacartotakecover.
ThenIsawaflashthatlookedlikeagun;itturnedouttobeaSaturdayNight
Special.Itoldthekid.Imacop,dropthegun.Ifyoudontdropthegun
youregonnagetshot.Hedroppedthegun.Somecopsworkingforme
wouldhavetakentheshotanditwouldhavetechnicallybeenjustified.65
Tomostpeople,thisisastoryofpolicingatitsbest:experience,confidence,andjudgment
comingtogetherinthemindofaveteranofficer,sparingthelifeofaboywhomaless
courageousofficermighthavekilled.Yetmuchpolicetrainingisfocusedonscenarios
wherehesitationcancostofficerstheirlives.Sometrainerswouldworrythatanytraining
thatencourageshesitationcompromisesofficersafety.Onlyexperiencecanbuildthekind
ofconfidenceandcouragethatthestoryaboveconveys,butthelatestsimulatorsand
interactivetrainingtechnologyaretheclosestthingtothatexperiencethatatraining
programcanprovide.Forexample,afterreviewingitshistoryoffirearmsdischarges,the
NYPDdesignedandimplementeditsAdvancedTacticalFirearmsTrainingCourseatwo
day,realitybasedfirearmstrainingprogramthatplacesofficersinhighstressscenarios
similartothosethathaveledtotragicmistakes.Thistypeofprovinggroundcangreatly
enhanceanofficerstacticalskills.
TrainingforCiviliansonConfrontationswithPolice
ThisTaskForceischargedtoconsidertheimplicationsofpoliceonpoliceshootingsnot
onlyforimprovingofficersafety,butalsoforimprovingthesafetyofthepublic.Sincewe
concludethattheseincidentscontainlessonsthatcanimprovetrainingofpoliceofficersto
deescalateaconfrontationwithotherofficers,wenowaskifthelessonsherecouldalsobe
sharedwithcivilians,increasingthechancethattheytoocanlearntodeescalate
confrontationswithpolice?
Manypoliceandcommunityledorganizationsalreadyprovidethistypeoftraining,often
gearedspecificallytowardyoungpeopleinurbanareas.Asimplesearchoftheinternetfor
informationaboutpoliceencountersyieldsliterallydozensofguides,videos,andother
adviceabouthowcivilianscanhandleencounterswiththepolice.Awidearrayof
organizationsfromtheNationalBlackPoliceAssociationtotheAmericanCivilLiberties
Unionofferadvicetociviliansregardingwhattodowhenstoppedbythepolice.66Several
witnesseswhospokeatourpublichearingsendorsedthetrainingthatalreadytakesplace
onavoluntarybasisinhighschoolsandcommunitycentersinsomeheavilypolicedurban
65StatementofHenryDeGeneste,January29,2010.
66SeeAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion,KnowYourRights:WhattoDoIfYou'reStoppedbythePolice(July30,
2004),http://www.aclu.org/druglawreform_immigrantsrights_prisonersrights_racialjustice/knowyour
rightswhatdoifyoureandNationalBlackPoliceAssociation,WhenStoppedBythePolice:a
Community/CitizenGuide,http://www.blackpolice.org/Stopped.html.
P a g e |52
communities.Forexample,theWestchesterRocklandGuardiansAssociation,an
organizationofblackpoliceofficers,conductsatrainingprogramforyoungpeoplein
WestchesterCountytitled,WhatToDoWhenStoppedbythePolice.Theprogram
providesbasicinstructiontoyouthonhowtohandlepotentialconflictwithpoliceofficers,
urgingthemnottomakeanysuddenmoves,tobehavecourteously,tokeeptheirhands
visible,toavoidarguingevenwithadisrespectfulpoliceofficer,andtoaddress
disrespectfulbehavioratalaterpointbyfilingaformalcomplaint.AtourWhitePlains
Publichearing,formerWestchesterRocklandGuardiansPresidentLarryBrownnotedthat
programssuchasthesehavebeenfoundtobehighlyinstrumentalinexplainingnotonly
citizenrightsbuttheoveralllawenforcementprocess,andhaveservedasaneffectivetool
incommunity/policerelationships.67
Manypeopleofcolor,includingmanypoliceofficersofcolor,toldusthattheyraisetheir
childrenwiththesamelessons.Yetitseemswrongtousthatinstructionforyoungpeople
onstayingsafeduringencounterswithpoliceshouldbeconcentratedincommunitiesof
color.Ifsuchtrainingisvaluableandweareconvincedthatitisthenitshouldbe
universal.Wedonotthinkthatyoungpeopleofcolor,particularlythosegrowingupin
lowincome,urbanneighborhoods,shouldgettheimpressionthattheyneedspecial
instructiononhowtohandlepoliceencountersthatarenotapplicabletotheirwhiteor
wealthycounterparts.Indeed,wenotethatacrosstheUnitedStates,themostcommon
involuntaryencountersciviliansexperiencewithpoliceoccurinthecontextoftrafficstops,
andtheseoccurroughlyproportionatelyacrossraceandethnicity,althoughblackand
Hispanicdriversaresignificantlymorelikelytobesearchedduringthosetrafficstopsthan
arewhitedrivers.68Wereturntothepossibilitieshereinourrecommendations.
67TestimonyofLarryBrown,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).AlsoappearsinViewpointsof
CharlesP.WilsononbehalfoftheWestchesterCountyGuardiansAssociation,December4,2009.
68SeeMatthewR.Durose,EricaL.Smith&PatrickA.Langan,ContactsBetweenthePoliceandthePublic,2005,
U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,April2007,NCJ215243,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.
P a g e |53
4.
Recommendations
Wemakeninerecommendations,eachdesignedtomakearealdifferencebothindividually
andaspartofacomprehensivesetofproposals,eachwithspecificimplicationsfor
multipleagenciesandlevelsofgovernment.Webelievethatifpromptlyadoptedand
faithfullyimplemented,theserecommendationscansavelives.
Wehavedeliberatelyavoidedmakingrecommendationsthataresonumerousordetailed
thattheywouldstandlittlechanceofbeingimplemented.Wearealsomindfulofthe
dangerofthatnewtrainingandreportingrequirementsmaybeviewedasunfunded
mandates.Forthatreason,wehaveconfinedourrecommendationstocosteffective,high
impactstepsthatwebelievecansavethelivesofpoliceofficersandofcivilians.
Inmakingourrecommendations,weacknowledgethecreativeanddiligentworkthatthe
NYPD,theMountVernonPD,theWestchesterCountyDepartmentofPublicSafety,and
otherpoliceagenciesacrossthenationhavealreadyundertakeninresponsetomistaken
identity,policeonpoliceshootingsthathavestruckmembersoftheirowndepartments.
Wehavetriedtospotlightthebestofthatworkinearliersectionsofthisreportandwe
hopethattheireffortssucceed.Forourpart,weconcentrateonactionsthatotherscanand
shouldtaketoeliminateorreducethenumbersofthesetragicpoliceonpoliceshootings
andothermistakenshootingsaswell.Ourrecommendationsarethereforedirected,first,
atpoliceagenciesthathavenotrecentlyexperiencedafatalshootingofthiskind;second,
atthegovernmentoftheStateofNewYork;andthird,attheUnitedStatesgovernment
generally,andattheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeinparticular.
1.DevelopStateandNationalProtocolsforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
Protocolsfordefusingpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsmustbeestablishedabovethelevel
ofindividuallawenforcementagencies.Withmanyofthefatalshootingsinvolvingofficers
frommorethanonepoliceagency,preventingfurthertragediesrequiresthatprotocolsbe
standardizedatleastatthestatelevel,ifnotnationwide.
InNewYorkState,thistaskcouldbetakenupbytheMunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncil
(MPTC),whichhasrepresentationfromtheNYPD,theFBI,andfromsmallandmidsized
policeagenciesacrossthestate.TheMPTCneedstogofurtherthanithasgonesofar,
specifyingasimple,consistentprotocolthatdoesnotleavecrucialelementstobeinvented
byofficersinthemidstofthesecriticalincidents.
