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Handbook of Philosophical Logic Second Edition 6
Handbook of Philosophical Logic Second Edition 6
2nd Edition
Volume 6
CONTENTS
Editorial Preface
vii
Dov M. Gabbay
Relevance Logic
Quantum Logics
129
229
Martin Bunder
Paraconsistent Logic
287
Graham Priest
Index
395
viii
We felt at the time (1979) that non-monotonic logic was not ready for
a chapter yet and that combinatory logic and -calculus was too far removed.1 Non-monotonic logic is now a very major area of philosophical logic, alongside default logics, labelled deductive systems, bring logics, multi-dimensional, multimodal and substructural logics. Intensive reexaminations of fragments of classical logic have produced fresh insights,
including at time decision procedures and equivalence with non-classical
systems.
Perhaps the most impressive achievement of philosophical logic as arising
in the past decade has been the eective negotiation of research partnerships
with fallacy theory, informal logic and argumentation theory, attested to by
the Amsterdam Conference in Logic and Argumentation in 1995, and the
two Bonn Conferences in Practical Reasoning in 1996 and 1997.
These subjects are becoming more and more useful in agent theory and
intelligent and reactive databases.
Finally, fteen years after the start of the Handbook project, I would
like to take this opportunity to put forward my current views about logic
in computer science, computational linguistics and articial intelligence. In
the early 1980s the perception of the role of logic in computer science was
that of a specication and reasoning tool and that of a basis for possibly
neat computer languages. The computer scientist was manipulating data
structures and the use of logic was one of his options.
My own view at the time was that there was an opportunity for logic to
play a key role in computer science and to exchange benets with this rich
and important application area and thus enhance its own evolution. The
relationship between logic and computer science was perceived as very much
like the relationship of applied mathematics to physics and engineering. Applied mathematics evolves through its use as an essential tool, and so we
hoped for logic. Today my view has changed. As computer science and
articial intelligence deal more and more with distributed and interactive
systems, processes, concurrency, agents, causes, transitions, communication
and control (to name a few), the researcher in this area is having more and
more in common with the traditional philosopher who has been analysing
1 I am really sorry, in hindsight, about the omission of the non-monotonic logic chapter.
I wonder how the subject would have developed, if the AI research community had had
a theoretical model, in the form of a chapter, to look at. Perhaps the area would have
developed in a more streamlined way!
ix
Dov Gabbay
King's College London
Logic
IT
Natural
language
processing
Temporal
logic
Expressive
power of tense
operators.
Temporal
indices. Separation of past
from future
Modal logic.
Multi-modal
logics
generalised
quantiers
Action logic
Algorithmic
proof
Discourse representation.
Direct
computation
on
linguistic input
Resolving
ambiguities. Machine
translation.
Document
classication.
Relevance
theory
logical analysis
of language
Quantiers in
logic
Montague
semantics.
Situation
semantics
Nonmonotonic
reasoning
Probabilistic
and
fuzzy
logic
Intuitionistic
logic
Set theory,
higher-order
logic,
calculus,
types
Program
control specication,
verication,
concurrency
Expressive
power for recurrent events.
Specication
of
temporal
control.
Decision problems. Model
checking.
Logic programming
Planning.
Time dependent
data.
Event calculus.
Persistence
through time|
the
Frame
Problem. Temporal
query
language.
temporal
transactions.
Belief revision.
Inferential
databases
Extension of
Horn clause
with
time
capability.
Event calculus.
Temporal logic
programming.
New
logics.
Generic theorem provers
General theory
of reasoning.
Non-monotonic
systems
Loop checking.
Non-monotonic
decisions about
loops. Faults
in systems.
Intrinsic logical
discipline for
AI. Evolving
and
communicating
databases
Negation by
failure. Deductive databases
Semantics for
logic programs
Constructive
reasoning and
proof theory
about specication design
Expert
systems. Machine
learning
Intuitionistic
logic is a better
logical basis
than classical
logic
Non-wellfounded sets
Negation by
failure
and
modality
Horn clause
logic is really
intuitionistic.
Extension of
logic programming languages
xi
Imperative
vs. declarative
languages
Database
theory
Complexity
theory
Agent theory
Special comments:
A
look to the
future
Temporal logic
as a declarative
programming
language. The
changing past
in databases.
The imperative
future
Temporal
databases
and temporal
transactions
Complexity
questions of
decision procedures of the
logics involved
An essential
component
Temporal
systems
are
becoming more
and more sophisticated
and extensively
applied
Dynamic logic
Database updates
and
action logic
Ditto
Possible
tions
Multimodal
logics
are
on the rise.
Quantication
and context
becoming very
active
Types. Term
rewrite
systems. Abstract
interpretation
Abduction, relevance
Ditto
Agent's
implementation
rely
on
proof theory.
Inferential
databases.
Non-monotonic
coding
of
databases
Ditto
Agent's reasoning
is
non-monotonic
A major area
now. Important for formalising practical
reasoning
Fuzzy
and
probabilistic
data
Database
transactions.
Inductive
learning
Ditto
Connection
with decision
theory
Agents constructive
reasoning
Major
now
Semantics for
programming
languages.
Martin-Lof
theories
Semantics for
programming
languages.
Abstract interpretation.
Domain recursion theory.
Ditto
Ditto
ac-
area
Still a major
central alternative to classical
logic
More central
than ever!
xii
Classical logic.
Classical fragments
Basic
ground
guage
Labelled
deductive
systems
A
unifying
framework.
Context
theory.
Resource and
substructural
logics
Fibring and
combining
logics
Lambek calculus
Truth
maintenance
systems
Logics of space
and time
backlan-
Dynamic syntax
Program synthesis
Modules.
Combining
languages
A basic tool
Fallacy
theory
Logical
Dynamics
Argumentation
theory games
Widely applied
here
Game semantics gaining
ground
Object level/
metalevel
Extensively
used in AI
Mechanisms:
Abduction,
default
relevance
Connection
with
neural
nets
ditto
Time-actionrevision models
ditto
Annotated
logic programs
Combining features
Relational
databases
Labelling
allows
for
context
and control.
Linear logic
Linked
databases.
Reactive
databases
xiii
The workhorse
of logic
The study of
fragments is
very active and
promising.
Essential tool.
Agents
have
limited
resources
Agents
are
built up of
various bred
mechanisms
The notion of
self-bring allows for selfreference
Fallacies are
really
valid
modes of reasoning in the
right context.
Potentially applicable
A
dynamic
view of logic
On the rise
in all areas of
applied logic.
Promises
a
great future
Always central
in all areas
Very important
for agents
Becoming part
of the notion of
a logic
Of great importance to the
future.
Just
starting
A new theory
of logical agent
A new kind of
model
RELEVANCE LOGIC
1 INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
2. The Admissibility of
3. Semantics
4. The Decision Problem
5. Looking About
We should add a word about the delimitation of our topic. There are by now
a host of formal systems that can be said with some justication to be `relevance logics'. Some of these antedate the Anderson{Belnap approach, some
are more recent. Some have been studied somewhat extensively, whereas
others have been discussed for only a few pages in some journal. It would be
impossible to describe all of these, let alone to assess in each and every case
how they compare with the Anderson{Belnap approach. It is clear that the
Anderson{Belnap-style logics have been the most intensively studied. So
we will concentrate on the research program of Anderson, Belnap and their
co-workers, and shall mention other approaches only insofar as they bear
on this program. By way of minor recompense we mention that Anderson and Belnap [1975] have been good about discussing related approaches,
especially the older ones.
Finally, we should say that our paradigm of a relevance logic throughout
this essay will be the Anderson{Belnap system R or relevant implication
(rst devised by Belnap|see [Belnap, 1967a; Belnap, 1967b] for its history)
and not so much the Anderson{Belnap favourite, their system E of entailment. There will be more about each of these systems below (they are explicitly formulated in Section 1.3), but let us simply say here that each of these
is concerned to formalise a species of implication (or the conditional|see
Section 1.2) in which the antecedent suces relevantly for the consequent.
The system E diers from the system R primarily by adding necessity to
this relationship, and in this E is a modal logic as well as a relevance logic.
This by itself gives good reason to consider R and not E as the paradigm
of a relevance logic.1
RELEVANCE LOGIC
heavily on the `Grammatical Propaedeutic' appendix of [Anderson and Belnap, 1975] and to a lesser extent on [Meyer, 1966], both of which are very
much recommended to the reader for their wise heresy from logical tradition.
Thus logical tradition (think of [Quine, 1953]) makes much of the grammatical distinction between `if, then' (a connective), and `implies' or its
rough synonym `entails' (transitive verbs). This tradition opposes
1. If today is Tuesday, then this is Belgium
to the pair of sentences
2. `Today is Tuesday' implies `This is Belgium',
3. That today is Tuesday implies that this is Belgium.
And the tradition insists that (1) be called a conditional, and that (2) and
(3) be called implications.
Sometimes much philosophical weight is made to rest on this distinction.
It is said that since `implies' is a verb demanding nouns to
ank it, that
implication must then be a relation between the objects stood for by those
nouns, whereas it is said that `if, then' is instead a connective combining that
implication (unlike `if, then') is really a metalinguistic notion, either overtly
as in (2) where the nouns are names of sentences, or else covertly as in (3)
where the nouns are naming propositions (the `ghosts' of linguistic entities).
This last is then felt to be especially bad because it involves ontological
commitment to propositions or some equally disreputable entities. The rst
is at least free of such questionable ontological commitments, but does raise
real complications about `nested implications', which would seem to take us
into a meta-metalanguage, etc.
The response of relevance logicians to this distinction has been largely one
of `What, me worry?' Sometime sympathetic outsiders have tried to apologise for what might be quickly labelled a `use{mention confusion' on the part
of relevance logicians [Scott, 1971]. But `hard-core' relevance logicians often
seem to luxuriate in this `confusion'. As Anderson and Belnap [1975, p. 473]
say of their `Grammatical Propaedeutic': \the principle aim of this piece
is to convince the reader that it is philosophically respectable to `confuse'
implication or entailment with the conditional, and indeed philosophically
suspect to harp on the dangers of such a `confusion'. (The suspicion is
that such harpists are plucking a metaphysical tune on merely grammatical
strings.)"
The gist of the Anderson{Belnap position is that there is a generic
conditional-implication notion, which can be carried into English by a variety of grammatical constructions. Implication itself can be viewed as a
implies that ', and as
connective requiring prenominalisation: `that
such it nests. It is an incidental feature of English that it favours sentences
with main subjects and verbs, and `implies' conforms to this reference by
RELEVANCE LOGIC
tendencies to `regiment' the English word `implies' so that it stands only for
logical implication. Although there is no objection to thus giving a technical
usage to an ordinary English word (even requiring in this technical usage
that `implication' be a metalinguistic relation between sentences), the point
is that relevance logicians by and large believe we are using `implies' in the
ordinary non-technical sense, in which a sentence like (3) might be true
without there being any logical (or even necessary) implication from `Today
is Tuesday' to `This is Belgium'.
Relevance logicians are not themselves free of similar regimenting tendencies. Thus we tend to dierentiate `entails' from `implies' on precisely
the ground that `entails', unlike `implies', stands only for necessary implication [Meyer, 1966]. Some writings of Anderson and Belnap even suggest
a more restricted usage for just logical implication, but we do not take this
seriously. There does not seem to be any more linguistic evidence for thus
restricting `entails' than there would be for `implies', though there may be
at least more excuse given the apparently more technical history of `entails'
(in its logical sense|cf. The oed).
This has been an explanation of, if not an apology for, the ways in which
relevance logicians often express themselves. but it should be stressed that
the reader need not accept all, or any, of this background in order to make
sense of the basic aims of the relevance logic enterprise. Thus, e.g. the
reader may feel that, despite protestations to the contrary, Anderson, Belnap and Co. are hopelessly confused about the relationships among `entails',
`implies', and `if-then', but still think that their system R provides a good
formalisation of the properties of `if-then' (or at least `if-then relevantly'),
and that they system E does the same for some strict variant produced by
the modier `necessarily'.
One of the reasons the recent logical tradition has been motivated to
insist on the erce distinction between implications and conditionals has
to do with the awkwardness of reading the so-called `material conditional'
A ! B as corresponding to any kind of implication (cf. [Quine, 1953]).
The material conditional A ! B can of course be dened as :A _ B ,
and it certainly does seem odd, modifying an example that comes by oral
tradition from Anderson, to say that:
7. Picking a guinea pig up by its tail implies that its eyes will fall out.
just on the grounds that its antecedent is false (since guinea pigs have no
tails). But then it seems equally false to say that:
8. If one picks up a guinea pig by its tail, then its eyes will fall out.
And also both of the following appear to be equally false:
9. Scaring a pregnant guinea pig implies that all of her babies will be
born tailless.
10. If one scares a pregnant guinea pig, then all of her babies will be born
tailless.
It should be noted that there are other ways to react to the oddity of sentences like the ones above other than calling them simply false. Thus there
is the reaction stemming from the work of Grice [1975] that says that at least
the conditional sentences (8) and (10) above are true though nonetheless
pragmatically odd in that they violate some rule based on conversational
co-operation to the eect that one should normally say the strongest thing
relevant, i.e. in the cases above, that guinea pigs have no tails (cf. [Fogelin,
1978, p. 136 .] for a textbook presentation of this strategy).
Also it should be noted that the theory of the `counterfactual' conditional
due to Stalnaker{Thomason, D. K. Lewis and others (cf. Chapter [[??]] of
this Handbook ), while it agrees with relevance logic in nding sentences like
(8) (not (10) false, disagrees with relevance logic in the formal account it
gives of the conditional.
It would help matters if there were an extended discussion of these
competing theories (Anderson{Belnap, Grice, Stalnaker-Thomason-Lewis),
which seem to pass like ships in the night (can three ships do this without
strain to the image?) but there is not the space here. Such a discussion
might include an attempt to construct a theory of a relevant counterfactual
conditional (if A were to be the case, then as a result B would be the case).
The rough idea would be to use say The Routley{Meyer semantics for relevance logic (cf. Section 3.7) in place of the Kripke semantics for modal
logic, which plays a key role in the Stalnaker{Thomason{Lewis semantical
account of the conditional (put the 3-placed alternativeness relation in the
role of the usual 2-placed one). Work in this area is just starting. See
the works of [Mares and Fuhrmann, 1995] and [Akama, 1997] which both
attempt to give semantics for relevant counterfactuals.
Also any discussion relating to Grice's work would surely make much of
the fact that the theory of Grice makes much use of a basically unanalysed
notion of relevance. One of Grice's chief conversational rules is `be relevant',
but he does not say much about just what this means. One could look at
relevance logic as trying to say something about this, at least in the case of
the conditional.
Incidentally, as Meyer has been at great pains to emphasise, relevance
logic gives, on its face anyway, no separate account of relevance. It is not
as if there is a unary relevance operator (`relevantly').
One last point, and then we shall turn to more substantive issues. Orthodox relevance logic diers from classical logic not just in having an additional logical connective (!) for the conditional. If that was the only
dierence relevance logic would just be an `extension' of classical logic, using the notion of Haack [1974], in much the same way as say modal logic
is an extension of classical logic by the addition of a logical connective
RELEVANCE LOGIC
for necessity. The fact is (cf. Section 1.6) that although relevance logic
contains all the same theorems as classical logic in the classical vocabulary
say, ^; _; : (and the quantiers), it nonetheless does not validate the same
inferences. Thus, most notoriously, the disjunctive syllogism (cf. Section 2)
is counted as invalid. Thus, as Wolf [1978] discusses, relevance logic does
not t neatly into the classication system of [Haack, 1974], and might best
be called `quasi-extension' of classical logic, and hence `quasi-deviant'. Incidentally, all of this applies only to `orthodox' relevance logic, and not to
the `classical relevance logics' of Meyer and Routley (cf. Section 3.11).
A!A
(A ! B ) ! [(C ! A) ! (C ! B )]
[A ! (A ! B )] ! (A ! B )
[A ! (B ! C )] ! [B ! (A ! C )]
Self-Implication
Prexing
Contraction
Permutation:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
A few comments are in order. This formulation is due to Church [1951b]
who called it `The weak implication calculus'. He remarks that the axioms
are the same as those of Hilbert's for the positive implicational calculus (the
implicational fragment of the intuitionistic propositional calculus H) except
that (1) is replaced with
A ! (B ! A) Positive Paradox:
(10 )
(Recent historical investigation by Dosen [1992] has shown that Orlov constructed an axiomatisation of the implication and negation fragment of R
in the mid 1920s, predating other known work in the area. Church and
Moh, however, provided a Deduction Theorem (see Section 1.4) which is
absent from Orlov's treatment.)
The choice of the implicational axioms can be varied in a number of informative ways. Thus putting things quickly, (2) Prexing may be replaced
by
(A ! B ) ! [(B ! C ) ! (A ! C )] Suxing.
(20 )
(3) Contraction may be replaced by
[A ! (B ! C )] ! [(A ! B ) ! (A ! C )] Self- Distribution,
(30 )
A ! [(A ! B ) ! B ] Assertion:
(40 )
These choices of implicational axioms are `isolated' in the sense that one
choice does not aect another. Thus
THEOREM 1. R! may be axiomatised with modus ponens, (1) Self-Implication
and any selection of one from each pair f(2); (20 )g; f(3); (30)g, and f(4); (40)g.
Proof. By consulting [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, pp. 79{80], and ddling.
(4a)
(4b)
Thus (4b) is just an instance of Assertion, and (4a) follows from Assertion
by substitution A ! A for A and using Self-Implication to detach. That
(4a) and (4b) together with Suxing and Contraction yield Assertion (and,
less interestingly, Self-Implication) can be shown using the fact proven in
[Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 8.3.3], that these yield (letting A~ abbreviate A1 ! A2 )
A~ ! [(A~ ! B ) ! B ] Restricted-Assertion.
(400 )
The point is that (4a) and (4b) in conjunction say that A is equivalent to
(A ! A) ! A, and so every formula A has an equivalent form A~ and so
`Restricted Assertion' reduces to ordinary Assertion.2
2 There are some subtleties here. Detailed analysis shows that both Suxing and
Prexing are needed to replace A~ with A (cf. Section 1.3). Prexing can be derived from
the above set of axioms (cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, pp. 77{78 and p. 26].
RELEVANCE LOGIC
Incidentally, no claim is made that this last variant of R! has the same
isolation in its axioms as did the previous axiomatisations. Thus, e.g.
that Suxing (and not Prexing) is an axiom is important (a matrix of
J. R. Chidgey's (cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 8.6]) can be used
to show this.
The system E of entailment diers primarily from the system R in that
it is a system of relevant strict implication. Thus E is both a relevance logic
and a modal logic. Indeed, dening A =df (A ! A) ! A one nds E
has something like the modality structure of S4 (cf. [Anderson and Belnap,
1975, Sections 4.3 and 10]).
This suggests that E! can be axiomatised by dropping Demodaliser from
the axiomatisation of R! , and indeed this is right (cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 8.3.3], for this and all other claims about axiomatisations
of E! ).3
The axiomatisation above is a `xed menu' in that Prexing cannot be
replaced with Suxing. There are other `a la carte' axiomatisations in the
style of Theorem 1.
THEOREM 2. E! may be axiomatised with modus ponens, Self-Implication
and any selection from each of the pairs fPrexing, Suxingg, fContraction,
Self-Distributiong and fRestricted-Permutation, Restricted-Assertiong (one
from each pair).
Another implicational system of less central interest is that of `ticket entailment' T! . It is motivated by Anderson and Belnap [1975, Section 6] as
deriving from some ideas of Ryle's about `inference tickets'. It was motivated in [Anderson, 1960] as `entailment shorn of modality'. The thought
behind this last is that there are two ways to remove the modal sting from
the characteristic axiom of alethic modal logic, A ! A. One way is to add
Demodaliser A ! A so as to destroy all modal distinctions. The other is
to drop the axiom A ! A. Thus the essential way one gets T! from E! is
to drop Specialised Assertion (or alternatively to drop Restricted Assertion
or Restricted Permutation, depending on which axiomatisation of E! one
has). But before doing so one must also add whichever one of Prexing and
Suxing was lacking, since it will no longer be a theorem otherwise (this is
easiest to visualise if one thinks of dropping Restricted permutation, since
this is the key to getting Prexing from Suxing and vice versa ). Also
(and this is a strange technicality) one must replace Self-Distribution with
its permuted form:
(A ! B ) ! [[A ! (B ! C )] ! (A ! C )]
This is summarised in
Permuted Self-Distribution.
(300 )
3 The actual history is backwards to this, in that the system R was rst axiomatised
by [Belnap, 1967a] by adding Demodaliser to E.
10
THEOREM 3 (Anderson and Belnap [Section 8.3.2, 1975]). T! is axiomatised using Self-Implication, Prexing, Suxing, and either of fContraction,
Permuted Self-Distributiong, with modus ponens.
There is a subsystem of E! called TW! (and P W, and T W in
earlier nomenclature) axiomatised by dropping Contraction (which corresponds to the combinator W) from T! . This has obtained some interest
because of an early conjecture of Belnap's (cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975,
Section 8.11]) that A ! B and B ! A are both theorems of TW! only
when A is the same formula as B . That Belnap's Conjecture is now Belnap's Theorem is due to the highly ingenious (and complicated) work of E.
P. Martin and R. K. Meyer [1982] (based on the earlier work of L. Powers
and R. Dwyer). Martin and Meyer's work also highlights a system S! (for
Syllogism) in which Self-Implication is dropped from TW! .
Moving on now to adding the positive extensional connectives ^ and _,
in order to obtain R!;^;_ (denoted more simply as R+) one adds to R!
the axiom schemes
A ^ B ! A; A ^ B ! B
[(A ! B ) ^ (A ! C )] ! (A ! B ^ C )
A ! A _ B; B ! A _ B
[(A ! C ) ^ (B ! C )] ! (A _ B ! C )
A ^ (B _ C ) ! (A ^ B ) _ C
Conjunction Elimination
Conjunction Introduction
Disjunction Introduction
Disjunction Elimination
Distribution
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
plus the rule of adjunction (A; B ` A ^ B ). One can similarly get the
positive intuitionistic logic by adding these all to H! .
Axioms (5){(8) can readily be seen to be encoding the usual elimination
and introduction rules for conjunction and disjunction into axioms, giving
^ and _ what might be called `the lattice properties' (cf. Section 3.3). It
might be thought that A ! (B ! A ^ B ) might be a better encoding
of conjunction introduction than (6), having the virtue that it allows for
the dropping of adjunction. This is a familiar axiom for intuitionistic (and
classical) logic, but as was seen by Church [1951b], it is only a hair's breadth
away from Positive Paradox (A ! (B ! A)), and indeed yields it given (5)
and Prexing. For some mysterious reason, this observation seemed to
prevent Church from adding extensional conjunction/disjunction to what
we now call R! (and yet the need for adjunction in the Lewis formulations
of modal logic where the axioms are al strict implications was well-known).
Perhaps more surprising than the need for adjunction is the need for axiom (9). It would follow from the other axioms if only we had Positive Paradox among them. The place of Distribution in R is continually problematic.
It causes inelegancies in the natural deduction systems (cf. Section 1.5) and
is an obstacle to nding decision procedures (cf. Section 4.8). Incidentally,
all of the usual distributive laws follow from the somewhat `clipped' version
RELEVANCE LOGIC
11
(9).
The rough idea of axiomatising E+ and T+ is to add axiom schemes
(5){(9) to E! and T! . This is in fact precisely right for T+ , but for E+
one needs also the axiom scheme (remember A =df (A ! A) ! A):
A ^ B ! (A ^ B )
(10)
(11)
(12)
and again (10) becomes redundant (since one can easily show (t ! A) $
[(A ! A) ! A]).
Further, this addition of t is conservative in the sense that it leads to
no new t-free theorems (since in any given proof t can always be replaced
by (p1 ! p1 ) ^ ^ (pn ! pn ) where p1 ; : : : ; pn are all the propositional
variables appearing in the proof | cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975]).
Axiom scheme (11) is too strong for T+ and must be weakened to
t:
(11T)
A $ (t ! A)
(13)
12
`Little t' is distinguished from `big T ', which can be conservatively added
with the axiom scheme
A!T
(14)
(15)
This axiom scheme is too strong for other standard relevance logics, but
Meyer and Routley [1972] discovered that one can always add conservatively
the two way rule
(A B ) ! C a
` A ! (B ! C )
Residutation (rule)
(16)
(in R+ (16) yields (15)). Before adding negation, we mention the positive
fragment B+ of a kind of minimal (Basic) relevance logic due to Routley
and Meyer (cf. Section 3.9). B+ is just like TW+ except for nding the
axioms of Prexing and Suxing too strong and replacing them by rules:
(17)
(18)
As for negation, the full systems R, E, etc. may be formed adding to the
axiom schemes for R+ , E+ , etc. the following 4
(A ! :A) ! :A
Reductio
(A ! :B ) ! (B ! :A) Contraposition
::A ! A
Double Negation.
(19)
(20)
(21)
Axiom schemes (19) and (20) are intuitionistically acceptable negation principles, but using (21) one can derive forms of reductio and contraposition
that are intuitionistically rejectable. Note that (19){(21) if added to H+
would give the full intuitionistic propositional calculus H.
In R, negation can alternatively be dened in the style of Johansson, with
:A =df (A ! f ), where f is a false propositional constant, cf. [Meyer, 1966].
Informally, f is the disjunction of all false propositions (the `negation' of
t). Dening negation thus, axiom schemes (19) and (20) become theorems
4 Reversing what is customary in the literature, we use : for the standard negation of
relevance logic, reserving for the `Boolean negation' discussed in Section 3.11. We do
this so as to follow the notational policies of the Handbook.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
13
A ! A
(A ! B ) ! (A ! B )
A ^ B ! (A ^ B )
A ! A;
and the rule of Necessitation (` A ) ` A).
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
His thought was that E could be exactly translated into this system R
with entailment dened as strict implication. That this is subtly not the
case was shown by Maksimova [1973] and Meyer [1979b] has shown how to
modify R so as to allow for an exact translation.
Yet one more system of interest is RM (cf. Section 3.10) obtained by
adding to R the axiom scheme
A ! (A ! A) Mingle:
(22)
Meyer has shown somewhat surprisingly that the pure implicational system
obtained by adding Mingle to R is not the implicational fragment of RM,
and he and Parks have shown how to axiomatise this fragment using a
quite unintelligible formula (cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 8.18]).
Mingle may be replaced equivalently with the converse of Contraction:
(A ! B ) ! (A ! (A ! B )) Expansion:
(23)
~
A~ ! (A~ ! A~ ) Mingle
(24)
14
and the free variables (sometimes called parameters) a; b, etc. The bound
variables are never allowed to have unbound occurrences.
The quantier laws were set down by Anderson and Belnap in accord with
the analogy of the universal quantier with a conjunction (or its instances),
and the existential quantier as a disjunction. In view of the validity of
quantier interchange principles, we shall for brevity take only the universal
quantier 8 as primitive, dening 9xA =df :8x:A. We thus need
8xA ! A(a=x)
8-elimination
8x(A ! B ) ! (A ! 8xB ) 8- introduction
8x(A _ B ) ! A _ 8xB Connement:
(25)
(26)
(27)
If there are function letters or other term forming operators, then (25)
should be generalised to 8xA ! A(t=x), where t is any term (subject to
our conventions that the `bound variables' x; y, etc. do not occur (`free')
in it). Note well that because of our convention that `bound variables' do
not occur free, the usual proviso that x does not occur free in A in (26)
and (27) is automatically satised. (27) is the obvious `innite' analogy
of Distribution, and as such it causes as many technical problems for RQ
as does Distribution for R (cf. Section 4.8). Finally, as an additional rule
corresponding to adjunction, we need:
A(a=x)
Generalisation:
(28)
8xA
There are various more or less standard ways of varying this formulation.
Thus, e.g. (cf. Meyer, Dunn and Leblanc [1974]) one can take all universal
generalisations of axioms, thus avoiding the need for the rule of Generalisation. Also (26) can be `split' into two parts:
(26a)
(26b)
(again note that if we allowed x to occur free we would have to require that
x not be free in A).
The most economical formulation is due to Meyer [1970]. It uses only
the axiom scheme of 8-elimination and the rule.
A ! B _ C (a=x)
(a cannot occur in A or B )
(29)
A ! B _ 8xC
which combines (26){(28).
RELEVANCE LOGIC
15
(For the sake of concreteness, X can be thought of as any of the Hilbertstyle systems of the previous section.) Where is a list of formulas of X
(thought of as hypotheses ) it is customary to dene a deduction from to
be a sequence B1 ; : : : ; Bn , where for each Bi (1 i n), either (1) Bi is in
, or (2) B is an axiom of X, or (3) Bi `follows from' earlier members of
the sequence, i.e. R(Bj1 ; : : : ; Bjk ; Bi ) holds for some (k + 1)|any rule R of
X and Bj1 ; : : : ; Bjk all precede Bi in the sequence B1 ; : : : ; Bn . A formula
A is then said to be deducible from just in case there is some deduction
from terminating in A. We symbolise this as `X A (often suppressing
the subscript).
A proof is of course a deduction from the empty set, and a theorem is
just the last item in a proof. There is the well-known
(Herbrand). If A1 ; : : : ; An ; A
have also A1 ; : : : ; An `H! A ! B .
Deduction Theorem
`H! B ,
then we
This theorem is proven in standard textbooks for classical logic, but the
standard inductive proof shows that in fact the Deduction Theorem holds
for any formal system X having modus ponens as its sole rule and H!
X (i.e. each instance of an axiom scheme of H! is a theorem of X). Indeed
H! can be motivated as the minimal pure implicational calculus having
modus ponens as its sole rule and satisfying the Deduction Theorem. This
is because the axioms of H! can all be derived as theorems in any formal
system X using merely modus ponens and the supposition that X satises
the Deduction Theorem. Thus consider as an example:
(1) A; B ` A
Denition of `
(2) A ` B ! A
(1), Deduction Theorem
(3) ` A ! (B ! A) (2), Deduction Theorem:
Thus the most problematic axiom of H! has a simple `a priori deduction', indeed one using only the Deduction Theorem, not even modus ponens
(which is though needed for more sane axioms like Self-Distribution).
It might be thought that the above considerations provide a very powerful
argument for motivating intuitionistic logic (or at least some logic having he
same implicational fragment) as The One True Logic. For what else should
an implication do but satisfy modus ponens and the Deduction Theorem?
But it turns out that there is another sensible notion of deduction. This is
what is sometimes called a relevant deduction.(Anderson and Belnap [1975,
Section 22.2.1] claim that this is the only sensible notion of deduction, but
we need not follow them in that). If there is anything that sticks out in the
a priori deduction of Positive Paradox above it is that in (1), B was not
used in the deduction of A.
A number of researchers have been independently bothered by this point
and have been motivated to study a relevant implication that goes hand in
16
hand with a notion of relevant deduction. This, in this manner Moh [1950]
and Church [1951b] came up with what is in eect R! . And Anderson
and Belnap [1975, p. 261] say \In fact, the search for a suitable deduction
theorem for Ackermann's systems : : : provided the impetus leading us to
the research reported in this book." This research program begun in the late
1950s took its starting point in the system(s) of Ackermann [1956], and the
bold stroke separating the Anderson{Belnap system E from Ackermann's
system 0 was basically the dropping of Ackermann's rule
so as to have
an appropriate deduction theorem (cf. Section 2.1).
Let us accordingly dene a deduction of B from A1 ; : : : ; An to be relevant
with respect to a given hypothesis Ai just in case Ai is actually used in
the given deduction of B in the sense (paraphrasing [Church, 1951b]) that
there is a chain of inferences connecting Ai with the nal formula B . This
last can be made formally precise in any number of ways, but perhaps the
most convenient is to
ag Ai with say a ] and to pass the
ag along in
the deduction each time modus ponens is applied to two items at least one
of which is
agged. It is then simply required that the last step of the
deduction (B ) be
agged. Such devices are familiar from various textbook
presentations of classical predicate calculus when one wants to keep track
whether some hypothesis Ai (x) was used in the deduction of some formula
B (x) to which one wants to apply Universal Generalisation.
We shall dene a deduction of B from A1 ; : : : ; An to be relevant simpliciter just in case it is relevant with respect to each hypothesis Ai . A
practical way to test for this is to
ag each Ai with a dierent
ag (say the
subscript i) and then demand that all of the
ags show up on the last step
B.
We can now state a version of the
Relevant Deduction Theorem (Moh, Church). If there is a deduction
in R! of B from A1 ; : : : ; An ; A that is relevant with respect to A, then there
is a deduction in R! of A ! B from A1 ; : : : ; An . Furthermore the new
deduction will be `as relevant' as the old one, i.e. any Ai that was used in
the given deduction will be used in the new deduction.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
17
The idea here is that in general in order to derive the strict (necessary )
implication A ! B one must not only be able to deduce B from A and
some other hypotheses but furthermore those other hypotheses must be
supposed to be necessary. And in S4 since Ai ! Bj is equivalent to (Ai !
Bj ), requiring those additional hypotheses to be strict implications at least
suces for this.
Thus we could only hope that E! would satisfy the
5 This seems to dier from the good-humoured polemical stand of Anderson and Belnap
[1975, Section 22.2.1], which says that the rst kind of `deduction', which they call
(pejoratively) `Ocial deduction', is no kind of deduction at all.
18
The proof of this theorem is somewhat more complicated than its unmodalised counterpart which we just proved (cf. [Anderson and Belnap,
1975, Section 4.21] for a proof).
We now examine a subtle distinction (stressed by Meyer|see, for example, [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, pp. 394{395]), postponed until now
for pedagogical reasons. We must ask, how many hypotheses can dance
on the head of a formula? The question is: given the list of hypotheses
A, A, do we have one hypothesis or two? When the notion of a deduction was rst introduced in this section and a `list' of hypotheses was
mentioned, the reader would naturally think that this was just informal
language for a set. And of course the set fA; Ag is identical to the set
fAg. Clearly A is relevantly deducible from A. The question is whether
it is so deducible from A; A. We have then two dierent criteria of use,
depending on whether we interpret hypotheses as grouped together into
lists that distinguish multiplicity of occurrences (sequences)6 or sets. This
issue has been taken up elsewhere of late, with other accounts of deduction appealing to `resource consciousness' [Girard, 1987; Troelstra, 1992;
Schroeder-Heister and Dosen, 1993] as motivating some non-classical logics. Substructural logics in general appeal to the notion that the number of
times a premise is used, or even more radically, the order in which premises
are used, matter.
At issue in R and its neighbours is whether A ! (A ! A) is a correct relevant implication (coming by two applications of `The Deduction Theorem'
from A; A ` A). This is in fact not a theorem of R, but it is the characteristic axiom of RM (cf. Section 1.3). So it is important that in the Relevant
Deduction Theorem proved for R! that the hypotheses A1 ; : : : ; An be understood as a sequence in which the same formula may occur more than
once. One can prove a version of the Relevant Deduction Theorem with
hypotheses understood as collected into a set for the system RMO! , obtained by adding A ! (A ! A) to R! (but the reader should be told that
Meyer has shown that RMO!, is not the implicational fragment of RM,
cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 8.15]).7
6 Sequences are not quite the best mathematical structures to represent this grouping
since it is clear that the order of hypotheses makes no dierence (at least in the case of
R). Meyer and McRobbie [1979] have investigated `resets' (nitely repeatable sets) as
the most appropriate abstraction.
7 Arnon Avron has defended this system, RMO! , as a natural way to characterise relevant implication [Avron, 1986; Avron, 1990a; Avron, 1990b; Avron, 1990c;
Avron, 1992]. In Avron's system, conjunction and disjunction are intensional connectives, dened in terms of the implication and negation of RMO! . As a result, they do
RELEVANCE LOGIC
19
20
`R X ^ A ^ T ! B;
where X is the conjunction of A1 ; : : : ; An , and T is the conjunction of all
the axioms of R used in the deduction of B . But since `R t ! T , we have
`R X ^ A ^ t ! B .
8 Of course this requires we give an independent characterisation of proof (and theorem), since we can no longer dene a proof as a deduction from zero premisses. We thus
dene a proof as a sequence of formulas, each of which is either an axiom or follows from
preceding items by either modus ponens or adjunction (!).
RELEVANCE LOGIC
21
`R (X ^ A ^ t ! B ) ! (X ^ t ! (A ^ t ! B )):
So `R X ^ t ! (A ^ t ! B ), which leads (using `R t) to X `R A ^ t ! B ,
which dissolving the conjunction gives the desired
A1 ; : : : ; An `R A ^ t ! B:
In view of the importance of the notion, let us symbolise A ^ t ! B
as A !t B . This functions as a kind of `enthymematic implication' (A
and some truth really implies B ) and there will be more about Anderson,
Belnap and Meyer's investigations of this concept in Section 1.7. Let us
simply note now that in the context of deduction theorems, it functions like
intuitionistic implication, and allows us in R! to have two dierent kinds
of implication, each well motivated in its relation to the two dierent kinds
of deducibility (ordinary and relevant).9 For a more extensive discussion
of deduction theorems in relevance logics and related systems, more recent
papers by Avron [1991] and Brady [1994] should be consulted.
A ! B
A
B[
[!E ]
Afkg
..
.
B
A ! B fkg
[!I ]
(provided k 2 )
22
Two fussy, really incidental remarks must be made. First, in the rule !E
it is to be understood that the premises need not occur in the order listed,
nor need they be adjacent to each other or to the conclusion. Otherwise we
would need a rule of `Repetition', which allows the repeating of a formula
with its subscripts as a later line. (Repetition is trivially derivable given
our `non-adjacent' understanding of !E |in order to repeat A , just prove
A ! A and apply !E .) Second, it is understood that we have what one
might call a rule of `Hypothesis Introduction': anytime one likes one can
write a formula as a line with a new subscript (perhaps most conveniently,
the line number).
Now a non-fussy remark must be made, which is really the heart of the
whole matter. In the rule for !I , a proviso has been attached which has
the eect of requiring that the hypothesis A was actually used in obtaining
B . This is precisely what makes the implication relevant (one gets the
intuitionistic implication system H! if one drops this requirement). The
reader should nd it instructive to attempt a proof of Positive Paradox
(A ! (B ! A)) and see how it breaks down for NR! (but succeeds in
NH! . The reader should also construct proofs in NR! of all the axioms
in one of the Hilbert-style formulations of R! from Section 1.3.
Then the equivalence of R! in its Hilbert-style and natural deduction
formulations is more or less self-evident given the Relevant Deduction Theorem (which shows that the rule ! I can be `simulated' in the Hilbert-style
system, the only point at issue).
Indeed it is interesting to note that Lemmon [1965], who seems to have
the same proviso on !I that we have for NR! (his actual language is
a bit informal), does not prove Positive Paradox until his second chapter
adding conjunction (and disjunction) to the implication-negation system
he developed in his rst chapter. His proof of Positive Paradox depends
nally upon an `irrelevant' ^I rule. The following is perhaps the most
straightforward proof in his system (diering from the proof he actually
gives):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
A1
B2
A ^ B1;2
A1;2
B ! A1
A ! (B ! A)
Hyp
Hyp
1; 2; ^I ?
3; ^E
2; 4; ! I
1; 5; ! I .
RELEVANCE LOGIC
23
A
B
A ^ B
[^I ]
A ^ B
A
A ^ B
B
[^E ]
A
A _ B
B
A _ B
[_I ]
A _ B
..
.
Ak
..
.
C[fkg
Bh
..
.
C[fhg
C[
[_E ]
But (as Anderson and Belnap point out) these rules are insucient. >From
them one cannot derive the following
A ^ (B _ C )
Distribution:
(A ^ B ) _ C
And so it must be taken as an additional rule (even if disjunction is dened
from conjunction and negation).
This is clearly an unsatisfying, if not unsatisfactory, state of aairs. The
customary motivation behind int-elim rules is that they show how a connective may be introduced into and eliminated from argumentative discourse
(in which it has no essential occurrence), and thereby give the connective's
role or meaning. In this context the Distribution rule looks very much to
be regretted.
One remedy is to modify the natural deduction system by allowing hypotheses to be introduced in two dierent ways, `relevantly' and `irrelevantly'. The rst way is already familiar to us and is what requires a
subscript to keep track of the relevance of the hypothesis. It requires that
the hypotheses introduced this way will all be used to get the conclusion.
The second way involves only the weaker promise that at least some of the
hypotheses so introduced will be used. This suggestion can be formalised by
24
A ^ B ! (C ^ D ! E ):
Now the natural deduction rules must be stated in a more general form
allowing for the fact that more than one formula can occur on a line. Key
among these would be the new rule:
; A _ B
..
.
; Ak
..
.
[_E 0 ]
[fkg
; Bl
..
.
[flg
[
It is fairly obvious that this rule has Distribution built into it. Of course,
other rules must be suitably modied. It is easiest to interpret the formulas
on a line as grouped into a set so as not to have to worry about `structural
rules' corresponding to the commutation and idempotence of conjunction.
The rules !I; !E; _I; _E; ^I , and ^E can all be left as they were (or
except for !I and !E , trivially generalised so as to allow for the fact that
the premises might be occurring on a line with several other `irrelevant'
premises), but we do need one new structural rule:
;
[Comma I ]
RELEVANCE LOGIC
25
; A ^ B
[^E 0 ]
; A; B
with the rule
;
[Comma E ]
It is merely a tedious exercise for the reader to show that this new system
N 0 R is equivalent to NR. Incidentally, N 0 R was suggested by re
ection
upon the Gentzen System LR+ of Section 4.9.
Before leaving the question of natural deduction for R, we would like to
mention one or two technical aspects. First, the system of Prawitz [1965]
diers from R in that it lacks the rule of Distribution. This is perhaps
compensated for by the fact that Prawitz can prove a normal form theorem
for proofs in his system. A dierent system yet is that of [Pottinger, 1979],
based on the idea that the correct ^I rule is
A
B
A ^ B[
He too gets a normal form theorem. We conjecture that some appropriate
normal form theorem is provable for the system N 0 R+ on the well-known
analogy between cut-elimination and normalisation and the fact that cutelimination has been proven for LR+ (cf. Section 4.9). Negation though
would seem to bring extra problems, as it does when one is trying to add it
to LR+ .
One last set of remarks, and we close the discussion of natural deduction.
The system NR above diers from the natural deduction system for R
of Anderson and Belnap [1975]. Their system is a so-called `Fitch-style'
formalism, and so named F R. The reader is presumed to know that in
this formalism when a hypothesis is introduced it is thought of as starting
a subproof, and a line is drawn along the left of the subproof (or a box is
drawn around the subproof, or some such thing) to demarcate the scope
of the hypothesis. If one is doing a natural deduction system for classical
or intuitionistic logic, subproofs or dependency numerals can either one be
used to do essentially the same job of keeping track the use of hypotheses
(though dependency numerals keep more careful track, and that is why they
are so useful for relevant implication).
Mathematically, a Fitch-style proof is a nested structure, representing
the fact that subproofs can contain further subproofs, etc. But once one
has dependency numerals, this extra structure, at least for R, seems otiose,
and so we have dispensed with it. The story for E is more complex, since
26
RELEVANCE LOGIC
27
1. (A ! B ) ! (A ^ ! B ^ ).
Here the closest one can come is to
2. (A ! B ) ^ t ! (A ^ ! B ^ ),
A zero degree formula contains only the connectives ^; _, and :, and can
be regarded as either a formula of relevance logic or of classical logic, as one
pleases. A rst degree implication is a formula of the form A ! B , where
both A and B are zero-degree formulas: Thus rst degree implications can
be regarded as either a restricted fragment of some relevance logic (say R
or E) or else as expressing some metalinguistic logical relation between two
classical formulas A and B . This last is worth mention, since then even a
classical logician of Quinean tendencies (who remains unconverted by the
considerations of Section 1.2 in favour of nested implications) can still take
rst degree logical relevant implications to be legitimate.
A natural question is what is the relationship between the provable rstdegree implications of R and those of E. It is well-known that the corresponding relationship between classical logic and some normal modal logic,
say S4 (with the ! being the material conditional and strict implication,
respectively), is that they are identical in their rst degree fragments. The
same holds of R and E (cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 2.42]).
This fragment, which we shall call Rfde (Anderson and Belnap [1975] call
it Efde ) is stable (cf. [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 7.1]) in the sense
28
Conjunction Elimination
Disjunction Introduction
5. A ^ (B _ C ) ! (A ^ B ) _ C
6. A ! ::A; ::A ! A
Distribution
Double Negation
8. A ! B; A ! C ` A ! B ^ C
9. A ! C; B ! C ` A _ B ! C
Transitivity
Conjunction Introduction
Disjunction Introduction
10. A ! B ` :B ! :A
Contraposition.
More interesting is the characterisation of Anderson and Belnap [1962b;
1975] of Rfde as `tautological entailments'. The root idea is to consider rst
the `primitive entailments'.
11. A1 ^ : : : ^ Am ! B1 _ : : : _ Bn ,
where each Ai and Bj is either a sentential variable or its negate (an `atom')
and make it a necessary and sucient criterion for such a primitive entailment to hold that same Ai actually be identically the same formula as some
Bj (that the entailment be `tautological' in the sense that Ai is repeated).
This rules out both
12. p ^ :p ! q,
13. p ! q _ :q,
RELEVANCE LOGIC
29
count as valid. Both relevance logic and classical logic agree on the standard `normal form equivalences': commutation, association, idempotence,
distribution, double negation, and de Morgan's laws. So the idea is, given
a candidate entailment A ! B , by way of these equivalences, A can be put
into disjunctive normal form and B may be put into conjunctive normal
form, reducing the problem to the question of whether the following is a
valid entailment:
15. A1 _ _ Ak ! B1 ^ ^ Bh .
But simple considerations (on which both classical and relevance logic
agree) having to do with conjunction and disjunction introduction and elimination show that (15) holds if for each disjunct Ai and conjunct Bj , the
primitive entailment Ai ! Bj is valid. For relevance logic this means that
there must be atom sharing between the conjunction Ai and the disjunction
Bj .
This criterion obviously counts the Disjunctive Syllogism
16. :p ^ (p _ q) ! q,
as an invalid entailment, for using distribution to put its antecedent into
disjunctive normal form, (16) is reduced to
160 (:p ^ p) _ (:p ^ q) ! q.
But by the criterion of tautological entailments,
17. :p ^ p ! q,
30
:A; A _ B ` B:
This is to say there is no deduction (in the standard sense of Section 1.4)
of B from :A and A _ B as premises. This is of course the most notorious feature of relevance logic, and the whole of Section 2 is devoted to its
discussion.
Looking now in another direction, Anderson and Belnap [1961] began
the investigation of how to translate intuitionistic and strict implication
into R and E, respectively, as `enthymematic' implication. Anderson and
Belnap's work presupposed the addition of propositional quanties to, let us
say R, with the subsequent denition of `A intuitionistically implies B ' (in
symbols A B ) as 9p(p ^ (A ^ p ! B )). This has the sense that A together
with some truth relevantly implies B , and does seem to be at least in the
neighbourhood of capturing Heyting's idea that A B should hold if there
exists some `construction' (the p) which adjoined to A `yields' (relevant
implication) B . Meyer in a series of papers [1970a; 1973] has extended
and simplied these ideas, using the propositional constant t in place of
propositional quantication, dening A B as A ^ t ! B . If a propositional
constant F for the intuitionistic absurdity is introduced, then intuitionistic
negation can be dened in the style of Johansson as :A =df A F . As
Meyer has discovered one must be careful what axiom one chooses to govern
F . F ! A or even F A is too strong. In intuitionistic logic, the absurd
proposition intuitionistically implies only the intuitionistic formulas, so the
correct axiom is F A , where A is a translation into R of an intuitionistic
formula. Similar translations carry S4 into E and classical logic into R.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
31
2 THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
:A _ B :
B
It was the third listed rule of Ackermann's [1956] system of strenge Implikation (; ;
; 1st, 2nd, 3rd). This was the system Anderson and Belnap
`tinkered with' to produce E (Ackermann also had a rule which they
replaced with an axiom).
The major part of Anderson and Belnap's `tinkering' was the extremely
bold step of simply deleting
as a primitive rule, on the well- motivated
ground that the corresponding object language formula
2. A ^ (:A _ B ) ! B
is not a theorem of E.
It is easy to see that (2) could not be a theorem of either E or R, since
it is easy to prove in those systems
3. A ^ :A ! A ^ (:A _ B )
(largely because :A ! :A _ B is an instance of an axiom), and of course
(3) and (2) yield by transitivity the `irrelevancy'
4. A ^ :A ! B .
The inference (1) is obviously related to the Stoic principle of the disjunctive syllogism :
:A
5. A _ B
:
B
Indeed, given the law of double negation (and replacement) they are equivalent, and double negation is never at issue in the orthodox logics. Thus E
and R reject
6. :A ^ (A _ B ) ! B
32
as well as (2).
