Hist. Sci., xviii (1980) Copyright © 1980 by Sergio Moravia THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN Sergio Moravia University of Florence ‘That the human and the social sciences, or at least a certain number of them, were born during the eighteenth century is a thesis which seems at present largely accepted, and which has been confirmed by some recent, valuable works. They developed through a rather complex historical process, full of theoretical détours and ambiguities. An adequate illustration of this itinerary would comand a much longer analysis than that which is possible here. Tackling the problem at the level of the history of ideas— and thereby passing over all the extra-cultural factors which favoured the growth of the sciences de Phomme during the Enlightenment—it is unde- niable that this growth took place in the eighteenth century, above all by way of a critical confrontation with the episteme of the preceding century. It is not by chance that, while tracing the programmes and procedures of the new-born human sciences, many savants and philosophes of the Age of Reason constantly took as their point of reference precisely the character and content of that episieme. Yet, the result of this confrontation was not uniform. On the one hand, the Enlightenment expressed the highest admiration for the age of Rationalism and the Scientific Revolution. On the other, it strove for self-emancipation from a theoretical perspective which was felt to hinder the birth and growth of certain sciences—or, to recall the notion dear to Imre Lakatos, of certain research programmes. ‘This helps explain the energy with which the eighteenth century criticized some philosophical principles of the age of Descartes, and worked out new cognitive principles and new anthropological views which were considered necessary for the elaboration of the sciences de U homme. In the course of this, paper it is my aim not so much to examine analytically the inquiries and debates through which the Enlightenment founded the human and social sciences, but rather to specify and comment briefly on the main theoretical conditions which permitted the opening of a new perspective for some of those sciences. I. THE “EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIBERALIZATION” ‘The first condition which should be mentioned is of a philosophical nature and might be defined as “epistemological liberalization”. The mainstream of seventeenth century thought had identified science substantially with248 + SERGIO MORAVIA physics and mathematics, correlatively privileging categories and proce- dures of an abstract, systematizing, deductive, and nomological type. The eighteenth century, it should be noted, was far from rejecting this episte- mological orientation altogether: the idea that the eighteenth century was totally empiricist and sensist is only one of the many historiographical fables which are perpetuated, at least in certain books, even today. Leafing through the works of a psychologist such as Condillac or of economists such as Quesnay and J.-B. Say is sufficient to reveal how strongly a ‘Car- tesian’-type episteme continued to influence important sectors of the human and social sciences of the period.? The Enlightenment, on the other hand, is the offspring not only of Descartes, but also of Locke—and of a Newton re-examined, at least partially, from a Lockeian point of view. While not rejecting Cartesian formalism and its mathematical bias, Enlightenment culture discovered the formidable heuristic potentialities inherent in the principles of the Essay concerning human understanding. Through various ‘French’ mediations and transformations (which have not yet been adequately studied) Locke be- came the source in enlightened Europe of five fundamental epistemological options: (a) the refusal to privilege the mathematical method; (b) the (relative) pluralization of cognitive strategies; (c) the tendency no longer towards formal and deductive but towards empirjcal and inductive construction of explanatory models; (d) the re-discovery of factual-empirical description; (c) the rehabilitation of sense observation. Itis clear to what extent sciences such as the human and the social—on the one hand difficult to reduce to axioms (at least in certain cases), on the other hand needing to open up, without over-systematizing, the multiform variety of their objects of study—could profit from the epistemological liberalization produced by the Lockeian philosophy. In addition, among the theoretical fruits of the empiricist’s lesson was the substitution for many categories and instruments of investigation of new categories and instru- ments, a fact which was to be of considerable service to the disciplines which interest us here. If Buffon did not hesitate to oppose “oidence” with the more empirical and easily controllable principle of “certitude”,3 others went so far as to criticize the (mathematical) myth of exactness. In L’Homme-mackine, La Mettrie, for his part, openly defended the criterion of simple similarity.‘ In this perspective, the ‘case’ of the principle of analogy deserves particular consideration. After a long period of eclipse, this principle experienced an extraordinary revival in the eighteenth century, so much so that it is possible to read in an author—one such as. Condillac, beyond all suspicion of a predilection for approximations — that it included, on close examination, nothing less than the whole art ofTHE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 249 reasoning.* But many branches of knowledge about man benefited particularly from the previously mentioned rehabilitation of “observation sensible”. Going through the principal cighteenth century texts of geography, ethnology, and medicine, one has the impression of encountering the consecration of a veritable ‘epistemology of sight’. “L’observation”, wrote the doctor and philosopher Cabanis in 1788, nous fait percevoir des différences ... ; elle nous fait voir que ces différences suivent certaines lois comme tous les phénoménes de la nature. .. . Nous pouvons donc déterminer ces rapports, ou l’enchaine- ment des effets, avec ce qu’on appelle leurs causes; car nous pouvons savoir, quand nous voyons un fait, que tel autre Ia précédé, L’observa- tion nous fait donc reconnoftre si 'un depend de Pautre, s'il le suit ou Paccompagne . . .. L’observation peut done apprécier Pinfluence de toutes les circonstances qui en ont une véritable: elle peut réduire cette connoissance en régles fixes, la rendre plus exacte par la méthode, plus présente A esprit par Phabitude de la retracer et d’en faire des applications.