itional sk DR ‘ibure, ‘oltics and 0.1, srlean f the tary. a to yon arity org/ 5 Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention: The Empty Promises of Human Rights Ritualism Annie Pohlman Indonesia is one of a handful of UN Member Nations which has resisted becoming a State Party to the Genocide Convention. Given its long and dark history of mass atrocity crimes, it is unlikely Indonesia will ratify the Genocide Convention in the near future. Yet in the past two decades since beginning the democratization process in 1998, Indonesia has been praised for its improvements in the promotion of human rights, regionally within ASEAN and internationally. Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and has long seen itself as the tegion’s natural leader. Former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-14) did much to try to raise Indonesia's international profile within the UN and regional organizations, self-consciously posi- tioning at different times as a middle power, an advocate for human rights and a buffer between China and the West. Despite its willingness to advocate on humanitarian issues at the regional and international levels, Indonesia has shown little progress in implementing adequate Protection against serious human rights abuses at the domestic level. ‘This chapter begins by laying out Indonesia's stance on the Genocide Convention over time. Rather than attempting to examine Indonesia's non-stance on the Genocide Convention per se, I instead reflect on Indonesia's performance in other institutions and areas of international human rights norms. Specifically, { focus on Indonesia's presence on the UN Human Rights Council, its performance within the Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR) in the First (2008) and Second (2012) cycles, and. its role as a comparatively progressive leader on human rights within ASEAN, | then compare these international and regional moves for the apparent promotion of human rights with the lack of progress to imple- ment commitments made at the international level for the protection of human rights domestically. To do this, | take up Hilary Charlesworth’s 123124 Annie Pohlman concept of human rights ritualism to explain the continuing dissonance between Indonesia's apparent embrace of human rights discourse in recent years and its lack of implementation of the substance of that discourse during the Reformasi (1998 - the present) period. Seven decades of the UN genocide convention in Indonesian history The Republic of Indonesia is one of a small group of member states of the UN yet to ratify the Genocide Convention. Amongst this small group, it is the largest country: aside from Japan, most others are small African, Pacific or Caribbean nations. In light of the nearly seven dec- ade history of the Genocide Convention, in addition to the host of other significant human rights treaties adopted by the majority of UN member states during that time, Indonesia's position on this major convention is somewhat incongruous. Indonesia remains, if not obsti- nate about joining the majority of the international community in ratifying this Convention, then certainly reticent. This reticence must be viewed in light of Indonesia's history of mass atrocities since gaining. sovereignty in 1949, and the refusal by successive administrations to deal with these atrocities. This reticence must also be held up against Indonesia's moves over the past decade and a half to position itself as a leader on human rights within the Southeast Asian region and an active member of the international community through, as I examine in this chapter, its participation in the UN Human Rights Council. In reviewing the seven decades since the creation of the Genocide Convention, we must take the long view of the Indonesian post- colonial nation-state and the factors which have hindered or enhanced possibilities for its ratification, During the first five decades of the Republic of Indonesia, under Presidents Sukarno (1949-66) and then Suharto (1966-98), there was never really ever a point at which Indonesia would have signed the Genocide Convention, The Sukarno years were a period which began with democratic practices but slid to authoritarian tendencies and antagonism with the UN and the West. After the massacres of 1965-1966, in which an estimated half a million people were killed, the man who had coordinated and carried out the purges, General Suharto, displaced the former president and went on to tule for the next 32 years. During neither the turbulent Sukarno years nor Suharto’s militarist, authoritarian New Order regime would it have been possible for the Genocide Convention to be signed, Under both presidents, Indonesia'se & d e a a a 2 Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 125 ‘engagement with the global community was minimal. For the whole of this first 50 year period, Indonesia was little known for its forays into international affairs and least of all for any role it might have played in. the protection or promotion of human rights. The two main features of Indonesia's outlook on the world over its first five decades could be summarized as its involvement in the non-aligned movement and, more significantly, its role as ‘first amongst equals’ in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Within both arenas, Indonesia was a noted stalwart of the ultra- conservative defence of state sovereignty and the rejection of anything which could be deemed as outside interference in domestic affairs, particularly with regard to widespread abuses against civilians.’ Mass atrocities committed under the New Order, such as the invasion and ‘occupation of East Timor, the treatment of long-term political prison- ts, military operations in ‘secessionist’ regions such as Aceh and Papua, and a variety of other human rights ‘incidents’ were clearly never issues about which Indonesia was willing to entertain extemal investiga tions or other forms of international interference.‘ As such, it was ever unlikely that such a strong international human rights instrument as the UN Genocide Convention would have been even considered, let alone tabled for signing under either Suharto or Sukarno. This chapter therefore concentrates on the period subsequent to their rule. When at last Suharto’s military regime came to an end in 1998, the new ‘Reform’ (Reformasiy movement under the interim President B. J. Habibie did see an initial period of substantial reforms.® This early reform period also saw a significant improvement in Indonesia's take- up of international human rights instruments, and a much stronger stated commitment to the protection of human rights. There was not, however, any move during this early Reformasi period of human rights reforms to sign the Genocide Convention ot to become party to other strong conventions, such as the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. Indonesia's continued refusal to become a party to major conven tions against gross violations and mass atrocity crimes in the post-New Order period stands in stark contrast to its current foreign policy and international relations agendas. While not a signatory to the Genocide Convention or the Rome Statute, Indonesia is now arguably seen as one of the most progressive states within Southeast Asia for the promotion of human rights. Principally under the two terms of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), Indonesia has persistently tried to position itself as a human rights advocate and defender within126 Annie Pohlman the ASEAN bloc and at several international forums. Nearly two decades after the New Order, Indonesia has emerged as the human rights leader within ASEAN and has shown itself willing to engage with the interna- tional community on a broader range of humanitarian issues. To decipher Indonesia’s advocacy on some human rights issues and its seeming recalcitrance on others, I take up Hilary Charlesworth’s con- cept of ‘human rights ritualism’.