FIREFLY COLLECTION A SOUND LIKE THUNDER MORTAIN AND FALAISE, AUGUST 1944 Written and illustrated by Dennis Oliver, ISBN 978°0-9876019-1-5 ‘Acknowledgments. The author and publisher would keto thank the stff of the National Library of Australi, Canberra, the State Library of New South Woles, Sydney the Natonol Archive ond Records Administration, Maryland USA and Darren Neely of Fox Company Research for ther valuable assistance nd adie We would also like to thank al those who contribute tothe Aus History Forum - particulary Martin Block and the late Ron Klages, the Feldgrau Forum, Panzer- Archade, Die Deutsche Wehrmacht website, the Archive 1944-45 website and Mr Brett Green at Missing Lynx. We also wish to thank Mr ernard Cher of M1 Workshop, Singapore and Mar Lim Kian Guan or ther kind permission to reproduce the photograph the sole mode Panzer IV whichappeors on the Bock cover. Further workcan be seenat wovu.themworkshop.com, Inaddition tthe websites mentioned above, the following printed works were also consulted: The Struggle For Europe. Wilt, C Breakout. Drive To the Seine. ‘Mason, D. Six Armies In Normandy. Keegan J, De 12.55-Panzer Division Hl. Wolther H. Panzers In The Bocoge. Berne, K. Operation Cobra. ZologaS. Flalse, 41944. Death Of An Army. Ford, K-Invasion They're Coming. Corel, Pa Battalle Du Bocage.6ufferaut, . Panzersin Normandy Then And Now. Lefevre, E.The Panzers And The Battle For Normandy. Sernace,G. Defenders Of Fortress Europe. Mitcham, S. D-Day The Battle For Normandy. Seevor, A. Armor Battles Of The Woffen'SS Fey, W. Vietory At Mortain. Reardon, M. Stee Inferno. Reynolds, M. ie Truppenkennzeicen der Verbéinde und Einheten der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS und ihre Einsdtze Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945, Schmitz, P and Theis K. Schwerer Panzerspachwogen. Jentz. Tigers In ‘Combat & Schneider W. The Western Front. fitgen,H. Les Panzer en Normandie. Guffetout, Grenadiers, Meyer k Panzersin The Gunsights. 2al090, SD ay Tank Battles. Blin, G. Folalse Pocket. Lotowsti,P. Steel Rain. Waffen SS Panzer Baties In The West. fipey T. US Tonk Battles In France. Zclog0, ‘SPonterwrecks 8. Archer ond Auerbach, W. Panzerurecks IJ. Archer, Land Auerbach, W Pontertruppen 2 ent. (Editor) Panzer Vand its Variants Spielberger WJ Pz. Kopf. IV Ausf /H/J.Vol2. Trojca, W. PanzerJager und SturmgeschUtze.Schiebert, H. Achtung Panzer No. 5. Sturmgeschit I, tug. V & SIG.33. itch M,(Eltor.Sturmartilerie.Speiberger W.Jand Fest U SturmgeschUta Ill andIV 1942-45, Doyle, Hand Jentz, Z.Sturmgeschuts 40, Schieber H .Safe251.Ledwoch, 1 Sturmgeschite Il. Culver, 8 The iltustationsin this book were al reated using contemporary photographs asa reference and we have attempted to present os faitifl reproduction as possible Including the shape and postion of any camouflage pattern, markings and te styl of etering used. nthe few cases where we have been forced tospecuiote we hove ‘ted to make this clear Where posible, we have reproduced the photograph or photographs soused, however copyright and budgetary restritons ond donot always ‘lon th Published by ADH Publishing, DoolittleMill Doolittlecane Totternhoe Bedfordshire LU6.10X United Kingdom Producedin co-operation with The Oliver Publishing Group Copyright © 40H Publishing. lights reserved. Apr fram fir dealing forthe purpose of private tu reseorch citi orevew as permitted under the Copyright Deion and Potente, 1088 mo porto ths publeation roy be reproduce, stored in etevalsystem or tronaritedinanyJormer by any means, econ eect chemo) Mechanica ‘optical photocopying recording oretherwise without prior writen permission af ADH Publshing. Alenqultes shouldbe adresedto the publisher Plctre Credits. Al photegrophs Navonl Archies and Records Admintrotion, excep: Burdesorch 18,2832; Howard Parke: IF.28; Author's Collection: IC; Ulstln va Berme: 1124 k Bere’ 48.17.2426 WM 13,2026 32,080 ‘Above left: Sturmbannfuher Herbert Kuhlman photographed shortly after the award of his Knight's Cross in February 1944 ‘During the Morton counterattack Kuhlman would command one ofthe two Kampfgruppen formed jrom elements of 15S Panzer Division. Above right: Two Prkw IV tonks of 7Kompanie, S-Panzer-Regiment 1 said to have been destroyed near ‘Morton. eile records suggest however that onl tanks from te regiment's fist battalion equipped with Ponthers-were present and these vehicles may have been photographed sometime later and further east. At Left: The metolmonogrom worn ‘nthe shoulder craps of NCD's of 1.86-Panver Dison ‘mibstandare Alf Hitler. The afcer's pattem were made of 0 git ‘metoland those of enistedmen embroideredin the pprooriate Wojfenfarbe, or bronchof service caleur{After landing in Normandy on 6 June 1948 ond establishing o bridgeheod in ‘ccupied Europe with such spectacular success, the achievements ofthe Aled frmies in the folowing weeks and months had fallen for short of initial expectations (n their right flank, US Army units were tasked with overrunning the Cotentin Peninsula with its important deep water port of Cherbourg. However, the "Norman countryside with ts ancient potchwork of hedgerows and forms known locally 2s the Bocage - offered the Germans a crucial defensive advantage ond it wos not until 26 June thot the Cherbourg. garrison Surrendered after destroying the port focilties and rendering them useless. ‘Thefrst shipment of supplies would not be unloaded in Cherbourg before late ‘August by which time the fighting had moved further west andthe port hod fost much ofits strategie significance. While the Americans were focused on Cherbourg the rsh and Canadians bttered away ot the German positions around Coen = which the Allis hod expected to capture on the fist day of the invasion - until ate July when ie was Jinoly secure. In seven weeks of hard fighting the Aled armies hod obtained Iitle more thon they had expected to secure inthe fst daysof the campaign to Iiberote Europe. nde, the German defence had been so tenocious ond conducted with such stil, that the American commander Lieutenant General ‘Omar Brody, in a less thon optimistic appraise of any future offensive operation, stressed the importance of maintaining momentum lest the ‘Germans be allowed to ..get set again, we sholl be right back to this hedge Fohting. ‘The sector ofthe front allocated tothe British and Canadians wos for more {favourable tothe deployment of armoured units than the Bacage andreaiing this from the outset the Germans had placed the bulk of thei armoured units there. The Brtsh commander General Montgomery somewhat belatedly Claimed that his intention had aways been to draw the German tanks onto his tinisions thus freeing the Americans to exploit the advantage of facing mostly infantry formations. Whatever the veracty of Montgomery's explanation his argument tht the bulk ofthe Panzers confronted the British and Canadians was now used by Bradley toextolthe benefits ofhis own plonnedofensive After false stort on 24 July -which merely succeeded in olerting the Germans to the probability of « mojor offensive - the American attack, codenamed Operation Cobro, went ahead the following day preceded by 0 massive aerial bombardment. Although some bombs fll on the US positions nitaly causing confusion the main weight of the onslaught caught the tonks of Panzer Lehr Division which had been conceoled in the numerous woods and sunken lanes throughout the area. The division's commander, Generalleutnant Fite Bayern, later claimed that his formation and its subordinate units together lost over 2,000 men in the fist two days of operation Cobra with Fifty percent of those casuaties being inflicting as a result of the bomting. {AUS Army M4A1 Medium Tank passes on abondoned 8 em Fok 36 ont-aircrft un du he frontof the American tank was designed to cut through the hedgerows and earthen banks that were common inthe rea and had lange prong like device at The Americans quickly broke through the German defences near Saint18 and ‘almost the entire western half of the front in Normandy began to crumble. By 28 uly, US commande the field were reporting thot resistance wos largely nonexistent and where the Germans were