* It should not be believed, however, that this ‘epistemology of sight’, which Foucault has had occasion to consider as well,’ reflected a concep- tion of human knowledge narrowly linked to the single sensorial datum. It is true, and should be stressed, that not a few eighteenth century scholars and philosophers (¢.g., Vico and Leibniz) defended the dignity and even the science of the particular, against the abstractions and generalizations, thus launching a theoretical proposition that the modern Geisteszwissen- schaften, from Rickert to Walter Benjamin, have amply taken up. It is also true, however, that the eighteenth century sciences de homme were quite capable of connecting the moment of particular and concrete observation to that of the construction of the general ‘type’. “Loin de moi”, wrote Degérando, the French father of semiotics, la pensée de vouloir descréditer observation. Je serois condamné par la saine philosophic, je serois en contradiction avec moi-méme. Je veux dire seulement que la science consiste moins dans le nombre ‘des observations, que dans leur choix, dans ordre qu’on a su mettre pov ll Ge aad In this context, a brief mention should be made of the eighteenth cen- tury elaboration of the category of comparison (comparaison). Numerous contemporary works belonging to the field of the human sciences—from the Moeurs des sauoages amériquains comparées aux mocurs des premiers temps, to Le monde primitifcomparé azec le monde modern (to cite two well-known works) —knowingly privilege, both heuristically and interpretatively, the method of comparison—as the titles themselves reveal. From Fontenelle to De la250 + SERGIO MORAVIA Crequiniére, from Lafitau to president De Brosses, from Court de Gébelin to Vicq d’Azyr, from Volney to Degérando, a great number of eighteenth century savants and philosophes from a variety of disciplines observed, analyzed, but above alll compared: Pour peu qu’on ait réfiéchi sur Porigine de nos connoissances [wrote Buffon in his treatise on man] il est aisé de s’apercevoir que nous ne pouvons en acquérir que par la voie de la comparaison; ce qui est absolument incomparable, est entigrement incompréhensible. . ..* Quotations of this sort could be multiplied without difficulty. For the eighteenth century scholars of the sciences de homme, comparison was a sort of middle-road between observation and abstract formalization, Those who compare know that reality is made up of discontinuous and indivi- dualized data, which are not, however, completely unrelated among themselves and, indeed, are susceptible to being juxtaposed and connected. They know, in addition, that they cannot be content with the mere visual inspection of the single datum, but that they must institute interfactual relations capable of penetrating to the meaning of the facts themselves, and eventually of constituting certain structures or constants useful for pursuing the investigation. Comparaison is one of the principal cognitive acts of the modern human sciences. Itis quite significant that it was worked out during the Enlightenment. IL. BRINGING TO EARTH THE ‘WHOLE’ OF MAN The second condition constructed by eighteenth century thought in favour of the human and the social sciences might be termed the “bringing to earth of the ‘whole’ of man”. The seventeenth century had achieved much of merit in the study of man. In particular, it had endeavoured, with considerable success, to bring the human being and human action within the coordinates of reality accessible to the instruments of science. In order to reach this goal, it tried to show that, in spite of certain appearances, man is built and behaves like all other natural phenomena; and, just as these are susceptible to scientific analysis, man can and must be also, As is well-known, this assumption had contributed to promoting a vast campaign of research. A whole range of scholars had analyzed man with the instruments furnished by the leading science of the time, namely mechanical physics. But the fundamental vitium of the seventeenth century science of man lay precisely here: that is, in admitting acritically the principle that what is valid for a certain order of phenomena (for example, heavy bodies of physics and their movement) can and must be valid for another order of phenomena (in our case, for human phenomena). This principle, to be sure, turned out to be valid for aTHE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 251 part of knowledge about man—consider, in particular, the case of ana~ tomical research, But in inquiries regarding the more complex aspects of the human being, however, its application tended to be rather mis- Teading.*? In addition, once physical and mechanical science was assumed to be the only possible science, many philosophers and scientists tended bon gré mal gré to exclude from the sphere of phenomena accessible to scientific thought all those phenomena which could not be reduced to that complex of matter and motion by means of which the mechanistic doctrines of the period intended to ‘say’ the world. It was owing to this orientation (in addition to his metaphysical leanings, which were tied, more than is generally believed, to the relative failure of his mechanistic anthropolo- gical theory), that Descartes, after having done so much to ‘bring man to earth’, decided to relegate certain aspects of the human being to a meta~ physical, meta-worldly ‘elsewhere’, inaccessible to science, which he called res cogitans, This was the seed from which sprang that anthropological dualism (on the one hand, a corporeal organisation, on the other a heteroge- neous and immaterial pensée) which frustrated and disheartened the pro- gressive wing of Enlightenment culture." Even at the end of the century the médecin-philosophe Cabanis identified the split between body and spirit, between moral and physique as the cause of the lack of development of an adequate science of moral phenomena—a close cousin, clearly, of the science of culture and of the human sciences in general: Depuis qu’on a jugé convenable de tracer une ligne de séparation entre l'étude de Phomme physique et celle de Phomme moral, les principes relatifs A cette derniére étude se sont trouvés nécessairement obscurcis par le vague des hypothéses métaphysiques. Il ne restoit plus, en effet, aprés introduction de ces hypothéses dans I’étude des sciences morales, aucune base solide, aucun point fixe auquel on pat rattacher les résultats de observation et de Pexpérience. Dés ce moment, flottantes au gré des idées les plus vaines, elles sont, en quelque sorte, rentrées avec elles dans le domaine de limagination.*? Approaching the problem from a point of view not substantially different from that of Cabanis, a whole range of eighteenth century savants and philosophes—among whom we may mention Gaub, La Mettrie, Helvétius, d’Holbach, Buffon, Diderot, Barthez, Bichat, Bonnet, D. de Tracy— strove to include within the sphere of empirical knowledge not only the body but also thought itself; not only the physique but also the moral; not only nervous sensibility but also the passions, emotions and higher psychic operations. Although he lacked biochemical and neurophysiological aids, Cabanis attempted to understand, beyond and against any mechanistic reductionism, the way in which thought is generated by certain bodily252 + SERGIO MORAVIA organs. Many years before this idéologue, Peter Camper, the brilliant Dutch physical anthropologist, devoted much patient research to the interpre- tation of human passions on the basis of the changes they produced in facial expressions." It would be an error to consider these inquiries com- pletely irrelevant or meaningless. Quite apart from their specific results, they should be included in a well-determined theoretical perspective. The esprit was to be made known by means of a visual bodily language. The most impalpable and spiritual functions of man were to reveal themselves empirically, to exhibit sensible signs, and to permit an empirical analysis of what until then had belonged to a metaphysical ‘elsewhere’. The basic hope was to be able to include not only a part but all of man, without other-worldly residues, within the limits of positive knowledge. Perhaps the soul and the cogito were not necessary hypotheses. But their elimination called for complex and demanding work. It was not enough, indeed—as the Spinozistes and materialistes had done!