* This ritualism, as Charlesworth argues, helps us to explain the continuing dissonance between Indonesia's apparent embrace of human rights’ discourse in recent years within international forums and its lack of implementation of the substance of that discourse at the domestic level. | use Charlesworth’s concept to help identify the practices of ritualism since the end of the New Order; that is, the techniques of avoiding implementation of human rights regulation while performing the rhetoric. 1 also argue that while the last decade shows patterns of this ritual- ism, in the case of some stronger mechanisms on international human rights norms Indonesia rejects pressure to comply with these norms. In particular, I point to the ongoing but unfulfilled promises to become a signatory to the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute as exam- ples of how Indonesia embraces the discourse of international human rights norms, but only up to the point where those norms are expedi- ent. Stronger treaties ~ the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute are cases in point ~ are perceived as impinging on national sovereignty and are thus rejected. Indonesia’s refusal to sign these treaties highlights that human rights ritualism has been embraced and practised by succes- sive post-New Order administrations, but that, in the end, a conserva- tive, defence-driven Indonesian bureaucracy continues to view these international instruments as potential vehicles for Western interference in domestic matters. The tired ASEAN thetoric of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Indonesian state, so dominant during the Suharto years, takes precedence and reveals just how shallow human. rights ritualistic behaviours can be. Practices of human rights ritualism at the international level in the Indonesian reform (Reformasi) period Beginning with practices of this ritualism at the international level, Indonesia has drastically improved its stated commitments to uphold human rights. In comparison to its record under Sukarno and Suharto, the past decade and a half has seen Indonesia ratify numerous inter- national human rights instruments and participate in various UNides der na. es, Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 127 monitoring activities.” Since the end of the New Order, Indonesia has also allowed a select number of monitoring missions to be conducted, such as country missions to investigate torture and sexual violence. Indonesia’ ratification of these and other international human rights instruments, and its acceptance of country missions by these UN special Fapporteurs and other UN monitors, can be seen as examples of human ‘ghts ritualism, As Hilary Charlesworth has argued in her discussion of this, Indonesia has demonstrably embraced, through these ratifications and other steps, the language and the thetoric of intemational human rights instruments and norms. It does so partly because of what may have been a genuine effort for improvements within the domestic agenda for human rights reforms, certainly within the early years of Reformasi. On the other hand, Indonesia's embrace of the language of buman tights treaties can also be seen as a practice of ritualism, whereby Indonesia responds to pressure within international forums, such as the various UN bodies, to adopt normative international human rights instruments, The emphasis of this practice is on the acceptance of {nese instruments of intemational human rights norms while neglect. ing to work on achieving the goals of those instruments or, indeed, on caning out the hard work of regulatory changes, undergoing scrutiny OF being accountable for failures. As John Braithwaite etal, whose work on regulatory ritualism underpins Charlesworth’s argument on human Fights ritualism, have stated, it is the ‘acceptance of institutionaliced sneans for Securing regulatory goals while losing focus on achieving the Boals or outcomes themselves’? In addition to accepting these various, softer international human Fights instruments, and allowing a handful of country monitoring mis. sions, Indonesia has also demonstrated its commitment to playing the 1ole of good international citizen by its membership on the UN Human Rights Council and its performance during its first two Universal Periodic Reviews before the Council. To date, Indonesia has served three consecutive terms on the UNHRC, ftom 2006 to 2014. Indonesia's membership on the UNHRC is an exemplar of its human ghts ritualism in practice. Candidate States for the Council are sup- Posed to be clected on the basis of their commitment to human rights and be required to uphold the highest standards for the protection and promotion of human rights, Candidates are also expected to make 3 Lanse of voluntary pledges and commitments to upholding these standards.” As part of the voluntary pledges and commitments made by Indonesia for its election to the Council in 2007 and 2011, Indonesia Outlined a range of measures to be undertaken at the international128 Annie Pohlman and domestic levels. These included commitments such as to work with treaty monitoring bodies at the international level, to continue to implement its various National Plans of Action on Human Rights (known as RANHAM, discussed in the final section below), to promot- ing religious tolerance nationally and to strengthening the role of civil society In the promotion of human rights domestically, regionally and internationally.!" While these and other commitments made by Indonesia in its bids to serve on the UNHRC were all welcome pledges to uphold human rights domestically and internationally, few have been fulfilled. In fact, in the lead-up to Indonesia's third bid for mem- bership in 2011, the Jakarta-based NGO Human Rights Working Group assessed Indonesia's performance in upholding the commitments made as part of its second bid, finding that, for most of them, ‘Indonesia did not make any progress, indeed in some aspects Indonesia moved back- wards, particularly in freedom of religions, strengthening engagement and partnership with civil society organizations, and good government and the rule of law’.? The repeated performances in embracing the discourse of human rights have served Indonesia well in securing many years on the Council, yet enactment of the substance of that discourse has been lacking, as also borne out in its performance on the UNHRC and in its First (2008) and Second (2012) cycles of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Indonesia's human rights ritualism in the Universal Periodic Review One of the main functions of the UNHRC is undertaking the UPR, the mechanism by which each UN Member State is reviewed and evaluated on a regular basis."S Indonesia's first cycle of the UPR was in April 2008, in which the government presented its national report, the stakehold- ers’ report was given, and Council Members and observers raised issues and asked questions about the state of human rights in Indonesia." As art of the UPR process, 17 international and national NGOs and civil society actors contributed to the stakeholders’ paper, and raised con- cerns regarding such matters as the seriously outdated and inadequate Indonesian Penal Code, civil liberties and freedoms, and Indonesia's handling of specific human rights abuses.'S At the end of its First UPR, Indonesia accepted the majority of the Council’s recommendations, particularly those which encouraged (but did not require) enhanced engagement with the various civil society and international bodies for the promotion of human rights. Indonesia was also congratulated for itsIndonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 129 efforts in complying with the UPR processes, and encouraged to follow through on its commitments to enact some of its promised legislation, such as acceding to various human rights instruments, particularly those listed within the RANHAM."