able to mount loca counterattacks these were poorly organised and often half hearted. On the same doy CCoutances, aout 40 kilometres west of Soint-L6, wos taken but attempting to push further south the Americans ran into elements of 2.55-Ponzer-Dvision ‘and 1755-Ponzergrenadier-Division and could maker further progress. During the evening of 29 July the two Waffen divisions mounted an attack of the flank of US 2nd Armoured Division neor SointDenis-e-Gast ond ‘lthough intialy successful, both formations were already badly depleted ‘ofter fighting in Normandy for weeks and were forced 9 retreat eavng most of their tanks and heavy equipment behind. By now the Germans were ‘conducting offensive operations that were nrealityescape attempts ‘871 August the town of Avranches at the base ofthe Cotentin peninsula had ‘been taken, together with on intact bridge across the Seine at nearby Pontoubout. Tasuppartthe Americon breakout the British lunches theirown ‘offensive code named Operation Bluecoat two days earlier on 30 July and ‘mach of the armored reserves thatthe Germans had hoped to employ against the Americans - including the powerful ISS-Panzerkorps- were diverted to focetheBriish, Around Auranches the Americans continued to expand thelr front ond ‘although the Germans managed to hold Vie, the Americans reached Mortain ‘ond captured the townon 3August Desperately attempting to scrape together enough armour for ‘counterattack the German commander in the west, Feldmarschall von Kluge, begged Hitler tobe allowed to withdraw tothe Seine only tobe told that he ‘mustattack and destroy the Alied armies, {Although undoubtedly unrealistic in hindsight, Hitler’ response should have ‘come as no surprise as an event which tok place far from the Normandy battlefields inthe weeks leading up tothe breakout, would have for reaching Implications on future operations in France and would indeed influence the Course ofthe war Although often viewed as something of a historical aside, the 20 July attempt on Hite’ ife confirmed in the German leaders mind the treachery he had long suspected was rampant throughout the senior ranks of the Army. n future, generals coud prove their loyalty only be carrying out ‘iter’s orders tothe letter - lack of success also being put down to treachery, ‘Any strategie considerations, and even tactical decisions, would be the preserve ofthe Fuhrer. The lost major operations in the west, the Mortain ‘counterattack and the Ardennes offensive, were both creations of Hitler in their entirety. 19 the early stages ofthe Operation Cobra break out iy1944, The done somuch to hinder the Ale in the post. The German gun seems tobe in relatively good condition apart from the flat yres-and traces ofa three-colour comouflage are visibleon thegun shied. .At left: An Sdkfz 251/7 oust D Pionierpanzerwogen of i1-Kompanie, Panzergrenadier Lebr-Regiment 901" s01d t0 have been photographed only hours ofter the US breakthrough near Saint, This vehicle i oiso shown and discussed on page 16 of the ilustraton section. Although the Panther tank in the background would seem t0 carry no sible markings it Is almest certainly from Panzer Lehr-Division and was in. foct the subject ofa further series of photographs ofter i had been cleared from the road. Below: A Pek V Panther ausf A of LAbteilung, Panzer Regiment 6. n te original print the beginnings fof 2 4.Kompanie number are visible on the turet side although almost half the Zimmerit paste is missing. Of note are what scem fo be ovo handles welded tothe glocs, presumably fo allow access tothe hull Bottom: A Pokw V Panther of 4.Kompanie, Ponzer-Regiment 5 photographed atthe US Army vehicle dump at Isignysur-Mer. The large red, outined white [numbers opplied to both the turret sides and /ear re clearlyshown here. early August f was decided fo withoraw whot remorned Of Panzer Lehr-Division with the exception of parts ofthe ordilery regiment and a single tank company equipped with o number of PalwIV vehicles combined into a Kampjaruppe under Oberst van Houser who hod been the commander of Ponzergrenadier-Lehr- Regiment 901. By 9 August Houser’s battle group had been re Jormed to elude vehicles which had been in short term repair dnd were now returned from the division’ workshops, the last Panther tanks of Panzer Regiment 6, remnants of Panzergrenadier Lehr-Regiment 02, what remained of the division’ reconnaissance battalion and stragglers who tad ‘managed to moke their woy back to their units. On 12 August Komofgruppe von Houser woe withdrawn and @ Kompforappe, commanded by Hauptmann Kuhnow, consisting ofa company of tanks, 0 howitzer battery and parts of Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 902 remained ot the front ond together with the ‘Surdvors of 12 $§ Panzer Dison managed to break out of the FolieePocketon 20 AugustTANK AND ASSAULT GUN STRENGTHS - JUNE TO AUGUST, 1944 Panzer Dison Taber, Paneer Regier’ Abteilung. Ponser Regiment3| | 96 Panzer Osion Abteilung, Panzer Regiment 3 Abteiang,Ponzer Regiment 33] Panzeroger Abteilung 50 i onser Dison Panzer Regiment 15 Aiea Penver Regiment 15 ABteig,Porzer Regiment 15 Panceriger. at i Panzer Dison Panzer Regiment 2 Le Panzer Dion Panzer Regiment 1) Taeona Panzer Regiment 2 7 Panzer Regiment 16 sa PanverLehr-Dvsion Aten, Ponte Regine 6 Teng, Ponzer Regiment 130] rDusion Ponaer Abteilung 103 Panzer Abteiiung $03 (Funklenk) 301 (Furklent) 302 ankienk) 315 ‘ompanie(unklent) 316 31 7 ULLAL : 394 502 infonterie Div (P19 Abt 326) Ls: Panver Dion Abteilung, $4 iment Abreing,S5-Ponzer Regiment ‘SS Sturmgeschite Abteilung 1 155 anver Dison Abtelung Ponzer Regiment TAbreiung,S-Ponser Regiment? ‘SS-Sturmgeschite Atelung 2 ‘iision Abteiung 5 Ponzer Regiment 9 Abteilung. 5-Ponzr Regiment 9] (055 Panter isin Abteilung, 5-Ponse Regine 0 12 Panter Win Abeiung,55-Ponzer Regiment 2 i ‘$5 PonserAbteong 7 101 102 Fe vision 7 Panzer oer Abteung TU) LiFe Ovi, - Panzeyage Abang 1 Brigade 1 2 West a =) he ** 2vehicles Befebispanze; +6 veices with shor barreled un; +*3 vehicles with 75em L24 gun, 3 vehicles with Sem LA2 guns and 7 vehicles with Sem L60 guns; AllBefehispanze; All Befehispanzer; + AllBefehispanze; *AllBefehispanzer.= Atleft:APekw IV ausf Hof Kompanie SS-Panzer- Regiment 2 photographed at the signy-sur Mer vehicle dump some time after the fighting for the Foaloise Pocket. This vehiclecan aso be seen nthe ‘background of the large photograph on poge 2. Below: Another Pekw IV ausf Hof S5:Panzer. Regiment 2, this one from & Kompani. This tank was the subject of several photogrophs, that shown here, and verycomprehensive series said to-have been token ot a vehicle dump near Tévlres, west of Carentan, sometime in July 1944, Tis vehicle s also shown and discussed in ‘the stretion section on Page 12.In August, 0 battle groups ofthis division under Sigadefuhrer (Otto Baum took port in Operation Ltich, capturing the town of Mortain and advancing {further than any other German unit, withdrewing ‘only when encirclement wos imminent. The ‘2ctions of the division during the fighting around Morton are discussed further an page 8. The last {few tanks of the diusion almost managed ¢0 ‘overrun units ofthe 1st Polish Armoured Division ‘near Mount Ormel on 20 August and in the [process allow many German units to escape the Falase Pocket. By 28 August the dvsion’s Panzer regiment had been reduced to six serviceable tanks.SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY STRENGTHS - JUNE TO AUGUST, 1944 Panzer Bivison renodier Regt Hi 3 .Ponzergrenaier Dvsion sturm-Ponzer-Abeiung 217 1.55 Panzer Division g [2ss-Ponzer Division ss 1255 Porzer vision‘Above: Bergepontheraus{Aof 2Ponzer-Division captured in late August 1944 after the fighting for the Folise Pocket. The exact location ofour photograph is Linforunately unknown but the presence of @ numberof Canadion solders throughout the whole series would suggest that wos taken somewhere onthe northern edge ofthe escape corridor Of nats the dion unit insignia, applied in white, clearly visible onthe rased superstructure side and the application of the Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste in @ series of diagonal lines. Below: A