—verbally eliminate the meta- physical entities. It was not even enough to ‘liberalize’ thought, cutting it loose from the rigidity of seventeenth century physicalism. Nothing less than redefining human corporeity in a new way was necessary in order to demonstrate its capacity both to do without the soul, and to produce autonomously even the most sophisticated and complex human acts, III. THE REHABILITATION OF HUMAN CORPOREITY All this brings us to the third condition developed by eighteenth century thought as a new basis for the human sciences. It might be defined the “rehabilitation of human corporeity””. It is not mere coincidence that the greatest contributors to the formation of this condition were physicians—even if they should be considered more exactly as médecins-philosophes. The redefinition of human corporeity, the demonstration of its ‘completeness’ and self-sufficiency, should only come about by means of empirical studies conducted on the physical organism itself, In order to prove what? Above all—and this is the principal theore- tical point—that the anthropological dualism instituted in the seventeenth century, and still so widespread in the following century, had an unexpec- ted accomplice in mechanism: precisely in that mechanism which appeared to many (and from certain points of view was—but this is another matter) the antechamber of materialism and of monism. ‘The reason is simple. To the extent to which the body—even the living body, even the human body—was considered a simple extended mass, a simple aggregate of inert, mechanical ressorts, it was almost impossible persuasively to attribute to it certain functions and prerogatives. How could one seriously demonstrate, for example, that sensibility, that ener- getic source of such numerous and varied impressions, was only the resultTHE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 253 of the action of certain atoms? How could one justify the existence in this integrally mécanique body of a force—at least of the force necessary to place the living machine in motion? In the face of this (and other) difficulties, at least part of seventeenth century mechanism ended up postulating the existence of a dynamic motor located outside the body-machine: and thus anthropological dualism was (re)born.15 If all this was true, in order to dismantle this dualism at its very founda- tions it was indispensable intensively to study the corporeal organization of man—in order to prove that such organization contained within itself all the forces necessary to organs for the correct functioning of vital, psychic and mental phenomena, none excepted.** Only by keeping the above considerations in mind can the extraordinary philosophical and cultural success of medicine during the whole of the eight- eenth century be explained."” If Dupaty reproached philosophy for not being capable of adequately probing the depths of human corporeity (“c'est 14 que homme moral est caché”), Antoine Le Camus entrusted medicine—and only medicine—with the task of studying the human If the medical-biological interest of Diderot, who singled out the “science du physique” as the decisive heuristic instrument for understanding man, is well-known, the exaltation of the anthropological and cognitive mission of doctors by La Mettrie is not easily forgettable: Ceux-ci ont éclairé le labyrinthe de homme; ils nous ont seuls dévoilé les ressorts cachés sous des envelopes, qui dérobent A nos yeux tant de merveilles. Eux-seuls, contemplant tranquillement notre Ame, Pont mille fois surprise, et dans sa misére, et dans sa gran- deur... .* Even at the end of the century many scholars looked to medicine to be, to use the words of Lanthenas, “ce qu’elle doit étre: la connoissance de Phomme naturel et social”’.?° Among his contemporaries none responded to the implicit invitation better than Cabanis. In his Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme, which stands out among the anthropological texts of the late Enlightenment, the idfologue utilized a century of medical and philosophical literature to demonstrate the following points: (i) that the living body, far from being a mere machine mécanique, is instead a complex dynamic and sensitive organism; (ii) that there is no need to postulate an dme or other spiritual entity, since the brain and nervous system appear empirically and experi mentally capable of producing the more complex intellectual and affective functions; (iii) that, correlatively, the infant science of psychology will become serious to the extent to which it abandons the study of vague essences254 + SERGIO MORAVIA and abstractions and ties itself to physiology; (iv) that the knowledge of man can and, in the last analysis, must assume the form of an intellectual and moral science firmly and completely linked to the science of physical man. In this connection Cabanis explained to his listeners at the Institute on the 7th Pluviése of the year 1v that he wished to speak des rapports de I’étude physique de ’homme avec celle des procédés de son intelligence; de ceux du développement systématique de ses organes avec le développement analogue de ses sentiments et de ses passions: rapports d’od il résulte clairement que la physiologie, Panalyse des idées et la morale ne sont que les trois branches d’une seule et méme science, qui peut s’appeler, & juste titre, la science de Yhomme.*# IV. THE DISCOVERY OF THE ENVIRONMENT The fourth condition whose theoretical formulation paved the way for the genesis of the eighteenth century sciences de Phomme might be defined the “discovery of the environment”. The seventeenth century had obviously been aware of the existence of a world or, if one prefers, of an Umwelt, whose action produced certain consequences having anthropological relevance. But as long as, so to speak, the more human side of man remained of a metaphysical nature or origin, it was difficult to conduct adequate analyses of the interaction between subject and environment, without mental reservations and beyond specific limits. In the eighteenth century, again, a change occurred. Man, as we have seen, is brought back one step at a time from heaven to earth. Whether conceived of as esprit (which in the French language and culture does not necessarily denote ‘spiritualistic’) or—better yet—as moral, the human mind is considered an entirely empirical pole: thus susceptible to carrying on organic relations with the surrounding (empirical) environment. The rehabilitation of corporeity and physical sensibility also contributed to underlining the profound relationship between man and the natural environment. The eighteenth century saw man as belonging integrally to the earthly horizon. “La terre”, wrote the geographer Edme Mentelle, “est la demeure de Phomme”.?? Man, echoed the biologist Bichat, is “Phabitant du monde”. His earthly nature, his motility (an intrinsic and peculiar property of his being) cause him to live “une vie extérieure, qui établit des relations nombreuses entre lui et les objet voisins, marie son existence & celle des autres étres”.?? It is precisely this sense of intimate solidarity between man and the natural world which constitutes one of the principal sources of eighteenth century interest in the environment fromTHE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 257 examine man in the various regions in which he lives (he wrote relative to this latter consideration) “we shall find a variety of genius corresponding to the effects of his conduct, and the result of his story”. The philosopher willfulfil an important task, he wrote at the beginning of the Essay, if he manages to “account for this diversity [i.e., among men] on principles either moral or physical”.