Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad

Roundtable

NSG, India and Pakistan

June 2, 2016
(Transcript)
Opening Remarks by the Chair, Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder
This is my pleasure and privilege to chair this important session NSG, India and Pakistan
because of the NSG plenary. Membership of NSG is very important for both India and Pakistan,
for non-proliferation and world community. Difference of the approach can be summed up by
saying that Pakistan wants non-discriminatory approach in which both countries can join
[NSG]. It does not say that India should not join, despite the problems it has vis-a-vis nuclear
agreement with NSG and with the USA.
The Main Speech, by Dr. Adil Sultan
Good Morning, AoA.
DG Khalid Rahman sb., thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on this very
important and timely topic.
In fact, what Ambassador Tariq Osman has said in the very beginning is the conclusion of my
talk. As a matter of fact I can stop and take questions answer from here. This is the end product
of my talk and presentation, but since this is a very technical issue I try to bring certain aspects
to familiarize some of the guests who are not conversant with what Nuclear Supplier Group is,
I will go through the presentation and in 20, 25 minutes I will introduce the group, what the
issue is and how relevant it is for Pakistan. I can also recognize my friends from diplomatic
corps., as well. Thank you for being here. You have been listening these things quiet a lot, but
I think there is always more to it.
First of all what is NSG?
NSG is a group of 48 supplier states, technological advance countries to regulate nuclear trade
for peaceful purposes. One thing is very clear that NSG does not deal with the military program,
it is only for peaceful applications. It is an informal arrangement with no legal obligations; it
is not a treaty or legally binding arrangement. Decisions within the NSG are made on the
principle of consensus. Even one member state, one participating government, as they term it,
they can veto the decision of NSG. This NSG, interestingly, was created as a result of Indias
diversion of civil nuclear technology and material (CIRUS) for conducting NW test in 1974;
in which India diverted civilian nuclear technology for military purposes, the reactor that
Canada supplied and the fuel that the US provided to India, India uses that plutonium for its
first nuclear test of 1974. So it was the birth of NSG.
Now we will talk about some of the factors, most commonly known as criteria of NSG
membership. [These are] ability to supply items covered by the NSG Annexes, which is
technical in nature, but it will briefly introduce you that, and what is its nature. Then it is the

Slightly edited transcript of the audio recording of the deliberations during event. Dr. Adil Sultan, director
research and analysis, SDP was the main speaker in the event chaired by Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder.

adherence to the NSG Guidelines, which I will also briefly cover. Another factor is the
enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system; adherence to one or more of
the NPT and NWFZs, so this is very important this a problematic area so that applies on Non
NPT states; why non NPT state cannot be member of NSG. Support of international efforts
towards non-proliferation of WMDs and their delivery vehicles.
NSG Guidelines
NSGs aim is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purpose does not contribute to the
proliferation of NWs or other nuclear explosive devices. It was created as a result of Indias
misuse or diversion of civil nuclear technology for military purpose; this was one of primary
objective to create this group that in future no other country should be able to divert civilian
fuels for the military purposes. And another purpose is that international trade and cooperation
in the civil nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. So this is not a cartel just to
stop or impede the nuclear trade; this is to facilitate by giving certain sets of guideline to the
participating governments. NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade as per
international nuclear non-proliferation norms, so whatever the international norms are existing,
NSG guidelines facilitate the nuclear trade according to these.
The Part 1 of the Guidelines deals with nuclear transfer, nuclear reactor or nuclear material
directly all those things or the items which contribute in nuclear weapons or nuclear program.
The Part 2 of the Guidelines deals with nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software,
and related technology. So there are two parts of guidelines part 1 and 2. In June 2011, NSG
also revised its Guidelines on supply of Enrichment and Reprocessing (E&R) technologies:
there are two significant aspects in these 2011 revision that were published in 2013; first was
that Non-NPT state would be ineligible to receive E&R technology. This is important as I
discuss subsequently also that India has negotiated E&R technology with the US since these
discussions are ongoing in 2006 and 2008. When these discussions were ongoing, [the] US
informs India probably at that time that whatever would be the outcome, it would be applicable
on all states. So in 2011 when these were published it was quiet discomfort for India. They had
a wavier on NSG. That means that they can have access on any of the sensitive technology
E&R. So this was the first disagreement of the interpretation of India-US nuclear deal also.
Another important factor for the E&R was Recipient state should have safeguards in perpetuity,
permanent. Whatever facilities you bring in [under] the safeguard you cannot remove those.
That is also very problematic area; India has a very unique safeguards arrangement that I will
cover. India has three streams. So it has facilities where it can put those facilities under
safeguards during a specific period so that it can take out those facilities outside the safeguards.
NSG and India Relationships
Why it is important?
After India US nuclear deal, India could not have acquired technology or reactor from US or
other NSG states unless NSG agreed to grant an exemption from its guidelines to India, so it
was granted in 2008 to India. After that arms-twisting, the NSG members granted India-specific
exemption in Sep 2008. This was a major disaster to the non-proliferation regime. A group that
was created because of India, same group granted exemption to same country from its
guidelines in 2008.