Pzkw IV aust of 8 Kompanie, Panzer Regiment 3 of 2Ponzer Division photographedinPont-Facy south of Saint 1 n early August. Inthe orignal rit the dvsion’s Trent uni¢isigna, olthough fan, is visible onthe hl fran tO theright ofthe driver's visor and the vehicle's number 802 can be seen behind the Bolkenkreuzon the turret Schurzen. This vehicle algo shown and discussed the ilustration section on poge 18. This dvsion was one ofthe strongest German armoured units avollable to Oberbefehishaber West when the invasion ‘began, being almost at full strength with seventy-nine Panther and ninetysixPekw IV ranks For most of lune the division operated against the British and Conadians in the Caumont area, south west of Rouen. On 26 June, withthe lounch of Operation Epsom, the serviceable Panther tanks of lAbtelung were detached to act independently nd ina single day - Wednesday, 28 une the battalion was credited withthe destruction offfty-three enemy tanks and fifteen ‘anti-tank guns. On 21 July the division wos slowly withdrawn from te front and gradually replaced by 326 Infanterie Division, although Abteilung of Panzer Regiment 3 probably femained behind. Badly worn down, the batalion reported that jus thirteen tanks were ready for operations although another twenty Six would be available after minor repairs coulabe completed. During the fist weeks of August, the dvsion took part n Operation itch, the counterattackon Uspositions around Mortainwith approximately sity tanks andfifeentank-destroyers The vision sport inthe counterattacks discussed further on poge&Que SAINT-LAURENT-DE-CUVES —// yo Saint Marfin-de efaliew Las Crea salt eee Lepontdteremn 1a gotniere erence Rouse | Ute Cousey f - temesniAdetee ph nnrove pus tartere ' spelefontaine JUVIGNY-LE-TETRE ¥ rourneri ees Y sainesarngiey fh a Tournerie am Je Mesni.tpoay y saine-ctementRancoudray_] chevaive — — Montigny — hasseeuey x my Mentieny Piaandoreics a Foret de Moran fomasry LeMesnipioeuts — imtesnard Les cose g —“S re oat Dr etary || sco ver Leis ~~) vicey ye" HILAIRE-DU-HARCOUET Lapenty ——— COUNTERATTACK AT MORTAIN ‘Above: The town of Mortain ond the surrounding area sit oppeared in 1944, Right: Pek VPonther photographed near Morten n August 1984 Although t isnot possible fo identi the unt touch this chile belongs withany cera, there were several urects from 88 Ponzer Repiment 1 neory which formed part ‘ofthe some colectonof mages Te absence ofthe characteristic Rooks se On theturetof metal tee bstandarte Ponte sigests tats venice oy by Wednesday 2 August 1944, the US Army divisions thot had broken through the German defences in Normandy between Saint LO and Périer as port of Operation Cobra had advanced to. Avranches. in the south and were ttreotening the important crossroads town of Vre more than 40 klometres {from their starting point. Around Coen the British had launched an attack in support of Cobra on the previous Sunday, tying down the German armoured ‘eserves that would hove been used to blunt the American offensive. By 3 ‘August, US troops had captured the bridge across the River Seine at Pontoubout, about Skilometres south of Auronches,anditseemed a ast that thestalemate that had prevailed since the Ales had landed in Normandy wos covert). (On that some Wednesday from his home in Berchtesgaden, Hitler - in what ‘appears to have been a spur of the moment decision - ordered Generalfelimorscholl Gunther von Kluge, since 5 July Oberbefehshaber West, tolounch an immediate counterattack towards Auronches andthe coost(2). Hitler promised Kluge the reinforcements that he would need for the counterattack while confiding to his staff that success would only fellow f fencugh armour could be detached from what he termed the main - that is Sriish fron, compete surprise were achieved and Kluge had forth In the lon. The lst condition a rather transparent device providing @ scapegoat for {he counterattacks possible follue before it was even launched. The deputy the chief of stoff of OKW, General Wolter Warlmont whe hod eorler been at ‘Kluge's headquarters relaying Hitler's orders thatthe defence must hold, was convinced thatthe Fahrerhod mode, once more, 'snapdecision' Viewed from Hitler's perspective however the plan had every chance of success The identification of Patton's 3rd Army, which Hitler had long feared ‘would be used ina secondary invasion, released the German divisions thot hod ‘been stationed north ofthe Seine. Further, te length ofthe American supply lines through Avranches seemed to present an dealopportunty of delivering severe setback othe Alles if attacked vigorously and, in addition, the folure (ofthe British attempt to breok out of ther bridgeheod around Caen meant thot the armoured unis there could be released for use elsewhere. In realty the formations on the east Bonk of the Seine were al infantry units and had been slowly drained of men and material to reinforce the dvsion fighting in Normandy, the armoured units facing the British had been bled 8 white in almost two months of continual combat and any attempt to attack towards Auranches would have to be undertaken through the same Bocoge ‘countryside that had done so much to suston the German defence, To all ths the necessity to operate completely withoutair cover, despite Hitlers promises to the controry, needs to be added. & further dsedvontage, completely Unkrown of course tothe Germans, was the forewornng enjoyed bythe Aled ‘commanders through the Ultracode-breaking operation. Buoyed by the news of reinforcements and perhaps inspired by the operation's ‘codename of Lattich(3), Kluge - with new found enthusiasm or maybe an ‘acceptance of the inevitable - now emphasised that the ottack go cheod ‘without delay. Hitler however insisted that Kluge and his subordinate, Oberaruppenfubrer Poul Housser the commander of “Armee, woituntilat least 8 August when ol the available units could be assembled, even at the risk of the situation ‘eteriorating further Dismayed, both Kluge and Hausser wanted any assault to begin immediately, pleading that any slow build up would attract the ‘attention of the Aled air forces. Uncharocteristically, Hitler gave Way and ‘agreedthat the attack should commence at 0.00pm an Sunday, & August The attack force may have looked formidable on poper and many histories ‘accept hat smal isolated American units were able o hold off upto four elte German armoured divisions, two infantry divisions ond a” number of Kamofgruppen or battle groups until renforcementscame tothe rescue. Inthe normal course of events this would have meant that Kluge would have had at his disposal tens of thousands of men and hundreds of armoured vehicles. Indeed, tier had promised him that eight ofthe nine armoured divisions then in France would be made available to him for the attack. However, by the ‘afternoon of 6 August elements of just three Ponzer divisions and one Panzergrenadier division had made ther way tothe Morton areawith partsof {2 further division -1S5-Panzer-Dision - struggling to reach ther assembly points The truths thatthe German divisions available were so depleted that a best they were litle more than strong brigades. s ths isso often ignored an ‘examination ofthe composition ofthe German units present may be helpful ‘Should be noted thatthe ists given here may not be complete but have been ‘compiled from the best avalable formation and any units not mentioned wereinillikeliiood not combat formations.2Panzer-Dvision Formost of une this division was engaged against the British forces the area south-west of Rouen and on 26 June, with the launch of Operation Epsom, Tabtelung of Panzer-Regiment 3 was detached to act independent. In tingle day - Wednesday, 28 June - the Ponthers of Abteilung were credited withthe destruction of over fifty enemy tanks. On 21 July the division began & (gradual withdrawal from the front and wos replaced by 326.ifantere Division. Tes lmost certain that the Ponther battalion - with ony thirteen ‘operational tanks - remained behind and did not toke part inthe fighting ‘round Mortan. For Operetion Latch the division's avalobe assets were Concentrated in Kompforuppe Schake led by Oberst Hans. Schacke, ‘commanding officer of the dlusion’s Ponzergrenadler-Regiment 304. This battle group contained the frst battalion of chacke's regiment together with anzeriager Abteilung 38 - equipped with fifteen serviceable Jogdpanzer IV tank destroyers - and LAbtelung, Panzer Regiment 24, which had been ig show DG a oe” Me) discussed further ‘dvsion's Panzergrenadier battalions had siof these ‘hafracksonhandiniune 1944, — ‘Above: The vehicle on ‘ohich cur isstrotion Ge Visible behind the foliage attoched' to the mudguard and i Below: Sdkfx 251/1 ausfD. Panzer-Lehr-Divsin. Photographed neor Cristot south-east of Bayeaux this vehicle ‘probably belongs to Pancerarenadler lehr Regiment 901, The use ofasingle igh number Isunusuol hale ‘meaning ofthe name 10 ‘hereaderzhu IV ausf J. 7-Kompanie, $5-Panzer-Regiment 2. Photographed on the ‘road between Soin Denis-e-Gast and Gavray, some 30 Klometres south ‘west of Sant, this tank of 2.85-Panzer Division Das Reich features rather unusual sold black number Note that n ur photograph the second to last Below: The unit insignia used throughout. 