® To date, little progress has been made on any of these recommendations. At the Second UPR for Indonesia in May 2012, almost twice the number of NGO and civil society stakeholders’ submissions were made to the Human Rights Council, highlighting many of the same issues raised during the First UPR cycle, with particular emphasis on the pro- tection of human rights defenders, the growing culture of impunity for violence, freedom of religion and abuses against religious minorities, and the failure to ratify a range of promised international human rights instruments.” The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also made a submission for Indonesia's Second UPR, high- lighting Indonesia's low level of compliance with the Commission's office and its special procedures, such as country visits, as well as the ongoing lack of domestic implementation of laws and protections com- mensurate with Indonesia's obligations as party to a range of human rights instruments, such as under the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT). This report did, however, detail Indonesia's progress on ratification of two universal human rights treaties: the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2011) and the Convention on Enforced Disappearances (signature only, 2010; not yet a State Party),"5 In contrast, the government's report to the Second UPR once again highlighted Indonesia's commitment to promoting human tights domestically and regionally, noting the RANHAM (by then in its third iteration) as a framework for strengthening protections, while also briefly acknowledging that numerous promises made within the Previous RANHAMs, and the previous UPR, were yet to be fulfilled. The government's report also highlighted the fact that Indonesia has a strong and vibrant civil society and efforts had been made towards ‘capacity-building in the promotion of human rights, domestically and regionally, within various ASEAN bodies. At the end of its report, the government discussed its commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights, but strongly qualified this commitment by framing specific human rights concerns, such as repeated abuses in Papua and West Papua provinces or ongoing attacks against religious minorities, as internal matters of the Indonesian state." Little or no mention was. made within the government's report regarding the human rights issues Tepeatedly addressed in the civil society stakeholders’ submissions, such130. Annie Fohiman as in regard to ongoing impunity and accountability for human rights violations, freedom of religion and the protection of human rights defenders. Looking back at the first two UPR cycles for Indonesia, there are a few distinguishable patterns which reveal the symptoms of human rights ritualism, First among these is Indonesia's selective response to human rights issues raised during the UPRs, At the end of the second UPR, as it had been at the end of the first, Indonesia was congratulated for those few areas where progress had been made and for its ongo- ing attempts to promote human rights despite domestic challenges, such as its creation of a third RANHAM and its regional efforts within ASEAN. These actions were also praised by numerous other country delegations in the interactive dialogue which is part of the UPR. As part of the dialogue, Indonesia answered some questions on notice, but only briefly addressed, if at all, some of the more pointed ques. tions regarding the delays of its revised Penal Code, concerns about the mistreatment of detainees by state security forces (the Indonesian National Armed Forces, TNI, and the police), concerns over abuses in Papua and West Papua provinces, and the protection of religious minorities, in some cases by reiterating its intent to consider ratifying ‘the Rome Statute! On surveying the various documents, statements, reports and broad- casts of the UPR Working Groups of the two UPR cycles for Indonesia, the indicators of human rights ritualism become clear and a second pat- tern appears, Indonesia's performance at both UPRs reveals a state highly Proficient at talking the talk of human rights, but when pressed or ques- tioned on matters relating to ongoing domestic abuses, the rhetoric falls short of walking the walk. Instead, Indonesia retreats to the language of these abuses being internal concerns and, when other states’ delegates raise these matters in questions, Indonesia claims that these states have misunderstood these matters ‘on the ground’. For example, on 25 May 2012, in his response to the UPR Report on Indonesia as part of its second cycle, Hasan Kleib, from Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that they accepted recommendations that were ‘formulated based ‘on well-informed assessment and understanding of the situation on the ground, including the challenges and constraints we are facing’. Where Indonesia did not accept recommendations, however, it was because of ‘some terminologies used which [did] not conform with [Indonesia’s} national applicability and context’, adding ‘they reflect inaccuracy in their formulation and lack of understanding of context of the factual situation we are facing on the ground’.22Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 131 Instead, Hasan Kleib emphasized that the protection of human rights in Indonesia was a continuous and evolving process. Of the 180 recom- mendations made at the end of the second UPR, 144 were accepted by Indonesia, while areas of specific national concern reflected in 36 of the recommendations were tabled for further consideration. In September 2012, Indonesia responded to these, accepting six and rejecting 30 of the 36 pending recommendations. Those recommendations accepted included the ratification of the Rome Statute as well as the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (OP-CAT), both of which had already been accepted (but unfulfilled) recommendations follow- ing their first UPR cycle in 2008. Numerous other recommendations accepted related, once again, to implementing existing commitments through the RANHAM, the general strengthening of national insti- tutions and education for the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly around the rights of women, children and migrants, Amongst those recommendations rejected were the ratification of par. ticular conventions and optional protocols, the issuing of standing invi- tations to specific and general UN Special Procedures including Special Rapporteurs, the elimination of the death penalty and, unsurprisingly, calls for greater press freedoms and an end to ongoing human rights abuses in Papua.”