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Alexander of Lycopolis An Alexandrian Platonist Against Dualism Alexander of Lycopolis Treatise Critique of The Doctrines of Manichaeus 1974
Alexander of Lycopolis An Alexandrian Platonist Against Dualism Alexander of Lycopolis Treatise Critique of The Doctrines of Manichaeus 1974
aati fra yer, lie eaten ib abd and
another teen psncplnos to God elvan. I shuld he nate, boweves thot hen
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Henge, on purdylopeal gro, bt bees ofthe exience fei The essay
eh on th ater ba, Hetogeor’ rata ir reeting th won pris,
ry ie, Nin’ Vina reeds om Gol Hil
Aor itana ent reatio nitil:hene, be pl forthe aseungtinn of 2
fomon suingina of gear
it harassing in a purely Mill Patoit way (9. 194, 311 By dein
Bree ral dexguariren aos ain, npr Bf roias wai Sriaras pony cao 6
3B 160. UB. deros seta Sx below, p 2 n 05 ood p89 835). Wemayay
thes Method Valerian undergoes a puntos sntamorphis + afore being
Pac tin, to har aealy besos «over oft de Phones, Hi
lo ito tat ofthe thie person of cho dialogue, Method “eu
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fthodies answer that the Valentinian’ diem ie ttditonal one and anounces
hat ho wil state i
mrtg TH state both his and the fond”. He himlf argues in favour of eratio ex
Shop te Hol ech tat Morgen thinks epeiliy of Tut, ot
mi lee] for of hic argument ndieats that be fle bck ona Mid Plato
Moon ant Iesoul bead ta Fata, Ora Graig on iaporng
Prag Pitt 81, who wld up msn of Pile, Dee 2) ba pen of the
that Gages sa bing eerd paps, ob wank zone, while ibd 15 he se
et composite. Hovever, ‘Tatinn docs not spesk of matter in terms af
vo
91.03 nard doco ‘
agg xe droconfy. On Tatian'sdocene cf, Ble, oe 6, 718 AN ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALIS® gt ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM 19
“it is impossible for any existing thing to perish into what is
for what is not does not exist”.** He omits the other half of this
viz, that what is cannot come to be from non-being (cf. the abow
quotation from Plutarch) since his argument lc. is only coneerne
with passing away, but cannot but have adhered to the thesis ag
whole. This exchides ereatio ex nihil (Hermogenes’ second possibility
Wo may conclude that Alexander, when speaking about a God who
‘maybe hoth aotive and passible and in relation to whom all hypos
‘come into being, bas indeed in mind a “creation out of Himself
should be pointed out that at p. 7, 9 Br. it is said that Man's matter
creates man “out of itself” (26 abrf), Le. acts as if it were God,
Furthermore, at p. 24, 144f, Alexander explicitly rejects the it
that the finst ‘Power’ (— soul) is a part (uépos) of God, for this wo
‘make God composite and eorporcal, snd it is exactly this notio
of o ‘part’ of God which he contrasts, ibd. p. 24, 16 ff. with that
the hypostatic origin of things while Cod ‘remains’ (rd & Bef
tos roi bod Snoordvess elvis).
‘Accordingly, the theory of the hypostatic origin of soul and mat
from Tntellect found in Alexander anowera the objections of
Middle Platonists as had rejected the notion of a God having p
‘The introduction of the concept of hypostasos % permits
choice than that made by Hermogenes, while the concept of “er
out of Himself” is not the samo as that of ereatio ex nihilo, Tt is
necessary to follow Theiler, who argues that the conception of mat
created by a demiurgic first God which he attributes to Ammon
Saccas was derived by the latter from the Chaldaeam Oracles.** Althougl
this possibility cannot be excluded, also the other pazallels enumerated
above should be taken into account,
sagan doctine that matter isthe principle of evil and that not the
Faest hint of @ possible connection of matter andl ovil isto be found
fo tho whole troatise. In view of his theory of the origin af matter out
arGod Himsel, this is understandable,
5, Alexander's views on matter cau be partly paralleled from Plotinus
‘and, expecially, Porphyry. The differences are, however, oqually im-
portant. We shall also see that Alexander and Porphyry concur in so
far a3 oortain differences from Middle Platonist doctrines are found in
both.
Ja Plotinus, we find two views of matter which cannot be easily
reconciled, is. that of matter as the last of generated things and that
of matter as evil. At Enn, TE 4 12}, 16, 25 matter is said to be wholly
evil (rdvr9 eaxés). In the late treatise On the Origin of Evil, Ena,
18 [Sl] he states that matter is a negative principle; though not
being in any way substantial, it ia a privation or absence of the good
(18, 11; the viewpoint of II 4, 16 is similar). This complete ack (rarrehjs
eWesfis) of the good is the absolule evil since it has no part of the good
whatsoever (f Dy. 13 wavvehda mune poDejclian Eyue dyed
potpav I 8, 5, -14).* In one of his earliest treatises, on the other
and, he formulates a dilemma which leaves open the possibility
that matior is the final term in the process of transcendental eavsation;
Be thio vexy reason, it must share in tho good (Brn. 1V 8 (6,0). At
mare pers BTS Seal crotes around it » eile of derinoe
jn iit mote positive viow of matter appears to be more prominent
Tau Gator treatises, Tt should be noticed that in thoso trentses,
Pon a todet ofthe ist principe but of «lower hypestasis7
inter tne sting tendency to conser matter as evil ix
taal naaty the views of How Middle Patonsts who conneted
evil(wo know that he continued to lecture on Numenius),
Cf elow, 9. 82 n 398 ———
5» Cf below, p. 86 u 20, p. 80 n. 98a, p. 91m. 97
52% That God ig without pats isan importaat doctrine for Alosanes of. Below,
1.1083
Soe CF the dnilae arguments of Dori, Emanation 148, who however only dl
‘Neeplatoniathypostate a compared to Gnostic emanation.