*! A few years later John Millar was even more explicit in stressing the importance of studying suchlike factors in the analysis of man and society when, in his Observations concerning the distinction of ranks in society (1775), he dealt at length not only with soil conditions (seen from the point of view, among others, of its productive implications), but also with the type of economic activity carried on by members of the community, with the nature of social relations constructed by the members among themselves, and with the level of art and culture developed by them.*? I would not conclude this section without mentioning, however briefly, the name and work of Volney, who is to be considered one of the founders of modern human geography. In his Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie (1787) Volney provides a masterly, original lesson in the geographical and social analysis of a particular region—in this case, of the Middle East. His primary concern is to delineate with precision the situation and the geo-physical configuration of the countries he visited. But this analysis, far from being limited to a mere description of lands and climates, of mountains and rivers, develops directly into an acute examination of the ethnic and social reality of Egypt and Syria, Although Volney was a fierce adversary of Montesquieu’s climatologic theories, he does not hesitate to point out certain correlations between geographic situation and the anthropological characteristics of the peoples he encountered. On the other hand, in analy- zing the psycho-social features of such populations, he undertakes an in- depth examination of both the socio-economic structures and the politics and history of the two middle-eastern countries. All of this follows from the conviction, expressed more than once in the course of the work, that the living patterns of men are also intimately connected to historical and cul- tural conditions (in the anthropological sense of the expression). On the whole, Volney developed an outlook in which physical and geographical components are mediated in a synthesis which points up, in an extraor- dinarily modern way, the dialectic relationship existing between man and environment. V. GEOGRAPHICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL OPENNESS TOWARDS THE ‘oTHER? The fifth condition necessary for the take-off of the human and social sciences in the eighteenth century (at least for some of them) might be258 - SERGIO MORAVIA defined as “geographical and anthropological openness towards the ‘Other’ ”. ‘A science of human beings worthy of the name could not, in fact, limit itself to studying only white, western and civilized men. It had to concern itself as well with those men who, in one way or another, ‘exceeded’ the limits established by the three characteristics just mentioned. This was particularly important for the birth and development of cultural anthro- pology and ethnology: two human sciences whose object and reason for being are due precisely to the existence of the ‘different? individual, culture, or society as such. The fact that these two disciplines were born in the eighteenth century (even the two words—anthropology and ethnology— made their appearance during the century), does not of course imply that in previous periods interest in ‘other’ societies and peoples had been completely lacking, But notwithstanding all the possible exceptions, that interest had succeeded only occasionally in rising to the theoretical and methodological level of scientific knowledge. All too often the ‘others’, discovered more and more frequently during the increasingly numerous and audacious journeys to the remote corners of the globe, had been looked upon as radically ‘different’, if not, indeed, as subhuman or ferine. Many examples, sometimes amusing, sometimes horrifying, might be cited to this effect.*# During the eighteenth century this mental outlook changed profoundly. A significantly different point of view with regard to ‘other’ men and peoples was both proposed and imposed. Their myths and rites should no longer be considered (to use a term well-known to scholars of seventeenth century culture) as mere curiasitates. They constituted, instead, a docu- mentary corpus of great cognitive importance. As such, they should be approached—and this is the heart of the matter—using the techniques and procedures of scientific knowledge: that is to say, with observation and analyse, with comparaison and with the search for causes and reasons. “Ce n’est pas une science”, wrote Fontenelle at the beginning of the century, “de s'étre rempli la téte de toutes les extravagances des Phéniciens et des Grecs; mais c’en est une de savoir ce qui a conduit les Phéniciens et les Grecs a ces extravagance”. * This consideration with regard to the Phoe- nicians and the Greeks—‘different’ peoples in an historical and temporal sense—was soon applied to ‘the different’ in a geographical and anthropo- logical sense as well. In this respect the travellers themselves made a decisive contribution, as they became more aware, on the one hand, of the predominantly cognitive and scientific nature that travels ought by then to assume, and, on the other hand, aware as well that man (or the human community) was the central object of research to be undertaken in far-off lands. “L’étude de Phomme”, the famous explorer Bougainville wrote towards the end of the century, “est sans doute celle qui nous‘THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 259 intéresse le plus.”®” A few years earlier the geographer Masson de Mor- villiers had stressed that one of the fundamental tasks of geographical research was to show “les hommes différer des hommes, les lois des lois”.** In fact, it was the philosophes who tended to regard the ‘different’, above all the so-called savages, from a more open and sympathetic point of view and to promote a move towards enlarging and transforming certain cate- gories referring to their study.2? The gradual modification in the notion of the savage is of special im- portance. To define an ‘other’ as ‘savage’ serves to stress his nature as ‘different’—and to stress it with the ulterior connotation of a more or less explicit psychic and moral inferiority. An early and significant transforma- tion of the meaning of the term occurred when the noun sauoage appeared accompanied by the adjective bon (or similar adjectives), thus creating one of the most evocative myths of modern consciousness. It is useless to dwell here upon an intellectual—and of course also ideological—occurrence which has recently been examined from various points of view.*° It should only be pointed out that, however imaginary or utopistic (in the literal sense of the word), the ‘figure’ of the bon sauoage served in one way or another to open up the European world sympathetically towards a ‘dif- ferent’ universe, of which it began to notice and appreciate certain be- havioural and social characteristics. At this point, however, it is more important to note two other terms which the eighteenth century used in defining the savage: the first is “man of nature” ; the second is “primitive”. Even those who have but a sketchy idea of the complex semantics of the term ‘nature’ in the eighteenth century will comprehend the under- lying meaning and value of the new expression.