Werecommendthatthisprotocolhavethreecomponents,eachconsistingofasetofrules:
thefirstaddressedtoofficersoutofuniformwhoareconsideringtakingpoliceaction,the
secondaddressedtothoseoutofuniformofficerswhoarechallengedbyanotherofficer,
andthethirdaddressedtoallofficersconfrontinganarmedindividualwhomayormaynot
beapoliceofficeroutofuniform.OurrecommendedprotocolappearsinFigure4.1.
P a g e |54
Mostofwhatappearsinthisprotocolisalreadywidelyrecognizedasbestpractice.Weadd
oneelement,suggestedtousbyretiredNYPDDetectiveCaptainFrankA.Bolz,Jr.,to
addressthefactthatconfrontedofficersarenotcurrentlyinstructedhowtoidentify
themselvesverballyasgenuinepoliceofficers.Leavingittoeachindividualintheheatof
themomenttocomeupwithwordsthatwouldonlybeknowntopoliceofficersistoo
vagueanapproach.Ontheotherhand,specifyingtoosimplearesponsetothecommand,
Police!DontMove!wouldinviteoffenderswhoarenotpoliceofficerstopretendtheyare.
WethereforerecommendthatcodedlanguagealreadyusedbySWATofficersasan
instructionnottofirecodesthatarenotgenerallyknownoutsideofpolicingbeapplied
inthesesituationsaswell.
Figure4.1ProposedProtocolforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
ForOfficersTakingActionOutofUniform
1.
2.
3.
4.
OnlyIntervenetoProtectPersonalSafetyorAnothersSafety;otherwise,beagoodwitness
InformthePoliceDispatcherorcall911ifYouareTakingAction,Armed,andinPlainclothes
DisplayYourShieldProminentlyPriortoTakingAction
IdentifyYourselfFrequentlyandLoudlyasaPoliceOfficer
ForConfrontedOfficers
1.
2.
3.
4.
DontMove
AvoidReflexiveSpin
IdentifyYourselfLoudlyasaPoliceOfficer,UsingSpecificCodedLanguage
ObeytheCommandsoftheConfrontingOfficer
ForOfficersChallenginganArmedIndividual
1.
2.
3.
4.
DontStereotype
TakeCover
Shoutclearlyandrepeat:Police!DontMove!
BroadenYourFocusfromtheGuntoAssesstheSituation
Atanationallevel,weurgetheU.S.DepartmentofJusticetoendorsethissameprotocol,
encouragingconsistencyacrossthecountry.TheU.S.Congresshasalreadybegunthe
processofencouragingoffdutyofficerstravelingacrossstatelinestotakepoliceaction
whennecessarythroughLEOSA.Asaresult,thefederalgovernmentcannotescape
responsibilitytoassurethatoutofuniformofficersarequicklyandreliablyidentified
wherevertheyareinthenation.
2.RequireContinuing,InteractiveTrainingonConfrontations
Thisisthefirstofthreerecommendationsonpolicetraining,andlikethenexttwo
requiresactionatthelevelofpolicedepartments,stategovernment,andthefederal
government.Trainingonconfrontationsisessentialtoavoidmoredeathsandserious
P a g e |55
injury,andthattrainingmustbeinteractiveandmustcontinuethroughoutanofficers
careerandacrossallranks.
InNewYorkState,thecurrenttwohourblockofconfrontationtrainingrequiredbythe
MPTCforallnewrecruitsshouldbeexpandedandmadeinteractive,makinguseof
simulationsandroleplays,witheveryrecruitplayingtherolesofboththechallengingand
theconfrontedofficertoexperienceconfrontationsfrombothsidesofthegun.
WestchesterCountysZone3PoliceTrainingAcademyhasalreadyincorporatedthis
recommendationintoitsentryleveltrainingprogramanditmayserveasthemodelfor
statewideimplementation.Inaddition,trainingontheinteractivetrainingonthe
protocolsshouldbereinforcedthroughoutthecurriculum,particularlyduringannual
firearmsrequalification.
ItispasttimetorequireinservicetrainingforpoliceofficersinNewYorkState.TheState
LegislatureshouldamendNewYorkExecutiveLaw840toexpandtheauthorityofthe
MPTCtorecommendtothegovernorrulesandregulationswithrespecttorequirements
formandatoryinservicetrainingwiththeabilitytocustomizeannualtrainingcycles.The
MPTCshouldthenrecommendtotheGovernoraminimumrequirementof21hoursof
annualinservicetrainingforallstateandlocallawenforcementofficers,toinclude
firearmsrequalification,scenariobasedtrainingwithintegratedpoliceonpolice
confrontationsituations,reviewofstandardsforappropriateuseofforce,legalupdates,
andcontemporaryissuesasidentifiedbytheCouncilforthatcycle.Wefurther
recommendthattheMPTCdisseminateitsrecommendationtotheheadsofalllaw
enforcementagenciesoperatinginNewYorkStateandthatitencouragethosenot
specificallygovernedbyitsrecommendations,suchastheNYPD,theStatePolice,andother
stateandfederalagencies,toadoptthesameminimumstandard.Sucha21hourannualin
servicetrainingrequirementwouldbringalllawenforcementagenciesinNewYorkState
inlinewiththecurrentrequirementforaccreditedagencies.ItisourhopethatDCJS,the
MPTC,theNewYorkStateSheriffsAssociationandtheNewYorkStateAssociationof
ChiefsofPolicecanthenworkcollectivelytodevelopthisrequiredannualinservice
programforallpoliceagencieswithinthestate.
Similarly,itistimetorequiresomebasictraininginmanagementandleadershipfor
lieutenants,captains,assistantanddeputychiefs,andothermidlevelpolicemanagers,as
wellaschiefsandcommissioners.Itisunacceptablethatstaterequiredtrainingdoesnot
extendintoapolicecareerbeyondanofficerspromotiontosergeant.Werecommend,
therefore,thattheNewYorkStateLegislatureamendNewYorkExecutiveLaw840,
empoweringtheMPTCtorecommendtothegovernorrequiredtrainingprogramsin
managementandleadershipformiddlemanagersandpoliceexecutivesateveryrank.The
MPTCshouldthenrecommendtotheGovernortrainingrequirementsthatinclude
governingtheuseofforce,strengtheningcommunityrelations,interactingwiththenews
media,andleadingondiversity.
Thefederalgovernmenthasadoublerolehere.Mostdirectly,federallawenforcement
agenciesmustpreventpoliceonpoliceshootingsamongtheirownofficersandthestate
andlocalpolicewithwhomtheyconductjointoperations.Equallyimportant,however,the
P a g e |56
U.S.DepartmentofJusticecanleadimprovementsatthestateandlocallevelthroughthe
OfficeofJusticePrograms,theOfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices(theCOPS
Office),theCommunityRelationsService,theCivilRightsDivision,andtrainingprovided
bytheFBI.69WethereforerecommendthattheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeandtheU.S.
DepartmentofHomelandSecurityintroduceinteractive,confrontationtrainingaspartof
theestablishmentofeveryjointtaskforcewithstateandlocalpolice,andthatsuchtraining
continuetobeprovidedasnewofficersareaddedtoanysuchtaskforce.Thiswillhelp
withthefederalgovernmentsdirectrole,whilesimultaneouslyexposingpoliceagencies
acrossthecountrytohighqualitytrainingonthissubject,settingabenchmarkforthe
developmentofstateandlocaltraining.
WefurtherrecommendthattheU.S.DepartmentofJusticedevelopandmakeavailable,at
locallevelandfederalexpense,interactive,confrontationtrainingforanyoffdutyor
retiredofficertravelingwithaconcealedweaponacrossstatelinespursuanttoLEOSA.