This rejection is typically the hardest thing to swallow concerning relevance logics. One starts o with some pleasant motivations about relevant
implication and using subscripts to keep track of whether a hypothesis has
actually been used (as in Section 1.5), and then one comes to the point
where one says `and of course we have to give up the disjunctive syllogism'
and one loses one's audience. Please do not stop reading! We shall try to
make this rejection of disjunctive syllogism as palatable as we can.
(See [Belnap and Dunn, 1981; Restall, 1999] for related discussions, and
also discussion of [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 16.1]); see Burgess
[1981] for an opposing point of view.
p ^ :p
p
:p
p_q
q
2, ^-Elimination
1, ^-Elimination
2, _-Introduction
3, 4 disjunctive syllogism
Indeed one can usefully classify alternative approaches to relevant implication according to how they reject the Lewis proof. Thus, e.g. Nelson rejects
^-Elimination and _-Introduction, as does McCall's connexive logic. Parry,
on the other hand, rejects only _-Introduction. Geach, and more recently,
Tennant [1994],accept each step, but says that `entailment' (relevant implication) is not transitive. It is the genius of the Anderson{Belnap approach
to see disjunctive syllogism as the culprit and the sole culprit.12
Lewis concludes his proof by saying, \If by (3), p is false; and, by (4), at
least one of the two, p and q is true, then q must be true". As is told in
[Dunn, 1976a], Dunn was saying such a thing to an elementary logic class
one time (with no propaganda about relevance logic) when a student yelled
out, \But p was the true one|look again at your assumption".
12 Although this point is complicated, especially in some of their earlier writings (see,
e.g. [Anderson and Belnap Jr., 1962a]) by the claim that there is a kind of fallacy of
ambiguity in the Lewis proof. the idea is that if _ is read in the `intensional' way (as
:A ! B), then the move from (3) and (4) to (5) is ok (it's just modus ponens for
the relevant conditional), but the move from (2) to (4) is not (now being a paradox of
implication rather than ordinary disjunction introduction).
RELEVANCE LOGIC
33
That student had a point. Disjunctive syllogism is not obviously appropriate to a situation of inconsistent information|where p is assumed
(given, believed, etc.) to be both true and false. This point has been argued strenuously in, e.g. [Routley and Routley, 1972; Dunn, 1976a] and
Belnap [1977b; 1977a]. The rst two of these develop a semantical analysis
that lets both p and :p receive the value `true' (as is appropriate to model
the situation where p ^ :p has been assumed true), and there will be more
about these ideas in Section 3.4. The last is particularly interesting since
it extends the ideas of Dunn [1976a] so as to provide a model of how a
computer might be programmed as to make inferences from its (possibly inconsistent) database. One would not want trivially inconsistent information
about the colour of your car that somehow got fed into the fbi's computer
(perhaps by pooled databases) to lead to the conclusion that you are Public
Enemy Number One.
We would like to add yet one more criticism of disjunctive syllogism,
which is sympathetic to many of the earlier criticisms.
We need as background to this criticism the natural deduction framework
of [Gentzen, 1934] as interpreted by [Prawitz, 1965] and others. the idea (as
in Section 1.5) is that each connective should come with rules that introduce
it into discourse(as principal connective of a conclusion) and rules that eliminate it from discourse (as principal connective of a premise). further the
`normalisation ideas of Prawitz, though of great technical interest and complication, boil down philosophically to the observation that an elimination
rule should not be able to get out of a connective more than an introduction
rule can put into the connective. This is just the old conservation Principle,
`You can't get something for nothing', applied to logic.
The paradigm here is the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction. The introduction rule, from A; B to infer A ^ B packs into A ^ B
precisely what the elimination rule, from A ^ B to infer either A or B
(separately), then unpacks.
Now the standard introduction rule for disjunction is this: from either A
or B separately, infer A _ B . We have no quarrel with an introduction rule.
an introduction rule gives meaning to a connective and the only thing to
watch out for is that the elimination rule does not take more meaning from
a connective than the introduction rule gives to it (of course, one can also
worry about the usefulness and/or naturalness of the introduction rules for
a given connective, but that (pace [Parry, 1933]) seems not an issue in the
case of disjunction.
In the Lewis `proof' above, it is then clear that the disjunctive syllogism
is the only conceivably problematic rule of inference. Some logicians (as
indicated above) have queried the inferences from (1) to (2) and (4), and
from (2) to (3), but from the point of view that we are now urging, this is
simply wrongheaded. Like Humpty Dumpty, we use words to mean what
we say. So there is nothing wrong with introducing connectives ^ and _
34
via the standard introduction rules. Other people may want connectives for
which they provide dierent introduction (and matching elimination) rules,
but that is their business. We want the standard (`extensional') senses of
^ and _.
Now the d.s. is a very odd rule when viewed as an elimination rule for _
parasitical upon the standard introduction rules (whereas the constructive
dilemma, the usual _-Elimination rule is not at all odd). Remember that
the introduction rules provide the actual inferences that are to be stored in
the connective's battery as potential inferences, perhaps later to be released
again as actual inferences by elimination rules. The problem with the disjunctive syllogism is that it can release inferences from _ that it just does
not contain. (In another context, [Belnap, 1962] observed that Gentzenstyle rules for a given connective should be `conservative', i.e. they should
not create new inferences not involving the given connective.)
Thus the problem with the disjunctive syllogism is just that p _ q might
have been introduced into discourse (as it is in the Lewis `proof') by _Introduction from p. So then to go on to infer q from p _ q and :p by the
disjunctive syllogism would be legitimate only if the inference from p; :p to
q were legitimate. But this is precisely the point at issue. At the very least
the Lewis argument is circular (and not independent).13
RELEVANCE LOGIC
35
sense of Church, and boils down to being able to divide up its elements into
the `true' and the `false' with the operations of conjunction, disjunction,
and negation treating truth and falsity in the style of the truth tables (a
conjunction is true if both components are true, etc.). If one thinks of
E (as Anderson surely did) as the logic of propositions with the logical
operations, and surely this should divide itself up into the true and the false
propositions.15
36
RELEVANCE LOGIC
37
` A;
Let T be the union of all these Tn 's. It is easy to see as is standard that T
is a theory not containing A. Also we can show that T is prime.
Thus suppose `T X _ Y and yet X; Y 62 T . Then it is easy to se that
since neither X nor Y could be added to the construction when their turn
came up without yielding A, we have both
1. X `T A,
2. Y `T A.
But by reasonably standard moves (R has distribution), we get
3. X _ Y `T A,
and so `T A contrary to the construction.
38
RELEVANCE LOGIC
39
extensional condition, i.e. v(A) = 1 and v(C ) = 0. But clearly since all of
v(A ! B ) = 1, v(B ! C ) = 1, v(A) = 1, then by the extensional condition,
v(C ) = 1, and we have a contradiction.
The reader might nd it instructive in seeing how negation is handled
to verify rst the intuitionistically acceptable form of the Reductio axioms
(A ! :A) ! :A, and then to verify its classical variant (used in some
axiomatisations of R), (:A ! A) ! A. The rst is easier. Also Classical
Double Negation, ::A ! A is fun.
This completes the sketch of Meyer's latest proof of the admissibility of
for R.
8xA 2 T i A(a=x) 2 T
This does not entirely x things, for in proving the Completeness Lemma
we have now in the induction to consider the case when A is of the form
8xB . If v(8xB ) = 1, then (by (5)), va(B (a=x)) = 1 for all parameters a.
By inductive hypothesis, for all a; B (a=x) 2 T . But, and here's the rub,
this does not guarantee that 8xB (a=x) 2 T . We need to have constructed
on The Way Up a theory T that is `!-complete' in just the sense that this
guarantee is provided. ([Meyer et al., 1974] call such a theory `rich'.) Of
course it is understood by `theory' we now mean a `regular RQ-theory',
i.e. one containing all of the axioms of RQ and closed under its rules (see
Section 1.3). Actually things can be arranged as in [Meyer et al., 1974] so
that generalisation is in eect built into the axioms so that the only rules
can continue to be adjunction and modus ponens.
Thus we need the following
Way Up Lemma for RQ. Suppose A is not a theorem of rst-order RQ.
Then there exists a prime rich theory T so that A 62 T .
40
This lemma is Theorem 3 of [Meyer et al., 1974], and its proof is of basically a Henkin style with one novelty. In usual Henkin proofs one can assure
!-completeness by building into the construction of T that whenever :8xB
is put in, then so is :B (a=x) for some new parameter a. This guarantees
!-completeness since if B (a) 2 T for all a, but 8xB 62 T , then by completeness :8xB 2 T and so by the usual construction :B (a) 2 T for some a, and
so by consistency (??) B (a) 62 T for some a, contradicting the hypothesis
for !-completeness. But we of course have for relevance logics no guarantee
that T is consistent, as has been remarked above.
The novelty then was to modify the construction so as to keep things
out as well as put things in, though this last still was emphasised. Full
symmetry with respect to `good guys' and `bad guys' was nally obtained
by Belnap, 18 in what is called the Belnap Extension Lemma, which shall
be stated after a bit of necessary terminology.
We shall call an ordered pair (; ) of sets of formulas of RQ and `RQpair'. We shall say that one RQ pair (1 ; 1 ) extends another (0 ; 0) if
0 1 and 0 1 . An RQ pair is dened to be exclusive if for no
A1 ; : : : ; Am 2 ; B1 ; : : : ; Bn 2 do we have ` A1 ^ ^Am ! B1 _ _Bn .
It is called exhaustive if for every formula A, either A 2 or A 2 .19
It is now easiest to assume that ^ and 9 are back as primitive. We call a
set of formulas _-prime (^-prime ) if whenever A _ B 2 (A ^ B 2 ),
at least one of A or B 2 (clearly _-primeness is the same as primeness).
Analogously, we call 9-prime (8- prime ) if whenever 9xA 2 (8xA 2 ),
then A(a=x) 2 for some a. Given an RQ pair (; ) we shall call ()
completely prime if is both _- and 9-prime ( is both ^- and 8-prime).
the pair (; ) is called completely prime if both and are completely
prime. We can now state the
. Let (; ) be an exclusive RQ pair. Then
(; ) can be extended to an exclusive, exhaustive, completely prime RQ
pair (T; F ) in a language just like the language of RQ except for having
denumerably many new parameters.
Belnap Extension Lemma
We shall not prove this lemma here, but simply remark that it is a
surprisingly straightforward application of Henkin methods to construct a
maximal RQ-pair and show it has the desired properties (indeed it simply
symmetrises the usual Henkin construction of rst-order classical logic).
RELEVANCE LOGIC
41
42
R]
The proofs of these results are relatively straightforward. The next result
is due to Friedman, and it is much more surprising.
The only dicult thing to show is that it satises the induction axiom.
For any formula A(x) in the vocabulary of arithmetic, the set of complex
numbers such that A() is true is either nite or conite. If A(x) is
atomic, then it is equivalent to a polynomial of the form f (x) = 0, and f
must either have nitely many roots or be 0 everywhere. But the set of
either nite or conite sets is closed under boolean operations, so no A(x)
RELEVANCE LOGIC
43
44
properly follow from another. In R] and R]] , we have 0 = 2 ! 0 = 4 because there is an `arithmetically appropriate' way to derive 0 = 4 from
0 = 2 | by multiplying both sides by 2. However, we cannot derive
0 = 2 ! 0 = 3, and, correspondingly, there is no way to derive 0 = 3
from 0 = 2 using the resources of arithmetic. The only way to do it within
the vocabulary is to appeal to the falsity of 0 = 3, and this is not a relevantly acceptable move. 0 6= 3 ! (0 = 3 ! 0 = 2) does not have much to
recommend as pattern of reasoning which respects the canons of relevance.
We are left with important questions. Are there axiomatisable extensions
of R] which are closed under
? Can theories like R] and R]] be extended to deal with more interesting mathematical structures, while keeping
account of some useful notion of relevance? Early work on this area, from a
slightly dierent motivation (paraconsistency, not relevance) indicates that
there are some interesting results at hand, but the area is not without its
diculties [Mortensen, 1995].
The admissibility of
would also seem to be of interest for relevant
type theory (even relevant second-order logic) with an axiom of innity (see
[Dunn, 1979b]).
One of the chief points of philosophical interest in showing the admissibility of
for some relevantly formulated version of a classical theory relates to
the question of the consistency of the classical theory (this was rst pointed
out in Meyer, Dunn and Leblanc [1974]). As we know from Godel's work,
interesting classical theories cannot be relied upon to prove their own consistency. To exaggerate perhaps only a little, the consistency of systems like
Peano (even Robinson) arithmetic must be taken in faith.
But using relevance logic in place of classical logic in formulating such
theories gives us a new strategy of faith. It is conceivable that since relevance logic is weaker than classical logic, the consistency of the resultant
theory might be easier to demonstrate. This has proved true at least in the
sense of absolute consistency (some sentence is unprovable) as shown by
[Meyer, 1976c] for Peano arithmetic using elementary methods. Classically
of course there is no dierence between absolute consistency and ordinary
(negation) consistency (for no sentence are both A and :A provable), and
if
is admissible for the theory, then this holds for relevance logic, too. The
interesting thing then would be to produce a proof of the admissibility of
, which we know from Godel would itself have to be non-elementary.
One could then imagine arguing with a classical mathematician in the
following Pascal's Wager sort of way [Dunn, 1980a].
Look. You have equally good reason to believe in the negation
consistency of the classical system and the (relative) completeness of the relevant system. In both cases you have a nonelementary proof which secures your belief, but which might be
mistaken. Consider the consequences in each case if it is mis-
RELEVANCE LOGIC
45
taken. If you are using the classical system, disaster! Since even
one contradiction classically implies everything, for each theorem you have proven, you might just as well have proven its
negation. But if you are using the relevant system, things are
not so bad. For at least large classes of sentences, it can be
shown by elementary methods (Meyer's work) that not both the
sentences and their negations are theorems.
` A; B
; A `
;
;
` B;
(Cut)
` A`B
(1)
:
`B
Since A ` B is derivable just when ` A ! B is derivable, and since in
classical logic A ! B is equivalent to :A _ B , (1) above is in eect
` A ` :A _ B
(10 )
;
`B
which is just
.
All of the Gentzen rules except Cut have the Subformula Property: Every
formula that occurs in the premises also occurs in the conclusion, though
perhaps there as a subformula. Gentzen showed via his Hauptsatz that
Cut was redundant|it could be eliminated without loss (hence this is often
called the Elimination Theorem). Later writers have tended to think of
Gentzen systems as lacking the Cut Rule, and so the Elimination Theorem
is stated as showing that Cut is admissible in the sense that whenever the
premises are derivable so is the conclusion. There is thus even a parallel
46
` :A1 ; : : : ; :Am ; B1 ; : : : ; Bn
It is possible to develop a calculus parallel to Gentzen's using only `righthanded' sequents, i.e. those with empty left side. This is in eect what
Schutte did, but with one further trick. Instead of working with a righthanded sequent ` A1 ; : : : ; Am , which can be thought of as a sequence of
formulas, he in eect replaced it with the single formula A1 _ _ Am .20
With these explanations in mind, the reader should have no trouble in
perceiving Schutte's calculus K1 as `merely' a notational variant of Gentzen's
original calculus LK (albeit, a highly ingenious one). Also Schutte's system had the existential quantier which we have omitted here purely for
simplicity. Dunn and Meyer [1989] treats it as well.
The axioms of K1 are all formulas of the form A _ :A. The inference
rules divide themselves into two types:
Structural rules:
M_A_B_N
N _A_A
[Interchange]
[Contraction]
M_B_A_N
N _A
Operational rules:
N _ :A N _ :B
N
N _A
[de Morgan]
[Thinning]
[Double Negation]
N _ :(A _ B )
N _B
N _ ::A
It is understood in every case but that of Thinning that either both of
M and N may be missing. Also there is an understanding in multiple
disjunctions that parentheses are to be associated to the right.
20 It ought be noted that similar \single sided" Gentzen systems nd extensive use in
the proof theory for Linear Logic [Girard, 1987; Troelstra, 1992].
RELEVANCE LOGIC
47
In [Meyer et al., 1974] it was said that the rule Cut is just
`in peculiar
notation'. In the context of Schutte's formalism the notation is not even so
dierent. Thus:
M _ A :A _ N
A :A _ B
[Cut]
[
]:
M_N
B
Since either M or N may be missing, obviously
is just a special case of
Cut.
It is pretty easy to check that each of the rules above corresponds to
a provable rst-degree relevant implication. Indeed [Anderson and Belnap
Jr., 1959a] with their `Simple Treatment' formulation of classical logic (extended to quantiers in [Anderson and Belnap Jr., 1959b]) independently
arrived at a Cut-free system for classical logic much like Schutte's (but with
some improvements, i.e. they have more general axioms and avoid the need
for structural rules). They used this to show that E contains all the classical tautologies as theorems, the point being that the Simple Treatment
rules are all provable entailments in E (unlike the usual rule for axiomatic
formulations of classical logic, modus ponens for the material conditional,
i.e.
). Thus the later proven admissibility of
was not needed for this purpose, although it surely can be so used. Schutte's system can also clearly
be adapted to the purpose of showing that classical logic is contained in relevance logic, and indeed [Belnap, 1960a] used K1 (with its quanticational
rules) to show that EQ contains all the theorems of classical rst-order
logic.
It turns out that one can give a proof of the admissibility of Cut for
a classical Gentzen-style system, say Schutte's K1 , along the lines of a
Meyer-style proof of the admissibility of
(see [Dunn and Meyer, 1989],
rst reported in 1974).21 We will not give many details here, but the key
idea is to treat the rules of K1 as rules of deducibility and not merely as
theorem generating devices. Thus we dene a deduction of A from a set of
formulas as a nite tree of formulas with A as its origin, members of or
axioms of K1 at its tips, and such that each point that is not a tip follows
from the points just above it by one of the rules of K1 (this denition has to
be slightly more complicated if quantiers are present due to usual problems
caused by generalisation). We can then inductively build a prime complete
21 We hasten to acknowledge the nonconstructive character of this prof. In this our proof
compares with that of Schutte [1956] (also proofs for related formalisms due to Anderson
and Belnap, Beth, Hintikka, Kanger) in its uses of semantical (model-theoretic) notions,
and diers from Gentzen's. Like the proofs of Schutte et al. this proof really provides a
completeness theorem. We may brie
y label the dierence between this proof and those
of Schutte and the others by using (loosely) the jargon of Smullyan [1968]. Calling both
Hilbert-style formalisms and their typical Henkin-style completeness proofs `synthetic',
and calling both Gentzen-style formalisms and their typical Schutte-style completeness
proof `analytic', it looks as if we can be said to have given an synthetic completeness
proof for an analytic formalism.
48
theory (closed under deducibility) on The Way up, which will clearly be
inconsistent since because of the `Subformula Property' clearly, e.g. q is not
deducible from p; :p. but this can be xed on The Way Down by using
metavaluation techniques so as to nd a complete consistent subtheory.
In 1976 E. P. Martin, Meyer and Dunn extended and analogised the
result of Meyer concerning the admissibility of
for relevant type theory
described in the last subsection, in much the same way as the
argument
for the rst-order logic has been analogised here, so as to obtain a new proof
of Takeuti's Theorem (Cut-elimination for simple type theory). This unpublished proof dualises the proof of Takahashi and Prawitz (cf. [Prawitz,
1965]) in the same way that the proof here dualises the usual semantical
proofs of Cut-elimination for classical rst-order logic. This dualisation is
vividly described by saying that in place of `Schutte's Lemma' that every
semi- (partial-) valuation may be extended to a (total) valuation, there is instead the `Converse Schutte Lemma' that every `ambi-valuation' (sometimes
assigns a sentence both the values 0, 1) may be restricted to a (consistent)
valuation.
3 SEMANTICS
3.1 Introduction
In Anderson's [1963] `open problems' paper, the last major question listed,
almost as if an afterthought, was the question of the semantics of E and
EQ. Despite this appearance Anderson said (p. 16) `the writer does not
regard this question as \minor"; it is rather the principle large question
remaining open'. Anderson cited approvingly some earlier work of Belnap's
(and his) on providing an algebraic semantics for rst-degree entailments,
and said (p. 16), `But the general problem of nding a semantics for the
whole of E, with an appropriate completeness theorem, remains unsolved'.
It is interesting to note that Anderson's paper appeared in the same
Acta Filosphica Fennica volume as the now classic paper of Kripke [1963]
which provided what is now simply called `Kripke-style' semantics for a
variety of modal logics (Kripke [1959a] of course provided a semantics for
S5, but it lacked the accessibility relation R which is so versatile in providing
variations).
When Anderson was writing his `open problems' paper, the paradigm of a
semantical analysis of a non-classical logic was probably still something like
the work of McKinsey and Tarski [1948], which provided interpretations
for modal logic and intuitionistic logic by way of certain algebraic structures analogous to the Boolean algebras that are the appropriate structures
for classical logic. But since then the Kripke-style semantics (sometimes referred to as `possible-worlds semantics', or `set-theoretical semantics') seems
RELEVANCE LOGIC
49
to have become the paradigm. Fortunately, E and R now have both an algebraic semantics and a Kripke-style semantics. We shall rst distinguish in
a kind of general way the dierences between these two main approaches to
semantics, before going on to explain the particular details of the semantics
for relevant logics (again R will be our paradigm).
50
S 2 jAj i S A:
a ^ b a, a ^ b b,
x a and x b ) x a ^ b,
a a _ b, b a _ b,
a x and b x ) a _ b x.
Note that (^lb) says that a ^ b is a lower bound both of a and of b, and
(^glb) says it is the greatest such lower bound. Similarly a _ b is the least
upper bound of a and b.
A structure (L; ; ^; _) satisfying all the properties above is a well-known
structure called a lattice. Almost any logic would be compatible with the assumption that propositions form a lattice (but there are exceptions, witness
Parry's [1933] Analytic Implication which would reject (_ub)).
RELEVANCE LOGIC
51
a ^ (b _ c) (a ^ b) _ c:
52
We shall call any unary function : satisfying (3) (or equivalently (1) and
(2)) a minimal complement. The intuitionists of course do not accept
4. (Classical Contraposition) :a :b ) b a, or
5. (Classical Double Negation) ::a a.
If one adds either of (4) or (5) to the requirements for a minimal complement
one gets what is called a de Morgan complement (or quasi-complement),
because, as can be easily veried, it satises all of de Morgan's laws
(deM1) :(a ^ b) = :a _ :b,
(deM2) :(a _ b) = :a ^ :b.
Speaking in an algebraic tone of voice, de Morgan complement is just a
(one{one) order-inverting mapping (a dual automorphism ) of period two.
De Morgan complement captures many of the features of classical negation, but it misses
(Irrelevance 1) a ^ :a b,
(Irrelevance 2) a b _ :b.
If (either of) these are added to a de Morgan complement it becomes a
Boolean complement. If Irrelevance 1 is added to a minimal complement, it
becomes a Heyting complement (or pseudo-complement ).
A structure (L; ^; _; :), where (L; ^; _) is a distributive lattice and :
is a de Morgan (Boolean) complement is called a de Morgan (Boolean )
lattice. Note that we did not try to extend this terminological framework
to `Heyting lattices', because in the literature a Heyting lattice requires an
operation called `relative pseudo-complementation' in addition to Heyting
complementation (plain pseudo-complementation).
As an example of de Morgan lattices consider the following (here we use
ordinary Hasse diagrams to display the order; a b is displayed by putting
a in a connected path below b):
23 Cf. Dunn [1994; 1996] wherein the various properties below are related to various
ways of treating incompatibility between states of information.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
@@
3: p = :p
2:
53
4: p
s
s
@@
@ :p
s
0
1
@@
@
@
s
4: p = :p
@
s
@@
q = :q
The backwards numeral labelling the third lattice over is not a misprint.
It signies that not only has the de Morgan complement been obtained by
inverting he order of the diagram, as in the order three (of course :I =
and vice versa ), but also by rotating it from right to left at the same time.
2 and 4 are Boolean lattices.
A homomorphism (isomorphism ) h between de Morgan Lattice with de
Morgan complements : and :0 respectively is a lattice homomorphism (isomorphism) such that h(:a) = :0 h(a).
A valuation in a lattice outtted with one or the other of these `complementations' is a map v from the zero-degree formulas into its elements
satisfying
v(:A) = :v(A);
v(A ^ B ) = v(A) ^ v(B );
v(A _ B ) = v(A) _ v(B ):
Note that the occurrence of `:' on the left-hand side of the equation denotes
the negation connective, whereas the occurrence on the right-hand side denotes the complementation operation in the lattice (similarly for ^ and _).
Such ambiguities resolve themselves contextually.
A valuation v can be regarded as in interpretation of the formulas as
propositions.
De Morgan lattices have become central to the study of relevance of
logic, but they were antecedently studied, especially in the late 1950s by
Moisil and Monteiro, by Bialynicki-Birula and Rasiowa (as `quasi-Boolean
algebras'), and by Kalman (as `distributive i-lattices') (see Anderson and
Belnap [1975] or Rasiowa [1974] for references and information).
54
Belnap seems to have rst recognised their signicance for relevance logic,
though his research favoured a special variety which he called an intensionally complemented distributive lattice with truth lter (`icdlw/tf'), shortened
in Section 18 of [Anderson and Belnap, 1975] to just intensional lattice. An
intensional lattice is a structure (L; ^; _; :; T ), where (L; ^; _; :) is a de
Morgan lattice and T is a truth-lter, i.e. T is a lter which is complete in
the sense T contains at least one of a and :a for each a 2 L, and consistent
in the sense that T contains no more than one of a and :a.
Belnap and Spencer [1966] showed that a necessary and sucient condition for a de Morgan lattice to have a truth lter is that negation have no
xed point, i.e. for no element a; a = :a (such a lattice was called an icdl ).
For Boolean algebras this is a non-degeneracy condition, assuring that the
algebra has more than one element, the one element Boolean algebra being
best ignored for many purposes. But the experience in relevance logic has
been that de Morgan lattices where some elements are xed points are extremely important (not all elements can be xed points or else we do have
the one element lattice).
The viewpoint of [Dunn, 1966] was to take general de Morgan lattices as
basic to the study of relevance logics (though still results were analogised
wherever possible to the more special icdl's). Dunn [1966] showed that upon
dening a rst-degree implication A ! B to be (de Morgan ) valid i for
every valuation v in a de Morgan lattice, v(A) v(B ); A ! B is valid i
A ! B is a theorem of Rfde (or Efde ). The analogous result for icdl's (in
eect due to Belnap) holds as well.
Soundness (`Rfde A ! B ) A ! B is valid) is a more or less trivial induction on the length of proofs in Rfde fragment|cf. [Anderson and
Belnap, 1975, Section 18].
Completeness (A ! B valid ) `Rfde A ! B ) is established by proving
the contrapositive. We suppose not `Rfde A ! B . We then form the
`Lindenbaum algebra', which has as an element for each zero degree formula
(zdf) X; [X ] =df fY : Y is a zdf and `Rfde X $ Y g. Operations are dened
so that :[X ] = [:X ], [X ] ^ [Y ] = [X ^ Y ], and [X ] _ [Y ] = [X _ Y ], and
we set [X ] [Y ] whenever `Rfde X ! Y . It is more or less transparent,
given Rfde formulated as it is, that the result is a de Morgan lattice. It
is then easy to see that A ! B is invalidated by the canonical valuation
vc (X ) = [X ], since clearly [A] 6 [B ].
The above kind of soundness and completeness result is really quite trivial (though not unimportant), once at least the logic has had its axioms
chopped so that they look like the algebraic postulates merely written in a
dierent notation. The next result is not so trivial.
Characterisation Theorem of Rfde with Respect to 4. `Rfde A !
B i A ! B is valid in 4, i.e. for every valuation v in 4, v(A) v(B ).
Proof. Soundness follows from the trivial fact recorded above that Rfde is
RELEVANCE LOGIC
55
3. x 2 P; :x 2 P : set h(x) = p;
4. x 62 P; :x 62 P : set h(x) = q.
56
(We shall call the pair (U; g) and involuted set |g is the involution, and is
clearly 1{1). Let Q(U ) be a `ring' of subsets of U (closed under \ and [)
closed as well under the operation of `quasi-complement'
2. :X = U
g[X ](X U ).
Proof. Let U be the set of all prime lters of D, and let P range over U .
Let :P ! f:a : a 2 P g, and dene g(P ) = D :P . We leave to the reader
to verify that U is closed under g. For each element a 2 D, set
f (a) = fP : a 2 P g:
Clearly f is one{one because of the Prime Filter Separation Property, so
we need only check that f preserves the operations.
ad ^: P 2 f (a ^ b) , a ^ b 2 P , ((10 ) of Section 3.3) a 2 P and b 2 P ,
P 2 f (a) and P 2 f (b) , P 2 f (a) \ f (b). So f (a ^ b) = f (a) \ f (b)
as desired.
ad _: The argument that f (a _ b) = f (a) [ f (b) is exactly parallel using
(20 ) (or alternately this can be skipped using the fact that a _ b =
:(:a ^ :b).
ad :: P 2 f (:a) , :a 2 P , a 2 :P
g[f (a)] , P 2 U g[f (a)].
X Y , X1 Y1 and Y2 X2
X ^ Y = (X1 \ Y1 ; X2 [ Y2 )
X _ Y = (X1 [ Y1 ; X2 \ Y2 )
:X = (X2 ; X1 ):
By a eld of polarities we mean a structure (P (R); ; ^; _; :) where P (R)
is the set of all polarities in some ring of sets R, and the other components
are dened as above. We leave to the reader the easy verication that every
eld of polarities is a de Morgan lattice.
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57
g[X ]; U
g(U
g[X ])) = (U
We now discuss informal interpretations of the representation theorems
that relate to semantical treatments of relevant rst-degree implications
familiar in the literature.
Routley and Routley [1972] presented a semantics for Rfde, the main ingredients of which were a set K of `atomic set-ups' (to be explained) on
which was dened an involution . An `atomic set-up' is just a set of propositional variables, and it is used to determine inductively when complex
formulas are also `in' a given set-up. A set-up is explained informally as being like a possible world except that it is not required to be either consistent
or complete. The Routley's [1972] paper seems to conceive of set-ups very
syntactically as literally being sets of formulas, but the Routley and Meyer
[1973] paper conceives of them more abstractly. We shall think of them this
latter way here so as to simplify exposition. The Routleys' models can then
be considered a structure (K; ; ), where K is a non-empty set, is an
involution on K , and is a relation from K to zero-degree formulas. We
read `a A' as the formula A holds at the set-up a:
1. (^ ) a A ^ B , a A and a B
2. (_ ) a A _ B , a A or a B
3. (: ) a :A , not a A.
The connection of the Routleys' semantics with quasi-elds of sets will become clear if we let (K; ) induce a quasi-eld of sets Q with quasi- complement :, and let j j interpret sentences in Q subject to the following
conditions:
58
10 .
20 .
j ^ j jA ^ B j = jAj \ jB j
j _ j jA _ B j = jAj [ jB j
30 . j:j j:Aj = :jAj.
Clause (^ ) results from clause j ^ j by translating a 2 jX j as a X (cf.
Section 3.2). Thus clause j ^ j says
a 2 jA ^ B j , a 2 jAj and a 2 jB j;
i.e. it translates as clause (^ ). The case of disjunction is obviously the
same. The case of negation is clearly of special interest, so we write it out.
Thus clause j:j says
a 2 j:Aj , a 2 :jAj;
, a 2 K jAj ;
, a 62 jAj ;
, a 62 jAj:
But the translation of this last is just clause (: ).
Of course the translation works both ways, so that the Routleys' semantics is just an interpretation in the quasi-elds of sets of Bialynicki-Birula
and Rasiowa written in dierent notation. Incidentally soundness and completeness of Rfde relative to the Routleys' semantics follows immediately
via the translation above from the corresponding theorem of the previous
section vis a vis de Morgan lattices together with their representation as
quasi-elds of sets. Of course the Routleys' conceived their results and derived them independently from the representation of Bialynicki-Birula and
Rasiowa.
We will not say very much here about what intuitive sense (if any) can be
attached to the Routleys' use of the -operator in their valuational clause for
negation. Indeed this question has had little extended discussion in the literature (though see [Meyer, 1979a; Copeland, 1979]). The Routleys' [1972]
paper more or less just springs it on the reader, which led Dunn in [Dunn,
1976a] to describe the switching of a with a as `a feat of prestidigitation'.
Routley and Meyer [1973] contains a memorable story about how a `weakly
asserts', i.e. fails to deny, precisely what a asserts, but one somehow feels
that this makes the negation clause vaguely circular. Still, semantics often
gives one this feeling and maybe it is just a question of degree. One way
of thinking of a and a is to regard them as `mirror images' of one another
reversing `in' and `out'. Where one is inconsistent (containing both A and
:A), the other is incomplete (lacking both A and :A), and vice versa (when
a = a , a is both consistent and complete and we have a situation appropriate to classical logic). Viewed this way the Routleys' negation clause
RELEVANCE LOGIC
59
makes sense, but it does require some anterior intuitions about inconsistent
and incomplete set-ups. More about the interpretation of this clause will
be discussed in Section 5.1.
Let us now discuss the philosophical interpretation(s) to be placed on
the representation of de Morgan lattices as elds of polarities. In Dunn
[1966; 1971] the favoured interpretation of a polarity (X1 ; X2 ) was as a
`proposition surrogate', X1 consisting of the `topics' the proposition gives
denite positive information about and, X2 of the topics the proposition
gives denite negative information about. A valuation of a zero degree
formula in a de Morgan lattice can be viewed after a representation of the
elements of the lattice as polarities as an assignment of positive and negative
content to the formula. The `mistake' in the `classical' Carnap/Bar-Hillel
approach to content is to take the content of :A to be the set-theoretical
complement of the content of A (relative to a given universe of discourse).
In general there is no easy relation between the content of A and that of
:A. They may overlap, they may not be exhaustive. Hence the need for
the double-entry bookkeeping done by proposition surrogates (polarities).
If A is interpreted as (X1 ; X2 ), :A gets interpreted as the interchanged
(X2 ; X1 ).
Another semantical interpretation of the same mathematics is to be found
in Dunn [1969; 1976a]. There given a polarity X = (X1 ; X2 ); X1 is thought
of as the set of situations in which X is true and X2 as the set of situations
in which X is false. These situations are conceived of as maybe inconsistent
and/or incomplete, and so again X1 and X2 need not be set-theoretic complements. This leads in the case when the set of situations being assessed
is a singleton fag to a rather simple idea. The eld of polarities looks like
this
(fag; ;)
(fag; fag)
B (= fT; F g)
Ts (= fT g)
@@
@
@@
@
s
(;; fag)
(;; ;)
N (= ;)
F (= fF g)
We have taken the liberty of labelling the points so as to make clear the
informal meaning. (Thus the top is a polarity that is simply true in a and
the bottom is one that is simply false, but the left-hand one is both true
and false, and the right-hand one is neither.) Note that the de Morgan
complement takes xed points on both B and N. This is of course our old
friend 4, which we know to be characteristic for Rfde .
This leads to the idea of an `ambi-valuation' as an assignment to sentences
of one of the four values T, F, B, N, conceived either as primitive or realised
60
as sets of the usual two truth values as suggested by the labelling. On this
latter plan we have the valuation clauses (with double entry bookkeeping):
(^) T 2 v(A ^ B ) , T 2 v(A) and T 2 v(B );
F 2 v(A ^ B ) , F 2 v(A) or F 2 v(B );
(_) T 2 v(A _ B ) , T 2 v(A) or T 2 v(B );
F 2 v(A _ B ) , F 2 v(A) and F 2 v(B );
(:) T 2 v(:A) , F 2 v(A);
F 2 v(:A) , T 2 v(A):
We stress here (as in [Dunn, 1976a]) that all this talk of something's
being both true and false or neither is to be understood epistemically and
not ontologically. One can have inconsistent and or incomplete assumptions,
information, beliefs, etc. and this is what we are trying to model to see what
follows from them in an interesting (relevant!) way. Belnap [1977b; 1977a]
calls the elements of the lattice `told values' to make just this point, and goes
on to develop (making connections with Scott's continuous lattices) a theory
of `a useful four-valued logic' for `how a computer should think' without
letting minor inconsistencies in its data lead to terrible consequences.
Before we leave the semantics of rst-degree relevant implications, we
should mention the interesting semantics of van Fraassen [1969] (see also Anderson and Belnap [1975, Section 20.3.1] and van Fraassen [1973]), which
also has a double-entry bookkeeping device. We will not mention details
here, but we do think it is an interesting problem to try to give a representation of de Morgan lattices using van Fraassen's facts so as to try to bring
it under the same umbrella as the other semantics we have discussed here.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
61
Indeed this operation turns out to be :(b :c) (with the weaker systems
or with positive R it is important to postulate this law of the residual).
Thus
(1) a b c , b a c
Commutativity
(2) a b c , b :a
1, (V)
(3) a b c , a :(b :c) 2, de Morgan lattice.
As an illustration of the power of (VI) we show how the algebraic analogue
of the Prexing axiom follows from Associativity. First note that one can
get from (III) the law of
(Monotony)
a b ) c a c b.
2. (a ! b) a b 1, (VI)
3. (c ! a) c a 2, Substitution
62
a b , e a ! b;
which follows immediately from (VI) and the fact that e is the identity
element. This means that (7) just above can be transformed into
e (a ! b) ! ((c ! a) ! (c ! b))
validating prexing as promised.
Other axioms of R can be validated by similar moves. Commutativity
validates Assertion, that e is the identity validates self-implication, squareincreasingness validates Contraction, antilogism validates Contraposition,
and the other axioms fall out of de Morgan lattice properties with lattice
ordering and the residual law pitching in.
We shall not here investigate the `converse' questions about how the
fusion connective in R is associative, etc. (that the Lindenbaum algebra of
R is indeed a de Morgan monoid (cf. Dunn's Section 28.2.2 of [Anderson
and Belnap, 1975])), but the proof is by `ddling' with contraposition being
the key move.
Not as much is known about the algebraic properties of de Morgan
monoids as one would like. Getting technical for a moment and using unexplained but standard terminology from universal algebra, it is known that de
Morgan monoids are equationally denable (replace (V) with a :(a :b)
b, which can be replaced by the equation (a :(a :b)) _ b = b). So
by a theorem of Birkho the class of de Morgan monoids is closed under
sub-algebras, homomorphic images, and subdirect products. Further, given
a de Morgan monoid D with a prime lter P with e 2 P , the relation
a b , (a ! b) ^ (b ! a) 2 P is a congruence, and the quotient algebra
D= is subdirectly irreducible, and every de Morgan monoid is a subdirect
product of such. It would be nice to have some independent interesting
characterisation of the subdirectly irreducibles.
One signicant recent result about the algebra of R has been provided
by John Slaney. He has shown that there are exactly 3088 elements in the
free De Morgan monoid generated by the identity e. Or equivalently, in
the language of R including the constant t, there are exactly 3088 nonequivalent formulae free of propositional variables. The proof technique is
RELEVANCE LOGIC
63
64
Perhaps saying the whole point of the semantics is given in the clause (!)
along is an exaggeration. There are at least two quick surprises. The rst
is that we do not require (or want) a certain condition analogised from a
condition required by Kripke's (relational) semantics for intuitionistic logic:
(The Hereditary Condition) If x A, then x y A:
This would yield that if x A, then x B ! A, i.e. if y B , ten
x y A. This would quickly involve us in irrelevance.
The other surprise is related to the failure of the Hereditary Condition:
Validity cannot be dened as a formula's holding at all pieces of information
in all models, since even A ! A would not then turn out to be valid.
Thus x A ! A requires that if y A then x y A. But this last
is just a commuted form of the rejected Hereditary Condition, and there
is no more reason to think it holds. We shall see in a moment that the
appropriate denition of validity is to require that 0 A for the empty
piece of information in all models.
Enough talk of what properties does not have! What property does it
have? We have just been
irting with one of them. Clearly 0 A ! A
requires that if x A then 0 x A, and how more naturally would that
be obtained than requiring that 0 be a (left) identity?
0 x = x:
(Identity)
xy =yx
x (y z ) = (x y) z
x x = x:
(Commutativity)
(Associativity)
(Idempotence)
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65
in the metalanguage makes this point nicely (we write `A; x' rather than
x A for a notational analogy):
1. A; x
Hypothesis
2. A ! B; z
Hypothesis
3. B; x [ z
1, 2, (!)
4. B; z [ x
3, Comm.
5. (A ! B ) ! B; x
2, 4(!)
6. (A ! B ) ! B; 0 [ x
5, Identity
7. A ! ((A ! B ) ! B ); 0.
The reader may nd it amusing to write out an analogous pair of proofs
for Prexing, seeing how Associativity of [ enters in, and for Contraction
watching the Idempotence.24
The game has now been given away. There is some ddling to be sure in
proving a completeness theorem for R! re the semi-lattice semantics, but
basically the idea is that the semi-lattice semantics is just the system F R!
`written in the metalanguage'.
There is not a problem in extending the semi-lattice semantics so as to
accommodate conjunction. The clause
x A ^ B i x A and x B
(^)
x A _ B i x A of x B
(_)
A _ B; x
A; x
Hyp.
..
.
c; x [ y
B; x
Hyp.
..
.
C; x [ y
C; x [ y:
24 Though unfortunately verication of this last does not depend purely on Idempotence, but rather on (xy)y = xy, which of course is equivalent to Idempotence given
Associativity and Identity. The verication of the formula A ^ (A ! B ) ! B `exactly'
uses Idempotence, but of course this is hardly a formula of the implicational fragment.
66
for the positive connectives and a four-valued treatment of negation in the style of [Dunn,
1976a]. they avoid the problem just described by in eect building into their denition of
a model that it must satisfy classical contraposition. This does not seem to be natural.
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67
68
28 In the original equivalent conditions of Routley and Meyer [1973] this was instead
`Pasch's Law': R2 abcd ) R2 acbd. Also Monotony (condition (5) below) was misprinted
there.
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69
Proof. Most of this will be left to the reader. We rst show that the axioms
of R+ are valid. Since they are all of the form A ! B we can simplify
matters a little by using the Verication Lemma. As an illustration we
verify Assertion (the reader may wish to compare this to the corresponding
verication vis a vis the semi-lattice semantics of the last section).
To show A ! [(A ! B ) ! B ] is valid, it suces by the Verication
Lemma to assume a A and show a A ! B ! B . For this last we
assume Rabc and b A ! B , and show c B . By Commutativity, Rabc.
By (!) since we have b A ! B and a A, we get c B as desired.
The verication of the implicational axioms of Self-Implication and Prexing are equally routine, falling right out of the Verication Lemma and
70
Associativity for the relation R. Unfortunately the verication of Contraction is a bit contrived (cf. note 24 above), so we give it here.
To verify Contraction, we assume that (1) a A ! :A ! B and show
a A ! B . To show this last we assume that (2) Rabc and (3) b A, and
show c B . From (2) we get, by Commutativity, Rbac. But Rbbb holds by
Idempotence. so we have R2 (bb)ac. By Associativity we get R2 b(ba)c, i.e.
for some x, both (4) Rbxc and (5) Rbax. by Commutativity, from (5) we
get Rabx. Using (!), we obtain from this, (1), and(3) hat (6) x A ! B .
by Commutativity from (4) we get Rxbc, and from this, (6), and (3) we at
last get the desired c B .
Verication of the conjunction and disjunction axioms is routine and is
safely left to the reader.
It only remains to be shown then that the rules modus ponens and adjunction preserve validity. Actually something stronger holds. It is easy to
se that for any a 2 K (not just 0), if a A ! B and a A, then a B
(by virtue of Raaa), and of course it follows immediately from (^) that if
a A and a B , then a A ^ B .
We next go about the business of establishing the
Completeness Theorem. If A is valid, then R+ A.
The main idea of the proof is similar to that of the by now well-known
Henkin-style completeness proofs for modal logic. We suppose that no R+
A and construct a so-called `canonical model', the set-us of which are certain
prime theories (playing the role of the maximal theories of modal logic).
The base set-up 0 is constructed as a regular theory (for the terminology
`regular', `prime', etc. consult Section 2.4; of course everything is relativised
to R+ ). From this point on for simplicity we shall assume that we are
dealing with R+ outtted with the optional extra fusion connective and
the propositional constant t (recall these can be conservatively added | cf.
Section 1.3). We then dene Rabc to hold precisely when for all formulas
A and B , whenever A 2 a and B 2 b, then A B 2 c.29
Let us look now at the details. Pick 0 as some prime regular theory T
with A 62 T . We can derive that at least one such exists using the Belnap
Extension Lemma (it was stated in Section 2.5 for RQ, but it clearly holds
for R+ as well). thus set = R+ and = fAg.
Dene K = set of prime theories,30 and dene the accessibility relation
R canonically as above.
29 The use of and t is a luxury to make things prettier at least at the level of description. Thus, e.g. as we shall see, the associativity of R follows from the associativity of
, and other mnemonically pleasant things happen. We could avoid its use by dening
Rabc to hold whenever if A 2 a and A ! B 2 b, then B 2 c. Incidentally, the valuational
clause for fusion is : x A B i for some a; b such that Rabx; a A and b B . The
valuational clause for t is x t i 0 x.
30 One actually has a choice here. We have required of theories that they be closed
under implications provable in 0, i.e. require of T that whenever A 2 T and A ! B 2 0,
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71
1. A ^ B ! A Axiom
2. A ^ B ! B Axiom
3. (A ^ B ) (A ^ B ) ! A B 1, 2, Monotony
4. A ^ B ! A B 3, square increasingness
ad Associativity. This is by far the least trivial property. Let us then
assume that R2 (ab)cd, i.e. 9x(Rabx and Rxcd). We need then show that
there is a prime theory y such that Rayd and Rbcy, i.e. R2 a(bc)d.
Set y0 = fY : 9B 2 b; C 2 c :`R B C ! Y g. (This is sometimes referred
to as b c). Clearly the denition of y0 assures that Rbcy0.
Observe that y0 is a theory.31 Thus it is clear that y0 is closed under
provable R-implication, since this is just transitivity. We show it is also
closed under adjunction. Thus suppose for some B; B 0 2 b; C; C 0 2 c; R
B C ! Y and `R B 0 C 0 ! Y 0 . Then `R (B C ) ^ (B 0 C 0 ) !
Y ^ Y 0 using easy properties of conjunction. But we have the R-theorem
(B ^ B 0 ) (C ^ C 0 ) ! (B C ) ^ (B 0 C 0 ) (which follows basically from the
one-way distribution of over ^; X (Y ^ Z ) ! (X Y ) ^ (X Z ), which
then B 2 T . The latter is a stronger requirement and leads to the `smaller' reduced
models of [Routley et al., 1982], which are useful for various purposes.
31 The presentation of Routley{Meyer [1973] is more elegant than ours, developing as
they do properties of what they call the calculus of `intensional R-theories', showing that
it is a partially ordered (under inclusion) commutative monoid ( as dened above) with
identity 0. Further is monotonous with respect to , i.e. if a b then c a c b, and
is square increasing, i.e. a a a. Then dening Rabc to mean a b c, the requisite
properties of R fall right out.
72
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73
A (A ! B ) ! B; we obtain B 2 c:
Right-to-left is harder, and in fact involves the third (and last) application
of the Belnap Extension Lemma in the proof of Completeness. Thus suppose
contrapositively that A ! B 62 a. We need to construct prime theories b
and c, with A 2 b and B 62 c. We let b = Th(fAg) and set c = a b ,
i.e. fZ : 9X 2 a; 9Y 2 b `R+ X Y ! Z g. This is the same as fZ : 9X 2
a `R+ X A ! Z g. We set c = fB g. Clearly (c ; c ) is an exclusive pair,
for otherwise `R+ X A ! B , i.e. `R+ X ! (A ! B ) for some X 2 a, and
so A ! B 2 a contrary to our supposition. We apply Belnap's Extension
Lemma to get an exclusive pair (c; c0 ) with c c and c prime theory. Note
32 In the `reduced models (cf. note 46) one can show that R0a0 a i a0 a.
74
RELEVANCE LOGIC
75
3. R000
2, (Commutation).
76
`B' appears to be for `Basic', for they regard the above postulates as a
natural minimal set on their approach.33 Gabbay [1976] investigates even
weaker logics where no conditions at all are placed on the frame, but these
have no theorems and are characterised only by rules of deducibility (unless Boolean negation and/or the Boolean material conditional is present,
options which he does explore).
The sense in which the above postulates are minimal goes something like
this. B3 is needed in proving the Hereditary Condition for implications,
and the Hereditary Condition is needed in turn for verifying 0 A !
