Sidnell, Jack (2010) - The Ordinary Ethics of Everyday Talk PDF

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waa a ‘way of doing things, Here, I would say, is another instance ofthe ethical imagination at work, acting within the new horizon that had been opened up by the women’s bold acton the battlefield. And here in the use of free indirect discourse is another instance of the way in which the ethical is tied up with the powe: of language to enable multiple perspectives and to allow and even compe! speakers to place their own in relation to others” and indeed, in relator to their own, as shown by this example and illumi- nated by Hegel, Freuc, Peirce, G. H. Mead, Vygotsky, and Bakhtin, all of ‘whom have shown in their various ways how our interior psychic lives are constituted through conversations among introjected social voices. ‘Though I cannot go into this matter here? it is obviously of central rele ‘vance for the understanding of ethics as a dimension of everyday life. Suf- fice it to note for present purposes, as emphasized by Vygots Volosinov (1987), and others, that this “inner conversatio human capacity to engage in it, are secondary products of the “outer” social one. It follows that the same is true of the relationship between “inner” ethical deliberation and its “outer” counterparts, including ethical action itself, all of these being intimately bound up with the nature of Ianguage. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For their helpful comments on various drafts ofthis chaper, woud like to thank Courtney Handman, Darja Hoenigman, Michael Lambek, Fran- ceica Merl, James and Jese Rumsey-Merlan, and an anonymous referee. “Thanks also to discusant James Laidlaw and the other participants at the Anthropology and Ordinary Ethics conference who commented on the original version there and to the conference organizers fr inviting me to itand for running iso well >. Sex however, Rumsey (20038) for some relevant considerations, ‘The Ordinary Ethics of Everyday Talk Jack Sidnell ‘The juxtaposition of cm nana ag ihr ees itr csr ea eA Saree din nate ee cae which would be much better off if only we could forget for a while about seta ale rece aac emee ate ‘one we already have by making its tacit principles explicit Gaal oFvoctany? nn PDSPS arc cough care. 1. Maclay’ (966 consideration of adjectives of ppail—the sacs English “goo” among chemin Homer and waters of recent ec be seen ahistorical application of the method 133 ny Jack Side So, on one reading, “ordinary” in “ordinary ethics” recalls the so-called ordinary language philosophy of Austin, Gilbert Rye, and P.F. Strawson. Buran objection here, a well-founded one from my perspective, would be that, forall their insight, the “ordinary language” plilosophers never really did study the ordinary language of ordinary people, despite the fact that Bertrand Russel (1961) prggisly lampooned them for it. Austin’s analyses were not afer all, based on his acquaintance with the ordinary language of his day—whstover that could mean-—but on introspection into his own usage, coupled with consultation of the OED. The result depicts not ordinary practices of language use but rather lexical system. Rather surprisingly perhaps, Austin’s analyses, in this area atleast, veer toward langue rather than jaole. The studies of which “A Plea for Excuses” is ‘one exemplar are, Icontend, ultimately lexicographie—they are concerned with the meanings and uss of words and not the ordinary uss to which words are put. ‘An analysis of ordinary usage must begin not with the dictionary but with the dewsils of social interaction, for it is here that words find their home: in the mouth of one person speaking to another. But more impor- tantly, only by looking at the social interaction in which words are used can we access an arzuably much more fundamental ethical domain than that revealed in vocbulary. For Austin, the moral and ethical character of tak is seen in its capacity to suture tears in the tissue of an essentially social order. If shoot your donkey, I can either claim it was a “mistake” (meant to shoot the wounded horse, not your healthy donkey standing next tot) ofan “acident” (the gun went off inadvertently). Excuses and justifications of this ore certainly point us in the direction ofan imporeant ‘moral and ethical domain. But consider now that when I say “T mistook your donkey for my wounded horse” I may say it through bubbling laugh- ter or while looking sheepishly at the ground, o Imay say it with obvious sincerity or clearly ander pressure from my mother, who is looking on concernedly. And you, the reipient of the justification, may choose t© ignore what I'm saying—with a steely gaze off into the distance—or you say receive my worls with mocking laugher or studied indifference “Oh gosh, I doa’ care abou that old donkey") and so on. And of course, such ‘nuances of poise andattentiveness may inflece any and all talk—as a mater of necessty—and not just that in which we are concerned with obvious tnatters of morality. There isa moral and etheal dimension tall intera- tion, becsuse interaction is itself « moral and ethical domain. When per- sons interact, they aecessaily and wnavoidably assess whether they are being heard, ignored, and so on. Is this person really listening to me? Ora Bey Tile ns Paying aention te? And, in 0 doing, acknowie in 0 doing, acknowledging ne as worth- wile person who mers such tention’ "Thee wet to spate ee some of the mst as ethical question af ordinary oc i eased, Bone of tis isaew- Qn ths teste of mpm.

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