Thistrainingshouldbeprovidedbyexistingstateandlocalpolicetraininginstitutions,but
thetrainingshouldbedevelopedandfundedbytheU.S.DepartmentofJusticesothatitis
standardacrossthenationanddoesnotfurtherburdenstateandlocaltrainingbudgetsfor
whatisanationalresponsibility.
Finally,weurgetheU.S.DepartmentofJusticetoworkwithoneormoreofthenational
associationsofpoliceexecutivesandwiththeWestchesterandWhitePlainsPolice
Departments,theNYPD,andotheragenciesthathaveenduredthesetragedies,tocreatea
leadershiptrainingmoduleontheresponsetomistakenidentitypoliceonpolice
shootings.Thetrainingmoduleshouldbebasedonahypotheticalcaseofamidsized
policeagencyandshouldbeconstructedasacomposite,drawingonelementsofthe
shootingsofOfficersRidleyandEdwards,andperhapsothers.Thefocuswouldnotbeon
thefrontlineofficersinvolved,butontheresponseofleadershipatthelevelsofcaptainand
above.Issuestobecoveredwouldincludealineofdutydeathpolicy,notificationoffamily
members,managementofthecrimescene,communicationwithinthedepartment,
communicationwiththemedia,managementoftheinvestigation,identificationofissuesof
race,managementofracialtensionsthroughbothinternalandexternalcommunications,
treatmentofthechallengingandshootingofficers,andactionstopreventrecurrence,
amongothers.Themodulecouldbeofferedinstatetrainingprogramsaswellasat
nationalconferencesandconventionsoftheassociationsofpoliceexecutives.Sucha
trainingmodulewouldcontainvaluablelessonsapplicabletoawiderangeofmanagement
andleadershipchallenges,wellbeyondthesepoliceonpoliceshootingsthemselves.It
woulddrawonthedramaticandemotionalpowerofthesetragediestoteachskills
essentialtopoliceleadershiptodaydoingaservicetothefieldwhilemarkingthelegacy
oftheseofficers.
69TheOfficeofJusticeProgramsincludesseveralrelevantagencies,inparticulartheNationalInstituteof
Justice,theBureauofJusticeStatistics,andtheBureauofJusticeAssistance.
P a g e |57
3.DevelopTestingandTrainingtoReduceUnconsciousRacialBiasin
Shoot/DontShootDecisions
Amongthemostpromisingdevelopmentswehaveencounteredisthedevelopmentof
testingthatcanidentifytheexistenceofunconsciousracialbiasinshoot/dontshoot
decisions,alongwiththesuggestioninearlyresearchthatpolicetrainingandexperience
mayreducethisbias.Thislineoftestingandtrainingmightsavenotonlythelivesofpolice
officersofcolorinpoliceonpoliceconfrontations,butofmanyciviliansaswell.
Thescientificbasisforthistestingandtrainingremainsuncertain,andmuchmore
researchisneeded.TheNewYorkPoliceDepartmenthastakentheleadinthisfieldby
beginningitsownexperimentswiththistesting,incollaborationwiththeresearcherswho
havepioneeredthiswork,andweurgeotherlargepoliceorganizationstofollowthe
NYPDsexamplehere.
Thedevelopmentofthistoolmightproceedalongapathsimilartothattakenbycrime
mappingtechnologyfifteenyearsago:withmanyindividualpoliceagenciesexperimenting
ontheirown,withagrowingnumberofuniversitybasedresearchersmakinguseofthe
tools,andwiththeNationalInstituteofJusticecreatinganationalcentertoconvene
interesteddepartmentsandresearchersannuallyandtobringfederalresourcestobearon
theearlyapplicationofthetools.Thedevelopmentofthesemethodsfortestinglevelsof
unconsciousracialbiasinshoot/dontshootdecisionsiscertainlyassignificantforthe
propercontroloftheuseofforceasgeocodingandcomputermappinghaveproventobe
fortheresponsetocrime.
WethereforerecommendthattheNationalInstituteofJusticeissueaspecialsolicitationto
researchersworkinginpartnershipwithlawenforcementagenciestodevelopandapply
thepotentialofthistesting.Wefurtherrecommend,followingtheexampleofcrime
mapping,thattheNationalInstituteofJusticecreateacenterforinherentbiasreduction
thatwouldbothdevelopapplicationsandconvenethoseactiveinthefieldoverthenext
fiveyears,andhighlightpolicetrainingprogramsandothereffortsthatareshownto
reduceunconsciousracialbiasasmeasuredinthesetests.
Atthesametime,weurgelargepoliceagenciesnotonlytoexaminetheearlyresearchand
tofollowtheresultsoftheexperimentsintheNYPD,butalsotobegintheirown
experimentationwiththistestingtechnology.Breakthroughsinthisareahavethe
potentialtocontributebothtoofficersafetyandgreaterpublicsafetysimultaneously
withoutdivertingattentionfromtheimportanceoftrainingofficersonhowtohandle
themselveswhenconfronted.
4.ExpandDiversityTrainingtoIncludeIssuesofDiversitywithinPolice
Agencies
Whilemostpolicetrainingcurriculatodayincludeunitsontheimportanceoftreatingall
personsequally,regardlessofgender,race,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religion,language,
sexualorientation,andotherfeaturesofidentity,thereislittlefocusondiversitywithin
P a g e |58
policeorganizations.Yetpoliceorganizationsarebecomingsubstantiallymorediverse
alongalloftheselines.Forexample,theNYPDreportsthatithasseenasignificant
demographicshiftoverthepastdecade,withofficersofcolorcomprisingjustover35
percentoftheforcein2001,butnowcomprisingnearly47percentofuniformedpersonnel
andover53percentofthoseholdingtherankofpoliceofficer.70
Werecommendthatpolicetrainingondiversityaddresstheseinternalissuesofdiversity,
evenwhiledepartmentscontinuetomaketheirexistingtrainingonpolicecommunity
relationshipsmoreeffective.Policeonpoliceconfrontationsprovideapowerfullens
throughwhichtheseissuesmightbeunderstoodanddiscussedinatrainingcontext,
especiallywhentheofficersinvolvedbelievethatissuesofappearanceandracialand
ethnicidentitymayhaveinfluencedtheconductofofficersintheencounter.Those
developingsuchtrainingmightbeginbysurveyingtheirownofficersaboutoffdutyand
plainclothespoliceonpoliceconfrontations,andaskingaboutissuesofappearanceor
identitythatmighthavecontributedtoanyaspectoftheconfrontation.Thesesurvey
responsescanprovidecompellingstoriesaboutthechallengesofdiversitywithinpolicing.
Moregenerally,thosedevelopingthistrainingmightcollectawidevarietyofoffduty
experiencesfromtheofficersofcolororotherminoritiesrepresentedwithintheir
agencies,usingthesetointroducediscussionsofthediversityinthewidercommunities
theseagenciesserve.
Manycurrentandretiredofficersofcolor,includingmembersofourTaskForce,believe
thatamongthecontributionstheycanmaketoimprovedpolicingistohelptheirfellow
officersavoidstereotypingbydressorotherfeaturesofpersonalappearance,especially
amongyoungpeopleofcolor.Weencouragepolicetrainingdepartmentstotakeadvantage
ofthisdesiretohelpandtomakeuseofthegrowingdiversitywithinlawenforcementto
groundtrainingintheexperienceoftheofficerswithineachagency.
5.DesignateandTrainaSpecializedTeamtoSupportDepartmentsthat
ExperienceaPoliceonPoliceShooting
WehopethatNewYorkStateneverseesanotherfatal,policeonpoliceshooting.Still,it
wouldbeirresponsibletobeunpreparedtorespondtosuchatragedyshouldoneoccur
againsomewhereinthestate.
