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    AQUINAS Edited by Nonseax xRET2MANN and SLEaNOnE stunt (published) ARISTOTLE Edited by JONATHAN sant (published) BACON Edited by mangxu reLToNEN BERKELEY. Edited by xenweva WINKLER DESCARTES Edited by jon CorriNcuAM [published EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY Edited by 4.4. 10NG FICHTE. Edited by ovswrex zoniten FOUCAULT Edited by axny CUTTING (published) FREGE Filited by vom niceerrs FREUD Edited by rexome Nev (published) HEGEL Edited by resoaicx sxser (published) HEIDEGGER Edited by chiantss GUIGNON [published) HOBBES Edited by rom sonnet HUME _ Edited by pavip rare Noxrow (published) HUSSERL. Bated by nanny syerri and Davi WILLIAM JAMES Edited by ruta awe ruvsast KANT. Edited by raut cuyen (published) KIERKEGAARD” Fated by avastaim wawway and LEIBNIZ. Edited by wicwocas ro. (published) LOCKE Edited by vine cxarrets (published! MARX Edited by TeReeLL canvan (published) ILL. Edited by jon sxonursxt NIETZSCHE Edited by nxn MAGNUS and PEIRCE Edited by cxnistorurn nooKwaY PLATO Edited by nicnano xeavr (published) PLOTINUS Edited by tiovo » cxRsoN SARTRE Eudited by cxmisrina wows11s (published) SPINOZA Fudited by Dox cARKETT WITTGENSTEIN Bdited by nans stuca and The Cambridge Companion to HABERMAS Edited by Stephen K. White Vins Packs nit nt ‘Sate Utero CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS © Cambie Univer rs 195 it pb 198 int inthe United Sates of Amerie tary of Congres Coaoini-ubesion Data ‘The Cmte componon Hatta / etl by Spies X White Ioclaer iii elena pind fsevosatqno wo 42446663 pbk) ra fren We, Steen K ‘catalog fr thi ok aero Bh bay smear 4taos hn CONTENTS List of contributors age vit PART I. INTRODUCTION Reason, modernity, and democracy 2 PART Il, HERITAGE AND CONTEXT entity and difference inthe ethical postions of ‘Adorno and Habermas 9 ‘What’ lef of Marat 4 ‘Universalism and the situated eritic o PART Il. COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY: SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS ‘Ceticaleheory a5 a research program a ‘Communicative rationality and cultural values 120 Practical discourse and communicative ethics Ps Contents PART IV. DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY “The self in discursive democracy Democracy andthe Rechsstaat: Habermas's Faktiitat und Geleung Discourse and democratic practices PART V, THE DEFENSE OF MODERNITY ‘Habermas significant other — “The other of justice: Habermas andthe ethical challenge of postmodernism Select bibliography Index 167 233 263 289 ps sar CONTRIBUTORS eNWerH navwes is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is the author of The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls and Ha: bermas (State Univesity of New York Press, 1993) and a co-editor of After Philosophy: End or Transformation! (MIT Press, 1987) simone CHAMMERS is Assistant Professor of Political Selence at the University of Colorado at Boulder Her main interest lie in the study of ethics and democratic theory Her book Discourse and Pro- cedural Ethics is forthcoming from Cornell University res. ROMAND COLES is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke ‘University. He isthe author ofa book on Augustine, Foucault and “Merleau-Ponty entitled Salf/Power/Other: Political Theory and Di- logical Ethics [Cornell University Press, 1993] as wells numerous tiles. He is currently completing a book entitled Critical Theory ‘and Difference: Toward a Pose Secular Cartas. oun s, prrzex is Professor of Political Science atthe University fof Oregon. His books include Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy (New York: Blackwell, 1987) and Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science [Cambridge Uni versity Pres, 1990). He writes mostly in the aeas of eitial theory, environmental politics, democratic theory, policy analysis, philoso: phy of socal science, and political science history. AxEL HonwETH is Professor of Political Philosophy at the Free University of Berlin. His books in English wanslation include: Social Action and Human Nature jtogether with Hans Joas; Cambridge viii Contributors ‘University Press, 1988, Critique of Power (MIT Press, 1990} and Struggle for Recognition (Polity Pres, frtheoming] NANCY §, LOVE is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pen sylvania State Universiy She is the author of Marx, Nietzsche, and ‘Modernity (Columbia University Press, 1986] and articles on critical ‘theory and postmodernism. Her current project sa study ofthe ole ‘of musi in the development of socal movements. |. DowaLD moos is Professor of Gaverament at Wesleyan Univer sity. Among his publications are Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conficts (Princeton University Press, 1993, ‘The Logie of Political Inquiry” inthe Handbook