Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1st Cir. (2013)
Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1st Cir. (2013)
No. 12-1405
SUSAN K. YOUNG,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN
TRUST 2007-CP1, ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-CP1;
AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
LIPEZ,
Circuit
Judge.
In
an
attempt to
avert
the
loan
servicers
homeowners.
to
offer
loan
modifications
to
eligible
Fargo")
and
American
Home
Mortgage
Servicing,
Inc.
her
12(b)(6).
complaint
under
Federal
Rule
Defendants moved to
of
Civil
Procedure
cases
and
the
complex
legal
issues
that
they
raise.
-2-
contract claim under Count II, her claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and her claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
We
Id.
designed
to
identify
likely
candidates
for
loan
-3-
HAMP
urges
banks
and
loan
servicers
to
offer
loan
mortgage
payments
to
sustainable
levels,
without
Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347 (D. Mass. 2011); see generally
Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons
from the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification
Program, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 748-53 (2010) (providing background
on HAMP's features).
pursuant
to
which
the
servicers
"agreed
to
identify
Id.
-4-
the guidelines state that the servicer should offer the borrower a
permanent loan modification.
Wigod,
Young's Complaint
We now turn to the facts of Young's case, drawn from her
Young
This
Shortly
thereafter, a notice was posted on her door stating that she was
late on her mortgage payment, but instructing the homeowner to
ignore the notice if she had already made the payments in question.
When Young called Wells Fargo on or about August 27, 2008, she was
told that while her payment had been received, the bank would not
process her check and intended to initiate foreclosure proceedings.
After a week of negotiations, Young agreed to send Wells
Fargo a $5,628.42 check, in exchange for which Wells Fargo would
fax her a forbearance agreement.
After
insisting
that
she
had
been
promised
This
the presumption of truth. See Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble
Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2000) ("It is a
well-settled rule that when a written instrument contradicts
allegations in the complaint to which it is attached, the exhibit
trumps the allegations.") (quoting N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows,
Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Young may be suggesting that, regardless of her mortgage
terms, she was charged a more favorable interest rate for the first
few years of her mortgage and that defendants later restored her
rate back to what the mortgage originally required. If this was
her meaning, it is far from clear from the complaint's language,
and our review is limited to the facts contained in the pleading
and the contents of documents cognizable under Rule 12(b)(6).
-6-
supervisor told Young that the August 2008 check for $2,600 had not
been processed, and acknowledged that if this check had been
processed, Young would be up to date on her payments.
The
supervisor also admitted that Wells Fargo was at fault for not
processing
the
check
and
represented
that
if
Young
signed a
By
April 2009, however, Young could not sustain these payments and she
stopped making them.
Young "implored [defendants] to work with her so she
could save her family's home" by modifying the terms of her
mortgage.
negotiate a modification.
The TPP
each
modification.
in
order
to
qualify
for
permanent
loan
-7-
Fargo and was advised that the January 2010 letter was sent in
error and that Young should simply ignore it.
payments from her trial period payments by almost $300, for a total
of $1658.71 per month.
-8-
agreement
and
defendants
moved
forward
with
the
foreclosure
process.2
Young pleads that she "was emotionally devastated by this
course of events" and experienced constant nervousness, anxiety,
and stress.
"extreme stress" was the primary cause of her separation from her
husband.
After sending Wells Fargo a pre-suit demand letter on
January 29, 2011, Young filed a complaint in the Commonwealth
courts
alleging
violations
of
Massachusetts
law.
Defendants
to
dismiss
under
Federal Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
The
true all well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor." Artuso v.
Vertex Pharm., Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2011).
We may also
Cir. 2008) (stating that court "may also review documents outside
of the pleadings where they are undisputed, central to plaintiffs'
claims,
and
sufficiently
referred
to
in
the
complaint
or
all
conclusory
allegations
that
merely
parrot
the
P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[T]he combined allegations,
taken as true, must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable,
case for relief.").