Theresponseofanyorganizationtoarareeventisalwaysdifficultbecausetheskills
learnedandinstinctshonedthroughexperiencearelessdeveloped,andmistakestherefore
occurmoreeasily.Policeonpoliceshootingsarepreciselysuchrareevents,andthe
difficultiesinherentinanyrareeventarecompoundedherebytheemotionsthatthese
shootingsinevitablystirinallpoliceofficers.Indeedfatal,mistakenidentity,policeon
policeshootingsareprobablythemostdifficultshootingsthatapoliceinvestigatoror
commandereverconfronts,inpartbecausetheinvestigatorsandcommandersdealing
withanyindividualcaseandtheemotionsitstirsuphaveneverdonesobefore.
70SeeAppendixD,LetterfromNYPDCommissionerRaymondW.KellytoGovernorDavidA.Paterson,Nov.
25,2009at6.
P a g e |59
Whatkindofsupportwouldadepartmentwantandneedinthefaceofsuchashooting?
Chiefswhohavefacedthesesituationstellustheywereunpreparedtodealwith
notificationoffamily,psychologicalsupporttoofficersonthesceneandtothosewho
workedwiththeofficerwhowasshot,communicationwiththepublic,andmore.
Investigationscanalsoproveunusual,withofficersfromacrossthedepartmentinvolving
themselves,offeringinformation,andtryingtohelpbringwitnessesforward.Asupport
teamshouldbepreparedtoofferadviceandassistanceinalloftheseareas.
Thequestionsofcredibilityintheseinvestigationsarealsocomplex.Iftheshootingis
controversial,thecontroversyislikelyonedividingthepoliceagencyitselforpittingone
agencyagainstanother,withsomepoliceofficersandtheirfamiliesquestioningthe
credibilityofotherpoliceofficers.If,inaddition,theshootingraisesissuesofrace,awider
debatemaybeswirlingaroundtheinvestigation.Thesupportteamshouldtherefore
includeinvestigativeexpertise,includingdetectivestrainedinpreviouspoliceonpolice
shootingsandabletobringthelessonsfromearliercasestotheinvestigationofanewone.
Thecostofsuchasupportteammustbemodest,forgovernmentswillbereluctantto
investsubstantialsumsinpreparationforaneventthatmayneveroccur,anditwillbe
especiallydifficulttosustainanyinvestmentastheserecentshootingsbecomemore
distant.Butbecausenospecializedcapacitytodayexiststorespondtotheseshootings
anywhere,thecreationofsomecapacityinNewYorkStatecouldbeofserviceelsewhere,
andmightalsorecoversomeofitscost,ifitshelpisrequestedbyanotherstateorbythe
federalgovernment.
Forthesereasons,werecommendthatacommitteeoflawenforcementexecutivesfrom
thethreeorfourlargestlocalagenciesinNewYorkStatebeconvenedtodesigna
specializedsupportteamtoassistanydepartmentintheStatewithanyfuturepoliceon
policeshootings.Thiscommitteeshoulddeterminewhatnumberandtypeofpersonnel
shouldbeincludedandhowitshouldbeledandmanaged.
Tokeepthecostslow,werecommendthatthisnotbetheprincipalassignmentforany
memberoftheteam.Rather,werecommendthatmembershipontheteambean
assignmentinadditiontoregularduties,andthatitcarrymerelyanexpectationof
participationinjointtrainingatinceptionandthenonaregularbasis.Wedonotbelieve,
however,thattheteamshouldbehousedeitherwithintheStatePoliceorDCJS.Thiswould
needtobeanoperational,locallycredibleanddiplomaticteamthatcouldrealistically
operateinNewYorkCityoranyotherjurisdictionwithinthestate.
WerecommendthattheGovernorconvenethisplanningcommitteetoestablishtheprecise
operationalrequirementsforsuchateam,tospecifythevariousrelationshipsthatsucha
teammighthavetoanyspecificcaseandtoidentifykeyresourcestosupportits
operations.
Inevitably,therewillbedelicateissuesofcomityandrespectwiththedeploymentofany
supportteamincludingofficersfromoutsidethelocationofapoliceonpoliceshooting.
Thesesensitivitieswouldprobablymakethedeploymentofsuchateamonanyregular
P a g e |60
basisimpossible;butpoliceonpoliceshootingsveryrare.Ifthesupportteamwe
recommendisassembledwithcareandsensitivitytotheseissues,webelievethatitwould
bewelcomedbypoliceleadershipinajurisdictionthatexperiencesoneoftheseshootings.
SuchateamwouldhaveatleastfourbenefitsfortheStateofNewYork.First,itwould
bringtobearthehighestqualityresponsepossibletotheserare,highprofile,tragiccases.
Second,itwouldaddalevelofcredibilitytotheresponsebecauseoftheparticipationof
expertsfrommultipleagencies.Theteammembersmightevenincludeforensicexperts
fromafederallawenforcementagencyoracivilianlegaladvisor.Weleavetheprecise
compositionoftheteamtotheplanningcommittee,buttheteamshouldbecomposedwith
aneyetothecredibilitythatitisdesignedtobringtothesecases.Third,itwouldgradually
spreadexpertiseinthesesensitivecasesthroughoutthestate,asofficersfromseveral
agenciesrotatedthroughtheteam,eachgainingrigoroustrainingintheresponseto
complexcases.Fourth,itwouldestablishNewYorkStateasaleaderintheresponseto
thesepoliceonpoliceshootingcases.Wecaneasilyimaginethatthisteam,once
established,wouldbecalledupontoassistdepartmentsinotherstateswithfatalpoliceon
policeshootings,muchasotheremergencyresponseteamsarecalledupon.Fundingfor
anydeploymentsoutofstateshouldcomefromtherequestingjurisdictionorfromthe
federalgovernment,butwerecommendthatthisteambeopentosuchrequests,aseach
willaddtoitsexperienceandexpertise.
6.EstablishaMandatoryStatewideReportingSystemforPoliceFirearms
DischargesandaVoluntary,AnonymousSystemforReportingPoliceon
PoliceConfrontations
Mostpoliceonpoliceshootingsarepreventable,butonlyifsupervisors,trainers,and
officersthemselvesunderstandhowtheyhavehappenedinthepast.Inthewakeofthe
deathofOfficerOmarEdwards,theNYPDwasabletocollectinformationonprevious
policeonpoliceshootingswithinthedepartmentfatalornotbecauseithadearlier
beguntomaintainarecordofallpolicefirearmsdischarges.Asaresult,theNYPDisableto
learnfromitsexperience.Thesameisnottrueatthestatelevelbecausemanydepartments
donotkeeparecordofallshotsfired,andnoneofthemarerequiredtoreportthis
informationtothestate.Thatshouldchange.
AlllawenforcementagencieswithinNewYorkStateshouldberequiredtorecordand
reporttoDCJSarecordofallpolicefirearmsdischarges,includingthoseinwhichcivilians
aretargets.71Timely,accurateandcomprehensiveinformationaboutpoliceshootingswill
alsohelptobetterinformthepublicaboutbothproblemsandprogress,particularlywithin
communitiesofcolor.
71See,forexample,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment,AnnualFirearmsDischargeReport,2008.Thevalueof
thiskindofreportingwasdescribedbyDonnaLiebermanandChristopherDunnoftheNewYorkCivil
LibertiesUnion,intheirwrittensubmissionofDecember2,2009,totheTaskForce:Ifcompletefactual
informationaboutshootingsisfreelyavailabletothepublicadvocates,electedofficials,academics,the
media,andotherlawenforcementagenciesitwillgreatlyenhancethelikelihoodthattheroleofracein
shootingswillgetathoroughreview.
P a g e |61
Weconsideredandrejectedtheideathatpoliceagenciesberequiredonlytorecordand
reportpoliceonpoliceshootings.Lawenforcementexpertsadvisedusthatadepartment
wouldonlybeabletoaccuratelyreportpoliceonpoliceshootingsifitwereroutinely
recordingandreportingallfirearmdischarges.Werecognizethatinorderforadata
reportingrequirementtobefaithfullyimplemented,itmustcomplementexistingreporting
obligations,formatsandmethods.Aspecialprocessforreportingonlypoliceonpolice
shootingswouldbeunreliable.Furthermore,wealsobelievethattheresultsofthis
reportingwillonlybevaluablewhenviewedinthewidercontextofallfirearmsdischarges.