of Political Sc ence (Addizon Wesley, 1975] andartcles on the philosophy of social {inquiry and the political theory of the welfare state. He isa co-editor of Dissent and Afimation Bowling Green University Press, 1983] land editor of Responsibility, Rights, and Welfare (Westview, 1988). Max Pewsey is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Binghamton University. He s author of Melancholy Dialecics: Walter Benjamin ‘and the Play of Mourning [University of Massachusets Press 1993) land translator of Habermas The Past as Future (University of Ne- braska Press, 1994) FRANK ANDREAS sros1To is Bnishing «dissertation in political thoory atthe University of California, San Diego, on the implica ‘ons for liberalism ofthe romantic extigue ofthe Enlightenment TRACY 8. s1RONG is Professor of Political Science atthe Unive: sity of California, Sn Diego, and editor of ee journal Political The (ry, His books inchide Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transformation (University of California Press expanded ed, 1988) and The Idea of Political Theory: Reflections on the Selfin Political ‘Time and Space University of Notre Dame Press, 1990 GEORGIA WARNE is Professor of Philosophy at dhe University of California, Riverside. She isthe author of Gadarmer: Hermeneutics, “Tradition and Reason [Stanford University Press, 1967), lustic and Interpretation (MIT Pres, 1993), and ariles on critical theory, he mencutics, and feminism Contributors Py MARK E. WARREN is Associate Professor of Government at George town University: He is author of Nietche and Political Thought (MIT Press, 1588) as well ar articles on Marx, Weber, Habermas, Nietzsche; and democratic theory. He is now working on a book emtitled Democratic Transformations of the Self. which deawe on ‘continental political thought to rethink concepts of the self in dem- ‘crate theory stepmaw x. whiTe is Professor of Political Science at Virginia ‘Tech. His books include The Recent Work of Jargen Habermas (Cambridge University Press, 1988}, Political Theory and Pastmod. fernism (Cambridge University Press, 99x} and Edmund Burke Modernity, Politics, and Aesthetics (Sage, 1994) NOILONGOULNI raed 1 Reason, modernity, and democracy ‘One ofthe most distinctive featutes on the intellectual landscape of ‘the last decades ofthe eweatieth century is the intensity with which ‘These evtiques had an immense impact both on the inital shape of the work of Jrgen Habermas and on is continued evolution “The very extremity ofthese critiques, as wll as their association ‘with fascism in Heidegger’ case and Marxism (however unortho: ox] in Horkheimer and Adorno’, made them highly contentious from the start. Thee real effect ~ andit was often achieved at second or third hand ~ was never one of convincing large audience to em: ‘brace some new; alternative morl-plitial vision rather, it brought ‘prevailing interpretations of reason, progress, nature, and subject fy toa new level of explici questioning. These intellectual assaults, ‘coupled with shatering wold events of the mid-twentieth century, 3 4 wrnopucrion have ensured that modernity’ sel-understanding will never have the level of eel assurance thats once possessed. For Heidegger, the lss of confidence was virtually compete, and many of those influenced by him, especially contemporary post: Structuraliste and postmodern, lean in the same direction. Simi larly, Horkheimer and Adomo felt litle reason for optimism when they considered the intellectual and political resources the West ‘could bring to bear to heal its selinflicted wounds, The choices Seemed to be either strutting sel-conBdence or total loss of conf ‘dence. And ye, in Dialectic of Enlightenment one could still detect fan appeal being made to some ideal of reason and freedom that ‘might provide the illumination, however weak and uncertain, nec tary for finding path out of modernity’ dificultis” Neither Horkheimer nor Adorno wanted, oF was able, however, to make this ‘gesture more convincing inthe years that followed “Theis appeal to eaton and freedom had its oots in the pre-World ‘War ler, when they had been among the founders ofthe Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. The institute members carci out wide range of philosophical and socal investigations sharply eit Cal ofthe economic, politics, and culture of Western societies. Al: ‘though they considered themecves tobe onthe lf politiealy their attachment to Marxism became looser and loser, especially asthe ‘Character of Stalin's regime in the Soviet Union became increasingly “apparent Horkheimer coined the term "critical theory” in the 19308 to deseribe their stance. As originally conceived, critical the cory would have the role of giving new life to ideals of reason and freedom by revealing thir false embodiment in scientism, capital- ism, the “elture industry,” and bourgeois Westen political institu “The members of the institute were force to flee Nazi Germany and most of them settled in the United States. I was during this time in exile that the Dialectic was writen. After the war, ork: hhelmer and Adorno reestablished the instieute at che University of Frankfurt. Among the young philosophers who became associated ‘with it was Jigen Habermas. During this period, Horkheimer and ‘Adorno became ever more disillusioned about the world around ‘them. Adorno began to arcculate a mode of thinking he called “nex lative daletics” that resisted any affirmative thinking whatsoever ‘shout ethics and poities* And Horkheimer was dawn increasingly ‘Reason, modernity, and democracy 5 toward theology Habermas, however, sessed these changes 0 direction, a — Bening thet he chute coun or hime whieh, ie spit and deepese moral commitment bar tot changed in fundamental sense” He was convinced that one could retain the ower of his predecessor erga of modern if nly by laying 2 disncive conception of tonality and arming the notion 8 just or “emancipated” society that would somehow corespond to that emcetion “Ths Habermas philosophical journey hepa with departare ‘rom the postions of Horkeimer and Alor ltr yea fut 4 dcparue that Habermas has alway felt beter sain the spit of the Fak Schools rw pe The tension with Aros ect works especialy interesting. For Habermas, his rowing pes smism andthe totalcaton of his tig of Western moderiey onsite something ofl of nerve In thi ead thers Subre and disturbing ality between Adorno and eee Frm the depths of veh oul etigue what sr of policy eo caput the imagination’ Heidegger ely secon wih Nasr, fd hs lislong ttl to rentunce thoroughly cary Sor Hi ‘eras lesson tht cannot be forgotten or downplayed. When is Philosophical Discourse of Modernity speared Inte 198, the list of those who threstened to exemely the continu hat discourse included not only Nictache, Heider Foucaly, and Dery, but slo Horkbiner an Ado In his ead one Bas cx nas in the ent oe wen some othe suet alsedin the Ba esa by Romund Coles concening Ado, 2nd those asd inthe last to esas comceming the challenge Habeas fom postmodernism, Many realers of The Phlowphicl Discourse of Modernity axe perpened a the intensity and fledesnen of Habermas sack ‘m his opponents. Adding to the perleity i the face that on of the hallmarks of hin carer hasbeen en extesorinay open cra discussions Sch pepe can be atleast paral i. pelle if one enember tha the stakes involved with tlie hues of modernity are vry high fora German who lke Habermas, ‘is hisorcally routed woes that certain figures of thought me citer lend themselves fren i uniting to despre forme of Politics or provide insffeen esurecs fr eictie resistance to 6 intropuctiow them, One simply cannot understand Habermas’ work 2s a whole ‘without attending to this historical rootedness. Max Pensky’ con: {mibution eo this volume draws this connection out in its various Aimeasions labermas project, as it emerged in the 1960s, had two major ‘components Fist, he se himself the daunting task of developing & ‘more comprehensive” conception of reason, by which he meant ‘one that was not edueible ro the instrumental technical or strategie {Calculations of an essentially monade, individual subject?” More- ‘ver, it was only in terms of such a brosder conception that one ‘ould begin to sketch the ouslines of an “emancipated” or “ratio- al” society” “The tlfot to think about season differently bore its fist frit 196s, in “Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective Ins inaugural Teetre delivered upon assuming 2 professorship at Frankfurt. The thesis was soon expanded into 2 book of the same ame" There he postulated the existence of three anthropologcally ‘deep seated interests of human beings, 10 which thee categories ‘of Knowledge and rationality correspond. We have “knowledge: Constitutive interests sm the technical control of the world around ‘sin understanding others, and in freeing ourselves fom structures of domination: a "technica" a "practical" and an “emancipatory” Interest.” Following Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas found that ‘modem society has fostered an unbalanced expansion of the techni Ca interest n contol: The drive to dominate nature becomes a dive to dominate other human beings. Hahermasé speculation upon how to alleviate this distorsion revolved around reasserting the rational- tiny inherent in our “practical” and “emancipatory” interests. En- toring these two interests in a distinctive fasion, Habermas an nounced that ¢ rational basis fr clleeive life would be achieved fonly when socal relations were organized “according 10 the prin tiple thatthe validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on 4 consensus arrived at in communication