1 Foyach, Neapl 8, 41-42,
See P. Henry. in 7 ave
Sion od. Harder Be
GSE Mater, Foret
Pong Pe a
28.953,
Wnteet. Halt Vy 247; of also Armstrong, oc 257; Plains
tle - Theiler, VE, Hanbur 1971, 15%
Newpl. 24,‘ay ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM 21
20 S ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM
fhe Christian view) goes back to Ammonine Saccas.©
Bek je any ease, remarkably similar to that of Alesaudes, who, oa
dhe other hand, is significantly differont from Porphyry in adopting the
Middle Platonist definition of matter as neither coxporeal not incoxpore-
while Porphyry, following Plotinus(e.g. Enn, U1 4[12} 9. 4-5) stated
io be incorporcal (dowuarov, ap. Philop., De aet, mud. p. 547, 10
Robe), Aloxander also differs from Porphyry in that, as we have al-
rend noticed, he does not connect matter and evil.
“Another close parallel between Aloxander’s and Porphy
ceptions of master consists in their rejection of the random motion af
‘matter. Alexander at length refutes what he says is Mani's definition of
matter, sc. “random motion” (éraxros. sionows, p. 5, 8; 10, 5; 26, 1
Br). Now Plato, Tim. 30 a, had said that the demiurge took over and
onganized “all that was visible, which was not at rest, but moving
in confusion and at random” (név dsov jv épardv ... ody How
xlav dyov AMA worjteror mhyjupehds ak dricras), while at
Tim. 53 he had spoken of the ‘traces’ (‘yrn) of the elements contained
inthe randomly moving receptacle, Notwithstanding such authoritative
parullols, Alexanvier oven riclienlos Moni's definition. This is all tho
more significant since this random motion of matter is found in all
Middle Platonists.«© A possible reason for Aloxander’s tacit rejection
of the Middlo Platonist view is the fact that, with the important
exception of Albinus, most Middle Platonists associated the random.
‘motion of matter with its being evil, or with the evil soul ombedded
Inmatter: we may refer to Plutarch, Atticus and Nuauenias.9”
Alexender’s sofutation of Mani's definition starts with the argument
though it should be stressed that unlike these he does not 6
‘matter as an independent principle. His ea
with the Christian ereatio ex nfhilo. Tt is not exactly the “out of
self”-doctrine deveribed above either, for Plotinus’ first pring
{and also his second) is only related to what is immediately belo
‘We may considor it as some sort of refinement of the “out of Hims
doctrine
The discrepancies in Plotinus’ conceptions of matter may help
explain why Porphyry, who doseribes matter as a principle of
(Sent, 30, 2, p. 16, 6-7 Mommert eaxot # Tq) and as absolnte
sharply from @
p.8, 2M; Menfes ravrds roi Svros, p. 8, 7-8 ML). also adh
a far more positive view. In his Commentary on the Timaecus ® Porpl
argued against euch Middle Platonists as Atticus, who posited a phi
ity of principles, ei2., God, matter {and ideas), He distinguished
Father from the demiurge by having the former produes “the wh
cout of himself” (f° cavrod year 76 dior, ap. Proch, In Ta
p. 300, 1ff. Diehl) and having the latter receive matter from som
thet He euduined Ube ductsine of the Ohukdaean Oractes that
is “bom from the Father”.*? Consequently
is the “out of Tlimself”-doctrine discussed above. Theiler assumes
Porpliyry’s view of created matter (which Theiler does not dist
8 Cf AH, Wenn, peeiee (Clos Fs Tiny Landoa-Laiden 1802, p. CHET
Porgl Ame 68-0
(© Publ aftr the death of Amollus (eR. Beutler, Porpiyria, RE NXT,
281) is a tine whon Porplyny al definitively boeome a Sllowor of Plotaus A
Js, the numer Middle Potonkt clemeuts ia Celeiins whieh are probsbly
fous Poephyes's Commentary (on Porphyry as Cali
p LXAIN tf, NC#E and J. don Boo? Cabiive on Pet Hie Doctrine oid 5
Leiden 1970} shoud be acvonntd for by Porphyy'«dexographie eal J.C. ML xa
‘en, in the “supplements notes” table Calinx on Mauer, Hs Devine and
(Usiden 158), Hd, 1965, 248 fF, though admitting thet Porphyry Je often Oak
score, explins cortaln Mite Pltonitelomunts a Calis by referring to Port
pre-Plosiian posi in view of the date of the Commentary, woweres, o refer
8 Forsch, Nou. 40
$f shore, p. 19 and ibd. n. 38,
she en sos: eg. Albus, Dida. pe 167, W18 Hes ib, 169, 4.5 1, whore
Meet Sementioned; Attions, ap, Proc! Zn Tim. p. 265.27; 981, 275304, 37 Dt
1 Fe da dos Places = Bunch, PB XV, 819, mater Grea, 1888 dracon
Tegmte ft 82 des Pinos = Cala, Ia Tim. p. 290,18 W, taconite fnsteet
mith De Lei. $098.$718, De un. procr. IISC; Aton, op. Prot, Ze Tn
Lp. 20, 10,53 eo
3,10, 7 DN 2 ‘
a 81,27 D.; Numenus, fg, 2 dea Phiees Nunes isnot wholly cone
Porpbyey’sdonogrplie habia Po
CE Tiller, Farah, Neopl [7180 (= Porgh Aug. MAT who sho a Bog ggg He (28 19) bk ho md wth th i Wt
cer prune gant by Diol Beat Benoit roves at random (300, 12-13 W) cf Wasi, Porph
#2 CL above, p. 15 0 $4,2 AN ALENANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALI AN ALEXANDRIAN FLATONIST AGAINST DUALISIE 23
to the irregular motion of the Manichaean First ‘Power! = Soul
embedded in matter (ivupthws s’peoBat, p. 6, 17 ff. Br.) may betray
that bis arguments derive from a refutation of some of the Middle
Piatonist views mentioned above.