-10-
"and
we
review
de
novo the
district
court's
Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2009). The dismissal
may be affirmed on any basis in the record.
Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011).
Breach of Contract
Under Massachusetts law, the interpretation of a contract
see also Lewis v. Commonwealth, 122 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Mass. 1954).
When the contract's terms are "ambiguous, uncertain, or equivocal
in meaning, [however,] the intent of the parties is a question of
fact to be determined at trial."
N.E.2d 946,
Young's
951
(Mass.
2002).
complaint
pleads
two
Count I
The
basic
elements
of
contract
claim
under
of the breach."
Increased Payments
and
that
the
bank
"breached the
contract
by
the bank breached the TPP by increasing the payments due under the
permanent modification agreement by almost $300 from the amounts
she paid during the trial period.
To the contrary, the TPP unambiguously distinguishes
between the payments Young agreed to make under the trial period
plan
and
the
payments
she
would
ultimately
owe
under
the
represented that she would pay Wells Fargo "the trial period
payment" of $1,368.94 on a monthly schedule.
Section 2 is clear
-12-
will be required under the modified loan terms," and that "[t]he
actual payments under the modified loan terms
different." (emphases added).
. . . may be
The TPP
further clarifies that the trial plan "is not a modification of the
Loan Documents" and that the underlying loan will not be modified
absent compliance with the TPP's terms.
Taken
together,
these
provisions
draw
a crystalline
distinction between the trial period payment amount and the monthly
amount owed under the permanent modification.
Young cites no
language in the TPP that barred Wells Fargo from altering that
payment amount after the trial period's conclusion.
Indeed, the
Young
also suggests that she should have been given some notice of
defendants' intent to alter her monthly payments, but a careful
review of the TPP reveals that it imposes no such obligation.
See
NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d
145, 149 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that facts pled in complaint
are taken as true unless "conclusory or contradicted by . . .
documentary evidence").
-13-
breach of contract claim based on the mere fact that the permanent
modification agreement increased her monthly payments.4
b.
Timeliness
The
She
This
theory would mean that defendants breached the TPP by sending her
a permanent modification agreement five months later, only after a
series of attempts to clear up Wells Fargo's erroneous January 2010
rejection letter.
Defendants respond that we are precluded from considering
this argument on appeal because the complaint does not plead a
theory
of
breach
based
on
failure
to
tender
permanent
The complaint
modification
agreement.
Although
Count
of
her
To be sure,
-15-
The
state [her] claim artfully," United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48,
63 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009), she timely brought it to the district
court's attention and it is therefore preserved for our review.
The TPP's
Section 3 echoes
Young's complaint
clearly alleges that she performed all of her obligations under the
TPP, a fact defendants do not dispute.
therefore
required
modification.
Wells
Fargo
to
her
permanent
Modification
Effective
Date,"
will
preclude
buyer
or
Thus, this
-18-
modified
payment
on
the
modification
effective
date.
This
response,
to
tender
defendants
a
permanent
contend
loan
that
they
modification"
"had
by
no
the
-19-
large
defendants'
swaths
of
the
interpretation
TPP
would
nugatory.
permit
them
In
to
particular,
exercise
an
They fall
See
Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122
(2d Cir. 2005) ("We are not obliged to accept the allegations of
the complaint as to how to construe [a contract], but at this
procedural stage, we should resolve any contractual ambiguities in
favor of the plaintiff.").
For these reasons, we vacate the dismissal of Count I of
Young's complaint.8
2.
Count II
In fact,
helpful in interpreting the contract does not change the fact that
through Count II, Young seeks the "enforcement of a contract
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[t]o the extent Swartz seeks a
declaration of defendants' liability for damages sought for his
other causes
of
action,"
claim
must
be
dismissed
as
"merely
claim
"appropriate
under
because
1983,"
the
dismissal
claim
is
of
former
claim
was
unnecessary").11
Since
The
11
136-37
(1st
Cir.