So as a result of this exemption, India has managed to negotiate civil nuclear cooperation
agreements with over 12 countries (US, France, Russia, Canada, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan,
Australia, RoK, Namibia, Argentina, Sri Lanka, UK), and negotiations completed with Japan,
Bangladesh and EU also . In November 2010, president Obama during his visit to India
announced US support to the India in getting membership of Missile Technology Control
Regime and NSG. Interestingly as we are talking on NSG and is being convened also in this
month where Indias application would be discussed for the MTCR membership which hit a
road block after Italy refused to agree on the Indias membership because of its diplomatic row
over the sailors. Probably they have sorted out those and India is on the road to the membership
[of MTCR] at least, if not the NSG. India already have enjoyed the privilege of NPT nuclear
weapon state with no reciprocal obligations. NSG membership is essentially for prestige. The
exemption that was granted to the India as compared to the nuclear weapons states, the P5, they
are party to the NPT and they have certain obligations; so Indias case is unique, it has no
obligations of NPT but it enjoys all the privileges of the nuclear weapon states. So the Article
6 of the NPT, the so-called cosmetic obligation of the nuclear weapons states to work in good
faith of disarmament. India does not have even that obligation. But it can have access to all
kind of nuclear technology. India has formally applied for membership of the NSG on May 13,
2016. And interestingly, it was anniversary of May 13, 1998 tests [of India] and it is very
symbolic. The day it [India] violated international norms and at the same day it wanted to
become the partner on international non-proliferation regime and this is the point that
international community have also to see the kind of signaling that India is giving; it does not
care for the non-proliferation norms.
There are several states that are opposing Indias membership as it negates the very principle
of NSGs existence. So granting another exemption could unravel the nonproliferation regime
as exemption of 2008 is different from granting a full membership. The exemption was to
facilitate nuclear trade with India; it is inalienable right of all member states that they can have
access to civil nuclear trade. I am not talking about the NSG, otherwise also, as per the IAEA
statues talk about, it is a right of all members of the IAEA to have civil nuclear trade. Exemption
was a different type of thing and granting a membership is entirely different.
But there are states, they think, agree to enhanced engagement with all original non-NPT states
(India, Pakistan, Israel) to find a workable model and integrate the three into global
nonproliferation regime and it will be good for non-proliferation regime. So they argue for, to
discuss, a moral criteria where all non NPT states [are] to be integrated into a mainstream of
non- proliferation regime.
Once you look at the NSG debate and the media stories which are appearing in Washington,
India and other powerful capitals it seems that India is coercing US at this moment to deliver
on its promise during the last year of Obamas administration. If president Obama is unable to
deliver on Indias membership as per promise or deceleration of November 2010, probably rebuilding a case with the next [US] administration may take time and diplomatic investment.
Thats the urgency on the Indian side and they are pushing the US. The offer to buy six power
reactors could be an added incentive for the US nuclear industry. It is also an incentive, where
US nuclear industry is also putting pressure on the US Administration in support of Indias
NSG membership. PM Modi is visiting this week to the United States. Thats also an irony that
a person who was denied visa one time, is being given such kind of protocol that he would be
addressing the Congress and he would be offered such kinds of incentives, the membership of
NSG and all those things.

Implications for Nonproliferation Regime

Indias exemption and potential membership of NSG has adverse implications on the global
non-proliferation regime. India has been able to significantly expand its military program as
the result of it. Indias has nuclear cooperation agreements with over 12 countries (as a result
of 2008 exemption). The fuel that India is importing from these sources or suppliers, [because
of that] India can divert its indigenous uranium reserves purely for military purposes. As former
undersecretary Alen wrote in 2006, when she was not in a government, and she was very
critical about this; she stated at that time that this nuclear deal would help Indias bomb making
potential by 50 additional bombs per year. Thats exactly what is happening now. This is also
a kind of indirect violation or the indirect assistance of the NPT states to India help Indias
military program to grow by providing it a civil nuclear assistance. So one can be interpreted
that the nuclear weapon states have promised that these states will not help non-nuclear weapon
states directly or indirectly to help their nuclear weapon program to grow. Therefore, this
indirect assistance by the NPT signatories is a violation of NPTs Article 1.
Some of the recent reports by credible think tanks have exposed Indias nonproliferation
credentials. They bring out these assessments and fears that Pakistan has been voicing since
2006 that NSG exemption or India US nuclear deal will help Indias military program.
According to one of the reports (Belfer Centers Three Overlapping Streams of Indias Nuclear
program, 2016), India has three different streams of nuclear facilities:
Unsafeguarded military facilities
Unsafeguarded civilian facilities
Safeguarded civilian facilities
Once India was negotiating with the US the nuclear separation plants, India promised that it
will keep its nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity. But these three streams, as has
been reported, contradict with their understanding with the US given in 2006. It is also in
conflict with NSGs revised guidelines of 2011, which require safeguards in perpetuity. Some
recent reports, now they are very public, that India has made significant expansion in its
uranium enrichment capacity (SMEF at Karnatka) that is called as the atomic city or new
nuclear city that India is creating.
Apart from it, Indias reactor grade Pu is also outside the safeguards which can be used for
weapon purposes. If you add this reactor grade plutonium, the bomb potential goes
exponentially high: it is closer to 900-1000 bomb which these reports also suggest now. As
part of India-US nuclear agreement and under the Henry J. Hyde Act (18 December 2006), the
President is required to make an annual determination of the steps that the US has taken to
encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop
production of fissile material for NWs unilaterally or under a multilateral moratorium, India
has made no such declaration and is neither being encouraged by the US. It means a decade
now: no commitments, on the other hand what we see is that India has expanded its fissile
material production capacity.
The US Administration had the obligation to inform the Congress of the facts and implications
of Indo-US nuclear deal which included:

Significant nuclear activities of India including the construction of new nuclear

facilities ( but I dont think so that anybody is informing the Congress)
Significant changes in the production of NWs or amounts of fissile material
produced
Changes in the purpose of operational status of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel
cycle activities (recent reports highlight that India continuous to change this but
nobody has reported that )
Estimate of the amount of uranium mined and milled in India
Amount of uranium likely used or allocated for the use of nuclear explosive
devices