2-55:Panzer-Diison ‘Mast if not ol Atellng Pekw 1 tanks dspoyed this symbol on the ‘ear hull os. depleted. on" the ‘Skompanetankshawn ot forleft Prkw IV ausf Hor J. 6 Kompanie,$5-Panzer-Regiment 2. Photographed ‘ot avehice collection point somtime in July 1944, this tanks number i ‘rendered ina sylecommon throughout the ‘company. atleftiso 3 Kompanie Pekw iV ‘withthe tonk’snumberpainteding Similorstyleand showing the ‘dision'sunitinsignic. "lal Left: Pzkw IV us 7.Kompanle, $$- Panzer Regiment 2 Photographed in late uly 1944, this mayhave been the fonk of Obersturmfubrer. Kor Kloskowski, the commander of the bottaions seventh company. The number itself Is unusual and itis probable that the use of 9m this regiment identified a. command ‘eile: Note that in addition to the Sternontenne atthe rear ull here is ‘also provision for a radio antenna on theturret,olthough onlytheinsulator Esshown here, Aight: Prkw 1Vausf1 8.Komponie, 5- iment 2. Photographed in the town of saint Denisle-Gast on 31 July 1848. The use ofa simple white futline to depict the tank's number Seems to have been common, with @ Small number of exceptions, throughout the battalion. The oft caption tothe US Army photograph on ‘ihich ou istration i based. claims that this tnk wos disabled bya 32mm ‘anti-tank gun mounted on on M2 hryprack 2‘efehlspanzerwagen V Panther ausf A. $-Panzer-Regiment2. The identification ofthis vehicle with 2.35-Panzer-Dision fs almost entirely Based on the use of the number 9 which seems tO ‘have Been an ndicator of command ehices within the division's Panzer regiment. Above and lft The us of commen fencing wire" often refered to ot ‘Bech wire -osamennsoflding Ielage comoutoge fo ony number f sujoces wes gute-0 common tratce in"Nortnandy and an Srampie when hor sured Shown above: Note thot on tanks ths wor isualy rested tothe tretat shown nur atraton. At eft and below: Prhw V Panther aus. 3.Kompanie, S-Panzer-Regiment 2. Photographed near Viledeules-Pobles, just 20 kilometres from the ationtic coast this tanks typical ofthe Panthers of LAbtellung. Note that the number has been repeatedinexoctlythe same style ond sizeontheturret rear Below: Pskw V Panther ausf A. 3.kompanie, sS-Panzer-Regiment 2. Possibly photogrophed at the some time and lose fo the same location a tank number 321, this vehicle again shows the use of fencing wire 0s 0 means of holding local foliage camoufloge. {As foros isknown, two photographs ‘exist ofthis tank. both from private ‘olections. While one i very clear the tank itself is obscured by US ‘Army solders and some important ‘Setats connot be seen, The second Image is somewhat blurred. but ‘does seem to confirm thot this s ‘pparently an early ausf A model without the Kugelblende, or ball ‘mount forthe null machine gun.Surgechitz I asf 6. L0atere, Surmgeschits-Bigode 344 7 Phatorophedneorchombol othe sdge of te Foo Rocket tis ‘essoult gun is typo ofthe vehicles of Batterie being inte by emma — Single ndmber rendered ns drkesous show here ats shown y thctwoctrples deptteaherethenuniberculry ‘oniderbiyinste ands Below: The unit insignia Sturmgeschite M ausf.. Sturmgeschitz Brigade 341. Althoughitisoften dificult, fnot impossible, todescribe J Sreven cer combusiope patents from oid monactrome phctogroph, sem crt thot te soul puts of us Daterywerepaintedinaplainbase coat J ofkai 7028 unkelgel. q ae r- Sil forming in eorly lune 194, ths battlion did not toke port inthe fighting until Mondo, 32 July ‘when I.Batterie went into action in the Brécey -Avranches area losing twelve ofits fourteen gunn s sa few days. By early August the battalions frst and second batteries had almost been completely _ destroyed, while the third battery was till waiting at Rennes many miles behind the front. Although i ‘reinforced at least once during the Normandy campaign - possibly from training facilities within Af » France by the beginning of September the battalion was able to feldonly twelve gun. = Vi as Sturmgeschitz Il ausf6. 2.Battere, Sturmgeschite Brigade 341. Photographed near the ratway station ot Pontaubaul, south of Auronches, this assault gun shows the lunusual modification tothe hull Scharzen which was opparentiy common within this battery. Also of note are the shields above the main gun, two versions of which are shownatrightandabove.Sturmgeschatz Ill ousf 6. banzerlager-Abtellung. 243. Photogrophed ot chefau-Pont, @allection point for coptured German armour, this assault gun one’ of fen the battalion ‘received during February “ond March 1944. Attached to 2453 Infanterie Division, this unit was also able to fied fourteen ‘Marder I selEpropelied guns ‘with the fist compony while the ‘sault guns were operated by Zkompanie which was. also ‘ferred to. 08 Sturmgeschita ‘Abtelung 1243. Ofnatelstheso- Called waffle pattern of Zimmert ‘pplication comman to vehicles ‘manufactured by. the rm of r ‘AikettofBrhn-Tegel —; Sturmgeschatz Ill ousf 6. Panzerjager-Abtellung 243. ‘Also photographed at Chef ont south-west ofSainte-Mere- Eglise, this vehicle has been coated with zZimmerit in a Checkerboard-like pattern indicative of vehicles ‘manufactured by the MIAG “Amine Werke ofrounschwelg ‘Sturmgeschite Iv. $S-Ponzer-Abtelng 17, 17.SS-Panzergrenadier Division Gbtz von ««__Berlchingen. The division hod ofullcomplement of frty-twoof these vehicles on hand at + | _ te beginning of tune 1944, although the battalion was not fo receive is allocated ‘command tanks until the middle of August. The only markings carried were the tactical ‘symbol and company number on the front fender as shown here. Note the method of ‘attaching the spare tracklengths tothe hull. ‘Sturmgeschite Il ausfG. $5-Panzer Regiment 10 Langemark,10.55-Panzer Division ‘Frundsbera. Photographed near Chombols this assault gun is one of thirty-eight such ‘ehicles serving withthe regiments seventh and eighth componies atthe Beginning of June 1944. Formedin late 1843 by utilsing the vehicles {from the division's disbanded Sturmgeschute Dattaion, mostofhe regiment sassoult ‘guns may have appeared as depicted here: that's without the application ofzimmeritanti:mognetimine paste andith the division’ unit insignia painted onthe hhullside.Noteatsothe rack = bolted tothe superstructure used to hold spare lengths oftrock‘Below: Ptkw IV aus). 