James Johnston 1

The Views and Implications of the Abortion Debate

James Johnston

James Johnston 2
Abstract:
The concept and implications of abortion have proven to be quite a challenge to the realm of
ethics. Much of the debate is loud noise coming from different theories, trying to apply
themselves to an uncommon type of moral dilemma and not being able to have a dialogue on the
same level. However, after reviewing the standard abortion arguments presented, a reasonable
individual can identify common areas of critique. These critiques become further exposed when
introduced to similar debates, such as reproductive controls or animal rights. When all of these
related debates are considered there is substantial reasoning that supports a more moderate
position, similar to the principle of Aristotles mean of excellence between two extremes.

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The first section of this paper shall give a brief introduction to the topic at hand.
Viewpoints that will be looked at are the standard abortion arguments, which are largely
arguments over whether life begins at conception or birth, and how to define the criteria that
should be used to make such a distinction. These will be followed by an abortion argument with
a different approach as well as other issues that are related to abortion, such as the argument
from marginal cases in animal rights debates. Over the course of considering the implications of
the related arguments the weaknesses of the extreme conception or birth views become more
apparent. After review of the arguments presented and the application of an Aristotelian
principle, a position of the reasonable middle between two extremes is concluded.
The introduction of abortion has had a profound effect on moral philosophy. Due to the
nature of the topic and its many aspects, it has seen a number of different interpretations,
arguments, theories, and perspectives. The nature of the idea has also caused very strong
emotions and passions from various groups, and as such it is incredibly unlikely that there is an
answer that everyone will accept regardless of any evidence presented. However, as philosophers
we are compelled to seek the most truthful and evidenced conclusions of such matters. If one
were to try and take a step back from all of the noise of the current discussion, and then
combine the various theories and perspectives that have been presented over time about the
topic, insightful connections and conclusions can be gained.
1. Standard Abortion Arguments
The first aspect that must be covered in any discussion over abortion is the definition,
category, and value of a fetus throughout the stages of development. One of the biggest reasons
that abortion is such a disputed topic is because it is largely a question of when exactly life
begins. Such a question can be very difficult to adequately answer while providing sufficient

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evidence. In addition, the problem becomes even more difficult when various religious,
scientific, and moral theories based on different premises and principles start to oppose other
theories evidence or application to the question as well as their conclusions.
The first theory having to do with this aspect of the debate is that as soon as a sperm
fertilizes an egg and becomes an embryo, it is a full person with complete moral rights equal to
any other human adult. John T. Noonan Jr. is famous for expressing this view. The main premise
he uses in order to support this idea is that conception is the decisive moment of humanization
because it is then that the new being receives a genetic code from its parents. From this point he
concludes: A being with a human genetic code is man (Noonan Jr., 1970, p. 51-59). He claims
that naturally a fetus will develop into a human adult and so to abort is an equivalent act to
murder. Unfortunately, the idea of a two cell zygote being equivalent to a person will continually
lose certainty throughout this paper as other theories and evidence cast doubt on it.
The theory on the opposite end of the spectrum would be that of Mary Ann Warren. She
disagrees with Noonans claim that personhood begins at conception. She makes the point that
whether or not something has human genetic code cannot be the deciding criteria for whether or
not something is a person. For instance, hair has human genetic code and is human in a
biological sense, while a human adult has human genetic code and is a human in the sense of a
moral person. Using this idea as a premise, she claims that an embryo or fetus is nothing more
than human biological material. This leads her to conclude that human material with the potential
of eventually becoming a person in the full moral sense does not override the rights of a fully
moral human woman to have an abortion. After this she seeks to define what criteria should be
used to define a person rather than human genetic code, and produces a list of five traits that
she believes better serve to define the category of personhood:

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1. Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to being), and in
particular the capacity to feel pain;
2. Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex
problems);
3. Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic
or direct external control);
4. The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite
variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents,
but on indefinitely many possible topics;
5. The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or
both. (Warren, 1973, as sited in Sommers & Sommers, 2010).
At this point she admits that there may be problems in deciding more precise definitions
of her principles and when to apply them. However, she claims that the basic understanding is
obvious, and that it is also obvious that a fetus does not appear to satisfy all of them. This line of
argument lead to Warren later acknowledging that many people have written replies to her article
saying that under her definition of personhood, infanticide would be permissible, as infants do
not meet the criteria she presents much better than a fetus does. Her response to this objection is
that they are correct, and under her definition infants are not persons in the full moral sense
either. However, she still claims that infanticide is impermissible, not because they have rights,
but because there are many people that would want a newborn infant, and therefore she claims
that the destruction of an infant would be comparable to wanton destruction of natural
resources, or great works of art (p. 398). She finishes by clarifying that her defense of