‘To sum up : Alexander's views on generatet| matter are somewhat
similar to those of the younger Plotinus, and atrikingly similar to
those of Porphyry. He is, however, more consistent than either of these
jn absolutely refusing to consider matter as evil. ‘This is not accidental
‘asa matter of Jact, that matter eannot be evil since it is generated by
‘that matter cannot be motion, sinee motion is inseparable from
moving object © and objects presuppose matter which has b
informed * (Ch. VI, p. 10, 23 ff, Br.) As soon as fire ete. ean be spa
Of, shape has been given to matter; in that ease, says Alexander, “4
is it possible for matter to be the random motion of the elements
(nas of dare raiv aroryein 4 dreveros xlomors # Oy, p- 10, 25g
Br). This is obviously zeminiscent of the ‘traces’ of the elements
moving about in Plato’s receptacle, To this it should be added 4
Alexander's Middle Platonist definition of matter contains an additig
element which I now quote for the first timo : matter is not “s conere God is one of his chiof arguments against the Manichacans, who
te individual object cithor” (oiire dvds 168e 74° p. 10, 20 Br) considered matter as an evil, autonomous principle. His definition
‘of matter differs from that of Plotinus and Porphyry iu being largely
a Middle Platonist one, Though the possibility of Porphyrian influences
pon Alexander's couception cannot be excluded @ priori, such an
‘concrete object, hence cannot be motion. influence does not explain the differences. Hence, one is tempted to
‘Now Porphyry, in a rather forced interpretation of Plato's formulate an ‘Arbeitssata’ in the manner of Theiler: whenever Porphyry
took exception to the conception of matter as suggested at Tim. 8 and Alexander differ from Plotinns and at the same time agree with
one another, @ common dependence on Ammonius Saccas should be
to above. He argued thot Plato's formala “all that is visible” entail seriously pondered.
ie., not a compositum of matter and form, This connects up well
Alexander's statement that motion is inseparable from moving abjee
and that: moving objects presuppose informed matter : matter is m
6. Another argument, at least at first sight, in favour of a possible
influence of Porphyry is Alexander's use of the theory of the proper
Places of the elements and of natural and unnatural motion in order
to refute Mani’s thesis that matter (the ‘below’) went upwards towards
the abode of God and did so of its own accord (Ch. VIII, p. 13, 20-14,
12. Br}, This theory of place and motion, first suggested by Plato
as being in motion. See Philoponus, De act. mund. p. 546, 8-041,
R,, from which I quota : “Porphyry... says that it is not matter whi
together with the traces, moves in confusion and at: random, but th
here you have already the bodies composed of matter and form
(5 yoo TE... 08 civ Dqy dna perd rev your 75 ayepeds
arderas mvotjevov, ... adi td By ef Glys wai eTBous ender
cdyara). The conceptual parallel with Alexander is striking indas
On the other hand, Alexander devotes a soparate argument to:
refutation not so much of matter as motion, but as random mo
see Ch, VIL, p. 11, 10-12, 24 Br.7 Furthermore, his casual refer
bp 98,18 Do, Alone ayn tat “those who hae ter wis abot them”
ta the Pons tnd matter to either assy nese hat wach crn
lati th af cng sla p18, 2122; 2,8 Br. Tt woul flow tot Alesander,
‘rag Mina rcteing the later, ao xpath eiinacy of the fre
stn, Hn. 188 10 mea of argue lye a favor of tho on esteee
imac, for whe Harder «Bouter « Thllr refer to Art's Inereation
Fate recep alo Perky reltees to toon sore p20 il
195100 ght in pointing ot that ia Arte and eg Numenun ter a opposed
{2 og ut goes oof in anining tha hi pin tht wae coneere one
‘etn Cleon, om, 8 6-0 angus that late hd defied tute wy ch
MY have boen deduced from such statements of Avltotle as ore quoted by Lilla.
© Originally, an Aratotlian doctsine; ef, below, p. 62-288.
8 CE Aristotle, Ply. Hf, 1: gion asthe prneple of motion is inherent in phyB
things end living beng,
Aristotelian terminology, of below, p- 627,320.
19 CE alo Cale, In Tim. p. 803, 17. W. and Wastiak ad
GE below, . 63 n. 230, p- 65, 248, n, 200.a AN ALEXANDREAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISO
in the Timacts * and developed into a full-grown theory by Aristotlea
‘was incorporated into the Stoic systom.7 Tt is found in a number
suuthors, for instance in Philo, who in his On the Bternity of the Waiver
used (or used a book which used) Aristotle’s lost work On Philosophy,
in Cicero who perhaps derives from Posidonius,7* and in may)
others both before and after Alexander.??
‘We happen to know that Porphyry argued against the Christi
doctrine of the resurrection of the body by means of the theory of th
proper places of the elements (dgainst the Christians ft. 35 Harnack)
Tt has been argued * that the anonymous author, quoted by Ane
qustine,* of an argument agoinst the resurrection of the body which
not only uses the theory of proper place and natural motion but is,
to its details, elosely parallel to the parallel accounts in Philo
Gieora,* is no one but Porphyry + Ausustine may have been as
an anonymons compilation partly based upon the Ayainst the Christie
2 Tia. fe, 81b, Soe alan below, p. G4 n
Beg. Coe, 76x28 fF, 10616 A; Pye. WEA, 208b10.20, 4814.16. Te ae
duel by Theoprastos, of Sons 88 (Dat, p, 326 8 Dil) and ap, Wil, De ad
135.136,
evo, SVP T, 895 Chrscipnee, SPF I, 27. See slao Diog. Latet, VIL 18
STF I, 680; At. Pe. 1. 12,4 (Dox. p. $11, 8A Dy q
™ Dead, wand. 28-94 — I, loos et. 19 Rees ef. so bel, 116, Son B- Ey
ar Theol mid Rosmolgie der Avital Script Uber di Piles
XD 1, 97,109; 1,48, 15-16, 18.
2, Reishasat, Poacianas, KE XXTT, 1953, 056
An eatesive lit given ly AS, Pour fn he note on in, NDT, 7,108 (ra Tp
Cambridge Ma, 1955, 245) A important reference ia Patch, De fac §H 9
28a, who ars at length agains the Ste ehoor’ of atu plts witont, ower
completly reeting i. lun De pri. frig 921). Soo Efe, 188 and Hh, Cs
reanns, nt om Patra Dit Defi, eer 100,91
av. Hsnnack, Porpyraa "Sogn te loiter”, Ab Pros. Ak, 1816 1 (Ber
1s, 6102
ay J Ropin, Titi eanequeethsopieehréenns Pala 1964, 28-481 Pit
eine ty a eagzeton of P Cure
C8. Charlo, Late Latin Writes and bir Greek Sours, Cambridge Ba. 1808
185 9,176, 21021 rs
#9 ects. Det XI 6; NUL, 11; Gens it TE 1 1,8
Blin, 0.428 Hn. 3.