fee from domination” | “This idea became the guiding thread of Habermass project. He son found, however, that it could not be adequately fleshed out ‘sing the epistemological framework of knowledge-constitutve in teress, He decided instead 0 pursue his aims through an explors- ‘don of the ongoing “communicative competence” displayed by al Reason, modernity, and democracy 7 speakers of natural languages The heat of this endeavor was an aplication of the implict mastery of ules for raising and te ‘deeming “validity claims” in ordinary Tanguage. Insofar as actors wish to coordinate their action through understanding rather than force or manipulation, they implicitly take on the burden of re. {deeming claims they aise to others regarding the truth of what they sy, ts normative rightness, and is sincerity. When claims are ex plictly challenged they can only be redeemed in, respectively, “the- retical discourse,’ "practieal discourse” or further interaction that reveals whether the speaker has been sincere." The fundamentals ofthis "linguistic tur’ in Habermast work ~ che eur tthe they of communicative rationality and aetion- are laid out in Georgia Warnke esay ‘With this shift, Habermas established a conceptual framework out ‘of which he has continued to work uatil the present. There have been many modifications and elaborations, but as he says, "my re search program has remained the same since about 19700" The task of making plausible the theory of communicative accion and rationality i an enormous ane, and his writings from this point on ave best seen as pursuing various but interelated paths toward this val For Habermas, there is no single, straightforward line of angu ‘ment that will make his case in knockdown fashion, Plausibility at this philosophical level is gained only piecemeal, by showing in a variety of contexts how the theory of communicative action and r- tionality generates more conceptual, moral, and empirical insight than alternative approaches." Four contests are particularly im: portant: methodological discussions inthe socal sciences, accounts ‘of the character of modernity and the societal rationalization astoc- ated with it, contoversies in contemporary moral philosophy, and contending views about the leptimacy of the lberl, democratic In the broadest methodological sense, Habermas account of rea som and action offers a new conceptual “core” tothe research tea. ton oferitial theory. It thus provides means of generating coher. fence across a broad terzain of esearch inthe socialsciences At the end of his monumental two-volume work, The Theaty of Commu nicative Action, he expliily harkens back tothe institutes efforts In the 10308 to pursue a wide range of interconnected, interdis plinary studies John Dryzek’ essay explores the geneal implica 8 ntRopuerion tions of Habermas’ approach forthe philosophy ofthe social sei “The Theory of Communicative Action is best known, however, for the striking perspective it provides on how we should understand ‘modernity, An underlying goal ofthe book is to elaborate how the ‘communist approach t reason and action helps us both to cr tigue certain aspects of modernity and yet to clarify the value of other aspects in such a way ab € give us some grounds for “sli: “Habermas offers two-level interpretation ofthe modern world, in which a distinction is drawn between the sational potential im- pliciein “cultural modernity" and che selective or one-sided utiliza ton ofthat potential in “societal processes of modernization” ‘The cultural potential of modernity constitutes the eitical stand- point from which patieular aspects of Western modernization can be judged negatively, What Habermas means by this is that modern culture has made avilable a “rationalized lifeworld” —one in which fsctors consistently carry the expectation thatthe various validity lam raised in speech are tobe cognitively distinguished and that they have to be redeemed in diferent ways. As such a lifeworld ‘emerges, an increasing number of spheres of social interaction are removed fram guidance by unquestioned uadition and opened to 0- ‘ordination through consciously achieved agreement. Simultane- fusly with this advance in communicative rationalization, there flso occurs an advance in the rationality of society as measured from a functionalist or systems perspective. This later sore of ratio ralization means that chere isan expansion of social subsystems ‘that coordinate action through the media of money (capitalist econ: ‘omy) and administrative power moder, centralized states}. The ini- tially beneficial expansion of these media has progressed to she ‘point, however, that they inereasingy invade areas of social life that fave been or could be coordinated by the medium of understanding or “solidarity” Modernization inthe West has thus generated