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infanticide does not translate to fetuses because infants do not infringe on a pregnant womans
freedom as a fetus does.
However, the admitted problems with Warrens argument are likely insurmountable. For
example, a deep sleeping adult arguably doesnt fit any of her criteria. In fact, there are numerous
examples and thought experiments of people with certain conditions or situations that would fail
one or more of her criteria, leading to their loss of personhood according to her theory.
Secondly, her definition-based argument inherently brings up related issues, such as the animal
ethics debate and the argument from marginal cases, although that will be further explained later
in the paper in its own section. Even beyond the problems with the criteria and their problematic
application, the largest flaw of this argument is likely its extremeness of its position. Drawing a
conclusion such as infanticide from a theory is a very common tool from opposing viewpoints in
a debate claiming ad absurdum. The very fact that this argument is coming out openly admitting
that it has a conclusion typically used in ad absurdum claims should be taken as an immediate
sign that perhaps the theory is in need of some reconsideration or adjusting. Infanticide is a
reprehensible act that most major ethical theories are unarguably against. There is not a
reasonable maxim that can regularly support it; it seems absurd to claim that the practice would
increase overall happiness, and carrying out the act is much more likely to cause an adverse
dehumanizing effect than increase virtue. Lastly, this theory doesnt fix the problem of trying to
determine when life begins, it merely moves the problem. Rather than trying to decide when
biologically human material becomes a human being through the gestation process, we are left
trying to decide when an infant becomes a full moral person through the development process.
Does a child start reasoning in a complex manner at six months? Two years? Can society create a
test of new and relatively complex problems that can be administered to young children in

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order for them to gain the legal protections of personhood? This argument brings us no closer to
a definitive answer than does the previous argument over when life begins.
A different point of view over the same argument covered above is the argument Don
Marquis presents for the banning of abortion. Marquis (1989) argues that the reason murdering a
person is wrong is because it deprives the individual of a future of value. He then claims that
fetuses have a future of value also, and that aborting them deprives them in a similar fashion,
therefore making it immoral.
However, an article by Mark T. Brown (2000) critiques Marquis argument on the idea of
a future of value. Brown comments that one can take the idea of future of value in one of
two ways. The first is to consider it a potential future of value. This he claims is an error
because morality cannot be based on potentialities. In order to argue potentialities one would
have to find out what exactly the potential or probability of all the possible outcomes would be in
a specific situation. This could only occur after considering all of the relevant evidence needed to
conclude those potentials, which could only happen after determining what evidence should be
used. If all of the needed evidence isnt available there is a problem. Conversely, even if all of
the above requirements are met there is still the line-drawing debate over exactly how much
potential is needed for there to be moral relevance. The second interpretation of future of value
is a self-represented future of value. He then claims, however, that this argument isnt sound
because a fetus lacks the neurological and cognitive development required on a very basic level
for being able to imagine its own future of value.
Judith Jarvis Thomsons article is different from the ones presented above because it is
not extreme in its conclusion on abortion, and it doesnt claim it to be completely permissible or
completely impermissible. It is also interesting because it completely ignores what is typically

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the main point of the abortion argument, which is when personhood begins. Rather she
presents an argument that abortion is sometimes permissible even if granting a fetus full moral
rights at the time of conception. She accomplishes this by presenting several famous analogies.
The first analogy that Thomson presents is the story of the famous violinist. Thomson
(1971) begins by asking the reader to imagine waking up in a hospital bed hooked up to a famous
and unconscious violinist. Then the doctor explains that the Music Lovers Association had
kidnapped you after finding out that you have the perfect blood type to help the violinist, who is
suffering from a rare kidney disease. The doctor continues by saying that in order to save the
violinist you must remain in the hospital for nine months, and that if you disconnect yourself
from the violinist they will die. The doctor concludes by saying that the violinists right to life
overrides your rights to freedom and deciding what happens to your body, therefore if you
unplug yourself you will be charged with murder. Thomson points out that this is wrong.
Although it might be said to be admirable to allow the violinist to keep you in a hospital for nine
months, you are not obligated to do so. In fact, the very carrying out of this act by the Music
Lovers Association against your will without your consent is an ethical failure. Thomson claims
that this analogy applies directly to rape victims. The fetus is hooked up to them clearly against
their will and without their consent; therefore women pregnant through rape are not obligated to
carry the resulting fetus to term.
She then presents another analogy of being in a stuffy room with a closed window in it.
She explains that it would be desirable to open the window and enjoy some fresh air. However,
in that environment there is a form of pollen that if it drifts into your room and settles, will cause
people to grow. Not wanting people to sprout in the room, a person has a special screen attached
to the window that is designed to stop the pollen from entering the room while still allowing the

