Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Judge Murphy's Decision
Judge Murphy's Decision
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
Instead, the
As permitted by the
The Parties
Georgia,
immaterial
and
but arguing
unsupported
this
by
proposed
proper
fact
is
evidence).
("Defendant
WCSD") is a school disthct existing under O.C.G.A. 20-249, and is managed by the Walker County Board of
Education (the "Board"). (Compl. (Docket Entry No. 1)1)2.)
separate documents.
'Defendants did not respond to PSAF HTJ 64-66. (See
generally DRPSAF
64-66.) The Court deems those statements
admitted to the extent that the statements are supported by the
record citations provided.
Five
individuals,
including
Defendant
Mike
Carruth
(Id)
The Board's
sessions.
Defendant
Raines
provides
each
A O 72A
(Rev. 8/8
H 34.)
b.
The Policy
relevant part:
Meetings of [the Board] are held to conduct the
affairs and business of the school system.
Although these meetings are not meetings of the
public, the public is invited to attend all meetings
and members of the public are invited to address
the Board at appropriate times and in accordance
with procedures established by the Board or the
Superintendent.
The Superintendent shall make
available
procedures allowing members of the public to
address the Board on issues of concern. These
procedures
shall
be available
at
the
7
Superintendent Procedures
public
participation
at
Board
meetings
(the
HH
Iffl 11,
13, 37.)
2.
3.
4.
10
required
The Superintendent
Catoosa
County
has
policy
governing
public
4.
5.
6.
a.
e.
15
viewpoints,
which
is the
hallmark
of
democratic
"Chattooga
County
Policy")
governing
public
18
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
19
a.
b.
c.
2.
3.
4.
5.
22
23
( I d H 4.)
24
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
25
PRDSMF
n40,
stated,
documentation
in
relevant
prepared
part:
"I
will
addressing
have
the
written
concerns
handed
Plaintiff an
investigation
report
Raines to investigate.
(Second
Decl. of PI. (Docket Entry No. 65-1) H 5.) The meeting was
scheduled for 4:00 p.m. and lasted until after the close of
business on that day. (PSAF ]\ 64.)
Plaintiff contends that he drafted and mailed his letter
requesting permission to speak at the February 17 meeting
to Defendant Raines on February 9, 2015. (PI. Decl. H 10.)
28
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
m
Defendants contend that Defendant Raines received
Plaintiffs letter on February 11, 2015, via U.S. mail, and
that Defendant Raines' administrative assistant stamped it
as received on that day. (DSMF UK 1, 44; PRDSMF
44.)
1,
(Aff. of
29
Plaintiff
30
relevant part:
Pursuant to [the Policy], I received your written
notice on Wednesday, February 11, 2015
requesting to address the members of the [Board;
during a time of public participation.
31
According to
33
34
35
(Raines
Procedural Background
The
37
Entry No. 28); Mot. Stay (Docket Entry No. 29); Order of
Aug. 5,2015 (Docket Entry No. 30).) The Parties attempted
to resolve this action through settlement negotiations and
through mediation before United States Magistrate Judge
Walter E. Johnson. (See generally Docket.) The Parties'
efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful,
On January 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. (Docket Entry No. 41.) On January
26, 2016, the Court denied as moot the pending Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.
38
Entry No. 55.) The briefing processes for both Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment are complete, and the Court
finds that the matter is ripe for resolution."^
II.
Id
When evaluating a motion for summaryjudgment, the
Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable
factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Morton v. Kirkwood. 707 F.3d 1276,
1280 (11th Cir. 2013); Strickland. 692 F.3d at 1154. The
Court also must '"resolve all reasonable doubts about the
facts in favor of the non-movant.'" Morton, 707 F.3d at 1280
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further,
40
Discussion
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summaryjudgment
42,
doctrine,
of
and
particular
independent
applications,
of
contain
the
a
Further because
A.
Substantial Likelihood of S u c c e s s
1.
Standing
plaintiffs from speaking prior to the meeting, but that does not make
their actions a prior restraint in a First Amendment sense."