* The recommendations that Indonesia ‘deferred’ fol- lowing the first UPR cycle had also involved those related to invitations to Special Procedures, protection of minorities and abolishing the death penalty. ‘That Indonesia has now been through two full cycles of the process supposedly designed to improve a state's domestic human rights situ- ation with very little actual progress made towards that aim is not at all surprising. One of the aims of the second cycle of the UPR was that states undergoing review should report on progress made to implement the accepted recommendations from the first cycle. Aside from being able to demonstrate some progress made in education about human tights amongst various government institutions, Indonesia was unable to show any evidence of having fulfilled its commitments made at the end of its first UPR. With regard to specific commitments about ra ing the Rome Statute and the OP-CAT, including by implementing a new penal code which would have adequate provisions regarding the Codification and sentencing of such grievous crimes, Indonesia simply restated its intent to fulfil these promises. In the few years since this second UPR, none of these commitments has been fulfilled. In his analysis of the UPR process, Walter Kalin has shown how the UPR enables human tights ritualistic behaviour by allowing states to132 Annie Pohlman mask their actual low levels of compliance with and commitment to international human rights norms through simply participating in the UPR.** Indonesia's role on the UN Human Rights Council and its perfor- ‘mance at its first and second UPRs are robust examples of this human rights ritualistic behaviour, On the Council and in these UPRs, Indonesia has been a very active participant. In its two UPRs to date, Indonesia has twice made almost identical sets of commitments and yet can show little, if any, progress towards implementing them. Indonesia gladly accepts the praise of the international community for its compliance in International procedures, but retreats from or ignores tough questions about ongoing and serious human rights violations, deflecting them as outside interference or foreign misunderstandings of situations ‘on the ground’. This participation in performative aspects of these interna- tional arenas intended to improve the domestic human rights of states does not make up for the lack of substance in implementing and, more importantly, upholding its commitments to human rights, Indonesia as an ASEAN leader on human rights The practices of human rights ritualism by Indonesia are perhaps most evident when comparing Indonesia’s commitments made at interna- tional forums, such as the Human Rights Council, with its performance at the regional level and, more importantly, its level of domestic implementation of those commitments. To consider this ritualism, in this third section 1 first look briefly at Indonesia's performance at the regional level, and within this its role within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is crucial. I then turn to Indonesia's perfor- mance at the domestic level in the final section of this chapter. To begin, it is worthwhile noting that within the wider ASEAN frame- Work, the promotion of human rights has itself become somewhat Of an exercise in human rights ritualism. For the first few decades of ASEAN since its creation in 1967, the organization was renowned for its conservative stance on relations between its member states; the ‘ASEAN way’ being one of consensus and cooperation, but also primarily based upon a mutual commitment to non-interference and non-intervention {in domestic affairs.” As such, for the first few decades of the organi- ation’s history, this ‘preoccupation with non-intervention rendered ASEAN hostile terrain for any concern with human rights’.2* The late 1990s saw a shift in the membership of ASEAN states and in the organization's policy on human rights and human security issues more broadly. The original members were joined by their remainingIndonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 133 mainland Southeast Asian counterparts. Many of the ASEAN states at this time were enduring at least some fallout from the Asian Economic Crisis of the late 1990s as well as undergoing some form of domestic transfor- ‘mation. It was during this period that many of the original ASEAN states began to push for a more progressive agenda, particularly on social issues and in the area of improving the language around human rights promotion.” The inclusion of human rights in the ASEAN Charter, and the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009 were seen as major steps forward the promotion of human rights within the region.” Furthermore, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) in November 2012 was also heralded as a key achievement by the organization. ‘These moves should be seen as characteristic of human rights ritual- ism within ASEAN. The human rights rhetoric foregrounded in each of these documents emphasizes the promotion of human rights while say- ing little with regard to the protection or enforcement of these rights, either through a regional ASEAN framework or domestically by mem. ber states.” There is a definite lag in action behind the discursive shift towards more ‘people-focused’ ASEAN commitments. As Mathew Davies hhas argued, this is an ‘action-identity gap’ in ASEAN’s engagement with human rights which has emerged since the late 1990s.%* Davies critiques norm-development and adoption within ASEAN and examines this ‘gap’ between the adoption by various ASEAN member states of various ‘human rights principles in rhetoric while continuing to violate human tights domestically. Further, Davies identifies a divide between two camps within ASEAN: the original members, which he calls the ‘pro- ‘gressives’ (those pushing for a more reformist agenda), and the newer ‘member states, or the ‘traditionalists’, which hold to the more classical state sovereignty approach.* Indonesia has been, and continues to be, one of the leading ‘progressives’ within the new, more ‘people-centred’ or ‘people-oriented" ASEAN.