a pa thology: an unbalanced development of its potential. Habermas re- fers to this phenomenon as “colonization ofthe lleworld” that brings in ts wake a growing sense of meaninglessness and din ling freedom “This imbalance is one that can be resisted cis not an unbreake able "zon cage” in Max Weber’ sens. Habermas sees palpable signs Reason, modernity, and democracy ° ‘ofthe rejection of the smooth unfolding of functionalist reason in ‘various new social movements that have emerged since the 19608, whose common denominator is their concern not so much with “problem of distribution, but [with] questions of the grammar of forms of life* Whether the questions arise inthe form ofa rte ‘of productivist civilization asin the ecological movement, of inthe form of a rejection of seripted identities a5 in feminism or the gay and lesbian rights movement, they all constitute resistance points to further colonization. Such opposition is ofcourse conceived by Habermas tobe progressive only to the degre tht its concerns can be articulated in ways that accord with the universalist normative ‘bent of communicative rationality, tht is, only to the degree that resistance to colonization of the feworld is carried out s0 a8 t0 build upon the culeual potential of modernity rather than reject, asis the case with exclusivst appeals to national identity. ‘The strong, universalist postion on rationality and morality, nd ‘the claim thatthe modern Wes - forall its problems ~ best embod. Jes these values, has, not surprisingly un into intense opposition. For a broad arty of poststructuralist, postmodern, and feminist ‘thinkers this sort of universalism is merely a sophisticated variant of earlier, deleterious forms. And, like them, i functions merely to ‘lind the West tothe ways in which ic both drives itself in ever more Aisciplinary directions and engenders “others” who fall short ofthe ‘demands caried by its eritera of reason and responsibilty. Such tiques are sometimes premised on a fairly significant misunder. standing sometimes nonreading| of Habermas’ work -but not al- ‘ways. The two essays inthis volume that engage such issues do s0 from a postion of adequate understanding and no small degzee of sympathy. racy Strong and Frank Sposito raise the problem ofthe other” of reason from within the Kantian tradition of philosophy 4s 2 whole and suggest that its shortcomings have to be more ade: ‘quately confronted by anyone wi, like Habermas, draws so deeply Upon that tradition. Axel Honneth esay caries a similar tone. He ‘surveys various critiques of Habermas that have emerged out of ‘postmodern and feminist concerns and shows how they contin eth teal insights to which Habermas has failed to do fll justice. (The last part of Naney Love's essay is also relevant to these issues} In the somewhat less hostile context of analytic moral philoso ‘hy, Habermas has exhibited grat willingness to elaborate his un vetsalist perspective and defend it at length against alternative pos: ‘dons. He has tried to show generally why a communicative ethics provides the best way of comprehending the universalist core ofthe ‘Wester understanding of morality. Tis has necessitated, fist, de {ending the priority he grants toa deontological approach to moral- ity, which delineates "the moral poin of view" in terms of proce- dural jstice and rights, ove teleological one, which understands ‘morality as oriented fist and foremost around substantive notion ofthe good, Second, Habermas has ha to distinguish his own deon- ‘ological view from those of Kant and contemporary philosophers such as John Rawls." The essays by Warnke and J. Donald Moon survey these efforts and asess their success Even asthe importance of the communicative approach to reason and ethics was becoming more widely recognized in the 19805, 2 persistent ertciam of Habermas remained in regard to what was perceived as his file to address adequately institutional, political ‘questions. His ethical perspective and critique of Wester rtional- ization seemed to distance him radically fom the existing institu tions of liberal democracy. That was acutely evident in his Legtima. tion Css, writen in the early 197052 Like many other ities of the legitimacy of liberal democracies written in that decade, Ha bermas contended that such systems were beset by difficulties likely to drive them into a ersis resalable only by radical democra tization, But the precise shape of this more just society - what he hhad earlier called “emancipated” ~ remained obscure. Up through the ealy 19705, Habermas continued to think in terms of a funda ‘mental transition fom a liberal, constitutional state to some sor of socialist system with more radicalized democratic institutions” By the time The Theory of Communicative Action appeared in Ger ‘man in r981, however, it was clear that