(looking
to
background
federal
faith
and
fair
dealing
between
the
parties
to
it.'"
T.W.
Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 924 N.E.2d 696, 703-04 (Mass.
2010) (quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d
806, 820 (Mass. 1991)).
13
In
order
to
prevail,
the
plaintiff
must
"present[]
Id. at 706;
Indem. Co. v. Millis Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 418 N.E.2d 645,
647 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
conduct
destroyed
party's
right
to
fruits
of
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Ayash v. Dana-Farber
As a consequence,
the implied covenant cannot "create rights and duties not otherwise
provided for in the existing contractual relationship," and instead
focuses on "the manner of performance."
implied
covenant
claim
incorporates
the
five months of communications and phone calls from both Young and
her lawyer before Young finally received the promised permanent
modification agreement in June 2010.
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The bank's
We also find it
modification,
responded
to
her
suggesting
without
that
defendants
lawyer's
would
intervention.
not
But
have
the
allegations that the bank acted to correct its initial errors, and
eventually sent Young a permanent modification agreement, paint a
picture of an unthinking and sloppy institution, rather than one
that acted with an improper purpose.
In
sum,
Young's
complaint
fails
to
plead
that
14
Cf.
Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 287, 301 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting
argument that only "'arbitrary and capricious' use of discretion"
could
support
implied
"Massachusetts
courts
'unreasonableness'")
covenant
have
[]
(citation
claim,
used
omitted).
and
observing
that
the
language
of
Our
disposition
of
-28-
opening brief fails to address the question of duty at all and her
reply gives the issue only perfunctory treatment.15
We
have
Waste
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 299 (1st Cir. 2000);
see also Brandt v. Wand Partners, 242 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of her NIED claim.
To make out an IIED claim under Massachusetts law, Young
must
demonstrate
that
Wells
Fargo
"(1)
intended
to
inflict
15
Foley v.
Inc., 607 F.3d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws
-30-
Violation of a statute is
Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 2008) (internal citation omitted)
(quotation marks omitted).
v. Public Storage, Inc., 127 F.3d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1997).
Like her emotional distress claims, Young's Chapter 93A
claim extends beyond the alleged breaches of the TPP and includes
defendants'
handling
of
her
entire
case,
beginning
with
the
On appeal,
-31-
We
16
damages when they did not "experience[] any other claimed economic
or noneconomic loss").
Here, we need not delineate the outer boundaries of what
constitutes "injury" under Chapter 93A, because Young's complaint
sufficiently alleges that she experienced economic damages as a
result of defendants' conduct.
states that
[b]ecause of the above described actions of
[defendants], the Plaintiff has suffered money
damages,
including,
but not
necessarily
limited to: (i) The Potential Loss of any and
all equity she has built up in the home during
the time she made payments; (ii) damage to her
credit rating and her ability to obtain loans
or credit in the future, and; (iii) an
increase in interest rates she will have to
pay on any existing or future loans and credit
card accounts.
Although defendants assert that this allegation is too speculative
to support Young's claim, that argument fails.
Chapter
93A
claim
encompasses
conduct
long
As noted, the
preceding
Young's
-33-
conduct
plausibly
placed
Young
"in
The consequences of
a
worse
and
[more]
untenable position than [she] would have been" had defendants dealt
with her appropriately during this period of time.
N.E.2d at 534.
Hershenow, 840
adversely affect her now and will continue to affect her in the
future. See Stagikas v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d
129, 137 (D. Mass. 2011) ("The complaint also alleges several
injuries
resulting
representations
from
about
defendant's
plaintiff's
HAMP
allegedly
deceptive
eligibility,
including
nor
sold
anything
of reduced
value,
faced no
17
Equitable Relief
The final count of Young's complaint requests equitable
claim under Count I, her Chapter 93A claim under Count V, and her
derivative claim for equitable relief under Count VI. We remand to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.