WethereforerecommendthattheGovernorsubmitandthattheNewYorkState
Legislatureadoptlegislationrequiringalllawenforcementagenciesinthestatetoreportto
DCJSannuallyallfirearmsdischargesbyitsswornofficers.Thelegislationshouldspecify
thatthesereportsshouldappropriatelyidentifydemographicinformation(including,but
notlimitedtotheage,rank,gender,race/ethnicity,dutyassignment,etc.)ofallparties
involved,alongwithsummaryinformationaboutthecircumstances,injuriestoanyparty,
andotherrelevantinformation.AnditshouldalsorequireDCJStopublishannualreports
onthisfirearmdischargedata.
Weconsideredandrejectedtheideathatallpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsbereportedto
thestate.Wearepersuadedthatthevastmajorityoftheseconfrontations,eventhose
involvingthedisplayofaweapon,arenotreportedthroughanyformalchannel,andmost
arenotreportedeveninformally.Withsomenotableexceptions,theofficersinvolvedon
bothsidesareusuallyembarrassedandapologetic,resolvingthemisunderstandingamong
themselves.Anyefforttorequirereportingoftheseconfrontationswouldfail.
Atthesametime,werecognizethevaluefortrainingandpreventivepurposesofasmuch
informationascanbegatheredaboutconfrontationsthatdonotinvolveshotsbeingfired.
Wethereforerecommendasacomplementtothemandatoryreportingofpoliceonpolice
firearmsdischargesthattheLegislaturealsorequirealllawenforcementagenciestooffer
thechancetoallofficersduringannualfirearmsrequalificationtovoluntarilycompletean
anonymousquestionnairereportingthedetailsofanypoliceonpoliceconfrontationsin
thelastyear.FullcopiesofthesecompletedquestionnairesshouldbeforwardedtoDCJS
foranalysisandinclusioninanannualreportonpoliceonpoliceshootingsandother
confrontations.WefurtherrecommendthatDCJScooperatewiththeInternational
AssociationoftheChiefsofPoliceintheireffortstoestablishanationaldatarepositorythat
wouldincludepoliceonpoliceshootings.72
Withanyphenomenonthisrare,thereisnosubstitutefornationaldata.TheFBIsLEOKA
programalreadycollectsinformationaboutfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsandfelonious
72Asaresultofthesignificantlimitationsontheavailabilityofnationaldataregardingdutyrelateddeaths
andinjuriesofpoliceofficers,theInternationalAssociationofChiefsofPoliceisplanningtoestablishaCenter
forthePreventionofViolenceAgainstthePolice.TheproposedCenterwouldserveasarepositoryof
nationaldataandanincubatorforresearchandthedevelopmentofbestpracticesforthepreventionof
violenceagainstlawenforcementofficers.TheTaskForceenthusiasticallysupportstheestablishmentofthis
CenterandapplaudstheIACPfortakingtheinitiativeinthisarea.Carefulandcomprehensivedatacollection
andanalysiscanbepowerfultoolsinpreventingthetragedyofmistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootings.
P a g e |62
assaultsofpoliceofficers.Atpresent,however,fatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsare
subsumedinalargeraccidentalshootingcategoryandnonfatalpoliceonpolice
shootingsarenotcapturedinLEOKAdataatall.WeencouragetheU.S.Departmentof
JusticeandtheFBItoenhancetheLEOKAprogramsdatacollectioneffortstoincludeand
clearlydelineatemistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootingsinitsstandarddata
categories.WefurtherrecommendthatLEOKAconductfollowupinterviewswiththelaw
enforcementagenciesinvolvedinanyreportedfatalornonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootings
orconfrontations.Currently,itsfollowupinterviewsarelimitedtoincidentsinvolving
feloniousassaultsonofficers.
7.PromoteTransparencyinProsecutorialDecisionsRegardingPoliceon
PoliceShootings
Anyindividualpoliceonpoliceshootingmayormaynotresultinprosecutionofoneor
moreoftheofficersoncriminalcharges,thoughthisseemsnottohaveoccurredanywhere
inthelast30years.Somepoliceonpoliceshootingsleadtocivillitigation.Nevertheless,
thepossibilityofprosecutionandlitigationinthesecasesshouldnotbeanexcusefor
withholdinginformationfromthepublic.Webelievethattransparencymustbeamongthe
primarygoalsofallinvestigatorsandprosecutorsdealingwiththesecases.Theneedfor
transparencycould,incertaincircumstances,begroundsfortheappointmentofaspecial
prosecutorunderexistingstatutoryauthority,butwebelievethatelecteddistrictattorneys
canhandlethesecasesascrediblyasanyspecialprosecutoriftheymaintainacommitment
topublictransparencywithinthelimitsofexistinglaw.
Werecognizethatsomeadvocateshavecalledfortheappointmentofastanding,fulltime
specialprosecutortohandleoneorallpoliceonpoliceshootingcasesinNewYorkState.
Morecommonhavebeencallsforanindependentinvestigativebody.Forexample,inhis
presentationtotheTaskForce,DamonJones,PresidentoftheNortheastRegionofthe
NationalBlackPoliceAssociation(NBPA),explainedhisviewthatanindependent
investigativeunitcouldreviewincidentsfromthestart,whenevidencecollectionand
interviewingwitnessesismostimportant.73Similarly,DetectiveAnthonyMitchell,
PresidentoftheWestchesterChapteroftheNBPA,testified:
ImplementingaStatewideIndependentInvestigativeUnitwilleliminatethe
perceptionofinjusticewithinthelawenforcementranksandensurethat
boththeofficersandtheallegedvictimsreceiveafairandimpartialthorough
investigation.Itwilluncoverthetruthbasedontheevidence,whichmay
resolvesomanyunansweredquestionswhilecontinuouslybuildingtrust
betweenlawenforcementandthecommunity.Therehavebeentoomany
incidentsinvolvinglawenforcementwithtoomanyquestionsandnot
enoughanswers.Wearecallingformoretransparencywithinthesystemto
protectbothourlawenforcementofficersandthecitizensinthecommunity
inwhichtheyserve.74
73TestimonyofDamonJones,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
74TestimonyofAnthonyMitchell,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
P a g e |63
CharlesWilsonoftheNationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficersechoedthese
sentimentsatourAlbanyhearing:
Theinvestigativeprocessfortheseincidentsmust...becomemore
transparent,asithasbecomeincreasinglyclearthatthecommunity,and
manyoftheofficersthemselves,havelittleornofaithinthemethodologyby
whichthepolicepolicethemselves.Independentinvestigativebodies
shouldbeputinplace,whetherbylegislativeactorexecutivefiatthatwill
havetheabilityandauthoritytoconsidertheactionsofallpartiesinvolvedin
theseincidents,aswellasthepowertobringtobeartheforceofthejustice
systemuponthosewhotransgress.75
Nevertheless,webelievethatthecreationofthestatewidesupportteamrecommended
above,combinedwithacommitmenttotransparencyinprosecutorialdecisionmaking,
willachievethegoalsmanyoftheseadvocatesseek.Investigationsbypoliceand
prosecutorsshouldbepursuedwithacommitmenttoeventualfulldisclosureofwhat
happenedandhowtheinvestigationwasconducted.
Wedonotfindcompellingreasonstoprioritizeconfidentialityovertheneedforpublic
confidence.Whiletheneedforsomeconfidentialityisunderstandable,itmustbebalanced
withthepublicsneedtoknowthattheirpolicedepartmentscanbetrustedtopolice
themselves.Andgiventheirroleinamassinginformationforgrandjuryproceedings,
DistrictAttorneysareinthebestpositiontoensuretransparency.Experienced,skillful
prosecutorsknowhowtohonorgrandjurysecrecywhilestillpermittingampleandtimely
publicdisclosure.Inshort,prosecutorsconsideringcriminalliabilityinthesecasesshould
erronthesideofpublicdisclosure,usingthegrandjurytoinvestigatebutnottoshroudthe
caseinsecrecy.TheGovernorandtheAttorneyGeneralshouldusetheirpowerstoappoint
specialprosecutorsorassumetheprosecutionthemselvesonlytotheextentthatdoingso
representsthemosteffectivewaytomaintaintransparencyandcredibilityforthepublic.