A (indeed anything) so we have at least some minimal theorems. The
Hereditary Condition is used in showing the equivalence of the verication
of an implication in a model and entailment in that mode, i.e. 0 A ! B
i 8x 2 K (x A ) x B ) (cf. Section 3.7 to see how these conditions
were used to establish these facts about R+ -models). What about B2? We
think it is just a `freebie'. It seems to play no role in verifying axioms or
rules, but the completeness proof can be made to yield canonical (`reduced')
models (cf. note 3.7) that satisfy it, so why not have it? This seems to be
what Routley et. al. [1982] say. It appears that B1 is even more a freebie.
It may be shown that A is a theorem of the system B+ (formulated in
Section 1.3) i A is valid in all B+ models.
Routley and Meyer establish the following correspondence between conditions on the accessibility relation R and axioms:
(1)
Raaa
A ^ (A ! B ) ! B
(2) Rabc ) R2 a(ab)c (A ! B ) ^ (B ! C ) ! (A ! C )
(3) R2 abcd ) R2 a(bc)d A ! B ! ([B ! C ] ! [A ! C ])
(4) R2 abcd ) R2 b(ac)d A ! B ! ([C ! A] ! [C ! B ])
(5)
Rabc ) R2 abbc
(A ! [A ! B ]) ! (A ! B )
(6)
Ra0a
([A ! A] ! B ) ! B
(7)
Rabc ) Rbac
A ! ([A ! B ] ! B )
(8)
0a
A ! (B ! B )
(9)
Rabc ) b c
A ! (B ! A).
Routley and Meyer connect these conditions on accessibility relations to
axioms extending the basic logic B. The correspondence is more perspicuous when you consider the structural rules corresponding to each axiom or
condition. We can express these as conditions on fusion:
33 However, some notational confusion is possible, with Fine's use of `B' as another
basic relevance logic diering slightly from Routley and Meyer's usage [Fine, 1974]. For
Fine, B includes the law of the excluded middle, and for Routley and Meyer, it does not.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
77
(1)
Raaa
A`AA
(2) Rabc ) R2 a(ab)c
A B ` A (A B )
(3) R2 abcd ) R2 a(bc)d (A B ) C ` A (B C )
(4) R2 abcd ) R2 b(ac)d (A B ) C ` B (A C )
(5)
Rabc ) R2 abbc
A B ` (A B ) B
(6)
Ra0a
At`A
(7)
Rabc ) Rbac
AB `BA
(8)
0a
B A ` B (or A ` t)
(9)
Rabc ) b c
A B ` B.
General recipes for translating between structural rules and conditions
on accessibility relations are to be found in Restall [1998; 2000].
If one wants to add to B+ any of the axioms on the right to get a sentential
logic X, one merely adds the corresponding conditions to those for a B+
model to get the appropriate notion of an X-model, with a resultant sound
and complete semantics.
Some logics of particular interest arising in this way are (nomenclature as
in [Anderson and Belnap, 1975]) (note well that T has nothing to do with
Feys' t of modal logic fame):
TW+ :
T+ :
E+ :
R+ :
H+ :
S4+ :
B+ + (3; 4)
TW+ + (5)
T+ + (6)
E+ + (7)
R+ + (8)
E+ + (8):
These are far from the most elegant formulations from a postulational
point of view, being highly redundant (in particular the Prexing and Sufxing rules of B+ are supplanted already in TW+ by the corresponding
axioms. further the rule of Necessitation (A ` (A ! A) ! A) is also redundant already in TW+ (this is not so obvious|proof is by browsing through
[Anderson and Belnap, 1975]).
What minimal conditions should be imposed on the -operator when it is
added to a B+ -frame so as to give a B-frame? Routley et. al. [1982] choose
B4. a = a, and
B5. a b ) b a .
The minimality of B5 can be defended in terms of its being needed for
showing that negations satisfy the Hereditary Condition. B4 would seem to
have little place in a minimal system except for the fact that the dominant
trend in relevance logic has been to keep classical double negation.34
34 In fact, B5 is too strong for a purely minimal logic of negation. See Section 5.1 for
more discussion on this.
78
One can get semantics for the full systems TW, T, etc. simply by adding
the appropriate postulates to the conditions on a B-model.
We could go on, but will instead refer the reader to Routley et al. [1982],
Fine [1974] and Gabbay [1976] for a variety of variations producing systems
in the neighbourhood of R.
Some nd the conditions on the \base point" 0 on frames rather puzzling or unintuitive. Why should the basic conditions on frames include
conditions such as the fact that a b dened as R0ab generate a partial
order? Some recent work by Priest and Sylvan and extended by Restall has
shown that these conditions can be done away with and the frames given an
interpretation rather reminiscent of that of non-normal modal logics [Priest
and Sylvan, 1992; Restall, 1993]. The idea is as follows. We have two sorts
of set-ups in a frame | normal ones and non-normal ones. Then we split
the treatment of implication along this division. Normal points are given
an S5-like interpretation.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
79
Rac ) a c or b c;
which neatly generalised to give a family of postulates yielding set-theoretical
semantics for a denumerable family of weakenings of RM which are algebraised by adding various weakenings of idempotence (an+1 = an ). It is an
open problem whether R itself is the intersection of this family and whether
they all have the nite model property (if so, R is decidable). Since R is
undecidable, one of these must be false. However, it is unknown at the time
of writing which one fails.
Proof Sketch
80
1. :X ! (:X ! :X )
2. X ! (:X ! X )
3. (A _ :A) ^ (B _ :B ) !
:((A _ :A) ^ (B _ :B )) !
((A _ :A) ^ (B _ :B ))
4. :(A _ :A) _ :(B _ :B ) ! 3, MP, de M
(A _ :A) ^ (B _ :B )
5. A ^ :A ! B _ :B
4, _I; ^E , de M.
Kalman [1958] especially investigated de Morgan lattices with the property a ^ :a b _ :b. We will call these Kalman lattices. he showed that
every Kalman lattice is isomorphic to a subdirect product of the de Morgan
lattice 3. This implies a three- valued Homomorphism Separation Property
for Kalman lattices (which also can be proven by modifying the proof of its
four-valued analogue, noting that each `side' of 4 is just a copy of 3). The
representation in terms of polarities uses polarities X = (X1 ; X2 ) where
X1 [ X2 = U , i.e. X1 and X2 are exhaustive.
This means informally that X always receives at least one of the values
true and false. This leads to a semantics using ambivaluations into the
left-hand side of 4:
s
T = ftg
B = ft; f g
F = ff g.
This idea leads to a simpler Kripke-style semantics for RM using an ordinary binary accessibility relation instead of the Routley{Meyer ternary
one (actually this semantics antedates the Routley{Meyer one, the results
having been presented in [Dunn, 1969]|cf. [Dunn, 1976b] for a full presentation. No details will be supplied here. This semantics has been generalised
to rst-order RM with a constant domain semantics [Dunn, 1976c]). The
analogous question with Routley{Meyer semantics is has now been closed in
the negative in the work of [Fine, 1989], which we consider in Section 3.12.
Meyer [1980] has used this `binary semantics' to give a proof of an appropriate Interpolation Lemma for RM. (Unfortunately, interpolation fails
for E and R [Urquhart, 1993].)
RELEVANCE LOGIC
81
a A , not a A:
One could not do this on ordinary R-models without things coming apart
at the seams, because in order to have the theorem p ! p valid, one
would need the Hereditary Condition to hold for p, i.e. if a b, then if
a p then b p, i.e. if a p then b p. But one has no reason to
think that this is the case, since all one has is the converse coming from
the fact that the Hereditary condition holds for p. The inductive proof
the Hereditary condition breaks down in the presence of Boolean negation,
but of course with classical R-models the Hereditary Condition becomes
vacuous and there is no need for a proof.
82
RELEVANCE LOGIC
83
8x(p ! F x) ! (p ! 8xF x)
But Fine constructs his example in such a way that this formula is valid,
despite the variable domains.
Despite this problem, Fine has found a semantics with respect to which
the logic RQ is sound and complete. This semantics rests on a dierent view
of the quantiers. For Fine's account, a statement of the form 8xA(x) is true
at a set-up not only when A(c) is true for each individual c in the domain
of the set-up, but instead, when A(c) is true for an arbitrary individual c.
In symbols,
84
to use the constant domain semantics on these frames. The task then is to
axiomatise this extension. The task is also to give some interpretation of
what the points in these semantic structures might be. For if they are theories (or prime theories) then the evaluation clauses for the quantiers do
not make a great deal of sense without further explanation. No-one thinks
that a claim of the form 9xA(x) can be a member of a theory only if there is
an object in the language of the theory which satises A according to that
theory. Nor are we so readily inclined to think that all theories need share
the same domain of quantication.
If, on the other hand, we take the set-ups in frames to be quite like (some
class of) theories, then we must face the issue of the relationships between
these theories. No doubt, if 8xA(x) is in some theory, then A(c) will be in
that theory for any constant c in the language of the theory. However, the
converse need not be the case.
Anyway, it is clear that there is a lot of work to be done in the semantics
of relevance logics with quantiers. One area which hasn't been explored at
any depth, but which looks like it could bring some light is the semantics of
positive quantied relevance logics. Without the distribution of the universal quantier over disjunction, these systems are subsystems of intuitionistic
logic.
4 THE DECISION PROBLEM
4.1 Background
When the original of this Handbook article was published back in 1985,
without a doubt the outstanding open problem in relevance logics was the
question as to whether there exists a decision procedure for determining
whether formulas are theorems of the system E or R. Anderson [1963] listed
it second among his now historic open problems (the rst was the admissibility of Ackermann's rule
discussed in Section 2). Through the work of
Urquhart [1984], we now know that there is no such decision procedure.
Harrop [1965] lends interest to the decision problem with his remark that
`all \philosophically interesting" propositional calculi for which the decision
problem has been solved have been found to be decidable : : : '.35 We now
have a very good counterexample to Harrop's claim.
In this section we shall examine Urquhart's proof, but before we get there
we shall also consider various fragments and subsystems of R for which there
are decision procedures. R will be our paradigm throughout this discussion,
though we will make clear how things apply to related systems.
35 He continues somewhat more technically ` : : : and none is known for which it has
been proved that it does not possess the nite model property with recursive bound.'
RELEVANCE LOGIC
85
These are formulas containing only ^; _, and :. As was explained in Section 1.7, the zero-degree theorems of R (or E) are precisely the same as
those of the classical propositional calculus, so of course the usual two valued truth tables yield a decision procedure.
86
A ` A:
Structural Rules.
Permutation
; A; B; ; ` C
; B; A; ; ` C
Contraction
; a; A ` B
; A ` B
Operational Rules.
(`!)
; A ` B
`A!B
(!`)
` A ; B ` C
:
; ; A ! B ` C
RELEVANCE LOGIC
Thus:
87
A`A
Thinning
A; B ` A
(`!)
A`B!A
(`!)
` A ! (B ! A)
` A ; A ` B
:
; ` B
`A `B
;
; [ A] ` B
88
` A ; B ` C
(!`0 )
[; ; A ! B ] ` C
38 This is named (following [Anderson and Belnap, 1975]) after an analogous lemma in
[Curry, 1950] in relation to classical (and intuitionistic) Gentzen systems. There, with
free thinning available, Curry proves his lemma with (!`) (in its singular version) stated
as:
; A ! B ` A ; A ! B; B ` C
:
;A ! B ` C
This in eect requires the maximum contraction permitted in our statement of (!`)
above, but this is ok since items contracted `too much' can always be thinned back in.
Incidentally, our statement of (!`) also diers somewhat from the statement of Anderson
and Belnap [1975] or Belnap and Wallace [1961], in that we build in just the minimal
amount of contraction needed to do the job.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
89
a `complete proof search tree'): one places above all possible premises
or pairs of premises from which follows by one of the rules. Note well
that even with the little bit of contraction built into (!`) this will still be
only a nite number of sequents. Incidentally, one draws lines from those
premises to . One continues in this way getting a tree. It is reasonably
clear that if a derivation exists at all, then it will be formed as a subtree
of this `complete proof search there', by the paragraph just above, the is
complete proof search tree can be constructed to be irredundant. But the
problem is that the complete proof search tree may be innite, which would
tend to louse up the decision procedure. There is a well-known lemma which
begins to come to the rescue:
nig's Lemma. A tree is nite i both (1) there are only nitely many
Ko
points connected directly by lines to a given point (`nite fork property') and
(2) each branch is nite (`nite branch property').
By the `note well' in the paragraph above, we have (1). The question
remaining then is (2), and this is where an extremely ingenious lemma of
Kripke's plays a role. To state it we rst need a notion from Kleene. Two
sequents ` A and 0 ` A are cognate just when exactly the same formulas
(not counting multiplicity) occur in as in 0 . Thus, e.g. all of the following
are cognate to each other:
`A
X; X; Y ` A
X; Y; Y ` A
X; X; Y; Y ` A
X; X; X; Y; Y ` A.
(1) X; Y
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
We call the class of all sequents cognate to a given sequent a cognation class.
Kripke's Lemma. Suppose a sequence of cognate sequents
0 ; 1 ; : : : ; is
irredundant in the sense that for no i ; j with i < j , is i a contraction
of j . Then the sequence is nite.
We postpone elaboration of Kripke's Lemma until we see what use it is
to the decision procedure. First we remark an obvious property of LR!
that is typical of Gentzen systems (that lack Cut as a primitive rule):
Subformula Property. If
is a derivable sequent of LR! , then any
formula occurring in any sequent in the derivation is a subformula of some
formula occurring in .
This means that the number of cognation classes occurring in any derivation (and hence in each branch) is nite. But Kripke's Lemma further shows
90
7
6
5
4
3
2
0
`A
RELEVANCE LOGIC
91
has to reduce the number of X 's (say, to be strategic, by one). The graph
now looks like 2 for the rst two members of the sequence 0 ; 1 .
7
6
5
1
4
3
2
0
92
The idea of LR:! is to accommodate the classical negation principles presenting R in the same way that Gentzen [1934] accommodated them for
classical logic: provide multiple right-hand sides for the sequents. this
means that a sequent is of the form ` , where and are (possible
empty) nite sequences of formulas. One adds structural rules for Permutation and Contraction on the right-hand side, reformulates (`!) and (!`)
as follows
; A ` B;
` A;
; B `
(`!)
(!`)
;
` A ! B;
; ; A ! B `
;
and adds `
ip and
op' rules for negation:
; A `
` A;
(` :)
:
(: `)
; :A `
` :A;
LE:! is the same except that in the rule (`!) must be empty and
must consist only of formulas whose main connective is !. The decision
procedure for LE:! was worked out by Belnap and Wallace [1961] along
basically the lines of the argument of Kripke just reported in the last section,
and is clearly reported in [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 13]. the
modication to LR:! is straightforward (indeed LR:! is easier because one
need not prove the theorem of p. 128 of [Anderson and Belnap, 1975], and so
one can avoid all the apparatus there of `squeezes'). McRobbie and Belnap
[1979] have provided a nice reformulation of LR:! in an analytic tableau
style, and Meyer has extended this to give analytic tableau for linear logic
and other systems in the vicinity of R [Meyer et al., 1995].
RELEVANCE LOGIC
93
Note that it is important that the rule (^ `) is stated in two parts, and
not as one `Ketonen form' rule:
; A; B ` C
(K ^ `)
:
; A ^ B ` C
The reason is that without thinning it is impossible to derive the rule(s)
(^ `) from (K ^ `).
Early on it was recognised that the distribution axiom
A ^ (B _ C ) ! (A _ B ) _ C
was dicult to derive from Gentzen-style rules for E and R. Thus Anderson
[1963] saw this as the sticking point for developing Gentzen formulations,
and Belnap [1960b, page 72]) says with respect to LE! that `the standard
rules for conjunction and disjunction could be added : : : the Elimination
Theorem (suitably modied) remaining provable. However, [since distribution would not be derivable], the game does not seem worth the candle'.
Meyer [1966] carried out such an addition to LR:! , getting a system he
called LR , whose Hilbert-style version is precisely R without the distribution axiom. He showed using a Kripke-style argument that this system
is decidable. This system is now called LR, for \lattice R".
Meyer [1966] also showed how LR can be translated into R!;^ rather
simply. Given a formula A in the language of LR+ , let V be the set of
variables in A, and let two atomic propositions pt and pf not in V . Set :A
for the moment to be A ! pf , to dene a translation A0 of A as follows.
p0 = p
t0 = pt
(A ! B )0 = A0 ! B 0
(A ^ B )0 = A0 ^ B 0
(A _ B )0 = :(:A0 ^ :B 0 )
(A B )0 = :(A0 ! :B 0 )
V
then
setting t(A) = fpt ! (p ! p) : p 2 V [ fpt; pf gg and f (A) =
V
f::p ! p : p 2 V [ fpt; pf gg, we get the following theorem:
+ then A is
Translation Theorem (Meyer). If A is a formula in LR
+
0
provable in LR if and only if (t(A) ^ f (A) ^ pt ) ! A is provable in R!;^ .
The proof is given in detail in [Urquhart, 1997], and we will not present it
here.
Some recent work of Alasdair Urquhart has shown that although R!;^
is decidable, it is only just decidable [Urquhart, 1990; Urquhart, 1997].
94
More formally, Urquhart has shown that given any particular formula in
the language of R!;^ , there is no primitive recursive bound on either the
time or the space taken by a computation of whether or not that formula
is a theorem. Presenting the proof here would take us too far away from
the logic to be worthwhile, however we can give the reader the kernel of the
idea behind Urquhart's result.
Urquhart follows work of [Lincoln et al., 1992] by using a propositional
logic to encode the behaviour of a branching counter machines. A counter
machine has a nite number of registers (say, ri for suitable i) which each
hold one non-negative integer, and some nite set of possible states (say,
qj for suitable j ). Machines are coded with a list of instructions, which
enable you to increment or decrement registers, and test for registers' being
zero. A branching counter machine dispenses with the test instructions and
allows instead for machines to take multiple execution paths, by way of
forking instructions. The instruction qi + rj qk means \when in qi , add 1 to
register rj and enter stage qk ," and qi rj qk means \when in qi , subtract 1
to register rj (if it is non-empty) and enter stage qk ," and qi fqj qk is \when
in qi , fork into two paths, one taking state qj and the other taking qk ."
A machine conguration is a state, together with the values of each register. Urquhart uses the logic LR to simulate the behaviour of a machine.
For each register ri , choose a distinct variable Ri , for each state qj choose
a distinct variable Qj . The conguration hqi ; n1 ; : : : ; nl i, where ni is the
value of ri is the formula
Qi R1n1 Rlnl
and the instructions are modelled by sequents in the Gentzen system, as
follows:
Instruction
Sequent
qi + rj qk Qi ` Qk Rj
qi rj qk
Qi ; Rj ` Qk
qi fqj qk
Qi ` Qj _ Qk
Given a machine program (a set of instructions) we can consider what is
provable from the sequents which code up those instructions. This set of
sequents we can call the theory of the machine. Qi R1n1 Rlnl `
Qj R1m1 Rlml is intended to mean that from state conguration
hqi ; n1 ; : : : ; nl i all paths will go through conguration hqj ; m1 ; : : : ; ml i after
some number of steps.
A branching counter machine accepts an initial conguration if when run
on that conguration, all branches terminate at the nal state qf , with all
registers taking the value zero. The corresponding condition in LR will be
the provability of
Qi R1n1 Rlnl ` Qm
RELEVANCE LOGIC
95
This will nearly do to simulate branching counter machines, except for the
fact that in LR we have A ` A A. This means that each of our registers
can be incremented as much as you like, provided that they are non-zero to
start with. This means that each of our machines need to be equipped with
every instruction of the form qi >0 + rj qi , meaning \if in state qi , add 1 to
rj , provided that it is already nonzero, and remain in state qi ."
Given these denitions, Urquhart is able to prove that a conguration
is accepted in branching counter machine, if and only if the corresponding
sequent is provable from the theory of that machine. But this is equivalent
to a formula
^
4.9 Positive R
In this section we will examine extensions of the Gentzen technique to cover
all of positive relevance logic. We know (see Section 4.12) that this will
not provide decidability. However, they provide another angle on R and
cousins. Dunn and Minc independently developed a Gentzen-style calculus (with some novel features) for R without negation (LR+ ).39 Belnap
39 Dunn's result was presented by title at a meeting of the Association for Symbolic
Logic, December, 1969 (see [Dunn, 1974]), and the full account is to be found in [Anderson
and Belnap, 1975, Section 28.5]). Minc [1972, earliest presentation said to there to be
February 24] obtained essentially the same results (but for the system with a necessity
operator). See also [Belnap Jr. et al., 1980].
96
[1960b] had already suggested the idea of a Gentzen system in which antecedents were sequences of sequences of formulas, rather than just the
usual sequences of formulas (in this section `sequence' always means nite
sequence). The problem was that the Elimination Theorem was not provable. LR+ goes a step `or two' further, allowing an antecedent of a sequent
instead to be a sequence of sequence of : : : sequences of formulas. More
formally, we somehow distinguish two kinds of sequences, `intensional sequences' and `extensional sequences' (say prex them with an `I ' or an
`E '). an antecedent can then be an intensional sequence of formulas, an
extensional sequence of the last mentioned, etc. or the same thing but with
`intensional' and `extensional' interchanged. (We do not allow things to `pile
up', with, e.g. intensional sequences of intensional sequences|there must
be alternation).40 Extensional sequences are to be interpreted using ordinary `extensional' conjunction ^, whereas intensional sequences are to be
interpreted using `intensional conjunction' , which may be dened in the
full system R as A B = :(A ! :B ), but here it is taken as primitive|see
below).
We state the rules, using commas for extensional sequences, semicolons
for intentional sequences, and asterisks ambiguously for either; we also employ an obvious substitution notation.41
Permutation
Thinning
[
] ` A
[
] ` A
[ ] ` A
;
[;
] ` A
; A ` B
(`!)
`A!B
Contraction
provided
[ ] ` A
[ ] ` A
:
is non-empty
` A [B ] ` C
(!`)
[; A ! B ] ` C
[A; B ] ` C
`A `B
(^ `)
(` ^)
[A ^ B ] ` C
`A^B
40 This diers from the presentation of [Anderson and Belnap, 1975] which allows such
`pile ups', and then adds additional structural rules to eliminate them. Belnap felt this
was a clearer, more explicit way of handling things and he is undoubtedly right, but
Dunn has not been able to read his own section since he rewrote it, and so return to the
simpler, more sloppy form here.
41 With the understanding that substitutions do not produce `pile ups'. Thus, e.g. a
`substitution' of an intensional sequence for an item in an intensional sequence does not
produce an intensional sequence with an element that is an intensional sequence formed
by juxtaposition. Again this diers from the presentation of [Anderson and Belnap, 1975,
cf. note 28].
RELEVANCE LOGIC
`A
`B
(` _)
(` _)
`A_B
`A_B
`A `B
(` )
; ` A B
97
[a] ` C [B ] ` C
(_ `)
[A _ B ] ` C
[a; B ] ` C
( `)
B] ` C
For technical reasons (see below) we add the sentential constant t with the
axiom ` t and the rule:
[B ] ` A
(t `)
[ ; t] ` A
The point of the two kind of sequences can now be made clear. Let us
examine the classically (and intuitionistically) valid derivation:
(1) A ` A
Axiom
(2) A; B ` A
Thinning
(3) A ` B ! A (`!):
It is indierent whether (2) is interpreted as
(2^) (A ^ B ) ! A; or
(2!) A ! (B ! A);
because of the principles of exportation and importation. In LR+ however
we may regard (2) as ambiguous between
(2; ) A; B ` A (extensional), and
(2; ) A; B ` A (intensional).
(2,) continues to be interpreted as (2^), but (2;) is interpreted as
(2) (A B ) ! A:
Now in R, exportation holds for but not for ^ (importation holds for
both). Thus the move from (2;) to (3) is valid, but not from (2,) to (3). On
the other hand, in R, the inference from A ! C to (A ^ B ) ! C is valid,
whereas the inference to (A B ) ! C is not. Thus the move from (1) to
(2,) is valid, but not the move from (1) to (2;). the whole point of LR+ is
to allow some thinning, but only in extensional sequences.
This allows the usual classical derivation of the distribution axiom to go
through, since clearly
A ^ (B _ C ) ` (A ^ B ) _ C
can be derived with no need of any but the usual extensional sequence. The
following sketch of a derivation of distribution in the consequent is even
98
more illustrative of the powers of LR+ (permutations are left implicit; also
the top half is left to the reader);
A; B ` (A ^ B ) _ C A; C ` (A ^ B ) _ C
(_ `)
X`X
A; B _ C ` (A ^ B ) _ C
(!`)
X ` X A; (X ; X ! B _ C ) ` (A ^ B ) _ C
(!`)
(X ; X ! A); (X ; X ! A; X ! B _ C ) ` (A ^ B ) _ C
X ! A; X ! B _ C ; X ` (A ^ B ) _ C
(X ! A) ^ (X ! B _ C ); X ` (A ^ B ) _ C
` (X ! A) ^ (X ! B _ C ) ! [X ! (A ^ B ) _ C ]
+
LR is equivalent to R+ in the sense that for any negation-free sentence A
of R; ` A is derivable in LR+ i A is a theorem of R. The proofs of both
halves of the equivalence are complicated by technical details. Right-to-left
(the interpretation theorem) requires the addition of intensional conjunction
as primitive, and then a lemma, due to R. K. Meyer, to the eect that
this is harmless (a conservative extension). Left-to-right (the Elimination
Theorem) is what requires the addition of the constant true sentence t. This
is because the `Cut' rule is stated as:
` A (A) ` B
;
() ` B
where () is the result of replacing arbitrarily many occurrences of A in
(A) by if is non-empty, and otherwise by t.42 Without this emendation
of the Cut rule one could derive B ` A whenever ` A is derivable (for
arbitrary B , relevant or not) as follows
A`A
Thinning
` A A; B ` A
Cut
B`A
Discussing decidability a bit, one problem seems to be that Kripke's
Lemma (appropriately modied) is just plain false. The following is a sequence of cognate sequents in just the two propositional variables X and Y
which is irredundant in the sense that structural rules will not get you from
a later member to an earlier member:
X ; Y ` X (X ; Y ); X ` X ((X ; Y ); X ); Y ` X : : : 43
42 Considerations about the eliminability of occurrences of t are then needed to show the
admissibility of modus ponens. This was at least the plan of [Dunn, 1974]. A dierent
plan is to be found in [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, Section 28.5], where things are
arranged so that sequents are never allowed to have empty left-hand sides (they have t
there instead).
RELEVANCE LOGIC
99
100
reduced. This is clear, for given any proof you can transform it into one in
which every sequent is reduced without too much fuss.
As a result, we have gained as much control over extensional contraction
as we need. Giambrone is able to show that only nitely many reduced
sequent can appear in the proof of a given sequent, and as a result, the
size of the proof-search tree is bounded, and we have decidability. This
technique does not work for intensional contraction, as we do not have the
result that every sequent is equivalent to an intensionally super-reduced
sequent, in the absence of the mingle rule. While A ^ A ` B is equivalent
to A ` B , we do not have the equivalence of A A ` B and A ` B , without
mingle.
These methods can be extended to deal with negation. Brady [1991]
constructs out of signed formulae T A and F A instead of formulae alone,
and this is enough to include negation without spoiling the decidability
property. Restall [1998] uses the techniques of Belnap's Display Logic (see
Section 5.2) to provide an alternate way of modelling negation in sequent
systems. These techniques show that the decidability of systems without
intensional contraction are decidable, to a large extent independently of the
other properties of the intensional structure.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
101
0
and a nite de Morgan sublattice (D; ^0 ; _; ), how to dene a new multiplicative operation 0 on D so as to make it a de Morgan monoid and so for
x; y 2 D, if x y 2 D then x y = x 0 y. the chief dicult is in satisfying
the associative law. For the Kripke-style models (say the Routley{Meyer
variety) the problem is more dicult to state (especially if the reader has
skipped Section 3.7) but the basic diculty is in the satisfying of certain requirements on the three-placed accessibility relation once set-ups have been
identied into a nite number of equivalence classes by `ltration'. Thus,
e.g. the requirement corresponding to the algebraic requirement of associativity is Rayx & Rbcy ) 9y(Raby & Rycx)45 the problem in a nutshell
is that after ltration one does not know that there exists the appropriate
equivalence class y needed to feed such an existentially hungry postulate.
The McKinsey-Tarski method has been used successfully by Maksimova
[1967] with respect to a subsystem of R, which diers essentially only in
that it replaces the nested form of the transitivity axiom
(A ! B ) ! [(B ! C ) ! (A ! C )]
by the `conjoined' form
(A ! B ) ^ (B ! C ) ! (A ! C ):46
Perhaps the most striking positive solution to the decision problem for
a relevance logic is that provided for RM by Meyer (see [Anderson and
Belnap, 1975, Section 29.3], although the result was rst obtained by Meyer
[1968].47 Meyer showed that a formula containing n propositional variables
is a theorem of RM i it is valid in the `Sugihara matrix' dened on the nonzero integers from n to +n. this result was extended by [Dunn, 1970] to
show that every `normal' extension of RM has some nite Sugihara matrix
(with possibly 0 as an element) as a characteristic matrix. So clearly RM
and its extensions have at least the nite model property. Cf. Section 3.10
for further information about RM.
Meyer [private communication] has thought that the fact that the decidability of R is equivalent to the solvability of the word problem for de
Morgan monoids suggests that R might be shown to be undecidable by
some suitable modication of the proof that the word problem for monoids
is unsolvable. It turns out that this is technique is the one which pays o |
although the proof is very complex. The complexity arises because there
is an important disanalogy between monoids and de Morgan monoids in
45 This is suggestively written (following Meyer) as Ra(bc)x ) R(ab)cx.
47 In fact neither McKinsey-Tarski methods nor ltration was used in this proof. We are
no clearer now that they could not be used, and we think the place to start would be to
try to apply ltration to the Kripke-style semantics for RM of [Dunn, 1976b], which uses
a binary accessibility relation and seems to avoid the problems caused by `existentially
hungry axioms' for the ternary accessibility relation.
102
4.12
R E
R0ab i a = b
Rabc i Rbac i Racb (total permutation)
Raaa for each a R2 abcd only if R2 acbd
The clauses for the connectives are standard, with the proviso that a :A
i a 6 A, since a = a .
Urquhart's rst important insight was that KR frames are quite like
projective spaces. A projective space P is a set P of points, and a collection
L of subsets of P called lines, such that any two distinct points are on
exactly one line, and any two distinct lines intersect in exactly one point.
But we can dene projective spaces instead through the ternary relation
of collinearity. Given a projective space P , its collinearity relation C is a
ternary relation satisfying the condition:
RELEVANCE LOGIC
103
provided that every line has at least four points (this last requirement is
necessary to verify the last condition). Conversely, if we have a set with a
ternary relation C satisfying these conditions, then the space dened with
the original set as points and the sets lab = fc : Cabcg [ fa; bg where a 6= b
as lines is a projective space.
Now the similarity with KR frames becomes obvious. If P is a projective
space, the frame F (P ) generated by P is given by adjoining a new point 0,
adding the conditions C 0aa, Ca0a, and Caa0, and by taking the extended
relation C to be the accessibility relation of the frame.
Projective spaces have a naturally associated undecidable problem. The
problem arises when considering the linear subspaces of projective spaces.
A subspace of a projective space is a subset which is also a projective space
under its inherited collinearity relation. Given any two linear subspaces X
and Y , the subspace X + Y is the set of all points on lines through points
in X and points in Y .
In KR frames there are propositions which play the role of linear subspaces in projective spaces. We need a convention to deal with the extra
point 0, and we simply decree that 0 should be in every \subspace." Then
linear subspaces are equivalent to the positive idempotents in a frame. That
is, they are the propositions X which are positive (so 0 2 X ) and idempotent
(so X = X X ). Clearly for any sentence A and any KR model M, the
extension of A, jjAjj in M is a positive idempotent i 0 A ^ (A $ A A).
It is then not too dicult to show that if A and B are positive idempotents,
so are A B and A ^ B , and that t and > are positive idempotents.
Given a projective space P , the lattice algebra hL; \; +i of all linear
subspaces of the projective space, under intersection and + is a modular geometric lattice. That is, it is a complete lattice, satisfying these conditions:
Modularity a c ) (8b) a \ (b + c) (a \ b) + c
104
! (vt $ wt )
where the sentence B is the conjunction of all sentences pi ^ (pi $ pi pi )
RELEVANCE LOGIC
105
x:y = (x
c23 )
(c31
y)
106
Now it is quite an involved operation to show that this is in fact an associative operation, but it can be done. And in fact, in certain circumstances,
the operation is a free associative operation. Given a countably innitedimensional vector space V , its lattice of subspaces is a 0-structure, and it
is possible to dene a modular 4-frame in this lattice of subspaces, such that
any countable semigroup is isomorphic to a subsemigroup of L12 under the
dened associative operation. (Urquhart gives the complete proof of this
result [Urquhart, 1984].)
The rest of the work of the undecidability proof involves showing that this
construction can be modelled in a logic. Perhaps surprisingly, it can all be
done in a weak logic like TW[^; _; !; >; ?]. We can do without negation by
picking out a distinguished propositional atom f , and by dening A to be
A ! f , t to be f , and A : B to be (A ! B ). A is a regular proposition
i
A $ A is provable. The regular propositions form an 0-structure, under the assumption of the formula = fR(t; f; >; ?); N (t; f; >; ?); > $
?g. where R(A) is
A $ A, N (A) is (t ! A) ! A, and R(A; B; : : : ) is
R(A) ^ R(B ) ^ and similarly for N . In other words, we can show that
the conditions for an 0-structure hold in the regular propositions, assuming
as an extra premise. To interpret the 0-structure conditions we interpret
u by ^, + by : and 0 by t.
Now we need to model a 4-frame in the 0-structure. This can be done
as we get just the modularity we need from another condition which is
simple to state. Dene K (A) to be R(A) ^ (A ^ A $ ?) ^ (A _ A $
>) ^ (A : A $ A) ^ (A $ A : A). Then we can show the following
K (A); R(B; C ); C ! A
` A ^ (B : C ) $ (A ^ B ) : C
In other words, if K (A), then A is modular in the class of regular propositions. Then the conditions for a 4-frame are simple to state. We pick out
our atomic propositions A1 ; : : : ; A4 and C12 ; : : : ; C34 which will do duty for
a1 ; : : : ; a4 and c12 ; : : : ; c34 . Then, for example, one independence axiom is
(A1 : A2 : A3 ) ^ (A2 : A3 : A4 ) $ (A2 : A3 )
and one modularity condition is
K (A1 : A3 : A4 )
We will let be the conjunction of the statements that express that the
propositions Ai and Cij form a 4-frame in the 0-structure of regular propositions. So, [ is a nite (but complex) set of propositions. In any algebra
in which [ is true, the lattice of regular propositions is a 0-structure,
and the denotations of the propositions Ai and Cij form a 4-frame. Finally,
when coding up a semigroup problem with variables x1 ; x2 ; : : : ; xm , we will
need formulae in the language which do duty for these variables. Thus we
RELEVANCE LOGIC
107
need a condition which picks out the fact that pi (standing for xi ) is in L12 .
We dene L(p) to be (p : A2 $ A1 : A2 ) ^ (p ^ A2 $ t). Then the semigroup
operation on elements of L12 can be dened in terms of ^ and : and the
formulae Ai and Cij . We assume that done, and we will simply take it that
there is an operation on formulae which picks out the algebraic operation
on L12 . This is enough for us to sketch the undecidability argument.
The deducibility problem for any logic between TW[^; _; !
; >; ?] and KR is undecidable.
108
! (vt $ wt )
The fusion connective has played an important part in the study of relevance logics. This is because fusion and implication are tied together by
RELEVANCE LOGIC
109
a b ! c i a b c
In addition, in the frame semantics, fusion and implication are tied to the
same ternary relation R, implication with the universal condition and fusion
with the existential condition.
This is an instance of a generalised Galois connection. Galois studied
connections between functions on partially ordered sets. A Galois connection between two partial orders on A and 0 on B is a pair of functions
f : A ! B and g : B ! A such that
b 0 f (a) i a g(b)
The condition tying together fusion and implication is akin to that tying
together f and g for Galois. So, gaggle theory (for `ggl': generalised Galois
logic ) studies these connections in their generality, and it turns out that relevance logics like R, E and T are a part of a general structure which not only
includes other relevance logics, but also traditional modal logics, Jonsson
and Tarski's Boolean algebras with operators [Jonsson and Tarski, 1951] and
many other formal systems. Dunn has shown that if a logic has a family of nary connectives which are tied together with a generalised galois connection,
then the logic has a frame semantics in which those connectives are modelled using the one n +1-ary relation, in the way that fusion and implication
are modelled by the same ternary relation in relevance logics [Dunn, 1991;
Dunn, 1993a; Dunn, 1994].
In general, an n-ary connective f has a trace (1 ; : : : ; n ) 7! + if
We write this as T (f ) = (1 ; : : : ; n ) 7! +. On the other hand, the connective f has trace (1 ; : : : ; n ) 7! if
110
RELEVANCE LOGIC
111
112
X`A A`Y
X`Y
In order to get away with this, a system needs to be such that whenever you
need to use a cut you can. The way Belnap does this is by requiring what he
calls the \display condition". The display condition is satised i for every
formula, every sequent including that formula is equivalent (using invertible
rules) to one in which that formula is either the entire antecedent or the
entire succedent of the sequent. For Belnap's original formulation, this is
achieved by having a binary structuring connective (not to be confused
with the sentential connective ) and a unary connective . The display
rules were as follows:
X Y ` Z () X ` Y Z
X ` Y Z () X Y ` Z () X ` Z Y
X ` Y () Y ` X () X ` Y
A structure is in antecedent position if it is in the left under an even number
of stars, or in the right under an odd number of stars. If it is not in
antecedent position, it is in succedent position. The star is read as negation,
and the circle is read as conjunction in antecedent position, and disjunction
in succedent position. The display postulates are a reworking of conditions
like the residuation condition for fusion and implication. Here we have the
conditions that a b c i a b + c (where x + y is the ssion of x and
y).
Belnap's system allows that dierent families of structural connectives
can be used for dierent families of connectives in the language. For example, when and are read intensionally, we can have the following rules for
RELEVANCE LOGIC
113
implication:
X A`B
X `A B`Y
X`A!B
A ! B ` X Y
If the properties of vary, so do the properties of the connective !. We
can give properties of extensional conjunction in order to get a material
conditional. Or conditions can be tightened, to give ! modal properties.
It is clear that the family of structural connectives (here and ) act in
analogously to accessibility relations on frames. However, the connections
with gaggle theory run deeper, however. It can be shown a connective introduced in with rules without side conditions, and in a way which `mimics'
structural connectives (just as here A ! B mimics X Y in consequent
position) must have a denable trace. Any implication satisfying those rules
will have trace ( ; +) 7! +, for example. For more details of this connection
and a general argument, see Restall's paper [Restall, 1995a].
Display logic gives these systems a natural cut-free proof theory, for Belnap has shown that under a broad set of conditions, any proof theory with
this structure will satisfy cut-elimination. So again, just as with gaggle theory, we have an example of the way that the study of relevance logics like
R and E have opened up into a more general theory of logics with similar
structures.
5.3 Paraconsistency
114
arbitrary) in logics like R, or any others with theorems related to the rule
of contraction. The theoremhood of propositions such as A ! (A !
B ) ! (A ! B ) and A ^ (A ! B ) ! B rule out a logic for service in the
cause of paraconsistent theories like these [Meyer et al., 1979].
However, this has not deterred some hardier souls in considering weaker
relevance logics which do not allow one to deduce triviality in these theories. Some work has been done to show that in some logics these theories
are consistent, and in others, though inconsistent, not everything is a theorem [Brady, 1989].
Another direction of paraconsistency in which techniques of relevance
logics have borne fruit is in the more computational area of reasoning with
inconsistent information. The techniques of rst degree entailment have
found a home in the study of \bilattices" by Melvin Fitting and others,
who seen in them a suitable framework for reasoning under the possibility
of inconsistent information [Fitting, 1989].
RELEVANCE LOGIC
115
information that A by writing `s A', and we'll write its negation, that s
doesn't support the information that A by writing `s 6 A'. This is standard
in the situation theoretic literature. The information carried by these situations has, according to Barwise and Perry, a kind of logical coherence. For
them, infons are closed under conjunction and disjunction, and s A ^ B
if and only if s A and s B , and s A _ B if and only if s A or
s B . However, negation is a dierent story | clearly situations don't
support the traditional equivalence between s :A and s 6 A (where :A
is the negation of A), for our situation witnessed by Max supports neither
the infon \Keating won the 1996 election" nor its negation.
What to do? Well, Barwise and Perry suggest that negation interacts with conjunction and disjunction in the familiar ways | :(A _ B )
is (equivalent to) :A ^ :B , and :(A ^ B ) is (equivalent to) :A _ :B .
And similarly, ::A is (equivalent to) A. This gives us a logic of sorts
of negation | it is rst degree entailment. Now for Barwise and Perry,
there are no actual situations in which s A ^ :A (the world is not
self-contradictory). However, they agree that it is helpful to consider abstract situations which allow this sort of inconsistency. So, Barwise and
Perry have an independent motivation for a semantic account of rst-degree
entailment. (More work has gone on to consider other connections between situation theory and relevance logics [Mares, 1997; Restall, 1994;
Restall, 1995b].)
Another connection with a parallel eld has come from completely dierent areas of research. The semantic structures of relevance logics have close
cousins in the models for the Lambek Calculus and in Relation algebras.
Let's consider relation algebras rst.
A relation algebra is a Boolean algebra with some extra operations, a
binary operation which denotes composition of relation, a unary operation
^ ,for the converse of a relation, and a constant 1 for the identity relation.
There is a widely accepted axiomatisation of the variety RA of relation
algebras. A relation algebra is set R with operations ^; _; ; 1; ; ^ such
that
These conditions are satised by the class of relations on any base set (that
is, by any concrete relation algebra). However, not every algebra satisfying
these equations is isomorphic to a subalgebra of a concrete relation algebra.
116
a x y
x 1 1
y 0 1
Then :a is the following relation
a x y
x 0 1
y 0 0
So we don't have b a _ :a for every b, and nor do we have a ^ :a _ b.
(However, we do have 1 a _ :a.)
The class of relation algebras have a natural form of implication to go
along with the fusionlike connective . If we dene a ! b to be :(:b a),
then we have the residuation condition a b c i a b ! c. However,
that is not the only implication-like connective we may dene. If we set
b a to be :(a :b), then a b c i b c a. Since is not, in general,
commutative, we have two residuals.
In logics like R this is not possible, for the left and the right residuals of
fusion are the same connective. However, in systems in the vicinity of E,
these implication operations come apart. This is mirrored by the behaviour
on frames, since we can dene B A by setting x B A i for each y; z
where Ryxz if y A then z B . This will be another residual for fusion,
and it will not agree with ! in the absence of commutativity of R (if Rxyz
then Ryxz ).49
It was hoped for some time that relation algebras would give an interesting model for logics like R. However, there does not seem to be a natural class of relations for which composition is commutative and square
increasing. (The class of symmetric relations will not do. Even if a = a^
and b = b^ , it does not follow that a b = b a. You merely get that
a b = a^ b^ = (b a)^ .) Considered as a logic, RA is a sublogic of R
(ignoring boolean negation for the moment). It is not a sublogic of E, since
in RA, a = 1 ! a. Another dierence between RA and typical relevance
logics is the behaviour of contraposition. We do not have a ! b = :b ! :a.
Instead, a ! b = :a :b.
A nal connection between RA and relevance logics is in the issue of
semantics. As we stated earlier, not all relation algebras are representable
as subalgebras of concrete relation algebras. However, Dunn has shown
49 We should
ag here that in the relevance logic literature, [Meyer and Routley, 1972]
seems to have been the rst to consider both left- and right-residuals for fusion.
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117
118
X ` B X ; A ` B !X ` B X; !A; !A ` B
X; !A ` B X ; !A ` B !X ` !B X; !A ` B
Given this proof theory it is possible to show that A ) B dened as !A !
B is an intuitionistic implication. This is similar to Meyer's result that
A ^ t ! B is an intuitionistic implication in R (indeed, !A dened as A ^ t
satises each of the conditions for ! above in R, but not in systems without
contraction). However, nothing like it holds in relevance logics without
contraction.
Linear logic also brings with it many new algebraic structures and models
in category theory. None of these models have been mined to see if they can
bring any `relevant' insight. However, some transfer has gone on in the other
direction | Allwein and Dunn [1993] have shown that the multiplicative
and additive fragment of linear logic can be given a Routley{Meyer style
semantics. This is not a simple job, as the absence of the distribution of
(additive) conjunction over disjunction means that at least one of these connectives (in this case, disjunction) must take a non-standard interpretation.
RELEVANCE LOGIC
119
8x8y(x = g ^ y = m ! Hx ^ Ly)
(assuming that (xHx)g and (yLy)m) but it need not follow that
8x8y(x = g ! (y = m ! Hx ^ Ly))
for there is no reason that Hx should follow from y = m, even given that
x = g holds. There is no connection between `y's being m' and Hg.
This latter proposition is a good candidate for expressing that there is a
real relationship holding between g and m. In other words, we can dene
(xyLxy)ab to be
8x8y x = a ! (y = b ! Lxy)
to express the holding of a relevant relation. For more on relevant predication, consult Dunn's series of papers [Dunn, 1987; Dunn, 1990a; Dunn,
1990b]
Relevance logics are very good at telling you what follows from what
as a matter of logic | and in this case, the logical structure of relevant
predication and relations. However, more work needs to be done to see in
what it consists to say that a relevant implication is true. For that, we
need a better grip on how to understand the models of relevance logics. It
is our hope that this chapter will help people in this aim, ant to bring the
technique of relevance logics to a still wider audience.
120
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Dunn's acknowledgements from the rst edition : I wish to express my thanks
and deep indebtedness to a number of fellow toilers in the relevant vineyards,
for information and discussion over the years. These include Richard Routley and Alasdair Urquhart and especially Nuel D. Belnap, Jr. and Robert
K. Meyer, and of course Alan Ross Anderson, to whose memory I dedicate
this essay. I also wish to thank Yong Auh for his patient and skilful help in
preparing this manuscript, and to thank Nuel Belnap, Lloyd Humberstone,
and Allen Hazen for corrections, although all errors and infelicities are to
be charged to me.
Our acknowledgements from the second edition : Thanks to Bob Meyer, John
Slaney, Graham Priest, Nuel Belnap, Richard Sylvan, Ed Mares, Rajeev
Gore, Errol Martin, Chris Mortensen, Uwe Petersen and Pragati Jain for
helpful conversations and correspondence on matters relevant to what is
discussed here. Thanks too to Jane Spurr, who valiantly typed in the rst
edition of the article, to enable us to more easily create this version. This
edition is dedicated to Richard Sylvan, who died while this essay was being
written. Relevance (and relevant ) logic has lost one of its most original and
productive proponents.
J. Michael Dunn
Indiana University
Greg Restall
Macquarie University
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QUANTUM LOGICS
1 INTRODUCTION
The ocial birth of quantum logic is represented by a famous article of
Birkho and von Neumann \The logic of quantum mechanics" [Birkho
and von Neumann, 1936]. At the very beginning of their paper, Birkho
and von Neumann observe:
One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the
most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which
it presupposes .... The object of the present paper is to discover
what logical structures one may hope to nd in physical theories
which, like quantum mechanics, do not conform to classical logic.
In order to understand the basic reason why a non classical logic arises
from the mathematical formalism of quantum theory (QT), a comparison
with classical physics will be useful.
There is one concept which quantum theory shares alike with
classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics. This is the
concept of a mathematical \phase-space". According to this
concept, any physical system S is at each instant hypothetically
associated with a \point" in a xed phase-space ; this point
is supposed to represent mathematically, the \state" of S , and
the \state" of S is supposed to be ascertainable by \maximal"
observations.
Maximal pieces of information about physical systems are called also pure
states . For instance, in classical particle mechanics, a pure state of a single
particle can be represented by a sequence of six real numbers hr1 ; : : : ; r6 i
where the rst three numbers correspond to the position -coordinates, whereas the last ones are the momentum -components.
As a consequence, the phase-space of a single particle system can be
identied with the set IR6 , consisting of all sextuples of real numbers. Similarly for the case of compound systems, consisting of a nite number n of
particles.