8.Kompanie, Ponzer-Regiment3, 2.Panzer Division. Photographedin ont Farcy, south of Saint, early August 1844 this vehicles typical ofthe Pzkw IV tanks of Abteung except for thelss ofthe hull Schuraen, Inthe photograph on which this - illustration s based he division sunt insignia iscearly ‘isibleon the hullfrontt the leftof the driver = visor. Thistank salsoshowninthe ‘photographatthe bottom ‘ofpage?. Above: Pokw WV tanks of Panzer Regiment 3 In training prior f0 lune 41944, Te heaviy sprayed lines of two ‘ark comouftage colours ona base coat ‘Of RAL 7028 Dunkelgelb wos common {othe tanks ‘of the regiment's abttiung Inthe orginal photogroph Iispossibetoscethenotation on each panel of the hull Schurzen described below: At right and for right: ‘Typical epplicetion of ‘markings forthe Paw IV fans Habteung. The front view shows the (tston’ unit inigna the hull front neor the (river's tizor and the Fahegestelinummer, or Chassis number nex tthe ‘machine gun mount. The Unit insignia was usualy ‘peated on the bul rear Ploteon the right handsige ‘andthe tonk’snumber was ‘ho painted a te back of thetorretsehuraen Atright:Pokw IV ausfH.8.Kompanie, Panzer Regiment 3. Note the application of Zimmer to the turret ‘Scharzen and that each panel ofthe addtional, hullormourhas been marked in ‘Sequence-eltherlftor ight. ‘Below: Safe 251 ausf D. 5Kompanie, Panzer-Aufildrungs-Abtellung 2. The division’ reconnaissance ‘battalion hed sx ofthese vehicles on hand in June 1944, At eft: A front view ofthe same vehicle showing the dlusion’s Trident unit insignia and the tactical symbol identifying a reconnaissance company equipped with halftracks, the later accompanied by the company number.Aight: Pekw V Panther ausf A. 2Komponie, Panzer Regiment 3, 2Panzer-Division. Photographed in August near Sain-Lambert-sur Dives, about 20 Kiometres east of Folaise, this tank is marked, unusually {forthe Panthersofthisbatalion, with argerednumbers. Panzer Division. Many, but nok i, the Panther tanks. of the regiment's LAbteilung. splayed the division’ Trident unit insignia ‘on the turret forward ofthe tank's ‘number This marking often varied Insize, syle ond exact placement. The number, although rendered here as black with a white outline, ‘may alsohove been avery dork red. ‘Below: The photograph on which the istration ot lft is based: The dass Unit insignia con be clearly seen on the turret side above the crewman hong the 7Semshet laf: ate V poner ou} A oe ees 2bentee lion Photesraphed i fant tet war oe eT 4 Cereus PE cont tad 9 mesa ae ee aes forthe font edge te tare ES Santee Right: Pzkw V Panther ous A. ‘4.Kompanie, Panzer Regiment 3, 2Panzer Division. 501d to have ‘been photographed near the small town of Cheux, west of Caen, in late’ june 1944 this vehicle provides a good exomple of the ‘method used to dsploy the tank’s number on the turret ear tls not Iikely" that the ‘division’ unit insignia was painted on both sides oftheturet.ve Sdife 23472 Stab, SS-Panzer-AufKlérungs-Abteilung 1. The headquarters of the ‘reconnaissance battalion of 1.55-Panzer-Dwision had ten ofthese vehicles on hand in ‘mid-June 1944 organised into two Zuge or platoons. The turret numbers of each ‘armoured car began with azero followed by forte ist platoon and 3 forthe second, Presumably the lest number was used as @ means of individual identification, These ‘elegant vehicles are often incorrectly referred toby the name Puma which i Infact a ‘post-war appellation and wes never used, t last fr these armoured cars, before 194. fost ifnotal these vehicles were ost the Normandy fighting. Atleft: the photograph ‘on which our illustration is based. Ths vehicle was Infact featured In quite a lengthy leceof newsre! film made forthe Deutsche Wochenschau which many readers wil no ‘doubt be fomiar with, Below: Sdkfe251/1 ousf 0. 7 Kompanie, S-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 1. The ilustations presented here are infact acompusite of two separate halfracks belonging to 1.S5-Panzer Division. The side and back views are based on a photograph taken near Mortinin early y ‘August 1944 whie an image ofa similar vehicle made neorFolase shorty afterwards wa! ‘sed forthe font view. The block outline Golkenkreus wos commonly seen onthe regiments hatferacks as was the log and foliage camouflage stropped to the hull side. Parts of this regiment were atoched to Kamofaruppe Knitel during the Mortoincounterattack ‘Below: SturmgeschitzIl oust. S5-Sturmgeschitz-Abteilung 1. Photographed ealerin the campaign heading towards the font ths assault gun is devoid ‘ofany markings other than tedvision’s unt insignia painted antotherighfrontfender. The so-called wolfe pattern Zimmer quite clear In the photograph ted to create thsilustration identifying ths as am Alkett produced vehicle. The battalion had afullcompementof forty fue assault guns nlune 1944 but was Sodepletedby the ightingin Normand that twas disbanded n November I's members being used rebuld Ss Panzenoger-AbtelungPekwIV aust). $S-Panzer-Regiment 1, Photogrophed in the village of Putanges near Folose this tank moy belong to. the headquorters of the regiments Abteilung or possibly the b. Sta of ith or eighth companies. Of note are the two wooden stowage boxes fined to the mudguard and the Zimmerit applied to the turret ‘Sehurzen, Prkw 1M. 7.Kompanie, $S-Panzer Regiment 1. Commanded. by Untersturmfuhrer” Gerhard Stile, who led the company’s fist platoon throughout the Normandy bottles, this tank survived the fighting nthe Falase Pocket only to bbe abandoned. near Elbeufsur-Andelle near ‘Rouen ue to.a mechanical failure. This late ousf Hor eorly ausf J model is ‘marked as most f not al, the Pokw IV tanks ofthis battalion were, although Ihave been repeated on the reor ofthe turetSchurzen. ‘Below: Pzkw IV ausf J. 7.Kompanie, SS:Ponzer-Regiment 4. This. tonk, photogrophed crossing one of the Seine River bridges, was one of the few survivors of the Pghting in the Folate Pocket. ‘Above and far right: Pzkw IV ousf J. 7Kompanie, S5-Panzer Regiment 2. This {iustraton based on the photograph shown below. Although unclear ft does seem thot the tank's number, 7240s repeatedon the rear ofthe turret Schrzenisrendered asewnteoutine ony,Left: Pzkw V Panther ausf A. ‘3.Kompanie, S5-Panzer-Regiment I Photographed earlier in. the campaign, this tank shows the ‘method of displaying the vehicle's ‘number common fo this unt: Most if ‘not all, the battolion’s Panther tanks had hooks welded tothe turret roof ‘on both sides from which spore lengths of track were suspended. Consequently, the number was pointed just Behind the gun mantet 5 shown here. ‘The actual ‘pplication of the numbers ranged ‘fromneat and lear to careless but legible. Leo ‘ight: Pokw V Panther ausf A. SS Panzer-Regiment 1. Although i is ‘ute certain thot tis tank fs from 1155-Ponzer-Diusion the vehicle’ ‘number dsployed Just behind the ‘un_montiet, 1s unfortunately Indecipherable in our photograph, The hooks that were welded fo the turrets of the bottalion’s Panthers ‘re visible ond what looks to be @ Targe bedrol cared on the turret side wos oso o common sight on this battalion's tanks. Note that. the Sternontenne associated with ‘Gommand tonksiscaried in place of the normal radio aeril just behind theturret. ty Left: Pekw V Panther ausf G. 4.Kompanie, 5-Panzer-Regiment 9. Photographed n early August 1944 this vehcie provides good exomple ofthe ‘appearance of the Panther tanks of 9.55-Panzer-Dision Hohenstaufen throughout ehe Normandy fighting. a — B Note thot the Zimmerit anti- 4 ‘magnetic mine paste has been ‘plied to the turret of Panther 182 in a seres of diagonal and horitontl lines. Both this vehicle tnd the tank depicted below are {also shown in the photographs on page 26. Right: Pekw V Panther ausf G. 3.komponie, $-Panzer Regiment 9. Photographed inthe town of Saint LombertsurDives the turret of tis tank was heavily domaged with much of the Zimmerit, ond consequenty the number, missing ‘ond so our Mustration is something ‘of a reconstruction. The colours of the number ore debatable ond are shown here 0s yellow outlined in black which | personally find more plausible than the dark blue Suggested elsewhere.SELF-PROPELLED ANTI-TANK GUN STRENGTHS - JUNE TO AUGUST, 1944 | Morse dr aPr 7 opearer a were Ponzertige Ab (263 nfomteri-Ovsion [einfoter SaTfantere (6 nfonterie-Ovision (ienfotereOvsion 1355 Pancer Dion lis PenserDviion " ac ueie Breer si tea eet ees Cae ae ears nd the road haveAt right: Two Pehw V Panther ausf A tanks of 1-Abtellung, $5-Ponzer Regiment 1. of 1.S5-Panzer Division ‘photographed on the road between Saint-Borthélemy and Juvignple-Tetre north-east of Mortin in August 1944 in the aftermath of Operation Latch The Panthers of this battalion formed part of Kampfaruppe Kuhimann which thos subordinated to 2 Panzer Division for the attack. The lengths of spore track were attached tthe hull sides by Sturdy metal hooks which hod been welded the turet roof and overhung the sides. Below: Another view of the tank shown in the