Analysis on whether importing uranium has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear
explosive devices, so no such information is being probably shared with the Congress.
What are the Implications for Pakistan?
If India becomes the member of the NSG, it may veto Pakistans NSG bid, since the Group
works on the principle of consensus.
NSG membership is important for Pakistans, because Pakistan has very ambitious nuclear
energy goals (40,000 MW by 2050). This is only practical if we have access to various sources
of nuclear energy. Only then we can meet. This forty thousand is only is fraction of overall
energy mix; it does not mean that we are shifting [entirely] to the nuclear. Moreover, since the
conclusion of the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement and the India-specific NSG
exemption of 2008, Pakistan has been voicing concerns over discriminatory treatment, this
NSG exemption is not for peaceful purposes, as we understand well. India will misuse it as it
did in 1974. Now the report of western scholars validate our concerns that we have been voicing
since 2006.
What Pakistan has done? We have submitted our adherence to IAEA. We have declared that
we adhere to NSGs latest guidelines of 2015 which are yet to be published, but we have even
endorse those also. This is a unilateral. What India did while submitting its adherence; it was
commitment as a part of NSG package on India-US nuclear deal. Pakistan was not granted any
concession, even then we have unilaterally agreed to adhere to NSG guideline as a responsible
nuclear power. Pakistan has formally applied for NSG membership on 19th May 2016.
Pakistans Credentials for NSG Membership
Pakistan believes that as one of the Participating Governments (PGs) of the NSG, Pakistan
would like to constructively contribute to the global non-proliferation objectives. Pakistans
aspiration to become NSG member is based on:
The desire to strengthen global non-proliferation regime
Need for strategic stability and level playing field in South Asia
Priority for socio-economic development and technological advancement of the
country
Unlike India, all of Pakistans civilian nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards
(INFCIRC/66 type). And these are in perpetuity. Pakistan has never violated its peaceful uses
obligations in relation to items and materials transferred to it internationally. Even once
Pakistan was sanctioned after Indias nuclear test of 1974, Pakistan voluntarily continued its
IAEA safeguards on Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) despite the termination of its

bilateral agreement with the supplier. Till today Pakistan is keeping it under safeguards.
Pakistan has more than 40 years of experience in safe, secure and safeguarded operation of
nuclear power plants.
Pakistan has the expertise, manpower, infrastructure, as well as the ability to supply NSG
controlled items, goods and services for a full range of nuclear applications for peaceful uses.
Pakistan is ready to assist interested states with the experience and expertise we have gained in
the areas of nuclear power generation, non-power application of nuclear technology, nuclear
security and safety, under the auspices of IAEA and our Prime Ministers also declared it in
2012 and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits. National statements also say so; this is not
something new. Pakistan has established an effective export control regime, supported by
strong national legislation and credible legal enforcement mechanisms
Conclusion
To conclude, NSG should consider membership for non-NPT states on the basis of nondiscriminatory and objective criteria. This will enhance NSGs own credibility. Pakistan hopes
that political expediency or commercial interests will not override non-proliferation objectives,
once again. Another country-specific exemption would not only be discriminatory but could
further accentuate the negative implications for strategic stability and regional balance. The
responsibility for ongoing discriminatory trends that adversely effects global nonproliferation
regime and the regional stability, rests with the supporters and promoters of Indias NSG
membership. Such discriminatory approaches reduce the incentive for countries like Pakistan
to remain meaningfully engaged with the global nonproliferation regime. Pakistan retains the
right to take all possible measures that would ensure strategic stability in the region, without
entering into arms race, but this NSG membership and the indirect effects of this membership
which India is using to help, to build its military potential. Besides the military potential it is
also aim that Indias stature and capacity to emerge as a regional hegemon, Pakistan has no
such ambitions.
I think I should stop here and Ill be happy to take questions, for answers.
Questions, Answers, Comments
Amb (r) Asif Ezdi: Thank you very much for your lucid presentation, I think you have
presented in a very good way and highlighted the issue that why Pakistans admission in to
NSG is in the global interest and off course in Pakistans interest. But we all know that the
decision taken by the NSG members, especially the larger countries are based solely on their
national interest and I think we have to make it clear to them that it is in their national interest
that Pakistan is admitted simultaneously and we can also tell them what the cost would be to
them if Pakistan is excluded. I think we should make it clear to them if India is admitted and
Pakistan is not, the Pakistan will never remove its objections to the conclusion of an FMCT.
So if India is admitted that naturally the consequence would be that Pakistan would not able to
get it. And we should make it known; if that happens than forget about the FMCT forever. At
least Pakistan will not negotiate that and will not be a party and if they want to negotiate
themselves than thats their business. Secondly we must make it clear that Pakistan will not in
that case ever sign the NTBT. Off course it is not a current issue now, but it might become
current topic in next 5 to 10 years. We should make it know that than Pakistan will not under
any condition and circumstances sign the CTBT. This we must make clear that the cost for the
NSG members for excluding Pakistan. The third point I think we already made it known that