Let us now consider an experimental proposition P about our system,
asserting that a given physical quantity has a certain value (for instance:
\the value of position in the x-direction lies in a certain interval"). Such
D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.),
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 6, 129{228.
c 2002, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
130
a proposition P will be naturally associated with a subset X of our phasespace, consisting of all the pure states for which P holds. In other words,
the subsets of seem to represent good mathematical representatives of
experimental propositions. These subsets are called by Birkho and von
Neumann physical qualities (we will say simply events ). Needless to say,
the correspondence between the set of all experimental propositions and
the set of all events will be many-to-one. When a pure state p belongs to
an event X , we will say that our system in state p veries both X and the
corresponding experimental proposition.
What about the structure of all events? As is well known, the power-set
of any set is a Boolean algebra . And also the set F () of all measurable
subsets of (which is more tractable than the full power-set of ) turns out
to have a Boolean structure. Hence, we may refer to the following Boolean
algebra:
B = hF (); ; \; [; ; 1; 0i;
where:
1)
;\;[;
p veries a disjunction X [ Y
member;
QUANTUM LOGICS
131
p 2 X or p 2 X:
QT is, instead, essentially probabilistic. Generally, pure states assign only
probability-values to quantum events. Let represent a pure state (a wave
function) of a quantum system and let P be an experimental proposition
(for instance \the spin value in the x-direction is up"). The following cases
are possible:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
In the rst two cases, we will say that P is true (false ) for our system in
state . In the third case, P will be semantically indeterminate.
Now the question arises: what will be an adequate mathematical representative for the notion of quantum experimental proposition? The most
important novelty of Birkho and von Neumann's proposal is based on the
following answer: \The mathematical representative of any experimental
proposition is a closed linear subspace of Hilbert space" (we will say simply
a closed subspace ).1 Let H be a (separable) Hilbert space, whose unitary
vectors correspond to possible wave functions of a quantum system. The
closed subspaces of H are particular instances of subsets of H that are closed
under linear combinations and Cauchy sequences. Why are mere subsets of
the phase-space not interesting in QT? The reason depends on the superposition principle , which represents one of the basic dividing line between
the quantum and the classical case. Dierently from classical mechanics,
in quantum mechanics, nite and even innite linear combinations of pure
states give rise to new pure states (provided only some formal conditions
are satised). Suppose three pure states ; 1 ; 2 and let be a linear
combination of 1 ; 2 :
= c1
1 + c2 2 :
1 A Hilbert space is a vector space over a division ring whose elements are the real or
the complex or the quaternionic numbers such that
(i) An inner product ( : ; :) that transforms any pair of vectors into an element of the
division ring is dened;
(ii) the space is metrically complete with respect to the metrics induced by the inner
product ( : ; :).
A Hilbert space H is called separable i H admits a countable basis.
132
ci i (ci 6= 0)
QUANTUM LOGICS
133
X u (Y
t Z ) 6= (X u Y ) t (X u Z ):
It turns out that C (H) belongs to the variety of all orthocomplemented orthomodular lattices , that are not necessarily distributive.
The failure of distributivity is connected with a characteristic property of
disjunction in QT. Dierently from classical (bivalent) semantics, a quantum
disjunction X t Y may be true even if neither member is true. In fact, it
may happen that a pure state belongs to a subspace X t Y , even if
belongs neither to X nor to Y (see Figure 1).
Such a semantic behaviour, which may appear prima facie somewhat
strange, seems to re
ect pretty well a number of concrete quantum situations. In QT one is often dealing with alternatives that are semantically
determined and true, while both members are, in principle, strongly indeterminate. For instance, suppose we are referring to some one-half spin
particle (say an electron) whose spin may assume only two possible values:
either up or down . Now, according to one of the uncertainty principles , the
spin in the x direction (spinx) and the spin in the y direction (spiny ) represent two strongly incompatible quantities that cannot be simultaneously
134
o7
jj X
ooojjjjjjj
o
o
ooojjjj
ojojojojjj
jjojoj
jjjj
j
j
j
jjj
jjjj
j
j
j
j
jjjj
/
QUANTUM LOGICS
135
136
sense. Foulis and Randall have called such an extensional collapse \the
metaphysical disaster" of the standard quantum logical approach.
2) The lattice structure of the closed subspaces automatically renders the
quantum proposition system closed under logical conjunction. This
seems to imply some counterintuitive consequences from the physical
point of view. Suppose two experimental propositions that concern
two strongly incompatible quantities, like \the spin in the x direction
is up", \the spin in the y direction is down". In such a situation,
the intuition of the quantum physicist seems to suggest the following
semantic requirement: the conjunction of our propositions has no definite meaning; for, they cannot be experimentally tested at the same
time. As a consequence, the lattice proposition structure seems to be
too strong.
An interesting weakening can be obtained by giving up the lattice condition: generally the inmum and the supremum are assumed to exist only for
countable sets of propositions that are pairwise orthogonal. In the recent
quantum logical literature an orthomodular partially ordered set that satises the above condition is simply called a quantum logic . At the same time,
by standard quantum logic one usually means the complete orthomodular
lattice based on the closed subspaces in a Hilbert space. Needless to observe, such a terminology that identies a logic with a particular example of
an algebraic structure turns out to be somewhat misleading from the strict
logical point of view. As we will see in the next sections, dierent forms of
quantum logic, which represent \genuine logics" according to the standard
way of thinking of the logical tradition, can be characterized by convenient
abstraction from the physical models.
2 ORTHOMODULAR QUANTUM LOGIC AND ORTHOLOGIC
We will rst study two interesting examples of logic that represent a natural logical abstraction from the class of all Hilbert space lattices.These are
represented respectively by orthomodular quantum logic (OQL) and by the
weaker orthologic (OL), which for a long time has been also termed minimal quantum logic . In fact, the name \minimal quantum logic" appears
today quite inappropriate, since a number of weaker forms of quantum logic
have been recently investigated. In the following we will use QL as an abbreviation for both OL and OQL.
The language of QL consists of a denumerable set of sentential literals
and of two primitive connectives: : (not ), ^ (and ). The notion of formula
of the language is dened in the expected way. We will use the following
metavariables: p; q; r; : : : for sentential literals and , ,
; : : : for formulas.
QUANTUM LOGICS
137
_ := : (: ^ : ) :
The problem concerning the possibility of a well behaved conditional connective will be discussed in the next Section. We will indicate the basic
metalogical constants as follows: not, and, or, y (if...then), i (if and only
if), 8 (for all ), 9 (for at least one).
Because of its historical origin, the most natural characterization of QL
can be carried out in the framework of an algebraic semantics. It will be
expedient to recall rst the denition of ortholattice :
DEFINITION 1 (Ortholattice). An ortholattice is a structure B = hB ; v ;0 ;
1 ; 0i, where
(1.1) hB ; v ; 1 ; 0i is a bounded lattice, where 1 is the maximum and
0 is the minimum . In other words:
(i) v is a partial order relation on B (re
exive, antisymmetric
and transitive);
(ii) any pair of elements a; b has an inmum aub and a supremum
a t b such that:
a u b v a; b and 8c: c v a; b y c v a u b;
a; b v a t b and 8c: a; b v c y a t b v c;
(iii) 8a: 0 v a; a v 1.
(1.2) the 1-ary operation 0 (called orthocomplement ) satises the following conditions:
(i) a00 = a (double negation);
(ii) a v b y b0 v a0 (contraposition);
(iii) a u a0 = 0 (non contradiction).
Dierently from Boolean algebras, ortholattices do not generally satisfy
the distributive laws of u and t. There holds only
(a u b) t (a u c) v a u (b t c)
a t (b u c) v(a t b) u (a t c):
The lattice hC (H) ; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0i of all closed subspaces in a Hilbert space
H is a characteristic example of a non distributive ortholattice.
DEFINITION 2 (Algebraic realization for OL). An algebraic realization for
OL is a pair A = hB ; vi, consisting of an ortholattice B = hB ; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0i
and a valuation -function v that associates to any formula of the language
an element (truth-value ) in B , satisfying the following conditions:
138
(i) v(: ) = v( )0 ;
(ii) v( ^
) = v( ) u v(
).
DEFINITION 3 (Truth and logical truth). A formula is true in a realization A = hB ; vi (abbreviated as j=A ) i v() = 1; is a logical truth
of OL (j=OL) i for any algebraic realization A = hB ; vi, j=A .
When j=A , we will also say that A is a model of ; A will be called a
model of a set of formulas T (j=A T ) i A is a model of any 2 T .
DEFINITION 4 (Consequence in a realization and logical consequence).
Let T be a set of formulas and let A = hB ; vi be a realization. A formula
is a consequence in A of T (T j=A ) i for any element a of B :
if for any 2 T , a v v( ) then a v v().
A formula is a logical consequence of T (T j=OL ) i for any algebraic
realization A: T j=A .
Instead of fg j=OL we will write j=OL . If T is nite and equal to
f1 ; : : : ; n g, we will obviously have: T j=OL i v(1 ) u u v(n ) v v().
One can easily check that j=OL i for any T , T j=OL.
OL can be equivalently characterized also by means of a Kripke-style
semantics, which has been rst proposed by [Dishkant, 1972]. As is well
known, the algebraic semantic approach can be described as founded on the
following intuitive idea: interpreting a language essentially means associating to any sentence an abstract truth-value or, more generally, an abstract
meaning (an element of an algebraic structure). In the Kripkean semantics,
instead, one assumes that interpreting a language essentially means associating to any sentence the set of the possible worlds or situations where
holds. This set, which represents the extensional meaning of , is called
the proposition associated to (or simply the proposition of ). Hence,
generally, a Kripkean realization for a logic L will have the form:
D
E
K = I ; R!i ; !
oj ; ; ;
where
(i) I is a non-empty set of possible worlds possibly correlated by relations
!i and operations in the sequence o!j . In most cases,
in the sequence R
we have only one binary relation R, called accessibility relation.
(ii) is a set of sets of possible worlds, representing possible propositions
of sentences. Any proposition and the total set of propositions must
satisfy convenient closure conditions that depend on the particular
logic.
(iii) transforms sentences into propositions preserving the logical form.
QUANTUM LOGICS
139
8i [i 2 X i 8j (i ?
=jyj?
= X )] :
In other words, a proposition is a set of worlds X that contains all and
only the worlds whose accessible worlds are not unaccessible to X . Notice
that the conditional i 2 X y 8j (i ?
=jyj?
= X ) trivially holds for any set
of worlds X .
Our denition of proposition represents a quite general notion of \possible
meaning of a formula", that can be signicantly extended also to other
logics. Suppose for instance, a Kripkean frame F = hI; R i, where the
accessibility relation is at least re
exive and transitive (as happens in the
Kripkean semantics for intuitionistic logic). Then a set of worlds X turns
out to be a proposition (in the sense of Denition 7) i it is R-closed (i.e.,
140
X is a proposition of F i 8i [i 2= X y 9j (i ?
= j and j ? X )]
00
X is a proposition of F i X = X .
i j= i 8j ?
= i 9k ?
= j (k j= ):
Proof. Since the accessibility relation is symmetric, the left to right implication is trivial. Let us prove i j== y not8j ?= i 9k ?= j (k j= ),
which is equivalent to i 2= () y 9j ?= i 8k ?= j (k 2= ()). Suppose
i 2= (). Since () is a proposition, by Lemma 8.1 there holds for a certain j : j ?= i and j ? (). Let k ?= j , and suppose, by contradiction,
k 2 (). Since j ? (), there follows j ? k, against k ?
= j . Consequently,
9j ?
= i 8k ?
= j (k 2= ()).
LEMMA 12. In any Kripkean realization K:
(12.1)
i j= : i 8j ?
= i (j j=
= );
QUANTUM LOGICS
(12.2)
141
i j= ^ i i j= and i j= .
THEOREM 15. OL
j= i OL
j= ; for any .
The Theorem is an immediate corollary of the following Lemma:
LEMMA 16.
For any algebraic realization A there exists a Kripkean realization KA such that for any , j=A i j=KA .
(16.2) For any Kripkean realization K there exists an algebraic realization AK such that for any , j=K i j=AK .
(16.1)
142
(p) = fb 2 I j b v v(p)g.
One can easily check that KA is a \good" Kripkean realization; further,
there holds, for any : () = fb 2 B j b 6= 0 and b v v()g. Consequently, j=A i j=KA .
(16.2) Any Kripkean realization K = hI; R ; ; i can be canonically
transformed into an algebraic realization AK = hB ; vi by putting:
B = ;
for any a; b 2 B : a v b i a b;
a0 = fi 2 I j i ? ag;
1 = I ; 0 = ;;
v(p) = (p).
It turns out that B is an ortholattice. Further, for any , v() = ().
Consequently: j=K i j=AK .
THEOREM 17.
T OL
j= i T OL
j= .
K
Let us now consider A . The algebra B of T
AK is complete, because is
closed under innitary intersection. Hence, f( )Tj 2 T g is an element
of B . Since i j= for any 2 T , we will have i 2 f( ) j 2 T g. Thus
there is an element of B , which is less or equal than v( )(= ( )) for any
2 T , but is not less or equal than v()(= ()), because i 2= (). This
contradicts the hypothesis T OL
j=A .
The right to left implication is trivial.
Let us now turn to a semantic characterization of OQL. We will rst
recall the denition of orthomodular lattice.
DEFINITION 18 (Orthomodular lattice). An orthomodular lattice is an
ortholattice B = hB ; v ;0 ; 1 ; 0i such that for any a; b 2 B :
a u (a0 t (a u b)) v b:
Orthomodularity clearly represents a weak form of distributivity.
LEMMA 19. Let B be an ortholattice. The following conditions are equivalent:
QUANTUM LOGICS
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
B is orthomodular.
For any a; b 2 B : a v b
For any a; b 2 B : a v b
For any a; b 2 B : a v b
143
b = a t (a0 u b).
i a u (a u b)0 = 0.
and a0 u b = 0 y a = b.
y
144
X \ (X \ Y )0 6= ; y X 6 Y:
Hence, by Lemma 19, the algebra B of AK is orthomodular.
AK and
Are there any signicant
structural
relations
between
A
and
K
between K and
AKA ? The question admits a very strong answer in the case
K
of A and KA .
A
THEOREM 26. A = hB; vi and AK = hB; v i are isomorphic realizations.
Sketch of the proof Let us dene the function : B ! B in the following
way:
(a) = fb j b 6= 0 and b v ag for any a 2 B .
One can easily check that: (1) is an isomorphism (from B onto B ); (2)
v (p) = (v(p)) for any atomic formula p.
K
At the same time, in the case of K and KA , there is no natural correspondence between I and . As a consequence, one can prove only the
weaker relation:
K
THEOREM 27. Given K = hI ; R ; ; i and KA = hI ; R ; ; i,
there holds:
() = fX 2 j X ()g ; for any :
QUANTUM LOGICS
145
In the class of all Kripkean realizations for QL, the realizations KA (which
have been obtained by canonical transformation of an algebraic realization
A) present some interesting properties, which are summarized by the following theorem.
THEOREM 28. In any KA = hI ; R ; ; i there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of worlds I and the set of propositions f;g such
that:
(28.1) i 2 (i);
(28.2) i ?
= j i (i) 6 (j )0 ;
(28.3) 8X 2 : i 2 X i 8k 2 (i)(k 2 X ).
Theorem 28 suggests to isolate, in the class of all K, an interesting subclass of Kripkean realizations, that we will call algebraically adequate .
DEFINITION 29. A Kripkean realization K is algebraically adequate i it
satises the conditions of Theorem 28.
When restricting to the class of all algebraically adequate Kripkean realizations one can prove:
K
THEOREM 30. K = hI ; R ; ; i and KA = hI ; R ; ; i are isomorphic realizations; i.e., there exists a bijective function from I onto I such
that:
(30.1) Rij i R (i) (j ), for any i; j 2 I ;
(30.2) = f (X ) j X 2 g, where (X ) := f (i) j i 2 X g;
(30.3) (p) = ((p)), for any atomic formula p.
One can easily show that the class of all algebraically adequate Kripkean realizations determines the same concept of logical consequence that
is determined by the larger class of all possible realizations.
The Kripkean characterization of QL turns out to have a quite natural
physical interpretation. As we have seen in the Introduction, the mathematical formalism of quantum theory (QT) associates to any physical system
S a Hilbert space H, while the pure states of S are mathematically represented by unitary vectors of H. Let us now consider an elementary
sublanguage LQ of QT, whose atomic formulas represent possible measurement reports (i.e., statements of the form \the value for the observable Q
lies in the Borel set ") and suppose LQ closed under the quantum logical
connectives. Given a physical system S (whose associated Hilbert space is
H), one can dene a natural Kripkean realization for the language LQ as
follows:
KS = hI ; R ; ; i ;
146
where:
For any atomic formula p, (p) is the proposition containing all the
pure states that assign to p probability-value 1.
Interestingly enough, the accessibility relation turns out to have the following physical meaning: Rij i j is a pure state into which i can be
transformed after the performance of a physical measurement that concern
an observable of the system.
3 THE IMPLICATION PROBLEM
Dierently from most weak logics, QL gives rise to a critical \implicationproblem". All conditional connectives one can reasonably introduce in QL
are, to a certain extent, anomalous; for, they do not share most of the characteristic properties that are satised by the positive conditionals (which
are governed by a logic that is at least as strong as positive logic ). Just
the failure of a well-behaved conditional led some authors to the conclusion
that QL cannot be a \real" logic. In spite of these diculties, these days
one cannot help recognizing that QL admits a set of dierent implicational
connectives, even if none of them has a positive behaviour. Let us rst propose a general semantic condition for a logical connective to be classied as
an implication-connective.
is called an
DEFINITION 31. In any semantics, a binary connective !
implication-connective i it satises at least the two following conditions:
is always true (identity );
(31.1) !
is true then is true (modus ponens ).
(31.2) if is true and !
In the particular case of QL, one can easily obtain:
to be an implicationLEMMA 32. A sucient condition for a connective !
connective is:
(i) in the algebraic semantics: for any realization A = hA; vi, j=A !
i v() v v( );
QUANTUM LOGICS
147
K = hI; R; ; i,
v( !2 ) = v( ) t (v()0 u v( )0 ).
v( !3 ) = (v()0 u v( )) t (v() u v( )) t (v()0 u v( )0 ).
148
c u a v b i c v a
b;
where: a b := a0 t b.
An orthomodular lattice B turns out to be a Boolean algebra i for any
algebraic realization A = hB; vi, any i (1 i 5) and any ; the following
import-export condition is satised:
v( ) u v() v v( ) i v( ) v v( !i ):
QUANTUM LOGICS
149
In order to single out a unique polynomial conditional, various weakenings of the import-export condition have been proposed. For instance the
following condition (which we will call weak import-export ):
v(
) u v() v v( ) i v(
) v v() !i v( );
whenever v() and v( ) are compatible.
One can prove [Hardegree, 1975; Mittelstaedt, 1972] that a polynomial
conditional !i satises the weak import-export condition i i = 1. As
a consequence, we can conclude that !1 represents, in a sense, the best
possible approximation for a material conditional in quantum logic. This
connective (often called Sasaki-hook ) was originally proposed by [Mittelstaedt, 1972] and [Finch, 1970], and was further investigated by [Hardegree,
1976] and other authors. In the following, we will usually write ! instead
of !1 and we will neglect the other four polynomial conditionals.
Some important positive laws that are violated by our quantum logical
conditional are the following:
! ( ! );
( ! ( !
)) ! (( ! ) ! ( !
));
( ! ) ! (( !
) ! ( !
));
( ^ !
) ! ( ! ( !
));
( ! ( !
)) ! ( ! ( !
)):
This somewhat \anomalous" behaviour has suggested that one is dealing with a kind of counterfactual conditional . Such a conjecture seems to
be conrmed by some important physical examples. Let us consider again
the class of the Kripkean realizations of the sublanguage LQ of QT (whose
atomic sentences express measurement reports). And let K S = hI; R; ; i
represent a Kripkean realization of our language, which is associated to a
physical system S . As [Hardegree, 1975] has shown, in such a case the conditional ! turns out to receive a quite natural counterfactual interpretation
(in the sense of Stalnaker). More precisely, one can dene, for any formula
, a partial Stalnaker-function f in the following way:
f : Dom(f ) ! I;
where:
Dom(f ) = fi 2 I j i ?
= ()g :
In other words, f is dened for all and only the states that are not orthogonal to the proposition of .
150
If i 2 Dom(f ), then:
f (i) = j P() i ;
where P() is the projection that is uniquely associated with the closed subspace determined by (), and j P() i is the normalized vector determined
by P() i. There holds:
i j= ! i either 8j ?
= i(j j=
= ) or f (i) j= :
From an intuitive point of view, one can say that f (i) represents the \pure
state nearest" to i, that veries , where \nearest" is here dened in terms
of the metrics of the Hilbert space H. By denition and in virtue of one of
the basic postulates of QT (von Neumann's collapse of the wave function ),
f (i) turns out to have the following physical meaning: it represents the
transformation of state i after the performance of a measurement concerning
the physical property expressed by , provided the result was positive. As a
consequence, one obtains: ! is true in a state i i either is impossible
for i or the state into which i has been transformed after a positive -test,
veries .
Another interesting characteristic of our connective !, is a weak non
monotonic behaviour. In fact, in the algebraic semantics the inequality
v( !
) v v( ^ !
)
can be violated (a counterexample can be easily obtained in the orthomodular lattice based on IR3 ). As a consequence:
!
j=
= ^ !
:
Polynomial conditionals are not the only signicant examples of implicationconnectives in QL. In the framework of a Kripkean semantic approach, it
seems quite natural to introduce a conditional connective (, that represents
a kind of strict implication . Given a Kripkean realization K = hI; R; ; i
one would like to require:
i j= ( i 8j ?
= i (j j= y j j= ):
However such a condition does not automatically represent a correct semantic denition, because it is not granted that ( ( ) is an element of
. In order to overcome this diculty, let us rst dene a new operation in
the power-set of an orthoframe hI; Ri.
DEFINITION 37 (Strict-implication operation ( ( ). Given an orthoframe
hI; Ri and X; Y I :
(Y
:= fi j 8j (i ?
= j and j 2 X y j 2 Y )g :
QUANTUM LOGICS
151
( ( ) := () ( ( ):
One can easily check that
immediately:
i j= ( i 8j ?
= i (j j= y j j= ):
Another interesting implication that can be dened in QL is represented by
an entailment-connective.
DEFINITION 39 (Entailment (). Given K = hI; R; ; i,
( ) :=
I; if () ( );
;; otherwise:
v( ) :=
1; if v() v v( );
0; otherwise:
152
One can easily check that represents the same connective in the two
semantics. As to (, given A = hB; vi, one would like to require:
F
v( ( ) = fb 2 B j b 6= 0 and 8c(c 6= 0 and b 6v c0 and
c v v() y c v v( ))g:
However such a denition supposes the algebraic completeness of B. Further we can prove that ( represents the same connective in the two semantics only if we restrict our consideration to the class of all algebraically
adequate Kripkean realizations.
4 METALOGICAL PROPERTIES AND ANOMALIES
Some metalogical distinctions that are not interesting in the case of a number of familiar logics weaker than classical logic turn out to be signicant
for QL (and for non distributive logics in general).
We have already dened (both in the algebraic and in the Kripkean semantics) the concepts of model and of logical consequence . Now we will
introduce, in both semantics, the notions of quasi-model , weak consequence
and quasi-consequence . Let T be any set of formulas.
DEFINITION 42 (Quasi-model).
Algebraic semantics
A realization A = hB; vi
is a quasi-model of T i
9a[a 2 B and a 6= 0 and
8 2 T (a v v( ))].
Kripkean semantics
A realization K = hI; R; ; i
is a quasi-model of T i
9i(i 2 I and i j= T ).
QUANTUM LOGICS
153
LEMMA 48. T j= y T j ; T j= y T j .
LEMMA 49. j i : j :.
Most familiar logics, that are stronger than positive logic, turn out to
satisfy the following metalogical properties, which we will call Herbrand{
Tarski , veriability and Lindenbaum , respectively.
Herbrand{Tarski
T j= i T
Veriability
Ver T i Real T
Lindenbaum
Real T y 9T [T T and Compl T ], where
Compl T i 8 [ 2 T or : 2 T ].
j
i T
j
The Herbrand{Tarski property represents a semantic version of the deduction theorem. The Lindenbaum property asserts that any semantically
non-contradictory set of formulas admits a semantically non-contradictory
complete extension. In the algebraic semantics, canonical proofs of these
properties essentially use some versions of Stone-theorem, according to
which any proper lter F in an algebra B can be extended to a proper
complete lter F (such that 8a(a 2 F or a0 2 F )). However, Stonetheorem does not generally hold for non distributive orthomodular lattices!
In the case of ortholattices, one can still prove that every proper lter can
be extended to an ultralter (i.e., a maximal lter that does not admit
any extension that is a proper lter). However, dierently from Boolean
algebras, ultralters need not be complete.
A counterexample to the Herbrand{Tarski property in OL can be obtained using the \non-valid" part of the distributive law. We know that
(owing to the failure of distributivity in ortholattices):
^ ( _
) j=
= ( ^ ) _ ( ^
):
At the same time
^ ( _
) j ( ^ ) _ ( ^
);
since one can easily calculate that for any realization A = hB; vi the hypothesis v( ^ ( _
)) = 1, v(( ^ ) _ ( ^
)) 6= 1 leads to a contradiction 2 .
154
A counterexample to the veriability-property is represented by the negation of the a fortiori principle for the quantum logical conditional !:
:= :( ! ( ! )) = :(: _ ( ^ (: _ ( ^ )))):
This
has an algebraic quasi-model. For instance the realization A =
hB; vi, where B is the orthomodular lattice determined by all subspaces of
the plane (as shown in Figure 2). There holds: v(
) = v() 6= 0. But one
can easily check that
cannot have any model, since the hypothesis that
v(
) = 1 leads to a contradiction in any algebraic realization of QL.
O
v()
j v ( )
jjjj
j
j
j
jjjj
jjjjjjj
jj j
jjjj
j
j
j
jjj
jjjj
j
j
j
j
jjjj
/
QUANTUM LOGICS
155
156
(p) = p;
(: ) = ( );
( ^
) = ( ) f (
).
In other words, translates any atomic formula as the necessity of the
possibility of the same formula; further, the quantum logical negation is interpreted as the necessity of the classical negation, while the quantum logical
conjunction is interpreted as the classical conjunction. We will indicate the
set f ( ) j 2 T g by (T ).
THEOREM 53. For any and T of OL: T j=OL i (T ) j=B ()
Theorem 53 is an immediate corollary of the following Lemmas 54 and
55.
LEMMA 54. Any OL-realization K = hI; R; ; i can be transformed into
a B-realization MK = hI ; R ; ; i such that: I = I ; R = R;
8i (i j=K i i j=MK ()).
Sketch of the proof Take as the smallest subset of the power-set of
I that contains (p) for any atomic formula p and that is closed under
I; ;; ; \; . Further, take (p) equal to (p).
LEMMA 55. Any B-realization M = hI; R; ; i can be transformed into a
OL-realization KM = hI ; R; ; i such that: I = I ; R = R;
8i (i j=KM i i j=M ()).
QUANTUM LOGICS
157
158
(OL1)
T [ fg j
(OL2)
T j ; T [ fg j
T [ T j
(OL3)
T [ f ^ g j
(^-elimination)
(OL4)
T [ f ^ g j
(^-elimination)
(OL5)
(OL6)
T j ; T j
T j ^
T [ f; g j
T [ f ^ g j
(identity)
(transitivity)
(^-introduction)
(^-introduction)
3 Sequent calculi for dierent forms of quantum logic will be described in Section 17.
QUANTUM LOGICS
(OL8)
fg j ; fg j :
:
T [ fg j ::
(OL9)
T [ f::g j
(OL7)
(OL10)
T [ f ^ :g j
(OL11)
fg j
f: g j :
159
(absurdity)
(weak double negation)
(strong double negation)
(Duns Scotus)
(contraposition)
8 (T1 j y T2 j= :):
The following theorem represents a kind of \weak Lindenbaum theorem".
160
T j y T j= :
Proof. Straightforward.
THEOREM 74. Completeness theorem.
T j= y T j :
Proof. It is sucient to construct a canonical model
that:
T j i T j=K :
As a consequence we will immediately obtain:
K = hI; R; ; i such
T j= y T j=
= K y T j=
= :
Denition of the canonical model
(i) I is the set of all consistent and deductively closed sets of formulas;
(ii) R is the compatibility relation between sets of formulas;
(iii) is the set of all propositions in the frame hI; Ri;
(iv) (p) = fi 2 I
j p 2 ig.
QUANTUM LOGICS
161
^ :( ^ :( ^ )) j .
(orthomodularity)
^ :( ^ :( ^ )) j=K :
As to the completeness theorem, we need a slight modication of the
proof we have given for ` OL. In fact, should we try and construct the
canonical model K, by taking as the set of all possible propositions of the
162
QUANTUM LOGICS
163
(iv) It is not known whether the canonical model of OQL is standard. Try
and construct a canonical realization for OQL by taking as the set
of all possible propositions (similarly to the OL-case). Let us call such
a realization a pseudo canonical realization . Do we obtain in this way
an OQL-realization, satisfying the orthomodular property? In other
words, is the pseudo canonical realization a model of OQL?
In order to prove that OQL is characterized by the class of all standard
Kripkean realizations it would be sucient to show that the canonical model
belongs to such a class. Should orthomodularity be elementary, then, by
a general result proved by Fine, this problem would amount to showing
the following statement: there is an elementary condition (or a set thereof)
implying the orthomodularity of the standard pseudo canonical realization.
Result (i), however, makes this way denitively unpracticable.
Notice that a positive solution to problem (iv) would automatically provide a proof of the full equivalence between the algebraic and the Kripkean
consequence relation (T OQL
j=A i T OQL
j=K ). If OQL is characterized by a
standard canonical model, then we can apply the same argument used in the
case of OL, the ortholattice of the canonical model being orthomodular.
By similar reasons, also a positive solution to problem (ii) would provide a
direct proof of the same result. For, the orthomodular lattice of the (not
necessarily standard) canonical model of OQL would be embeddable into
a complete orthomodular lattice.
We will now present Goldblatt's result proving that orthomodularity is
not elementarity. Further, we will show how orthomodularity leaves defeated one of the most powerful embedding technique: the MacNeille completion method.
hI; Ri j=
(ii)
164
Thus,
= fhI; Ri
j hI; Ri j= g :
DEFINITION 78 (Elementary substructure). Let hI1 ; R1 i ; hI2 ; R2 i be two
frames.
i hI2 ; R2 i j= [i1 ; : : : in ]:
In other words, the elements of the \smaller" structure satisfy exactly the
same L2 -formulas in both structures. The following Theorem [Bell and
Slomson, 1969] provides an useful criterion to check whether a substructure
is an elementary substructure.
THEOREM 79. Let hI1 ; R1 i be a substructure of hI2 ; R2 i. Then, hI1 ; R1 i
is an elementary substructure of hI2 ; R2 i i whenever (x1 ; ; xn ; y) is a
formula of L2 (in the free variables x1 ; ; xn ; y) and i1 ; ; in are elements
of I1 such that for some j 2 I2 , hI2 ; R2 i j= [i1 ; ; in; j ], then there is some
i 2 I1 such that hI2 ; R2 i j= [i1 ; ; in ; i]:
Let us now consider a pre-Hilbert space 5 H and let H+ := f 2 H j 6= 0g,
where 0 is the null vector. The pair
+
;=
H ?
where 8 ; 2 H+ : ?= i
is an orthoframe,
the inner product of
and is dierent from the null vector 0 (i.e., ( ; ) 6= 0). Let (H) be the
ortholattice of all propositions of hH+ ; ?
= i, which turns out to be isomorphic
to the ortholattice C (H) of all (not necessarily closed) subspaces of H (a
proposition is simply a subspace devoided of the null vector). The following
deep Theorem, due to Amemiya and Halperin [Varadarajan, 1985] permits
5 A pre-Hilbert space is a vector space over a division ring whose elements are the real
or the complex or the quaternionic numbers such that an inner product (which transforms
any pair of vectors into an element of the ring) is dened. Dierently from Hilbert spaces,
pre-Hilbert spaces need not be metrically complete.
QUANTUM LOGICS
165
us to characterize the class of all Hilbert spaces in the larger class of all
pre-Hilbert spaces, by means of the orthomodular property.
THEOREM 80 (Amemiya{Halperin Theorem). C (H) is orthomodular i H
is a Hilbert space.
In other words, C (H) is orthomodular i H is metrically complete.
As is well known [Bell and Slomson, 1969], the property of \being metrically complete" is not elementary. On this basis, it will be highly expected
that also the orthomodular property is not elementary. The key-lemma in
Goldblatt's proof is the following:
LEMMA 81. Let Y be an innite-dimensional (not necessarily closed) subspace of a separable Hilbert space H. If is any formula of L2 and 1 ; ; n
are vectors of Y such that for some 2 H, hH+ ; ?
= i j= [ 1 ; ;
= i j= [ 1 ; ; n ; ].
n ; ], then there exists a vector 2 Y such that hH+ ; ?
As a consequence one obtains:
THEOREM 82. The orthomodular property is not elementary.
166
QUANTUM LOGICS
167
(OAL)
Greechie has proved that (OAL) holds in H but fails in a particular nite
orthomodular lattice. In order to understand Greechie's counterexample, it
will be expedient to illustrate the notion of Greechie diagram .
Let us rst recall the denition of atom .
DEFINITION 87 (Atom). Let B = hB; v; 1; 0i any bounded lattice. An
atom is an element a 2 B f0g such that:
8b 2 B : 0 v b v a
b = 0 or a = b:
168
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
a0
a
o ?OO
ooo ??O?OOOO
o
o
?? OOO
o
??
OOO
ooo
ooo
o
0
0
0
?O?OOOb ?? ocoo ?O?OOOd ?? oeo0oO
?? OOO oo?o?
?? OOO oo?o?
?? ooOoOO??
Oo ?
??o
o
?
?oo OO ?
O
ooo ? OO?
? oooo ? OOO?O?
O
o
oOOOOb ?? c o d oeoo
o
OOO ??
ooooo
OOO ?
o
OOO??
ooo
OO?
oo
QUANTUM LOGICS
169
n
c
i
??
???
??
?
o
??r
?
??
l ???
??
??
??
??
?
?
g ??? m ???
k
??
??
??
??
??
f ????
h
??
s
b
Hence, there are two formulas and (whose valuations in a convenient
realization represent the left- and right- hand side of (OAL), respectively)
such that j==OQL . At the same time, for any C (H) 2 H and for any
realization A = hC (H); vi, there holds: j=A .
As a consequence, OQL is not characterized by H . Accordingly, HQL
is denitely stronger than OQL. We are faced with the problem of nding
170
out a calculus, if any, that turns out to be sound and complete with respect
to H . The main question is whether the class of all formulas valid in H is
recursively enumerable. In order to solve this problem, it would be sucient
(but not necessary) to show that the canonical model of HQL is isomorphic
to the subdirect product of a class of Hilbert lattices. So far, very little is
known about this question.
QUANTUM LOGICS
171
172
are dened in the usual way. We will use x; y; z; x1 ; ; xn ; as metavariables ranging over the individual variables, and t; t1 ; t2 ; as metavariables
ranging over terms. The existential quantier 9 is supposed dened by a
generalized de Morgan law:
9x := :8x::
DEFINITION 95 (Algebraic realization for rst-order
OL). An algebraic
(i) BC = B C ; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0 is anF ortholattice closed under innitary inmum ( ) and supremum ( ) for any F B C such that F 2 C (C
being a particular family of subsets of B C ).
F
DEFINITION
96 (Truth and logical truth). A formula is true in A =
C
B ; D; v (abbreviated as j=A ) i for any interpretation of the variables
, v () = 1; is a logical truth of OL (j=OL) i for any A, j=A .
DEFINITION
97 (Consequence
in a realization and logical consequence).
Let A = BC ; D; v be a realization. A formula is a consequence of T in
A (abbreviated T j=A ) i for any element a of B c and any interpretation
QUANTUM LOGICS
173
(i) I ; R ; C satises the same conditions as in the sentential case; further C is closed under innitary intersection for any F c such
that F 2 C (where C is a particular family of subsets of C );
(ii) U , called the domain of K, is a non-empty set, disjoint from the set
of worlds I . The elements of U are individual concepts u such that
for any world i: u(i) is an individual (called the reference of u in the
world i). An individual concept u is called rigid i for any pairs of
worlds i, j : u(i) = u(j ). The set Ui = fu(i) j u 2 U g represents the
domain of individuals in the world i . Whenever Ui = Uj for all i,j we
will say that the realization K has a constant domain .
(iii) associates a meaning to any individual constant am and to any
predicate Pmn according to the following conditions:
(x) = (x)
(am ) = (am )
(Pmn t1 ; ; tn ) = (Pmn )( (t1 ); ; (tn ))
(: ) = ( )0
( ^
) = ( ) \ (
)
T
(8x ) = [x=u ] ( ) j u 2 U ; where
[x=u] ( ) j u 2 U 2 C .
For any world i and any interpretation of the variables, the triplet h ; i ; i
(abbreviated as i ) will be called a world-valuation .
DEFINITION 99 (Satisfaction). i j= (i satises ) i i 2 ().
DEFINITION 100 (Verication). i j= (i veries ) i for any : i j= .
174
LEMMA 103. Given A = BC ; D ; v and K = I ; R ; C ; U; :
(103.1) If and coincide in the values attributed
to the variables
oc
curring in a term t, then v (t) = v (t); (t) = (t).
(103.2) If and coincide in the values attributed
to the free variables
occurring in a formula , then v () = v (); () = ().
One can easily prove, like in the sentential case, the following lemma:
LEMMA 104.
(104.1) For any algebraic realization A there exists a Kripkean realization
KA such that for any : j=A i j=KA . Further, if A is
orthomodular then KA is orthomodular.
(104.2) For any Kripkean realization K, there exists an algebraic realization AK such that for any for any : j=K i j=AK . Further,
if K is orthomodular then AK is orthomodular.
An axiomatization of rst-order OL (OQL) can be obtained by adding
to the rules of our OL (OQL)-sentential calculus the following new rules:
(PR1)
(PR2)
All the basic syntactical notions are dened in the expected way. One
can prove that any consistent set of sentences T admits of a consistent
inductive extension T , such that T j 8x(t) whenever for any closed term
t, T j (t). The \weak Lindenbaum theorem" can be strengthened as
follows: for any sentence , if T j= : then there exists a consistent and
QUANTUM LOGICS
175
Proof. Straightforward.
THEOREM 106. Completeness.
T j= y T j :
in the sentential
a canonical model K = I ; R ; C ; U ; such that T j i T j=K .
Denition of the canonical model
(i) I is the set of all consistent, deductively closed and inductive sets of
sentences expressed in a common language LK , which is an extension
of the original language;
(ii) R is determined like in the sentential case;
(iii) U is a set of rigid individual concepts that is naturally determined by
the set of all individual constants of the extended language LK . For
any constant c of LK , let uc be the corresponding individual concept
in U . We require: for any world i, uc (i) = c. In other words, the
reference of the individual concept uc is in any world the constant c.
We will indicate by cu the constant corresponding to u.
(iv)
(am ) = uam ;
(Pmn )(uc11 ; : : : ; ucnn ) = fi j Pmn c1 ; : : : ; cn 2 ig :
Our is well dened since one can prove for any sentence of LK :
i j= y 9j ?
=i :j
j ::
176
i j= i 2 i;
where is the sentence obtained by substituting in any free variable x
with the constant c(x) corresponding to the individual concept (x).
Sketch of the proof. By induction on the length of . The cases =
Pmn t1 ; ; tn , = : , = ^
are proved by an obvious transformation
of the sentential argument. Let us consider the case = 8x and suppose
x occurring in (otherwise the proof is trivial). In order to prove the left
to right implication, suppose i j= 8x . Then, for any u in U , [x=u] j=
(x). Hence, by inductive hypothesis, 8u 2 U , [ (x)][x=u] 2 i. In other
words, for any constant cu of i: [ (x)] (x=cu ) 2 i. And, since i is inductive
and deductively closed: 8x (x) 2 i. In order to prove the right to left
implication, suppose [8x (x)] 2 i. Then, [by (PR1)], for any constantcc of
i: [ (x=c)] 2 i. Hence by inductive hypothesis: for any uc 2 U , i [x=u ] j=
(x), i.e., i j= 8x (x). On this ground, similarly to the sentential case,
one can prove T j i T j=K .
However, in QL, the truth of the antecedent of our implication does not
generally guarantee the existence of a particular individual such that x can
be regarded as a name for such an individual. As a counterexample, let us
consider the following case (in the algebraic semantics): let A be hB ; D ; vi
where B is the complete orthomodular lattice based on the set of all closed
subspaces of the plane IR2 , and D contains exactly two individuals d1 ; d2 .
Let P be a monadic predicate and X; Y two orthogonal unidimensional
subspaces of B such that v(P )(d1 ) = X , v(P )(d2 ) = Y . If the equality
predicate = is interpreted as the standard identity relation (i.e., v (t1 =
t2 ) = 1, if v (t1 ) = v (t2 ); 0, otherwise), one can easily calculate:
QUANTUM LOGICS
177
v[x=d1 ] (P x) 6= 1; v[x=d2 ] (P x) 6= 1:
In other words, there is no precise individual in the domain that satises
the property expressed by our predicate P !
10 QUANTUM SET THEORIES AND THEORIES OF QUASISETS
An important application of QL to set theory has been developed by [Takeuti,
1981]. We will sketch here only the fundamental idea of this application. Let
L be a standard set-theoretical language. One can construct ortho-valued
models for L, which are formally very similar to the usual Boolean-valued
models for standard set-theory, with the following dierence: the set of
truth-values is supposed to have the algebraic structure of a complete orthomodular lattice, instead of a complete Boolean algebra. Let B be a
complete orthomodular lattice, and let , ,... represent ordinal numbers.
An ortho-valued (set-theoretical ) universe V is constructed as follows:
S
V B = 2On V ( ) , where:
V (0) = ;.
178
6j=V B x = y ! 8z (x 2 z $ y 2 z ):
According to our semantic denitions, the relation = represents a kind
of \extensional equality". As a consequence, one may conclude that two
quantum-sets that are extensionally equal do not necessarily share all the
same properties. Such a failure of the Leibniz-substitutivity principle in
quantum set theory might perhaps nd interesting applications in the eld
of intensional logics.
A completely dierent approach is followed in the framework of the theories of quasisets (or quasets ). The basic aim of these theories is to provide
a mathematical description for collections of microobjects, which seem to
violate some characteristic properties of the classical identity relation.
In some of his general writings, Schrodinger discussed the inconsistency
between the classical concept of physical object (conceived as an individual
entity) and the behaviour of particles in quantum mechanics. Quantum
particles { he noticed { lack individuality and the concept of identity cannot
be applied to them, similarly to the case of classical objects.
One of the aims of the theories of quasisets (proposed by [da Costa et al.,
1992]) is to describe formally the following idea defended by Schrodinger:
identity is generally not dened for microobjects. As a consequence, one
cannot even assert that an \electron is identical with itself". In the realm
of microobjects only an indistinguishability relation (an equivalence relation
that may violate the substitutivity principle) makes sense.
On this basis, dierent formal systems have been proposed. Generally,
these systems represent convenient generalizations of a Zermelo{Fraenkel
like set theory with urelements . Dierently from the classical case, an urelement may be either a macro or a microobject . Collections are represented
by quasisets and classical sets turn out to be limit cases of quasisets.
A somewhat dierent approach has been followed in the theory of quasets
(proposed in [Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia, 1993]).
The starting point is based on the following observation: physical kinds
and compound systems in QM seem to share some features that are characteristic of intensional entities. Further, the relation between intensions and
extensions turns out to behave quite dierently from the classical semantic
situations. Generally, one cannot say that a quantum intensional notion
uniquely determines a corresponding extension. For instance, take the notion of electron , whose intension is well dened by the following physical
property: mass = 9:1 10 28 g, electron charge = 4:8 10 10e.s.u., spin
QUANTUM LOGICS
179
180
QUANTUM LOGICS
181
of the measurement (which tests the property), and also on the accuracy
involved in the operational denition for the physical quantities which our
property refers to.
12 EFFECT STRUCTURES
Dierent algebraic structures can be induced on the class E (H) of all eects.
Let us rst recall some denitions.
DEFINITION 108 (Involutive bounded poset (lattice)). An involutive
bounded poset (lattice) is a structure B = hB ; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0i, where hB ; v ; 1 ; 0i
is a partially ordered set (lattice) with maximum (1) and minimum (0); 0
is a 1-ary operation on B such that the following conditions are satised:
(i) a00 = a; (ii) a v b y b0 v a0 .
DEFINITION 109 (Orthoposet). An orthoposet is an involutive bounded
poset that satises the non contradiction principle:
a u a0 = 0:
DEFINITION 110 (Orthomodular poset). An orthomodular poset is an orthoposet that is closed under the orthogonal sup (a v b0 y a t b exists)
and satises the orthomodular property:
a v b y 9c such that a v c0 and b = a t c.
DEFINITION 111 (Regularity). An involutive bounded poset (lattice) B is
regular i a v a0 and b v b0 y a v b0 .
Whenever an involutive bounded poset B is a lattice, then B is regular
i it satises the Kleene condition :
a u a0 v b t b0 :
The set E (H) of all eects can be naturally structured as an involutive
bounded poset:
E (H) = hE (H) ; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0i ;
where
(i) E v F i for any state (statistical operator) W , Tr(W E ) Tr(W E )
(in other words, any state assigns to E a probability-value that is less
or equal than the probability-value assigned to F );
j projection, respectively;
(ii) 1, 0 are the identity (1I) and the null (O)
(iii) E 0 = 1 E .
182
One can easily check that v is a partial order, 0 is an order-reversing involution, while 1 and 0 are respectively the maximum and the minimum with
respect to v. At the same time this poset fails to be a lattice. Dierently
from projections, some pairs of eects have no inmum and no supremum
as the following example shows [Greechie and Gudder, n.d.]:
EXAMPLE 112. Let us consider the following eects (in the matrix-representation) on the Hilbert space IR2 :
1
E = 02 01
2
3
F = 04 01
4
1
G = 02 01
4
16
QUANTUM LOGICS
183
representing unsharp physical properties , possibly violating the non contradiction principle.
The eect poset E (H) can be naturally extended to a richer structure,
equipped with a new complement , that has an intuitionistic-like behaviour:
E is the projection operator PKer(E) whose range is the kernel Ker(E )
of E , consisting of all vectors that are transformed by the operator E
into the null vector.
By denition, the intuitionistic complement of an eect is always a projection. In the particular case, where E is a projection, it turns out that:
E 0 = E . In other words, the fuzzy and the intuitionistic complement
collapse into one and the same operation.
The structure hE (H) ; v ; 0 ; ; 1 ; 0i turns out to be a particular example
of a Brouwer Zadeh poset [Cattaneo and Nistico, 1986].
DEFINITION 113. A Brouwer{Zadeh poset (simply a BZ-poset ) is a structure hB ; v ; 0 ; ; 1 ; 0i, where
(113.1) hB ; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0i is a regular involutive bounded poset;
(113.2) is a 1-ary operation on B , which behaves like an intuitionistic
complement:
(i) a u a = 0.
(ii) a v a.
(iii) a v b y b v a .
(113.3) The following relation connects the fuzzy and the intuitionistic
complement:
a0 = a .
DEFINITION 114. A Brouwer Zadeh lattice is a BZ-poset that is also a
lattice.
184
Another interesting way of structuring the set of all eects can be obtained by using a particular kind of partial structure, that has been called effect algebra [Foulis and Bennett, 1994] or unsharp orthoalgebra [Dalla Chiara
and Giuntini, 1994]. Abstract eect algebras are dened as follows:
DEFINITION 115. An eect algebra is a partial structure A = hA ; ; 1 ; 0i
where is a partial binary operation on A. When is dened for a pair
a ; b 2 A, we will write 9 (a b). The following conditions hold:
(i) Weak commutativity
9(a b) y 9(b a) and a b = b a.
(ii) Weak associativity
[9(b c) and 9(a (b c))] y [9(a b) and 9((a b) c)
and a (b c) = (a b) c].
(iii) Strong excluded middle
For any a, there exists a unique x such that a x = 1.
(iv) Weak consistency
9(a 1) y a = 0.
From an intuitive point of view, our operation can be regarded as an
exclusive disjunction (aut ), which is dened only for pairs of logically incompatible events.
An orthogonality relation ?, a partial order relation v and a generalized
complement 0 can be dened in any eect algebra.
DEFINITION 116. Let A = hA ; ; 1 ; 0i be an eect algebra and let a; b 2
A.
(i) a ? b i a b is dened in A.
(ii) a v b i 9c 2 A such that a ? c and b = a c.
(iii) The generalized complement of a is the unique element a0 such
that a a0 = 1 (the denition is justied by the strong excluded
middle condition).
