Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PIL Chap 9-10
PIL Chap 9-10
States (P) suit against the Canada (D) with an injunction against further
air pollution by Trail Smelter.
Issue:
Is it the responsibility of the State to protect to protect other states
against harmful acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction at all
times?
Held:
Yes. It is the responsibility of the State to protect other states against
harmful act by individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times. No
state has the right to use or permit the use of the territory in a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein as stipulated under the United States (P)
laws and the principles of international law.
By looking at the facts contained in this case, the arbitration held
that Canada (D) is responsible in international law for the conduct of
the Trail Smelter Company. Hence, the onus lies on the Canadian
government (D) to see to it that Trail Smelters conduct should be in
line with the obligations of Canada (D) as it has been confirmed by
International law. The Trail Smelter Company will therefore be required
from causing any damage through fumes as long as the present
conditions of air pollution exist in Washington.
So, in pursuance of the Article III of the convention existing
between the two nations, the indemnity for damages should be
determined by both governments.
Finally, a regime or measure of control shall be applied to the
operations of the smelter since it is probable in the opinion of the
tribunal that damage may occur in the future from the operations of
the smelter unless they are curtailed.
Blackmer vs. US
Facts:
Blackmer (D), a U.S. (P) citizen who was residing in France, was served
subpoenas to appear in court as a witness in a criminal trial in the U.S.
Contempt proceedings were initiated against Blackmer (D) when he
failed to respond to the subpoenas and he was found guilty and fined.
Blackmer (D) appealed on the ground that the federal statute was
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Must there be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in
personam?
Held:
Yes. There must be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction
in personam. The court may adjudge the witness guilty of contempt if
the witness fails to comply with the court order. Congress acted
pursuant to its authority in enacting the statute and it could prescribe
a penalty to enforce it.
Chief Justice Hughes, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated
"[n]or can it be doubted that the United States possesses the power
inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this country of a citizen,
resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it, and to
penalize him in case of refusal." Also, "[i]t is also beyond controversy
that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to
support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving
his testimony whenever he is properly summoned."
NOTTEBOHM CASE
Liechtienstein vs. Guatemala
Facts:
Nottebohn (P), a German by birth, lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years,
retaining his German citizenship and family and business ties with it.
He however applied for Liechtenstein (P) citizenship a month after the
outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm (P) had no ties with Liechtenstein
but intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization application
was approved by Liechtenstein and impliedly waived its three-year.
After this approval, Nottebohm (P) travelled to Liechtenstein and upon
his return to Guatemala (D), he was refused entry because he was
deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not
honored. Liechtenstein (P) thereby filed a suit before the International
Court to compel Guatemala (D) to recognize him as one of its national.
law,
US vs Alvarez-Machain
Facts:
Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly
kidnaped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he
was arrested for his participation in the kidnaping and murder of a
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot.
Mter concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction,
the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it
violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico
(Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the
court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction
and since the Mexican Government had protested the Treaty violation,
jurisdiction was improper.
Held:
The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his
trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal
laws. Pp. 659-670.
(a) A defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an
extradition treaty. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407. However,
when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly exercise
jurisdiction even though the defendant's presence is procured by
means of a forcible abduction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436. Thus, if the
Extradition Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule
of Ker applies and jurisdiction was proper. Pp. 659-662.
(b) Neither the Treaty's language nor the history of negotiations and
practice under it supports the proposition that it prohibits abductions
outside of its terms. The Treaty says nothing about either country
refraining from forcibly abducting people from the other's territory or
the consequences if an abduction occurs. In addition, although the
Mexican Government was made aware of theKer doctrine as early as
1906, and language to curtail Ker was drafted as early as 1935, the
Treaty's current version contains no such clause. Pp. 663-666.
(c) General principles of international law provide no basis for
interpreting the Treaty to include an implied term prohibiting
international abductions. It would go beyond established precedent
and practice to draw such an inference from the Treaty based on
respondent's argument that abductions are so clearly prohibited in
international law that there was no reason to include the prohibition in
the Treaty itself. It was the practice of nations with regard to
extradition treaties that formed the basis for this Court's decision
in Rauscher, supra, to imply a term in the extradition treaty between
the United States and England. Respondent's argument, however,
would require a much larger inferential leap with only the most general
of international law principles to support it. While respondent may be
correct that his abduction was "shocking" and in violation of general
international law principles, the decision whether he should be
returned to Mexico, as a matter outside the Treaty, is a matter for the
Executive Branch.
Held:
Yes. The provision of the Torture Convention is not consistent with the
notion of continued immunity for former head of states. Pinochet (D)
was not acting in any capacity that gives rise to immunity if as alleged;
he masterminded and authorized torture after the 8th of December
1988 because these acts clearly contravene international law. Hence,
the torture proceedings brought against the defendant should only
continue on the allegation that torture in pursuance of a conspiracy to
commit torture was being committed by the defendant after he lost his
immunity in December 1988.
CASE
Mighell vs. Sultan of Johore
DOCTRINE
The Sultan of Johore was sued for
breach of promise to marry in a
British court. The subject of the
suit therefore was a private
matter, not a state matter. Upon
verification of his being a sitting
foreign sovereign, the case was
dismissed. The immunity that is
recognized here is absolute for a
sitting head of state.
Pinochet Case
The
Schooner
MacFaddon
Exchange
Republic
of
Banco National
Sabbatino
de