this perspective was under fing substantial modification As sid earir, Habermas there af firms certain modes of resistance in advanced industrial societies, but such opposition is never conceived as directed toward a whole: sale replacement of liberal states. The primary image ones left with fs stniggle at the margins. Healthy democratic impulses scem largely confined tothe periphery of organized polities, from there they merely ty to resist further systemic encroachment. The force ‘of communicative reason, at manifest in new social movements and Reason, modernity, and democracy 1 ‘other upwellings of radical “public spheres” can, inefect, only husl themselves against an administrative Leviathan, ‘Even though the precise institutional implications of Habermas’ ‘coneeption of democracy remained uneleat though the 198s, there were other aspects of it that were developed in enough detail oper mit a fruifl engagement with various issues in demorati theory “Mark Warren essay investigates how a discursive perspective brings about something of "paradigm shife in how we think about the location and leptimacy of radically democratic expectations” (see Chapter 8), ‘The brosd suggestivencss of Habermas's perspective for democ- racy has finally been brought into the context of a more detailed analysis of political institutions with the publication of is Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, which appeared in German in x953.” In The Theory of ‘Communicative Acton, Habermas had certainly regarded the emer sence of modern law, with its universalism and orientation to ind ‘vidual right, as a significant evoluionary step in moral:practical learning, But this postive quality was seen largely 28 something that dha kept us from recognizing the degree to which law in the wellze state has in fact become a vehicle for expanding administrative power [a problem Habermas treated under the theme of “urdifica- tion’ [Verrechtlichung|> Thus, although modern law is understood in that book 88 deeply ambivalent, its negative side is what te- vives the most distinctive ueatment. This onesidedness is cor. rected in Facticity and Validity. The essays by Kenneth Baynes and Simone Chambers explore the various issues raised by this signi ficant addition to Habermas’ corpus. ‘Within the new perspective lw role as an instrument of stabil- lity and social control isretained only now that capacity is displayed 4s being in perpetual “tension” with the distinctive nd postive ‘normative quality it takes on in moder polities” The insittions ‘of modern law, such a8 basic rights and constitutions, provide means by which actor can maintain, in a historically new way, collective sense of "validity" and “solidarity” no longer adequately carried by traditional institutions. The former institutions can a sume this role because they can be understood as representations of ‘the idea of a self determining community of free and equal subjects ‘who wish to guide their collective life through binding rules. In a general sense, ruch a philosophical reconstruction of the sell: landerstanding of modem politics is quite familia. Habermas, how- ‘ever, wants 10 show how communicative rationality ean provide a ‘novel way of reconceptuaizing eis gure of thought, Previous artic ‘lations ofthe idea of a politicl community of free and equals have foundered on thei inability to resolve the conflict between private and public autonomy Either individual right are given priority over ‘collective autonomy (sin Kane and liberalism) or collective auton: ‘omy is given priority over the individual (as in Rousseau, republican fm, and communitarianiam), The problem, according to Habermas, that both postions are rooted in notions of subjectivity, indivi tual or collective. If political theory is rooted instead in a notion of intersubjectivity fleshed out in communicative rational terms, then. ‘we can understand the “equi-primordialiy of private and pubic right [Rech This is so because, in Habermas terms public av tonomy is reconceived asthe avalailty of a diferentiated “net. “work” of communicative arrangements for the discursive formation ‘Of public opinion and will and system of basic individual “rights provides exactly the condition under which the forms of ommuni= Cation necessary for a politically autonomous constitution of law ‘an be insittionalized "= “This “discursive” conception of democracy links up with other recent efforts to te legitimacy more elosely tothe quality of deliber- ation exhibited in political processes. Democratic legitimacy, for “Habermas, i mestired not jst in terms of law being enacted by a majority, but also in terme ofthe discursive quality ofthe Full pro- esoes of delibestion leading up to such a result. Discursvely healthy processes, from the most difuse and informal to the most structured