background of the photograph at right. The practice of ‘marking the tanks number on the side ofthe gun mantlet was necessitated by the spare tracks which normally covered the turret sides. The third compary number, 328, cn be cleary een here. Further exomples of the Panther tanks of this battalion are shownonpoge 22. Below: Two Priw V Panther ous} A tanks of Abteilung, 's-Ponzer Regiment 1. The number 113, denoting ‘frst company vehicle, can be seen on the gun mantet of the tank nearest the ‘camera and wht may bea number 3is Just visible on the turret rear access hhotch of the tank In the background, Note also that the latter does not have the hooks on its turret. normally fssociated with Panther tanks of the fegiment. This bottolion ‘rrived in France with no tanks after fighting on the Eastern Front and wor allocated Hfory-fve Ponthers in Moy 1944 with twenty-four coming from Panzer: Regiment 33, onother sixteen. from Panzer Regiment 35 anda further ive Jfrom SS-Panzer-Regiment 3. The battalion did not received ony replacement tonks during the Normandy bottles and none. of the jriginal forty-five survived the campaign.At right: A Sturmgeschate Ill ausf 6 of 55 Sturmgeschite-Abtelung 1 photographed earlier in the campoign moving towards the front. The Unit insignia of 1S5-Panzer Divisions jus visible Of the right hand side fender. The foliage Camouflage was a common sight in Normandy Were the Alles enjoyed almost complete ait Superionty, Below: One of the last of the diuision’s assault guns photographed near the bridge over the Orne river at Putonges south of Folise. The unitinsignia of 1.SS-Poncer Division can also be seen on the front fender of this Uehicle nearest the camera. Nate thot both ‘assault guns depicted here have the so-called waffle pattern of Zimmerit application Indicative of vehicles manufactured by Alket. ‘An assault gun of this battlin s also shown ‘and discussed in the ilustration section on age20, ee eee eg Ce ee eT Leg eee en een a aa ae Ras eee ee ee es ‘counterattack. The actions of these two groups are discussed further on page 8. By August 12 the Na me oe ra Ce eee Te ea that dey around Carrouges, south of Argentan, lst Ce ge eee CS OO ts ae ae i eee eer eae oid ‘managed to reach the River Dives. On 20 August what remained of the regiment broke out of the ere a eer BreeTop of page: APekw V Panther of 3.Kompanie, S5-Ponzer-Regiment 9 photographed in Sant Lambert sur Dives inthe aftermath ofthe bottles forthe Folase Pocket. Above: A Paw V Panther ous{ ofl Kompanie $5 Panter Regiment 9 photographed in Sait-Andre-sur-Ome, south of Caen, on 9 August. Ths tank moy hhave infact been dsabled at some earlier date, possibly atthe end of July, but nevertheless gives @ ood impression ofthe style of numbering used by this battalion and also a close up view ofthe method of zimmert application. Beamples ofthe tanks ofthis battalion are also shown on page 22 of the iustration ection. When the Allied invasion began this sion had been fighting inthe Eat and wos rushed to France on 12 une 1948, that me the Panzer regiment> iAbteiiung hed forty-one combat ready Pek IV tanks concentrated nits fifth and sith companies -and thirty-eight Sturmageschitz I assault guns with the seventh andeighth companies. The regiments Abteilung was already in France taining ot Mily-le-Camp with ts new Panther tanks nd by 9 June wos ale to report that seventy-nine vehicles were on hand. The regiment would however receive a replacement tanks while twas in Normandy andfurther, the division's Panzeriager Abtelling remained n Russia. By 18 uly the division reported that twenty Pekw IV and twenty five Panther tonks and fifteen assault guns were ‘operational. Interestingly, a report ofthe some doy states that olarge number of enemy tanks had been captured eleven of them in running order By 1 August the diision’s remoining armored vehicles were formed into o Kompfaruppe led by the commander ofthe Panzer regiment Obersturmbonnfuhrer Otto Meyer. Thedlision emoinedin the area south of Caen inside the Folate Pocket unt 16 August when twas ordered to withdraw towerds Vimoutir va Trun and ding thismoveanumber of Meyer's tanks were taken over by 1285-Panzer Division. The ew remaining tanks ofthe dvsion, together with 2.55-Panzer Dvsion, were Invelvedin the attempts t9elieve the encircled German units from outside the Pocket. 26Ny Two photographs of Pekw V Panther ausfG tants of 'Abtelung, Panzer Regiment 24 token while the bottlion wos ottached to 116 Ponzer-Division. The tonk at lft number 432 of 4xKompone, shows the Style of comouflage common to many tanks of this battalion where large hagonal strpesofRotbroun and Olive hhove been painted over the Dunkelge ose coat. As most available photographs of this battalion’ tonks depict vehicles ‘which have either been damaged or ae in 1 very worn state, this patter may hove been more common than previously tought =f not universol. The proctice of hhonging spare lengths of track from the turret sides and attaching @ spare whee! towards the rear of the turret 15 0ls0 indicotve of the Panther tanks of this bettaion, In another photograph of the vehicle shown below, the number 421 15 clearly visible. Further exomples of this bataion’s tanks and an explanation of thei markings canbe found on page 33. {for lees an example ofthe sem-ofcial Tadltion Bodge worn by members. of 116 Panzer ivsion. n'sPanzeriager is fullalocaton ‘of twenty-one Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers ~ on example of which is shown ot left. This Botton ‘commanded by Major Helmut Bochnig ‘and was made up ofa staff platoon, two ‘companies of tank destroyers onda {further company equipped with towed ok 0 nt tonk uns. However ot east ‘one authoritative source states that the vision had sixself propelled guns that were carried outside the divisions ‘outhorised establishment. Although there has been some speculation thot these vehicles were Sturmgeschite oul guns it ems key that, a: the battalion was formed in part by Reserve PanzerigerAbtellng 9, they were In foct three Marder 7-5em and three Marder’ 7.62cm self ‘ont-tank guns. Whether thesewere stil fon hand by the time of the Mortain ‘counterattack cannot be ascertained with any certainty.Sovlongy Bellous THE TRAP AT FALAISE The development ofthe False Pocket, the darker areas ore those controlled by the Aled armies. The map a lft depicts the situation ot oon on 17 August the day Feldmarschal von Huge was eleved ofthe command of both Oberbefonshaber West and Heersgruppe Bt hgh an be seen the terior held bythe A ‘August when the gop wes nal ose forthe lst ome: Numbers indeate the approximate poston of he flowing disor 1)12S8-Pr Dh 2)271. nf-Dw. 3)277 If Be ajoreinr Dne 5p Feecirm bv. 6121 Pr-O, 7126 Inf i B)ea if. 940.85 Pe Di, 10]263.nf Ov. 12)908 nf-Dv. 1912S: Pe Du 13/9 SPs Dh 14) 56 Pe Div 15)2 Pew 16)9-0¥ I7}116.Pr- Dir 189 inf Dic 19)85 fDi. 20)272 nf On 21)346 Inf Dit shouldbe noted that the locations have been taken from the best avaiobe evidence, however glen the chaotic nature of thes bythistimedvsionsinnomeonh (Operation Latich had gained nothing forthe Germans. By the evening of the {frst doy, the attack the Kampfaruppen which made up OXXVI Ponzerkorps ‘nad been halted andin the folowing days they would be driven back past their Staring points. The operation had in foct been counterproductive, effectively destroying one of Kluge’slat armoured reserves During the eorly hours of Tuesday, 8 August - just two doys after the ‘counterattack began the British and Canadian forces around Caen launched 3 ‘major offensive codenamed Totlse, aimed atthe high ground north of the {own of Flaise. Holding a front of almost 14 kilometres were elements of 12:55 Panzer-Division Hitler Jugend commanded by Oberfuhrer Kurt Meyer ‘who on the previous day had been ordered to join the German units sil {fighting arcund Mortain. As Meyers men were preparing to move off the preliminary Aled aera! bombardment began to fall on the postions of the ‘nearby 89.Infanterie-Divsin. Realising that a major attack was imminent ‘Meyer on his own initiotve, countermanded the movement order and directed Sturmbonnfahver Mex Wunsche to move