* Occasionally heralded as ‘a regional champion of democracy and human rights’, over the past ten years Indonesia has played an active role in bringing about the ASEAN Charter, the AICHR and the AHRD, as well as numerous other initiatives, such as the plan for an ASEAN security community. Indonesia's leadership in building a ‘just, democratic ... and caring ASEAN Community’ (to be established in 2015) has also been significant.” ‘These moves within ASEAN since the early 2000s have been part Of Indonesia's efforts to be seen as a growing middle-power state. Particularly under the two terms of former President Susilo Bambang134 Annie Pohiman Yudhoyono, Indonesia has purposefully positioned itself in regional and international forums as a leader on human rights. In recent years, Indonesia has hosted numerous international summits and forums, playing host to major meetings of world leaders and Track Il dialogues on issues related to climate change, democracy and governance, such as the Bali Democracy Forum since 2008. The previous decade has wit- nessed Indonesia's rise to take its place as a pivotal state in the broader Indo-Pacific region through its ongoing economic success and mindful self-positioning as a ‘counterbalance’ to China's growing influence across the region, Indonesia should be congratulated for these and other moves as one of the progressive states within ASEAN pushing for the reshaping of that strongly traditionalist organization, originally premised on uphold- ing state sovereignty and the non-interference in the internal affairs Of states. Only two short decades ago, it would have been ludicrous to claim that, by 2015, ASEAN would have set up a human rights body, have made a declaration on human rights, and be on-track to re-create the organization as a regional community.” Considering ASEAN's past. ‘thetoric and formation, in some ways outstanding progress has been made since the early 2000s toward strengthening the promotion of ‘human rights regionally, in no small part due to Indonesia's efforts. While many of these new moves by the ASEAN community are only 4 few years old, ASEAN’s rhetoric around human security and human rights has so far been hollow. It is in this rhetoric that, once again, the sequelae of human rights ritualism can be observed. The rhetoric which is spun out in recent ASEAN documents, such as the Terms Of Reference (TOR) for the AICHR, or in the AHRD, reveals that the performative and thetorical devices of human rights ritualism are simply that; there is lit tle evidence of actual improvements in the substance of that discourse. Human rights ritualism at the domestic level in Indonesi the RANHAMs’ repeated promises In the early years of Reformasi, particularly under former Presidents Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dus), some significant steps Were taken to improve the protection of human rights in Indonesia. ‘These included the reforms of the 1945 constitution, the enactment of the 1999 human rights and 2000 ad hoc human rights courts laws, and the strengthening of the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM)’s mandate.” While few of these measures have been Successful in having any noticeable impact on the improvement ofme ld. tte Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 135 human tights in Indonesia, all were part of what is often seen as a genuine attempt by early Reformasi legislators to ‘respond to public demand for long needed mechanisms’ to protect human rights.*! Another important framework established at this time was the RANHAM, the first of which was established by Presidential Decree in 1998 by then President Habibie, The First RANHAM covered the period 1998-2003, the Second 2004-09 and the Third 2011-14 (sometimes noted for the period 2010-2015). At various international forums, Indonesia frequently points to its commitments made within the vari. ous RANHAMS as evidence of its work towards implementing human rights domestically, such as during the UPR, discussed above. By most ‘estimates, however, all three RANHAMs have been failures, in that each one failed to fulfil more than smalll sections of its mandate.'? To illustrate this point, at the beginning of this chapter I noted that Indonesia Is one amongst a small group of UN member states yet to sign either of the two most important international instruments for holding accountable those who commit mass atrocities against civil- ian populations: the UN Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. In the successive RANHAMS, there have been commitments made to ratify either one or both of these international instruments, In the first RANHAM document, regarding ‘priorities’ for ratification, the UN Genocide Convention is listed for consideration in 1999, In the second RANHAM, regarding ‘international human rights instruments to be prepared for ratification’, the UN Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute were both listed, supposedly scheduled for 2007 and 2008 respectively." In the third RANHAM, once again under a section on human rights instruments to be prepared for ratification, the Rome Statute and the UN Genocide Convention were listed, to be tabled in the third and fourth year respectively.‘ Despite support amongst civil society groups in Indonesia to ratify ‘these instruments, progress has been, for want of a better term, slow. For example, as part of its mandate to make recommendations to the government about ratifying international human rights instruments, Komnas HAM carried out a study which recommended that Indonesia should ratify the Rome Statute as soon as possible." Further, in the National Report compiled by the government at the second UPR at the Human Rights Council in 2012, specific attention was given to Plans to ratify the Rome Statute. At both of Indonesia's UPRs, the government has accepted recommendations that it ratify the Rome Statute. International NGOs which lobby governments to ratify the Rome Statute and other intemational instruments have also been136 Annie Pohiman hosted in Jakarta, In 2013, for example, after one such international delegation by Parliamentarians for Global Action, there was some discussion amongst activist groups and international delegations that Indonesia would ratify the Rome Statute in 2014, as scheduled in the third RANHAM.” The declarations made about the ratification in these meetings with the delegation, however, were swiftly negated by spokes- People from Indonesia’s defence community.’ So why does Indonesia not join the majority of countries across the world in ratifying the Genocide Convention or, indeed, the Rome Statute? The majority of nations in the region are signatories to the Genocide Convention: Indonesia’s non-accession makes it a curious and conspicuous Outlier. As Greenhill and Strausz have argued, given that states incur only marginal costs for ratifying the Genocide Convention and other similar international treaties, why does Indonesia stubbornly resist? Also, while it is true that fewer than half (17) of the 39 countries in the Asia-Pacific region have joined the Rome Statute, Indonesia has made repeated promises to do so. Recent analyses of the benefits of ratifying human rights conventions versus the costs of doing so show a trong pattern supportive of human rights ritualistic behaviours: sign- ing on to such instruments benefits states through reputational gain while costing them little by way of actual compliance.*' If the govern- ‘ment of Indonesia has bowed to domestic and international pressures to sign other significant human rights treaties, such as the Convention against Torture, why make public promises regarding the ratification of the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute, but then not fulfil them? Indonesia's activism within the region and in international forums to Duild its image as a good international citizen which supports human ‘rights wanes with regard to the ratification of these instruments. By upholding its promises to ratify the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute, Indonesia could further demonstrate its leadership within the region on human rights. The payoff for Indonesia at both the domestic and international levels seems to far outweigh the likely minimal costs of ratification. Yet Indonesia remains obstinate. “This obstinacy seems to come ftom Indonesia's defence community rather than from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the ten years Of SBY's presidency, particularly under former minister Hassan Witajda, the ministry was given much more weight in foreign policy-making and managed to separate itself from the military’s influence which had dominated during the Suharto years. The Ministry's ‘new activism’ and more inclusive approach to foreign policy-making transformednational 's some ons that Jin the in these spokes. across 2 Rome to the vus and mn that ention bornly anttries sia has fits of howa 1 sign. 1 gain overn- ssures ntion ation fulfil ns to ‘man 5. By the ‘ship both kely nity cars ida, sing tich sm’ aed Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 137 its image to reflect Indonesia's genuine democratic reforms.