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PIPER ALPHA

INCIDENT
PREPARED BY:

KHAIRUL ZAKIRIN BIN BADRUL HAYAD

SAYYID SYAFIQ BIN SYED MOHAMED

YUSRINA BT YUNUS

NUR ALINA BT MEGAT JAMAL

North Sea oil production platform fully managed and


operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd
subsidiaries of Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy)
located at approximately 110 miles from Aberdeen,
Scotland.
1988, the oil platform that had once been the worlds single
largest oil producer was starting to show its age produced
317, 000 barrels of oil every day.
167 peoples died (2 peoples from the emergency response
personnel) = 109 (inhaling smokes)+14 (attempt to escape
& burns)
135 bodies recovered, 32 bodies unrecovered.
61 peoples survive (climbing down ropes, hoses or by
jumping from 210ft into the sea)

Official investigation report written by Lord Cullen, it was the


failures of companys management on safety on the Piper
Alpha Platform
A lack of physical evidence, based upon eyewitness
accounts it was concluded that, a release of light
hydrocarbon (condensate such as propane, butane, and
pentane) occurred when a pump was restarted after
maintenance
The hub of a network of platforms interconnected by oil and
gas pipelines
Initial explosion ruptured oil lines on Piper Alpha and the
leaks were fed by the still-pressurized inter-platform
pipelines

CHRONOLOGY

12.00 Noon

6.00P.M.

Pump As pressure safety valve was removed for routine


maintenance
Pump fortnightly overhaul was planned but had not started
Open condensate pipe temporarily sealed with disk cover (flat
metal disc called blind flange) hand-tightened
On-duty engineer fill permit which stated Pump A not ready
and not switched under any circumstances

day shift end, night shift started (62 men)


Engineer neglected to inform on-duty custodian condition of
Pump A
Place permit in control centre and left (permit lost)
Another permit issued for general overhaul of Pump A that had
not yet begun

7.00P.M.

9.45P.M.

9.52P.M.

Diesel pump design to suck in large amount of sea water for


fire fighting (automatic control to start)
At evening, fire-fighting system under manual control

In the day methanol system had problems, methane clathrate


(flammable ice) accumulate in gas compression system
pipework (cause blockage)
Pump B (NGL)stop
Entire power supply of offshore construction work depend on
that pump, manager had few minutes to bring pump back

Valve in different location from pump


Permit were stored in different boxes (sort by location)
Metal disc replacing safety valve was several metres from
ground level and obscured by machinery

9.55P.M.

Before
Disaster

Pump A switch on
Gas flow into pump, caused overpressure and metal disc did not
withstand
Gas audibly out high pressure,triggering six gas alarm (high level
gas alarm)
Gas ignited and explode,blow through firewall (2.5 1.5 metre)
and not designed to withstand explosion
Custodian press emergency stop button, close huge valves in
sea line and ceasing all oil and gas production

After
Disaster

Management and
Operation

The management and its


structures

The figure shows hierarchy root system failures

Main element of the accident sequence is based on the organizational


level

Management decision from how the leader doing his planning, decision
and actions influence the occurrences

The fault mainly on the companys management of safety on Piper Alpha

Objective of the management

Piper alpha management structures for action or


decision started from managers

One :- Ensuring that all objectives of the subordinates


linked to the organizations objectives.

Two :- Better communication

Three :- coordination and interaction between superiors


and subordinates helps solve problems.

Industrial Processes

Side view

Top view

Module A (wellheads) and


reservoir

The reservoir were mixtures of crude oil, gas, water


and sand.

Then, it will brought to the surface through pumping


the 34 wells connecting reservoir to the platform.

Liquid state in the reservoir, but because of high


pressure, by the time they reach surface, they
become gas and fluid.

Extraction happens during that time thats why.

Module B (separation)

Separate gas and produce water from the


crude oil

Module C

Process gas from module B

Remove condensate from gas, increases


pressure of the gas.

How:- centrifugal, reciprocating compressors

Module D

End of platform.

More equipment stored here.

CAUSES OF THE
ACCIDENT

Direct Causes

Leaking of methane gas

2 times explosion

1st time was by the malfunctions of pump

2nd time giant fire ball was by the rupture of main


pipeline

Indirect Causes

Misunderstood between management and operator

Lack of equipment information

Most people on the rig not aware ignition

Inadequate emergency respond plan

Root Causes

Operator Performance
Insufficient training to ensure effective
operation of the PTW system
Contractors lack offshore experience
Working Environment
Inadequate flow of labour
Inadequate working programme
Pressure to maintain production at whatever
cost

Communication & Information

Lack of feed forward and feedback communication


Inadequate display and access of information
Inadequate emergency control centre
Emergency procedures manual inadequate

Organization & Management

Inadequate methods for setting work priorities


Lack of commitment to safe working environment
Inadequate PTW system and fire safety
Poor organization between operations and maintenance
Inadequate shift changeover procedures

Site & Plant Facilities

Operating outside the design envelope


Lack of isolation of gas pipelines from other rigs

Engineering Integrity

Platform not designed to withstand prolonged fire

CONSEQUENCES OF THE
ACCIDENTS

DIRECT COST OF THE


ACCIDENTS

167 of the people died

165 were the workers

109 by inhaling smoke,

14 while attempting to escape

A few died of burns

135 bodies were recovered

2 men from the rescue boat

Some of the people that survived suffer injury because


of the fire and explosions

INDIRECT COST OF THE


ACCIDENT

According to Cullens report,

US$ 3.4 billion cost in property damage

100 kg of hydrocarbons loss which containment to the


marine

it only insured around US$ 1.4 billion by the Insurers Lloyd


of London

Occidental Petroleum, Piper Alpha operating company


also paid millions of compensation to the victim family.

Families suffer emotionally for the losses of their


family.

RECOMMENDATION

Management and Human Resources

Any recruitment of new workers shall be exposing to the safety


training and emergency response training.

Platform managers must be train on how to respond to


emergencies on other platforms and give order to the workmen
on the board.

Practice of Permit to Work (PTW) system must be put on high


priority with regular audit and review of the system to make sure
it is being used and is effective.

All workers must been Training in use of the Short Messaging


System (SMS) and training in understanding the risks of the
operation

Regular production Quality Assurance audits at the yard, high


level of Non-destructive Testing(NDT) inspections of pipe welding
and piping pressure testing.

Design and Process

Segregation of hazardous areas from control rooms and


accommodations, use of firewalls, blast walls,
protected control rooms and muster areas.

Installation of a gas, fire, explosion, and smoke-proof


temporary shelter for the crew on offshore
installations, for use until evacuation is arranged.

A variety of evacuation and escape systems. Must be


more than one route.

Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR) to Prevent smoke ingress.

Provide secondary escape equipments e.g. : ropes,


ladders & nets

Heating Venting and Cooling (HVAC) systems be


upgraded to prevent ingress of smoke to
accommodation modules, pressurizing them and
providing air locks to prevent smoke/toxic fumes
entering these areas.

Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESD Valves) be located on


the deck as well as subsea locations on hydrocarbon
risers, with the ESDs on the deck being installed within
a blast-proof container

Safety and Health

Provide annual safety training. All new recruitment or


existing employee must be exposed on emergency
response training either twice or once a year.

Regularly auditing and inspection on safety and health


in the working places.

CONCLUSION

Main cause of these fire and explosions was due to lack


of communication between shifts.

Any company management will not take any measures


in order to save money in the short term which can lead
to shortage of manpower, less experienced and
overworked operators.

Company should expose their employees to proper


safety training and emergency response training.

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