8.ApplytheLessonsofPoliceonPoliceShootingstoReduceMistakenPolice
CivilianShootings
OurchargefromtheGovernorwastoexaminetheimplicationsofpoliceonpolice
shootingstoenhanceofficersafetyandpublicsafety,andthismustincludeapplyingthe
lessonswehavelearnedtosavecivilianliveswheneverpossible.Wehaveconcludedthat
protocolsandtrainingforconfrontedofficerscanhelpthemavoidanddefusearmed
confrontationswithotherpolice,andwebelievesimilarbenefitswouldcomefrom
protocolsandtrainingforcivilianswhofindthemselvesinconfrontationswithpolice.
Advicetoremainabsolutelymotionless,toobeythecommandsoftheofficerincharge,and
toavoidturningtowardstheofficermightallbeapplicabletocivilians.Forthosewitha
limitedunderstandingofEnglish,itmightevenbeusefultoidentifyoneselfloudlyand
75TestimonyofCharlesWilson,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).
P a g e |64
clearlyassomeonewhoisfluentonlyinacertainlanguage,orassomeonewhodoesnot
understandEnglish.
Indeed,manypoliceorganizationsalreadyparticipateinvoluntarytrainingprogramsthat
helpciviliansnavigatehighstressencounterswithpoliceofficersduringtrafficstopsand
pedestrianstops.Yet,theexisting,voluntaryprogramsarelargelyaimedatyouthofcolor
inurbancommunities.Weareconcernedthatthisfocusmayinadvertentlycommunicate
thattheseyoungpeopleneedinstructiontocomplywithpolicecommandsinwaysthat
theirwhiteorwealthycounterpartsdonot.Ifadviceandtrainingisusefulforcivilianswho
findthemselvesinconfrontationswithpoliceofficers,itisimportantitbeofferedona
universalbasis,notonlytocertainpeople.
WerecommendthatDCJSconveneacommitteeofnonprofitorganizationsthatcurrently
offerprogramsoftrainingforciviliansonhowtohandlethemselvesduringconfrontations
withpolice.Thatcommitteeshouldreviewthelessonsdrawnfromthepoliceonpolice
shootingsandconsiderdevelopingcommonadviceforciviliansthatcanbedisseminated
byanyinterestedorganizationsondeescalatingconfrontations.Thatadvicemightbe
usefullydividedbetweenadvicefortrafficstopsandadviceforpedestrianstops.Inboth
cases,theadvicemightemphasizetheimportanceofremainingstill,keepinghandsvisible,
andobeyingtheinstructionsoftheofficerstoppingyou.Theguidelinesshouldbe
developedtobebroadlyapplicabletovariouscontextssothatasimplesetofguidelinescan
servecivilianswellinasmanysituationsaspossibleandcanbecomecommonknowledge.
Inordertounderscoretheuniversalnatureofthisadvice,werecommendthattheadvice
forhandlingoneselfinatrafficstopbeincludedamongthequestionsaskedaspartofthe
writtenportionoftheexaminationforadriverslicenseinNewYorkState.Requiringthis
knowledgeasuniversallyaspossiblewillhelptospreadtheknowledgewidelyandremove
anyunintendedstigmathatmightbeassociatedwiththeneedforthisguidance.Themost
recentnationalsurveydatasuggestthatthelargestcategoryofpolicecivilianencounters
occurintrafficstops,andtheseoccurroughlyequallyacrossracialandethniclines.76
9.ExpandUnderstandingoftheLifeExperiencesofOfficersofColor
Wereturn,inourfinalrecommendation,tothemoststrikingfactrevealedbyour
examinationofalmost30yearsofpoliceonpoliceshootings:officersmistakenfor
offendersandkilledwhileoffdutyhavealmostallbeenofficersofcolor,whereasofficers
killedwhileworkingplainclothesorundercoverhavebeenofallracesandethnicities.Why
areofficersofcoloratsuchspecialriskwhentakingactionoffduty?
Theanswertothatquestionisunknown,butcertainlycomplicated.Yetthescholarshipon
policingintheUnitedStateshasvirtuallyignoredtheoffdutyexperiencesofofficersof
color.Althoughresearchonpolicinghaspenetratedalmosteveryaspectofthisdangerous
work,ithasrarelyifeverfollowedofficersofcolorbackhomeattheendoftheirshifts.
76Durose,etal.,http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.
P a g e |65
ThreeoftheninemembersofthisTaskForcearecurrentorretiredofficersofcolor,asare
manyofthosewhoofferedtestimonyorwrittensubmissionstous.Together,theyand
othershavealertedustothespecialstrainsandtensionsthatofficersofcolorfacewhen
theytakeofftheiruniforms.OneAfricanAmericanformerpolicechiefdescribedbeing
stoppedbypoliceofficerswhodidnotrecognizeherwhenshewastryingtoenterherown
home;anotherformerchieftoldusofwarninghisson,alsoapoliceofficer,tobeonhis
guardbecausehisblackskinmakeshimdifferentfromotherofficers.
Aspoliceagenciesacrossthenationbecomemorediverse,theleadersoftheseagencies
needtounderstandmoreaboutthelifeexperiencesoftheirofficersofcolor,especiallythe
experienceswhileoutofuniform.Weurgepoliceexecutivesacrossthenationtoengage
theirofficersofcolorinstructuredconversationsabouttheseexperiencesonaregular
basis.Equallyimportant,weurgetheNationalInstituteofJusticeandtheOfficeof
CommunityOrientedPolicingServices(theCOPSOffice)tosupportresearchintothis
largelyignoredareaofcontemporarypolicingandtoengageabroadspectrumofofficersof
colorandthevariouspolicefraternalorganizationsthatrepresentthemindialoguewith
policeexecutivesandresearchersabouttheseissues.Itshouldnottakeapoliceonpolice
shootingtoshakethefieldintoawarenessabouttheneedtorespect,support,andembrace
officersofcolorastheystrivetodotheirduty,servetheircountry,andbringsafetyand
justicetocommunitiesthatneedthemsodearly.
P a g e |66
Figure4.2SummaryofRecommendations
1. DevelopStateandNationalProtocolsforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
a. InNewYorkState,theMPTCshoulddevelopstatewideprotocolsfortakingpoliceactionoutof
uniform,protocolsforconfrontedofficers,andprotocolsforchallengingofficers.
b. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeshouldendorsethesameprotocolsencouragingconsistency
acrossthecountry.
2. RequireContinuing,InteractiveTrainingonConfrontations
a. InNewYorkState,theMPTCshoulddoublethecurrent2hourmandateandshouldrequirethat
thetraininguseinteractivesimulationsandroleplaying.
b. Policeagenciesshouldincludeconfrontationtrainingasapartofannualfirearms
requalification.
c. TheNewYorkStateLegislatureshouldamendNYExec.LawSec.840togivetheMPTCthesame
authorityoverinservicetrainingthatitcurrentlyexercisesoverrecruittraining.
d. TheNewYorkStateLegislatureshouldamendNYExec.LawSec.840togivetheMPTCthesame
authorityoverpolicemanagementandleadershiptrainingthatitcurrentlyexercisesover
recruittraining.
e. TheMPTCshouldestablisha21hourinservicetrainingrequirement,toincludeconfrontation
training.
f. Federallawenforcementagenciesshouldrequireinteractiveconfrontationtrainingofall
membersofalljointtaskforces
g. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeshoulddevelopandsponsorannualtrainingopportunitieson
confrontationsavailabletothoseretiredandoffdutyofficerswhoseektocarryweaponsacross
statelinespursuanttoLEOSA.
h. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeshouldcollaboratewithoneormorelargemunicipalpolice
agenciestodevelopaleadershiptrainingmoduleonrespondingtocrossracial,mistaken
identity,policeonpoliceshootingsdrawingontheexperienceofthepoliceagenciesthathave
facedthesetragedies.