his battle grouptt) to Potigny were they were able to coverthe Caen Fala road, Despite the massive preparatory bombardment and the employment of specially converted personnel corer, the British and Canadians in we doys Of desperate fighting, were able to progres less thon halfway to their ‘bjective down the Route de Folase before tne advance began t stl (On 10 August, none great push, the Canadians reached the high ground north ofthe town but were unable to go any further. The following morning, the CConadlan corps commander replaced his armoured divisions with infantry formations, effectively ending the offensive. Once again, the Germans had ‘been able to scrape together enough men and tanks to hold their line. Although Operation Totlise had allen shor of ts moin objective, ithod made ‘lear the probabilty that 7-Armee would eventualy be encicled by the “Americans steadily opproaching from the south and the pressure from the Siish nthe north which must, In the long run, succeed. Indeed, on the ‘assumption that Kluge would withdraw his men to the east, the British ‘commander Montgomery -supported by Patton the US 3rd army commander. ‘now suggested thot his forces tur eft and strike towards the Seine while the “Americans block the escope route through the Loire volley. They were both ‘overruled by Eisenhower who sided with Generol Bradley in adopting a imited ‘operation aimed at the area around Argentan, some 30 kilometres south of Foloise. Unknown to all of them, Hitler” despite the strongest urgings from Kluge - was refusing to allow a single unit to be withdrawn. To compound his intransigence Hitler persisted in viewing the British as the main threat and took no interest at all n the operations of the US Army which had kicked Hausser's 7 Armee out ofits headquarters at Le Mans and pinned down the tanks of9.Panzer- Division inthe south When the American offensive resumed, their 3rd Army wos able to reach Alengon by 12 August and despite o German counter thrust bythe tanks of Panceraruppe Eberbach(2), found themselves onthe outskirts of Argentan by the following dey ~ an advance of over 40 kilometres. However, the next ‘morning = while poised to take the town = they were ordered to withdraw. Astounded, the local commander was advised that as the British were {ation tls entielypassibe that someerrarsmey have been mode Asa, most ofthese unis woul be ‘advancing from the north, the withdrawal would ensure that no friendly fre’ Incidents occurred. Controversy stil rages over the identity ofthe author of ths ‘bizare explanation with at least one respected source suggesting that ‘originated with Montgomery in any event, a large gap now existed which resented the Germans with the opportunity of escape. (On the morning of 14 August a new offensive codenamed Tractable went ‘ahead with parts of Canadion 1st Army and the Polish 1st Armoured Divison. Unite Operation Totolse this assault would toke place n daylight, @ dense Smoke screen would hopefully blind the defenders. The intention wos to take Foloise by midnight ofthe fst day ond then move onto Tun. from there an ‘advance tonearby Chambais wouldenoble link up with the Americans. Once ‘again, 1285 Panzer-Dhision with @ number of infantry formations] would Decale upon to holdthe German ine. In an incredible stroke of luck, o Canadian offer carrying a complete set of, plans forthe operation drove into the German lines only hours before the ‘offensive was about to begin. Forewarned, Meyer was able to make the most of his meager resources and placed his remaining tanks and infantry, Supported by twelve .8¢m Pok 43 at: tonk guns, clong the Caen Falaiseroad ‘hoping tointercept the main Canaion drive. ‘Atnoon hundreds of RAF bombers pounded the front and rom behind a smoke ‘Screen lid down by their artillery, the two Canadian dvsions moved forward, Although the smoke severely hampered the German gunners they were sill ‘ble to inflict severe casualties on the Allied tank units killing the armoured ‘brigade commander, as they struggled south towards Fails. Throughout the remainder of the doy the lied attacks continued and despite 1 counterattack by the Tigers of 2Kompanie, schwere-Ss-Panzer Abtellung 402{4)-by late the afternoan the Poles were in Potgny, about 7 kiometres ‘orth of Folaise. When darkness fll elements of two Conadlan infantry ‘lusions had reached the high ground north of Foalse but despite ther best ‘efforts hod been unable to breok ito the own. Although the fist day had not ‘gone as well as expected, the Alles were optimistic and during the night the Genadians movedanotherinfontrydivision into the ine Early on 15 August both the Conadian and Polish armoured dusions resumed their drive south-east towards the town of Falaise while onthe lft flank the two infantry dvsions pushed south, At the end of the days fighting the Cenadian tonks were Soulangy but Foaise stil heldoutandTrun, tothe eos, had oso not been token. However, on the following doy elements of the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division broke ito Faloie and although it would take two days to completely secure the town, now only defended by scattered ‘groups of German solders, the Canadians could regroup their forces forafnal usb to capture Tru, lnk up with the Americans and close the ever narrowing ‘escape condor. ‘Ashe Canadian infantry had been fighting their way into Falaiseon 16 August, Hitler was demanding that Kluge mount another counterattack Pleading that ‘any offensive action wes quite mpossbleandthat the bestpart ofthe German ‘army nthe west wos about tobe encircled, Kluge at last persuaded Hitler that {2 general withdrowal was the only option and late that afternoon Hitier Telented. Any reef the Feldmarschall may have experienced however 30was only temporary asthe nextday Hitler sacked him and had him recalled to Germanys). Convinced that he was about face execution and dishonour, ‘luge took poison on a stopover in Metz. His replacement would be Feldmarshail Wolter Model, who Hitler awarded with the Diamonds this {knight's Cross with Ookleaves and Swords onthe very day Kluge killed himself Renowned for his skilin conducting defensive operations and greoty admired by Hitler, Model wos given almost a free hand and his fst order was that Armee and Panzergruppe Eberbach should retreat immediately through the 20 kilometre wide gop that was sil open on the afternoon of 17 August. To hold the corridor open ISS-Panzerkorps wouldface the British and Ganadions ‘on the northern edge while on the southern front XXXXVII Panzerkorps, which hadalready been badly bottered at Mortain, wouldholdthe Americans. (0n 18 August, the Polish dlvsion- which had been split int three battegroups ‘began a sweeping manceuvre for tothe south-east with the intention of linking up with the Americans wha were now at Argenton. The Canadians hod ‘also maintained the momentum of thelr vance having taken Trun on the ‘Same doy. By 19 August the Poles had reached the outsks of Chambois and ‘eiforced by an armoured brigade coptured the town by nightfall. That same ‘evening they established contact with the units ofthe US 3a Army. During the ‘doy however a Kampfaruppe of 2.Panzer Division had managed to break fwough the Canadian front at Soi-Lambert-sur ives, almost exactly ‘between Trun and Chamois, keeping the road open for sx hours unt just before sunset and ellowing «large number of German troops to escape. Although smell poties managed to inftrote the Canadian lines during the hight and cross the River Dives to safety, the gap wos now forthe time being ~ effectively closed ‘on the morning of 20 August, Model ordered the remaining tanks of 2.SS- Panze-Diison(6) and 9.5-Ponzer-Divsion to atack from outside the pocket towards the Polish positions on the high ground above the vlloge of Coudehard, about 8 kilometres east of Tun, referred to os Mount Ormel. By ‘noon another battle group made up of elements from 0.5S-Panzer-Diision, 412:55-Panzer-Division and 116.Ponzer Division broke through the Polish front ‘once again opening the gop, while 9.SS-Panzer-Divsion prevented the Canadians jrom assisting the Poles. Within a few hours approximately ten thousand