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refreshing breeze to cool down the room. If after the screen is properly installed, pollen still gets
into the room because the screen installed is defective due to a manufacturing error no fault of
the person living in the room, is the person responsible for taking care of the sprouting persons?
Thomson claims that this would be absurd as a person has a right to fresh air and took
precautions to avoid the pollen. The screen makers mistake cannot be used to punish the resident
of the stuffy room. Thomson then concludes that this analogy adequately explains how a woman
who has become pregnant due to a defective contraceptive is also justified in having an abortion.
Taking the argument even further, she repeats the last analogy with the distinct difference
that the person staying in the stuffy room finds the screens to be somewhat dampening to the
effect of the refreshing breeze, and then precedes to open the window without installing a screen
in order to more fully enjoy the fresh air. If after doing so, some pollen drifts into the room, is the
resident then obligated to take care of any people that sprout in the living room? Again, Thomson
concludes that this analogy explains how a woman who has become pregnant after not using a
contraceptive is also justified in having an abortion. She claims that it is not valid for anyone to
claim that a person has rights to their rooms, with the exception of opening their windows for
air, because of the possibility that sprouting may occur. She then points out that merely
walking outside of a door without an armed escort can possibly result in a woman getting
pregnant, therefore making the argument against abortion by taking a risk of pregnancy invalid.
She concludes her article by reminding the reader that if any of the her analogies are acceptable,
then the main argument against abortion of claiming that a fetus has full personhood doesnt
effectively end the debate; as all of the analogies were made after granting the fetus full human
rights for the sake of argument. Consequently, any future evidence to fetuses having anything
less than full moral consideration is only further strength to her arguments.

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After contemplation of Thomsons position, one sees what she is trying to accomplish.
The pull of her position is not only in the strength of her arguments from analogy or their
inherent questioning of where to draw the line, but also in the way she shifts the argument;
changing the focus from a black and white argument over when and how to draw a hard line
allows for fresh perspective on the matter. This reminds those debating over whether or not
abortion is taking a morally significant life that in fact people of unarguable personhood
occasionally have their lives ended or are allowed to die justifiably, therefore exposing their
argument as not necessarily taking everything into consideration. This issue and its implications
are much more complex than most standard abortion arguments. As an issue becomes more
complex it becomes more difficult as well as often gaining a level of gray area. To resolve such
issues requires a calm and reflective mind open to considering any and all relevant aspects or
arguments that can be related to the initial question at hand.
2. Related Arguments
Perhaps more information and insight can be gained by looking at more than just the
standard arguments over abortion. For example, there are other perspectives or facts not
included in the above arguments that apply. The March of Dimes says that one out of every four
known pregnancies end in a miscarriage. However, society does not hold a funeral when this
situation occurs, because it doesn't normally hold the moral standing of fetuses high in accidental
deaths, indicating there is no reason it should when it is intentional. Coincidentally, society
doesnt hold funerals after abortions are performed either. Also, certain animals actually have the
ability to abort embryos or fetuses through internal biological control in response to external
factors such as extremity of winter. Furthermore, some organisms can change the sex of their
offspring to better keep the population balanced. These facts seem to weaken certain arguments