AN AUEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISO 2
qs? Thus, a parallel between Alexander's argument against the
josurroetion of matter against God and Porphyry’s argument against
the resurrection of the body eannot be denied. In view of the fact that
the theory of proper place and natural motion is a common-place one,
however, this parallel does not prove that Alexander depends upon
Porphyry. To this it must be added that the argument against Zeno’s
doctrine of fire * which he quotes in Ch, XIV recalls the similar anti-
Stoic views adduced by Philo in the above-mentioned treatise.
17, Praechter’s comparison between Alexander and Hierocles of
‘Alexandria has been quoted ahove.s? Hierocles studied with the
Neoplatonist Plutorch of Athens, who died, at a very advanced age,
in 431 or 492 A.D. Plutarch of Athens, interpreting the Parmenides
of Plato, held that the first three hypostases are God — the One,
Intelleot and Soul (Beds = &, vods, Yuyr, Procl. In Parm. VI, 27-80,
p. 1058, 21%. Cousin).** Hierocles, on the other hand, as appears
from tho extracts and abstracts of his On Providence and Euman
Iiberty found in Photine’ Library argued against: those Platonisis
who had not preserved a proper notion of the deniiurgic God (p. 460b
25.25 Bekker, from the beginning of the work). He held that the supreme
principle is a domiurgio Intellect,** of, p. 462b 18-19 B. “Intellect,
being the leader of all, God the cause of the universe o(r09 za advraw
‘iyouérou wai OcoG rav Shuv Gvros airfou), p. 461, 18-21 B., “the
God and Father who is their maker is king of all, and this fatherly
Kingship of his is providence” (mdvraw &€ faaedew rév romyriy
airdy Bebv nai warépa, xal raiiryy iv narpovojuxiyy Baothelay abrot
apSvowaw). The same view is found in his Commentary on the Golden
Verses of the Pythagoreans, where he speaks of the “demiurgic Tntellect
‘and divine Will which eternally produces all things and overlastingly
reserves them, and the lawful order deriving from the Father of the
‘Universe and demiurge” (3. Snjuoupyenés vods wal Geta Bovdyans #
8 Dd. a0
3 CE below, p74, 204 and 285,
” 5.78
2GE Beatle, Petarch oon Alten, RE NXT, 51, 070.071,
CE Theiler, Borech, Mevplat. 10,26 AN ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISA
AiBlas mpodyoucn ri wdvra wat eis del Braceitoura, réfis 62 Braue
4 ded 708 warps trav Sav xai Syacovpyod, p. 28, 12-15 M
‘The echoes of the title of the pagan Origen’s Only the King is De
are obvious. Hierocles’ view of the relation between God and m
also parallels that of Alexander, ef. ap. Phot, p. 46166 ff. B., “God, .
the demiurge, ... is Lord of the whole visible and invisible orda
arrangement of the universe, which eame to be out of no prior suba
tum whatsoever; for his Will suffices as to the hypostasis of thin
Ludavois re at dpavots Staroojsjacos, ex wnBevds Tpodmoneyicva
yeyernuérns: dpxedy yap 78 éxelvou Rona els tréoramey rip
Srro). Even the notion that God's will is @ sufficient om
‘of hypostasis can be paralleled in Alexander, who says, p. 24, 16
Br,, that according to the true doctrine God would have made
Deeause ho wanted to do so (ry Sivazu radirqy éroinoer Bou’
6 Beds). We need no longer follow Pracchter * by assuming
Hierocles’ views are influenced by Christian conceptions,
separate principle of evil (Zn Carm, Aur, p. 71, 11 ML, xab obBév
kaxdv dpxs, ore érumoxeysiins ofre Huber xr.)
‘The conception of a demiurgic Intellect causing matter is not fou
© Cf. F, Heinemann, doxmonioe Saline wn die Ureprang der newplatoniachen H
tovenehre Heras O1, 1020, 19; Dodds, Nar. and Are. 28.
CL ako Thilo, Fork. Newptat. 28, who however alducs parla which do a
refer to the asative will of God, bat to Go's wll as cause of structure; Lilla, 0
tuduces the Christian Paotacaus ap. Clan fet. 48 S16hlln. An early pralel for
creative will of God iz found in Hine 11 of ehe anonymous hyn mentioned abovs, PTS
1.4, Soe aso Movderatue of Gades, ap. Simpl, Jn Pigs p. 251, 6 D- Pox hy
naias Mayes i rhe yc A kavro8 in Beran asorfoneb oh Hat, Porph
131,
(9), passim,
© OL Pracehtes 0.6 1-19; Theiler, Porch. Tapa. 2, rho supposes tha
‘Saccae argued ogainst Gnostce such ax Marcon ( would be fosinating bo eo
‘Alexander's anti Masishasins with Amimonius ausumed ant-Gnosticlm, but eit
be pustued hero of. however below, p. 60m, 205). Pachter tc, who had also ds
Alexander, auggestl that Hieroles’ view too may be anti Manichseans eto
Hiersles presumed anti-Msnichaeantem has become 0 certainty for Couresll,
atin Writers 320-321
AN ALEANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM ar
‘plutarch of Athens or in his pupils Syziaaus and Proclus. Tt has heen
inted out (by E. Evrard) * that these other pupils of Plutarch
Eynificantly differ from their master in being largely influenced by
Tenlichus.®> Evrard explains this difference by refering to the
jnfluences of the milieux where these two etudied before following
Phutarch's lectures.* A similar independence on Hierocles’ partis fully
nderstandable; we may assume that he remained true to the traditions
of his native town. This would explain his similarities with the pagan
Origen and with Alexander as well as his differences from Porphyry
‘aud later Athonien Neoplatonism, Since certain of his most significant
Similarities with Alexander (and the pagan Origen) are precisely those
points of view in respect of which Hierocles, Alexander and Origen
differ from Porphyry, we may again think of Ammonius Saceas as a
possible common source, The points of difference can be traced to
Plotinus, which makes those points on which Porphyry differs from
PPlotinns and agrees with Alexander and Origen even more significant,
Tt should be added that, in Hierocles’ view, Ammonius Saccas is tho
key figure in the history of Platonism.+
8, The theory of incorporeals and the relation of incorporeals to
bodies found in’ Alexander is not that of Plotinus and Porphyry.