‘? To consider the sauvage as an homme de nature suggested (with a few interesting exceptions) the thesis that certain individuals or groups were closer to, more sensitive towards, and more respectful of the great mother and legislator of humanity, and because of this closeness possessed truer, gentler, and wiser dispositions and habits. This, then, was in certain circles—in spite of all the criticism directed at the myth of the homme de nature—another source of possible new interest and openness with regard to the ‘Other’. Now, let us consider for a moment the identification of ‘savages’ with ‘primitives’. This theoretical operation is rather important. To consider savages as ‘primitives’ is to consider them not so much as ‘different’ but as our fellows, who are simply more backward than ourselves. Some savants interpreted the notion of primitive in an even more positive sense, The primitives are not so much backward—or at least thisisnottheir mostsalient characteristic. They are, rather, ancestors. They are the present-day ex- pression of what we were. At this point I should invoke Vico. I prefer instead to cite the lesser-known Lafitau, also to point out (with all due regard to certain scholars) how little isolated, how ‘European’ the author260 + SERGIO MORAVIA of the Scienza nuova was. “I have not limited myself”, wrote Lafitau in his already mentioned Mocurs des sauvages amériquains, to studying the temperament of the savages and informing myself about their customs and practices; in those customs and practices I have searched for the vestiges of more remote antiquity; .. and I confess that if the authors of Antiquity have served me as a basis for several lucky conjectures relative to the savages, the customs of the savages have served me as a guide to understanding more easily and explaining a number of things contained in the ancient authors. Towards the end of the century this thought is echoed by Louis- Francois Jaufiret, founder of the Société des Obseruateurs de Homme: “les observations des navigateurs sur les habitants actuels des différentes regions du globe pourront fournir des lumiéres précieuses sur les premiéres époques de Phistoire du genre humain.”*? To undertake a journey of exploration among the sauages meant carrying out a marvellous voyage in memory and in time. As Degérando wrote, “le voyageur-philosophe qui navigue vers les extrémités de la terre traverse en effet la suite des Ages; il voyage dans le passé; chaque pas qu'il fait est un sidcle qu’il franchit. Les fles inconnues auxquelies il atteint sont pour lui le berceau de la société humaine.” From this point of view the sausages become extraordinarily important evidence of origins—of our origins. To study the savages as primitifs means to study our ancestors—and, in the ultimate analysis, ourselves. In this way, the openness towards the ‘Other’ becomes complete. ‘VI. THE SCIENCES OF THE ‘DIFFERENT’ Of course, the Other is not only the sawage or the primitif. It is also the Foreigner and the Mad: namely, those who, in one way or another, under- mine the identity of the ‘normal’ subject and his value system. After having alternately feared and exorcized them, the European consciousness decided to face these ‘figures’ with the weapon of knowledge. To some extent, the human and social sciences sprang up in the eighteenth century as a new response to obscure psychological and cultural anxieties, By ‘Foreigner’ I mean here an individual who is radically ‘different’ (compared to the European ‘type’), but cannot be considered a savage or a primitive. The attitude of the Europeans towards Foreigners in the eighteenth century is a topic which gives rise to a number of interesting and relatively unex- plored considerations. On one hand, it was precisely in the Age of Enlight enment that Europe acquired a solid and mature concept of its own iden- tity and uniqueness.“ However different, one from another, wrote Rous seau, “toutes les Puissances de Europe forment entre elles une sorte de systéme qui les unit par une méme religion, par un méme droit des gens,THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 261 par les moeurs, par les lettres, par le commerce, et par une sorte d’ équilibre qui est Peffet nécessaire de tout cela”.*5 On the other hand, eighteenth century Europe appears particularly open towards ‘other’ forms of civil and cultural society, both as a source of knowledge and of self-criticism. It is enough to read through certain pages of Diderot or to recall the sympathetic attention with which many writers and scholars of the period —from Leibniz, to Turgot, to Voltaire—regarded the great oriental civilizations.” It is difficult to say to what extent the birth, with Fougeret de Monbron, of the neologism ‘cosmopolite’ can be legitimately charged with an emblematic significance.‘ What is certain is that the eighteenth century European moved, travelled and considered himself—as we have had occasion to note in a passage of Xavier Bichat—an “inhabitant of the world”. But how did the European behave when he had the possibility of meet- ing and studying a ‘Foreigner’ on his home ground—namely, in Europe? Already in the seventeenth century this experience was not impossible, at least for the inhabitant of London, Paris or the larger Atlantic seaports. However, the more or less fleeting presence in certain European cities of a few Indians, Chinese or Malaysians does not appear to have aroused reactions different from those of the usual curiosité. Here, again, the situation appears to change in the course of the eight- centh century. In the first half of the century Montesquieu profited from the stay of a Chinese in Paris to ask him—from what is already an ethno- logical point of view—a number of questions concerning oriental religion and philosophy, moral and juridical norms, conceptions relative to property and government, culture and language, as well as temperament, pastimes and clothing.*® Later on, in the 1760s, the arrival in Paris of two other Chinese aroused the interest of Dupont de Nemours, of Tuxgot and even of the government, which declared itself prepared to grant a sort of pension in return for a regular correspondence from the Land of the Rising Sun, “which might serve to make Chinese literature and sciences well- known”.5° But the most significant episode occurred towards the end of the century. The arrival in Paris of a young Nankin merchant after a series of unfortunate adventures which we may skip over here, spurred an entire intellectual circle, by now devoted to the science de Chomme, to interest itself seriously in the case. In fact, itis precisely the seriousness anc scientific rigour with which Tchong-A-Sam (the Chinese merchant's name) was examined that impress us, and constitute a landmark date in the history of the human sciences. R. A. Sicard, director of the famous Institute for the Deaf-mute, a brilliant innovator of methods for communi- cating with the audio- and phono-handicapped (his work deserves to be better known from the point of view of the sciences de Phomme), wasted no time in requesting authorization adequately to study the young Chinese,262 + SERGIO MORAVIA his language, and possible non-linguistic ways of constructing a relation- ship with this ‘foreigner’, At the same time, the Société des Observateurs de P’ Homme decided to examine Tchong-A-Sam from an anthropological and psychological point of view, and nominated a commission expressly for the purpose. 5! Initially the commission, composed of Le Blond and Jauffret himself (an expert in the ethno-anthropology of the Far East), requested Cuvier to ascertain Tchong-A-Sam’s race and nationality, Cuvier analyzed and measured his skull and concluded that, according to Blumenbach’s classi- fications, the subject was in fact a Chinese belonging to the Mongol race. At the same time, J.