Pakistan will have no choice but to appropriately upgrade its nuclear weapons program and
capability of launching sea based missiles. So these three consequences would follow from
Indias admission .We dont have to formally write a note to NSG countries that this is what
happens, but there are other ways of making it known that this will be the consequence and if
you are willing to accept that, that will be your choice.
Dr. Adil Sultan: It is more of a comment and I will take it as a comment, also a suggestion. I
have not much to respond to that, but I would say that it is matter of principle that we are facing
a case and that we have energy needs and NSG is an informal arrangement but it also helps
integrate Pakistan, India and Israel within the non-proliferation regime. So this was in that
sense important but I just briefly refer to the FMCT. With due respect although several will not
agree, we have not used and we have never said we do not agree to missile treaty or anything
like that. So our position since 1995 has been consistent. We are the only country in the CD
which has maintained consistent position, since 1995. There are other powers, major powers,
which changed and India also changed Nobody offered us any concessions. But still we are
voluntarily engaged constructively with the international community. On the other hand as part
of India and United States nuclear deal; there were certain obligations, commitments made by
India that it will work with United Sates for the conclusion of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Nobody mention that even once that India has objected to the CD and FMCT and there is
perception that Pakistan is probably obstructing. Pakistan is not obstructing at all. Our position
has been based on our regional concerns and thats why we continue to say the implications on
NSG membership and the exemption and the way India has used it. These were our concerns,
the very start and now the international scholars are validating our concerns. India is expanding
their fissile material production and weapons program and that our main concern. Our position
is principle based. I fully agreed its only national interest that the major powers and thats what
because we always consult United States as an ally and still we consult U.S as an ally, because
its an important country and we have lots of issue that we continue and its a difficult relation
and we continue to deal with the U.S.
That what we have been telling U.S that this is the country that has done so much to protect the
interests of the U.S and other major powers. But on the other hand, a country which projects
itself that one day it will stand for U.S against China and we are opening everything for that
specific country you are undermining global non-proliferation norms, you are violating all the
principles for that specific country. So thats a discrimination and that has worst implications.
And finally without referring to these issues, because they are very sensitive issues, once there
is discrimination and international community, especially U.S also understands, it limits the
space for even decision makers also. Because the public sentiments are so strong, the kind of
discrimination that is being often done against Pakistan and in favor of India, that has negative
implications among public in Pakistan. So even if you want to engage meaningfully on these
issues thats why I said it would be difficult to remain meaningfully engage, its not just kind
of Im making statement the people who have experience in Pakistan they can understand the
public does not allowed that why are you giving these as concessions, once you have been
discriminated in NSG and other forums also. So our allies, partners and other countries with
which we like to have relationship they should also understand this domestic politics in
Pakistan. So I partially endorsed your point.
Muhammad Ummar (NUST): What if the majority of the countries, NSG members, deny
both countries NSG membership based on their principled stand that we are non NPT states?
How would that affect our ability to meet 40 thousand MW electricity goal by 2050?

Dr. Adil Sultan: Briefly I just respond thats a plan that was prepared keeping in view lots of
factors and there could be variables that can impact those and that can help generate those. And
thats what we say this is our requirement that what we have planned for our nation. Because
we foresee the shortage of electricity. That is only possible if there are multiple sources.
Pakistan has been offering foreign investors and vendors to come, develop nuclear parks,
produce electricity and sell electricity, under IAEA safeguards. So it is a long standing demand
and requirement. So if both India and Pakistan are denied, I think thats not good for the nonproliferation regime. Also, one thing is for sure that we will never join NPT as non-nuclear
weapon state. So if we have no obligation, the only best alternative is to bring us into other
non-proliferation instruments like the NSG, where we would of course be under certain
obligations as part of the NSG participating governments. Thats why there are large group of
countries which support that we have to address this .... This is the alternative, the instrument
is NSG and there are other instruments where you can engage them, bring them, universalize
the non-proliferation regime. And if this regime is universalized, it would reduce the incentives
for non-nuclear weapon states. As long as there are states outside the NPT there would an
incentive for states to give up their obligations and some states have already done so.
Amb. (r) Zamir Akram: Thank you Adil for your very informative and comprehensive
presentation! But as you know, I have a certain different take on it. It is good to be in academic
sittings, such as this, and talk about from an academic perspective, about principles, and about
non-discrimination. But the NSG and other bodies like the CD make their decisions on the
basis of political considerations, not on the basis of fair play and non-discrimination etc. So we
need to recognize that the decision, whatever will be the decision in the NSG, will be on the
basis of political interest. Second thing that you mentioned, which is true, that NSG
membership is about prestige. It is about prestige, but lets take that further. If there is a
discriminatory approach where India is made a member and Pakistan is not, then there will be
a permanent distinction that will emerge between India and Pakistan and our nuclear programs.
One, if India is accepted it will be acknowledged and recognized such as a responsible nuclear
weapon state. On the other hand Pakistans rejection would amount to Pakistans description
in the further as a rouge or pariah state. So it is very important to us to ensure that both of us
become members, or neither of us become members. Another reason you mentioned, that India
without Pakistan can veto Pakistans membership in future. I think it will also challenge
Pakistans existing civil nuclear cooperation with China. And that will create lots of
complications for us. So while we talk about principles, we need to signal, and I would directly
signal, and I would say that upfront. Thats the best way to conduct diplomacy; that if Pakistan
is excluded, then there will be cost for international non-proliferation regime. One thing I
would recommend very strongly that we should discontinue the dialogue with the United
States. Another thing is that we should no longer be committed to what we have been saying
that we are committed in observing NSG guidelines. If we are going to be treated as rouge
state, then we should act as a rouge state, why should we voluntarily impose upon ourselves
restrictions and limitations and obligations for which we have not been rewarded or
acknowledged by the international community. I think this is a serious issue. So we need to be
very aware how this debate will unfold on 9th of June.
Dr. Adil Sultan: I think it is an opinion and you are not seeking response.
Barrister Sadia Abbasi: Your presentation was very comprehensive, what I can gather from
it is that India has huge international support. I want to know that how much chances Pakistan
have in order to have NSG membership. And my second question is that who has the ownership
of Pakistans civil and military nuclear policy.

Dr. Adil Sultan: Regarding chances of Pakistans membership of NSG, we are engaging the
NSG governments. Most recently last month, we had several meetings, almost one fourth of
the NSG participating countries out of 48. None of the country opposed Pakistan membership.
It suits non proliferation principles to bring Pakistan and other non-proliferation states under
certain obligations, since they are non NPT states. And NSG were already discussing
modalities to develop a criteria, so there was mechanism but sudden urge by India because they
realize that if discussion are prolonged and goes to the next stage probably it would be
complicated, otherwise the NSG was already deliberating the non NPT states issue within the
NSG and majority of the states they agreed that we need to build the criteria, even U.S itself
proposed two papers which in a way could be categorized that there was set of references to
start discussions or negotiations to develop a criteria for non NPT states. But I think Indias
momentum or push has overtaken that other initiatives and India is just demanding from
U.S that you need to close the other major powers and facilitate our entry. So no one principally
oppose to Pakistans membership.
Regarding your ownership of nuclear policy question. There is a National Command Authority,
the structure is like that; Prime minister is the chairperson and there are two committees; one
is Employment Control Committee and other is Development Control Committee. The
Employment Control Committee has four senior ministers i.e. Interior, Finance, Defense
and Foreign minister being deputy chairman and three services chiefs and Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee. So it is balance of all. Prime minister sits at the top, so any decision
even this decision to apply for the NSG membership, it was deliberated at that level and prime
minister has given guidance to move forward. So that is how we have applied for NSG
membership. So ownership of all the decisions rests with the prime minister who is the head of
the government.