®? Despite this progress, it seems that defence continues to play a role in foreign policy decisions, particularly regarding ratifications of human rights instruments or anything involving potential international criticism of the domestic human rights record (particularly regarding incidents involving the armed forces). With regard to the possibility of the Indonesian parliament (DPR) ratifying the Rome Statute in 2013, for ‘example, defence was still able to overrule the country’s legislators.* It appears that despite the new activism of the foreign policy-makers, the desires of the country’s legislators, the pressures of domestic civil society and the normative pressures applied by the international community, defence remains steadfast on matters which it perceives as a threat to internal affairs. The old rhetoric of non-interference trumps the new rhetoric of human rights. Unless there is a significant shift in policy on implementing human rights measures by the current administration under Joko Widodo (okowi), the current torpor on actually achieving any real difference in the lives of ordinary Indonesians will continue. Unless Jokowi manages to curb the persistent and malignant interference of defence, there is unlikely to be progress on the ratifications of human rights instruments such as the Genocide Convention or the Rome Statute. It is the lack of upholding the very promises which are so publicly and so often made which reveal just how shallow human rights ritualism can be. In this, Indonesia's rhetoric and performance should be taken as a representa. tive model of Charlesworth’s human rights ritualism. Conclusion: human rights ritualism and empty promises Charlesworth and Larking encapsulate human rights ritualism as ‘a technique of embracing the language of human tights precisely to deflect human rights scrutiny and to avoid accountability for human rights abuses, while at the same time gaining the positive reputational benefits or legitimacy associated with human rights commitments’ 4 In this chapter, | have outlined Indonesia's ‘embrace of the language of human rights’ in its engagements with the international community and within ASEAN. The repeated promises made at these international forums, such as at the Human Rights Council and as part of the Universal Periodic Review process, construct a positive and progressive image of Indonesia. This image is one of commitment to international human rights norms and instruments, and of cooperation and engage- ment with the international community. Most strikingly, this image138 Annie Pohiman {s of a state performing an important leadership role on improving human rights within ASEAN, one of the most statist and traditional- ist regional organizations in the world, founded on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, Indonesia's construction of this good international citizen image, and its engagement in these and other international and regional forums on human rights, are all conscious efforts by Indonesia to garner ‘positive reputational benefits or legitimacy’ as it continues to grow as a middle- power state. The performance of Indonesia’s rhetoric has, at some points, been matched by its commitments. As outlined above, over the past two dec- ades during the democratization process, Indonesia has ratified some international instruments and made efforts to implement some of the requirements of their ratification, particularly in the areas of education, the rights of the child and migrant rights. It is by comparing the treaties to which Indonesia has acceded with those to which it has promised to accede but has not yet done so, that human rights ritualistic symptoms are further revealed. In recent years, there have been a handful of international human rights instruments which have been considered by Indonesia's foreign affairs and associated ministries, but have not yet been ratified. Aside from the unfulfilled promises to ratify the Rome Statute and other instruments, in September 2010, for example, Indonesia signed but has yet to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Indonesia has also indicated that it will consider (but has yet to sign) any of the treaties on refugees and stateless persons. Indonesia has, however, acceded to some international instru- ‘ments, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and even the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Indonesia remains unlikely, despite promises, to ratify the two strongest and most important instruments for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes: the UN Genocide Convention and the Rome Statue. Indonesia's ratification of safer treaties and conventions on the one hand, and its reluctance to become party to stronger human rights instruments on the other, is symptomatic of its ritualistic behaviours. The language and minor measures required to be seen to be com. pliant with the treaties to which Indonesia is a party allow for the demonstration of good international citizenship, without the burden of actually upholding the full measures of compliance. When we con- sider Indonesia's stance on these various international human rightsving onal: 28 of ates. and son itive (dle. Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 139 instruments the reluctance to sign on to the UN Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute is glaring I would further argue that while Indonesia accedes to certain human rights instruments, its acquiescence to pressure to comply with intemna- tional human rights norms has limited effect. When it comes to harder human rights instruments, or high levels of scrutiny of human rights at the domestic level, Indonesia instead displays the very essence of human rights ritualism. When pressed to make good on the promises made at international forums, or to summon the political will to enact even those most basic legislative improvements for the protection of human rights already set down during the early Reformasi period, the hollow nature of Indonesia’s human rights ritualism is thrown into sharp relief. Strong human rights instruments such as the Genocide Convention or the Rome Statute have ever been (and will remain) unlikely to be ratified by Indonesia. The embrace of the human rights rhetoric and the performance on the international stage come up short for such strong instruments, When it comes to the stronger human rights instru- ments, Indonesia retreats from its stated commitments and rejects normative pressures. This disengagement reveals how half-hearted the shows of compliance with regulation are. In the context of a state undergoing peer review through the UPR mechanism, or as a member of the UNHRC, or even as a ‘defender of human rights’ within ASEAN, Indonesia's rhetoric and performance are exactly as described by Hilary Charlesworth: Indonesia embraces the discourse but rejects implement- ing the substance of that discourse. With regard to strong international human rights instruments such as the Genocide Convention or the Rome Statue, Indonesia’s human rights ritualism turns instead to resist- ance to and rejection of the human rights norms underpinning the international human rights system. When we compare the promises which Indonesia makes during the UPR and at other international forums with the progress made domestically on enforcing human rights’ protections, the rhetoric of Indonesia’s human rights ritualism. can only ever be that of empty promises. Notes 1, See S. Linton (2006), ‘Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia’, Singapore Year Book of International Law, 10, 199-231; and International Centre for ‘Transitional Justice (ICT)) and the Commission for Disappeared Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS) (2011), Derailed: Transitional Justice in Indonesia since the Fall of Socharto ~ A Joint Report by ICT] and KontraS (Jakarta: ICT] and. Kontras)..2, 3 14, As, 16. 