and form, are what maintain a sense of validity and Solidarity among a. “consicutional community” (Rechte Imeinschafl they alone allow law tobe structured not just by the ‘Systemic "needs" of control, expressed in the autonomous expan Sion of "administrative power” but also by needs arising from the Iieworld of actors, expresod in “communicative power” [here He ‘bermas borrows heavily from Hannah Arendt). When the demo cratic constitutional state is functioning wel it continually “wans- lites” communicative power into administrative power ‘Between Facts and Norms thus presents us with some substantial Reason, modernity, and democracy 5 shifts in Habermas’ views about polities i the iberal sat, Fist, and most evident, any notion of a socialist democracy seems to have receded almost completely from view. Although Habermas does not wish t0 renounce totally his socialist root, i s not ently clear ‘what is realy left of them, Nancy Love’ estay wrestles witht spect of Habermas's herstage. ‘The picture of politics in Between Facts and Norms also consti: tutes a modification ofthe one offered in The Theory of Commun. ‘ative Acton, which envisioned a radial alterity between a norm tively obtuse, monolithic, administrative state and the discursive claim arising in civil society. Now the picture iso a differentiated state whose multiplicity of sits for deliberation and decision mak. ing is broadly warranted by communicative rationality. Each site, however, must be judged carefully in terms of "the discursive level ‘of public debates” occurring there. Discursive democracy thus re ‘quizes a continual and variegated “interplay” between a multiplicity ‘of "public spheres" emerging across civil society and broad spec: trum of formal politcal institutions = Habermas's detailed elaboration of his discursive, deliberative ‘mode constitutes a major contribution tothe debates in contempo: rary democratic theory. This model contends with liberal variants, fon the one sie, and republican and communitarian ones, on the ‘other For Habermas, the former neglect the need fora social solid. ity obtainable only by radicalization of public communication pro cesses, while the later seek to constitute such solidarity around notions of community that are too thick, These claims no doube ‘will be the subject of intense controversy forthe next few years. ‘This reference toa new opening in debate isthe appropriate place ‘wend this introduction. Habermas’ pace of philosophical contribu tom has not slackened. Conclusions remain, hopefully, a Tong way oft + Manin Heidegpet, “say om Humanism” in Basie Wings, eed and ‘with inrodtion by David Kell [New York: Harper & Row 1977) Pp. {ey-aga and The Question Concerning Technology and Other Esa, translated and with introduction by Willa’ Loi [New York Harper & Row 1577) 14 INTRopuctiON 2 Max Hokbimer and ThendorW. Adorn, Dil o Enlightenment tans Jobn Cumming New Yok: Seabury £972) 3 Bi selon, {Seep orien "Madonl nd Coesl They" util The oy Selected say Mathew O'Connell (New York: Sex buy ira) wp. tas 5, Aino, Negaine Dates, ent £.B. Aston [New York: Contin 6 Forth ann orheimer howe Habermas,“ Sek a ‘san Uncondionl Meaning witost Cod Is Fee Undeaing Fefectons oa ema of Max Horie? tn Jutifston and Ap pleation Remarks on Discourse Bis, was. Clan Cronin (Cat Shige Mae: IT Pres, 93h p33 17nd we a stinton fees hs dept ee of comment td the posal amor intend to make god on The fo tre as ot changed cscs the ate, howewe, has ben od fed vgs 5 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, ans. Peek Lene (cambldge, Mast: MIT Prem 187 ch 9 Habeas, "Tae Acsycal Theory of Soence and Dike” in ‘Arn esl, The Pst Dispute in German Soils len ‘Ay td Di Py Ne Yn: Mapes & Row 19769. and"A Tostvatially Bnd Rationalism’ Inthe sme volume, 2198-9, 2p. als The Thooy of Communicative Aton, Vo Reston ad ite Ravonatentien of oe am, Tomas Carthy Boston Bee con Pr tah. so Se Habermas Toward o Reon Society: Stade Prot Scene nd Pats, ans, Jrery Shapiro [Boston Reon Piss, 179) 11 Habeas, Koowladge aad Haman Interests, rane. remy Shapeo {Boson econ Pes 97]-Te omar ete nll aan ap ten 12 Bi, p08 15 Bid 384 12 Habeas Theory of Communicative Actos, VO xxx 1 takers, “Toward Theor ol Communicative Competence i Pt tans of Communit Behav cl Hane Dre Now Yack: Mc ml 970 135-48 16 Merny, "What ls Unive Pragmats?” in Communcotion end {he Bvlation uf Sete, was, Thomas McCarty foto: Bescon Pros oy ry: th, Theary of Communic Action. Vl Sn and Nara! Consciousness aod Communicate acon, cs ‘Reason, modemity, and democracy 15 (Christian Lenhart and Shicery Weber Nicholuen (Cambridge, Mass MIT Pres, 190) Habermas, aseaton and Application. 