Representative from British High Commission: I want you to elaborate two things, you said
if Pakistan does not get membership to the NSG, then it will have to take necessary steps to
secure its security. Please elaborate what that will involve and you also said there will be less
incentive for Pakistan to engage in international non-proliferation mechanisms, what you think
such development would look like.
Dr. Adil Sultan: I think I have partially address this in one of the previous comments. But I
will again go for it. As we see the NSG exemption, the India and U.S nuclear deal, it has helped
India to enhance its military potential. What is effecting this regional stability is the military
potential that has exponentially been enhanced, because of this India and U.S nuclear deal.
India is also getting benefits from Australia. And the other thing is that it is not trackable.
Because India objects that they will not allow tracking if that nuclear material what goes to the
military program or civil program. So all these factors directly affect Pakistans calculations,
because Indias military potential, the conventional superiority it already enjoys, it is investing
billions of dollars in military modernization, and rest of the international community is helping
India to build its nuclear capability also. They perceived Chinese as threat and what we say any
action done by international community will destabilize regional imbalance. So Pakistan would
have all the rights to take measures to restore that balance. So we are taking in terms of regional
dynamics against India, we are not talking about any other powers also. As I tried to explain
the nuclear program in Pakistan is very emotional because it is attached to the public
sentiments. Any decision that we take on nuclear issue, it has to be justifiable to the common
people. We seriously view these issues because we cannot go against the public perception.

The point is we have to be sensitive to the sentiments, if there no other superiority and it is
continuous discrimination it would reduce the incentive for decision makers. And for the
public, to support those decisions in Pakistan. So that is the kind of strategic culture we have,
we have strong sentiments about nuclear program. Thats what we have to care about.
Pervaiz Butt: I will take two statements. The first is I think should carry out a study, why
India would requires so many bombs. I can imagine India have locations where they would
store bombs, so that they could be used. I can imagine they require bombs on their submarines
on their ships, but the calculation what we make number of bombs they could make from all
of the plutonium and their enriched uranium, their accumulating is awesome. What kind of
future they plan with so many bombs? Why would they make so many bombs? They give the
reason that they will use the enriched uranium and plutonium for breeder reactors, but they do
not have a breeder reactor program as such, so this is one thing that I think we should consider
why India is going to make so many bombs.
My second statement is about 40,000 MW, in the future. This is a plan that Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission has made. If I was the plan maker, I would even make or setup more
nuclear power plants. Because at the moment if we look at the energy situation, the nuclear
power plants are the only plants in the country which are operating according to international
standards. We have made a mess of all our other power stations and generating units. Either
electricity is very costly or it is not generating according to its capacity. So in order to meet the
demand, we should prepare for indigenization. We started indigenization, I started that even
when all technical support to KANUP was stopped and we started making separate equipment
ourselves. And Karachi nuclear power plant continuous to operate in its 44th year despite of all
the embargoes. It still has those embargoes, we are doing everything ourselves. Now here is no
power plant in country which is operating in its 44th year. So that it is also important and this
indigenization that we develop the capability to indigenize nuclear power plant equipment, [it]
also helps to develop nuclear weapon. So it is important that we must indigenize, the nation
must support PAEC in indigenization. We have to take massive steps for indigenization and
that should be our plan.
Dr. Adil Sultan: It has a long answer but I would be brief. First of all nuclear number does not
matter, so if India is building, Pakistan is not going to match what India is doing. There was an
interesting statement by former president Bush, that he will help India to emerge as
superpower. On this one of the American scholar said: since when a superpower help another
power to emerge as a rival superpower, because it goes against the principles of realpolitik.
This is the irony. I often ask my American colleagues also, is India running your foreign policy
because it is doing everything what it wants to do and USA is just supporting it without
realizing that it is creating regional imbalance. There is a lots of confusion within the Indias
strategic it is making ICBMs also. The scientist are buildings intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) and submarine based missiles without understanding what the threat is, either
it is Pakistan or China. Even if it is China why to go for ICBM. USA should ask India that we
are helping you to build your military potential, but in response you are building capabilities
that could one day threaten us. Nobody is asking those questions. Recent reports that show
Indias potential is 900 to 1000 bombs. But in literature you will see India is 10 bomb below
Pakistan. So it shows that Pakistan is the fastest than India. So if Pakistan is the fastest since
ten years and India is only 10 bombs short, it shows that India is also moving fastly. Recent
reports shows that India has much more potential than often projected by itself.