3. DevelopTestingandTrainingtoReduceUnconsciousRacialBiasinShoot/DontShootDecisions
4. ExpandDiversityTrainingtoIncludeIssuesofDiversitywithinPoliceAgencies
5. DesignateandTrainaSpecializedTeamtoSupportDepartmentsthatExperienceaPoliceon
PoliceShooting
6. EstablishaMandatoryStatewideReportingSystemforPoliceFirearmsDischargesand
Voluntary,AnonymousSystemforReportingPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
a. TheNYLegislatureshouldadoptandtheGovernorshouldapprovelegislationrequiringannual
reportsofallfirearmsdischarges.
b. TheNYLegislatureshouldrequiretheDivisionforCriminalJusticeServicestoconducta
continuing,voluntary,anonymoussurveyofalllawenforcementofficersundergoingfirearms
requalificationregardingpoliceonpoliceconfrontations.
c. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeandtheFBIshouldrefinetheLEOKAreportingsystemtocollect
informationonallfatalandnonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootings,pursuingthesetothesame
levelofdetailthatiscurrentlyappliedtofelonious,fatalshootingsofpoliceofficers.
7. PromoteTransparencyinProsecutorialDecisionsRegardingPoliceonPoliceShootings
8. ApplytheLessonsofPoliceonPoliceShootingstoReduceMistakenPoliceCivilianShootings
9. ExpandUnderstandingoftheLifeExperiencesofOfficersofColor
P a g e |67
Acknowledgements
Ourwork,andthepublicationofthisreport,wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthetremendous
effortsofourdedicatedstaffandadvisorslistedatthefrontonthisreport.Inaddition,wethankall
ofthosewhotestifiedatourpublichearings,metwithusontheirowntime,andprovided
statementstous.ThechairisespeciallygratefultotheOpenSocietyInstituteforenablingthe
PrograminCriminalJusticePolicyandManagementattheHarvardKennedySchooltosupportthe
workoftheTaskForce.Thefollowingindividualsandorganizationsallprovidedvitalsupportin
variousways.WearedeeplygratefulfortheircontributionstotheworkoftheTaskForce.
ExecutiveChamber
CharlotteHitchcock,
ChiefofStafftothe
Governor
ClemmieHarris
TerriBrennan
SenyTaveras
LatiaCurry
LaurenPassalacqua
RichardThomas
JosephSimenic
BrandonKelley
MarcoCarrin
SandraHawkins
ThomasAiello
JamesHanson
ThomasIrvin
JennyReyes
HaroldMoore
KhalilNobles
StacieBennett
MichelleClark
PeterYacobellis
NeldaRobinson
AnnieMonroeConnor
JeanetteCepeda
MichelleDuca
MaryBernet
NYSDiv.ofProbation&
CorrectionAlternatives
RobertM.Maccarone,
StateDirector
NEWYORKSTATEGOVERNMENT
NYSDivisionofCriminal
JusticeServices
MaryKavaney,
DeputySecy.forPublic
Safety&HomelandSecurity
SeanByrne,
ActingCommissioner
DeniseE.ODonnell,
formerCommissioner
JohnBilich,
DeputyCommissioner
GinaBianchi,
DeputyCommr.&Counsel
PatriziaGreco
MarkBonacquist
JohnCaher
RichardBellucci
JuliePasquini
HilaryMcGrath
LucyVerrigini
MicheleKordrupel
TerrySalo
ToddNelson
JodieYu
PatriciaJohnston
JohnJoel
LoriWheelock
JamesTagliento
AlbertKolar
ThomasMitchell
RosemariaWilson
JonathanVanderwerken
OfficeforTechnology
MarilynCordell
ChristineL.Thayer
DarleneWood
NoraOwens
RandiBrice
OfficeofGeneralServices
WillieWalker
DeborahRodriguezCook
NYSFdn.forScience,
Technology&Innovation
JanetteM.Rond
NYStateInsuranceFund
FrancineJames,
ChiefDeputyExec.Dir.
JohnMurdaugh
EmpireStateDev.Corp.
MichaelH.JonesBey
OrrinJ.Getz
RickyToledo
CharlesAlvarez
CarmenCordero
P a g e |68
LAWENFORCMENTAGENCIES
FederalBureauofInvestigation,Criminal
JusticeInformationSystemsDivision
DanielD.Roberts,AssistantDirector
RobertCasey
CharlesMiller
FrankieL.Kelley
DorothyKisner
TimReid
JimCarder
U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture
SATessdelCarmen
U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
GraylingWilliams,Director,Officeof
CounternarcoticsEnforcement
U.S.DrugEnforcementAdministration
SACJimmyS.FoxIII
SACJohnSutton(ret.)
SACGarfieldHammonds(ret.)
ActingDep.AdministratorArtLewis(ret.)
AssistantSACWilliamFaiella
U.S.MarshalsService
DavidTurk,U.S.MarshalsHistorian
NewYorkStatePolice
Supt.HarryCorbitt(ret.)
FirstDep.Supt.PedroPerez(ret.)
Dep.Supt.DeborahCampbell
InspectorHectorLebron
AddisonPoliceDepartment(TX)
Capt.DeannaRobinson
AtlantaPoliceDepartment
ChiefRichardPennington(ret.)
AustinPoliceDepartment
LaurieNajjar
BostonPoliceDepartment
CommissionerEdwardDavis
DeputySupt.MichaelA.Cox
BrightonPoliceDepartment(AL)
ChiefJohnnieJohnson
EastPaloAltoPoliceDepartment
ChiefRonaldL.Davis
MountVernonPoliceDepartment
ChiefBarbaraDuncan
OfficerPatrickJeanJerome
NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment
CommissionerRaymondW.Kelly
DeputyCommissionerWilburChapman
AssistantCommissionerPhilipMcGuire
DeputyChiefJohnDonohue
DeputyInspectorKimRoyster
Det.Captain.FrankA.Bolz,Jr.(ret.)
LieutenantWillieShaw(ret.)
OaklandPoliceDepartment
ChiefAnthonyW.Batts
ProvidencePoliceDepartment
Chief,Col.DeanEsserman
SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment
Sgt.MichaelNevin
UniversityofCentralFloridaPoliceDept.
AssociateDirectorMichaelZelanes
WellesleyPoliceDepartment(MA)
DeputyChiefWilliamG.BrooksIII
WestchesterCountyDept.ofPublicSafety
DemosthenesLong,formerDeputyCommr.