At Ch, VILL, p. 13, 10-14, 17 Br. Aloxander asks if Mani’s two uk
timate principles, God and matter, are to be considered as (2) both
‘nvorporeal (dssya7a), (b) the one corporeal, the other incorpoveal or
(©) both corporeal (oxipara), and triumphantly shows that neither of
hese assumptions fits the Manichaean doctrine of the arrival of
aiter in the house of God (of. p. 5, 16 Br).
As to the first possibility, Alexander points out that “when both
Are ineorporeal, neither one can be in the other 4 — except pethaps
in the manner of grammatical knowledge being in the soul” (et cv yap
% te ato de Parte toe ob gins du Mla Aine, Ant
‘Class. 28, 1960 (108 ff, 301 ff " me
* 0. Sor
Os aa
2 Ap. Ro, pa 840; hgh. B
+ Ctl, p.m 308,28 AN ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM AN ALDXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM 29
dadpara éxdrepn, obStrepor év aiterdéoy, hiv et pe} Ss ypq
peru &v soy}, p. 13, 11-14 Br). Tn respect of ultimate principles,
Rowever, such a suggestion would be absurd, Nor ean the one be j
the other as in a void," since the essence of the void is nothingness
(5 wiSeo, p. 18, 17 Br), ic. Mani would contradict himself by deprive
§ng one of his ultimate principles from being. Nor, Alexander gbes om,
can they be in ono another in the manner of attributes (ouppePnndea,
P- 18, 17 Br), for when both are of an attributive nature they can he.
nowhere at all : when bereft of substance (ateia), attributes cannok.
be anywhere at all, since “substance is a kind of vehicle supporting
the attributes” (Syqya yép Saxep coriy tmoBeBiyscvor rots comer
Prxdoer # oboia).t** Howover if we assume that the one is corporeal,
the other incorporeal, then, Alexander says, “if the one” (sc. the cue.
considered incorporesi) ‘‘is minglod with the other, it chould bOeRea
soul or intellect or attribute. For itis only in this way that ineoxpoxeahs
are capable of mingling with bodies” (ed 8 wduerae rd Erepov 7
Exdpe, i uxt vos ooBePryxds dv ein -obres yap psvor rd deebpara
ros oxdaot wépcort wiyrusbas, p. 14, 15-18 Br),
Plotinus expressis rerbis says that it is a novelty #° and so to speak
apologizes for bringing it up at all (et yor) mpd Sdfav raw Ee
colons 76 heyépevor Acyew aagcarepov, Enn, IV 8, [6], 8, 1-2). It
Ghoul be emphasized that soul, while being in Intellect, yet remains
soul, This distinguishes Plotinus’ view from that of Numenius, fgt
42 dos Places (= Iambl. ap. Stob. I, p. 458, 3-4 Wachsmuth-Hense),
according to which the human soul is absorbed by its origins after
doa, while smother view atéributed to Numenius by Tamblichus,
that of the presence of the intelligibles in soul (fgt. 41 des Places =
ap.Stob. I, p.305, 5-21 W.-H.) is the opposite of Plotinus’ novel view =
in that the latter speaks of the presence of the lower in the higher, not
of the higher in the lower.!? Iamblichus correctly says that Plotinus
does not agree with Numenins all the way. He also says that Porphyry
did not make up bis mind about this question and that he sometimes
‘explicitly disagreed with Numenins, and at other times accepted his
view as being the traditional one (rapaBofecoy dva®ev), Since Tam-
blichus is not more explicit, itis difficult to exactly interpret his remark
about Porphyry. We know, however, that Porphyry followed Plotinus
in hia Syma. Zet% to the extent of otating that intelligibles — in
corporeals are either within themselves or in the inteligibles which
are above them, o,f, tou is in itself when ratiocinating, in Intellect
when intelligizing (ap. Nemes., De nat. hom. 3, p. 135, 6 ff. M. voyrd
Yap rea dv voqreis wal rérois dort, H yap ev éavrots % ev rots
Snxcpresidvors vonrots. abs 4 yu) ore pau dv daved doer, bre doyi-
Grae, mor’ 88 ev 7H vG, Srav vof cf. also Sent. 16, p. 5, 7 M).
Porphyry accepted Plotinus’ viow that embodied soul can be in Intellect
however, his words do not permit us to conclude that like Plotinus he
believed some part of soul to be always in Intellect in an unconscious
‘way, though this possibility cannot be altogether excluded. Anyhow,
9. I shall first concentrate upon Alexander's apodictic denial of the:
possibility for an ineorporeal to be in another incorporeal. The position:
of Plotinas and Porphyry is the exact opposite
Plotinus held that no soul, not even the embodied human soul, is en=
tirely within the sensible sphere, ut that on the eontrary soul to some
extent always remains in the rogion of tho intelligible, ‘This is Bit
so-called theory of the unconsciows,** expressed in ternts of the presen
of the lower hypostasis in the higher. Cf. Enn. IV 8 [6], 8, 3, Zore
aiiris év 7@ vonré det and ibd. 7, 2; of. also ibd. IV 7 [2], 9-10, where
he speaks of soul as being both in itself and above itself. The ever
lasting presence, to some extent, of soul in Intellect of course provides |
‘the ontological foundation for Plotinus’ theory of ekstasis, of Ente
1V 7 [3], 10, 91-32 anc 40, ibd. 12, 7-8, OF this theory of the tmeonsei
“OF H. Din, Pop. $2108 108
8 ata ar: nL ali te Pas 15 A629
Pia gat he prs he higher ystos in ouvn,Zan
YAO) 1039 ess sion Sneemaptne sie n eomoog.