The category of all eect algebras turns out to be (categorically) equivalent to the category of all dierence posets , which have been rst studied in
[K^opka and Chovanec, 1994] and further investigated in [Dvurecenskij and
Pulmannova, 1994].
Eect algebras that satisfy the non contradiction principle are called
orthoalgebras :
DEFINITION 117. An orthoalgebra is an eect algebra B = hB ; ; 1 ; 0i
such that the following condition is satised:
QUANTUM LOGICS
185
Strong consistency
9 (a a) y a = 0.
In other words: 0 is the only element that is orthogonal to itself.
In order to induce the structure of an eect algebra on E (H), it is sucient to dene a partial sum as follows:
9 (E F ) i E + F
2 E (H);
9 (E F ) y E F = E + F:
It turns out that the structure hE (H) ; ; 1I ; Oj i is an eect algebra, where
the generalized complement of any eect E is just 1I E . At the same time,
this structure fails to be an orthoalgebra.
Any abstract eect algebra
A = hA ; ; 1 ; 0i
can be naturally extended to a kind of total structure, that has been termed
quantum MV-algebra (abbreviated as QMV-algebra) [Giuntini, 1996].
Before introducing QMV-algebras, it will be expedient to recall the denition of MV-algebra. As is well known, MV-algebras (multi-valued algebras )
have been introduced by Chang [1957] in order to provide an algebraic proof
of the completeness theorem for Lukasiewicz' innite-many-valued logic L@ .
A \privileged" model of this logic is based on the real interval [0; 1], which
gives rise to a particular example of a totally ordered (or linear) MV-algebra.
Both MV-algebras and QMV-algebras are total structures having the
following form:
M = (M ; ; ; 1; 0)
where:
(i) 1 ; 0 represent the certain and the impossible propositions (or alternatively the two extreme truth values);
(ii) is the negation-operation;
(iii)
186
a d b := (a b) b:
In the concrete MV-algebra based on [0; 1], the operations are dened as
follows:
(i) 1 = 1; 0 = 0;
(ii) a = 1 a;
(iii)
a + b; if a + b 1;
1;
otherwise:
a e b = Minfa; bg
(a et b is the minimum between a and b):
a d b = Maxfa; bg
(a vel b is the maximum between a and b):
A standard abstract denition of MV-algebras is the following [Mangani,
1973]:
DEFINITION 118. An MV-algebra is a structure M = (M ; ; ; 1; 0),
where is a binary operation, is a unary operation and 0 and 1 are
special elements of M , satisfying the following axioms:
(MV1)
(MV2)
(MV3)
(MV4)
(MV5)
(MV6)
(MV7)
(MV8)
(a b) c = a (b c)
a0=a
ab=ba
a1=1
(a ) = a
0 = 1
a a = 1
(a b) b = (a b ) a
QUANTUM LOGICS
187
EF =
Further, let us put:
E + F; if 9(E F );
1;
otherwise:
E = 1I E:
The structure E (H) = hE (H) ; ; ; 1 ; 0i turns out to be \very close" to an
MV-algebra. However, something is missing: E (H) satises the rst seven
axioms of our denition (MV1-MV7); at the same time one can easily check
that the axiom (MV8) (usually called \Lukasiewicz axiom") is violated. For
instance, let us consider two non trivial projections P; Q such that P is not
orthogonal to Q and Q is not orthogonal to P . Then, by denition of ,
we have that P Q = 1I and Q P = 1I. Hence: (P Q) Q = Q 6=
P = (P Q) P .
As a consequence, Lukasiewicz axiom must be conveniently weakened to
obtain a representation for our concrete eect structure. This can be done
by means of the notion of QMV-algebra.
188
:BB !B
QUANTUM LOGICS
a b :=
189
a b; if 9(a b);
1;
otherwise:
9(a b) y a b = a b:
The resulting structure hM ; ; 1 ; 0i will be denoted by Mea .
THEOREM 123. [Gudder, 1995; Giuntini, 1995] Let B = hB ; ; 1 ; 0i be
an eect algebra and let M = (M ; ; ; 1; 0) be a QMV-algebra.
EF =
E + F; if 9(E F );
1;
otherwise;
and
E = 1 E = E0:
These dierent ways of inducing a structure on the set of all unsharp
physical properties have suggested dierent logical abstractions. In the
following sections, we will investigate some interesting examples of unsharp
quantum logics.
13 PARACONSISTENT QUANTUM LOGIC
Paraconsistent quantum logic (PQL) represents the most obvious unsharp
weakening of orthologic. In the algebraic semantics, this logic is characterized by the class of all realizations based on an involutive bounded lattice,
where the non contradiction principle (a u a0 = 0) is possibly violated.
190
hE (H) ; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0i ;
where H is any Hilbert space. In the Kripkean semantics, consider the
realizations based on the following frames
QUANTUM LOGICS
191
^ : j _ :
(Kleene rule )
A completeness theorem for both PQL and RPQL can be proved, similarly to the case of OL. Both logics PQL and RPQL admit a natural modal
translation (similarly to OL). The suitable modal system which PQL can
be transformed into is the system KB, semantically characterized by the
class of all symmetric frames. A convenient strengthening of KB gives rise
to a regular modal system, that is suitable for RPQL.
An interesting question concerns the relation between PQL and the orthomodular property.
Let B = hA; v ; 0 ; 1 ; 0i be an ortholattice. By Lemma 19 the following three conditions (expressing possible denitions of the orthomodular
property) turn out to be equivalent:
(i) 8a; b 2 B : a v b y b = a t (a0 u b);
(ii) 8a; b 2 B : a v b and a0 u b = 0 y a = b;
(iii) 8a; b 2 B : a u (a0 t (a u b)) v b.
However, this equivalence breaks down in the case of involutive bounded
lattices. One can prove only:
LEMMA 126. Let B be an involutive bounded lattice. If B satises condition
(i), then B satises conditions (ii) and (iii).
Proof. (i) implies (ii): trivial. Suppose (i); we want to show that (iii) holds.
Now, a0 v a0 t b0 = (a u b)0 . Therefore, by (i), (a u b)0 = a0 t (a u (a u b)0 ).
By de Morgan law: a u b = (a u (a0 t (a u b)) v b.
192
a0
a
o ?OfO
ooo ??O?OOOO
o
o
?? OOO
o
??
OOO
ooo
ooo
o
0
0
?O?OOO ?b? ooo ?O?cOOO ?d?0 oooO
?? OOO oo?o?
?? OOO oo?o?
?? oooOOO??
o??o?o?ooOOOOO???
?
O
o
?
O
o
?
O
?
O?
o
o
ooOoOOO ??b O ?ooco d oooO ?
OOO ??
oo
OOO ??
oo
OOO?? ooooo
OO
ooo
e0
e
f
0
Figure 6.
G14
LEMMA 127. Any involutive bounded lattice B that satises condition (iii)
is an ortholattice.
QUANTUM LOGICS
193
194
8i 9j : i 6? j :
(ic) hI;
6?i is an orthoframe;
(id) Fuzzy accessibility implies intuitionistic accessibility:
i 6? j y i
6? j:
(ie) Any world i has a kind of \twin-world" j such that for any
world k:
(a) i
6? k i j 6? k
(b) i
6? k y j 6? k.
For any set X of worlds, the fuzzy-orthogonal set X 0 is dened like in OL:
X 0 = fi 2 I j 8j 2 X : i ? j g :
QUANTUM LOGICS
195
The BZL-calculus includes, besides the rules of RPQL the following modal
rules:
196
(BZ1)
L j
(BZ2)
L j LL
(BZ3)
ML j L
(BZ4)
j
L j L
(BZ5)
L ^ L j L( ^ )
(BZ6)
; j :(L ^ :L)
QUANTUM LOGICS
197
where our sentence certainly holds, and the domain of the situations where
our sentence certainly does not hold. Similarly to Kripkean semantics, the
situations we are referring to can be thought of as a kind of possible worlds.
However, dierently from the standard Kripkean behaviour, the positive domain of a given sentence does not generally determine the negative domain
of the same sentence. As a consequence, propositions are here identied
with particular pairs of sets of worlds, rather than with particular sets of
worlds.
Let us again assume the BZL language. We will dene the notion of
realization with positive and negative certainty domains (shortly ortho-pair
realization ) for a BZL language.
DEFINITION 131. An ortho-pair realization is a system O = hI ; R ;
; vi ;
where:
(i) hI ; R i is an orthoframe.
(ii) Let 0 be the set of all propositions of the orthoframe hI ; Ri.
As we already know, this set gives rise to an ortholattice with
respect to the operations u; t and 0 (where u is the set-theoretic
intersection).
An orthopairproposition of hI ; R i is any pair hA1 ; A0 i, where
A1 ; A0 are propositions in 0 such that A1 A00 . An orthopairproposition hA1 ; A0 i is called exact i A0 = A01 (in other words,
A0 is maximal). The following operations and relations can be
dened on the set of all orthopairpropositions:
(iia) The fuzzy complement:
hA ; A i
0 := hA ; A i :
1
*
\
fAn1 g ;
fAn0 g
198
fhAn1 ; An0 ig :=
fAn1 g ; fAn0 g :
hA1 ; A0 i v hB1 ; B0 i
i A1 B1 and B0 A0 :
;u;t
(iii)
is a set of orthopairpropositions, that is closed under
0;
and 0 := h; ; I i :
(iv) v is a valuation-function that maps formulas into orthopairpropositions according to the following conditions:
v(: ) = v( )
0;
;
v( ) = v( )
v( ^
) = v( )uv(
).
The other basic semantic denitions are given like in the algebraic semantics. One can prove the following Theorem:
THEOREM 132. Let hI ; R i be an orthoframe and let
0 be the set of all
; h;; I i;
orthopairpropositions of hI ; R i. Then, the structure h
0 ; ;
0 ;
hI; ;ii is a complete BZ-lattice with respect to the innitary conjunction and
disjunction dened above. Further, the following conditions are satised: for
any hA1 ; A0 i ; hB1 ; B0 i 2
0 :
.
(i) hA1 ; A0 i = hA1 ; A0 i
0
= (hA ; A i
0 ).
(ii) hA1 ; A0 i
1 0
0.
(iii) hA1 ; A0 i = hA1 ; A0 i
(iv) (hA ; A i
u hB ; B i)
= hA ; A i
t hB ; B i
:
1
QUANTUM LOGICS
199
_ : and
_ :
One can easily check that they are logically equivalent in the ortho-pair
semantics. For, given any ortho-pair realization O, there holds::
_ : =j=BZL _ :
For instance, let us consider the following algebraic BZL{realization A =
hB ; vi, where the support B of is the real interval [0 ; 1] and the algebraic
structure on B is dened as follows:
a v b i a b;
a0 = 1 a;
(
1 ; if a = 0;
a =
0 ; otherwise:
1 = 1; 0 = 0.
Suppose for a given sentential literal p: 0 < v(p) < 1=2. We will have
v(p _ p) = Max(v(p) ; 0) = v(p) < 1=2. But v(p _ :p) = Max(v(p) ; 1
v(p)) = 1 v(p) 1=2. Hence: v(p _ p) < v(p _ :p).
As a consequence, the orthopair-semantics characterizes a logic stronger
than BZL. We will call this logic BZL3 . The name is due to the characteristic three-valued features of the ortho-pair semantics.
Our logic BZL3 is axiomatizable. A suitable calculus can be obtained
by adding to the BZL-calculus the following rules.
Rules of BZL3 .
(BZ3 1)
L( _ ) j L _ L
(BZ3 2)
L j ; j M
j
200
(DR2)
M ^ M j M ( ^ )
(DR3)
( ^ ) j _
j BZL
3
T j=BZL3:
T j=BZL3 y T
j BZL :
3
(i) I is the set of all possible sets i of formulas satisfying the following
conditions:
(ia) i is non contradictory with respect to the fuzzy negation ::
for any , if 2 i, then : 62 i;
(ib) i is L-closed : for any , if 2 i, then L 2 i;
(ic) i is deductively closed : for any , if i j , then 2 i.
(ii) The accessibility relation R is dened as follows:
Rij i for any formula : 2 i y : 62 j .
(In other words, i and j are not contradictory with respect
to the fuzzy negation).
Instead of not Rij , we will write i ? j .
(iii)
is the set of all orthopairpropositions of hI; Ri.
QUANTUM LOGICS
201
:pg :
v1 () = fi j i j g
v0 () = fi j i j :g
LEMMA 139. For any formula :
0 := h;; I i = hfi j i j L ^ :Lg ; fi j i j :(L ^ :L)gi.
LEMMA 140. Let T = f1 ; : : : ; n ; : : : g be a set of formulas and let be
any
formula.
T
fv1 (n ) j n 2 T g v1 () y L1 ; : : : ; Ln ; : : : j .
As a consequence, one can prove:
LEMMA 141. Lemma of the canonical model
T j=O y T j :
Suppose T j=O . Hence (by denition of consequence in a given realization): for any orthopairproposition hA1 ; A0 i 2
, if for all n 2 T ,
hA1 ; A0 i v v(n ), then hA1 ; A0 i v v().
The propositional lattice, consisting of all orthopairpropositions of O is
complete (see Theorem 132). Hence: n fv(n ) j n 2 T g v v(). In
other words, by denition of v:
F
(i) fv1 (n ) j n 2 T g v1 ();
F
(ii) v0 () fv0 (n ) j n 2 T g.
Thus, by (i) and by Lemma 140: L1 ; : : : ; Ln ; : : : j . Consequently,
there exists a nite subset fn1 ; : : : ; nk g of T such that Ln1 ^ : : : ^
Lnk j . Hence, by the rules for ^ and L: L(n1 ^ : : : ^ nk ) j .
202
At
F the same time, we obtain from (ii) and by Lemma 138: v1 (:) v
fv1 (:n ) j n 2 T g.
Whence, by de Morgan,
h\
i0
v1 (:)
f(v1 (:n ))0 j n 2 T g :
Now, one can easily check Tthat in any realization: v1 (:)0 = v1 (M). As
a consequence: v1 (:) [ f(v1 (Mn ) j n 2 T g]0 : Hence, by contraposition:
\
fv1 (Mn ) j n 2 T g (v1 (:))0
and
\
fv1 (Mn ) j n 2 T g v1 (M):
Consequently, by Lemma 140 and by the S5 -rules:
LM1 ; : : : ; LMn ; : : : j M ;
M1 ; : : : ; Mn ; : : : j M :
QUANTUM LOGICS
203
1) Is there any Kripkean characterization of the logic that is algebraically characterized by the class of all de Morgan BZ-lattices
(i.e. BZ-lattices satisfying condition (i) of Denition 142)? In
this framework, the problem can be reformulated in this way: is
the (strong) de Morgan law elementary?
2) Is it possible to axiomatize a logic based on an innite manyvalued generalization of the ortho-pair semantics?
3) Find possible conditional connectives in BZL3 .
4) Find an appropriate orthomodular extension of BZL3 .
j i assigns to E probability 1g ;
X0E := fi j i assigns to E probability 0g :
In other words, X1E ; X0E represent the positive and the negative
domain of E , respectively. The map f turns out to preserve the
order relation and the two complements:
E v F i f (E ) v f (F ):
204
^: := :(: _+ : ):
The intuitive idea underlying our semantics for UPaQL is the following: disjunctions and conjunctions are always considered \legitimate" from
a mere linguistic point of view. However, semantically, a disjunction _+
will have the intended meaning only in the \well behaved cases" (where
the values of and are orthogonal in the corresponding eect orthoalgebra). Otherwise, _+ will have any meaning whatsoever (generally not
connected with the meanings of and ). As is well known, a similar
semantic \trick" is used in some classical treatments of the description operator (\the unique individual satisfying a given property"; for instance,
\the present king of Italy").
QUANTUM LOGICS
205
v( _+ ) =
v( ) v(
); if v( ) v(
) is dened in B;
any element; otherwise.
1 j 1 ; : : : ; n j n
j
In other words, we will consider only inferences from single formulas.
Rules of UPaQL
(UPa1)
(UPa2)
j j
j
(UPa3)
::
(identity)
(transitivity)
206
(UPa4)
:: j
(UPa5)
j
: j :
(contraposition)
(UPa6)
j _+ :
(UPa7)
(UPa8)
j
ity)
(UPa9)
(excluded middle)
: _ : j _
: j
+
(unicity of negation)
: j 1 1 j j 1 1 j
_ j 1 _ 1
+
j :
_+ j _+
(weak substitutiv-
(weak commutativity)
(UPa10)
:
j :( _
)
j :
(weak associativity)
(UPa11)
:
j :( _
)
_ j :
(weak associativity)
(UPa12)
:
j :( _
)
_ ( _
) j ( _ ) _
(weak associativity)
(UPa13)
j :
j :( _+
)
( _+ ) _+
j _+ ( _+
)
(weak associativity)
QUANTUM LOGICS
207
j :
j
(WPaQL)
(Duns Scotus)
Clearly, the Duns Scotus-rule corresponds to the strong consistency condition in our denition of orthoalgebra (see Denition 117). In other words,
dierently from UPaQL, the logic WPaQL forbids paraconsistent situations.
Finally, an axiomatization of strong partial quantum logic (SPaQL) can
be obtained, by adding the following rule to (UPa1)-(UPa13), (WPa):
(SPaQL)
: j
j
_ j
+
Fj ; j T
(D2)
j :
j _+
j
(orthomodular-like rule)
_+ : ( _+ : )
(D3)
(D4)
:
j :
_
_
+
(cancellation)
208
In other words, the logical implication behaves similarly to the partial order
relation in the eect algebras.
The following derivable rule holds for WPaQL and for SPaQL:
j : j
j
j _+
(D5)
_+ j
Our calculi turn out to be adequate with respect to the corresponding semantic characterizations. Soundness proofs are straightforward. Let us
sketch the proof of the completeness theorem for our weakest calculus (UPaQL).
THEOREM 146. Completeness.
j= y j :
Proof. Following the usual procedure, it is sucient to construct a canonical model A = hB ; vi such that for any formulas ; :
j y j=A :
[] v [ ] i j :
QUANTUM LOGICS
209
: .
j i [] v [ ] i v() v v( ) i j=A
The completeness argument can be easily transformed, mutatis mutandis
for the case of weak and strong partial quantum logic.
16 LUKASIEWICZ QUANTUM LOGIC
As we have seen in Section 12, the class E (H) of all eects on a Hilbert
space H determines a quasi-linear QMV-algebra. The theory of QMValgebras suggests, in a natural way, the semantic characterization of a new
form of quantum logic (called Lukasiewicz quantum logic (LQL)), which
generalizes both OQL and L@ .
The language of LQL contains the same primitive connectives as WPaQL
( _+ ; :). The conjunction (^: ) is dened via de Morgan law (like in WPaQL).
Further, a new pair of conjunction ( ^^ ) and disjunction ( __ ) connectives
are dened as follows:
^^ := ( _+ : ) ^:
__ := :(: ^^ : )
DEFINITION 148. A realization for LQL is a pair A = hM ; vi, where
(i) M = hM ; ; ; 1 ; 0i is a QMV-algebra.
210
v(: ) = v( ) .
v( _+
) = v( ) v(
).
The other semantic denitions (truth, consequence in a given realization,
logical truth, logical consequence) are given like in the QL-case.
LQL can be easily axiomatized by means of a calculus that simply mimics
the axioms of QMV-algebras.
The quasi-linearity property, which is satised by the QMV-algebras of
eects, is highly non equational. Thus, the following question naturally
arises: is LQL characterized by the class of all quasi-linear QMV-algebras
(QLQMV)? In the case of L@ , Chang has proved that L@ is characterized
by the MV-algebra determined by the real interval [0; 1]. This MV-algebra
is clearly quasi-linear, being totally ordered.
The relation between LQL and QMV algebras turns out to be much more
complicated. In fact one can show that LQL cannot be characterized even
by the class of all weakly linear QMV-algebras (WLQMV). Since WLQMV is
strictly contained in QLQMV, there follows that LQL is not characterized
by QLQMV. To obtain these results, something stronger is proved. In
particular, we can show that:
a b = 1 i a b:
Thus, it might happen that the notion of logical truth of the logic based
on H SP(QLQMV) is (nitely) axiomatizable, while the notion of \logical
entailment" ( j= ) is not.
We will now show that the QMV-algebra M4 (see Figure 7 below) does
not admit any good polynomial conditional. The operations of M4 are
QUANTUM LOGICS
211
dened as follows:
0
0
0
0
a
a
a
a
b
b
b
b
1
1
1
` 1
0
a
b
1
0
a
b
1
0
b
a
1
0
a
b
1
0
a
b
1
a
1
1
1
b
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
a
b
1
1
a
b
0
?
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
0
Figure 7.
M4
212
1
2
0
Figure 8.
M3
dened as follows:
0
0
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
2
1
0
1
2
1
0
1
2
0
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
h(x) :=
0
1
2
1
2
M4 ! M3 such that 8x 2 M4
8
>
<0;
if x = 0;
if x = a or x = b;
:
1; otherwise
1;
>2
1
2
!M
1
= 1;
2
QUANTUM LOGICS
213
214
C ??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
QL
L
`N
M1 ` N1 : : : Mn ` Nn
M `N
where M1 ` N1 ; : : : ; Mn ` Nn are the premisses , while M ` N is the
conclusion of the rule. Rules can be structural or operational . Operational
rules introduce a new connective, while structural rules deal only with the
structure of the sequents (orders, repetitions, etc.).
A derivation is a sequence of sequents where any element is either an
axiom or the conclusion of a rule whose premisses are previous elements of
the sequence.
Basic logic has been introduced in [Battilotti and Sambin, 1999], and
substantially reformulated in [Sambin et al., 1998]. According to the sec14 A multiset is a set of pairs such that the rst element of every pair denotes any object,
while the second element denotes the multiplicity of the occurrences of our object. Two
multisets are equal if and only if all their pairs are equal, that is all their objects together
with their multiplicities are equal.
QUANTUM LOGICS
215
ond formulation (we will follow here),15 our logic is characterized by three
strictly linked principles: re
ection , symmetry , visibility . The re
ection
principle states the fact that logical constants are the result of importing
into a formal system metalinguistic links between assertions, considered preexisting. There is a method that leads to the rules of the calculus, starting
from metalinguistic links between assertions. Such a method analyses the
following equivalences, which assert a correspondence between language and
metalanguage:
`
if and only if M
` R
` N if and only if L ` N
Here the generic sign \", corresponding to a metalinguistic link between
assertions, is translated respectively into the connective R , when it appears
on the right of the sign `, and into the connective L, when it appears on the
left. In B, the operational rules are completely determined by such equivalences. As a consequence, the meaning of a connective turns out to be
semantically determined by the correspondence with a metalinguistic link,
quite independently of any link with a context. Since every metalinguistic
link is translated into a connective according to two specular ways, the system of rules, obtained by this method, turns out to be strongly symmetric.
In fact B contains, for every axiom and for every (unary or binary) rule R
Mi ` Ni
M `N R
its symmetric rule Rs , given by
Nis ` Mis s
Ns ` Ms R
where the map ( )s is dened by induction (on the length of formulas), by
putting sR L and sL R , given a suitable correspondence between
propositional variables.
The third principle that B satises is the visibility property. A rule
for a given connective is called visible when the principal formula and the
corresponding secondary formulas appear in the rule without any context.16
15 The formulation of the rules of B presented in [Sambin et al., 1998] is based on nite
lists rather than nite multisets of formulas; hence it contains in addition the structural
rule of exchange. Here we prefer to use multisets, in order to obtain an easy comparison
with sequent calculi for quantum logics.
16 In any operational rule, the formula in the conclusion that contains the connective
introduced by the rule itself is called the principal formula; the formulas in the premisses
that are the components of the formula introduced by the rule are called the secondary
formulas.
216
M; ` N M; ` N
M; _ ` N
In the case of B, instead, disjunction is introduced according to the following visible form:
`N `N
_ `N
where the context M has disappeared.
From the intuitive point of view, one can read the dierence between the
two cases as follows: the rule typical of classical logic attaches a meaning
to the connective _ in presence of the link \;" with M (such a link is to be
interpreted as a conjunction), whereas the visible rule is intended to explain
the meaning of the connective _ by referring only to the connective itself.
In particular, the visible rule does not permit us to prove the equation that
links conjunction and disjunction ( the distributive law of ^ with respect to
_). As a consequence, any sequent calculus for a quantum logic shall adopt
the visible form for the rule that concerns the introduction of disjunction
on the left. As to the other rules, visibility is not strictly necessary in
order to obtain an adequate sequent calculus for quantum logic. However, a
more convenient strategy permits us to axiomatize quantum logic, by adding
only structural rules to basic logic, without any change in the rules for the
connectives. In this way, we can preserve the characteristic properties of
symmetry and visibility of B, that turn out to be highly convenient from
the proof-theoretical point of view (as we will see below).
Basic logic B has no structural rules. As a consequence, B can be regarded as \the logic of connectives" from which various stronger logics can
be obtained by adding suitable structural rules.
Let us now present the sequent calculus for B. Similarly to linear logic,
the language of B contains two pairs of conjunctions and disjunctions: the
additive conjunction ^ and the multiplicative conjunction
; the additive
disjunction _ and the multiplicative disjunction . Further there are two
conditionals (!, ), and two pairs of propositional literals 1 and >, 0
and ?.
&
QUANTUM LOGICS
217
Operational rules
&
(Re ection)
&
(Formation)
?` ? L
`N `N
_`N
`N
`N
(Re
ection)
^ `N ^ `N
(Formation)
(Formation)
(Formation)
(Re
ection)
(Order)
_L
^L
0 ` N 0L
`
L
`
` `N !L
!`N
`
`
!U
!
`!
M ` ;
R
M `
M2 ` M1 `
M2 ; M1 `
M`
?R
M `?
&
(Re ection)
; ` N
L
`N
` N1 ` N2
L
` N1 ; N2
` N 1L
1`N
&
(Formation)
` 1 1R
M ` M `
^R
M `^
M `
M `
M `_ M `_
M
_R
` > >R
`
`! !R
M ` `
R
M `
` `
U
`
218
BRS
BLRS
BLS
BS
BLR
BL
BR
M ` N weakening M; O; O ` N; N; P contraction
M; O ` P; N
M; O ` N; P
Every logic with \L" allows left contexts in any inference rule; every logic
with R allows right contexts in any inference rule. In particular, the cube
solves our initial problem, sketched in Figure 11. In fact, vertex BLRS,
opposed to B represents classical logic, vertex BLR and vertex BLS represent respectively Girard's linear logic and intuitionistic logic; nally, vertex
BS corresponds to paraconsistent quantum logic (see below). Moreover,
since logics with R are simply the symmetric copy of logics with L, logics
containing both L and R (BLRS, BLR) or logics containing neither L nor
17 As we have seen, in B (as well as in linear logic) the connectives conjunction and disjunction are splitted into a multiplicative and an additive connective. Such a distinction
depends on the fact that there are two ways of formulating contexts in any operational
rule: this leads to a multiplicative and to an additive form for each rule. The multiplicative and additive formulation turn out to be equivalent, whenever the structural rules of
weakening and contraction hold. Hence, the distinction plays an essential role in linear
logic and a fortiori in basic logic (where weakening and contraction fail); at the same
time, it vanishes in classical logic and in orthologic.
QUANTUM LOGICS
219
R (BS, B), are symmetric. The study of quantum logics nds place in the
diagonal of symmetric logics, where a ner distinction of structural rules
can be obtained.
Sequent calculus for Orthologic.
The logic BS is non-distributive. Let us consider the fragment of BS restricted to the connectives ^ and _. If we want to obtain a quantum logic
from it, what is still missing is an involutive negation, satisfying de Morgan.
This aim can be reached by extending the language and by adopting
Girard's negation. The key point is to assume as primitive symbols of the
language both the propositional variables and their duals. In other words,
the propositional literals are assumed to be given in pairs, consisting of a
positive element (written p) and of a negative one (written p?). On this
basis, the negation of a formula is dened as follows:
p?? := p
( ^ )? := ? _ ?
( _ )? := ? ^ ?
By this choice, we obtain a calculus called basic orthologic and denoted by
? BS (where the symbol ? reminds us that our calculus is applied to a dual
language). Basic orthologic turns out to be equivalent to paraconsistent
quantum logic (PQL). As we already know, PQL represents a weakening
of orthologic, that is obtained by dropping the non contradiction and the
excluded middle principles. Hence, in order to have a calculus for orthologic,
it will be sucient to add such principles to our ? BS. This can be done by
means of two new structural rules called transfer . The result is a calculus
for orthologic, which will be denoted by ? O.
The rules of ? O are the following (where (i) -(v) are the rules of ? BS 18
while (vi) express the transfer rules).
(i)
(ii)
`N `N
_ ` N _L
(iii)
`N
^ `N
(iv)
`N
^ ` N ^L
M ` M `
M ` ^ ^R
M `
M `_
M `N
M; O ` P; N weakening
M `
M ` _ _R
18 Note that, in ? BS, weakening and contraction are redundant. In fact, one can show
that such a calculus admits elimination of contraction. At the same time, weakening on
the right and on the left can be simulated by ^L and _R, respectively. On this basis,
PQL turns out to admit a very simple formulation, given by (i), (ii), (iii).
220
(v)
(vi)
M; O; O ` N; N; P
contraction
M; O ` N; P
M ` N tr1
M; N ? `
M `N
` M ? ; N tr2
M `N
N? ` M?
O ` ; P ` N
cutR
O ` N; P
QUANTUM LOGICS
221
`
^ `
^
_L M;M;
^ ` `
_ `
^
cutL
M; _ `
In this derivation, the cut-formula is principal on the right premiss;
hence the right rank is 1. In such a situation, Gentzen's procedure to
lower the rank must operate on the left; this would necessarily produce
the two derivations
`
^ M;
^ `
`
^ M;
^ `
cutL
cutL
M; `
M; `
Now, one would like to conclude by applying _L, in order to obtain
M; _ ` . However, this step is here not allowed, unless M is
empty. Such a problem does not arise for the calculus ? O, because,
by visibility, every principal formula has an empty context.
(ii) In ? O the only rules about negation are the structural rules of transfer.
Let us consider a derivation of the form:
..
..
M `
tr1
O ` ? M; ? `
cutL
M; O `
We can reduce the rank in a quick way, by exploiting symmetry. In
fact, Girard's negation has the nice property that every formula
and its dual ? have exactly the same degree. The same idea can
be extended to derivations, and hence to the rank of a cut. As we
have seen in Lemma 151, whenever we have a derivation for the
sequent M ` N , we also have the dual derivation ? , which derives
N ? ` M ? . The two derivations and ? have exactly the same
(symmetrical) structure. Hence in particular, if is principal, ? is
principal. If has rank r, then also ? will have the same rank r. In
222
tr
?O
? OL
BS
S
tr
?B
Quantum logics and classical logic
We will now consider the symmetric diagonal of the cube in the diagram
in Figure 11. In our diagram, the calculus ? O appears as an intermediate
point between basic orthologic and classical logic. Similarly, we have another
intermediate point between basic logic and linear logic: this is given by ? B
+ tr, which represents the common denominator for orthologic and linear
logic (we will call it \ortholinear logic" ? OL). In the same way, ? B turns
out to be the common denominator of basic orthologic and linear logic. On
this basis, we obtain a whole system of quantum logics, which are all cutfree. The last of our logics, ? B + tr, seems to be a good candidate in order
to represent a linear quantum logic in the sense of Pratt [1993].
So far we have only dealt with a fragment of basic logic, which has no
implication connective. By means of this linguistic restriction, we have
easily proved the equivalence between our calculi and the usual formulations of paraconsistent quantum logic and of orthologic. However, the same
methods can be naturally applied to the complete versions of our calculi,
preserving cut-elimination and
ipping of derivations. In this way, we will
have a primitive implication connective ! (together with its dual ) in all
the logics we have considered. An interesting question to be investigated
concerns the possibility of physical interpretations of such new connectives.
QUANTUM LOGICS
223
In the diagram above, we have still a question mark concerning the path
from orthologic to classical logic. Our question can be solved as follows:
THEOREM 153. A calculus for classical logic is obtained from a calculus
for orthologic by adding a pair of structural rules, named separation:
(vii)
M; O `
sep1
M ` O?
` N; P sep2
N? ` P
M1 ` ; N1 M2 ; ` N2
cut
M1 ; M2 ` N1 ; N2
The converse is also true: full cut allows us to derive separation (by cutting
with ` A; A? ). In this sense, separation and cut rule are equivalent: adding
either of them to orthologic gives rise to one and the same logic. Theorem
153 then expresses, with a more eective20 content, the well known fact
that adding a full cut rule to orthologic yields classical logic (cf. [Dummett,
1976], [Cutland and Gibbins, 1982]).
It is natural to ask what is the meaning of sep. In the same way as the
tr rules are equivalent to tertium non datur and non contradiction, the sep
rules turn out to be equivalent to reductio ad absurdum 21
M; ? `
M ` RAA
Let us consider again our Figure 11, where the question marks have been
substituted by sep. Given the logic B as a basic calculus, which contains the
fundamental rules for the connectives, several structural rules can be added:
each rule permits us to reach a \superior" logic. The strongest element is
represented by classical logic, which can be characterized as ? B + S + tr +
sep. With respect to our formulation of classical logic (denoted by ? C) all
the other logics in the diagram can be described as `substructural logics:
for, they can be obtained by dropping some structural rules. This situation
holds in particular for quantum logics, which turn out to be simpler and
more basic than classical logic, from the proof-theoretical point of view.
As we have seen, the examples of quantum logic (we have considered so
far) are, at the same time, substructural with respect to classical logic and
substructural one with respect to the other. On this basis, on can prove
20 For, in a sequent calculus cut should represent a metarule, that is should be eliminable.
21 In [Gibbins, 1985], pag.361, Gibbins shows that dropping the rule RAA has a direct
justication in terms of quantum mechanics, and this is the only case of direct justication, among all the rules which must be restricted in quantum logic.
224
#( ) := # #
for every binary connective .
Separable formulas are precisely those formulas that satisfy the separation
rules, which are then dened as follows:
(vii0 )
M; # O `
M `# O?
# sep1
`# N; P # sep2
# N? ` P
QUANTUM LOGICS
225
226
QUANTUM LOGICS
227
[da Costa et al., 1992] N. C. A. da Costa, S. French and D. Krause. The Schrodinger
problem, in M. Bibtol and O. Darrigol (eds), Erwin Schrodinger: Philosophy and the
Birth of Quantum Mechanics, Editions Frontieres, pp. 445{460, 1992.
[Dalla Chiara and Giuntini, 1994] M. L. Dalla Chiara and R. Giuntini. Unsharp quantum logics, Foundations of Physics 24, 1161{1177, 1994.
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228
MARTIN BUNDER
1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we rst look at operators called combinators. These are
very simple but extremely powerful. They provide a means of doing logic
and mathematics without using variables, are powerful enough to allow the
denition of all recursive functions and have more recently been used as a
basis for certain \functional" computer languages.
We are interested in another use here which involves the functional
character or type possessed by many combinators. Each type can be
interpreted as a theorem of the intuitionistic implicational logic H! and
combinators possessing that type can be interpreted as Hilbert-style proofs
of that theorem. Weaker sets of combinators can be used to represent
proofs in sublogics of H! , these include the substructural logics, such
as the relevance logics R! and T!. There is a further interpretation of
combinators and types as programs and specications which we will not
discuss here.
Next we look at lambda calculus. This also allows the denition of all
recursive functions and has also been used in foundations of mathematics
and computer language development. Many lambda terms also have types
and these again are the theorems of H! . The lambda terms represent
natural deduction style proofs of these theorems.
In the third section of this chapter we look at translations from combinators to lambda terms and vice versa. For the combinators and lambda
terms that represent proofs in H! these translations are well known, for
those corresponding to proofs in weaker logics they are quite new.
In a fourth section we develop a new algorithm which, given an implicational formula, allows us to nd lambda terms representing natural deduction style proofs of the formula or demonstrates that the formula has no
proof.
Most implicational substructural logics are specied by substructural
rules or by axioms and not by rules in the natural deduction form. Our
translation procedure, together with the algorithm, provides us with a simple constructive means of nding Hilbert-style proofs in many of these logics.
As the translation procedure tells us which lambda terms are translatable
into which sets of combinators, the algorithm can be directed to look only
for the lambda terms of the appropriate kind. The algorithm is inherently
nite; for any given formula, and for many logics, bounds for the proof
searches can be written down.
D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.),
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 6, 229{286.
c 2002, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
230
MARTIN BUNDER
Axy = Ayx:
Given a combinator C with the property:
Cxyz = xzy
this becomes
Axy = CAxy
which could be simply written, without variables, as
A = CA:
Given an identity combinator I, i.e. one such that
Ix = x
we can write
as
or
and so, without variables, as
0+x=x
A0x = x
A0x = Ix
A0 = I:
x+0=x
231
would be
CA0 = I:
Schonnkel found that only two combinators, K and S, were enough to
dene all others.
We will now introduce these, other combinators, and our method of writing functional expressions (such as Axy rather than A(x; y)) more formally.
Notation We use association to the left for terms. This means that our
Axy is short for ((Ax)y). A binary function over the real numbers such as
A is therefore interpreted as a unary function from real numbers into the
set of unary functions from real numbers to real numbers.
The process of going from CXY Z to XZY or from IX to X is called
reduction. This is dened as follows:
DEFINITION 3 (Reduction). The relation X . Y (X reduces weakly to
Y ) is dened as follows:
(K) KXY . X
(S) SXY Z . XZ (Y Z )
() X . X
) UX . UY
( ) X . Y ) XU . Y U
( ) X . Y and Y . Z ) X . Z
() X . Y
232
MARTIN BUNDER
(K) and (S) are called the reduction axioms for K and S.
DEFINITION 4 (Weak equality). X = Y if this can be derived from the
axioms and rules of Denition 3 with \=" instead of \ .", together with
() X = Y
) Y
= X.
Proof.
1. SKKX . KX (KX )
by (S)
so SKKX . X
by (K) and ( )
2. S(KS)KXY Z . KSX (KX )Y Z by ( ) and ( )
. S(KX )Y Z
by (K) and ( )
. KXZ (Y Z )
by (S)
. X (Y Z )
by (K) and ( ).
so S(KS)KXY Z . X (Y Z )
by ( )
If M (X1 ; : : : ; Xn ) is a term made up by application using zero or more
occurrences of each of X1 ; : : : ; Xn ; we can nd a combinator Z such that
ZX1 X2 : : : Xn . M (X1 ; : : : ; Xn ).
233
This property is called the \combinatory completeness" of the combinatory logic based on K and S.
The combinator Z above is represented by
I
(k) [xi ] Y
KY if xi 62 Y
() [xi ]Y xi Y if xi 62 Y
(s) [xi ]Y Z S([xi ]Y )([xi ]Z ),
where xi 62 Y stands for xi does not appear in Y .
(i) [xi ] xi
The above clauses must be used in the order given i.e. (iks). In the order
(iks), we would always obtain S([xi ]Y )I for [xi ]Y xi , if xi 62 Y , instead of
the simpler Y .
Repeated bracket abstraction as in [x1 ]([x2 ](: : : ([xn ]M ) : : :)) we will write
as [x1 ; x2 ; : : : ; xn ]M .
EXAMPLE 8.
[x1 ; x2 ; x3 ] x3 (x1 x3 )
S(KK)(SI)x1 x2 x3 .
.
.
.
.
by (s)
by (i) and ()
by (k)
by (k) and ():
234
MARTIN BUNDER
KX : ! ;
where ! represents the set of all functions from into .
From this it follows that K is a function from into ! , so we can
write:
K : ! ( ! ) :
Sets such as the ; and ! ( ! ) above will be denoted by
expressions called types. Types are dened as follows:
DEFINITION 10 (Types).
1. a; b; c; : : : are (atomic) types.
2. If and are types so is ( ! ).
For types we use association to the right, ! ( ! ) can therefore be
written as ! ! .
The type variables or atomic types can be interpreted as arbitrary sets,
the compound types then represent sets of functions.
Above we arrived at K : ! ! ; such a derivation we call a type
assignment, we call ! ! the type of K and K an inhabitant of
! ! .
Type assignments can be more formally derived from:
DEFINITION 11 (Type Assignment).
1. Variables can be assigned arbitrary types
235
S : (a ! b ! c)
! (a ! b) ! a ! c ;
and it can be seen, from the work above, that every type of S has to be a
substitution instance of this. A type with this property we call the principal type scheme (PTS).
The PTS of K is given by
K:a!b!a:
Notice that the types of K and S are exactly the axioms of H! , intuitionistic implicational logic, when ! is read as implication and ; ; : : :
are read as well formed formulas or propositions.
Denition 11.2 and 3 can be rewritten as:
!e
and
X:! Y :
XY :
[x :. ]
..
.
Xx
!i X : :! (x 62 X )
We have, considering only the right hand sides of the :s, the rules of
inference of a natural deduction formulation of H! .
If we take the types of K and S as axiom schemes and use only the parts
of !e to the right of the :s, we have a Hilbert-style formulation of H! .
What appears on the left hand side of the nal step in such a proof gives
us a unique representation of a proof of the theorem expressed on the right
of the :.
236
MARTIN BUNDER
! ( ! ) ! ! by
K : ! (
! ) !
S:
KS : (
! ) !
S : ((
! ) ! ) ! ((
! ) ! !
! )
! (
! ) ! ( !
) ! !
S(KS) : ((
! ) ! !
! ) ! (
! ) ! ( !
) ! !
K : (
! ) ! !
!
S(KS)K : (
! ) ! ( !
) ! !
We note that each S or K in S(KS)K represents the use of an axiom
and each application a use of !e . We also note that the above represents
a type for the combinator B of Denition 5.
Some combinators do not have types, for example if we want to nd a
type for SSS we would proceed as follows:
let S : ( !
! )
and S : ( ! ! )
! ! = ; ! = and ! = :
SS : ((
! ( !
) ! !
! ( ! ) ! !
! ! ) ! ! ) ! ( ! ! ) ! ! :
Now with S : ( !
assign a type to SSS :
! ) ! ( ! ) ! ! , we would need, to
and
!!
= !! ;
= ! ;
= ! :
237
Proof.
1. It can be proved by an easy induction on the length of X that
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ` X :
implies
1 ; : : : ; n `
The isomorphism between inhabitants and types and proofs and theorems
of H! , which can be extended to t programs and specications, is called
the Curry-Howard or Formulas-as types isomorphism.
Curry was the rst to recognise the relation between types and theorems
of H! (see [Curry and Feys, 1958]). The idea was taken up and extended
to other connectives and quantiers in Lauchli [1965; 1970], Howard [1980]
(but written in 1969), de Bruin [1970; 1980] and Scott [1970]. Recently it
was extended to include a large amount of mathematics in Crossley and
Shepherdson [1993].
238
MARTIN BUNDER
239
D1
K : ! ! X : D2
KX : !
Y :
KXY :
D3
with D1 ; D2 and D3 representing other proof steps.
With the reduction of KXY to X the proof reduces (or normalises) to:
D1
X :
D3
If the proof involving SXY Z is:
D1
S : ( ! !
) ! ( ! ) ! !
X : ! !
D2
Y :!
SX : ( ! ) ! !
D3
SXY : !
Z:
SXY Z :
D4
With the reduction of SXY Z to XZ (Y Z ) the proof reduces (or normalises) to:
D1
D3
D2
D3
X:!!
Z:
Y :!
Z:
XZ : !
YZ :
XZ (Y Z ) :
D4
It may be, by the way, if D3 is a particularly long part of the proof, that
the \reduced proof" is actually longer than the original. In the same way,
if Z is long, XZ (Y Z ) may be longer than SXY Z .
DEFINITION 19. If a term has no subterms of the form KXY or SXY Z ,
the term is said to be in normal form.
Not every combinator has a normal form, for example WI(WI) and
WW(WW) do not, but every combinator that has a type also has a normal
form.
240
MARTIN BUNDER
241
242
MARTIN BUNDER
6. [Y=x]y:Z z:[Y=x][z=y]Z
if y 6 x; y 2 F V (Y ); x 2 F V (Z ) and z 62 F V (Y Z ).
As we saw in Example 21, a -term of the form (x:X )Y can be simplied
or \reduced". This kind of reduction is specied by the following axiom:
( ) (x:X )Y . [Y=x]X :
A -term of the form (x:X )Y is called a -redex.
The following axiom allows a change of bound variables and is called an
-reduction.
() x:X . y:[y=x]X
if y 62 F V (X ):
) x:X . x:Y ;
if x 62 F V (X ):
243
)Y
= X .
244
MARTIN BUNDER
Note that, as with combinatory logic, if we ignore the terms on the left
of the :, we have in Denition 20.2 and 3 the elimination and introduction
rules for ! of the natural deduction version of H! . For any Y : , the
types of the variables free in Y constitute the uncancelled hypothesis which
yield . When Y has no free variables, is a theorem of H! and Y
represents a natural deduction proof of . This can be best seen when the
type assignment rules are written in tree form as in the example below.
EXAMPLE 31.
(6 1)
(6 2)
x
:
a
1
!e x!1 x2b :!b !c cx2 : a x3 : (b !(6c3)) ! a ! d
(6 2) !e
x3 (x1 x2 ) : a ! d
!e x2 : a
x3 (x1 x2 )x2 : d
(6 4)
!i x2 :x3 (x1 x2 )x2 : a ! d (2)
x4 : (a ! d) ! e
!e
2 :x3 (x1 x2 )x2 ) : e
(3)
!i x3 :x4 (x2 :xx3 (4x(x
1 x2 )x2 ) : ((b ! c) ! a ! d) ! e (1)
!i x1 x3 :x4 (x2 :x3 (x1 x2 )x2 ) : (a ! b ! c) !
c) ! a ! d) ! e
!i x4 x1 x3 :x4 (x2 :x3 (x1 x2 )x2(() b: !
(4)
((a ! d) ! e) !
(a ! b ! c) ! ((b ! c) ! a ! d) ! e
Proof.
1. We will prove the following more general result by induction on X :
If F V (X ) x1 ; : : : ; xn and if
then
in H! .
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ` X :
(a)
1 ; : : : ; n `
(b)
245
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ; xn+1 : n+1 ` Y : ;
where = n+1
hypothesis
1 ; : : : ; n ; n+1 `
X UV where
xi1 : i1 ; : : : ; xik : ik ` U : ! ;
xj1 : j1 ; : : : ; xim : jm ` V:
and xi1 : i1 ; : : : ; xin : ik [ xj1 : j1 ; : : : ; jm : jm
= x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n
If
i1 ; : : : ; ik
and
`!
j1 ; : : : ; jm
and so (b).
2. We show by induction on the length of a proof in H! of
1 ; : : : ; n `
(c)
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ` X :
If is one of the i s this is obvious with X = xi .
If (c) is obtained by the !i rule from
1 ; : : : ; n ;
`
where =
! , then by the induction hypothesis we have
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ; xn+1 : ` Y :
(d)
246
MARTIN BUNDER
where F V (Y ) x1 ; : : : ; xn ; xn+1 :
Then (d) follows with X = xn+1 :Y .
If (c) is obtained from
i1 : : : ; ik ` !
and
j1 : : : ; jm `
where i1 ; : : : ; ik [ j1 ; : : : ; jm = 1 ; : : : ; n
We have, by the induction hypothesis:
xi1 : i1 ; : : : ; xik : ik ` Y : !
xj1 : j1 ; : : : ; xjm : jm ` Z :
where F V (Y ) xik ; : : : ; xik and F V (Z ) xj1 ; : : : ; xjm .
(d) then follows with X = Y Z .
247
D1
(6 1)
X :!
x:
!e
Xx :
(x 62 F V (X ))
!i
(1)
x:Xx : !
D2
reduces to
D1
X:!
[X=x:Xx] D2
An expansion of a typed -term to lnf reverses the second reduction.
The eect of these reductions on a type assignment shown by the above
is stated in the theorem below.
THEOREM 35 (Subject Reduction Theorem). If
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ` X :
and
then
X . Y ;
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ` Y :
248
MARTIN BUNDER
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ` X : !
then
if x 62 F V (X ).
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ` x:Xx : !
References Much more detail on the work in this section can be found
in [Hindley, 1997, Chapter 2]. The system T A discussed there is eectively
the system we have introduced. See also [Barendregt, 1984, Appendix A].
4 TRANSLATIONS
As -terms and combinators describe the same set of (recursive) functions
it is not surprising that for each -term there is a combinator representing
the same function and, in a simple case, with the same reduction theorems
(as in (K), (S) or Theorem 6) and the same types.
For every combinator there is also a similar -term given by:
DEFINITION 37 ((X )).
S
K
(XY )
xyz:xz (yz )
xy:x
X Y :
X X
249
and
Y Y
for any combinator X and -term Y .