I d (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found that the
requirement that an individual obtain permission to speak at a
school board meeting prior to that meeting was a time, place, and
manner restriction, rather than a prior restraint, i d Given that
authority, the Court is not convinced that the Policy is a prior
restraint on speech.
47
48
affected
with
constitutional
interest,
but
I d at 755 (internal
49
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
First Amendment
of expression
protected
by the
First
an
activity
is
protected
by
the
First
"The
51
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
Jd
(footnote omitted).
a.
See Maples v.
Martin. 858 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that
"teachers whose speech
public's
52
speech
would
be
protected
by
the
First
Amendment.
b.
Type of Forum
the
nature
of the
government
property
Court
has
delineated
three
Jd
"The
categories
of
53
between
citizens,
and
discussing
public
54
55
citation omitted).
governmental
Certainly,
interest
"[tjhere is a significant
in conducting
orderly,
efficient
56
Frandsen. 212
57
58
AO 72A
(R3V.8/8
Defendants' Justifications
60
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
Thus, there is a
61
speech
based
on
its
62
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
"To do
63
Harris. 616 F.
64
A O 72A
(Rev.8/8
omitted). "In determining whether a restriction is contentneutral, the Court's controlling consideration is the purpose
in limiting the Plaintiffs' speech in a public forum."
Id
"A
omitted).
Further, "a facially neutral law does not become content
based simply because it may disproportionately affect
65
id
(alteration in original)
"The
draws
!d
Id
68
Such
laws, "like those that are content based on their face, must
also satisfy strict scrutiny." Id.
Applying Reed's guidance, the Court finds that the
Policy is content-based. The Policy provides, in relevant
part:
Prior to making a request to be heard by the
Board, individuals or organizations shall meet with
the Superintendent and discuss their concerns. If
necessary, the Superintendent shall investigate
their concerns, and within ten work days, report
back to the individual or organization.
After
meeting with the Superintendent, individuals or
organizations still desiring to be heard by the
Board shall make their written request to the
Superintendent at least one week prior to the
scheduled meeting of the Board stating name,
address, purpose of request, and topic of speech.
Any individual having a complaint against any
employee of the Board must present the complaint
to the Superintendent for investigation. The Board
will not hear complaints against employees of the
Board except in the manner provided for
69
A O 72A
(R8V.8/8
speakers to "[a]void
references,
by the Board,"
71
72
Timmon v.
that
policies
prohibiting
personal
attacks
on
73
facially unconstitutional
insofar as it is adopted
and
74
see
75
Board, makes
personnel
by bringing
those
76
Unbridled Discretion
also
argues
that
the
Policy
is
facially
77
Id
78
that
the
regulation
did
"not
provide
the
79
AO 72A
(Rev.8/8
permit to be issued
Id
Likewise, in Redner v. Dean. 29 F.Sd 1495 (11th Cir.
1994), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that an ordinance that
provided for the clerk of a board "to schedule a hearing for
as soon as the Board's calendar will allow" did not place a
time limit on the board and created "the risk that protected
expression will be restrained for an indefinite period of time
81
29 F.Sd at 1501
"to
reasonable
time
limits
on
the
decisionmaker." Id.
Here, the Policy imposes some reasonable time limits
on Defendant Raines.
82
prior
to
the
Board
meeting.
Under
those
83
^The Court cannot read out of the Policy the requirement that
the individual or organization seeking permission to speak give the
Superintendent an opportunity, which could take up to ten work
days, to investigate the concerns and, if necessary, to meet again
with the individual or organization. Reading that requirement out
of the Policy would defeat the stated purpose of the Policy: to give
the Superintendent an opportunity to investigate and to address
and report on the concerns before the individual or organization
brings the concerns to the Board.
84
4.
Plaintiff
Advance Notice
also
argues
that
the
Policy
is
facially
Plaintiff
86
Although the
Summary
87
Irreparable Harm
White v.
Balance of Harms
Public Interest
Contrary to Defendants'
90
The Court
be
served
by
the
enforcement
of
an
Suntrust
91
92
Summary
IV.
Conclusion
ACCORDINGLY, the Court G R A N T S Plaintiffs Motion
to
his
facial
challenge.
The
Court
4^
UNITED STATES'DISTRI
95