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Nadeau v. Matesanz, 289 F.3d 13, 1st Cir. (2002)
Nadeau v. Matesanz, 289 F.3d 13, 1st Cir. (2002)
Nadeau v. Matesanz, 289 F.3d 13, 1st Cir. (2002)
3d 13
Appellant Richard Nadeau appeals from the district court's denial of his petition
for writ of habeas corpus. In March 1996, a Middlesex Superior Court jury
convicted Nadeau of two counts of burglary, three counts of receiving stolen
property, and one count of receiving a stolen motor vehicle. Appealing his
convictions, Nadeau argued inter alia that he could not lawfully be convicted of
both the burglary and the receiving of the stolen property. On April 2, 1999, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed with Nadeau's argument and vacated the
possession of stolen property convictions but affirmed the remaining
convictions. Commonwealth v. Nadeau, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 1121, 708 N.E.2d 154
(1999) (table).1 On June 3, 1999, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
denied Nadeau's application for further appellate review. Commonwealth v.
Nadeau, 429 Mass. 1109, 712 N.E.2d 99 (1999) (table).
On June 25, 2000, Nadeau filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 2254, asserting three grounds of error. The district court denied the
petition on August 21, 2001, but issued a certificate of appealability on
September 18, 2001. In this appeal, Nadeau continues to press two purported
grounds for relief. First, he maintains that the trial judge's instructions to the
jury violated his constitutional right to present a defense and to have his guilt
determined by a jury of his peers. Second, he contends that the Massachusetts
Appeals Court erred when it chose merely to vacate the convictions for
possession of stolen property, and should instead have ordered a new trial.2
Finding neither of these arguments meritorious, we affirm.
I.
3
The question is, has the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Nadeau did certain things. He is the only defendant. You are not to focus on
whether there were or should have been anyone else accused of these offenses.
The question is, has the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Nadeau is guilty.
Nadeau objected to this instruction at trial, arguing that it was "confusing and
contradictory" and, in essence, told the jury to ignore Nadeau's arguments
regarding the possible culpability of Farese. On habeas review, the district
court rejected Nadeau's claim that the trial court's failure to modify or correct
the jury instructions violated his constitutional rights. Nadeau's appeal is
governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28
U.S.C. 2254. Therefore, in order to prevail, Nadeau must show that the state
court decision was contrary to federal constitutional law or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court. Id. 2254(d)(1). We review the district court's denial of habeas relief de
novo. See Almanzar v. Maloney, 281 F.3d 300, 303 (1st Cir.2002).
Nadeau has not offered any Supreme Court case that would suggest that the
jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate. The reasonable doubt
instruction offered by the trial judge closely parallels a model federal
instruction,3 and the validity of comparable instructions has been upheld on
previous occasions.4 Furthermore, we have not independently identified
anything in the instruction chosen by the state court judge that runs afoul of the
minimum constitutional requirements identified by the Supreme Court.
Therefore, Nadeau's argument that the Appeals Court's affirmance of the trial
court's instruction was an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court
precedent must fail. 5 See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).
II.
7
III.
9
Notes:
1
See generally United States v. Trzcinski, 553 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir.1977)
("Traditionally, receipt of stolen goods has been a crime distinct from the theft.
Under the general view, a thief who actually carried away the goods could not
`receive' them from himself. This principle is based either upon the theory of
avoiding the infliction of a double penalty or upon the philosophic
consideration that a single act may not constitute both the larceny and the
receiving. An accessory, however, may be guilty of both larceny and receipt of
stolen goods. See 2 F. Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 576 (12th
ed.1957), and R. Perkins, Criminal Law 321 (1969). But these general
observations are not controlling because ... the question is one of statutory
construction, not common law distinctions.").
2
The third issue raised by Nadeau in his original petition, but not presented on
appeal, concerned the denial of his motion to suppress the confession he made
to the police on the date of his arrest
See United States v. Dennis, 645 F.2d 517, 522-23 (5th Cir.1981), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88
L.Ed.2d 814 (1986).
As a practical matter, we are also not convinced that Nadeau's ability to present
his defense was compromised by the jury instruction. As the district court
noted, "The instruction tells jurors to ignore whether anyone else wasaccused
(e.g., charged/indicted) with the crimes, not whether they actually committed
the crimes." In other words, the instruction directed the jurors to render a
verdict of not guilty unless they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant before them, and not some other person, had committed the
crimes at issue in the case.