Lt.MichaelCindrich
Sgt.DanielLangford
P.O.JeffreyWeiss
WhitePlainsPoliceDepartment
CommissionerDavidE.Chong
ChiefJamesM.Bradley
Sgt.DennisP.Doherty
Det.PeterC.Martin
Det.RickLee
DianeCouzens
P a g e |69
OtherNewYorkPoliceDepartmentsParticipatingintheDCJSandNYSACOPSurveys
AlbanyPoliceDepartment
AmityvilleVillagePoliceDepartment
AuburnPoliceDepartment
AvonPoliceDepartment
BathVillagePoliceDepartment
BeaconPoliceDepartment
BinghamtonPoliceDepartment
BuffaloPoliceDepartment
CamillusPoliceDepartment
CanajohariePoliceDepartment
ChathamVillagePoliceDepartment
ChesterTownPoliceDepartment
ClarkstownTownPoliceDepartment
CoeymansTownPoliceDepartment
ColonieTownPoliceDepartment
EastchesterTownPoliceDepartment
EllenvillePoliceDepartment
ElmiraHeightsVillagePoliceDepartment
ElmiraPoliceDepartment
EndicottPoliceDepartment
EvansTownPoliceDepartment
FallsburgTownPoliceDepartment
FreeportVillagePoliceDepartment
FultonCityPoliceDepartment
GardenCityPoliceDepartment
GreatNeckVillagePoliceDepartment
GreenburghTownPoliceDepartment
HamburgVillagePoliceDepartment
PalmyraPoliceDepartment
PelhamManorPoliceDepartment
PortChesterVillagePoliceDepartment
PortWashingtonPoliceDepartment
PoughkeepsieCityPoliceDepartment
PoughkeepsieTownPoliceDepartment
QuogueVillagePoliceDepartment
RensselaerPoliceDepartment
RochesterPoliceDepartment
SchenectadyPoliceDepartment
SkaneatelesPoliceDepartment
SouthNyackGrandViewPolice
Department
SpringValleyVillagePoliceDepartment
StonyPointTownPoliceDepartment
HempsteadVillagePoliceDepartment
HighlandFallsPoliceDepartment
HudsonPoliceDepartment
JamestownPoliceDepartment
JohnsonCityPoliceDepartment
KenmorePoliceDepartment
KingstonPoliceDepartment
KirklandTownPoliceDepartment
LittleFallsPoliceDepartment
LloydTownPoliceDepartment
LowvillePoliceDepartment
LyonsVillagePoliceDepartment
MacedonTownPoliceDepartment
MalvernePoliceDepartment
MiddletownPoliceDepartment
MountKiscoPoliceDepartment
MountPleasantTownPoliceDepartment
NassauCountyPoliceDepartment
NewHartfordTownPoliceDepartment
NewRochellePoliceDepartment
NewWindsorTownPoliceDepartment
NewYorkMillsPoliceDepartment
NewburghCityPoliceDepartment
NewburghTownPoliceDepartment
NiagaraFallsPoliceDepartment
NorthTonawandaPoliceDepartment
OldWestburyVillagePoliceDepartment
OneidaIndianNationPoliceDepartment
SuffolkCountyPoliceDepartment
SUNYCortlandPoliceDepartment
SUNYOneontaPoliceDepartment
SyracusePoliceDepartment
TonawandaTownPoliceDepartment
TroyPoliceDepartment
TuxedoTownPoliceDepartment
UlsterTownPoliceDepartment
UticaPoliceDepartment
WaterfordPoliceDepartment
WatertownPoliceDepartment
WebsterPoliceDepartment
YonkersPoliceDepartment
NYSDept.ofEnv.ConservationPolice
NYSParksPolice
P a g e |70
POLICEASSOCIATIONS,FRATERNALORGANIZATIONS&UNIONS
AmericanPoliceOfficersHallofFame
LoriShepard
FederalLawEnforcementFoundation
AnthonyBergamo,Chairman
InternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolice
DanielN.Rosenblatt,ExecutiveDirector
JamesW.McMahon,Dep.ExecutiveDir.
MarkLomax
JeffreyMagers,Ph.D.,ChairPolice
AdministrationCommittee
MajorCitiesChiefsAssociation
TomFrazier,ExecutiveDirector
NationalAssociationofBlackLaw
EnforcementOfficers
Lt.CharlesP.Wilson,NatlChairperson
CynthiaHadleyBailey
NationalBlackPoliceAssociation(NBPA)
RonaldHampton,ExecutiveDirector
DamonK.Jones,N.E.RegionPresident
ChristopherCooper
RogerL.Abel
RodneyWilliams
RobertRivers
NationalLatinoOfficersAssociation
AnthonyMiranda,ExecutiveChairman
NationalLawEnforcementOfficers
MemorialFund
BernetaV.Spence,DirectorofResearch
JeremyBorrego
JeniferAshton
NationalOrganizationofBlackLaw
EnforcementExecutives(NOBLE)
ErnestE.GreenIII,President
JilesH.Ship,SecondVicePresident
JessieLee,ExecutiveDirector
ElsieScott,Ph.D.,SpecialAsst.tothePresident
WilmaeLeach
NationalOrganizationofBlackLaw
EnforcementOfficers
Lt.CharlesP.Wilson
CynthiaHadleyBailey
NOBLENewYorkCityChapter
Asst.ChiefJerryNelson,President
GregoryA.Thomas
SophineCharles,Ph.D.
NYGrandCouncilofGuardians
CharlesBillups,Chairperson
NYPDGuardiansAssociation
BonitaZelman,Esq.,Counsel
NYStateAssociationofChiefsofPolice
(NYSACOP)
ChiefWilliamKilfoil,President
JohnP.Grebert,ExecutiveDirector
MarkSpawn,DirectorofResearch
PoliceConferenceofNewYork
RichardWells,President
PortAuthorityofNY&NJPoliceDept.
OfficerCorvetCurley(ret.)
WestchesterCountyDepartmentofPublic
SafetyPoliceBenevolentAssociation,Inc.
MichaelHagan,President
WestchesterCountyNBPAChapter
Det.AnthonyC.Mitchell
WestchesterRocklandGuardiansAssoc.
CynthiaHood,President
LarryBrown
NormanDownes
P a g e |71
ACADEMIC,RESEARCHANDCOMMNITYORGANIZATIONS
CenterforConstitutionalRights
VincentWarren,Exec.Director
DariusCharney
AnnetteDickerson
SunitaPatel
CityofMountVernon,NY
Hon.ClintonI.Young,Mayor
ConsortiumforPoliceLeadershipinEquity
(CPLE)
PhillipAtibaGoff,Ph.D.,Exec.Dir.ofResearch
TracieL.Keesee,Ph.D.,Exec.Dir.ofOperations
JohnDovidio,Ph.D.,DirectorofTraining
JoshuaCorrell,Ph.D.
DetectiveChristopherA.RidleyFoundation
StanleyRidley
FelitaBouche
DSMSafetyProductsLLC
Sgt.MikeLessman
ForceScienceInstitute
WilliamLewinksi,Ph.D.,Exec.Director
ScottBuhrmaster
ChuckRemsberg
GreaterCentennialAMEZionChurch
Rev.W.DarinMoore,Pastor
HarvardKennedySchoolofGovernment,
PrograminCriminalJusticePolicy&Mgmt.
ChristineM.Cole,Exec.Director
AnthonyA.Braga,Ph.D.
BrianWelch
KlaraKabadian
JohnJayColl.ofCriminalJustice
JeremyTravis,President
DeloresJonesBrown,J.D.,Ph.D.
JonShane,Ph.D.
KarenTerry,Ph.D.
TheLawOfficesofR.JackAyres,Jr.,P.C.
R.JackAyres,Jr.,Esq.
NatlAssociationfortheAdvancement
ofColoredPeople(NAACP)
HazelN.Dukes,NationalBoardMember&
President,NYStateConf.ofNAACPBranches
Hon.LauraBlackburn,InterimGen.Counsel
RobertRooks,Dir.ofCriminalJusticePgms.
NiazKasravi,Ph.D.,Sr.Mgr.forLaw
EnforcementAccountability
NationalActionNetwork
Rev,AlSharpton,President
TamikaMallory,ExecutiveDirector
NewYorkCivilLibertiesUnion
DonnaLieberman,ExecutiveDirector
ChristopherDunn
PsychologistsinPublicSafety
GuyO.Seymour,Ph.D.
PoliceAssessmentResourceCenter(PARC)
MerrickBobb,President
RochesterInstituteofTechnology
RonWhitlock,MBAcandidate
WesternConnecticutStateUniversity
Prof.TerrenceP.Dwyer,Esq.
WVOX1460AMNewRochelle
AbdulQadaar,ChristopherRidleyRuckerShow
ErnieDavis,ConversationswithErnieDavis
P a g e |70

Police On Police Shootings Report

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Police On Police Shootings Report

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NewYorkStateTaskForceon

You might also like