Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States Court of Appeals: For The First Circuit
United States Court of Appeals: For The First Circuit
United States Court of Appeals: For The First Circuit
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
December 7, 2015
as to the Bivens claim for reasons other than those relied upon by
the district judge.
Division nor the AFMC directly administer or run the CHPS Program.
Rather, the FOH Division engages private contractors to perform
these functions.
In 2007, Casey was hired as a Nurse Coordinator by STG
International
Inc.
("STG"),
the
government
contractor
Casey
classes,
was
responsible
conducting
blood
for
teaching
pressure
and
then
As a Nurse
health
cardiac
and
risk
known
as
Millennium
Health
and
Fitness,
Inc.
STG
entered
into
subcontract
with
Millennium.
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Casey's
immediate STG supervisor was Jesse Burk, who was the Health
Promotion Operation Manager overseeing the CHPS Program at a total
of eight Air Force bases across the country.
Although Burk
Burk also
evaluations.
direct
When
Burk
responsibility
transferred
for
Casey's
from
STG
to
performance
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Casey
was
uncommunicative.
not
performing
her
job
duties
and
was
being
and
confronted
memorandum's contents.
Carpenter
in
his
office
about
the
removed
Steinman.
from
the
CHPS
Program.
In
turn,
Burk
contacted
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The
next
day,
November
15,
the
tenor
of
the
thereafter,
Air
Force
Colonel
Frank
Glenn
("Colonel
Glenn") arrived at Casey's office, escorted her off the base, and
revoked her security clearance.
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Title VII.
judgment.
II. Discussion
Casey now appeals both the district judge's dismissal of
her Bivens claim and the magistrate judge's entry of summary
judgment on her Title VII claim.
A.
Bivens
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized for the first
alleged
to
have
violated
citizen's
constitutional
Id.
decades since, the Supreme Court has extended the Bivens holding
beyond its original Fourth Amendment confines only twice.
See
is
generally
better-positioned
to
craft
appropriate
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federal officers.
legal
liability
[for
First
Amendment
violations]
("It
is
questionable
whether
Bivens
extends
to
cases
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U.S. at 378).
In the proceedings below, the district judge dismissed
Casey's Bivens claim after finding that an alternative process
existed to remedy the alleged infringement of her First Amendment
rights.
We
review the allegations in the complaint liberally, treating wellpled facts as true, and indulging all reasonable inferences in
Casey's favor.
Id.
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As we explain, however, we
was asserted against the DoD, the DHHS, Secretary Donley (in his
official
capacity
only),
Colonel
Glenn
(in
his
personal
and
Cir. 2003) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994)).
Nor may a Bivens suit be brought against a federal officer in his
official capacity.
Thus, when all is said and done, what was once a lively
v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Rule
8,
In
evaluating
we
must
the
first
sufficiency
distinguish
of
"the
complaint
complaint's
under
factual
Garca-Cataln
v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Then,
we
must
determine
whether
the
complaint's
factual
Haley
v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678).
At the outset of our analysis, we must be clear about
the legal issue that is in dispute.
perpetrated
necessarily
focus
Glenn,
we
and
by
on
must
Carpenter.
the
factual
decipher
Our
inquiry,
allegations
whether
these
then,
against
must
Colonel
allegations
are
contains
Read
in
its
entirety,
the
following
the
allegations
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First
Amended
against
Complaint
Colonel
Glenn:
whatsoever
employment.
in
the
decision
to
terminate
Casey's
assigned the task of escorting Casey from her office and revoking
her
security
employment.
clearance
once
STG
decided
to
terminate
her
apparent that Colonel Glenn did not commit the offense of which he
stands accused.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Casey's Bivens
claim fails to plausibly demonstrate her right to recover against
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Title VII
Following
the
dismissal
of
her
Bivens
claim,
the
In a Third Amended
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Alberty-Vlez v. Corporacin de
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2,
3; see also Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 107 (1st Cir.
2015).
dispute that she was an employee of STG, but she invokes the socalled "joint employment doctrine" to contend that she was also an
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Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2015) ("[T]wo parties can
be considered joint employers and therefore both be liable under
Title VII if they share or co-determine those matters governing
the essential terms and conditions of employment." (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Title
VII
defines
an
"employee"
as
"an
individual
plainly
define
it,
we
"must
presume
that
Congress
has
determining
whether
an
employment
relationship
Manual
("EEOC
Manual"),
which
sets
forth
"non-
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the worker and the employer; (5) whether the employer has the right
to assign additional projects to the worker; (6) whether the
employer sets the hours of work and the duration of the job; (7)
whether the worker is paid by the hour, week, or month rather than
the agreed cost of performing a particular job; (8) whether the
worker hires and pays assistants; (9) whether the work performed
by the worker is part of the regular business of the employer;
(10) whether the employer is in business; (11) whether the worker
is engaged in his or her own distinct occupation or business; (12)
whether the employer provides the worker with benefits, such as
insurance,
leave,
or
worker's
compensation;
(13)
whether
the
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Our own
For example,
suggest that Burk acted as an agent of the DHHS, and that the DHHS
therefore exercised actual control over the performance of her job
duties.
We do not consider the issue of control in a vacuum.
Rather, control "must be considered in light of the work performed
and the industry at issue."
Here,
Division
was
responsible
for
recruiting
contractors
The
to
government
entities
ultimately
responsible
for
the
CHPS
Program, would exert some measure of control over STG's (and later
Millennium's) performance.
However, the measure of control that the DHHS employed
in
setting
performance
criteria
and
overseeing
Burk's
As
Supp. 831, 838 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("Presumably, any large
government contract will be supervised to some extent by the
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DHHS
controlled
the
terms
and
conditions
of
Casey's
correspondence
during
this
period,
both
Holl
(an
In eAFMC
that
Casey's
employment
should
be
terminated.
Casey
suggests that this is evidence that the DHHS had the authority to
order her termination.
We reject this suggestion.
Holl
and
Steinman,
as
representatives
of
the
two
government
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2011) (finding that the defendant city mayor was not an employer
of the plaintiff high school athletics coach where, despite his
"indirect influence," the mayor did not have the ultimate authority
to fire the coach).
What is more, we consider the EEOC Manual factors in
their specific context.
Here, it
appears that Steinman and Holl were concerned because Casey was
acting unpredictably and was unaccounted for at a secure military
facility.
4.
When
We can
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