149. ahermas, Faluciat und Geltung: Beittage zur Dishurstheorie dee Recs und des demolratschen Rechistoats [Rashfure: Sika, oa] p. "Intent Social Seience venus Hermeneaticsm,' in So ial Science as Mora Inu ed. Nora Habs etl (New Yok’ Co frm University Pros, 1983p. 61, and "Pilsopy as Sand in and Interpreter” tn Alter Philosophy: End or Tansfermation, ed. Kenneth ‘aynes, ames Boman and Tomas McCarthy (csmbedg, Mass MIT Press, 1871 pp. Hon, and The Theory of Communieave Action, VoL I, Lfeworid and system: A Crtigue of Fanctonalit Reon, ‘tans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987 pp. 398-40), Hahermas, Theory of Communicative Action ol pp 8H CC. also Deyzeks Dscusive Democracy Politics, Pole, and Plc Science |Cambrige: Cambridge University Pres, 1990 ino. and ch Ste Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. Val ch. 8, and Philosophical Discourse of Modemity, ch 1 Hahermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Wl. 1 pp. 137-85, Ibid pp. 183, 230-40, and VoL Ih pp. 292-9, 422452, 470-88 Hahermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Nal fp. 576 579 "Hahermast most ecet reflections on these issues are contained i us ‘ifleation and Application, Habermas, Lepitimation Cis, ans. Thomas MeCarthy (Boston: Bes on Pres 1575 The German ction appeared in 1973 Hakermas, “Further Relecons on the Public Sphere” im Habermas tnd he Pable Sphere, CraigCalhoun (Carbrdge, Mas: MIT Pres, to9al p44, Sous not to make the mistake of thinking that he simply changed hie ‘ind ar rerlt ofthe collape of communism inthe Soviet Unio, i {smprtant to note that Habermas's views on socialism were siting slay inthe early 19s Cited inn 1, An English eranalation ofthis volume ented Between Facts and Norms: Contributions #0 4 Discourse Theory of Law ad Democracy, ans. Wiliam Reh, is fortioming rom MIT Pres, Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. Mp 357 Fakusat und Geltung pp. 7,109. bid. 134-35 181, 207-08, hid. 26 intropuerion 54 bid, pp 96,448 I shouldbe noted that atenton wo dhe leavening ca {nflaneeofpuble spheres" on politics ra theme that hss been pres ‘ent in one form or another, ince hie Hablltationschi. which was HERITAGE AND CONTEXT published in German in 196, The English wanlatin sented The Strucrura hanformation ofthe Pub phere: A Ingutryinto a Ca egy of Bourgeois Society, rane. Thomas Burger with the ssstance of Frederick Lawrence Cambeige, Mass MIT Pres, 1985), 2 Identity and difference in the ethical positions of Adorno and Habermas ‘One can explore the overlaps and tensions between Adorno and Hi bbermas on diverse and related themes concerning instrumental ra son, the potential for crises in contemporary capitalist democracies, the prospects for historical tansformation, the relationshipe be tween ertical theory, socal seience and analytic philosophy, the normative postions of critical theory, and so on. Depending upon one's thematic focus, assessments of proximities, distances, advan tages, and disadvantages will vary markedly In this essay my analy. sis ofthe relationship between Adorno and Hahcrmas is limited to ‘questions concerning the normative character of critical theory On my reading Adorno provides a more interesting and promising pos: tion than Habermas recognizes, and both illuminates and gestures ‘beyond some ofthe most important weaknesses of Habermas com ‘mupicaive ethics Habermas once noted with a certain melancholy chat is writing Jnad not succeeded as much as he would have liked in “awakenling| the hermeneutic willingness requisite fr its reception’ Ironically, siven Habermas often harsh and repeated criticisms of Adorno, there is a sense in which Habermas may indirectly contsbute t0 just such an awakening forthe reception of Adorno's work. For the former’ emphasis on communicative ethics has contributed to an ‘nterrogative framework ~ a set of compelling questions concerning ‘ethics and dialogue ~ which illuminates and brings into sharper fo feu themes that ae often missed because of their ablique, some times ilusive [though persistent and promising) treatment in ‘Adorno’ work. Thus illuminated, Adorno appears to raze the quet ‘on of whether Habermas self proclaimed movement beyond him 19 ‘snot more adequately tobe characterized as “one step forward, two steps hack” begin by summarizing Habermas's account of Adorno concern- ing the question of normative foundations, and then sketch the cen- tral contours of Habermas's effore to move beyond problems he per ceives in Adomo by developing discourse ethics. tn the next half ofthe essay I develop a dalogical ethics of nonidentity that runs throughout Adorno's work and erticize Habermas's position from, this vantage point. “While te tradition of ideology extique stemming fom Marx dite entiates between Knowledge and power, and undermines false ‘aims to the former by showing them to be sustained infact only by the later, secording to Habermas. Adorno and Horkheimer un-

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