USCA1 Opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 97-1978

KATHLEEN WALCZAK,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

MASSACHUSETTS STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

Defendant, Appellee.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

_____________
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
_____________

____________________

Kathleen Walczak on brief pro se.

________________

____________________

FEBRUARY 25, 1998

____________________

Per Curiam.
__________

We have carefully reviewed the record,

appellant's brief,

district

and the

appendices, and

agree with

the

court that the complaint is legally frivolous under

28 U.S.C.

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

See Neitzke
___ _______

v. Williams, 490
________

U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989) (a legally frivolous complaint is one

which

is based on "an indisputably meritless legal theory").

The judgment

of

reason stated by

1997.

We

that court

is therefore

affirmed for

the court in its Memorandum,

add that

the following

the

dated June 2,

claims also

are legally

frivolous.

1.

the

As with the complaint, appellant's claim under

Americans with

12131 et seq.,

Disabilities Act

("ADA"),

42 U.S.C.

is "inextricably intertwined" with

court judgments regarding

the denial of her

the state

application for

accidental

disability

retirement

benefits.

That

is,

entertaining the claim would require a lower federal court to

review the state court

the

judgments.

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
______________

of Appeals
__________

v. Feldman, 460
_______

This is prohibited

under

See District of Columbia Court

___ __________________________

U.S. 462, 476 (1983);

Rooker v.
______

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).

__________________

2.

amended

Even

to name

legally frivolous.

the

if

appellant's

proper defendant,

it

That is, nowhere in her

order to show cause, in her brief

her state

Title

brief is there

VII

claim

still would

be

response to the

filed in this court, or in

any indication that anyone

-2-

were

at the

Commission

color,

discriminated against her

on the basis

of race,

religion, gender, or national origin -- the practices

outlawed by Title VII.

what does appear

See 42 U.S.C.
___

2000e-2(a).

Indeed,

clearly from appellant's pleadings

is that

her former supervisors had conflicts with appellant and that,

at least in appellant's view, these conflicts were due to the

resentment of

one

of the

supervisors

over the

hiring

of

appellant as

one.

a counselor before that supervisor was hired as

Personnel actions motivated by personality conflicts or

cronyism do

not

violate

Title

VII.

See
___

DeNovellis
__________

v.

Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997).

_______

3.

To

under 42 U.S.C.

the extent

1983, that the

while employed at the

rights,

her

cause of

Cir. 1991) (per

statute

action

latest,

in August

asserting,

discrimination she endured

is barred

by

the three-year

See Street
___ ______

v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38, 39

____

curiam) (the

Massachusetts three-year

of limitations

M.G.L.c. 260,

appellant is

Commission violated her constitutional

statute of limitations.

(1st

that

2A).

1987,

applies to

Appellant's

when she

1983 actions,

claim accrued,

became

citing

at

the

disabled by

the

discrimination and quit work.

See id. at 40 (the limitations

___ ___

period begins to run when a plaintiff "knows or has reason to

know

of

the injury

which

is

the

basis of

the

action")

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Thus, any

1983

appellant's

action

challenging

what happened

-3-

during

tenure at

the Commission

should have been

filed by

August

1990 in order to be considered timely.

4.

Finally, in her response to

cause

why the complaint

made

conclusory

"continued"

ongoing.

allegations

after she

Appellant,

responsible for

be dismissed

left

the

however,

this harassment.

name the individual

not

should not be

dismissed, appellant

that

the

Commission

nowhere

discrimination

and

still

identified

is

anyone

Where a complaint fails to

defendants by name the

as frivolous

the order to show

complaint should

"if the allegations in the

___________________________

complaint allow for the specific persons to be subsequently

_____________________________________________________________

identified with reasonable certainty."

____________________________________

Smith-Bey v. Hospital
_________
________

Adm'r, 841
_____

Because

F.2d 751, 759

the

conclusory

allegations

to

permit

(7th Cir. 1988)

in

the

(emphasis added).

response

identification

of

are

far

any

too

particular

defendants with any certainty, the dismissal was not an abuse

of discretion.

See id. at 758

___ ___

(a court is not

required to

"invent factual scenarios that cannot be reasonably

from the

pleadings").

See also
___ ____

inferred

Macias v. Raul A.,

______
_______

23 F.3d

94, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1994) (where a court would be required to

go beyond

an

the allegations in a complaint

in forma

pauperis

plaintiff

might be
_____

and speculate that

_________

able

to make

nonfrivolous claim if he or she were given a second chance to

amend, the court may dismiss the complaint as frivolous).

-4-

The

except to the

judgment of

the district

court is

extent that the judgment shall

dismissal is "without prejudice."

_______ _________

affirmed,
________

state that the

-5-