The former identity holds, but the latter one does not, in general.
EXAMPLE 38.
1. (SKK) (xyz:xz (yz )) (uv:u) (ts:t)
([x; y; z ]:xz (yz ))([u:v]u)([t; s]t)
([x; y]:Sxy)([u]:Ku)([t]:Kt) SKK
2. (z (xyz:xyyz )) z ([x; y; z ]:xyyz )
z ([x; y]:xyy) z ([x]:SxI) z (SS(KI))
z (xyz:xz (yz ))(uvw:uw(vw))((st:s)(r:r))
. z (yzw:zw(yzw))(tr:r)
. z (zw:zw((tr:r)zw))
. z (zw:zww)
In the second example above we have only
Y = Y :
This turns out to be about as much as we can hope to have.
Weaker sets of combinators can be translated into -calculus in the same
way as above with the translations of S and K in Denition 37 replaced by
appropriate translations such as:
B xyz:x(yz ) ;
for each element of the given basis set Q.
The reverse process however is not so simple. It is not clear which terms can be translated, say, into BCIW combinators, nor how to perform
this translation.
We will resolve this problem later for several basis sets Q.
The process is important as, as was mentioned in the introduction, it
provides a decision procedure and a constructive proof nding algorithm
for axiomatic logics.
250
1. X X
MARTIN BUNDER
(X an atom)
2. (XY ) X Y
3. (x:X ) x:X ;
x varies with Q but is, in simple cases, like the bracket abstraction [x] of
Denition 7, a sequence of some of the following clauses:
(i) x:x I
(k) x:X KX if x 62 F V (X )
() x:Xx
(s) x:XY
X if x 62 F V (X )
S( x:X )( x:Y )
(b) x:XY BX ( x:Y ) if x 62 F V (X )
(c) x:XY C( x:X ) if x 62 F V (Y )
X X :
251
EXAMPLE 38.2
with
(iks);
z (xyz:xyyz );
z (zw:zww);
Y
and Y
so (B) holds with Y1 = Y .
B
(xyz:x(yz ))
C(BB(BBI))(C(BBI)I) 6 B;
X .Q Y
) X .Q Y :
X X
252
MARTIN BUNDER
3. For every pair of -terms U and V for which U and V are dened
and are Q-terms,
U = V , U = V
4. If Y is dened and is a Q-term then
(x:Y ) x = Y
Proof.
1. It suces to prove the result for X P X1 : : : Xn where P is any
Q-combinator and Y f (X1 ; : : : ; Xn ) which results by a single P reduction step. Then
X
P X1 : : : Xn
(x1 : : : xn :f (x1 ; : : : ; xn ))X1 : : : Xn .Q f (X1 ; : : : ; Xn )
Y :
U = V () U = V
so the result follows by (B).
4. By (3) ((x:Y )x) = Y so the result holds by Denition 39.2.
253
Proof.
1. If Z is Q-denable there is a Q-translation algorithm so that, by (B)
Z = Z:
thus Z is the required X .
2. If X is a Q-term and is a Q-translation algorithm, by Theorem 44.2
X X; so clearly X is Q-denable.
The importance of Q-denability, for implicational logics is that a typed
-term Y is Q-denable if and only if its type is a theorem of Q-logic. In
all the cases we deal with below we nd that, for a given Q, we can nd a
Q-translation algorithm which translates all Q-denable -terms.
We now give translations algorithms for a number of sets of combinators.
First we need a lemma.
LEMMA 47. If U is a -term for which U is dened then
1. if is the (iks) algorithm ( x:U )x .KS U :
2. if is the (ikbc) algorithm
3. if is the (ibc) algorithm
4. if is the (ibcs) algorithm
Proof.
1. By induction on the length of U . If U x
( x:U )x Ix SKKx . KS x U :
If U U1 x where x 2=F V (U1 );
( x:U )x U1 x U :
If x 2=F V (U );
254
MARTIN BUNDER
THEOREM 48.
1. (iks) is an SK-translation algorithm.
2. (ikbc) is a BCK-translation algorithm.
3. (ibc) is a BCI-translation algorithm.
4. (ibcs) is a BCIW-translation algorithm.
Proof.
1. It is easy to check that (A) holds for the (iks) abstraction algorithm.
We prove (B) by induction on the length of the -term Y .
If Y is an atom Y Y:
If Y UV; Y U V and by the inductive hypothesis we have
a U1 and V1 such that Y U V .KS U1V1 / UV Y:
If Y x:Xx, where x 62 F V (X ),
Y
.SK x:((x:U ) x)((x:V ) x)
Y :
Note that if x had not been chosen as the third bound variable in
S , an extra -reduction would have been required from x:U1 V1 to
reach the term obtained by the SK-reduction. We will use similar
simplications below.
If Y x:x;
Y I = Y :
If Y
255
x:X; where x 62 F V (X ),
Y K X
(yx:y) X .SK x:X :
X .SK X1 / X
so
256
MARTIN BUNDER
Proof.
1. is trivial.
2. If Y 2 Once(i1 ; : : : ; in ) for some i1 ; : : : ; in we show by induction on Y
that Y is BCI-denable using the (ibc) algorithm.
Case 1 Y is an atom Y(ibc) Y .
Case 2 Y UV; U 2 Once(j1 ; : : : ; jr ) and V 2 Once(m1 ; : : : ; ms ),
where (j1 ; : : : ; jr ) and (m1 ; : : : ; ms ) are disjoint subsequences of (i1 ;
: : : ; in ) and r + s = n:
Then by the induction hypothesis U and V are BCI-denable using
the (ibc) algorithm and
257
We now look at some basis sets that do not include (as dened or primitive)
the combinator C. Its lack causes a problem.
Previously the algorithms we used in evaluating x2 :X did not aect
the denability of x1 : x2 :X . When we are dealing with algorithms that
do not include (c) (or (s)), this denability may fail depending on a choice
of .
If, for example, we dene x3 :x4 x2 (x1 x3 ) to be B(x4 x2 )x1 , using
clause (b), we cannot easily dene x2 :B(x4 x2 )x1 . If however we dened x3 :x4 x2 (x1 x3 ) as B0 x1 (x4 x2 ), using a clause (b0 ), we can dene
x2 : x3 :x4 x2 (x1 x3 ) as B(BB0 )x1 x4 using (b). Clearly if (b) and (b0 ) (and
so B and B0 ) are both available in our translation algorithm, the choice of
which to use would depend on the variables to be abstracted later.
If a subterm xin+1 :Y of a -term X is to be translated by and is in
the scope of (from
left to right in X ): xi1 ; : : : ; xin , we will write this
in
translation as xxii1n;:::;x
:Y , so that the variables with respect to which we
+1
need to abstract later are
agged as: xin to be done next, then xin 1 etc.
These abstractions are of course tied to some set Q and to algorithm clauses
which we still denote by .
To ensure that the
agged xij s are distinct we will assume that any term X being translated has, if necessary, rst been altered so that no xk
appears more than once in X .
258
MARTIN BUNDER
P if P is an atom
(xi1 ; : : : ; xin ; P ) (xi1 ; : : : ; xin ; Q)
;:::;xin
xxii1n+1
:(xi1 ; : : : ; xin ; xin+1 ; R)
xi1 (xi1 ; R) :
in
xxii1n:::x
:xin+1
+1
I
in
() xxii1n:::x
:Uxin+1
+1
U if xin 62 F V (U )
+1
in
in
(b) xxii1n:::x
:P Q BP (xxii1n:::x
:Q)
+1
+1
if idx(P; i1 ; : : : ; in ) idx(Q; i1 ; : : : ; in ) or xi1 : : : xin is replaced by ;
and xi n+1 2= F V (P ).
in
in
(b0 ) xxii1n:::x
:P Q B0 (xxii1n:::x
:Q)P
+1
+1
if idx(P; i1 ; : : : ; in ) > idx(Q; i1 ; : : : ; in) and xin+1 2= F V (P ).
:::xin
in
in
(s) xxii1n:::x
:P Q S(xxii1n+1
:P )(xxii1n:::x
:Q)
+1
+1
if idx(P; i1 ; : : : ; in ) idx(Q; i1 ; : : : ; in ) or if xi1 : : : xin is replaced by
in
in
in
(s0 ) xxii1n:::x
:P Q S0 (xxii1n:::x
:Q)(xxii1n:::x
:P )
+1
+1
+1
if idx(Q; i1 ; : : : ; in ) < idx(P; i1 ; : : : ; in)
259
EXAMPLE 56.
0
2 4
3
2 4
3
2 4
3
2 4 3
5
2 4 3
5
2 4 3 5
6
0 0
2 4
3
2 4
3
2 4 3
1
in
xxii1n:::x
:X xin+1
+1
Ixin .Q xin X
+1
+1
in
xxii1n:::x
:X xin+1
+1
Uxin X :
+1
260
MARTIN BUNDER
in
in :V x
xxii1n:::x
:X xin+1 BU xxiin;:::x
in+1
+1
+1
xi1 :::xin
.Q U xin+1 :V xin+1
.Q UV X ;
by the induction hypothesis.
Case 4 X UV where xin+1 62 F V (U ), xin+1 6 V and idx(V; i1 ; : : : ; in ) <
idx(U; i1 ; : : : ; in ). Similar to Case 3.
Case 5 X UV where xin+1 2 F V (U ) \ F V (V ) and idx(U; i1; : : : ; in )
idx(V; i1 ; : : : ; in ). Similar to Case 3.
Case 6 X UV where xin+1 2 F V (U ) \ F V (V ) and idx(V; i1 ; : : : ; in ) <
idx(U; i1 ; : : : ; in ). Similar to Case 3.
:::xim
xxim1+1
:Z .Q Z1 / xim+1 :Z
We then have, by Theorem 44.1,
((xi ; : : : ; xi ; Y ) ) .Q ((xi ; : : : ; xi ; Y 0 ) ) / Y 0 / Y
1
261
If Z xim+1 , then
im
xxii1m;:::;x
:Z
+1
(b)
I xim :Z
+1
If Z UV , where xim+1 2= F V (U ); V
im ) idx(V; i1 ; : : : ; im)
(c)
6 xim
+1
and idx(U; i1 ; : : : ;
im
xxii1m;:::;x
:Z BU xximi1+1:::xim :V
+1
xi ;:::;xim
B U
:V )
(xi1m+1
im
.Q xim+1 :U xxii1m;:::;x
:V xim+1
+1
1 ;:::;xim
xxiim
:Z .Q xim+1 :U V xin+1 :U V
+1
Now by the induction hypothesis we have a U1 and V1 such
that:
1 ;:::;xim
xxiim
:Z .Q xim+1 :U1 V1 / xim+1 :UV
+1
xim :Z
+1
262
MARTIN BUNDER
2. If M; N 2 HRM (i1; : : : ; in )
and idx(M; i1 ; : : : ; in ) idx(N; i1 ; : : : ; in)
then MN 2 HRM (i1 ; : : : ; in ).
3. If M 2 HRM (i1; : : : ; in+1 )
then xin+1 :M 2 HRM (i1; : : : ; in ).
Strictly we should write HRMQ(i1 ; : : : ; in ), but in each case below the
basis Q will be clear from the context.
HRMBB0 I (1; : : : ; n) is HRM (x1 ; : : : ; xn ) of Hirokawa 1996. Our HRM (1;
: : : ; n) is also HRMn of Trigg et al. [1994] where the basis is also taken
from the context.
Before obtaining the classications we need a lemma.
LEMMA 60. If X is a BB0 IW-term or X Y where Y is a BB0 IW-term
and X .BB0 IW Z or Z . X then, if X is in HRM (i1; : : : ; in ), so is Z .
Proof. If X is a BB0 IW-term this is easy to prove by induction on the
length of the BB0 IW-reduction or of the -expansion.
If X Y , where Y is a BB0 IW-term more single BB0 IW-reductions
are possible. For example instead of
B0 UV W .B0 V (UW )
we can have (uvw:v(uw)) U V W .B0 (vw:v(U w))V W
263
2. is similar.
The (ibb0)-algorithm for BB0 I was rst used (for abstraction only) in
[Helman, 1977]. It was also used by Hirokawa in his proof of the ) half of
(B) in [Hirokawa, 1996]. Hirokawa proved the result of Theorem 61.1 there.
5 THE BASES BB0 IK; BB0 ; BB0 W AND BB0 K
The BB0 IK(i1 ; : : : ; in ) abstractable terms of Trigg et al 1994 were terms
obtainable from terms of HRM (i1; : : : ; in ) \ Once(i1 ; : : : ; in ) by deleting
certain variables. The BB0 IK(i1 ; : : : ; in )-translation algorithm that we
develop here has as its rst stage, a \full ordering algorithm" which
reverses the deletion process by building up elements of a subclass of
Once (i1 ; : : : ; in ) to elements of HRM (i10; : : : ; in ) \ Once(i1 ; : : : ; in). Such
elements can then be translated by ( ; )(bb i) . A partial ordering algorithm,
which builds up to elements of HRM (i1; : : : ; in ) \ Once (i1 ; : : : ; in ) could
also be used and requires only simple alterations to 1. and 2. below.
THE FULL ORDERING ALGORITHM
Aim To extend, if possible, a BB0 IK-term Y 2 Once (i1 ; : : : ; in) to a
-BB0 IK-term Y o 2 HRM (i1; : : : ; in) \ Once(i1 ; : : : ; in ) so that Y o .KI Y .
1. If Y a, an atom not in fxi1 ; : : : ; xin g
Y o K a (xi1 xi2 : : : xin )
2. If Y xim , and 1 m < n then
Y o K xim (xi1 : : : xim 1 xim+1 : : : xin )
3. If Y xin ,
Y o K I (xi1 : : : xin 1 )xin
4. If Y xin+1 :Z , nd, if possible, Z o such that
and Z o .KI Z
then Y o xin+1 :Z o .
5. If Y
and Z o .KI Z
then Y o Z oxin .
1)
264
MARTIN BUNDER
Y o x3 (K x2 x4 )(K x1 x5 )
EXAMPLE 63.
x7 (K x0 x8 )(x9 :x5 (x4 (x3 (K x2 x6 ))(K x1 (x10 x11 ))x9 )
2 HRM (0; 1; 2; : : : ; 8; 10; 11) \ Once(0; 1; 2; : : : ; 8; 10; 11)
265
fj1 ; : : : ; jp g \ fr1 ; : : : ; rq g = ;;
F V (X ) \ fxr ; : : : ; xr q g = ;;
F V (Y ) \ fxj 1 ; : : : ; xj p g = ;;
1
x1 2 P RM (1)
x1 2 P RM (1; 5)
x2 2 P RM (2; 4)
x3 2 P RM (3)
x3 x2 2 P RM (2; 3; 4)
266
MARTIN BUNDER
and
Note:
x3 x2 x1 2 P RM (1; 2; 3; 4; 5)
x3 x2 x1 2= P RM (1; 2; 3) [ P RM (1; 2; 3; 4)
Proof. ) By induction on Y .
The case where Y is an atom is obvious.
If Y xi n+1 :Z , then as each bounded variable of Y appears at most
once in Y , we have Z 2 P RM (i1; : : : ; in+1 ) \ Once (i1 ; : : : ; in+1).
By the induction hypothesis we have an appropriate
Z o 2 HRM (i1; : : : ; in+1 ) \ Once(i1 ; : : : ; in+1 )
and so a Y o xin+1 :Z o 2 HRM (i1; : : : ; in ) \ Once(i1 ; : : : ; in ).
If Y Zxi n , then as each bounded variable of Y appears at most once
in Y , we have Z 2 P RM (i1; : : : ; in 1) \ Once (i1 ; : : : ; in 1 ).
By the induction hypothesis we have an appropriate
fj1 ; : : : ; jp g \ fr1 ; : : : ; rq g = ;;
F V (U ) \ fxr1 ; : : : ; xrq g = ;; rq = in ; or n = p = q = 0;
F V (V ) \ fxj 1 ; : : : ; xj p g = ;
U 2 P RM (j1 ; : : : ; jp ) \ Once (j1 ; : : : ; jp )
and
267
we have
2 P RM (i1; : : : ; in ):
+1
+1
U 2 P RM (j1 ; : : : ; jp )
V 2 P RM (r1 ; : : : ; rq )
268
MARTIN BUNDER
W
and
2 P RM (j1 ; : : : ; jp )
S 2 P RM (r1 ; : : : ; rq )
and so
R W S 2 P RM (i1; : : : ; in )
LEMMA 68. If A. B and A.KI C then there is a term D such that B.KI D
and C . D.
0
Thus ( ; Y o )(ibb ) is a BB0 IK-translation algorithm.
THEOREM 70. The set of BB0 IK-translatable terms is P RM ( )\ Once ( ).
Proof. We have a BB0 IK-translation algorithm by Theorem 69.
If Y 2 P RM ( )0\ Once ( ), then by Lemma 67 Y o 2 HRM ( ) \ Once( )
and so ( ; Y o )(ibb ) is a BB0 IK-term, so Y is BB0 IK-denable.
If Y is BB0 IK-denable, the proof of Y 2 P RM ( ) \ Once ( ) proceeds
as for Theorem 61.
1. HRM ( ) \
2. HRM ( ) \
3. P RM ( ) \
\ Once
269
270
MARTIN BUNDER
271
The two lemmas that now follow will help to tell us with what a long
normal form inhabitant of a given type can be constructed and also how
to restrict the search for components.
LEMMA 78. If X is a normal form inhabitant of , U is a subterm of X
of type and V is a term of type with F V (V ) F V (U ), then the result
of replacing U by V in X is another inhabitant of .
EXAMPLE 79.
Here x1 : a ! a ! b, x2 : (a ! b) ! b, x3 : a and x4 : a, so
and
So we have by Lemma 77:
x3 :x1 x3 x3 : a ! b:
`Y :
Proof.
1. By Theorem 34 there is an X 0 in lnf such that ` X 0 : .
If X 0 now contains two variables xk and xe with the same type we
can change any part xe :B (xk ; xe ) of X 0 to xk :B (xk ; xk ) and any
part xe :B (xe ) to xk :B (xk ).
Let X be the term obtained when all possible changes of this kind
have been made to X 0 . In X no two distinct variables will have the
same type.
272
MARTIN BUNDER
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xn : n ; : : : ; xk : k ` xs Z1 : : : Zp : b:
Thus ` x1 : : : xk :xs Z1 : : : Zp : 1 ! : : : ! k ! b where Y is a long
subterm of x1 : : : xk :xs Z1 : : : Zp of -depth d 1.
Thus 2. holds by the induction hypothesis with a long positive
subtype of 1 ! : : : ! k ! b and so of or an atom which is
the tail of a long positive as well as of a long negative subtype of
1 ! : : : ! k ! b and so of .
Note The rst inhabitant given in Example 79 is a counterexample, due to
Ryo Kashima,to an earlier version of Lemma 80. This claimed property 2.
273
for any inhabitant X of the given type in long normal form, rather than
just some X .
It follows from Lemmas 78 and 80 that an X in long normal form such
that
` X : ;
can be built up from subterms of the form
xr : : : xs :xi X1 : : : Xn ;
where xi : i ; i is a long negative subtype of , and i has tail a, where a
is an atom which is also the tail of a positive subtype of .
The compound types of these subterms in long normal form must be
among the long positive subtypes of .
With this in mind we arrive at the following algorithm for nding inhabitants of types, i.e. proofs in intuitionistic implicational logic.
6.2
-logic (H !)
SK
Aim
Given a type , to nd a closed X in long normal form (if any) such that
`X:
Step 1
To each distinct long negative subtype i of assign a variable xi giving a
nite list:
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xm : m
Step 2
For each atomic type b that is the tail of both a long negative and a long
positive subtype of , form by application, (if possible) a lnf inhabitant Y
of b if we don't already have a Y 0 : b with F V (Y 0 ) F V (Y ) in Step 1 or
this or earlier Steps 2.
274
MARTIN BUNDER
Step 3
For each long positive composite subtype of , form, by abstraction, with
respect to some of x1 ; : : : ; xm , a term Y in lnf such that Y : if we don't
already have a Y 0 : with F V (Y 0 ) F V (Y ) in Step 1 or earlier Steps 3.
If one of these terms Y is closed and has type we stop.
If there is no such term we continue with Steps 2 and 3 until we obtain
no more terms with a \new" set of free variables or a new (atomic tail or
long positive) type. If there are no new terms there is no solution X .
Note
In the work below and in all examples we will select our variables in
Step 1 in the following order: x1 is assigned to the leftmost shallowest long
negative subtype of ; x2 to the next to leftmost shallowest long negative
subtype etc. until the shallowest long negative subtypes are used up. The
next variable xn+1 is assigned to the leftmost next shallowest long negative
subtype and eventually xm to the rightmost deepest long negative subtype.
In Example 81 below, x1 to x4 are assigned to the shallowest subtypes
and x5 to the next shallowest (the deepest) subtype.
Because of this ordering of the variables of X any subterm Y formed
by the algorithm will be in the scope of x1 x2 : : : xn xp1 xp1 +1 : : : xp2 xp3 : : :
xp4 : : : xpq where n < p1 < p2 < p3 : : : < pq and where each xp2i+1 : : : xp2i+2
represents a single set of abstractions.
EXAMPLE 81.
= [((a ! b) ! d) ! d] ! [(a ! b) ! d ! e] ! [a ! a ! b] ! a ! b
Step 1 x1 : ((a ! b) ! d) ! d; x2 : (a ! b) ! d ! e;
x3 : a ! a ! b; x4 : a; x5 : a ! b,
Step 2 x3 x4 x4 : b; x5 x4 : b;
= ((a ! b) ! a) ! a:
Step 1 x1 : (a ! b) ! a; x2 : a:
= [((a ! a) ! a) ! a] ! [(a ! a) ! a ! a] ! [a ! a ! a] ! a ! a:
275
Step 1 x1 : ((a ! a) ! a) ! a; x2 : (a ! a) ! a ! a,
x3 : a ! a ! a; x4 : a; x5 : a ! a;
Step 2 x3 x4 x4 : a; x5 x4 : a;
Step 3 x4 :x4 : a ! a, x5 :x5 x4 : (a ! a) ! a, x1 x2 x3 x4 :x3 x4 x4 : .
THEOREM 84. Given a type , the SK long inhabitant search algorithm
will, in nite time, produce an inhabitant of or will demonstrate that
has no inhabitants. The algorithm will produce at most F ( ) terms before
terminating.
Proof. It follows from the Weak Normalisation Theorem (see [Turing, 1942;
Hindley, 1997]) that if has an inhabitant, this inhabitant has a normal
form and this will also have type .
By Lemma 80, will have an inhabitant X of the form prescribed there.
We show that our SK-algorithm provides such an inhabitant X of .
Step 1 of the SK-algorithm provides us with the largest set of variables
x1 ; : : : ; xm that, by Lemma 80, need appear in a solution for X .
Step 2 of the algorithm considers terms U = xi X1 : : : Xn with an atomic
type having a particular subset of x1 ; : : : ; xm as free variables. By Lemma
78 other terms xj Y1 : : : Yk with the same atomic type and a superset of
these free variables can at most produce alternative inhabitants and so do
not need to be considered.
The total number of variables we can have is dn( ). These are the terms
generated by Step 1. The number of subsets of these is at most 2dn( ), the
number of atomic types we can have is at most dapn( ) so the number of
terms generated by Steps 2 is at most 2dn( ):dapn( ).
Step 3 forms terms in long normal form which have composite long positive subtypes of as types. There are dcp( ) of these and we can form at
most one of these terms for each set of variables. Hence the most terms we
can form using Steps 3 is 2dn( ):dcp( ).
The maximal number of terms formed using the algorithm is therefore
dn( ) + 2dn( ):(dapn( ) + dcp( )) = F ( ).
Note
As dapn( ) + dcp( ) dp( ) where dp( ) is the number of occurrences of
distinct positive subtypes in , F ( ) < dn( )+2dn( ) :dp( ) < 2dn( )+dp( )
2d( ) where d( ) is the number of long subtypes of so F ( ) < 2j j.
In Example 1, F ( ) = 197 while 2d( ) = 212 and 2j j = 225. The actual
number of terms formed by the algorithm was 10.
276
6.3
MARTIN BUNDER
BCK
Logic
We now adapt our long Inhabitant Search Algorithm to search for BCK-terms in long normal form. By Theorem 51(3), these need to be elements
of Once ( ).
The BCK Logic Decision Procedure or the BCK-Long Inhabitant Search
Algorithm
Aim
Given a type to nd a closed BCK-denable -term in long normal form
(if any) such that
` X : :
Step 1 To each occurrence of a long negative subtype i of assign a
variable xi giving a nite list:
x1 : 1 ; : : : ; xm : m :
Step 2 For each atomic type b that is the tail of both a long positive and a
long negative subtype of form (if possible), by application, from the terms
we have so far, an inhabitant Y of b such that no free variables appear more
than once in Y , if we don't already have a Y 0 : b with F V (Y 0 ) F V (Y ).
Step 3 For each long positive subtype of , form, by abstraction, with
respect to some of x1 ; : : : ; xm , a term Y such that Y : , if we don't already
have a Y 0 : where F V (Y 0 ) F V (Y ).
EXAMPLE 85.
= [((a ! b) ! d) ! d] ! [(a ! b) ! d ! e] ! [a ! a ! b] ! a ! b
Step 1 x1 : ((a ! b) ! d) ! d; x2 : (a ! b) ! d ! e;
x3 : a ! a ! b; x4 : a; x5 : a ! b; x6 : a;
Step 2 x5 x4 : b; x5 x6 : b; x3 x4 x6 : b;
277
Step 1 x1 : (a ! a) ! a ! a ! b; x2 : a; x3 : a; x4 : a;
Step 2 No new terms are formed.
Step 3 x2 :x2 : a ! a;
Step 2 x1 (x2 :x2 )x2 x3 : b;
x1 (x2 :x2 )x2 x4 : b; x1 (x2 :x2 )x3 x4 : b;
Step 3 x1 x2 x3 :x1 (x2 :x2 )x2 x3 : :
Notes: 1. The SK algorithm would have produced only x1 x2 x3 :x1 (x2 :x2 )
x2 x2 : which is not a BCK--term.
2. It was essential here to have a variable for each distinct long negative
occurrence of a in .
LEMMA 87. If X is a BCK term which is a normal form inhabitant of
; U a subterm of X of type and V a BCK term of type , in which
no free variable appears more than once, with F V (V ) F V (U ), then the
result of replacing U by V in X is another BCK inhabitant of .
`BCK X :
Proof.
1. The formation of an X in long normal form is as in the proof of Lemma
80(1) except that the extra variables xm+1 ; : : : ; xn that are choosen
must not be free in xi X1 ; : : : ; Xm, (otherwise xm+1 : : : xn :xi X1 ; : : : ;
Xmxm+1 ; : : : ; xn would not be a BCK-term). Also for the same reason, we don't identify distinct variables with the same type. We let
X be a term obtained by the expansion of Z to long normal form.
278
MARTIN BUNDER
2. As for Lemma 80(2) except that we have to show that we have at most
one variable for each distinct occurrence of a long negative subtype of
. We extend the induction proof to include this.
When d = 1, we clearly have one variable for every long negative
subtype 1 : : : ; n of = 1 ! : : : ! n ! a and no others.
When d > 1 the subterm Y appears as Zj in a term
xt U1 : : : Us
where Ue = xu : : : xv :xr Z1 : : : Zp
xt :
1 ! : : : !
s ! c
and
w = u ! : : : ! v ! d
and
1 j p; 1 e s and 1 w s:
The extra typed variables added at this stage are xu : u ; : : : ; xv : v .
By the inductive hypothesis we have that
1 ! : : : !
s ! c is an
occurrence of a long negative subtype of and it therefore follows
that the same holds for u ; : : : ; v . Note that as in BCK (and BCI)
logic there can be only one free occurrence of the variable xt in a term
before we abstract with respect to xt , so there can be no other use of
xt that might generate another set of variables with types u ; : : : ; v
i.e. one occurrence of
1 ! : : : !
q ! c in generates at most one
occurrence of a variable for each occurrence of u ; : : : ; v which are
long negative subtypes of depth one lower than
1 ! : : : !
q ! c in
.
THEOREM 89. Given a type , the BCK long inhabitant search algorithm
will in nite time produce an inhabitant or will demonstrate that has no
BCK-inhabitants. The algorithm will produce at most G( ) terms before
terminating.
Proof. As for Theorem 84, except that Lemmas 87 and 88 replace Lemmas
78 and 80.
It might be thought that the BCK algorithm might require fewer than
the maximal F ( ) terms required for SK, in fact it requires more because
there may be several variables with the same type. Even when this is not
the case, both algorithms require at most one term for each given type and
each set of variables. For SK some variables may appear several times, for
BCK they may not. For BCI in addition all abstracted variables will have
to appear in the term being abstracted.
The bounds F ( ) and G( ) are not directly related to standard complexity measures. The algorithm will in fact generate some other terms but not
record them because they have the same type and set of free variables to
another already recorded.
6.4
BCI
279
Logic
Again we can adapt the Long Inhabitant Search Algorithm. This time the
inhabitants found must, by Theorem 51(2) be in Once( ).
The BCI-Logic Decision Procedure or the BCI Long Inhabitant Search Algorithm
Aim
Given a type to nd a closed BCI--term X in long normal form (if any)
such that:
` X : :
Method
As for the BCK-algorithm except that Step 2 and 3 end in \F V (Y 0 ) =
F V (Y )" and in Step 3 we may only form xi : : : xj :Z if xi ; : : : ; xj occur free
in Z exactly once each.
EXAMPLE 90.
= ((a ! b) ! c) ! b ! d ! (c ! e) ! e
Step 1 x1 : (a ! b) ! c; x2 : b; x3 : d; x4 : c ! e; x5 : a
Step 2 No new terms are formed.
Step 3 x5 :x2 is not a BCI--term, so no new terms are generated and so
there is no BCI-proof of .
EXAMPLE 91.
((a ! b ! c) ! d) ! (b ! a ! c) ! d:
Step 1 x1 : (a ! b ! c) ! d; x2 : b ! a ! c; x3 : a; x4 : b;
Step 2 x2 x4 x3 : c;
Step 3 x3 x4 :x2 x4 x3 : a ! b ! c;
Step 2 x1 (x3 x4 :x2 x4 x3 ) : d;
Step 3 x1 x2 :x1 (x3 x4 :x2 x4 x3 ) : :
Example 86 also produced a BCI-term.
THEOREM 92. Given a type , the BCI long inhabitant search algorithm
will, in nite time, produce an inhabitant or will demonstrate that has no
inhabitants. The algorithm will produce at most G( ) terms before terminating.
280
MARTIN BUNDER
6.5
BCIW
Logic (R !)
Aim
Given a type to nd a closed BCIW--term X in long normal form (if
any) such that
`X:
Method
As for the BCI algorithm except that in Steps 2 and 3 each variable must
appear in Y and Z at least once.
If the algorithm that we have to this stage fails, additional variables with
the same types as the ones rst given in Step 1 are added and the previous
algorithm is repeated.
Note that, as it is not clear as to how many times new variables might
need to be added, this method, while, as shown in Theorem 96, it leads
to nding an inhabitant if there is one, does not constitute a decision procedure. The need for extra variables is illustrated in Example 95 below.
This logic does have a decision procedure (see [Urquhart, 1990]), but its
maximum complexity is related to Ackermann's function.
EXAMPLE 93.
= [((a ! b) ! d) ! d] ! [(a ! b) ! d ! e] ! [a ! a ! b] ! a ! b
Step 1 x1 : ((a ! b) ! d) ! d; x2 : (a ! b) ! d ! e;
x3 : a ! a ! b; x4 : a; x5 : a ! b; x6 : a
Step 2 x3 x4 x4 : b; x3 x4 x6 : b; x3 x6 x6 : b; x5 x4 : b; x5 x6 : b
281
= (c ! a ! a ! a) ! c ! a ! a
Step 1 x1 : c ! a ! a ! a; x2 : c; x3 : a:
Step 2 x1 x2 x3 x3 : a:
Step 3 x1 x2 x3 :x1 x2 x3 x3 : :
EXAMPLE 95.
= c ! c ! (a ! a ! b) ! (c ! (a ! b) ! b) ! b
x1 : c; x2 : c; x3 : a ! a ! b; x4 : c ! (a ! b) ! b; x5 : a
x3 x5 x5 : b
x5 :x3 x5 x5 : a ! b
x4 x1 (x5 :x3 x5 x5 ) : b;
x4 x2 (x5 :x3 x5 x5 ) : b;
Step 3 No new terms can be formed.
(Add to) Step 1 x6 : a
Step 2 x3 x5 x6 : b, x3 x6 x6 : b
Step 3 x6 :x3 x5 x6 : a ! b; x5 :x3 x5 x6 : a ! b
Step 2 x4 x1 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 ) : b; x4 x2 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 ) : b;
x4 x1 (x5 :x3 x5 x6 ) : b; x4 x2 (x5 :x3 x5 x6 ) : b;
Step 3 x5 :x4 x1 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 ) : a ! b; x5 :x4 x2 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 ) : a ! b;
Step 2 x4 x1 (x5 :x4 x1 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 )) : b;
x4 x2 (x5 :x4 x1 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 )) : b;
x4 x2 (x5 :x4 x2 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 )) : b;
Step 3 x1 x2 x3 x4 :x4 x2 (x5 :x4 x1 (x6 :x3 x5 x6 )) : :
Note that in Example 95 x4 is used twice and so the one occurrence of a in
c ! (a ! b) ! b, requires two variables of type a. If these were identied
the resultant -term would no longer be BCIW-denable.
THEOREM 96. Given a type , the BCIW long inhabitant search algorithm will, in nite time, produce an inhabitant.
Step
Step
Step
Step
1
2
3
2
282
MARTIN BUNDER
Logic (T !)
0
BB IW search algorithm nds -terms of a given type that are in HRM ( )\
Once+ ( ), as required by Theorem 61.
6.6
BB0 IW
Step 2 For each atom b and for each subsequence (j1 ; : : : ; jr ) of (1; : : : ; m)
nd one BB0 IW--term Y xj i X1 : : : Xk (k 0; 1 i r),
such that Y 2 HRM (j1 ; : : : ; jr ); Y : b and F V (Y ) = fxj1 ; : : : ;
xjr g, if there is not already such a Y .
Step 3 For each subsequence (j1 ; : : : ; jr ) of (1; : : : ; m) and for each long
positive subtype of , form a BB0 IW--term Y by abstraction
so that Y : and F V (Y ) = fxj1 ; : : : ; xj r g, if we don't already
have such a Y .
Now repeat steps 2 and 3 and if needs be add extra variables as for BCIW.
As with the BCIW-algorithm this does not, in general, provide a decision
procedure.
EXAMPLE 97.
= (a ! b ! c ! d) ! a ! c ! b ! d
Step 1 x1 : a ! b ! c ! d; x2 : a; x3 : c; x4 : b
Step 2 x1 x2 x4 x3 : d and x1 x2 x4 x3 2 HRM (1; 2; 4; 3)
Step 3 The only term with a positive subtype of that can be formed is
x1 x2 x3 x4 :x1 x2 x4 x3 : ; but this is not a BB0 IW--term. Adding
extra variables with the same types only allows us to generate this
same (modulo- conversion) inhabitant of .
283
EXAMPLE 98.
= (c ! a ! a ! a) ! c ! a ! a
The only BCIW denable--term inhabitant of was x1 x2 x3 :x1 x2 x3 x3 ;
this is also a BB0 IW denable -term.
THEOREM 99. Given a type , the BB0 IW long inhabitant search algorithm will, in nite time, produce an inhabitant.
Proof. As for Theorem 96, except that we can replace subterms only by
subterms belonging to the same class HRM (j1 ; : : : ; jr ) (1 j1 < : : : <
jr m).
6.7
BB0 I
The search algorithm for this logic nds elements of the appropriate type
in HRM ( ) \ Once( ), as requried by Theorem 61(1).
The BB0 I Logic or T-W(P-W) Decision Procedure or the BB0 I Long Inhabitant Search Algorithm
Aim
Given a type to nd a closed BB0 I--term X in long normal form (if any)
such that
`X:
Method
As for BB0 IW logic except that in the terms formed in Step 2 no free
variable may appear twice and that no extra variables need be added.
EXAMPLE 100.
= (c ! a ! a ! a) ! c ! a ! a
The only BB0 IW inhabitant of is x1 x2 x3 :x1 x2 x3 x3 and this is not a
BB0 I-denable -term. Thus has no BB0 I inhabitants.
EXAMPLE 101.
= [(a ! a) ! a] ! (a ! a) ! a
Step 1 x1 : (a ! a) ! a; x2 : a ! a; x3 : a
Step 2 x2 x3 : a
Step 3 x3 :x3 : a ! a
x3 :x2 x3 : a ! a
284
MARTIN BUNDER
Proof. As for Theorem 99, except that each variable xi must appear exactly
once in Y in any xi :Y as with BCI logic. Also as in Theorem 89 and 92
the procedure can be bounded. Note that the number of subsequences of a
sequence is the same as the number of subsets of the corresponding set.
6.8
BB0 IK
Logic
The search algorithm for this logic nds -terms of the appropriate type in
P RM ( ) \ Once ( ).
The BB0 IK Logic Decision Procedure or the BB0 IK Long Inhabitant Search
Algorithm
Aim
Given a type to nd a closed BB0 IK- term X in long normal form (if
any) such that
` X : :
Method
As for BB0 I logic except that in Step 2 HRM is replaced by P RM .
EXAMPLE 103.
= b ! (b ! c) ! a ! c
Step 1 x1 : b; x2 : b ! c; x3 : a
Step 2 x2 x1 : c (x2 x1 2 P RM (1; 2; 3))
Step 3 x1 x2 x3 :x2 x1 2 :
THEOREM 104. Given a type the BB0 IK long inhabitant search algorithm will, in nite time, produce an inhabitant or will demonstrate that
has no inhabitant. The algorithm will produce at most G( ) terms before
terminating.
285
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Barendregt, 1984] H. P. Barendregt. The Lambda Calculus, North Holland, Amsterdam,
1984.
[Ben-Yelles, 1979] C.-B. Ben Yelles. Type Assignments in the Lambda Calculus, Ph.D.
thesis, University College, Swansea, Wales, 1979.
[Bunder, 1996] M. W. Bunder. Lambda terms denable as combinators. Theoretical
Computer Science, 169, 3{21, 1996.
[Bunder, 1995] M. W. Bunder. Ben-Yelles type algorithms and the generation of
proofs in implicational logics. University of Wollongong, Department of Mathematics,
Preprint Series no 3/95, 1995.
[Church, 1932] A. Church. A set of postulates for the foundation of logic. Annals of
Mathematics, 33, 346{366, 1932.
[Church, 1933] A. Church. A set of postulates for the foundation of logic. (second paper).
Annals of Mathematics, 34, 839{864, 1933.
[Crossley and Shepherdson, 1993] J. N. Crossley and J. C. Shepherdson. Extracting programs from proofs by an extension of the Curry-Howard process. In Logical Methods,
J. N. Crossley, J. B. Remmel, R. A. Shore and M. E. Sweedler, eds. pp. 222{288.
Birkhauser, Boston, 1993.
[Curry, 1930] H. B. Curry. Grundlagen der Kombinatorischen Logik. American Journal
of Mathematics, 52, 509{536, 789{834, 1930.
[Curry and Feys, 1958] H. B. Curry and R. Feys. Combinatory Logic, Vol 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1958.
[de Bruin, 1970] N. G. de Bruin. The Mathematical Language AUTOMATH, Its Usage,
and Some of Its Extensions. Vol. 125 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics, Springer
Verlag, Berlin, 1970.
[de Bruin, 1980] N. G. de Bruin. A survey of the project AUTOMATH. In To H. B.
Curry, Essays on Combinatory Logic, Lambda Calculus and Formalism, J. R. Hindley
and J. P. Seldin eds. pp. 576{606. Academic Press, London, 1980.
[Dekker, 1996] A. H. Dekker. Brouwer 0.7.9- a proof nding program for intuitionistic,
BCI, BCK and classical logic, 1996.
[Helman, 1977] G. H. Helman. Restricted lambda abstraction and the interpretation of
some nonclassical logics, Ph.D. thesis, Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh, 1977
[Hindley, 1997] J. R. Hindley. Basic Simple Type Theory. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1997.
[Hindley and Seldin, 1986] J. R. Hindley and J. P. Seldin. Introduction to Combinators
and -Calculus. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
[Hirokawa, 1996] S. Hirokawa. The proofs of ! in P W . Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 61, 195{211, 1996.
[Howard, 1980] W. A. Howard. The formulae-as-types notion of construction. In To H.
B. Curry: Essays on Combinatory Logic, Lambda Calculus and Formalism, J. R.
Hindley and J. P. Seldin eds. pp 479{490. Academics Press, London, 1980.
286
MARTIN BUNDER
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
1 INTRODUCTION
Paraconsistent logics are those which permit inference from inconsistent information in a non-trivial fashion. Their articulation and investigation is a
relatively recent phenomenon, even by the standards of modern logic. (For
example, there was no article on them in the rst edition of the Handbook.)
The area has grown so rapidly, though, that a comprehensive survey is already impossible. The aim of this article is to spell out the basic ideas and
some applications. Paraconsist logic has interest for philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists. As bets the Handbook, I will concentrate on those aspects of the subject that are likely to be of more interest to
philosopher-logicians. The subject also raises many important philosophical
issues. However, here I shall tread over these very lightly|except in the
last section, where I shall tread over them lightly.
I will start in part 2 by explaining the nature of, and motivation for, the
subject. Part 3 gives a brief history of it. The next three parts explain the
standard systems of paraconsistent logic; part 4 explains the basic ideas, and
how, in particular, negation is treated; parts 5 and 6 discuss how this basic
apparatus is extended to handle conditionals and quantiers, respectively.
In part 7 we look at how a paraconsistent logic may handle various other
sorts of machinery, including modal operators and probability. The next
two parts discuss the applications of paraconsistent logic to some important theories; part 8 concerns set theory and semantics; part 9, arithmetic.
The nal part of the essay, 10, provides a brief discussion of some central
philosophical aspects of paraconsistency.
In writing an essay of this nature, there is a decision to be made as to how
much detail to include concerning proofs. It is certainly necessary to include
many proofs, since an understanding of them is essential for anything other
than a relatively modest grasp of the subject. On the other hand, to prove
everything in full would not only make the essay extremely long, but distract
from more important issues. I hope that I have struck a happy via media.
1 Wittgenstein [1975], p. 332.
288
GRAHAM PRIEST
Where proofs are given, the basic denitions and constructions are spelled
out, and the harder parts of the proof worked. Routine details are usually
left to the reader to check, even where this leaves a considerable amount of
work to be done. In many places, particularly where the material is a dead
end for the purposes of this essay, and is easily available elsewhere, I have
not given proofs at all, but simply references. Those for whom a modest
grasp of the subject is sucient may, I think, skip all proofs entirely.
Paraconsistent logic is strongly connected with many other branches of
logic. I have tried, in this essay, not to duplicate material to be found in
other chapters of this Handbook, and especially, the chapter on Relevant
Logic. At several points I therefore defer to these. There is no section of
this essay entitled `Further Reading'. I have preferred to indicate in the text
where further reading appropriate to any particular topic may be found.2
2 DEFINITION AND MOTIVATION
2.1 Denition
The major motivation behind paraconsistent logic has always been the
thought that in certain circumstances we may be in a situation where our
information or theory is inconsistent, and yet where we are required to draw
inferences in a sensible fashion. Let ` be any relationship of logical consequence. Call it explosive if it satises the condition that for all and ,
f; :g ` , ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ). (In future I will omit set
braces in this context.) Both classical and intuitionist logics are explosive.
Clearly, if ` is explosive it is not a sensible inference relation in an inconsistent context, for applying it gives rise to triviality: everything. Thus, a
minimal condition for a suitable inference relation in this context is that
it not be explosive. Such inference relationships (and the logics that have
them) have come to be called paraconsistent.3
Paraconsistency, so dened, is something of a minimal condition for a
logic to be used as envisaged; and there are logics that are paraconsistent
but not really appropriate for the use. For example, Johansson's minimal
logic is paraconsistent, but satises ; : ` : . One might therefore attempt a stronger constraint on the denition of `paraconsistent', such as: for
no syntactically denable class of sentences (e.g., negated sentences), , do
2 The most useful general reference is Priest et al. [1989] (though this is already a
little dated). That book also contains a bibliography of paraconsistency up to about the
mid-1980s.
3 The word was coined by Miro Quesada at the Third Latin American Symposium on
Mathematical Logic, in 1976. Note that a paraconsistent logic need not itself have an
inconsistent set of logical truths: most do not. But there are some that do, e.g., any logic
produced by adding the connexivist principle :( ! :) to a relevant logic at least as
strong as B . See Mortensen [1984].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
289
290
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
291
some of the inconsistent information in the data base; reject or revise the
scientic theory; change the law to eliminate the inconsistency. But this
is not possible in all of the cases given, e.g., for counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents. And even where it is, this not only may
take time; it is often not clear how to do so satisfactorily. (The matter is
certainly not algorithmic.) While we gure out how to do it, we may still
be in a situation where inference is necessary, perhaps for practical ends,
e.g., so that we can act on the information in the data base; or manipulate
some piece of scientic technology; or make decisions of law (on other than
an obviously inconsistent case). Moreover, since there is no decision procedure for consistency, there is no guarantee that any revision will achieve
consistency. We cannot, therefore, be sure that we have succeeded. (This is
particularly important in the case of the data base, where the deductions go
on \behind our back", and the need to revise may never become apparent.)
In cases of this kind, then, even though we may not, ideally, be satised
with the inconsistent information, it may be desirable|indeed, practically
necessary|to use a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, we know that many
scientic theories are false; they may still be important because they make
correct predications in most, or even all, cases; they may be good approximations to the truth, and so on. These points remain in force, even if the
theories in question contain contradictions, and so are (thought to be) false
for logical reasons. Of course, this is not so if the theories are trivial; but
that's the whole point of using a paraconsistent logic.
One can thus subscribe to the use of paraconsistent logics for some purposes without believing that inconsistent information or theories may be
true. The view that some are true has come to be called dialetheism, a
dialetheia being a true contradiction.7 If the truth about some subject
is dialetheic then, clearly, a paraconsistent logic needs to be employed in
reasoning about that subject. (I take it to be uncontentious that the set
of truths is not trivial. Why this is so, especially once one has accepted
dialetheism is, however, a substantial question.)
Examples of situations that may give rise to dialetheias, and that have
been proposed, are of several kinds, including:
1. certain kinds of moral and legal dilemmas;
2. borderline cases of vague predicates;
3. states of change.
Thus, one may suppose, in the legal example mentioned before, that a
person who is A and B both has and has not the right to do x; or that in
7 The term was coined by Priest and Routley in 1981. See Priest et al. [1989], p. xx.
Note that some writers prefer `dialethism'.
292
GRAHAM PRIEST
a case of light drizzle it both is and is not raining; or that at the instant a
moving object comes to rest, it both is and is not in motion.8
The most frequent and, arguably, most persuasive examples of dialetheias
that have been given are the paradoxes of self-reference, such as the Liar
Paradox and Russell's Paradox. What we have in such cases, are apparently
sound arguments resulting in contradictions. There are many suggestions as
to what is wrong with such arguments, but none of them is entirely happy.
Indeed, in the case of the semantic paradoxes there is not (even after 2,000
years) any consensus concerning the most plausible way to go. This gives
the thought that the arguments are, after all, sound, its appeal.9
Naturally, all the examples cited in this section are contestable. I will
return to the issue of possible objections in the last part of this essay.
3 A BRIEF HISTORY OF PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
293
:
: _
13 Book , ch 4. The historical success of this defence is, however, out of all proportion
to its intellectual weight. See Priest [1998e].
14 Much of this and the rest of the material in this subsection is documented in Sylvan
[2000], ch. 4. The discussion there is carried out in terms of the conditional, though it is
equally applicable to the consequence relation.
294
GRAHAM PRIEST
The argument uses just two principles (three if you include the transitivity
of deducibility): Addition ( ` _ ) and the Disjunctive Syllogism (; : _
` ). As we shall see in due course, the Disjunctive Syllogism (DS) has,
unsurprisingly, been rejected by most paraconsistent logicians. Now Stoic
logicians endorsed just this principle. The explosive nature of their logic
would therefore seem a good bet. Despite this, it probably was not: there is
reason to suppose that their disjunction was an intensional one that required
some kind of connection between and for the truth of _ . If this is
the case, Addition fails in general, as does the Lewis argument.