Hane Zens whol apie ithe Haden, Perph Pi I 96 an tert
mea qc ben 2
"Ct Dies indametlepeitn Ppl 89-0
4 Ch. below, p. 67 n. 200
10 CE below, p. Fm. 122, p. GO 5, 3
89 CL Ph, Merlan, Mysticiom Monopeyhism Melaconsiousncs, Den Haag 186%
18 and the references ibd, m230 AN ALEXANDRIAN PLATOMIST AGAINST DUALISIE
his exposition in Oa the Way in which Embryos are Ensoulea, 12, p,
10ff, Kalbfleisch has it that Intellect only enters the embodied soul af
later age, and from outside, just as the leading soul enters the body
at the moment of birth. Perhaps Tamblichus has this passage in mind
when speaking of Porphyry’s adheronce to the traditional view,
Porphyry Lo, refers to Plato and to Aristotle's nods which enters
outside.
Darrie has rightly argued that this conception of soul in Intel
is unique, and typical of Plotinus and Porphyry. Significant
Theiler’s attempts to find parallels in Hierocles and the Christ
Origen 1° cannot be considered successful ; in Hierocles, there is m
parallel for the prosence of intelligibles in other intelligibles, while
the only perallel in the Chistian Origen which at first sight lool
acceptable (De ovat, p. 819, 4 ff. Koetschau) deals not with the presen
of the embodied inteligizing soul in Intellect but is about the mystic
‘union ‘” of praying soul and Spirit. It should also he noticed that the
theory about incorporeals attributed to Ammonius Saccas by Poxph
ry ap. Nemes. p. 129, 9 ff. is given as Ammonius’ solution to
soul-berly problem, and contrasts inteligibles with those entities which
are fit to receive them in a manner which suggests that the rece
entities are not themselves intelligibles. ‘This makes Alexande
denial of the presence of one incorporeal in another all the more i
portant. It even has a polemical ving, as if inspired by a critique
Plotimus’ innovation, and may owe its formulation to the book of
sure that it was not held by Ammonius Saccas or any of the lat
108 Cf. Hot, Porph Vit , 188, who mages the influence of Alexander
Apheodisias. However, he does not distinguish sharply enongh between the especti
conceptions of Potinss and Pomphsry, — Seo also bel, p. 2.05 m. 880, 381, 382.
108 Porph, SH 68 fF, 196, Cf. the review by Armstrong, CLR. 10, 1960, 20-221.
96 Porch, Neuph 38:31.
‘7 For Origo's myatolm of. oJ, Quaston, Patroogy, 2, Uteetit ete. 1953,
108 GE, Dorrie, Porph. BE 65, Theiler, Poach. Newpl 86 4, Unter ant. Zit. 6
sovepte the whole passage in Needus ge pure Ammonive, but T thik Doei's
‘eutiogs view (oe which ef. slo won, 430) i t be preferred.
00 CE above 9. p 1
AN ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM 31
‘other pupils. It is, as we have seen, also an innovation compared with
the idoas of Numenins. I would like to suggest that a theory comparable
to Alexander's axiom may have been held by Ammonius Saccas;
jt would in any case havo agrocd very well with the system of a reality
jn compartments (“Schottensystem")" reconstructed for the latter
by Theiler
FHowever this may be, the difference between the refined theory
of the presence of one incorporeal in another represented by Plotinus
and Porphyry and the categoric denial of the possibility of such a
presenco hy Alexander is of eracial significance
‘Also significant is Alexander's exception, vi, that of grammatical
knowledge being in the soul. Both Peripatetics and Middle Platonists
held soul to be an incorporeal.'" They defended this conception against
the Stoies by criticizing the Stoie theory that the soul is like a quality
(roxérqs) in being a body which as such is capable of total mixture
(xpiews 6'éhov, pigs) with another body. Alexander's exception
reals the Stoio idea that knowledge is a certain state, or being qus-
lified, of the leading part of the soul, ie, a body mingled with another
body.t## A Platonict eannot but consider knowledge oa incorporeal,
but he is prepared to admit the presence of such an ineorporeal in the
inoorporeal soul, Tt is the doctrine of o.g. Albinus that soul, which has
Jmowledge of all things, should contain all things, ic. hoth intelligibles
and (strangely, for the soul is an incorporeal, Didase. 25, p. 177, 19 HL.)
sensibles, toe Didase. 14, p. 169, 16 ff. H.4¢ Alexander theorizes on the
saute level as such Middle Platonists. Note, however, that his concep-
tion appears to be a more Stoicized one than that of Albinus in that
hhe apparently restricts himself to objects of cognition integrated
into the knowing soul itself.
10. We have already noticed that Alexander avcepts the mixture
of the incorpozeals soul, intellect and attribute with body. That is to
2° Forsch, Nevpl 30,
1 Ge: Dori,Porph 82 170
M8 Bg, SVPT, 142, 618, 1 407; 1, 148
Brag. BM Reeoe, The Scie Conch of Quality, SIPh TS, 1967 (104, $182; SP
M8 CE Donne, Parph, 82 19032 AN ALEXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DVALISM
say, Alexander accepts the above-mentioned Stoic theory of mixtun
but substitutes incorporeals for the Stoic eorporeals. Also in this Tespoeg
Alexander's views are significantly different from those of Ploti
and Porphyry. Though it would be correet to state that both Plotiny
and Porphyry’s conceptions of the relation between soul and ba
hhave been decisively influenced by the conceptual structures of St
physics, they do nat, as Alexander, place soul on the same level as the
attribute, Furthormore, Plotinus rejeeted the mixture of soul and bod
while Porphyry expressis verbis put this mixture on a wholly diferent
Iovel.
Plotinus of course defends the inoorporeality of the soul. Altho
when speaking about its connexion with the body, he again and
uses terms borrowed from Stoic physies, eg. when saying that soul
“completely penctrates” the body, he eays that it does so as incorpore
and he explicitly rejects "a mixture of soul and body (Ewe. 11 (53), 45
ibd, he critically discusses the possibility of its being ‘interwoven!
