Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Villanueva v. Holder, JR., 1st Cir. (2015)
Villanueva v. Holder, JR., 1st Cir. (2015)
Villanueva v. Holder, JR., 1st Cir. (2015)
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.
discretionary relief.
In June 2009, Villanueva, a native of El Salvador living
in the United States, was charged with removability for being a
non-citizen present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled.
Villanueva sought
1254a.
The
TPS
statute
affords
undocumented
immigrants
Shul-Navarro v. Holder,
762 F.3d 146, 147 (1st Cir. 2014). The Attorney General designated
El Salvador for TPS in 2001 because of a disruption of living
conditions in El Salvador resulting from a series of earthquakes
that occurred that year.
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of
an
"aggravated
felony."
See
2011
hearing,
the
Immigration
Judge
U.S.C.
After an
(IJ)
denied
therefore
an
"aggravated
felony."
See
U.S.C.
now
petitions
for
review
of
the
BIA's
77,
79
(1st
Cir.
2013),
we
agree
with
Villanueva.
See 8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F).2
crime
and
determine
whether
those
elements
are
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013); see also Fish, 758 F.3d at 5-6.
However, if a statute is "divisible," -- that is, "if it
sets forth one or more elements of a particular offense in the
alternative" -- we may apply the "modified categorical approach."
Fish, 758 F.3d at 6.
was actually convicted, and then ask whether that particular crime
categorically falls within the generic offense.
v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2014); Patel, 707 F.3d at 8081; see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281; Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
If those documents are inconclusive, then we must discard
the modified categorical approach and determine whether all of the
alternative means of committing the predicate crime fit within the
federal definition of the generic offense.
See
degree
of
intent
than
negligent
or
merely
accidental
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The government's
which
prong
of
the
statute
Villanueva
was
convicted.
We do not reach
At the
beginning of the plea hearing, the court asked for the "[f]actual
basis for the assault," and the prosecutor (not Villanueva's
attorney) responded:
It was January 11, 2006 in the town of South
Windsor, Your Honor, at Nutmeg Recycling.
Apparently he . . . got into an altercation
with a Samuel [INDECIPHERABLE] and he said
that the defendant kicked him in the head
causing a large bump. It was like an argument
on the loading docks there.
Villanueva's attorney then initially asked if his client could
enter an Alford plea to the assault charge, and asked the court to
explain the consequences of an Alford plea to his client.
following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: All right. Fredy, the State just
indicated on the record what are things
happened [sic] that constitute the assault in
the third degree. Under the Alford plea you
disagree with some of those facts, but after
talking to [your attorney] you come to the
conclusion that if you go to trial you could
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. So
basically you're asking the Court to accept
your plea without admitting all the facts so
you could dispose of this matter by the offer
that's been made on the record. Is that what
you want to do?
MR. VILLANUEVA:
Well [SPANISH]
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The
THE COURT:
S or no?
break
in
which
the
court
conducted
other
The
And you
sufficient
to
conviction."
identify
which
crime
is
the
crime
of
He pled
enter an Alford plea (under which Villanueva would admit guilt but
not the underlying facts), but then, after a break necessitated by
Villanueva's inability to understand the proceedings and the nature
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of the charges against him, the attorney asked the court to "vacate
the prior pleas and elections" and to allow Villanueva to enter a
plea of nolo contendere to third-degree assault.
The court
obliged,
the
and
underlying
the
there
plea.
was
no
In
further
short,
discussion
the
plea
of
colloquy
facts
does
not
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