It is not known who discovered the Lewis argument. Martin [1985] conjectures that it was William of Soissons in the 12th Century. (It was certainly
known to, and endorsed by, some later logicians, such as Scotus and Buridan.) At any rate, William was a member of a group of logicians called the
Parvipontanians, who were known not only for living by a small bridge, but
for defending ECQ. This group may therefore herald the arrival of explosion
on the philosophical stage. Whether or not this is so, after this time, some
logicians endorsed explosion, some rejected it, dierent orthodoxies ruling at
dierent times and dierent places (though, possibly, the explosive view was
more common). One group of logicians who rejected it is notable, since they
very much pregure modern paraconsistent logicians. This is the Cologne
School of the late 15th Century, who argued against the DS on the ground
that if you start by assuming that and :, then you cannot appeal to
to rule out : as the DS manifestly does.
Notoriously, logic made little progress between the end of the Middle
Ages and the start of the third great period in logic, towards the end of the
19th Century. With the work of logicians such as Boole and Frege, we see
the mathematical articulation of an explosive logical theory that has come
to be know, entirely inappropriately, as `classical logic'. Though, in its early
years, many objected to its explosive features, it has achieved a hegemony
(though never a universality) in the logical community, in a (historically)
very brief space of time. Whether this is because the truth was denitively
and transparently revealed, or because at the time it was the only game in
town, history will tell.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
295
296
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
297
4.1 Filtration
One of the simplest ways to prevent explosion is to lter it, and any other
undesirables, out. Consider, for simplicity, the one-premise case. (Finite
sets of premises can always be reduced to this by conjoining.) Let F (; )
be any relationship between formulas. Dene an inference from to to be
prevalid i j=C and F (; ). The thought here is that for an inference
to be correct, something more than classical truth-preservation is required,
e.g., some connection between premise and conclusion. This is expressed by
F . Usually, prevalidity is too weak as a notion of validity, since, in general,
it is not closed under uniform substitution, and this is normally taken to be
a desideratum for any notion of validity. However, closure can be ensured
if we dene an inference to be valid i it is a uniform substitution instance
of a prevalid inference.
What inferences are valid depends, of course, entirely on the lter, F .
One that naturally and obviously gives rise to a paraconsistent logic is:
F (; ) i and share a propositional parameter. (This collapses the
notions of validity and prevalidity, since if and share a propositional
parameter, so do uniform substitution instances thereof.) This logic is not
a very interesting paraconsistent one, however, since, as is clear, p ^:p j=
where is any formula containing the parameter p.26
A dierent lter, proposed by Smiley [1959] is: F (; ) i is not a
(classical) contradiction and is not a (classical) tautology.27 (Note that,
according to this denition, ^ : = is not prevalid, but it is valid,
since it is an instance of p ^ q = p.) It is easy to see that on this account
p ^ :p does not entail q. The major notable feature of lter logics is that,
in general, transitivity of deducibility breaks down.28 For example, using
26 A stronger lter is one to the eect that all the variables of the premise occur in
the conclusion. This gives rise to a logic in the family of analytic implications. On this
family, see Anderson and Belnap [1975], sect. 29.6.
27 Filters of a related kind were also suggested by Geach and von Wright. See Anderson
and Belnap [1975], sect. 20.1.
28 Though it need not. First Degree Entailment, where transitivity holds, can be seen
as a lter logic. See Dunn [1980].
298
GRAHAM PRIEST
: ;
; : :
; :
; ^ :
; :
; ^ :
1 : 1 ; 2 : 2 ;
1 ; 2 : 1 ; 2 ; ^
: ;
: ; _
: ;
: ; _
1 ; : 1 2 ; : 2
1 ; 2 ; _ : 1 ; 2
29 The restriction of Tennant's approach to the one-premise, one-conclusion, case obviously gives Smiley's account. Smiley himself, handles the multiple-premise case, simply
by conjoining. As Tennant points out ([1984], p. 199), this generates a dierent account
from his. It is not dicult to check that p _ q; :(p _ q) 6j= p ^ q for Smiley. (The conjoined antecedent is a contradiction; and any inference of which the conjoined form is a
substitution instance is not classically valid.) But it is valid for Tennant, since it is a
substitution instance of p _ q; r _ s; :(t _ q); :(r _ u) j= p ^ s.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
299
4.2 Non-adjunction
All the other approaches that we will consider, except the last (algebraic
logics) accept validity as dened simply in terms of model-preservation.
Thus, given some notion of interpretation, call it a model of a sentence if the
sentence holds in the interpretation; an interpretation is a model of a set of
sentences if it is a model of every member of the set; and an inference is valid
i every model of the premises is a model of the conclusion. In particular,
then, if explosion is to be avoided, it must be possible to have models for
contradictions, which are not models of everything. Where the dierences
in the following approaches lie is in what counts as an interpretation, and
what counts as holding in it.
For the next approach, an interpretation, I , is a Kripke interpretation
of some modal logic, say S 5, employing the usual truth conditions. Each
world in an interpretation may be thought of as the world according to some
party in a debate or discussion. This gives the approach its common name,
discussive (or discursive) logic. I is a (discursive) model of sentence i
holds at some world in I , i.e., 3 holds in the model. Thus, j= i
holds, discursively, in every discursive model of , i.e., i 3 j=S5 3,
where 3 is f3; 2 g. This approach is that of Jaskowski [1969].32 It is
clear that discussive logic is paraconsistent, since we may have 3 and 3:
30 The proof theory can be given a ltered natural deduction form too. Essentially, classical deductions that have a certain \normal form" pass through the lter. See Tennant
[1980].
31 Though if we do this, symmetry suggests that we should take to follow from i
for some 0 and 0 , 0 ` 0 ; in this case paraconsistency is lost since ; : ` .
32 Popper also seems to have had a similar idea in 1948. See his [1963], p. 321.
300
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
301
302
GRAHAM PRIEST
Despite the dierences, Schotch and Jennings' approach shares with that
of Rescher and Manor the following features: for consistent sets, consequence coincides with classical consequence; Adjunction fails. For Schotch
and Jennings, like Jaskowski, ^ : explodes. For Rescher and Manor, it
has no consequences (other than tautologies). The logics that we will look
at in subsequent sections are more discriminating concerning conjoined contradictions.
_I
^E
_I
..
.
in a rule indicates a subproof with as one assumption|though there may be others|
and conclusion . If is overlined, this means that the application of the rule discharges
it.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
_E
..
.
303
..
.
4.4 Non-truth-functionality
Let us now return to the other basic approaches to paraconsistent logics.
On the rst of these, explosion is invalidated by employing a non-truthfunctional account of negation. Typically, this account of negation is imposed on top of an orthodox account of positive logic. Thus, let an interpretation be a map, , from the set of formulas to f1; 0g, satisfying just the
following conditions:
( ^ ) = 1 i () = 1 and ( ) = 1
( _ ) = 1 i () = 1 or ( ) = 1
In particular, the truth value of : is independent of that of . Validity
is dened as truth preservation over all interpretations. It is obvious that
explosion fails, since we may choose an evaluation that assigns both p and
:p (and their conjunction) the value 1, whilst assigning q the value 0.
These semantics can be characterised very simply in natural deduction
terms by just the rules _I , _E , ^I and ^E . Soundness is easy to check.
For completeness, suppose that 6` . Then put = fg, and extend
304
GRAHAM PRIEST
() = 1 if 2
() = 0 if 2=
It is easy to check that is an interpretation. Hence, we have the result.
This system contains no inferences that involve negation essentially. For
this reason, : can hardly be thought of as a negation functor. Stronger paraconsistent systems, where this is more plausibly the case, can be obtained
by adding conditions on the semantics. The following are some examples:39
(i) if () = 0, (:) = 1
(ii) if (::) = 1, () = 1
(iii) if () = 1, (::) = 1
(iv) (:( ^ )) = (: _ : )
(v) (:( _ )) = (: ^ : )
Sound and complete rule systems can be obtained by adding the corresponding rules, which are, respectively:
(i) _ :
(ii) ::
(iii) ::
:
( ^ )
(iv)
: _ :
:( _ )
(v)
: ^ :
(Double underlining indicates a two-way rule of inference, and a zero premise
rule, as in (i), can be thought of as an assumption that discharges itself.)
The corresponding soundness and completeness proofs are simple extensions
of the basic arguments.
These additions give the ^; _; :-fragments of various systems in the literature. (i) gives that of Batens' P I [1980]; (i) and (ii) that of da Costa's
C! ;40 (i)-(v) that of Batens' P I S . In P I S every sentence is logically equivalent to one in Conjunctive Normal Form. This can be used to show that P I S
39 Some others can be found in Loparic and da Costa [1984], and Beziau [1990].
40 Semantics of the present kind for the da Costa systems were rst proposed in da
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
305
is a maximal paraconsistent logic, in the sense that any logic that extends
it is not paraconsistent. (For details, see Batens [1980].)
Observe, for future reference, that if we add to P I or an extension thereof
the condition:
if () = 1, (:) = 0
then all interpretations are classical, and so we have classical logic. As may
easily be checked, adding this is sound and complete with respect to the
rule of inference:
^ :
Another major da Costa system, C1 , extends C! in accordance with the
following idea. It should be possible to express in the language the idea that
a sentence, , behaves consistently; and for consistent sentences classical
logic should apply. Let us write :( ^:) as 0 . Then it is natural enough
to suppose that 0 expresses the consistency of . It does not, in any of
the above systems, since we may have ^: ^ 0 true in an interpretation.
This is exactly what is ruled out by the condition:
(vi) () = (:) then (0 ) = 041
( () = (:) i both are 1, by semantic condition (i). Note that (i) also
guarantees the converse of (vi): () 6= (:) then (0 ) = 1.)
C1 is obtained by adding (vi) to C! , together with the following condition,
which requires consistency to be preserved under syntactic constructions:
(vii) if (0 ) = ( 0 ) = 1 then ((:)0 ) = (( ^ )0 ) = (( _ )0 ) = 1
The deduction rules that correspond to (vi) and (vii) are, respectively:
0
(vi) ^ : ^
(vii)
0
(:)0
0 0
( ^ )0
0 0
( _ )0
306
GRAHAM PRIEST
t f
b b
f t
^ t b f
t
b
f
t
b
f
b
b
f
f
f
f
_ t b f
t
b
f
t t t
t b b
t b f
It will be noted that these are just the matrices of Lukasiewicz and Kleene's
3-valued logics, where the middle value is normally thought of as undecidable, or neither true nor false, and so not designated. It was the thought
that this value might be read as both true and false|a natural enough
thought, given dialetheism|and so be designated, that marks the start
of many-valued paraconsistent logic. This was the approach proposed by
Asenjo (see his [1966]), and others, e.g. Priest [1979], where the logic is
called LP , a nomenclature that I will stick with here.
42 It might be suggested that one ought not to take 0 as expressing consistency unless
it, itself, behaves consistently. This thought motivates the weaker da Costa system
C2 , which is the same as C1 , except that 0 is replaced everywhere by 0 ^ 00 . Of
course, there is no reason to suppose that this expresses the consistency of unless it,
itself, behaves consistently. This thought motivates the da Costa system C3 where 0 is
replaced everywhere by 0 ^ 00 ^ 000 . And so on for all the da Costa Systems Ci , for
nite non-zero i.
43 For a discussion of this in the context of da Costa's logics, see Urbas [1989].
44 For a general discussion of many-valued logics, see the articles on the topic in this
Handbook. See also, Rescher [1969].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
307
(:) = 1 ()
( ^ ) = minf (a); ( )g
( _ ) = maxf (a); ( )g
The same conditions can be used for any set of reals f0; 0:5; 1g X [0; 1],
which is closed under subtraction (of a greater by a lesser). For suitable
choices of X , these are the matrices of the odd-numbered nite Lukasiewicz
many-valued logics, and for X = [0; 1] they are the matrices of Lukasiewicz'
continuum-valued logic. In Lukasiewicz' logics proper, the only designated
value is 1, which does not give a paraconsistent logic. But if one takes
the designated values to be fx; a < x 1g (or fx; a x 1g) then
the logic will be paraconsistent provided that 0 < a < 0:5 (or 0 < a
0:5). Let us call such logics Lukasiewicz generalisations. In a Lukasiewicz
generalisation where the set of truth values is [0; 1], these may naturally be
thought of as degrees of truth. Hence, such a logic is a natural candidate
for a paraconsistent fuzzy logic (logic of vagueness).46
It is not dicult to see that any Lukasiewicz generalisation is, in fact,
equivalent to LP . As with the Sugihara generalisations, any LP countermodel is a Lukasiewicz countermodel; and conversely, any Lukasiewicz
45 See Anderson and Belnap [1975], sect. 26.9.
46 A variation on this theme is given by Pe~na in a number of papers. (See, e.g., Pe~na
[1984].) Pe~na takes truth values to be an ordered set of more complex entities dened in
terms of the interval [0; 1].
308
GRAHAM PRIEST
f (x) = 1
= 0:5
=0
if 1 a x 1
if a < x < 1 a
if 0 x a
f (x) = 1
if 1 a < x 1
= 0:5
if a x 1 a
=0
if 0 x < a
The generalisations of LP that we have considered in this section all,
therefore, generate the same logic. What its proof theory is, we will see in
the next.
:1 i 0
:0 i 1
^ 1 i 1 and 1
^ 0 i 0 or 0
_ 1 i 1 or 1
_ 0 i 0 and 0
Let us say that a formula, , is true in an interpretation, , i 1, and
false i 0; then validity may be dened as truth preservation in all interpretations. According to this account, classical logic is just the special case
where multi-valued relations have been forgotten.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
309
These semantics are the Dunn semantics for the logic of First Degree
Entailment, F DE .47 In natural deduction terms, F DE can be characterised
by the rules ^I , ^E , _I and _E , together with the rules:
:( ^ )
: _ :
: ^ :
:( _ )
::
p1 i p 2
p0 i :p 2
A straightforward (joint) induction shows that this characterisation extends
to all formulas. Completeness follows.
There are two natural restrictions that one may place upon Dunn evaluations:
#1
#2
^ :
_ :
x i x 2 ()
47 Published in Dunn [1976], though he discovered them somewhat earlier than this. In
the present context, it might be better to call the system `Zero Degree Entailment' since
the language does not contain a conditional connective.
310
GRAHAM PRIEST
In this way, F DE can be seen as a many- (in fact, four-) valued logic.48
Restriction #2, which ensures that no formula takes the value , gives a
three-valued logic that is identical with LP . It is easy enough to check that
the values f1g, f1; 0g, and f0g work the same way as t, b, and f , respectively.
I will make this identication in the rest of this essay. Restriction #1, which
ensures that no formula takes the value f1; 0g, obviously gives an explosive
logic, which is, in fact, the strong Kleene three-valued logic. This is therefore
a logic dual to LP .49
A feature of these semantics for LP and F DE is that they are monotonic
in the following sense. Let 1 and 2 be functional evaluations. If for all
propositional parameters, p, 1 (p) 2 (p) then for all , 1 () 2 ().
The proof of this is by a simple induction. One consequence of this for LP
is worth remarking on. LP is clearly a sub-logic of classical logic, since it
has the classical matrices as sub-matrices. The consequence relation of LP
is weaker than that of classical logic, since it is paraconsistent. But the set
of logical truths of LP is identical with that of classical logic. For suppose
that is not valid in LP . Let be an evaluation such that 1 2= ().
Let 0 be the interpretation that is the same as , except that for every
parameter, p, if (p) = f0; 1g, 0 (p) = f0g. This is a classical evaluation;
and by monotonicity, 1 2= 0 (), as required.
Another feature of these semantics is the evaluation that assigns every
propositional parameter the value f1; 0g, vf1;0g ; and, in the four-valued
case, the evaluation that gives every parameter the value , v . A simple
induction shows that these properties extend to all formulas. Thus, vf1;0g
makes all formulas true|and false|and v makes every formula neither.
In particular, then, F DE has no logical truths.50
w ( ^ ) = 1 i w () = 1 and w ( ) = 1
48 In fact, the straight truth tables with values 1, 2, 3 and 4 were enunciated by Smiley.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
311
w ( _ ) = 1 i w () = 1 or w ( ) = 1
The truth conditions for negation are:
w (:) = 1 i w () = 0
Note that if w = w, these conditions just reduce to the classical ones. A
natural understanding of the operator is a moot point.51 I will return to
the issue in a moment. Validity is dened in terms of truth preservation at
all worlds of all interpretations.
In natural deduction terms, this system can be characterised by modifying that for F DE by dropping the rule for double negation, and replacing
it with:
..
.
2 i : 2=
and is dened by:
(p) = 1 i p 2
(#)
312
GRAHAM PRIEST
The logic can be made stronger without (necessarily) ruining its paraconsistency by adding further conditions on . The most notable is: w = w.
This is sound and complete with respect to the additional rule:
::
as a simple extension of the completeness argument demonstrates.
These semantics are, in fact, very closely related to the those for F DE
of the previous section. Given an F DE interpretation, , dene a Routley
evaluation on the worlds w and w , as follows:
w (p) = 1 i 1 2 (p)
w (p) = 1 i 0 2= (p)
A simple induction shows that these conditions follow for all formulas. Conversely, we can turn the conditions into reverse. Given any Routley evaluation on a pair of worlds, w, w , dene a Dunn evaluation by the conditions:
1 2 (p) i w (p) = 1
0 2 (p) i w (p) 6= 1
Essentially the same induction shows that these conditions hold for all formulas. Hence, the two semantics are inter-translatable, and validate the
same proof theories.52 The translation also suggests a natural interpretation
of the operator. w is that world characterised by the set of unfalsehoods
of w. (This is, of course, in general, distinct from the set of truths in a
four-valued context.)
Under the above translation, the condition: 1 2 (p) or 0 2 (p), which
gives an LP interpretation, is equivalent to: w (p) = 1 or w (p) 6= 1;
imposing which condition on an intensional interpretation therefore gives
an intensional semantics for LP .
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
313
is, and will be in all the cases we consider|the consequence relation of the
logic is represented by the lattice order relation, dened in the usual way:
a b i a ^ b = a. Thus, a logic will be paraconsistent if it is possible in
the algebra to have an a and b such that a ^ :a 6 b.
Several of the logics that we have looked at can be algebraicised. Consider, for example, F DE . If we take the four-valued semantics for this, we
can think of the values as a lattice whose Hasse diagram is as follows:
f1; 0g
f1g
f0g
(^ is lattice-meet; _ is lattice join; :f1; 0g = f1; 0g, and : = .)
This
generalises to a De Morgan algebra. A De Morgan algebra is a structure A =
hA; ^; _i, where hA; ^; _; :i is a distributive lattice, and : is an involution
of period 2, i.e.:
::a = a
a b ) :b :a
The structures take their name from the fact that in every such algebra
:(a ^ b) = :a _ :b holds, as do the other De Morgan laws.
Dene an inference 1 ; :::; n = to be algebraically valid i for every
homomorphism, , into a De Morgan algebra, A, (1 ) ^ ::: ^ (n ) ( ).
Then the algebraically valid inferences are exactly those of F DE . It is
easy to check that the rule system for F DE is sound with respect to these
semantics. Completeness follows from completeness in the four-valued case.
Alternatively, we can give a direct argument as follows.
Consider the relation , dened by: ` and ` . One can
check that this is an equivalence relation, and a congruence on the logical
operators (i.e., if 1 1 and 2 2 then 1 ^ 2 1 ^ 2 , etc.).53 If
F is the set of formulas, dene the quotient algebra, A = hF= ; ^; _; :i,
where, if [] is the equivalence class of , :[] = [:], [] ^ [ ] = [ ^ ],
etc. One can check that A is a De Morgan lattice. Now, let be the
homomorphism that maps every to []. If (1 ) ^ ::: ^ (n ) ( ).
Then [1 ^ ::: ^ n ] [ ], i.e., [1 ^ ::: ^ n ^ ] = [1 ^ ::: ^ n ]. Hence,
1 ^ ::: ^ n ` 1 ^ ::: ^ n ^ and so 1 ^ ::: ^ n ` . Conversely, then, if
1 ^ ::: ^ n 6` then (1 ) ^ ::: ^ (n ) 6 ( ), as required.
53 The only tricky point concerns negation. For this, we need to appeal to the fact,
which we have already noted, that if ` then : ` :. This can be established
directly, by an induction on proofs.
314
GRAHAM PRIEST
It should be noted that not all the logics we have considered in previous
sections algebraicise. In particular, the non-truth-functional logics resist
this treatment in general. This is for the same reason that the substitutivity
of provable equivalents breaks down: the semantic value of : is entirely
independent of that of . It cannot, therefore, correspond to any well-dened
algebraic operation.
The point can be made more precise in many cases. Suppose that A is
some algebraic structure for a logic, and consider any interpretation, , with
values in the algebra, such that for some p, q and r, (p) = (q) 6= (r).
Then the condition () = ( ) is a congruence relation on the set of
formulas, and collapse by it gives a non-degenerate quotient algebra (i.e., an
algebra that is neither a single-element algebra, nor the algebra of formulas).
But many non-truth-functional logics can be shown to have no such thing.
(See, e.g., Mortensen [1980].)
One nal algebraic paraconsistent logic is worth noting. This is that
of Goodman [1981]. A Heyting algebra can be thought of as a distributive lattice, with a bottom element, ?, and an operator, !, satisfying the
condition:
a ^ b c i a b ! c
(which makes ? ! ? the top element). We may dene :a as a ! ?.
Let T be a topological space. Then a standard example of a Heyting
algebra is the topological Heyting algebra hX; ^; _; !; ?i, where X is the
set of open sets in T , ^ and _ are intersection and union, respectively, ? is
, and a ! b is (a _ b)o |overlining denotes complementation and o is the
interior operator of the topology. :a is clearly ao .
It is well known that for nite sets of premises, Intuitionistic logic is
sound and complete with respect to the class of Heyting algebras, in fact,
with respect to the topological Heyting algebras. That is, 1 ; :::n j=I i
for every homomorphism, , into such an algebra, (1 ^ ::: ^ n ) ( ).54
The whole construction can be dualised in a natural way to give a paraconsistent logic. A dual Heyting algebra is a distributive lattice, with a top
element, >, and an operator, , satisfying the condition:
a b _ c i a
bc
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
315
316
GRAHAM PRIEST
5.1
! as
1 ; : 1 ; 2 : 2
1 ; 2 ; ! : 1 ; 2
Unfortunately, the equivalence between these two approaches now fails. For,
semantically, p j= :p ! q (though the system is still paraconsistent); but
without dilution there is no proof of the sequent p : :p ! q. At this point,
Tennant prefers to go with the proof theory rather than the semantics.
He also prefers the intuitionist version, which allows at most one formula
on the right-hand side of a sequent. For further details, including natural
deduction versions of the proof theory, see Tennant [1987], ch. 23.
In [1992] Tennant suggests modifying the rule for the introduction of !
on the right.58 The in the premise sequent is made optional, and the
following rule is added.
57 One can modify this approach, invoking the lter in the truth conditions of the
conditional itself, to give logics of a more relevant variety. This is pursued in a number of
the essays in Philosophical Studies 26 (1979), no. 2, a special issue on relatedness logics.
58 In fact, he gives the natural deduction rules. The sequent rules described are the
obvious equivalents.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
317
; :
: ! ;
The exact relationship between these rules and the above semantics is as
yet unresolved.
In the non-adjunctive logics of Rescher and Manor, and Schotch and
Jennings: ! may again be identied with , producing no novelties. The
machinery of maximally consistent subsets and partitions carries straight
over.
318
GRAHAM PRIEST
( ! ) = 1 i () = 0 or ( ) = 1
(Note that !, so dened, is distinct from .) Adding this condition to the
logics of 4.4 (except, C! , which we will come to in a moment) gives the full
(propositional) versions of the logics mentioned there; in particular it gives
the da Costa logic C1 (and the other Ci for nite non-zero i). In each case,
a natural deduction system can be obtained by adding the rules:
!E
(a)
(b) _ ( ! )
Soundness is proved as usual. The extension to the completeness proof
amounts to checking that for a prime theory, , ! 2 i 2= or
2 . From left to right, the result follows by (! E ). From right to left:
if 2 then the result follows from (a); if 2= then ( ! ) 2 by (b)
and primeness.
If instead of (a) and (b), we add to any of these systems|except the ones
with a consistency operator; I will come to these in a second|the rule:
!I
..
.
we obtain, not classical positive logic, but intuitionist positive logic. (These
rules are well known to be complete with respect to this logic.) In particular,
if we add ! I and ! E to the rule system for the basic language fragment
of C! we obtain da Costa's C! .
The intuitionist conditional is not, of course, truth functional, but a
valuational semantics for C! can be obtained as follows. A semi-valuation
is any function that satises the conditions for conjunction, disjunction and
negation, plus:
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
319
if ( ! ) = 1 then () = 0 or ( ) = 1
if ( ! ) = 0 then ( ) = 0
A valuation is any semi-valuation, , satisfying the following condition. Let
be of the form 1 ! (2 ! (3 ::: ! n ):::), where n is not itself of the
form !
. Then if () = 0 there is a semi-valuation, 0 , such that for
all 1 i < n, 0 (i ) = 1, and 0 (n ) = 0. C! is sound and complete with
respect to this notion of valuation. For details, see Loparic [1986].61
Changing the deduction rules for ! to the intuitionist ones, makes no
dierence for those logics that contain a consistency operator, and in particular, the da Costa logics Ci for nite i.62 The reason, in nuce, is that
the consistency operator allows us to dene a negation with the properties
of classical negation. As is well known, the addition of such a negation to
positive intuitionist logic is not conservative, but produces classical logic.
In more detail, the argument for C1 is as follows.63
Dene : as : ^ o . Then it is easy to check that:
(: ) = 1 i () = 0
In particular, then, : satises the rules for classical negation:
_ :
^ :
320
GRAHAM PRIEST
( ! ) = (: _ )
= (: ^ )
if () ( )
if () > ( )
This denition gives rise to \semi-relevant" logics, i.e., logics that avoid the
standard paradoxes of relevance, but are still not relevant.
In the case where the set of truth values is the set of all integers, this
gives the Anderson/Belnap logic RM . Proof-theoretically, RM is obtained
from the relevant logic R, which we will come to in the next section, by
adding the \mingle" axiom:
` ! ( ! )
For details of proofs, see Anderson and Belnap [1975], sect. 29.3.
In the 3-valued case, where the set of truth values is f 1; 0; +1g, the
conditions for ! give the matrix:
! +1 0 1
+1 +1
1
1
0 +1
0
1
1 +1 +1 +1
and the stronger logic called RM 3. This is sound and complete with respect
to the axiomatic system obtained by augmenting the system R with the
axioms:
` (: ^ ) ! ( ! )
` _ ( ! )
For the proof, see Brady [1982].
Turning to the second systematic approach, consider any Lukasiewicz
generalisation of LP . Lukasiewicz' truth conditions for his conditional, 7!,
are as follows:
( 7! ) = 1
= 1 ( () ( ))
if () ( )
if () > ( )
7!
1 0.5 0
1 1 0.5 0
0.5 1 1 0.5
0 1 1
1
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
321
Now the most notable feature of the Lukasiewicz denition, given that 0:5 is
designated, is that modus ponens fails. For example, consider a valuation, ,
where (p) = 0:5 and (q) = 0. Then (p 7! q) = 0:5. Hence p; p 7! q 6j= q.
(Modus ponens is valid provided that the only designated value is 1, but
then the logic is not paraconsistent.)
Kotas and da Costa [1978] get around this problem by adding to the
language a new operator, , with the truth conditions:
() = 1
=0
if () is designated
otherwise
5.5 Relevant !s
Given a Routley interpretation (say one for F DE , though the other cases
will be similar), it is natural to treat ! intensionally. The simplest way is
to give it the S 5 truth conditions:
( ! ) _ :( ! )
:( ! )
and so are unsuitable for serious paraconsistent purposes. Moreover, even
though there may be worlds where ^ : is true, or where _ : is false,
EFQ!
65 In fact, their treatment is more general, since they consider the case in which the
extension of may be other than the set of designated values.
66 Pe~na [1984] denes an operator, F , on real numbers such that the value F is 0 if
that of is greater than 0, and 1 otherwise; and then denes a conditional operator,
C , as F _ . The result is similar.
322
GRAHAM PRIEST
`!
` ( ^ ) ! ` ( ^ ) !
` ! ( _ ) ` ! ( _ )
` $ ::
` (: _ : ) $ :( ^ )
` (: ^ : ) $ :( _ )
` ( ^ ( _
)) ! (( ^ ) _ ( ^
))
If ` and ` ! then `
If ` and ` then ` ^
If ` ! and ` !
then ` !
If ` ! then ` : ! :
If ` ! and ` !
then ` ! ( ^
)
If ` !
and ` !
then ` ( _ ) !
Strong (i.e., deducibility-) completeness requires also the rules in disjunctive form.69 The disjunctive form of the rst is: ` _
and ` ( ! ) _
then ` _
. The others are similar.70
obtained by retaining the positive logic and adding a non-truth-functional negation. For
details, see Routely and Loparic [1978].
69 Which are known to be admissible anyway.
70 A sound and complete natural deduction system is an open question.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
323
(p) = 1 i p 2
Once it can be shown that this condition carries over to all formulas, the
result follows as usual. This is proved by induction. The only dicult case
concerns ! when = . From right to left, the result follows from the
denition of W . From left to right, the result follows from the following
lemma. If !
62 then there is a -theory, , such that 2 and
62 . To prove this, we proceed essentially as in 4.3, except that `
is redened. Let ! be the set of conditionals in ; then ` is now
taken to mean that there are 1 ; :::; n 2 and 1 ; :::; m 2 such that
! ` (1 ^ ::: ^ n ) ! (1 _ ::: _ m ). Now set = f g, and = f g, and
proceed as in 4.3. The rest of the details are left as a (lengthy) exercise.71
If we add the Law of Excluded Middle to the axiom system:
` _ :
we obtain a logic that we will call HX . In virtue of the discussion in 4.7,
one might suppose that this would be sound and complete if we add the
condition: for all w, and parameters, p, 1 = w (p) or 0 = w (p). This
condition indeed makes _ : true in all worlds; but for just that reason,
it also veries the irrelevant ! ( _ :). To obtain HX , we place this
constraint on just normal worlds. The semantics are then just right, as
may be checked. For further details, see Routley and Loparic [1978]. Since
normal worlds are now, in eect, LP interpretations, HX veries all the
logical truths of LP and so of classical logic.
A feature of this system is that substitutivity of equivalents breaks down.
For example, as is easy to check, p $ q 6j= (r ! p) $ (r ! q). This can be
changed by taking the valuation function to work on propositions (i.e., set of
worlds), rather than formulas.72 The most signicant feature of semantics
of this kind is that there are no principles of inference that employ nested
71 Details can be found in Priest and Sylvan [1992].
72 For details see Priest [1992].
324
GRAHAM PRIEST
` (( ! ) ^ ( !
)) ! ( ! ( ^
))
` (( !
) ^ ( !
)) ! (( _ ) !
)
and adding a rule that ensures replacement of equivalents:
If ` ! and `
! then ` ( !
) ! ( ! )
The soundness and completeness proofs generalise those for H . Details can
be found in Priest and Sylvan [1992].
We may form the system BX proof theoretically by adding the Law of
Excluded Middle. Semantically, we proceed as with H , placing the appropriate condition on normal worlds.
As with modal logics, stronger logics can be obtained by placing conditions on the accessibility relation, R. In this way, most of the logics in the
Anderson/Belnap family can be generated. Details can be found in Restall
[1993]. The strongest of these is the logic R, an axiom system for which is
as follows:
`!
` ( ! ) ! (( !
) ! ( !
))
` ! (( ! ) ! )
73 Initially, this was in Routley and Meyer [1973]. For further discussion of all the
following, see the article on Relevent Logic in this volume of the Handbook.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
325
` ( ! ( ! )) ! ( ! )
` ( ^ ) ! ; ` ( ^ ) !
` (( ! ) ^ ( !
)) ! ( ! ( ^
))
` ! ( _ ); ` ! ( _ )
` (( !
) ^ ( !
)) ! (( _ ) !
)
` ( ^ ( _
)) ! (( ^ ) _
)
` ( ! : ) ! ( ! :)
` :: !
with the rules of adjunction and modus ponens.
The equivalence between the Dunn 4-valued semantics and the Routley
operation that we noted in 4.7 suggests another way of obtaining an
intensional conditional connective. In the simplest case, an interpretation is
a structure hW; vi where W is a set of worlds and is an evaluation of the
parameters at worlds, but this time it is a Dunn 4-valued interpretation.
The truth conditions for the basic language are as in 4.6, except that they
are relativised to worlds. Thus, using the functional notation:
1 2 w (:) i 0 2 w ()
0 2 w (:) i 1 2 w ()
1 2 w ( ^ ) i 1 2 w () and 1 2 w ( )
0 2 w ( ^ ) i 0 2 w () or 0 2 w ( )
1 2 w ( _ ) i 1 2 w () or 1 2 w ( )
0 2 w ( _ ) i 0 2 w () and 0 2 w ( )
The natural truth and falsity conditions for ! are:
1 2 w ( ! ) i for all w0 2 W; (1 2 w0 () ) 1 2 w0 ( ))
0 2 w ( ! ) i for some w0 2 W , 1 2 w0 () and 0 2 w0 ( )
These semantics do not validate the undesirable:
:( ! )
as their counterparts do. But they are still not relevant. Relevant logics
can be obtained by adding a class of non-normal worlds. The semantic
values of conditionals at these may either be arbitrary, as with H , or, as
with B , we may employ a ternary relation and give the conditions as follows:
326
GRAHAM PRIEST
5.6
! as
There is a very natural way of employing any algebra which has an ordering
relation to give a semantics for conditionals. One may think of the members
of the algebra as propositions, or as Fregean senses. The relation on the
algebra can be thought of as an entailment relation, and it is then natural to
take ! to hold in some interpretation, , i () ( ). The problem,
then, is to express the thought that ! holds in algebraic terms. We
obviously need an algebraic operator, !, corresponding to the connective;
but how is one to express the idea that a ! b holds when the algebra may
have no maximal element?
A way to solve this problem for De Morgan algebras is to employ a designated member of the lattice, e, and take the things that hold in the algebra
to be those whose values are e.74 While we are introducing new machinery, it is also useful algebraically to introduce another binary (groupoid) operator,
,
often
called
`fusion', whose signicance we will come back to in a moment. We may
also enrich the basic language to one containing a constant, e, and an operator, , expressing the new algebraic features.
Thus, following Meyer and Routley [1972], let us call the structure
A = hD; e; !; i a De Morgan groupoid i D is a De Morgan algebra,
hA; ^; _; :i, and for any a; b; c 2 A:
74 A dierent way is to let T be a prime lter on the lattice, thought of as the set of all
true propositions. We can then require that a ! b 2 T i a b. For details, see Priest
[1980].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
327
ea=a
a b c i a b ! c
if a b then a c b c and c a c b
a (b _ c) = (a b) _ (a c) and (b _ c) a = (b a) _ (c a)
The rst of these conditions ensures that e is a left identity on the groupoid.
(Note that the groupoid may not be commutative.) And it, together with
the second, ensure that a b i e a ! b. The third and fourth ensure that
respects the lattice operations in a certain sense. The sense is question in
that of a sort of conjunction, and this makes it possible to think of fusion
as a kind of intensional conjunction.
An inference, 1 ; :::; n =; is algebraically valid i for every homomorphism, , into a De Morgan groupoid, (1 ^ ::: ^ n ) ( ), i.e., e
((1 ^ ::: ^ n ) ! )).75
These semantics are sound and complete with respect to the relevant
logic B of 5.5. Soundness is shown in the usual way, and completeness can
be proved, as in 4.8, by constructing the Lindenbaum algebra, and showing
that it is a De Morgan groupoid.
Stronger logics can be obtained, as usual, by adding further constraints.
The condition: e a _:a gives the law of excluded middle (and all classical
tautologies). Additional constraints on give the stronger logics in the usual
relevant family, including R. Details of all the above can be found in Meyer
and Routley [1972] (who also show how to translate between algebraic and
world semantics).76
Before leaving the topic of conditionals in algebraic paraconsistent logics,
a nal comment on dual intuitionist logic. Goodman [1981] proves that in
this logic there is no conditional operator (i.e., operator satisfying modus
ponens) that can be dened in terms of _; ^ and :; and draws somewhat
pessimistic conclusions from this concerning the usefulness of the logic. Such
pessimism is not warranted, however. Exactly the same is true in relevant
logic; this does not mean that a conditional operator cannot be added to the
basic language. And as Mortensen notes,77 given any algebraic structure
with top (>) and bottom (?) elements, the following conditions can always
be used to dene a conditional operator:
( ! ) = >
=?
if () ( )
otherwise
328
GRAHAM PRIEST
5.7 Decidability
Before we leave the topic of propositional logics, let me review, brie
y, the
question of decidability for the logics that we have looked at. Unsurprisingly,
most (though not all) are decidable, as the following decision procedures
indicate. As will be clear, in many cases the procedures actually given
could be greatly optimised.
Any lter logic is decidable if the lter is. Given any inference, we can
eectively nd the set of all inferences of which it is a uniform substitution
instance. Provided that the lter is decidable, we can test each of these for
prevalidity. If any of them is valid, the original inference is valid; otherwise
not.
Smiley's lter is clearly decidable. So is Tennant's semantic lter. Given
an inference with nite sets of premises and conclusions, and , respectively, we can test the inference for classical validity. We may then test
the inferences for all subsets of and . (There is only a nite number
of these.) If the original inference is valid, but its subinferences are not,
it passes the test; otherwise not. Tennant's proof theory of 5.1 is also decidable. Anything provable has a Cut-free proof (since Cut is not a rule of
proof). Decidability then follows as it does in the case of classical logic.
Turning to non-adjunctive logics: Jaskowski's discursive logic is decidable; we may simply translate an inference into the corresponding one concerning S 5, and use the S 5 decision procedure for this. The same obviously
goes for any generalisation, provided only that the underlying modal logic
is decidable.
Rescher and Manor's logic is decidable in the obvious way. Given any
nite set of premises, we can compute all its subsets, the classical consistency of each of these, and hence determine which of the sets are maximally
consistent. Once we have these, we can determine if any of them classically
entails the conclusion. Similar comments apply to Schotch and Jennings'
logic. Given any premise set, we can compute all its partitions, and so determine its level. For every partition of that size, we can test to see if one
of its members classically entails the conclusion.
Non-truth-functional logics are also decidable by a simple procedure.
Given an inference, we consider the set of all subformulas of the sentences
involved (which is nite). We then consider all mappings from these to
f0; 1g, the set of which is also nite. For each of these we go through
and test whether it satises the appropriate constraints in the obvious way.
Throwing away all those that do not, we see whether the conclusion holds
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
329
330
GRAHAM PRIEST
; :
; 8x :
; (x=c) :
; 9x :
where in the rst and last of these, c does not occur in any formula in or
. For proofs, see Tennant [1984]. (With the conditional operator added,
the situation is dierent, as we saw in 5.1.)
Non-adjunctive logic accommodates quantiers in an obvious way. Consider discursive logic. An inference in the quantied language is discursively valid i 3 j=CS5 3, where CS 5 is constant-domain quantied S 5.
Clearly, any other quantied modal logic could be used to generalise this
notion.80
Rescher and Manor's approach and Schotch and Jennings' also generalise in the obvious way, the classical notion of propositional consequence
involved being replaced by the classical rst-order notion. In the quanticational case, the usefulness of these logics is moot, since the computation
of classically maximally consistent sets of premises, or partitions, is highly
non-eective.
In all these logics, except Smiley's, the set of logical truths (in the appropriate vocabulary) coincides with that of classical quantier logic; hence
these logics are undecidable.81
80 For details of quantied modal logic, see the article on that topic in this Handbook.
81 I do not know whether Smiley's logic is decidable, though I assume that it is not.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
331
8I
_ (x=c)
_ 8x
x
8E 8(x=c
)
9I
9E
(x=c)
9x
(x=c)
..
.
9x
332
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
333
6.4 LP and F DE
The technique of extending a many-valued logic to a quantied one can
be put in a slightly dierent, and possibly more illuminating, way for the
logics with relational semantics, LP and F DE . An interpretation, I , is a
pair, hD; di, where D is the usual domain of quantication, d is a function
that maps every constant into the domain, and every n-place predicate into
a pair, hEP ; AP i, each member of which is a subset of the set of n-tuples
of D; Dn . EP is the extension of P ; AP is the anti-extension. For LP
interpretations, we require, in addition, that EP [ AP = Dn . Truth values
are now assigned to sentences in accord with the following conditions. For
atomic sentences:
1 2 (P c1 :::cn ) i hd(c1 ); :::; d(cn )i 2 EP
0 2 (P c1 :::cn ) i hd(c1 ); :::; d(cn )i 2 AP
Truth/falsity conditions for connectives are as in the propositional case; and
for the quantiers:
1 2 (8x) i for every c 2 D; 1 2 ((x=c))
0 2 (8x) i for some c 2 D, 0 2 ((x=c))
1 2 (9x) i for some c 2 D; 1 2 ((x=c))
334
GRAHAM PRIEST
8x:
:9x
9x:
:8x
hc1 ; :::; cn i 2 EP
hc1 ; :::; cn i 2 AP
i P c1 :::cn 2
i :P c1 :::cn 2
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
335
I2 .
83 More complex semantics can be employed in the usual variety of ways employed in
modal logic. (See the article on Quantied Modal Logic in this Handbook.) In particular, we might employ variable-domain semantics. This makes matters more complex.
336
GRAHAM PRIEST
Consider the following quantier axioms and rules (where ` is now taken
to indicate universal closure):
` 8x ! (x=c)
` (x=c) ! 9x
` ^ 9x ! 9x( ^ ) x not free in
` 8x( _ ) ! ( _ 8x ) x not free in
If ` 8x( ! ) then ` 9x ! x not free in
If ` 8x( ! ) then ` ! 8x x not free in
It is easy to check that these axioms/rules are valid/truth-preserving for
H . If they are added to the propositional axioms/rules for H , they are also
complete. For the proof, see Routley and Loparic [1980].84
If we strengthen the two rules to conditionals (so that the rst of these
becomes ` 8x( ! ) ! (9x ! ), etc.) and add them to the rules
for B , they are also sound and complete. The same is true for a number
of the extensions of B , including BX . (For details, see Routley [1980a].)
A notable exception to this fact is the system R. Though the system is
sound, it is, perhaps surprisingly, not complete.85 In fact, a proof-theoretic
characterisation of constant domain quantied R is still an open problem.
The axioms and rules are complete for the stronger semi-relevant system
RM of 5.4.86
Since every relevant logic in the above family contains F DE , and this is
undecidable, it follows that all the logics in this family are also undecidable.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
337
A. Algebraic values are then assigned to all formulas in the usual way. In
particular, for quantied sentences the conditions are:
V
338
GRAHAM PRIEST
t=t
t1 = t2 (x=t1 )
(x=t2 )
This does not require identity statements to be consistent. In LP the antiextension of identity is any set whose union with the extension exhausts
D2 , and so a pair can be in both the extension and the anti-extension of
the identity predicate. In other logics, negated identities can be taken care
of by whatever mechanism is used for negation. The completeness proof for
quantied LP can be extended to include function symbols and identity in
the usual Henkin fashion.
I note that description operators can be added in the obvious ways, with
the same panoply of options as in the classical case.88
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
339
340
GRAHAM PRIEST
..
.
..
.
2( _ )
2 _ 3
2
^ 3
3(
^ )
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
2
1 ^ ::: ^ 2
n
2(
1 ^ ::: ^
n )
341
3(1 _ ::: _ n )
31 _ ::: _ 3n
2 2 ) 2
2 ) 3 2
2 2
, 8 s.t. R, 2
, 8 s.t. R, 1 2 ( )
, 1 2 (2 )
:2 2 , 3: 2
, 9( R and : 2 )
, 9( R and 0 2 ( ))
, 0 2 (2 )
342
GRAHAM PRIEST
operators, that employs the Routley to handle negation, see Routley [1989].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
343
are possible, but by the view that everything is possible.95 The valuation
f1;0g assigns every formula the value f1; 0g. (See 4.6). Hence, any interpretation that contains f1;0g as one world will verify 3, for all , at any
world that accesses it.96 If we interpret the modal operators 2 and 3 as the
deontic operators O (it is obligatory that) and P (it is permissible that), respectively, then the thesis that everything is possible becomes the nihilistic
thesis that everything is permissible|what, according to Dostoevski, would
be the case if there is no God.
Less exotically, standard deontic logic suers badly from explosion.97
Since in classical logic ; : j= it follows that O; O: j= O : if you
have inconsistent obligations then you are obliged to do everything. This
is surely absurd. People incur inconsistent obligations; this may give rise
to legal or moral dilemmas, but hardly to legal or moral anarchy.98 And
one does not have to believe in dialetheism to accept this. Unsurprisingly,
deontic explosion fails, given the semantics of the previous section: just
consider the interpretation where there is a single world, w; R is universal;
w (p) = f1; 0g and w (q) = f0g. It is not dicult to check that w (Op) =
w (O:p) = f1; 0g, whilst w (Oq) = f0g.
What is often taken to be the basic possible-worlds deontic logic (called
KD by Chellas [1980], p. 131) makes matters even worse, by requiring that
in an interpretation the accessibility relation be serial: for all x, there is
a y such that xRy. This validates the inference O=P . It also validates
the inference O:=:O. Hence we have, classically, O; O: j= O ^
:O j= ; one who incurs inconsistent obligations renders the world trivial.
Someone who believes that there are deontic dilemmas may just have to
jettison the view that obligation entails permission, and so give up seriality.
But on the above account one can retain seriality, and so both the above
inferences; for O ^ :O 6j= , as the countermodel of the last paragraph
shows.99
Another standard way of interpreting the modal operator 2 is as an
epistemic operator, K (it is known that), or a doxastic operator B (it is
believed that). In these cases, classically, one would almost certainly want to
put extra constraints on the accessibility relation, though what these should
be might be contentious: all can accept re
exivity (xRx) for K (but not
for B ) since this validates K j= . Whether one would want transitivity
((xRy&yRz ) ) xRz ) is much more dubious for B and K , since this gives the
95 E.g., Mortensen [1989].
96 A similar, but slightly more complex, construction can be employed to the same
eect if the logic has a conditional operator.
97 See the article on Deontic Logic in this Handbook for details of Deontic Logic, including the possible-worlds approach.
98 For further discussion, see Priest [1987], ch. 13.
99 We have just been dealing with some of the \paradoxes of deontic logic". There are
many of these. Arguably, all of them|or at least all the serious ones|are avoided by
using a paraconsistent logic with a relevant conditional. See Routley and Routley [1989].
344
GRAHAM PRIEST
t (p) = f1g
= f1; 0g
= f0g
if t < t0
if t = t0
if t > t0
7.5 Probability
Probability is not a modal notion. But it, too, has paraconsistent signicance. One of the most natural ways of constructing a paraconsistent probability theory is to extract one from a class of paraconsistent interpretations,
in the manner of Carnap.102
100 If you believe classical logic, then you might suppose that they are rationally committed to everything, but that is quite dierent. Even here, however, an explosive logic
would seem to go astray. Dialetheism aside, situations such as the paradox of the preface,
as well as more mundane things, would seem to show that one can be rationally committed to inconsistent propositions without being rationally committed to everything. See
Priest [1987], sect. 7.4.
101 See Priest [1982] and Priest [1987], ch. 11.
102 See Carnap [1950].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
345
A probabilistic interpretation is a pair, hI; i, where I is a class of interpretations for LP 103 and a nitely additive measure on I , that is, a
function from subsets of I to non-negative real numbers such that:
() = 0
(X [ Y ) = (X ) + (Y ) if X \ Y =
If is any sentence, let [] = f 2 I ; 1 2 ()g. For reasons that we will
come to, we also require that for all , ([]) 6= 0. There certainly are such
interpretations and measures. For example, let I be any nite class that
contains the trivial interpretation, f1;0g , where all sentences are true, and
let (X ) be the cardinality of X . Then this condition is satised.
Given a probabilistic interpretation, we dene a probability function, p,
by:
p() = ([])=(I )
It is easy to see that p satises all the standard conditions for a probability
function, such as:
0 p() 1
if j= then p() p( )
if j= then p() = 1
p( _ ) = p() + p( ) p( ^ )
except, of course: p(:) + p() = 1. Since we have p( ^ :) > 0, and
p( _ :) = 1, it follows that p() + p(:) > 1.
By the construction, we have, in fact, p() > 0 for all . It might be
suggested that a person whose personal probability function gives nothing
the value zero would have to be very stupid|or at least credulous. But since
p() may be as small as one wishes, this hardly seems to follow. Moreover,
giving nothing a zero probability signals an open-minded and undogmatic
policy of belief. Arguably, this is the most rational policy.