Biarhaxelaa, deanenhéOuu — with tho body). Ab Enn. 1V 8 (27)
26 ff. he says that soul is not in body as in a substratum (drroneijoo
for this would make soul a stato (7400s) of the cubstratumi, as
colour and form. Tbd. 92, 1 f. he compares the presence of soul in bad
to that of light in air which, being present, “is at the same time n0l
present and which being present throughout” (Stoic language) “dae
not mingle with anything” (wai yap ad wal rodro rapsy ob srdpea
at 81 Stow mapiv ober piyverat).
Poxphyzy explicitly denies that the union of incoxporeal soul
body can be put on one and the same level with the various forms a
mixture as distinguished by Stoic physics : itis “not blend or mi
oor combination or juxteposition, but a different way ... transoondig)
those (unions) which fall within the sphere of sensation” (Sent, &
2 For losin, of A. Grocer, Plotinur and the Bois, Leiden 1972, 18
Porphyry, Dorris, Porph. SZ 2673, 160
U6 CL AINM. Rich, Body and Souls the Philosophy af Potna in: Anton I
(ody, Bzaaye dn Ancient Grech Phiosoph, Albany N-Y. 1 (620), 626628. Grae
Le, hus cllesten passage whens Plsls oppoars to sympathize with the nota
sminiure as auch, but omits En, 1 [6], Por Plotinus attempts to construst an ent
connecting goul and body ac tho srtiela of Rich.
AN AUBXANDRIAN PLATONIS? AGAINST DUALISM 33
p.2, 104. M. ofre oly updns @ wis 9 avvoBos § mapdBeass, dX
Frepos tpin0s . raadv (Se. Kowanny) ... emPeBpadis rév xd ry
Slabqow mrzoundn). In the Sym, Zet. soul is said to be of a transoon-
dental and metaphysieal nature and to ‘unite’ with body in a manner
hich so %0 speak makes it both have and eat its cake : it is as if
Jningled, but retains its own nature, as if only juxtaposed. At Sent.
4,p. 1, J21f, M.he denies that incorporeals are mixed with (ovyiepraras)
podios as to their hypostasis and essence, In his treatise On...Hmbr.,
be likewise discusses the unin between the vegetative soul and the
body and that between vegetative soul and higher soul by manipulating
the Stoic vocabulary of physical mixture, Contrary to what one would
expoot when coming from the Seut., however, he this time does not
‘efcain from using the term “total? mixture, though this is immediately
(qualified as not entailing the destruction of the proper natures of its
constituents (rs dounpbdprov 8° Shuw rpderews, 10, 6, p.47, 27 K.).36®
bd. 10, 5, p. 47, 22 K. he again uses the term ‘mixture’, but qualifies
this mixture as being of « divine and paradoxal kind (rij Belay execonvy
rpiow Kai mapdBotov). We may conchide that Porphyry in principle
prsfere to avoid tho torm ‘mixture! (xpdots) hocanse of ita physical
and Stoie connotations and that, when using i, he immediately makes
clear thet he does so in an entirely new sense, In the Symm. Zet,
hho uses the term ‘union’ (Zoors) ; the divine and paradoxical mixture
of soul and body is sub specie of the One; ef. also ‘unite’ (doivra:),
On... Embr. p. 47, 23 Kt?
Certain Middle Platonists already argued against the Stoic theory
of the mixture of corporeal soul and bovly. An argument to this effect
has beon proserved by both Caleidius and Nemesius;™* it refutes the
Stoie conception of physical mixture etc. of eorporeals, but allows for
‘Ute This has been avesoo aro who denies the term pon
es hed by Dari, who denon the term apo to Porphyry
B* On inwous and xpiz of. alan K. Kalbflesch, Die neeplatonic
~ dy K. Kalbflesiok, Die nenplatonieche
Deeln 1805, 14
Groese, 117 fh
ectoh
wschriekene Schrift Ts Tabpwr oar Gxboxotra i EuSpue, ADK. Ak
~ Pho term Suoer itself eppaaca ta be of Stale provenience of. eg,
ot ung Uy DUtie, Porph 82 80%, — Note that Phtereh, Quoc. Plat, 10011 speak
‘wixize of World Soul and world (below, p. 40)oe AN ALEXANDRIAN FLATONIST AGAINST DUALISM
soul's penetration of the body in the way of an incorporeal quality
(Cale. 227, p. 242, 20 ff. W., proprium vero est hoc eius naturae quae
sine corpore, wt dulcedinia quae pervadit melleum corpus, ut lucis
corpus aéreum penetrat). Te will be recalled that Plotinus comp:
the presence of soul in body to that of light in air, just as Calcidius,
Dut that on the other hand he refused to consider soul as a state of
substratum. The argument in Caleidius, however, by giving as its off
example “sweetness in honey” accepts an equivalence between. Sou
and attribute. #9°Though we may owe the preservation of this Midd
Platonist argument to the doxographic zeal of Porphyry, I belie
that Waszink’s suggestion 2 that it was Porphyry himself who ean
strected it out of an anti-Stoie argument of the Peripatetic Alexander
of Aphrodisias (who comes after the Middle Platonist period) need no
bbe accepted.198 Dérrie was right in stating that Porphyry himself
not have put attribute and transcendental soul on the same level
‘a matter of fact, this is confirmed by a fragment of Poxphyry's On i
Sout, ap. Kuseb., PR XV, 11, TI, p. 374, 9 #. Mras : “to compare so
to heaviness or singular and unchanging corporeal qualities, in aco
ance with which the aubstratum is either moved or qualified in such
such @ way, is to be mistaken” (76 58 Bapiryre drreuxdZew hy due
morse nae pavoerdéor nati duunfrows owyarvedis, wat? &s # neveira
4 notov cori 73 tinoxelpevov, denenreondros 4p Kir-h.) d
‘To this it should bo added that already before Alexander of Aphro
disias, cortain authoritative Middle Platonists actually argued again
the Stoio doctrine of the oorporeality of tho qualities with the help
of Peripatetic concepts. This can be ilhustrated ftom Albinus, whe
Didescalicus incorporates largo chunks of Peripatetic doctrine
‘the canon of Platonist philosophy. The Peripatetic vocabulary used
(qualities, preserved under Galen's name, which may be dated to
second cent. A.D. It is also found in our Alexander.
ume Dara, Porph. SZ TO4f, saya the link Detween Calo and Plot je verbal
socidental, not genetic. He eorecty lat the differences. But Pltinss deab with
em problems whieh ooaupicd the Middle Platonists,
NP (sce p. 97, ad) 12) Porph. SE 36; cf, also Ammonis
180 Perph. 82.35; ef sto Ammonios, $51
1m yd. J, Westenberger, Galen gui fet de qualtatibus incor paris balun,
1906, Cf below, p35 2.125.