Germans were able to escape The Mount Orme! postion while penetrated hod not been overrun and ino ‘rare loss of contol Hausser, the 7 Armee commander, exasperated by the ‘ortilery fire being directed onto his men by the Poles, ordered that they be ‘eliminated’. Scraping together the remnants of 2.85-Panzer-Dvsion ond 352 Infantrie- Division he thew them at the Poles iflting such damage that they could only watch asthe survivors of 0. Panzerkorpsfled through the ‘90p. Exhausted, both sides chose not to continue the fight after nightfol ‘lthough sporadicarilery fire continued to harass the retreating Germans, (nthe following morning, at 11.00am, a fina attempt wos made to capture ‘Mount Orme! which was aniy narrowly defeated and just after noon the Canadians managed to reinforce the Polish units defending the hil. That ‘ofternoon the survivors of the Das Reich and Hohenstaufen dlusions were ordered toretreat towards the Seine. By evening ofthe following day, Monday 21 August, the Canadian armoured dlusion had reached the Polish forces ot Coudehard, while two Canadion Ai foupe infantry divisions hod taken Saint-Lambert-sur-Divesandsecuredthe area northofChambois, The Falaise Pocket hadfinaly been sealed, ‘The German ossesin this battle that ended the Normandy campaign were horrendousand there arenodefinitiveestimatesof casuoltieswithfigures ranging from 10-15,000 men killed ond 40:50,000 missing oF token brisoner. Some formations were almost totally destroyed in the fighting Such as 1285 Panzer Division which lost almost oll ts armoured vehicles and artillery as well os over three-quarters of ts transport. By the end of the Normandy bottles the division cguld only muster thres hundred men and fen tanks. And although the efforts oftheir comrades had ollowed thousands of German troops to escape, whot litle heavy equipment they managedtosave wasforthemostpartiostinthe Seinecrossinge (2) wansche had been the commander of SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 of Meyer's division when the Invasion began. On the evening of 7 August, when Totallse commenced, the Kampfgruppe which bore his nome ‘consisted of the regimental and first battalion stoffs of SS-Panzer Regiment 12, the regiment's third ond eighth companies equipped with Panther and Pakw IV tanks respectively, the second company of schwere: ‘SS-Ponzer-Abtellung 101 and the understrength first and second battalions of 55-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 26. Meyer also had at his ‘disposal Kampforvope Waldmaller commanded by Sturmbannfabrer Hans Waldmuller- consisting ofpartsof Abteilung, $6-Ponzer Regiment ‘2nd 1.Kompanie, 85 Pancerjager Abteilung 12. (2) Commanded by General Heinrich Eberbach this wos an ad hoc formation comprised of staff and support elements of LXXXI Armeekorps, XAXKVIL Panzerkorps, 116.Panzer-Divsion {minus most ofits tanks and reconnaissance battalion), parts of 1.SS-Panzer-Division and 2.Panzer Division, thesecondbottalionof Panzer Regiment 30/9 Panzer-Divsion, remnants of 276, 277 and 346.Infonterie-Divsionen, Luftwoffen Feld. Division 16and Werfer-Brigaden and3. (3) Allthe infantry divisions supporting Meyer's unit - 272, 272 and 85 were badly under strength and only pats of 89.Infanterie-Division would take partin the battle. In foct, Aled inteligence was only able to identify fwodistinctdivisions. (4) On 18 August this company, which hod been continually engogedsince July, had anly three operational tanks available numbered 212,221 ond 241. Later that day during anattack near Sovlangy Tiger 231, commanded ‘by Untersturmfuner Lort, was lost and towards evening Tiger 212 of Untersturmfuher Munster was destroyed by Canadian infantrymen. On the following day the remaining vehicle, Tiger 241 commanded by Untersturmfuher Mertin Schroi, was Joined by the tanks of 1.Komponie ‘andwasinvolvedin the fighting around Potigny. (5) Hitler had been unable to contact Kluge for some hours during the morning of 17 August and immediately assumed that he wes conspiring to Surrender his entre command to the Alle. Informed of kluge's death, Hitler dlamissed the news with the comment "he probably would have beenorrestedanywoy’ (6) By this time as few as ten tanks of SS-Panzer-Regiment 2 supported by the remnants of the third battalion of the Der Fuhrer regiment, the remaining assault guns and ports of the division's reconnalssance battalion, destruction one death, for the German's at leas, would stand out from all the rest. On 8 August, in a field north-east of Gaumesr urmfohrer Michoe! Wittmann led sie Tiger tanks of 2Komipanie, schwereSs-PonzerAbtellung 101 northwards towards Sint-Algnan-de-Cromesn Just 10kilometers south of Caen, were he expected to find the lead elements ofthe ist Polish Armoured Division Having served withthe elestandarte-SS Adolf Hitler since te fst day ofthe war Wittmann was already something ofa celebrity when his badly depleted company of jus three Tigers managed to inflict Severe defeat on units ofthe British 7th Armoured Divison at Villers Bocoge on 13 une. On 10July the battalion commander, Obersturmbannfuhrer Hein Von Westerhagen, was releved for medical reasons ond reploced by Wittman who took over the commander's tank. numbered 007, shown here. Now, 0s the German tenks opproached Gaumesni, moving paalle!to the Flaise-Caen rood, they foledtanotice a troop of British Sherman tonks that had taken cover ina nearby wood and which now opened a devastting fie Positioned at the rear of the German formation Wittmann’ Tiger was hit by two rounds that slammed Into the side of his Tiger near the fuel tank causing an explosion of such force thatthe turret was lifted from the hl. Within secands the tank's ammunition ‘exploded blowing the turret completely clear ofthe vehicle and ripping off both tracks. Of the other six tanks fe ere knocked out and the lst abandoned. i opdreported-even tohiswife- that he ic myth that hs tankhad been destroyed Such wos Wittmann’s fame in Germany thot the outhorites felt unable to adit for some time that he wos not 4 was merely missing. Thenotion thatan enemy tank had accounted for Witmann could ofcourse not be tolerat bythedreadedlabos-the lied fihter-bombers-was begun,‘Pekw Panther aus{ 6. 1.Kompanie, Pnzer-Regiment 24, 16.Panzer-Divsion. ‘An identiving feature of this battalions tanks was the spore whee! fixed tothe turret towards the rear usually on both sides. Al the battalions Panthers were ‘marked with the large, solid, white numbers shown here. at) Pekw V Panther ausf 6. 4.Kompanie, Panzer-Regiment 24,116 Panzer Division. The duision’s ‘original Panther battalion was stil n training when the Normandy campolgn began and {abtoiung of Panzer Regiment 24 was temporarily attached othe dion although the tanks ‘continued to crry the unit insignia of thelr parent formation, 24 Ponger-Dvsion shown in on ‘enlarged view above. The marking was usually displayed on the right side stowage box atthe Tears shown here and sometimes atthe hul front. ‘Above: In axltion to the anit insignia of 24Panzer Division System of marking wos employed Were 0 Fight coloured, probably White, ‘cre oF bar woe painted fontothe tore reoraccess door The Slgnificonce of this Is not Understood ot present. Note so thefueleans ‘Below and right: Sdkfe 234. Panzer-Aufklérungs-Abtelling 116, 116.Panzer-Dvision. Photographed neor Occagnes, asmallvilage located about 7 kilometres north-west of Argenton, ‘t the conclusion of the fighting forthe Fala Pocket In August 1948, this armoured cor wos Coptured intact except for @ bent front fender. Only eightysight ofthese vehicles were built ‘between lune and December 1944 and the divisions reconnalssance battalion i reported to have ‘operated anumber within its heodauarters and 4 Kompanie-olthough the later may infact never brave received theiralacation, some authontative sources stating thatthe division had any two.0n ‘hand at any time. The front view shows the placement ofthe division sunt insigniaand shouldbe noted thot the registration number is completely speculative being indecipherable in the photogrophon which thisilustration based,‘A SOUND LIKE THUNDER MORTAIN AND FALAISE, AUGUST 1944 UN modeller a