Given a probability function, conditional probability can be dened in
the usual way:
p(= ) = p( ^ )=p( )
A singular advantage of this paraconsistent probability theory over standard accounts is that conditional probability is always dened, since the
denominator is always non-zero.
103 Again, many other paraconsistent logics could be used instead.
346
GRAHAM PRIEST
p(e) =
=
=
=
p(e ^ (h1 _ h2 ))
p((e ^ h1 ) _ (e ^ h2 ))
p(e ^ h1 ) + p(e ^ h2 ) p(e ^ h1 ^ h2 )
p(h1 ):p(e=h1) + p(h2 ):p(e=h2 ) p(h1 ^ h2 ):p(e=(h1 ^ h2) )
Thus:
p(h1 =e) =
p(e=h1 ):p(h1 )
p(h1 ):p(e=h1 ) + p(h2 ):p(e=h2 ) p(h1 ^ h2 ):p(e=(h1 ^ h2 ))
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
347
light is shone onto a screen through a mask with two slits. The intensity
of light on any point on the screen is proportional to the probability that
a photon hits it, , given that it goes through one slit, , or goes through
the other, . Let us write p( _ ) as q. Then:
theory on conrmation theory, see Priest [1987], sect. 7.6, and Priest et al. [1989], pp.
376-9, 385-8.
348
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
349
(of the kind found in physics, not agriculture). This metaphor suggests that
even if inconsistencies are present they will be relatively rare. If it is true
inconsistencies we are talking about, these will be even rarer|something
that the classical logician can readily agree with!108
This suggests that consistency should be a default assumption, in the
sense of non-monotonic logic. Many non-monotonic logics can be formulated by dening validity over some class of models, minimal with respect to
violation of the default condition. In eect, we consider only those interpretations that are no more pro
igate in the relevant way than the information
necessitates. In the case where it is consistency that is the default condition,
we may dene validity over models that are minimally inconsistent in some
sense. I will illustrate, as usual, with respect to LP .109
Let I = hD; di be an LP interpretation. Let 2 I ! i is P d1 :::dn ,
where P is an n-place predicate and hd1 ; :::; dn i 2 EP \ AP in I . (Recall that
I am using members of the domain as names for themselves.) I ! is a measure
of the inconsistency of I . In particular, I is a classical interpretation i
I ! = . If I1 and I2 are LP interpretations, I will write I1 < I2 , and say
that I1 is more consistent than I2 , i I1 ! I2 !. (The containment here is
proper.) I is a minimally inconsistent (mi) model of i I is a model of
i I is a model of and if J < I ; J is not a model of . Finally, is
an mi consequence of ( j=m ) i every mi model of is a model of .
As is to be expected, j=m is non-monotonic. For if p and q are atomic
sentences, it is easy to check that fp; :p _ qg j=m q, but f:p; p; :p _ qg 6j=m q.
Moreover, since all classical models (if there are any) are mi models, and
all mi models are models, it follows that j= ) j=m ) j=C .
The implications are, in general, not reversible. For the rst, note that
fp; :p _ qg 6j= q; for the second, note that fp; :pg 6j=m q. But if is
classically consistent, its mi models are exactly its classical models, and
hence we have j=m , j=C : classical recapture.
j=m has various other interesting properties. For example, it can be
shown that if the LP consequences of some set is non-trivial, so are its mi
consequences Reassurance. For details, see Priest [1991a].110
108 Though this is not so obvious once one accepts dialetheism. For a defence of the
view given dialetheism, see Priest [1987], sect. 8.4.
109 Though the rst paraconsistent logician to employ this strategy was Batens [1989],
who employs a non-truth-functional logic. Batens also considers the dymanical aspects
of such default reasoning.
110 In that paper, in the denition of <, a clause stating that the domains of I1 and
I2 are the same is added. With this clause, the result concerning classical recapture is
false (and that paper is mistaken). For example, if is 9xP x ^ 9x:P x, then hD; di is an
mi model, wher D = fag; EP = AP = fag, though this is not a classical model. (This
was rst noted by Diderik Batens, in correspondence.) As < is dened here, f8x(P x ^
:P x)g m 9x8yx = y, which may be thought to be counter-intuitive. But if 8x(P x ^
:P x) is all the information we have, and inconsistencies are to be minimised, perhaps it is
correct to infer that there is just one thing. Note that f8x(P x^:P x); 9xQx^9x:Qxg 6j=m
9x8yx = y. For hd; di is an mi model of the premises, where D = fa; bg; EP = AP =
350
GRAHAM PRIEST
T -schema: T hi $
S -schema: Sx h i $ (y=x)
D-schema: D hti x $ x = t
where is any sentence, is any formula with one free variable, y, and t
is any closed term. Angle brackets indicate a name-forming device. In set
theory the principle is the schema of set existence:
Comprehension Schema: 9x8y(y 2 x $ )
where is any formula not containing x. What the connective $ is in the
above schemas, we will have to come back to.
Despite the fact that these schemas appear to be obvious, they all give rise
to contradictions, as is well known: the paradoxes of self-reference, such as
(respectively) the Liar Paradox, the Heterological Paradox, Berry's Paradox
and Russell's Paradox. The usual approaches to set theory and semantics
restrict the principles in some way. Such approaches are all unsatisfactory
in one way or another, though I shall not discuss this here.111
A paraconsistent approach can simply leave the principles as they are,
and allow the contradictions to arise. They need do no damage, because
the logic is not explosive. Even so, not all paraconsistent logics are suitable as the underlying logics of these theories. For a start, if the above
schemas are formulated with the material they give rise to a conjoined
contradiction, so using a non-adjunctive logic (except Rescher and Manor's)
explodes the theory.112 And in the da Costa systems, Ci , for nite i, an
operator behaving like classical negation, : can be dened (see 5.3). The
usual arguments establish contradictions of the form ^ : , and so again
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
351
the theories explode. Fortunately, there are other paraconsistent logics that
will do the job.113
352
GRAHAM PRIEST
T hi
1 () = t ) 2 () = t
1 () = f ) 2 () = f
If 1 2 then this condition extends to all formulas of L. For suppose
that 1 2 . If n is in the extension of T in I2 but not I1 ; then 2 (T n) = t
or b, but 1 (T n) = f , violating the condition. Similarly for anti-extensions.
Hence, I2 I1 . By monotonicity, for all , 2 () 1 (). The conclusion
follows. For suppose that 2 () 6= t. Then is false (i.e., b or f ) in I2 ;
hence is false in I1 , i.e., 1 () 6= t. The argument for f is similar.
This result is, in fact, just another version of monotonicity; I will call it
the Monotonicity Lemma.
Let I0 be any arithmetical interpretation, with evaluation function 0 .
We now dene a transnite sequence of arithmetical interpretations,
117 Whether or not more follows with minimally inconsistent LP (see 7.6) is presently
unknown. Another non-monotonic notion of inference also suggests itself here. According
to this, the things that follow are the things that hold in all minimally inconsistent models
where the arithmetic part is the standard model. Employing this would be appropriate
if there were good reasons to believe that the only inconsistencies involve the truth
predicate.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
353
k (T hi) = t
=f
=b
if is eventually t by k
if is eventually f by k
otherwise
:
:T hi
Yet the theory is not trivial: anything false in the standard model of arithmetic is untrue in J , and so T1 6j= .
It is not dicult to see that the construction used to dene J is, in fact,
just a dualised form of Kripke's xed point construction for a logic with
truth value gaps using the strong Kleene three-valued logic.118 (Provided
we start with a suitable ground model, monotonicity is guaranteed from the
beginning, and so we can just set k (T hi) to t (or f ) if takes the value t
(or f ) at some i < k.) Hence, if any sentence is grounded in Kripke's sense,
it takes a classical value in J . In particular, if is any false grounded
sentence, T1 6j= .
118 See the article on Semantics and the Liar Paradox in this Handbook. One of the rst
people to realise that the construction could be dualised for this end was Dowden [1984].
354
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
355
k ( ! ) = t
=f
=b
if 8j < k, j ( ) ) = t
if 9 j < k, j ( ) ) = f
otherwise
And where is of the form T s, where s is any closed term which evaluates
to the code of a sentence:
k () = t
=f
=b
356
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
357
t = "xD hti x
123 Nor does the T -schema have to be taken as axiomatic. One can give truth conditions
for atomic sentences and then prove the T -schema in the usual Tarskian fashion. See
Priest [1987], ch. 7.
124 For this, see Priest [1987], ch. 2.
125 The advantages of a paraconsitent account of truth rub o onto any account of modal
(deontic, doxastic, etc.) operators that treats them as predicates. For all such theories are
just sub-theories of the theory of truth. See Priest [1991b]. We will have an application
of this concerning provability in 9.6.
358
GRAHAM PRIEST
Now in arithmetic, just as for any formula, , with one free variable, x, we
can nd a sentence, , of the form (x= h i), so, for any term, t, with one
free variable, x, we can nd a closed term; s, such that s is t(x= hsi). If f
is any one place function symbol, apply this fact to the term f"yDxy, to
obtain an s such that:
s = f"yD hsi y
Since s = "yD hsi y, it follows that s = fs: any function has a xed point.
This shows that the semantic machinery does have purely arithmetic consequences. In particular, for example, 9x x = x + 1. Arithmetic statements
like this can be kept under control, as we will see later in the next part, but
worse is to come.
Let f be the parity function, i.e.:
fx = 0
=1
if x is odd
if x is even
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
359
9x8y(y 2 x )
8x(x 2 y x 2 z ) y = z
where x does not occur free in . Call this theory S0 . S0 is inconsistent.
For putting y 2= y for , and instantiating the quantier we get: 8y(y 2 r
y 2= y), whence r 2 r r 2= r. Cashing out in terms of : and _ gives
r 2 r ^ r 2= r.
In constructing models of S0 , the following observation (due to Restall
[1992]) is a useful one. First some denitions. Given two vectors of LP
values, (gm ; m 2 D), (hm ; m 2 D), the rst subsumes the second i for all
m 2 D; gm hm . Now consider a matrix of such values (em;n; m; n 2 D).
This is said to cover the vector (gm ; m 2 D) i for some n 2 D, the vector
(em;n ; m 2 D) subsumes it. A vector indexed by D is classical i all its
members are t or f . (Recall that we are writing f1g, f1; 0g, f0g as t, b f ,
respectively.)
Now the observation. Consider an LP interpretation, hD; di, and the
matrix (em;n ; m; n 2 D), where em;n = (m 2 n). If this covers every
classical vector indexed by D it veries the Comprehension principle. For let
be any formula not containing x, and consider the vector ( ((y=m)); m 2
D). This certainly subsumes some classical vector; choose one such, and let
this be subsumed by (em;n ; m 2 D). Now consider any formula of the form
m 2 n (y=m). Where the two sides dier in value, one of them has the
value b. Hence, the value of the biconditional is either t or b. Thus the same
is true of 8y(y 2 n ), and 9x8y(y 2 x ).
Using this fact, it is easy to construct models for S0 . Consider an LP
interpretation, hD; di, where D = fm; ng, and em;n is given by the following
matrix:
2 m n
m b
n b
t
t
360
GRAHAM PRIEST
x 2 fy; g
(y=x)
Call this theory S1 . S1 is inconsistent. For let r be fx; x 2= xg. Then:
r2r
r 2= r
The law of excluded middle then quickly gives us r 2 r ^ r 2= r.
127 For this, and some further observations in this direction, see Restall [1992].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
361
8x( )
fx; g = fx; g
But if we do this, trouble arises.128 For let r be as before. Then since
r 2 r must take the value b in any interpretation, we have, for any ,
8x( r 2 r), and so fx; g = fx; r 2 rg. Thus, for any and ,
fx; g = fx; g; which is rather too much.
The problem arises because the Extensionality rule of inference allows
us to move from an equivalence that does not guarantee substitution (
;
6j=LP
) to one that does (identity). This suggests formulating Extensionality itself with a connective that legitimises substitution.
So let us add a detachable connective to the language, !, and formulate
Extensionality as:
8x( $ )
fx; g = fx; g
The trouble then disappears.
And now that we have a detachable conditional connective at our disposal, it is natural to formulate the Comprehension principle as a detachable
biconditional, as follows:
362
GRAHAM PRIEST
and add the law of excluded middle, the Comprehension principle still gives
triviality.129 Again however, a relevant logic without contraction will do the
job.
Consider the set theory with Extensionality and Comprehension formulated as just described, and based on the underlying logic BX (with free
variables, so that these may occur in the schematic letters of Extensionality and Comprehension). Call this S2 : The rst thing to note about S2 is
that identity can be dened in it, in Russellian fashion. Writing x = y for
8z (x 2 z $ y 2 z ), x = x follows. Substituting fw; g for z , and using
the Comprehension principle gives (w=x) $ (w=y). Hence, we need no
longer assume that = is part of the language.
Since the Comprehension principle of S2 gives the two-way deduction
version of S1 , S2 is inconsistent. It is also demonstrably non-trivial, as
shown by Brady [1989].130 To prove this, we repeat the proof for T2 of
8.2 with three modications. The rst, a minor one, is that we add two
propositional constants t and f to the language; their truth values are always
what the letters suggest. (This is necessary to kick-start the generation of
the xed point into motion. In the case of truth, this was done by the
arithmetic sentences.) More substantially, in constructing we replace the
clause for T by:
k (s 2 fx; g) = t
if (x=s) is eventually t by k
=f
if (x=s) is eventually f by k
=b
otherwise
where s is any closed term, and contains at most x free. The nal modication is that in extending evaluations to all formulas, we use substitutional
quantication with respect to the closed set abstracts.
Now; ~ veries all the theorems of S2 , in the sense that if is any closed
substitution instance of a theorem, it receives the value t or b in ~ . This
is shown by an induction on the length of proofs. That the logical axioms
have this property, and the logical rules of inference preserve this property,
is shown as in 8.2. This leaves the set theoretic ones.
Given the construction of ~ , it is not dicult to see that it veries the
Comprehension principle. It is not at all obvious that Extensionality preserves verication. What needs to be shown is that if 8x( $ ) is veried,
so is anything of the form a 2 c $ b 2 c, where a is fx; g and b is fx; g.
Let c be fy;
g. Then, given Comprehension, what needs to be shown is that
(y=a) $
(y=b) is veried. If this can be shown for atomic
, the result
will follow by induction. Given the premise of the inference and Comprehension, it is true if
is of the form d 2 y. If it is of the form y 2 d, where
129 See Slaney [1989]. Other classical principles are also known to give rise to triviality
in conjunction with the Comprehension schema. See Bunder [1986].
130 A modication of the proof shows that the theory based on the logic B is, in fact,
consistent. See Brady [1983].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
363
131 Brady's treatment of identity is slightly dierent from the one given here. He denes x = y as 8z (z 2 x $ z 2 y). Given Comprehension, this delivers the version
of Extensionality used here straight away. What is lost is the substitution principle
x = y; (w=x) ` (w=y). Given the Comprehension principle, this can be reduced to
x = y; x 2 z ` y 2 z (which follows from our denition of identity). Brady takes something stronger than this as his substitutivity axiom: ` (x = y ^ z = z ) ! (x 2 z $ y 2 z ).
Hence, his construction certainly veries the weaker principle. It is worth noting that
the construction does not validate the simpler ` x = y ! (x 2 z $ y 2 z ), which, in any
case, is known to be a Destroyer of Relevance. See Routley [1980b], sect. 7.
364
GRAHAM PRIEST
concerns results about sets, like Russell's set and the universal set, that do
not exist in ZF . Let us take these matters in turn.
S2 is able to provide for virtually all of bread-and-butter set theory
(Boolean operations on sets, power sets, products, functions, operations
on functions, etc.), and so provide for the needs of working mathematics.132
For example, if we dene the Boolean operators, x \ y, x [ y and x as
fz ; z 2 x ^ z 2 yg, fz ; z 2 x _ z 2 yg and fz ; z 2= xg, respectively, and x y
as 8z (z 2 x ! z 2 y), then we can establish the usual facts concerning
these notions. Some care needs to be taken over dening a universal set, U ,
and empty set, , though. If we dene , as fx; x 6= xg, we cannot show
that for all y, y, since the underlying logic is relevant and cannot prove
x 6= x ! for arbitrary . (Dually for U .) If we dene as fx; 8z x 2 z g,
this problem is solved, since 8z x 2 z ! x 2 y. (Dually for U .)
The reason for the qualication `virtually' in the rst sentence of the last
paragraph, is as follows. The sets, as structured by union, intersection and
complementation, are not a Boolean algebra, but a De Morgan algebra with
maximum and minimum elements. Though we can show that 8y y 62 x \ x,
we cannot show that x \ x , since, relevantly, ( ^ :) ! fails.
(Dually for U .) There are, in a sense, more than one universal and empty
sets. Moreover, this is essential. If we had x \ x then, taking fz ; g
for x, we get ( ^ :) ! 8y z 2 y. Now take fz ; g for y, and we get
( ^ :) ! ; paraconsistency fails. In fact, Dunn [1988] shows that if the
principles that there is a unique universal set, and a unique empty set, are
added to any set theory such as S2 , full classical logic falls out.
Turning to the second area, the question of how much of the usual transnite set theory can be established in S2 is one to which the answer is
currently unknown. What can be said is that the standard proofs of a number of results break down. This is particularly the case for results that are
proved by reductio, such as Cantor's Theorem. Where is an assumption
made for the purpose of reductio, we may well be able to establish that
( ^ ) ! (
^ :
), for some
, where is the conjunction of other facts
appealed to in deducing the contradiction (such as instances of the Comprehension principle). But contraposing and detaching will give us only
: _ : , and we can get no further.133
Lastly, the third area: reasoning in S2 , one can prove various results about
sets that are impossible inSZF . For example, as usual, let fxg be fy; y = xg,
fx; yg be fxg [ fyg and x be fz ; 9y 2 x; z 2 yg. r = fx; x 2= xg, and we
know that r 2 r and r 2= r. Then:134
(1) If x 2 r then fxg 2 r. For fxg 2 fxg or fxg 2= fxg. In the rst case,
132 Much of this is spelled out in Routley [1980b], sect. 8.
133 Interesting enough, however, it is possible to prove a version of the Axiom of Choice
using the completely unrestricted version of the Comprehension principle. See Routley
[1980b], sect. 8.
134 The following is taken from Arruda and Batens [1982].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
365
by denition.
S
(4) 8x x 2 r. For suppose that fx; rg 2 fx; rg. Then fx; rg = x or
fx; rg = r. In the rst case, fxg = Sffx; rgg, so fxg 2 r, by (3). In the
second, fx; rg 2 r. In either case x 2 r. Suppose, on the S
other hand, that
fx; rg 2= fx; rg. Then fx; rg 2 r, by denition, and so x 2 r.
S
That r is universal, is hardly a profound result. But it at least illustrates the fact that there are possibilities which transcend ZF .
Let me end this section with a speculative comment on what all this
shows. The discussion of this section, and especially the part concerning the
non-Boolean properties of sets in S2 , shows that it is impossible to recapture
standard set theory in its entirety in this theory. Sets are extensional entities
par excellence; using an intensional connective in their identity conditions is
bound to gum up the works. In fact, it seems to me that the most plausible
way of viewing S2 is as a theory of properties, where intensional identity
conditions are entirely appropriate. But what you call these entities does
not really matter here. The important fact is that they are not the sets of
standard modern mathematical practice.
If we want a theory of such entities, the appropriate identity conditions
must employ , and this means that we are back with the proof-theoretically
weak S0 (or S1 ). Since this does not contain ZF , how should someone who
subscribes to a paraconsistent theory of such sets view modern mathematical
practice?
One answer is as follows. The standard model of ZF is the cumulative
hierarchy. As we saw in 8.2, there are models of S0 which contain this
hierarchy. We may thus take it that the intended interpretation of S0 is a
model of this kind (or if there are more than one, that they are all models of
this kind). The cumulative hierarchy is therefore a (consistent) fragment of
the set-theoretic universe, and modern set theory provides a description of
it. There is, however, more to the universe than this fragment. A classical
logician may well agree with that claim. For example, they may think that
there are also non-well-founded sets. The paraconsistent logician agrees
with this: after all, r is not well-founded; but they will think that sets
outside the hierarchy may have even more remarkable properties: some of
them are inconsistent.
366
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
367
Similarly for 0 and anti-extensions. Monotonicity then entails that for any
formula, , () (). This is the Collapsing Lemma.138
The Collapsing Lemma assures us that if an interpretation is a model of
some set of sentences, then any interpretation obtained by collapsing it will
also be a model. This gives us an important way of constructing inconsistent
models. In particular, if the language contains no function symbols, and I is
a model of some set of sentences, then, by appropriate choice of equivalence
relation, we can collapse it down to a model of any smaller size. Thus we
have a very strong downward Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem: If a theory in a
language without function symbols has a model, it has a model of all smaller
cardinalities.
I note that, since monotonicity holds for second order LP (section 7.2),
the Collapsing Lemma extends to second order LP . Details are left as an
exercise.
138 The result is proved in Priest [1991a]. A similar result was proved by Dunn [1979].
368
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
"
k 1
! ::: !
:::
369
i+1
I will call such models cycle models. They were, in fact, the rst inconsistent
models to be discovered.141 If M is any model, n = 1; and k = 1, we
have a tail isomorphic to C0 , and then a degenerate single-point cycle. In
particular, if M is a non-standard model and C0 comprises the standard
numbers, we have the natural numbers with a \point at innity",
:
0
! :::
370
GRAHAM PRIEST
every member. We may thus say that p is a period of the nucleus itself. It
also follows that if N1 N2 and p is a period of N1 it is a period of N2 .
If a nucleus has a regular non-zero period, m, then it must have a minimum (in the usual sense) non-zero period, since the sequence 0; 1; 2; :::; m is
nite. If N1 N2 and N1 has minimum regular non-zero period, p, then p
is a period of N2 . Moreover, the minimum non-zero period of N2 , q, must
be a divisor (in the usual sense) of p. For suppose that q < p, and that q is
not a divisor of p. For some 0 < k < q, p is some nite multiple of q plus k.
So if x 2 N2 , x = x + q = x + p + ::: + p + k. Hence x = x + k, i.e., k is a
period of N2 , which is impossible.
If a nucleus has period p 1, I will call it proper. Every proper nucleus
is closed under successors. For suppose that j 2 N with period p. Then
j j 0 j + p = j . Hence, j 0 2 N . In an inconsistent model, a number
may have more than one predecessor, i.e., there may be more than one x
such that x0 = j . (Although x0 = y0 x = y holds in the model, we cannot
necessarily detach to obtain x = y.)142 But if j is in a proper nucleus, N ,
it has a unique predecessor in N . For let the period of N be q0 . Then
(j + q)0 = j + q0 = j . Hence, j + q is a predecessor of j ; and j j + q0 = j .
Hence, j + q 2 N . Next, suppose that x and y are in the nucleus, and
that x0 = y0 = j . We have that x y _ y x. Suppose, without loss of
generality, the rst disjunct. Then for some z , x + z = y; so j + z = j , and
z is a period of the nucleus. But then x = x + z = y. I will write the unique
predecessor of j in the nucleus as 0 j .
Now let N be any proper nucleus, and i 2 N . Consider the sequence
:::;00 i;0 i; i;
i0 ; i00 :::. Call this the chromosome of i. Note that if i, j 2 N , the chromosomes of i and j are identical or disjoint. For if they have a common
member, z , then all the nite successors of z are identical, as are all its nite
predecessors (in N ). Thus they are identical. Now consider the chromosome
of i, and suppose that two members are identical. There must be members
where the successor distance between them is a minimum. Let these be j
and j 0:::0 where there are n primes. Then j = j + n, and n is a period of
the nucleus|in fact, its minimum non-zero period|and the chromosome
of every member of the nucleus is a successor cycle of period n.
Hence, any proper nucleus is a collection of chromosomes, all of which
are either successor cycles of the same nite period, or are sequences isomorphic to the integers (positive and negative). Both sorts are possible in
an inconsistent model. Just consider the collapse of a non-standard model,
of the kind given in the last section, by an equivalence relation which leaves
all the standard numbers alone and identies all the others modulo p. If p
is standard, the non-standard numbers collapse into a successor cycle; if it
142 In fact, it is not dicult to show that there is at most one number with multiple
predecessors; and this can have only two.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
371
:::a ! a0 :::
:::b ! b0 :::
..
.
:::
:::
d0 :::di
" #
e0 :::ei
" # :::
dm :::d0i em :::e0i
f0 :::fi g0:::gi
:::
:::
Another obvious question is what possible orderings the proper nuclei can
have. For a start, they can have the order-type of any ordinal. To prove
this, one establishes by transnite induction that for any ordinal, , there
is a classical model of arithmetic in which the non-standard numbers can
be partitioned into a collection of disjoint blocks with order-type , closed
under arithmetic operations. One then collapses this interpretation in such
a way that each block collapses into a nucleus.
The proper nuclei need not be discretely ordered. They can also have
the order-type of the rationals. To prove this, one considers a classical nonstandard model of arithmetic, where the order-type of the non-standard
numbers is that of the rationals. It is possible to show that these can
be partitioned into a collection of disjoint blocks, closed under arithmetic
operations, which themselves have the order-type of the rationals. One can
then collapse this model in such a way that each of the blocks collapses into
a proper nucleus, giving the result. This proof can be extended to show that
any order-type that can be embedded in the rationals in a certain way, can
also be the order-type of the proper nuclei. This includes ! (the reverse of
!) and ! + !, but not ! + ! . For details of all this, see Priest [1997b].
What other linear order-types proper nuclei may or may not have, is still
an open question.
372
GRAHAM PRIEST
nite models of arithmetic, e.g., the cycle models. For these, a complete
characterisation is known.
Placing the constraint of nitude on the results of the previous section,
we can infer as follows. The sequence of improper nuclei is either empty or
is composed of the singletons of 0; 1; :::; n, for some nite n. There must be
a nite collection of proper nuclei, N1 ::: Nm ; each Ni must comprise a
nite collection of successor cycles of some minimum non-zero nite period,
pi . And if 1 i j m, pj must be a divisor of pi .143
Moreover, there are models of any structure of this form. To show this,
we can generalise the construction of 9.2. Take any non-standard classical
model of arithmetic. This can be partitioned into the nite collection of
blocks:
C0 ; C10 ; :::; C1k(1) ; :::Ci0 ; :::; Cik(i) ; :::; Cm0 ; :::; Cmk(m)
where C0 is either empty or is of the form f0; :::; ng, each subsequent block
is closed under arithmetic operations, and there are k(i) successor cycles in
Ni . We now dene a relation, x y, as follows:
(x; y 2 C0 and x = y) or
for some 1 i m:
(for some 0 < j < k(i), x; y 2 Cij , and x = y mod pi ) or
( x; y 2 Ci0 [ Cik(i) and x = y mod pi )
One can check that is an equivalence relation, and also that it is a congruence relation on the arithmetic operations. Hence we can construct the
collapsed model. leaves all members of C0 alone. For every i it collapses
every Cij into a successor cycle of period pi , and it identies the blocks Ci0
and Cik(i) . Thus, the sequence Ci0 ; :::Cik(i) collapses into a nucleus of size
k(i). The collapsed model therefore has exactly the required structure.144
There are many interesting questions about inconsistent models, even the
nite ones, whose answer is not known. For example: how many models
of each structure are there? (The behaviour of the successor function in
a model does not determine the behavior of addition and multiplication,
except in the tail.) Perhaps the most important question is as follows. Not
all inconsistent model of arithmetic are collapses of classical models. Let
M be any model of arithmetic; if M0 is obtained from M by adding extra
pairs to the anti-extension of =, call M0 an extension in M. If M0 is an
extension of M, monotonicity ensures that it is a model of arithmetic. Now,
consider the extension of the standard model obtained by adding h0; 0i to
the anti-extension of =. This is not a collapsed model, since, if it were, 0
would have to have been identied with some x > 0. But then 1 would have
143 It is also possible to show that each nucleus is closed under addition and
multiplication.
144 For further details, see Priest [1997a].
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
373
been identied with x0 > 1. Hence, 00 6= 00 would also be true in the model,
which it is not. Maybe, however, each inconsistent model is the extension
of a collapsed classical model. If this conjecture is correct, collapsed models
can be investigated via an analysis of the classical models of arithmetic and
their congruence relations.
374
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
375
^ : 2 Q.
Godel's second undecidability theorem says that the statement that canonically asserts the consistency of Q is not in Q; this statement is usually taken
to be : (x= h0 i), where 0 is 0 = 00 , and is the canonical proof predicate
of Q. This also fails in LP .149 Let Q be as in the previous two paragraphs.
Then Q is not consistent. However, it is still the case that 0 62 Q (provided that the collapse is not the trivial one). Consider the relationship:
n is (the code of) a proof of formula (with code) m in Q. Since this is
recursive, it is represented in A by a formula P rov(x; y). If is provable
in Q then for some n, P rov(n; hi) 2 A (where n is the numeral for n);
thus, 9xP rov(x; hi) 2 A and so Q. If is not provable in Q then for all n,
:P rov(n; hi) 2 A; thus, 8x:P rov(x; hi) 2 A (since A is !-complete) and
:9xP rov(x; hi) 2 A and so Q. Thus, 9xP rov(x; y) represents Q in Q. In
particular, since 0 62 Q, :9xP rov(x; h0 i) 2 Q, as required.
376
GRAHAM PRIEST
` B hi !
If ` then ` B hi
for all closed |including sentences containing B . For if
is of the form
:B h
i, then, by the rst, ` B h
i ! :B h
i, and so ` :B h
i, i.e., `
.
Hence, ` B h
i, by the second.
And we do recognise these principles to be sound. Whatever is provable
is true, by denition; and demonstrating shows that is provable, and so
counts as a demonstration of this fact.151
B is a predicate of numbers, but we do not have to assume that B is
denable in terms of 0 , + and using truth functions and quantiers. The
argument could be formalised in a language with B as primitive. As we saw
in the previous part in connection with truth, it is quite possible to have
an inconsistent theory with a predicate of this kind, where the sentences
denable in terms of 0 , + and using truth functions and quantiers behave
quite consistently.
Of course, if B is so denable, which it will be if the set of things we
can prove is axiomatic, then the set of things that hold in this language is
inconsistent. And there are reasons for supposing that this is indeed the
case.152 Even this does not necessarily mean that the familiar natural numbers behave strangely, however. As the model with the \point at innity" of
9.2 showed, it is quite possible for inconsistent models to have the ordinary
natural numbers as a substructure.153 There are just more possibilities in
Heaven and Earth than are dreamt of in a consistent philosophy.
10 PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS
In previous parts I have touched occasionally on the philosophical aspects
of paraconsistency. In this section I want to take up a few of the philosophical implications of paraconsistency at slightly greater length. Its major
151 The paradox is structurally the same as a paradox often called the `Knower paradox'.
In this, B is interpreted as `It is known that'. For references and discussion of this paradox
and others of its kind, see Priest [1991b].
152 See Priest [1987], ch. 3. This chapter discusses the connection between Godel's
theorem, the paradoxes of self-reference and dialetheism at greater length.
153 Though whether the theory of that particular model is axiomatisable is currently
unknown.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
377
378
GRAHAM PRIEST
10.2 Negation
Another major use of logic (perhaps the one that many think of rst) is
in contexts where we want inference to be truth-preserving; for example,
ploying this procedure when the data base is fp; :pg and the query is q will result in a
negative answer. Such inference engines are therefore paraconsistent, though they do not
answer to any principled semantics that I am aware of.
156 For details of some automated paraconsistent logics, see, e.g., Blair and Subrahmanian [1988], Thistlewaite et al. [1988].
157 One might also take the other example on that list, constitutions and other legal
documents, to be an example of this. Such documents certainly contain information.
And one might doubt that this information is the sort of thing that is true or false: it
can, after all, be brought into eect by at|and may be inconsistent. However, if it is
that sort of thing, legal reasoning concerning it would seem to require truth-preservation.
158 See, e.g., Devlin [1991].
159 It is worth noting that North American relevant logicians have very often|if not
usually|thought of the F DE valuations information-theoretically, as told true and told
false. See, e.g., Anderson et al. [1992], sect. 81.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
379
380
GRAHAM PRIEST
10.3 Denial
Another global objection to dialetheism goes by way of a supposed connection between negation and denial. It is important to be clear about the
distinction between these two things for a start. Negation is a syntactic
and/or semantic feature of language. Denial is a feature of language use:
it is one particular kind of force that an utterance can have, one kind of
illocutionary act, as Austin put it. Specically, it is to be contrasted with
assertion.163 Typically, to assert something is to express one's belief in, or
acceptance of, it (or some Gricean sophistication thereof). Typically, to
deny something is to express ones rejection of it, that is, one's refusal to ac161 The analogy between logic and geomety is discussed further in Priest [1997a].
162 The topics of this section and the next are discussed at greater length in Priest [1999].
163 Traditional logic usually drew the distinction, not in terms of saying, but in terms of
judging. It can be found in these terms, for example, in the Port-Royal Logic of Arnauld
and Nicole.
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
381
the meaning of negation than this. It cannot, for example, perform that function when
it occurs attached to part of a sentence.
167 Some non-dialetheists have even argued that it may not even be rational to revise
our views in some contexts. See, e.g., Prior on the paradox of the preface [1971], pp. 84f.
382
GRAHAM PRIEST
says as a denial.168
This objection is equally
awed. For a start, even if to assert a negated
sentence is to deny it, it is certainly not the only way to deny it. One can
do so by a certain shake of the head, or by the use of some other body
language. A dialetheist may deny in this way. Moreover, just because the
assertion of a negated sentence by a dialetheist (or even a non-dialetheist,
as we have seen) may not be a denial, it does not follow that it is not. In
denial, a person aims to communicate to a listener a certain mental state,
that of rejection; and asserting a negated sentence with the right intonation,
and in the right context, may well do exactly that|even if the person is a
dialetheist.169
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
383
functions. This account must both do justice to the data, and avoid the
contradictions.
Many such accounts have, of course, been oered. But they are all well
known to suer from various serious problems. For example, they may
provide no independent justication for the restrictions on the semantic
principles involved, and so fail to explain why we should be so drawn to the
general and contradiction-producing principles. They are often manifestly
contrived and/or
y in the face of other well established views. Perhaps
most seriously, none of them seems to avoid the paradoxes: all seem to be
subject to extended paradoxes of one variety or another.171 If the global
objections to dialetheism have no force, then, the dialetheic position here
seems manifestly superior.172
It might be said that the inconsistency of the theory is at least a prima
facie black mark against it. This may indeed be so; but even if one of the
consistent theories could nd plausible replies to it problems, as long as the
theory is complex and ghting a rearguard action, the dialetheic account
may still have a simplicity, boldness and mathematical elegance that makes
it preferable.
As orthodox philosophy of science realised a long time ago, there are many
criteria which are good-making for theories: simplicity, adequacy to the
data, preservation of established problem-solutions, etc.; and many which
are bad-making: being contrived, handling the data in an ad hoc way, and,
let us grant, being inconsistent, amongst others.173 These criteria are usually orthogonal, and may even pull in opposite directions. But when applied
to rival theories, the combined eect may well be to render an inconsistent
theory rationally preferable to its consistent rival.
General conclusion: a theory in some area is to be rationally preferred to
its rivals if it best satises the standard criteria of theory choice, familiar
from the philosophy of science. An inconsistent theory may be the only
viable theory; and even if it is not, it may still, on the whole, be rationally
preferable.174
171 All this is documented in Priest [1987], ch. 2.
172 One strategy that may be employed at this point is to argue that a dialetheic theory
is trivial, and hence that any other theory, even one with problems, is better. As we
have seen, dialetheic truth-theory is non-trivial, but one might nonetheless hope to prove
that it is trivial when conjoined with other unobjectionable apparatus. Such arguments
have been put forward by Denyer [1989], Smiley, in Priest and Smiley [1993], and Everett
[1995] and elsewhere. Replies can be found in, respectively, Priest [1989b], Priest and
Smiley [1993], and Priest [1996]. Since my aim here is to illustrate general features of the
situation, I will not discuss these arguments.
173 Though one might well challenge the last of these as a universal rule. There might be
nothing wrong with some contradictions at all. See Priest [1987], sect. 13.6, and Sylvan
[1992], sect. 2.
174 For a longer discussion of the relationship between paraconsistency and rationality,
see Priest [1987], ch. 7.
384
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
385
mantics. Let me illustrate the matter with the Dunn semantics. Similar
considerations apply to others. With these semantics, the natural attempt
to characterise Boolean negation is:
386
GRAHAM PRIEST
for revision; it is not the only reason. This is quite obvious in the case of
non-dialetheic paraconsistency. If a contradiction is entailed by one's views,
then even though they do not explode into triviality, they are still not true.
One will still, therefore, wish to revise. One may not, as in the classical case,
have to revise immediately. It may not be at all clear how to revise; and
in the meantime, an inconsistent but non-trivial belief set is better than no
belief set at all. But the pressure will still be there to revise in due course.
The situation may be thought to change if one brings dialetheism into
the picture. For the contradiction may then be true, and the pressure to
revise is removed. Again, however, the conclusion is too swift. It is certainly
true that showing that a person's views are inconsistent may not necessarily
force a dialetheist to revise, but other things may well do so. For example, if
a person is committed to something of the form ! ?, and their views are
shown to entail , there will be pressure to revise, for exactly the classical
reason.180
Even if a dialetheist's views do not collapse into triviality, the inference
to the claim that there is no pressure to revise is still too fast. The fact that
there is no logical objection to holding on to a contradiction does not show
there are no other kinds of objection. There is a lot more to rationality than
consistency. Even those who hold consistency to be a constraint on rationality hold that there are many other such constraints. In fact, consistency
is a rather weak constraint. That the earth is
at, that Elvis is alive and
living in Melbourne, or, indeed, that one is Kermit the Frog, are all views
that can be held consistently if one is prepared to make the right kinds of
move elsewhere; but these views are manifestly irrational. For a start, there
is no evidence for them; moreover, to make things work elsewhere one has
to make all kinds of ad hoc adjustments to other well-supported views. And
whatever constraints there are on rational belief|other than consistency|
these work just as much on a dialetheist, and may provide pressure to revise.
Not, perhaps, pressure of the stand 'em up - knock 'em down kind. But such
would appear to be illusory in any case. As the history of ideas has shown,
rational debates may be a long and drawn out business. There is no magic
strategy that will always win the debate|other than employing (or at least
showing) the instruments of torture.181
180 Provided that one is not a person who believes that everything is true, then asserting
! ? is a way of denying . A dialetheist might do this for a whole class of sentences,
and so rule out contradictions occurring in certain areas, wholesale.
181 Avicenna, apparently, realised this. According to Scotus, he wrote that those who
deny the law of non-contradiction `should be
ogged or burned until they admit that it
is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped'. (The
Oxford Commentary on the Four Books of the Sentences, Bk. I, Dist. 39. Thanks to
Vann McGee for the reference.)
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
387
11 CONCLUSION
Let me conclude this essay by trying to put a little perspective into the development of paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistent and explosive accounts of
validity are both to be found in the history of logic. The revolution in logic
that started around the turn of the century, and which was constituted by
the development and application of novel and powerful mathematical techniques, entrenched explosion on the philosophical scene. The application of
the same techniques to give paraconsistent logics had to wait until after the
second world war.
The period from then until about the late 1970s saw the development of
many paraconsistent logics, their proof theories and semantics, and an initial exploration of their possible applications. Though there are still many
open problems in these areas, as I have indicated in this essay, the subject was well enough developed by that time to permit the beginning of a
second phase: the investigation of inconsistent mathematical theories and
structures in their own rights. Whereas the rst period was dominated by
a negative metaphor of paraconsistency as damage control, the second has
been dominated by a more positive attitude: let us investigate inconsistent mathematical structures, both for their intrinsic interest and to see
what problems|philosophical, mathematical, or even empirical|they can
be used to solve.182
Where this stage will lead is as yet anyone's guess. But let me speculate.
Traditional wisdom has it that there have been three foundational crises
in the history of mathematics. The rst arose around the
p Fourth Century
BC, with the discovery of irrational numbers, such as 2. It resulted in
the overthrow of the Pythagorean doctrine that mathematical truths are
exhausted by the domain of the whole numbers (and the rational numbers,
which are reducible to these); and eventually, in the development of an
appropriate mathematics. The second started in the Seventeenth Century
with the discovery of the innitesimal calculus. The appropriate mathematics came a little faster this time; and the result was the overthrow of the
Aristotelian doctrine that truth is exhausted by the domain of the nite (or
at least the potential innite, which is a species of the nite). The third
crisis started around the turn of this century, with the discovery of apparently inconsistent entities (such as the Russell set and the Liar sentence)
in the foundations of logic and set theory|or at least, with the realisation
that such entities could not be regarded as mere curiosities. This provided
a major|perhaps the major|impetus for the development of paraconsistent logic and mathematics (as far as it has got). And the philosophical
result may be the overthrow of another Aristotelian doctrine: that truth is
182 It must be said that both stages have been pursued in the face of an attitude
sometimes bordering on hostility from certain sections of the establishment logicophilosophical, though things are slowly changing.
388
GRAHAM PRIEST
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392
GRAHAM PRIEST
PARACONSISTENT LOGIC
393
INDEX
F ( ), 270
G( ), 270
HRM (i1; : : : ; in ), 261
P RM (i1; : : : ; in )--terms, 265
R! , 229
T!, 229
[Y=x]X , 241
, 268
!, modality in linear logic, 118
-normal form, 242
-redex, 242
-reduction, 241, 242
-normal form, 242
-reduction, 242
, combination of information, 63
, fusion, 12
-normal form, 243
-redex, 242
-reduction, 242
8-elimination, 14
8-introduction, 14
, see disjunctive syllogism
I -calculus, 19
-depth, 270
-terms, 240
! as , 326
, necessity, 13
^ , relational converse, 115
dapn( ), 270
dcp( ), 270
dn( ), 270
do( ), 270
Lukasiewicz generalisations, 307
Lukasiewicz, J., 295, 306
abstraction, 240
accessibility relation, 138{141, 146,
190, 194, 200
396
Avron, A., 18
axiom, 86
axiomatizaable logic, 158
INDEX
BZ-poset, 183
calculus for orthologic, 220
canonical model, 160, 162, 163,
170, 200, 208
canonical realization, 163
Cassinelli, G., 135
Cattaneo, G., 179, 183, 196
Cauchy sequences, 131
Chang, C. C., 185, 210
Chovanec, F., 184
Church, A., 7, 8, 16, 19
classical relevance logics, 7
Clinton, Bill, 118
closed subspace, 131{133, 135{137,
146, 176, 179, 203
closed term, 241
coincidence lemma, 174
collinearity, 102
combinators, 229
combinatory completeness, 233
combinatory logic, 232
compatibility, 148, 160
compatible, 148, 167, 170
complete, 154, 170
complete Boolean algebra, 177
complete BZ-lattice, 198
complete extension, 153
complete involutive bounded lattice, 182
complete ortholattice, 165, 166
complete orthomodular lattice, 163,
177
completeness, 175
completeness theorem, 160, 161,
175, 191, 196, 200, 208
completion by cuts, 166
conditional, 2, 354
counterfactual, 6
conditional connectives, 315
conguration, 158
connement, 14
confusion
about `', 112
INDEX
397
398
INDEX
INDEX
399
400
Kripke, S., 86
Kripke-style semantics, 138
Kripkean models, 155
Kripkean realization, 139{143, 145,
149, 174, 194
Kripkean realization for (rst-order)
OL, 173
Kripkean realizations, 155
Kripkean semantics, 138, 139, 143,
147, 148, 150, 152, 156,
160, 190, 191, 194{197
Lahti, P., 179
lambda calculus, 229
lambda reductions, 247
lambda terms, 240
lattice, 182
de Morgan, 59
LC, the logic, 79
Leibniz' principle of indiscernibles,
179
Leibniz-substitutivity principle, 178
lemma of the canonical model, 161,
176, 201
Lemmon, E. J., 22
length of a lattice, 170
Lewis, C. I., 293
Lewis, D. K., 6
Lindenbaum, 153
Lindenbaum property, 154
line, 102
linear combinations, 131
linear logic, 46, 118, 222, 224
linear orthologic, 213
lnf, see long normal form
logic
deviant, 6
the One True, 15
logic R, 324
logical consequence, 138, 141, 143{
145, 152, 156, 172, 174,
194, 195, 205, 210
logical theorem, 159
INDEX
INDEX
401
Organon, 293
Orlov, 295
Orlov, I., 7
orothvalued universe, 177
ortho-pair realization, 197, 203
ortho-pair semantics, 199
ortho-valued (set-theoretical)universe
V , 177
ortho-valued models, 177
orthoalgebra, 184, 185, 204, 205
orthoarguesian law, 167
orthocomplement, 132, 137, 139,
213
orthocomplemented orthomodular
lattice, 133
orthoframe, 139, 140, 150, 155, 156,
165, 166, 194, 197, 198,
201
orthogonal complement, 132
ortholattice, 137, 142, 147, 153,
162, 164, 166, 182, 191,
197
orthologic, 136, 189, 205, 213, 219,
221, 223, 224
orthomodular, 143, 144, 148, 165,
174
orthomodular canonical model, 162
orthomodular lattice, 142, 143, 147,
148, 153, 154, 162, 167,
176, 178
orthomodular poset, 181, 204, 205
orthomodular property, 191
orthomodular quantum logic, 136
orthomodular realization, 157, 161
orthomodularity, 162
orthopair semantics, 199
orthopairproposition, 197, 198, 200,
201, 203
orthopairpropositional conjunction,
197
orthopairpropositional disjunction,
197
othoposet, 181
Oxford English Dictionary, 5
402
P W, the logic, 10
PA, Peano arithmetic, 42
PA+ , positive Peano arithmetic,
42
paraconsistent modal operators, 342
paraconsistent quantum logic, 189,
219, 220
paraconsistent set theory, 363
permutation, 7, 86
total, 102
Perry, J., 114
phase-space, 129{131
Philo-law, 147
physical event, 179
physical property, 179
physical qualities, 130
Piron, C., 135
Piron{McLaren's coordinationization theorem, 170
Piron{McLaren's Theorem, 171
point, 102
polarities, 59
polynomial conditionals, 147, 150
positive conditionals, 146
positive domain, 197, 203
positive laws, 149
positive logic, 139, 146, 153
positive paradox, 7, 10, 22
positive-plus logics, 331
possibility operator, 198
possible worlds, 138
Powers, L., 10
Pratt, V., 222
Prawitz, D., 66
pre-Hilbert space, 164
predicate-concept, 173
prexing, 7
premisses, 214
Priest, G., 349
principal formula, 215, 221
principal type scheme (PTS), 235
principle quasi-ideals, 141
prinicpal ideal, 182
Prior Analytics, 293
INDEX
Q-combinators, 237
Q-combinatory logic, 238
Q-denable, 252
Q-logic, 238
Q-terms, 237
Q+ , the logic, 102
Q-translation algorithm, 249
QMV-algebra, 185, 187, 188, 209,
210
quantication
propositional, 11
quantier, 14
quantiers (in paraconsistent logic),
329
quantum events, 132
quantum logical approach, 135, 171
quantum logical implication, 158
quantum MV-algebra, 185
quantum proposition, 157
quantum set theory, 178
quantum-logical natural numbers,
177
quantum-sets, 178
quasets, 178
INDEX
quasi-consequence, 152
quasi-ideal, 145, 147, 165
quasi-linear, 188
quasi-linear QMV-algebra, 189, 209
quasi-model, 152, 154
quasisets, 178
Quesada, M., 288
403
reduction, 231
reference, 173, 175
re
ection, 215
regular, 182, 191
regular involutive bounded poset,
183
regular paraconsistent quantum logic,
191, 195
regular symmetric frame, 194
regularity, 181
regularity property, 190
relation
binary, 80
ternary, 68, 78, 80, 102
relation algebra, 115
relational valuations, 308
relevance, 2, 6
relevant arithmetic, 41{44
relevant arrows, 321
relevant deduction, 15
relevant implication, 2
relevant logics, 193, 335
relevant predication, 118
representation theorem, 135, 165
residuation, 12
resource consciousness, 18
Restall, G., 100
restricted-assertion, 8, 9
rigid, 173
rigid individual concepts, 175
RM, the logic, 7, 13, 18, 78{80,
101
RM3, the logic, 95
RMO!, the logic, 18
Routley interpretation, 310
Routley, R., 63, 292
Routley, V., 292
RQ, the logic, 13, 14, 39{42, 70,
82, 83
rule, 158, 195, 199, 205, 214, 215
S5 , 196, 202
S4, 155
S! , the logic, 10
404
INDEX
INDEX
405
406
Zermelo{Fraenkel, 178
zero degree entailment, 309
INDEX