Crime DA (cards need to be cut)

1- An illegal market
would immediately spring up due to low supply
Don B. Kates 82 bracketed for language Don B. Kates Jr (practices law with O'Brien and Hallisey in San Francisco), "Gun
control versus gun prohibition," American Bar Association Journal, September 1982 AZ

Nor is there any reason to think that even a national prohibition could prevent the development of an illegal black market sufficient to
serve both criminals and ordinary citizens. If, for instance, handguns were smuggled into this* country at the
rate at which federal officials estimate marijuana is, more than 20 million guns of the size used to
kill John Lennon could be imported illegally in any year. (There are only 60 million legally owned handguns at
present.) Moreover, any competent machinist can build a revolver or automatic pistol from pot metal for a
fraction of what even the cheapest commercially produced handgun costs. Can it be doubted that
there would be thousands of "entrepreneurs" willing to build $15 junk .45s and .38s for a 500 per cent profit at illegal black market
sale? Of course, this type of gun would not fire more than a few hundred rounds and would be accurate only at close range. But that is

adequate for a buyer who wants a gun only for murder, robbery, or self-defense.

2 - After a gun ban, the growth of the underground market will be so explosive that no legal
measure will stop it
Cook et al 06 summarize Terry
Philip J. Cook professor at Duke University and NBER; Jens Ludwig professor at Georgetown University and NBER ;
Sudhir Venkatesh - professor at Columbia University; Anthony A. Braga professor at Harvard University: Underground Gun
Markets research was supported by a grant from the Joyce
Foundation and written in part while Cook and Ludwig were resident fellows at the Rockefeller Foundations Bellagio Study and
Research Center; August 2, 2006

Don Terry staff reporter, How Criminals Get Their Guns: In Short, All Too Easily, The New York Times, March 11, 1992, p.
A1IG 12/16/15
Underground gun markets have developed in America in response to regulations that seek to prohibit[ion] [of] ownership and
possession by that subset of the population deemed to be at unacceptably high risk of misusing guns primarily youth and adults with
serious prior criminal records while preserving easy access for everyone else. Whether 1 Most of what is known about

the underground gun market comes from interviews with incarcerated prisoners or innercity youth (for example Wright and Rossi, 1994, Webster et al., 2002, Sheley and Wright, 1993, Callahan and Rivara, 1992).
However such interviews can at best shed light on how a subset of the retail market operates,
and are not informative about other aspects of market structure or conduct. 3 the gun market can

be segmented in this way remains the topic of spirited debate in U.S. policy circles. In Section 1 we review this regulatory system and
note that a few jurisdictions, including Chicago, go further and essentially prohibit the private
possession of handguns, the type of gun most commonly used in crime and violence. The fact that Chicago has unusually
restrictive regulations makes the city an interesting case study.
Economists and other skeptics like to point out that government

prohibitions on transactions are difficult to

enforce; the ingenuity of the marketplace, motivated by profit, will overcome whatever legal
obstacles are put in place. If true for handguns in Chicago, then we would expect to find that
youths and criminals are able to acquire them with little trouble (low transaction costs) at prices
not that much higher from those in the legal market.
As New York University law professor James Jacobs observes in this regard, Some criminals claim that it is as easy to buy a gun on
the streets as it is to buy fast food. One Chicago gang member stated, Its like going through the drive-through window. Give me
some fries, a Coke, and a 9-millimeter (2002, p. 150).2

3 - Underground gun markets hurt the economy, governmental legitimacy, create a state of
panic, and exacerbate conflicts in general
Cook et al 09
PHILIP J. COOK, WENDY CUKIER AND KEITH KRAUSE - Duke University, USA, Ryerson
University, Canada, and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland: The illicit firearms trade in North
America Criminology and Criminal Justice 2009; ISSN 17488958; Vol: 9(3): 265286 IG 12/16/15

In general, we know little about the specific impact and effects of illicitly trafficked firearms. Although we know that armed violence
can ha[s]ve a variety of deleterious effects on perceived and real insecurity, public health, economic development and political
stability (Small Arms Survey, 2003), we do not know how much of this can be associated specifically with changes in the availability
of firearms. The economic consequences of armed violence are undeniable: one global model (using a
willingness to pay approach and reductions in life expectancy) estimated the social value of violence reduction (to zero) at 67 percent
of GDP for Mexico, the eighth-highest global value. Life expectancy is diminished by 0.6 years for all Mexicans as a result of armed
violence. The figures for the USA and Canada, for comparison, are 0.31 and 0.08, respectively (Soares, 2006). A macro-economic
study of direct and indirect costs of violence in Latin America estimates these at 9.5 percent of GDP for Mexico; lower than the 20
percent for Colombia and El Salvador, and around the same level as Brazil (Londono and Guerrero, 2000).
The negative effects of firearms are highly context dependent: they depend on the strength of demand factors, the types of weapons in
circulation, the groups in society with access to weapons and the purposes for which they possess them. In the case of Canada and
Mexico, illegally trafficked weapons are primarily used by criminal groups of varying degrees
of organization, and in Mexico there are some weapons also in the hands of armed groups

challenging state authority. The use of guns by criminal groups increases their relative
power, and in the dramatic circumstances we see in Mexico, contributes to subverting legitimate
authority and creating such fear as to have a substantial economic and political impact. In
spite of the comparatively low rates of gun violence in Canada, random shootings in public places and increasingly
weaponized conflict between criminal groups, however statistically rare, fuels a sense of insecurity.
In addition, even a small number of illegal guns in circulation can have a significant impact,
particularly when a cycle of retaliatory violence begins. Although data show gun homicide in Canada has
declined significantly since 1991, public perceptions are that it has increased. When Toronto, a city with 2.8 million people hit 52 gun
homicides in 2005, it became the year of the gun (Regular, 2005) in spite of the fact that the city had one of the lowest murder rates
on the continent for a city of