-J. Virey, another scholar who, while not a member of the Society, was nevertheless very close to the Odservateurs, studied Tchong- A-Sam as well, and accurately sketched his face and head, inserting the drawings as experimental documents in the chapter on the Mongol race in his interesting Histoire naturelle du genre humain. As for Jauffret’s work, only a brief note has been preserved, which stresses the importance of the research, and the need to avoid, in anthropological research, the example furnished by certain “systematic” authors who are only capable of accept- ing ‘‘as real” the “chimeras of an excited imagination”. As for Le Blond, he has left us a Rapport, in itself somewhat mediocre, but which informs us of Guvier’s research and of that conducted by Jauffret and Le Blond him- self on Tchong-A-Sam’s moral, Later, under the supervision of Millin and the Arabist Sylvestre de Sacy, direct interrogations and indirect experi- ments were undertaken, In one of these experiments, they dressed the merchant in the clothes of his own country empirically to test his memory, sense of country, and the intensity of his emotional reactions. They began, in addition, important research on the language and intellec- tual capacity of the subject, who appears to have been of a rather lively temperament. They also attempted, with some success, to use his explana- tions to help understand Chinese figures and illustrations then in Paris. Broquet, for his part, together with Le Blond, had pursued a study of the language: the topic of Chinese writing already excited the interest of French culture. But in spite of their efforts, the Obsercateurs were unable to discover what appeared to be the “secret” of Chinese characters. The hasty departure of Tchong-A-Sam, when the government decided to have him accompanied to the Orient by the Baudin expedition, prevented Sicard, Brouquet and Le Blond from pursuing a kind of research dear to late eighteenth century culture. Nevertheless, this episode, in itself of modest proportions, remains a sign of a sum of articulate and genuine interests, linked to the main currents of the science de Phomme. The second ‘figure’ about whom I have already hinted in some remarks is that of the Mad. In this case as well, a significant conceptual evolution is noticeable during the centuries of special interest to us. In what Michel‘THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN - 263 Foucault defines as the “classical age” insanity was, in one way or another, considered a meta-natural event.*? It seemed, in fact, to have to do only with spiritual faculties—the intellect, the will—of which it altered the functions. The body appeared to have but an accessory and secondary part in this disturbance, which appeared to be of an essentially psycho- moral nature. From a certain point of view, Cartesian dualism tended to radicalize this situation. If it is true that in some texts (Les passions del’ éme, letters to Princess Elizabeth) Descartes attempted to mediate the two traditional components of man into a unitary perspective, it is also true that in his general theoretical work the clear-cut separation of res cogitans and res extensa did not really favour the study of the corporeal aetiology of mental disturbances. It should not surprise us that for many scholars in the dge classique insanity formed not so much part of the range of corporeal phenomena as of spiritual phenomena. What was often termed, signifi- cantly, désordre or dériglement de U’ éme appeared in fact dissoluteness, disor- derliness and perversion, which called for judgement—if not, indeed, moral reprobation. These brief considerations indicate to what extent the theoretical foun- dation of the science of mental illnesses depended, perhaps more than any other human science, on the process of that integral “bringing to earth” of man which was the focus of my second section. In fact, only by secu- larizing and naturalizing the ‘spiritual’ functions of man would it have been possible for modern thought to operate in an empirical and physical way on this particularly delicate and complex level. Thus it is again in the eighteenth century that, parallel to or following the progressive ‘heal- ing’ of the split caused by Cartesian dualism, we witness the gradual for- mation of psychiatric science. While some savants such as Linnaeus and Boissier de Sauvages laid down abstract classifications of mental dérégle- ments—~in which, among other things, these déréglements lack any adequate physiological reference—other scholars attempted to link psychic dis- turbances and disorders to concrete organic causes, In 1744 Antoine Le Camus wrote a Médecine de esprit in which he attempted to examine: 1° le mécanisme du corps qui influe sur les fonctions de l’ame; 2° les causes physiques qui rendent ce mécanisme ou plus défectueux ou plus parfait; 3° les moyens qui peuvent l’entretenir dans son état libre lorsqu’il est géné. *? The text reveals that a significant evolution had taken place; but the stage reached was still far from the goal. Much progress was made when, during the second half of the century, the couple éme|esprit-corps was sub- stituted by the less radical, or more empirical couple moral-physique. At this point, in fact, a relative ontological homogeneity, necessary to suggest the existence of a mutual relationship between mind and body susceptible to264 + SERGIO MORAVIA empirical demonstration and to scientific analysis, was established between the two poles. The homogeneity, indeed, became so close that some of the more audacious exponents of materialistic thought began to affirm expli- citly that in reality man was one, and that his so-called spiritual activities were in fact corporeal activities of a certain type: “On a visiblement abusé”, wrote d’Holbach in 1770, de la distinction que ’on a fait si souvent de homme physique et de Vhomme moral. L’homme est un étre purement physique; l'homme moral n’est que cet étre physique considéré sous un certain point de vue, c’est-A-dire, relativement & quelques-unes de ses fagons d’agir dues & son organisation particuliére.* The affirmation is of considerable importance. And, moreover, it is not at all isolated: it is echoed by Diderot, Marat, and Raynal, to mention but a few.5# A short time later a scholar formed in the milieu holbachique such as Cabanis not only came back to the theme of the substantial identity between moral and plysique, but also drew decisive consequences for the infant psychiatric science. The two disciplines (wrote Cabanis in his Coup doeil sur les réootutions et sur la réforme de la médecine) which in one way or another deal with insanity, that is to say medicine and ethics, from now on must seek to base themselves only on the study of the physique, and thus of physiology: De la sensibilité physique ou de organisation qui la détermine et la modifie découlent en effet les idées, les passions, les vertus et les vices. Les mouvements désordonnés ou réguliers de ’ame [Cabanis added] ont la méme source que les maladies ou la santé du corps: cette véritable source de la morale est dans Porganisation humaine, dont dépendent et notre faculté et notre maniére de sentir.