AN ALEXANDEIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALIOC 35
We have slready notiood that Alexander denies that Manis first
principles, iincorporeas, ate able to mingle in the manner of attributes
{couBefqxéra, p. 13, 17 Br), for then they would be without substance
{ovoca) which is the “vehicle of the attributes” # (p. 18, 17-20 Br).
“Again, at p. 14, 17 Br. he states that the incorporeal attribute (oyyBe-
Beds), just as soul, mingles with body. The Stoies, however, did not
speak of attributes, but of qualities (nowdrqres) : Alexander's distino-
tion between substance and attributes is (ultimately) Aristotelian.t#
Albinus’ treatise testifies to the incorporation into Platonism of those
Peripatetic concepts : Didase. 5, p. 156, 21-23 HL. he says that it is
the purpose of dialects to look first at substance, next at the attributes;
ibd. 6, p. 159, 84-85 H. he affirms that Plato, in the Parmenides and
lsowhore, discusses the ten (Aristotelian }) categosies, which implies
‘that he held nine of theso to bo attributes of substance.*** His refutation
of the eorporeality of the qualities formally equates (Stoie) quality
(codes) and (Peripatetio and Middle Platonist) attribute (cuppe-
Pyxés), Didese. 11, p. 166, 15-16 H. 4 8% moidr9s ody" Soxeluevor,
GUE comPePrxds.® This formal equation, by the way, also explains
"ee This curious metaphor shoul probaly be explained on the basis of the conneetion
Ietween the arguments agsinet corporeal qualities and corgosel soul (for whlah of,
shove, p. 84), or the Syyaa in this contest we shoul think not so much of the sous
‘utr body, but of Pat's humoraus desorption of the body a8 the yquc ofthe head
fontalning the rational soul at Tim. dil, which ie quite sriooly sited All Didase
23, p. (70, LL15 HE. Ta tal the mntion of ata 48 “auppertiag” the aitibuies is not
Jncomprchensble; for a deserption of similar nature, Aviat, Met, 1009610,
4028.20. D. 24. Mackinnon, diseusing Aristtl's Coneption of Suditanc (in: B. Bam
Prowah (o., New Lasrys in Plato and Arie, Londos 1865, 108) pointe ovt that the
‘alr ems “cho els, ch vel that Bern he quite boi asides and
ag Of Hed. Krbwes, Platoniomas wad llniticke Phowphie, Belin WM, 624,
‘ud ep. 43, 308 on Aristotle's own distinction between substance nnd nesidents; see
kod. Manse, Thita-P 1, 1972, 63.2, where innsggonted thatthe Stois themelves
Meeady adapted Avistate’s theory.
2A CER, Witt Alnus 66
Sepak Mansi Le Por parallels in Dept incorp seep. 2, 9113 8, $A 3, 205
SN 5. 16,1810 W. he wae tho terminology of attbation when speaking of
sity qualifying another quality p16, 17-19 W. refers to Arsttle's division of beings
‘enees and ates36 AN ADPXANDRIAN PLATONIST AGAINST DUALISAT ‘Ax ALBXANDRIAN PATONISY AGAINST DUALISM 37
gaif it were a body. In view of this, it is only natural to look for an
gati-Stoic background of this argument as well.
‘In his synopsis of the cosmological myth, Alexander speaks of the
‘cividing wp of the divine Power over matter” (riy Setay Sivayuur
papiteatoe cs Tiv Typ, p. 8, 9 Br). His diseussion of this point in
Gh, XX to some extent looks like a blend of two different arguments,
sinoo be criticizes the Manichaeans both for “making the divine Power
into something corporeal and entting it up just as those Suxphorrc is (ght) suggeeted by Drinkrnann(p. 30, 17)
599 de, has owadror at tho end ofthis sentence (p 9,21 Br), whichis unéranslatable
in this context; we have omitted I,
90) exon itis unnecesary to follow Brinkmann, who conjectures dyuor. Alex
ander goes of to nak (p. $1, 28 Br, below) ifthe soul i x08 hor. ole 0p oops. For
the oxjuara orn of the elements of above, Ch. Vig p10, 42. Br, and p. 63 a. 188,
P. 02 n, 250, p. 85 m. 361. Light elements move astuclly upwards, heavy elements
Aownwards, cf. Tnttodp. 28.25. A few lines before, Alezander har scovand Mani of
‘usking coal Into something eorporel and mated ef. p. 65m. 252, n. 359)pm Be
ob, XXII Br,
88 AN ALEXANDRIAN PLATOSIST AGAINST DUALISM.
Should not some sort of magazine, where the souls assemble and any
prepared for thei joumey to the moon, have beon marked off m seine
‘part of the earth or of the clouds or of some other place ?
‘There is another difficulty as well. For what possible reason does thy
moon not become full immediately, or for what reason does it wait
‘exactly a fortnight ? Tt is not the least amazing thing among those that
‘have been pointed out that never within the memory of man the moon
hhas become full in less than a fortnight, but that this did not even
happen during the cataclysm in Dencalion’s time and even less in
Phoroneus’ time, when, so to speak, everything upon earth perished,
and, consequently, the power happened to be separated from matter to
a quite large extent. Apart ftom this, it would have been proper to
take also the fertilities and infertlities of gencrations and also their
death into consideration ** since these do not occur according to a
fixed pattern, the regular order of full moons and wanings should not
hhave been so strictly presorved either.
Not wholly beside the point is also the following argument, tia,
that, if the divine power contained within matter is infinite, the cone
tinnons Iahours of stm and moan are of no avail with megane to ite
rowing less; since when something definitely finite *is taken away
from it, that which remains is still infinite. If, on the other hand, itis
finite, it should have heen perceptible in the course of so long a time
to what extent this power had, in the long run, grown less in the worlds
but all things remain as they were.%#