Majid, CISS: I have a very different question. It is regarding the Pakistani insistence of joining
the NSG. What if we are asked that ok, Pakistan would be given a waiver and a membership
provided that you should attach brackets to your nuclear program; your development of ballistic
missiles and other areas where developments are happening. Some of this has come to the
media reports. So this has implications for Pakistan and would be very difficult for Pakistan to
accept such a deal. What if we are asked that you should open your program more to security?
So we need to be aware of this thing as well.
Dr. Adil Sultan: Discrimination, another. Asking Pakistan to accept brackets, agree to
whatever India is doing, this will be another blatant discrimination. Of-course, Pakistan will
never accept that because it has no linkage with NSG. What we are talking about the NSG is
for our civil nuclear, energy needs and to be integrated into international non-proliferation
regime. This is completely separate track and thats what we are saying, that India is
manipulating even the non-proliferation instruments to build its military potential and you are
asking Pakistan to be bracket the nuclear program. We dont have infinite needs. We do not
want to emerge as regional or global hegemon. We have very specific threat that is India. We
will not go beyond that. We are not into numbers or the arms race. But again I fully agree that
this nation was raised by some of the scholars who are very conversant with the Pakistan
nuclear and security compulsions. They have brought out this thing knowingly, that Pakistan
will never agree. It has no linkages with the NSG also.
Amb. Javed Hafeez: Thank you sir, thank you for a very enlightening briefing. I have two
brief questions. The first one is as a layman, and indeed it may look a bit simplistic. Both India
& Pakistan have been excluded from the NSG because they have not signed the NPT. The
question is would Pakistan loose if it was to sign NPT unilaterally. The second question is that
yes there are international double standards; Pakistan has been discriminated against. They
treat India & Pakistan at different levels. Everything is for India and not for Pakistan. When
we asked the countries that have indulged in such discriminations, they say that the difference
between Pakistan and India is the A. Q. Khan affair. Now A. Q. Khan is story of the past; its
more than twelve years ago that it happened and since then Pakistan has behaved as a model
country as for as nuclear safety and security is concerned. Why have we not been able to
convinced the international community all these twelve years that we are as responsible at least
or even more responsible than India as for as nuclear safety and security is concerned or do
you think that the international community which means some countries, not all the countries,
are not just prepared to listen to us and they want to keep us out. Thank you!
Dr. Adil Sultan: On the A. Q. Khan affair! When I teach my class, I often say that no country
has developed its program indigenously. This technology was proliferated by everyone. Even
Oppenheim was discredited because he proliferated to the Soviets and then Soviets gave it to
others and the other countries gave to more countries. So if you go to the proliferation history,
every country, every NWS has bought, stolen and developed their nuclear program. Difference
over here is that A. Q. Khan affair happened. That was a sad episode, that should not have
happened and that we do realize. Thats why this command and control authority was
structured. All those arrangements came up to preclude the responsibility in future and we have
been telling the international community that stop using A. Q. Khan affair as a whipping stick
against Pakistan. And we also understand there are interest groups outside US who would want
this issue to remain in the lime light to discredit Pakistan. Even the story that you can see now
these days also on the NSG issue. They bring out this affair: Since Pakistan has a bad
proliferation record so it does not match with India. I do not want to go ahead in detail about
what India has done in the past. There is ample literature available on the net but we do not
google and search about that. India had been proliferating, there are safety and security issues

within India. But the way the international environment is coming up, whatever India does, it
would be accepted as a responsible country and no matter what Pakistan does. It would be
targeted because the objective is to de-hyphenate both India and Pakistan. And the reality is
that these states cannot be de-hyphenated. They are part of this region. They have a long history
of conflicts. Whatever India does, it becomes a global power, it cannot extricate itself from this
region unless it resolves all these issues. They may say China is a threat or whatever it is. On
the NPT, I just have a brief response to that: Article 9 or 11, I think, of the NPT! It states: all
those states which conducted nuclear tests before January 1967, they will be recognized as
nuclear weapon states for the purpose of NPT. So it precludes the possibility of Pakistan joining
NPT in as a NWS, it will have to give up the nuclear weapons, and assumed the status of nonNWS. Only then you can have it unilaterally. That is never going to happen. So India Pakistan
cannot join NPT for that. Thank you!
[Inaudible question and answer.]
Brig. (r) Said Nazir: This perceived narrative of India building it for countering China, the
Pivot to Asia, and that NATO like alliance will be coming and that will be led by India. And
all these big platforms are being offered to them, conventional and non-conventional and so
much favors, NSG and others. On the other hand, the reality is that all its [Indias]
posturing is against Pakistan. The second thing is that what are the Pakistans counter weights
if such things occur, and where they can prevail on the international community that they are
relevant.
Dr. Adil Sultan: Briefly, India China has 80-billion-dollar trade and this is going to multiply
in the future. India will never fight China for USA. So thats for sure. The perception will
continue to build because of getting concessions from the international community and there
are the major powers to build its capability that is very clear. Thats my personal assessment.
It will not stand for anyone. Counter weight for Pakistan, if it is discriminated in this NSG
issue, I think, I will not say counter measures or weight or something. Pakistan is a NWS, has
200 million people, strategically very important, it would still remain relevant in the
international relations. These keep happening and anything which does not have substance in
it, probably it would die down sooner or later. As it is being expected about this perceived
India rise as a regional or a global power and take responsibilities on behest of the other powers;
this is going to be temporary phenomenon. We are not competing with anyone in terms of
status. So I would not see it as some counter-measure, things like that. We would do what is
necessary for us and I think we need to put our own house in order and improve our economy
and other issues. We would remain relevant to the international community. Nobody can
neglect Pakistan.
[Inaudible question and answer.]
Muhammad Ali: The presentation clarified a lot of aspects of an important issue. I endorse
the point that it is the energy and economy which is driving the conquest for NSG membership.
That is quite important. As there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; so is it
a possibility that we would like to consider that instead of opposing Indian membership we
work with Indian for joint NSG membership, because in contrast we have friends who will
probably not help India become a member and probably that is case for Indias friends. So for
the international community, which want India to become an NSG member, is it not better that
both Pakistan and India simultaneously become NSG members, instead of neither becomes a
member?

