Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States v. Lewis, 1st Cir. (2013)
United States v. Lewis, 1st Cir. (2013)
United States v. Lewis, 1st Cir. (2013)
Before
Torruella, Stahl, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
October 4, 2013
2011,
deputies
of
the
Cumberland
County
Sheriff's
Office
State-appointed
defense
counsel
that
complaint
The record
-3-
The
government
lodged
federal
detainer
at
the
August
29,
2011.2
Later
that
same
day,
the
State
What
occurred next (or, more accurately, failed to occur) sets the stage
for this appeal.
The parties stipulated as to the procedures generally
followed by the Cumberland County Jail when a federal detainer is
lodged against one of its inmates.
Although the parties agree on the exact date and time that
the detainer was lodged with the Jail, the document itself is not
in the record. Indeed, it is not clear whether that document still
exists.
3
notified the United States Marshals Service that the State charges
had been dismissed.
dismissal, they did not notify the U.S. Attorney's Office that the
State charges had been dismissed and that the appellant should be
taken
into
federal
custody.
Thus,
the
appellant
remained
an
outside
actor.
Finally,
on
September
26,
2011,
the
It
the State charges were dismissed on August 29, 2011, and in reply
the government's prosecutor stated the Jail was still holding the
appellant on the State charges.
was
still
in
State
custody.
In
further
He
also promised to ask the State court to notify the Jail of the
dropped charges.
While the record shows that there was some additional
email correspondence between the State and government attorneys
regarding the status of the case over the next several days, no
official action was taken and the appellant remained in State
custody for the next week.
officer at the Cumberland County Jail that the Jail had in fact
received
notification
of
the
dismissal,
and
he
advised
-6-
the
Thereafter the
that even though he was being held at a State facility from August
6 to October 3, the dismissal of all State charges and the lodging
of the federal detainer on August 29, 2011, was the functional
equivalent of an arrest by federal authorities. The appellant took
district
court
held
hearing
and
denied
the
starting point, he then argues that the government violated the Act
-8-
by
failing
to
indict
him
within
thirty
days,
necessitating
While
According to the
him
on
the
previously-dismissed
State
charges.
The
As
to
the
appellant's
request
for
sanctions,
the
Therefore, the
Id.
The parties
26, 2011, indictment clearly did not comply with the Speedy Trial
Act if the clock began ticking on August 29.
-10-
1.
Federal detainers
Our analysis begins with the statutory language.
Speedy
Trial
information
Act
or
provides,
indictment
in
pertinent
charging
an
part,
that
individual
The
"[a]ny
with
the
18 U.S.C. 3161(b).
The term
18 U.S.C. 3172(2).
687 (1st Cir. 2011) ("The Act, by its terms, applies only where
there is an 'arrest' or service of a 'summons' in connection with
the relevant federal charges." (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3161(b))),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2116 (2011).
The record shows that once this was done, the Jail
The
-12-
on
these
undisputed
facts,
we
conclude
the
We have
that the Speedy Trial Act "is intended to mandate an orderly and
expeditious procedure for federal criminal prosecutions by fixing
specific,
mechanical
time
limits
within
which
the
various
United States v.
Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982); see also United States
v. Shahryar, 719 F.2d 1522, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1983).
Consistent with its mechanical nature, the Act sets forth
a very clear trigger for the thirty-day time limit:
-13-
the date on
which
defendant
is
arrested
or
served
with
summons
18 U.S.C. 3161(b).
in
The
as
subsequent
provision
of
the
Act
specifically
the
explicit
reference
to
federal
detainers
Had Congress
intended for the lodging of a federal detainer to begin the thirtyday countdown, it would have included detainers as a triggering
event along with arrests and summonses. As Congress elected not to
do so, it is not for this Court to substitute its judgment for that
of Congress and rewrite the statute.
-14-
2.
the
Fourth
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
in
United
States
v.
Circuit concluded that the thirty-day clock begins to tick when the
government knows or should know that an individual is being held by
a state for the sole purpose of answering to federal charges.
at 596.8
Id.
statutory
language
of
section
3161(b),
nor
cites
any
bright-line
rules
consistently.
The
that
can
be
appellant
has
applied
not
mechanically
provided
us
with
and
any
with
the
Act's
clear
language
and
bright-line
requirements.
Moreover, we are concerned that the knowledge test for
which the appellant advocates frustrates the purpose of the Act and
is unworkable in practice.
Act
is
to
be
interpreted
in
manner
allowing
for
the
2015.9
Tinklenberg involved the Speedy Trial Act's requirement
for
trial
to
commence
within
seventy
days
of
(1)
filing
an
Id. at 2010.
excludes "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing
of the motion through . . . [its] disposition" from this seventyday period.
The Sixth
Circuit had held that a pretrial motion fell within the exclusion
only if it actually caused or led to an expectation of delay.
Id.
Id.
-17-
Id.
Similar
concerns
are
present
with
respect
to
the
This would
rule,
it
would
necessitate
additional
pretrial
result
in
needless
dismissals
-18-
of
and
rules set forth in the Act and run contrary to the concerns
previously expressed by the Supreme Court and by this Circuit.
We
and
burdensome
standard,
especially
where
it
is
the
appellant's
contention
an
arrest
that
and
detainer
thereby
is
starts
a
the
"functional
equivalent"
of
thirty-day
countdown.
10
Id. at 687.
As we explained, by
Id.
Id.
Id.
federal detainers when it drafted the Act, Congress was also "well
aware" of ad prosequendum writs but chose not to have their
issuance trigger the thirty-day clock.
Id. at 688.
We concluded
that "[w]here a state arrest takes place and the United States
later files a complaint and a detainer seeking to prosecute that
individual, there is no federal 'arrest' under the Act, as the
individual is in custody based on state law violations."
-20-
Id. at
689 (citing United States v. Taylor, 814 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir.
1987) and United States v. Copley, 774 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir.
1985)); see also Woolfolk, 399 F.3d at 595 ("[T]he Government's
filing of a complaint, serving of an arrest warrant and lodging of
the warrant as a detainer . . . while Woolfolk was in state custody
answering to state charges, did not activate the provisions of the
Speedy Trial Act.").
The
reasoning
in
Kelly
applies
strongly
here.
In
A federal detainer,
Accordingly,
thirty-day
arrest
to
indictment
requirement
is
not
triggered.11
11
the
appellant
argues
that
the
government
U.S.C.
3162(b),
which
sets
forth
range
of
potential
allusions
are
not
adequate
to
preserve
an
United States
There is no indication
The
However, his
-23-