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presented above, such as the argument of a two-celled zygote being equal to a full adult. For
instance, if a two-celled zygote is equal to a full adult as Noonan and Marquis argued, it would
be a contradiction that society treats the two categories differently by only having memorial
services for one of them. Also, these facts weaken Marquis claim that fetuses have a future of
value, as that is clearly not always the case. Continuing to seek insight from outside of the
abortion debate, there are other issues that could assist in finding a better position.
2a. Advanced Technological Insight
Genetic and reproductive controls are two moral debates that have obvious implications
on the abortion debate. Warren argued against infanticide because the infant can be cared for by
others that want it after it is born so that it no longer infringes on the womans freedom. As
technology continues to improve and the date a fetus can be born prematurely while still
surviving continues to become sooner, while stem cell and embryonic research continue to
advance, it seems an eventuality that a sperm and an ovum will be able to be combined, and
entirely developed, within a hospital or lab. This would make Warrens entire argument against
infanticide obsolete, because any embryo or fetus that would be aborted could instead be
removed from the pregnant woman and developed and cared for by others almost as easily as
infants. Taking this into consideration, the extreme view on the opposite side of the debate
claiming that fetuses have absolutely no consideration or rights justifying the loss of freedom
they impose will lose strength as science continues to decrease the amount of freedom that needs
to be lost.
In his personal statement from the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Michael J. Sandel
(as sited in Munson, 2008) advocates for the permissibility of creating and using embryonic stem
cells for cloning-for-biomedical-research. Sandel compares using embryos for research in a

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responsible manner, under regulation, to the use of embryos for fertility treatment. He claims that
both practices lose some embryos as part of achieving worthy goals for full adults,
acknowledging that those who view embryos as full persons cannot accept this as it would
violate Kantian law, among others. This is because, according to the categorical imperative, a
person must act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other, always
as an end and never as a means only (Kant, 1785, as sited in Rachels, 2003), therefore pointing
out a contradiction if embryos truly have equal value to a fully adult human being, as practices
where fully developed human beings are lost as part of achieving worthy goals are illegal.
Therefore, by the same logic it is also contradictory, or at least a social inconsistency, that
abortion remains a hot button issue while fertility treatments fail to receive the same amount of
attention in news and politics. He follows this by stating that an embryo or fetus must belong to
one of three categories. The first category is that they have no moral consideration, much like a
rock. The second category is that they have full moral consideration much like a fully
functioning adult. The third category is that they have a moral consideration in-between the first
and second options and are neither equal to a rock or a person. He claims that the correct answer
is the third category, and offers an analogy to support this claim. A fetus is an early undeveloped
form of life and should have some moral consideration, hence his call for regulation and
responsible conduct involving their use. However, he presents the following scenario: Suppose
there is a murderer that walks up to an elementary school child and shoots them. Then suppose
on the same day a fertility clinic suffered a power outage and lost several frozen embryos. He
claims that if a reasonable person had to choose which event was worse they would choose the
murdering of the child. Choosing the single child over the several frozen embryos implies that an
embryo does not have the same moral worth as an already existing, living individual. He

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concludes that the correct answer to the value of fetuses is to be in the reasonable middle rather
than either extreme.
Granted, opponents of his view would be quick to point out that the implications of the
presented analogy are appealing to intuition rather than hard metaphysical definitions, and they
would be right. It could also be pointed out that several theories would condemn the act of
murdering the child while claiming that a power outage isnt a moral dilemma, merely an
unfortunate event. In fact, probably the only ethical theory equipped to properly interact with this
thought experiment is utilitarianism; due to the fact that the theory is based on calculating the
choice that produces the greatest overall possible good in a situation. However, it is reasonable to
believe a utilitarian would agree with Sandel in his conclusion of which situation would be better
overall. At the same time, the positive aspects of this viewpoint should not be overlooked.
Although not bulletproof, the thought experiment in question is very provocative. Lastly, in an
argument full of people trying to draw hard lines, trying to draw a reasonable ballpark area
seems like a much safer position to start from.
2b. The Animal Rights Debate
The abortion debate has several similarities to the debate on the moral consideration of
animals. First, a large part of the animal rights discussion is based in definitions and line drawing
for where and when to apply full moral consideration. This is largely done by trying to boil down
what specifically places human beings in the category of moral beings, and then trying to discern
if any or all of those characteristics are present in various species of animals. Substitute fetus
with animals and several arguers in the debate sound exactly like Warren, even down to using
some of the same definitional criteria. In fact, the argument from marginal cases mentioned
earlier is an animal rights debate tactic of comparing certain higher intelligence animals to