* And elsewhere, pursuing his search for the causes of mental illness, he pointed out, on one hand, the action of certain internal organs of the body, and, on the other hand, possible abnormal conditions of the brain: En revenant encore, et A plusieurs reprises, sur les dissections des sujets morts dans P’état de folie; en ne se lassant point d’examiner leur cerveau, des anatomistes exacts sont cependant enfin parvenus, touchant les divers états de ce viscére, & quelques résultats assez généraux et costans. Ils ont trouvé, par exemple, le cerveau d’une mollesse extraordinaire chez des imbéciles; d’une fermeté contre nature chez des fous furieux; d’une consistance trés-inégale, c’est-a- dire, sec et dur dans un endroit, humide et mou dans un autre, chez des personnes attaquées de délires moins violens.*? These positions are of extraordinary value. After having been considered alternately a moral déréglement, a disturbance of the éme and a maladie deTHE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 265 Pesprit, insanity now became, explicitly, an organic illness and only an organic illness—and in the texts of certain scholars, even more specifically, a maladie du cerveau. It is not by chance that Philippe Pinel, one of the found- ing fathers of modern psycho-pathology and psychiatry, indicated that the decisive event in the birth of this discipline was the insertion of “aliénation mentale” “dans ordre des sciences physiques”. Neither is it by mere coincidence that, with Johann-Christian Reil, the term ‘psychiatry’ itself appeared for the first time during this period, as a way of designating the physical science and therapy of a particular class of physical disturbances. It would be irrelevant to discuss here to what extent the bodily interpre- tation of mental diseases suggested by Pinel is valid, or to what extent linking psychiatry to what Pinel termed “changements plysiques” has been useful to an adequate comprehension of mental insanity. As a matter of fact, whether we like it or not (and, in fact, neither Foucault nor I like it), in the modern age the science and therapy of mental disturbances deve- loped mainly as a study of “lésions™, of “changements physiques”, of physical disorders. And it was the eighteenth century of Cabanis, Pinel, Reil and Chiarugi which dictated the presuppositions and conditions of this theoretical choice. REFERENCES “This paper was originally delivered as a special lecture for the Office for History ‘of Science and Technology, University of California, Berkeley, 24 May, 1979, and presented as 2 communication to the Fifth International Congress on the Enlightenment in Pisa, 27 August-2 September, 1979. For this reason references have been kept to a minimum, ‘We mention here only the works by Georges Gusdorf who, within his large history of the human sciences in Western culture, devoted four noteworthy books to the age which interests us. See Le principe de a penst au izle des lumies (Pars, 1971) Dieu, la nature, Vhomme au sidcle des lumitres (Paris, 1972); L'avdnement des sciences de homme au sidle des lumibes (Pati, 1973); La conscience revolutionnare. Les idiologues (Paris, 1978). 2. On the epistemological ambivalence of the eighteenth century (not only from the point of view of the seiences kumaines) see S. Moravia, II penser deg Idllogues, Scienza « flosofia in Francia, 1780-1815 (Florence, 1974). See also R. Hubert, Les sciences sociales dans 1’ Encyclopédie (Paris, 1923); and K. M. Baker, Condorcet. ‘From natural philosophy to social mathematics (Chicago, 1975). 3. GeL. L, de Button, Esai @aritmMique sociale, in Buoresphilsophiquer, ed. by J. Pivetean (Paris, 1954), 456. 4. J. 0. de La Mettsie, L’Homme machine, critical ed. by A. Vartanian (Princeton, 1960), 164. 5. E.B.de Condillac, Langue des caleuls,in ures philosphigus, ed. by G. Leroy (3 vols, Paris, 1947-51)» ji, 420. On the analogy see also M. Hesse, Models and analagice in science (London, 1966), and E. Melandri, La linea il crclo (Bologna, 1968); G. Canguilhem, Btudes @histoire et de philosophic des sciences (Paris, 1968); W. H.266 13. 14 15. 16. 7m 18, 19. 20. ar. 22. 23. 24. + SERGIO MORAVIA Leatherdale, The role of analogy, model and metaphor in science (Amsterdam-New York, 1974). P. J. G. Cabanis, Du degré de certitude de la médecine, in GEuores philosophiques, ed. by G. Lehec and J. J. Cazeneuve, i (Paris, 1956), 66. ‘M. Foucault, Naissance de la clinique. Une archéologie du regard médical (Paris, 1963). J-M. Degérando, De la géntration des connoissances humaines (Berlin, 1802), 218-19. G-L. L. de Buffon, Histoire naturelle d Phomme, in Gluores philosophiques (op. cit. (Get. 3)), 293. Another, more recent and valuable, edition of this work is that edited by Michele Duchet (Paris, 1971). On the cognitive meaning of the category of comparison see 8. Moravia, La scienza del uomo nel settecento (Bari, 1978). See also F. Manuel, The eighteenth century confronts the gods (Cambridge, Mass., 1959). See G. Canguilhem, La formation du concept de réflexe au XVIIé et XVIII* sitcles (Paris, 1955); J- Roger, Les sciences dela vie dans la penste frangaise au XVIIL¢ sidele (Paris, 1963). On the crisis of anthropological dualism (and mechanism) during the eighteenth century, see S. Moravia, Il pensiero degli Idéologues (ref. 2), pt. i. Gf. also, from ano- ther point of view, L. Gohen-Rosenfeld, From beast-machine to man-machine, new and enlarged edition (New York, 1968); M. Kirkinen, Les origines de la conception moderne de Vhomme-machine (Helsinki, 1960); R. Mercier, La rbhabilitation de la nature humaine 1700-1750 (Villemomble, 1960). Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de Phomme, in Buores philosophiques (ref. 6), i, 111, Of this capital work an English trans,, edited by G. Mora and S. Moravia, is forthcoming. P, Camper, Discours sur la manitre de peindre les différentes passions sur le visage de homme, in Gores qui ont pour objet Phistoire naturelle, la physiologie et Panatomie comparte (Paris, an x2), ii, groff. On their contribution to the large philosophical and anthropological debate be- tween the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries see P. Verniére, Spinoza et la pensle francaise avant la Révolution (2 vols, Paris, 1954); J. S. Spink, French free- thought from Gassendi to Voltaire (London, 1960). (On this complex subject see G. Canguilhem, Le concept de réflexe (ref. 10)3,J. Roger, Les sciences de lave (ref. 10); and S, Moravia, ‘“From ‘homme machine’ to ‘homme sensible’: Changing eighteenth century models of man’s image”, Journal of the istory of ideas, xxxix (1978), 45-60. See 8. Moravia, “Cabanis ¢ la fondazione di un’antropologia materialistica”, corresponding to the first part (pp. 13-290) of Il pensiero degli Iddologues (ref. 2). L. 8. King, The medical world of the eighteenth century (Chicago, 1958); S. Moravia, “Philosophie et médecine en France a la fin du xvme siécle”, in Th. Besterman Swudies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century, xxxxix (1972), 1089-15. Dupaty, Lettres sur P'Htalie, écrites en 1785 (Paris, 1825), i, 123; A. Le Camus, La midecine de Pesprit (Pais, 1753), 1. La Mettrie, L’homme mackine (ref. 4), 151. F.-X. Lanthenas, De Pinfluence de la liberté sur la santé (Paris, 1792), 18. Cabanis, Rapports (ref. 12), Stance des Koes normale, recullies par des stnagraphes et reoues par les professurs (Paris, 1800), série Legons, i, 65. X. Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (Patis, an vin), 3. “De tous les animaux”, we read in the Rapports, “homme est sans doute le plus soumis a Pinfluence des causes extérieures; il est celui que 'application fortuite, ou raisonnée des différens corps de univers peut modifier le plus fortement et le plus diversement. Sa sensibilité plus vive, plus délicate et plus étendue; lesTHE ENLIGHTENMENT AND MAN + 267 sympathies multipliées et singuliéres des diverses parties éminemment sensibles de son corps; son organisation mobile et souple qui se préte sans effort & toutes les maniéres d’étre et, en méme temps, cette ténacité de mémoire pour ainsi dire physique laquelle elle retient les habitudes, si facilement contractée; tout, en tun mot, se réunit pour faire prendre constamment & homme un caractére et des formes analogues ou correspondantes au caractére et aux formes des objets qui Pentourent, des corps qui peuvent agir sur lui?” (Cabanis, Rapports (ref. 12), 395)- 25. J.B. Lamarck, “Discours d’ouverture, prononcé le 27 floréal de l’an x au Muséum histoire naturelle”, in Bulletins scientifiques de la France et de la Belgique, x1 (1907), 518-19; G. Barsanti, Dalla storia naturale alla storia della natura, Saggio su Lamarck (Mitan, 1979). Gf. also M. Galzigna, “L’organismo vivente e il suo ambiente: nascita di un rapporto”, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, xxiv (1979), 134-61. 26. On the notion of environment in Montesquieu, ¢f. W. Stark, Montesquieu, pioneer of the sociology of knowledge (London, 1960). Gf. also R. Shackleton, Montesquieu, A critical biography (Oxford, 1963). 27. C, Helvétius, De Esprit (Paris, 1758); De Homme (Paris, 1773). 28. 8. Moravia, “From ‘homme machine’ to ‘homme sensible’ ” (ref. 15), esp. 58-60. 2g. The most significant proof, from both the theoretical and the practical point of view, of the validity of the ‘environmentalistic’ theses of Condillac is probably provided by the famous ‘case’ of the “Sauvage de 1” Aveyron”: a handicapped child who, after having been discovered in the woods of the department of Avey - ron and later brought in Paris, was successfully (at least within certain limits) re-educated by J. Itard, a médecin-philosophe who used Condillacian principles and procedures. See S. Moravia, II ragazzo seloaggio dell Aveyron (Bari, 1972). 30. On the sociological studies (in the broad sense of the word) of the Scottish philoso- phers of the eighteenth century see W. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the beginnings of modern sociology (New York, 1930); G. Bryson, Man and society: The Scottish inquiry of the eighteenth century (Princeton, 1945). gt. A. Ferguson, An essay on the history of civil society (Edinburgh, 1767; reprinted Edinburgh, 1966), 112, and 10. On the thought of this great Scottish philosopher see the recent work by P. Salvucci, 4. Ferguson: socilogia ¢filosofia politica (Urbino, 1972). ga. J. Millar, Observations cnceng the distinction of ranks in society (London, 1781), 2 ‘The first edition was published in Edinburgh in 1775. 33- On Volney see J. Gaulmier, L’idéologue Volnsy (1757-1820). Contribution & Pétude de Porientalisme en France (Beyrouth, 1951). A greater attention to the anthropological and the geographical perspective of the idéolagues is in S. Moravia, II pensiero degli Téologues (ref. 2), p. iv. 34- The key texts in this sense are those by the Swiss scholar A. Chavannes, Anthyo- ‘ologie, ou scence de Phomme (Lausanne, 1788); Essai sur Péducation intellectuelle, avec le projet dune science nowwelle (Lausanne, 1787). See S, Moravia, La scienza dell'uomo nel settecento (ref. 9), 78 and 210-12. 35- See F. Tinland, L’homme sawage (Paris, 1968). 36. B.le B. de Fontenelle, De Poriginedes fables, in Ocwores (5 vols, Paris, 1825), iv, 310. 37. A. de Bougainville, “Notice historique sur les sauvages de Amérique septentrio- rnale”, in Mémoires de l'Institut, Classe de Sciences Morales et Politiques, ii, 322. On the new cultural and scientific dimension of the journey in the eighteenth century see S. Moravia, “Philosophie et géographie @ la fin du xvme siécle”, in Th. Besterman (ed.), Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century, Wii (1967), 937-1011. Gf also J. E. Martin-Allanic, Bougainville navigateur et les décowvertes de son temps268 38. 39: 4 4. 43. 3h 5a. 53° 5 56. + SERGIO MORAVIA (2 vols, Paris, 1964); N. Broc, La géographie des philasophes, Géographes et vayageurs frangaise ou XVIMe sidcle (Pats, 1975). N. Masson de Morvilliers, Discours sur la géographie, in Encyclopédie méthodique (75 vols, Paris, 1782-1832), sect. Geographic, vol. i, p. xvi. “C'est un objet digne de Vattention d'un philosophe”, wrote Voltaire on the ‘different’ as represented by the oriental civilisations, “que cette différence entre Jes usages de V’Orient et les ndtres, aussi grande qu’entre nos langages. Les peuples les plus policés de ces vastes contrées n’ont rien de notre police; leurs arts ne sont point les nétres, Nourritures, vétements, maisons, jardins, lois, culte, bienséances, tout différe . . .” (Essai sur les moeurs, ed. R. Pomeau (2 vols, Paris, 1963), ii, 321). ‘A valuable critical review of the studies on the bon sausage is that by G. Gliozzi, “1 ‘mito del buon selvaggio’ nella storiografia tra otto ¢ novecento”, Rivista di ‘Filosofia, Wiii (1967), 288-335. On the crisis ofthis myth during the late eighteenth ‘century see §, Moravia, La scienza del? uomo nel setecento (ref. 9). Of. also F. Tinland, Lhomme sauoage (ref. 25); M. Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au sitcle des lumidres (Paris, 1978); R. Meek, Socal sciences and the ignoble savage (London, 1976). J. Ehrard, L'idée de nature dans la premitre motié du XVIIT® sidcle (2 vols, Paris, 1963). J.-F. Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages ambriquains comparles au mocurs des premiers temps (2 vols, Paris, 1724), i, 3. LaF, Jauffret, Introduction aux Mémoires de a Socitté des Obseroateurs de ' Homme. This text has been republished in S. Moravia, La scienza dell’uomo nel settecento (ref. 9), where the passage quoted is at p. 269. J. M, Degérando, Considévations sur les diftrentes méthodes &suiore dans Vobservatian des ‘peuples sawvages (Paris, 1800); trans. by F. G.'T. Moore as The obsercation of savage ‘Peoples (with an introduction by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, London, 1969). On this subject see F. Chabod, Storia dellidea d’ Europa (Bari, 1962). JeJ. Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétulla ds M. PABbS de Saint-Pierre, in Guores completes, ed. by B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, iii (Paris, 1964), 565. V. Pinot, La Chine et la formation de Pesprt philosophique en France, 1640-1740 (Paris, 1932). L.-C, Fougeret de Monbron, Le cosmopoite, ou le citeyen du monde (new ed., Bordeaux, 1970). C. de D. Montesquieu, Geographica, in CBuores complétes, ed. by A. Masson, ii (Paris, 1950), 927-43. ‘Very interesting are, in particular, the Questions sur la Chine ¢t les Chinois by Turgot, in Gures, ed. by G. Schelle, ii (Paris, 1914), 523-33- On this episode see Moravia, Scienza dell uomo (ref. 9), 10558. M, Foucault, Histoire de la folie & Cage classique (Patis, 1961). This is the sub-title itself of the work. (See G. Gusdorf, Diew la nature, Phomme (ref. 1), 512.) P.H. D. d'Holbach, Systtme de la nature (2 vols, Paris, 1820), i, 66-67. ‘On the complex debate of the late Enlightenment on the notions of moral and ‘lysique and on the unity of man see my Il pensiero degli Idéalogues (ref, 2), 135-86 (where the reader will find some additional references to the authors and texts mentioned above). Cabanis, Coup d’oeil sur les réoolutions et sur la réforme de la médecine, in CBuores philosom ‘hiques (ref. 6), ii, 209-10. Cabanis, Rapports (ref, 12), 154-5. Ph. Pinel, Traité medico-philosophique sur Valiénation mentale (Patis, 1809), 56. On the work of Pinel and its importance see W. Riese, The legacy of Philippe Pinel (New York, 1969).