Dr. Adil Sultan: I think none of our official statements state that we oppose Indias
membership. We say that we oppose discrimination that you bring one and keep other outside.
Other than that I think we have equal credentials. Both the applications are there. Whether we
formally work with each other or not, I think we are on the same track.
Anum Khan: What will Pakistan offer to the international community in terms of incentives
if Pakistan wants to strengthen its case for NSG membership?
Dr. Adil Sultan: I think without having the luxuries or the incentives that India has offered,
Pakistan has offered much more than that. Our credentials speak of themselves. What else can
we offer. Because once you are talking about the NSG context, so keep the military program
away from that. In IAEA, we have safeguards on the facilities permanently, in perpetuity. We
have unilaterally submitted adherence. India did as a part of application and otherwise we have
also track record. I dont see anything beyond that Pakistan can offer to the international
community because whatever the international standards and the global norms are, Pakistan is
abiding even though Pakistan is continuously discriminated. Our engagement with the Nuclear
Security Summits, Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism and the CPPNM mandate, which is
now CPPNMF. We did it because that is how responsible states and nuclear powers behave
and that is what we continuously told the international community. We are behaving
responsibly even though we are continuously targeted or discriminated as compared to our
neighbor. Our credentials are very open and I think its speaks for itself.
Robina Waseem: I have recently gone through Normal Nuclear Pakistan, by Dalton. It gives
5 suggestions [regarding Pakistans nuclear program] and is of the opinion that in South Asia
[when] there is addition of 6 bombs; out of them 4 or 5 are from Pakistan, something like that.
There were suggestions that we should slow down developments of TNWs; we should go for
FMCT; we should not wait for India to sign CTBT and we should sign CTBT. They were quite
blunt by saying that Pakistan should not compare itself with India because India is a global
market, because of that the likelihood is that economic interests are more [prevailing] than the
discrimination, criteria, principles etc. So what could be the Pakistans reaction on that because
they are quite clear by giving waiver to India, and why they are more interested in India because
for the containment of China they need India? They want to establish an alternate market for
them. So what could be the reaction of Pakistan.
Dr. Adil Sultan: Partly, Majid has also pointed to that. I think he and his team that authored
Normal Nuclear Pakistan perfectly understand and know it. This could be their perceptions,
what they want to propagate. These are not the realities. I have already commented on IPFM
reports, ISIS reports. If you have seen all these reports the fact is that there lies this perception
which is commonly there and in such reports Pakistan has a faster growing rate. We have a
very modest program. Everybody knows it, probably take satellite pictures of those facilities.
If you compare with what India is doing, they are much more in numbers. [India has] 8
reactors outside the IAEA safeguards and there are several facilities that they can bring in and
out of safeguards. They do not agree to tracking of fuel from the Australia or other countries.
Still people continue to say that we have fastest growing program. This is myth. Probably they
would realize one day that they wrong masters at the wrong time.
Question: Sir, my question is related to NSG waiver. Since we know that India has already
being gaining the fruits of NSG waiver and its receiving nuclear technology and material under

that. So would the NSG membership be just a symbolic or will it bring India more benefits.
Thank you.
Dr. Adil Sultan: I think we talked about it; its essentially about prestige because India is
already reaping all the benefits of that.
Barrister Sadia Abbasi: You talked about Dr. Qadir Khan. I dont abide by the narrative of
the West regarding Qadir Khan. As you said that Pakistans nuclear program is under prime
minister and there are four federal ministers and three services chiefs who run Pakistans
nuclear policies. As you said that Pakistans nuclear policies are based on public sentiments.
For the public of Pakistan Dr. Qadir is a hero and he gave a program and implemented the
vision that was initiated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Shaheed. So this narrative is not a narrative of
the people of Pakistan.
Dr. Adil Sultan: I do appreciate your sentiments senator sahiba. I have never said Dr. Qadir
has no role in Pakistans nuclear program. I did not belittle him or his stature also. He
contributed in Pakistans nuclear program because there was a time once Pakistan was faced
with this issue. It was kind of a deadlock. But you have to read the history and you know the
facts. I have equal sentiments about my nuclear program. But I have also interacted with people
who have spent their lives in remote areas for 20-25 years. There are many many unsung heros
of Pakistans nuclear program. You can ask chairman PAEC and he will narrate those stories.
All those people have contributed in Pakistans nuclear program. People of Pakistan have
suffered for it. There is no particular individual. PM Bhutto had the vision and he started that
program. Dr. Qadir Khan had a very important contribution and he brought in enrichment
technology. I take this as inappropriate when people do not recognize the sacrifices of PAC
and other institutions. No single individual can make a bomb. I never said Dr. A. Q. Khan did
not do anything. He did something very important. He contributed in the enrichment program
but several unsung heroes who never came on record but they have sacrificed their lives for
this. So this is collective contribution of this nation. Because nation also sacrificed for this. We
faced sanctions. Its a collective contribution of the people in PAEC, people in KRL but the
vision goes to PM Bhutto who brought him, who constituted this team and subsequently owned
this program and today nobody in Pakistan disowns this. So it is by no means undermining a
particular individuals contribution, but I am suggesting that [it is] a collective contribution of
everyone in which there are several unsung heroes.
Concluding Remarks by the Chair, Amb. (r) Tariq Osman Hyder
Thank you very much!
Well we have reached at the end of our questions and answers session. It is, one can see from
the questions and eloquent answers, that it is a subject of great importance from many many
dimensions. So, I now need to conclude and sum up. My summing up will, briefly of course,
be in two parts: one is of brief observations on the remarks which were made; and secondly
some structured [remarks] in terms of where we are, why/how we got there and where we are
going.
The speaker talked that, said which implied that India was coercing US: I would say it really
is in boths interest. American interest is very much there. I dont think that India is coercing.
He also said that if India gets in, it may veto [Pakistans entry.] There is no doubt about it that
if India gets in, they will veto us. They have been that in case of Indian Ocean Rim