140 Annie Pohiman 2. Bs See R. Cribb (2001), ‘Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966", Journal of Genocide Research, 3, no. 2, 219-39, See D. F. Anwar (1994), Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, (New York: St. Martin’s Press) See G. Robinson (1998), ‘Rawan Is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh’, Indonesia, 66, 127-157; and C. Budiardjo and L. S. Liong (1984), The War Against East Timor, (London: Zed Books). See T. Lindsey (2008), ‘Constitutional Reform in Indonesia: Muddling towards Democracy’, in T: Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd edn (Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press), pp. 23-47. ». See H. Charlesworth (2011), ‘Swimming to Cambodia: Justice and Ritual in ‘Human Rights after Conflict’, Australian Year Book of Intemational Law, 29, 1-16. - For example, the Convention against Torture (but not the Optional Protocol) in October 1998 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in November 201 1 See Charlesworth, ‘Swimming to Cambodia’ J. Braithwaite, T. Makkai and V. Braithwaite (2007), Regulating Aged Care Ritualism and the New Pyramid, (Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar), p. 7. Human Rights Council, GA Res. 60/251, UN GA OR, 60th sess, 72nd plen. ‘Mtg, (8), UN Doc. A/RES/60/251. ‘The Permanent Mission of Indonesia's document outlining Indonesia's Voluntary Pledges and Commitments to the President of the UNGA, Document UNGA A/61/855, 12 April 2007. See M. A. Safa'at (2010), “Assessment of Indonesia's Human Rights Progress and Contribution as 2 Member of the United Nations Human Rights Council’, Human Rights Working Group, December 2010, safaat.lecture.ub.ac.id/files/2011/11/Report- Assessment-of-Indonesias-Role-1-march.pdf, date accessed 3 May 2014. Safa’at, ‘Assessment of Indonesia's’, p. 43. See, for example, T. Rathgeber (2013), ‘Performance and Challenges of the UN Human Rights Council: An NGO's View’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, February 2013. Available at http:/library fes.de/paf-files/iez/global/09680.pdf, date accessed 4 May 2014, For an overview of the UPR process, see Hi. Charlesworth and E. Larking (2014), ‘Introduction: The Regulatory Power of the Universal Periodic Review’, in 4H. Charlesworth and E. Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Rituatism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-24. Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. First session, Geneva, 7-18 April 2008. A/HRC/WG.6/1/IDN/1, 11 March 2008, ‘The full list of documents submitted as part of Indonesia's first UPR cycle. Available at wwwohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/idsession | aspx, date accessed 4 May 2014, ‘The intemational NGO, UPR Watch, keeps records of the outcomes of each country’s UPR, including recommendations followed. To review the UPR outcomes on Indonesia, go to www.upr-epu.com, date accessed 6 May 2014,“Genocide ‘onalis, sorder in. S. Liong fuddling 2nd edn, Ritual in Law, 23, ‘rotocol) ns with ed Care: in, MA: ad plen. onesia's UNGA, (2010), tion as 1 Rights Report 4 ages of ‘fun, library, For an 2014, ew’, in Periodic Press), teview. March, oyde, & date ‘feach © UPR 3 May Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 141 1. See Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Thirteenth session, Geneva, 21 May-4 June 2012. AJHRC/WG.6/13/ IDN/3, 9 March 2012, ‘Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. ‘Thirteenth session, 21 May-June 2012, A/HRW/WG.6/13/IDN/2, 12 March. 2012, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. National report submitted in accordance with paragraph $ of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Indonesia. Thirteenth session, Geneva, 21 May-4 June 2012. A/HRC/WG.6/13/IDN/1, 7 March 2012. For a summary of the 32 stakeholdery’ submissions to the UPR, see Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph S of the annex to Human Rights Council reso- lution 16/21, Indonesia. Thirteenth session, Geneva, 21 May-4 June 2012. AJHRC/WG.6/13/IDN/3, 9 March 2012, See also Amnesty Intemational (2014), ‘Indonesia: Setting the Agenda: Human Rights Priorities for the New Government’, ASA 21/011/2014, 29 April 2014. See the Report of the Working Group, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Thirteenth session, Geneva, 21 May-4 june 2012, A/HRC/21/7, 23 May 2012, ‘Closing Remarks by H. E. Mr. Hasan Kleib, Deputy Minister for Multilateral ‘Affairs, Ministry of Forelgn Affairs of Indonesia, at the 13th Session of the Working Group Meeting on the UPR for Indonesia, 25 May 2012. To ‘view the video recording of this address, go to: www.unmultimedia.org/tv/ ‘webcast/2012/05 /adoption-upr-teport-of-indonesia-13th-universal-periodic- review:html, date accessed 10 July 2014. |. The international NGO, UPR Info, maintains a database of all information processed through the UPR process. To see the full list of accepted and. rejected recommendations arising from Indonesia's 2nd UPR in 2012, the ‘Adoption in the Plenary on 19 September 2012, go to: http://www.upr-info. ‘org/sites/clefault/files/document/indonesia/session_13_-may-2012/recom- ‘mendationstoindonesia2012.pdf, date accessed 10 July 2014. The list of accepted recommendations for the 2008 cycle are available at http:// ‘www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/indonesia/session_01)-_ april_2008/recommendations indonesia_2008.pdf, date accessed 10 July 2014, See Y. Wahyuningeum (2014), ‘Indonesia and the Universal Periodic Review: Negotiating Rights, in H. Charlesworth and E. Larking (eds), Humart Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 315-38. . Wahyuningrum, ‘Indonesia and the Universal Periodic Review’, p. 321 ‘Wahyuningrum, ‘Indonesia and the Universal Periodic Review’, pp. 326-27. . W, Kalin (2014), ‘Ritual and Ritualism at the Universal Perfodic Review: A Preliminary Appraisal’, In H. Charlesworth and E. Larking (eds), Hummant Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). . See, for example, M. Davies (2013), ‘The ASEAN Synthesis: Human Rights, Non-Intervention, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, Georgetown Journal of Intemational Affairs, Summer/Fall, 51-S8.142 32, 33. 35, 37, 38, 39. 40, 41. 42. Annie Pohlman Davies, ‘The ASEAN Synthesis, p. 52. Davies, The ASEAN Synthesis’ p.