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infants! The debate has extreme viewpoints on each end, with a large set of ideas met with
general agreement in the middle. This is why there are very few people advocating for extreme
positions, such as torturing animals being permissible or killing frogs earning lifetime
imprisonment. It is much more likely that a person in the debate views animals as not being
morally equivalent to people, yet still deserving of consideration and humane treatment. To have
such a view correlates with Sandels idea of moral value in between a rock and a full person.
Similarly, a two cell zygote doesnt display self-awareness like a fully developed human being,
yet it is understandable why a person might view it as more valuable than a rock, or continue to
see an increasing level of value as it develops into a fetus, and eventually sees it as equal value if
it develops completely and is born as a healthy human infant. It should be acknowledged that this
debate exists, and that with all of its similarities much of society has shown through both action
and governing that animals are to be treated in this reasonable middle ground.
2c. Further Advocating A Moderate Viewpoint
One of the more well-known ideologies in the realm of ethics is virtue theory. The theory
as a whole is subject to certain critiques just like every other theory. However, I want to focus on
one of the main aspects of the theory, specifically the idea of finding virtue in the moderation
between two vices. The founder of this theory, Aristotle, used terminology such as the mean of
excellence to communicate this concept and the avoidance of extremes. An example he used to
further describe this idea is that to be entirely foolhardy was a deficient level of fear. Likewise, to
be a coward would be an excess of fear. The appropriate, and therefore virtuous, level of fear was
courage, or the mean of the previous two extremes. Reflecting on this, several of the extreme
viewpoints throughout this paper were shown to be weak due to the very rigid nature of their
position. Furthermore, out of all of the abortion arguments presented above, this principle

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seems to strengthen Sandels and Thomsons arguments, as they both opted for more moderate
positions.
3. Conclusions
After contemplation and review of everything presented in this paper, it seems that to
view a fetus as worthy of moral consideration, though not equal to that of a full human being, is
quite possibly the most reasonable and evidenced choice currently available. This would
conclude that abortion is permissible in some situations after consideration, such as in the case of
rape or an unintentional pregnancy still in the first month. Simultaneously, this moderate position
would not find abortion permissible without consideration or extenuating circumstance, such as a
situation where the fetus is near fully developed with less than a month before due date.
Admittedly, such a viewpoint will be met with disapproval by hardline arguers such as Noonan
or Warren. However, I believe this paper has adequately shown points of weakness in their
arguments, as well as substantial reasoning why the proposed conclusion may be more
justifiable.
Regulation should be in place to support this conclusion, and is for the most part. Quite
often abortion is performed in situations that comply with the conclusion, such as the morning
after pill or extenuating circumstances such as the fetus threatening the life of a pregnant woman.
The opposite end of the spectrum is also respected by the resistance towards final trimester
abortions. Although there is, and will likely always be, extremist viewpoints being purported, it
is good to see a more reasonable mean prevailing, even if begrudgingly by both sides.
In closing, the process of reaching this reasonable conclusion to a complicated and heated
debate was the result of a long process. This process included careful consideration of all
relevant information that is directly and indirectly involved in the main debate, analysis of

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related implications, comparison of the various arguments, and a conclusion of choosing the
overall view evidenced to be most reasonable. Not surprisingly the final conclusion was a mean
of excellence between two extremes, as Aristotle had professed was the correct choice. Perhaps
the person most responsible for the founding of the branches of logic and ethics can still be given
consideration in current debates, even if not his theory in its entirety. Finally, perhaps a new
ethical theory could be realized that takes into consideration the strengths of different principled
moral theories, as well as the implications of the various arguments of a topic, and then chooses
the most reasonable option in an Aristotelian manner. Admittedly, this would draw objection
from extreme-black-and-white theory arguers, but to draw on the strength of another moral
theory, if we were all to sign a contract of how we would want society to best function, it would
be reasonable to want the governors of that society to have this moral view of consideration.

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Kant, I. (1959). Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. (L. W. Beck, Trans.). Indianapolis,
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill. (Original work published in 1785).
Marquis, D. (1983). Why abortion is immoral. The Journal of Philosophy, 84 (4), 183-202.
Munson, R. (2008) Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics (8th ed.).
Belmont: Wadsworth, Thomson Higher Education.
Noonan Jr., J. T. (1970) The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Rachels, J. (2003) The Elements of Moral Philosophy (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Sommers, C. H., Sommers, F. (2010) Vice & Virtue in Everyday Life (8th ed.). Belmont:
Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1 (1), 47-66.
Warren, M. A. (1973). On the moral and legal status of abortion. The Monist, 57 (1).