Organization, which has been there for 32 years, vetoing our application to join, which is not
that important or serious for us.
Anyhow, then in terms of FMCT, Amb. Zamir Akram is here, I think in the nutshell, our
objective is that we cannot accept the agreement where asymmetric treatment is given to
existing stock, not the future or present. I think that is the essence.
Also I think the speaker also mentioned our objections to the 2008 waiver. And Amb. Zamir
Akram alos said that it was very unfortunate that our objections (which were eloquently put
together by his brother Amb. Munir Akram and off course by Amb. Shahbaz was also second
in that) were pulled out on the last moment by political decisions, by the then government or
PM, whatever. I would like to add that when the India-US deal was first announced in 2005,
we made our first comment and objection where we said that both countries are fossil fuel
deficit and that they have equal needs and America has last chance for nuclear restraint in the
area by favoring and discriminating against one. So our position is quite principled and goes
back, by some time.
Then of course Amb. Zamir Akram being a practitioner, [who has] headed our delegation in
CD for so many years, and has been an additional secretary to the PM and now he is very senior
advisor to the government on the nuclear affairs, perhaps the senior most diplomatic advisor;
while he speaks in a personal capacity as he emphasized two things which are very true and
fair. In one statement, he said that if India gets in then they will make problem for us on our
nuclear cooperation with China. Well I think that our nuclear cooperation with China is based
on the grandfathered agreement, we have stayed ahead. There have been very strong exception
from America and other NSG countries but it did not face China, I dont see that India can do
much more. Another point is that India can only come in if China would bring them in, if they
dont reject them, or veto them. So you could say that if China brings them in, the game is over,
so I am not worried about it.
Another thing is that if we are not in we should be act like a rouge state. I can see that there is
obviously an emotional element here and justified that people will feel like that. But I think
point is that we dont want to be like DPRK. I think we should not think, even, that India would
get in and we will not. I dont think we should say that we are rouge state. We have laws and
legislation and there is no possibility that a person whether he is military or civilian or a
politician can give away our nuclear material or technology. So I think it is understandable,
that emotionally we feel like that and I think it is very justified. But just to make it clear that
we are not going to be a rouge state, nor can we be a legally rouge state and our position is
clear.
That was in terms of the questions and comments!
Now, here, I can say that what are the lessons at least that I can draw from: one is that what
should be the really project to achieve. We are really at the cusp of things. I would like to say
that unfortunately Pakistan has always been reactive in terms of nuclear issue, perhaps because
of our position vis--vis India. So we have always been little late to be a proactive. First
decision is coming this month, but at least for the future we can do that. Now one thing, we
sort of dance around it but I think we can just say it specifically, is that the India-US deal where
is it in terms of saying that our credentials are same as of India or not, I think the question
here. In the India US deal those eight reactors that are outside the safeguards, are ideal for
making weapons grade plutonium; and they can produce 275 weapons a year we should say

that. Secondly, they have breeder reactor program of 13 reactors. Pervaiz Butt sb said that they
have no breeder reactor but actually their first breeder reactor is about to come on stream soon
and they could have 375 kgs of plutonium which is an exponentially growing program. We
dont do our homework and we dont project that, we cannot expect from other people to take
our strongest argument. While the argument we have is that they can put plutonium in or
they can take plutonium out, fine, but we should be stick to the main argument as well.
Another important point which was made not only in this but in many other programs that if
we were economically strong and could buy reactor that would give a lot of incentives to other
countries. Yes we are getting it from Chinese, they are we good, but we want more. The
essential thing is that we have to grow our economy and that we should indigenize our program
which we should have done long time ago. And I think we should have been able to make
300MW reactor by We should be able to do that in any case.
Another thing which we have to project, and it has real implications, is that nuclear power is
very essential for our energy security. It is not a question that it is a small percentage of our
energy security or not: it has a high capital cost but low cost in term of running; so it is essential
part of energy security. Our American friends, they are against the Iran gas pipeline, they are
against nuclear power. The point is when we speak to them we should emphasize that you are
against all serious energy options for Pakistan, apart from renewable which can add at the most
most to 10-15 % .
Another point is that if we dont have energy security and a good mix including a strong mix
from nuclear energy, which is safe for environment also, what it means for us? It means that
socio-economic progress keeps at 4.5 rate, extremism will grow, terrorism which is fueled by
actors like India and others for that matter it will be difficult for us to get an handle on that. On
terrorism, I would say that one objection that people would have on our nuclear program is,
terrorism . Its manifestations. I think as we are getting more handle over terrorism, it will
remove one of the objection that we have.
Now in terms of leverage and what should be our attitude in future. I dont foresee that India
will get in, frankly. And I dont see that will we get in, in this session. So let us see what happen,
it is not up to us. So let see what happens. The point is that we are very very may be because
of A.Q Khan Affair in terms of our nuclear cooperation. We have an ability to provide, on
different levels of nuclear technology to other countries. For instant in medicine, PAEC has
long record in terms of medicine, agriculture and water management, we have a long record.
at least OIC has been discussing that.
We tend to forget that we have still many people who have been trained here from the first
wave. they have different skills. So by now we have trained people, reactors have been built
in Turkey, Dubai, Saudi Arabia we should offer our experienced people for help in the civilian
technology. It would be good for us, good for cooperation. We should have massive program
of having encouraging people from these countries, especially the Arab countries. They dont
have a nuclear technology as a black box. They can send people here for a reactor technology
and for basic sciences, for safety and security, so we should do that as well. So in other words
we dont have to be a rouge state, we will be more in proactive in terms of nuclear cooperation
with other countries. And that is what we have to show to NSG countries to take them into
account that we are doing all under IAEA safeguards. I dont think that there is anything wrong
in that. So we have to decision.

At the end I think it is very important subject, at a very at important time. It is a bit late in the
day, but its better late than never. We have conducted it on a very important time. These were
some examples what we have learned from the process to do better in the future.
Thank you very much, I thank Dr. Adil our speaker, Thank you Khalid sahib, the DG and thank
you all, the audience, for coming.
---Ends---