§2. See V. Muntarbhorn (2013), Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN Region, (Leiden: Bri. Compare with Human Rights Watch (2012), ‘Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, Human Rights Watch, 19 November 2012, Available at www.hrw.org.news/2012/11/19/ civil-society-denounces-adoption-flawed-ascan-human-rights-declaration/, date accessed 10 August 2014. See C. Drummond (2011), ‘The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (ATCHR) and the Responsibility to Protect: Opportunities and Constraints’, Working Paper on ASEAN and ROP No. 2, Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia Program, Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 30 March 2011. M. Davies (2013), ‘ASEAN and Human Rights Norms: Constructivism, Rational Choice, and the Action-Identity Gap’, Intemational Relations ofthe Asia-Pacific, 13, no. 2, 207-31. Davies, “The ASEAN Synthesis, pp. 51-52. Compare with H. Katsumata (2008), ‘ASEAN and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure ot Emulating the West?', The Pacific Review, 22, no, 5, 619-37. See K. Gerard (2014), ASEAN’ Engagement of Civil Society: Regulating Dissent, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan) A Cook (2011), ‘Differentiated Policies: Indonesia's International Leadership and Internal Challenges,’ Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, 5. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Policy Brief No. 12, June 2011, p. 2 See ‘Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015), ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, Available at www.asean. ‘org/news/item/cha-am-hua-hin-declaration-on-the-roadmap-for-the-asean- community-2009-2015, date accessed 15 August 2014 See G. Nabbs-Keller (2011), ‘Growing Convergence, Greater Consequence: ‘The Strategic Implications of Closer Indonesia-China Relations’, Security Challenges, 7, no. 3, 23-41, At the time of writing, the most recent ASEAN declaration on the estab- lishment of the ASEAN Community was the ‘Nay Pyi Taw Declaration on Realisation of the ASEAN Community by 2015’, ASEAN Secretariat, 11 May 2014. Available at wwv.asean.org/images/documents/24thASEANSummit/ Nay_Pyi Taw_Deciaration pdf, date accessed 17 August 2014 See J. Herbert (2008), ‘The Legal Framework of Human Rights in Indone: in T, Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd edn (Leichhardt, NS\ The Federation Press), pp. 456-69. See Herbert, “The Legal Framework’, p. 456. On some of the failutes ofthese ‘measures, see ICT} and Kontra, ‘Derailed’ For example, see the evaluation of the 2nd RANHAM in: Task Force Pemantauan RANHAM (2011), ‘Evaluasi Pelaksanaan RANHAM 2004-2009 dan Rencana Ratifikasi Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (CAT) dalam RANHAM 2004-2009 dan Perencanaan RANHAM 2010-2014," The Partnership for Governance Reform, May 2011. Available at wow. Kemitraan.or.id/sites/default/files/20120809092409.Evaluasi Pelaksariaan RANHAM 2004-2009,pdf, date accessed 18 August 2014,fay vit x Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention 143 43. A copy of the Ist RANHAM is available at http://sipuusetkab.go.id/ PUUdoe/S114/kp1291998.htm, date accessed 14 August 2014. Given how new the Rome Statute was at the time, there is no mention of it in the 1998, RANHAM document. 44, A copy of the 2nd RANHAM is available at www.kontras.org/_ri_ham/RAN HAM 2004-2009.paf, date accessed 14 August 2014. 45. A copy of the 3rd RANHAM Is available at_http://www-polkam.go.id/ LinkClick.aspx?tileticket=KaGx25%2B2d10%3D &tabid=S9&mid=400slang, uuage=id-ID, date accessed 15 August 2014. 46. Komnas HAM (2009), ‘Kertas Posisi tentang Pengesahan The Rome Statute of the Intemational Criminal Court (Statuta Roma Mahkamah Pidana International) (Statuta Roma), 1998", Komnas HAM, Sidang Paripurna, 10-11 March 2009, Agenda Sidang No. Il.2, Sif.ed.: UMUM, Keputusan Komnas HAM No. 05/SP/I1/2009. Available at_http://www.komnasham, g0.1d/portal/files/Kertas%20Posisi&:20Statuta&20Roma,pdf, date accessed 15 ‘August 2014, 47. To see a list of the PGA's engagement with Indonesia on the Rome Statute since 2004, go to: www.pgaction.org/countries/asia/indonesia.htmi, date accessed 28 August 2014 48, See M. S. Aritonang (2013), ‘Government Officially Rejects Rome Statute’, The Jakarta Post, 21 May 2013. Available at www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2015/05/21 /govt-officialy-rejects-rome-statute.html, date accessed 28 August 2014. 49. B. Greenhill and M, Strausz (2014), ‘Explaining Nonratification of the Genocide Convention: A Nested Analysis’, Freign Policy Analysis, 10, 371-91 90. E. Waller, E. Palmer and L. Chappell (2014), ‘Strengthening Gender Justice in the Asia-Pacific through the Rome Statute’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68, no. 3, 356-73. SL. See, for example, Greenhill and Strausz, ‘Explaining Nonratification’, 52, See A. 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'No portion ofthis publication may be repraduced, copied or trensmitted save with vaitten permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence ‘permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 10 Kirby Street, London ECIN &TS. ‘Any person who does any unauthorized actin relation to this publication ‘may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. ‘The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this ‘workin accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Fist published 2016 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, reglstered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US isa division of St Martins Press LLC, 1175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10070. Palgrave Macmillan isthe global academic imprint of the above companies ang has companies and representatives throughout the world Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, ‘the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-137-48448-2 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully ‘managed and sustained forest sources, Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin ‘A catalogue record for this book is availabe from the British Library. ‘catalog record for tis book is available from the Library of Congress. ‘Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.Contents List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgements Notes on Contributors Introduction Deborah Mayersen 1 On Genocide and Settler-Colonial Violence: Australia in Comparative Perspective Philip Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan 2. Betrayal and Hypocrisy: The United Nations, ‘Cambodia, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Rebecca Gidley 3. Lessons from Srebrenica: The United Nations after Bosnia Hariz Halilovich 4 Naming and Framing: Darfur, the Genocide Debate and the Responsibility to Protect Jess Gifkins 5. Indonesia and the UN Genocide Convention: The Empty Promises of Human Rights Ritualism Annie Pohiman 6 When the UN Refuses to Prevent Genocide: Legal, Political, and Religious Factors Hannibal Travis 7. The Responsibility to Protect and the ‘Responsibility to Assist’: Developing Human Rights Protection through Police Building Charles Hawksley and Nichole Georgeou 8 United Nations Outreach Programmes and Genocide Prevention Deborah Mayersent xi 32 54 100 146 186 210viii Contents 9 Moving beyond ‘Technical Fixes’: Genocide Prevention and the United Nations Stephen McLoughlin Conclusion Deborah Mayersen Index