MEJOFF vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled for release

pending deportation?

> This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff.

> The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who
was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative
by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands.
Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U.S. Army.
Later he was handed to the Commonwealth Government.
Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release. But the
deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no travel
documents Mejoff was illegally in this country, and consequently
referred the matter to the immigration authorities. Board of
commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered
the Philippines illegally, without inspection and admission by the
immigration officials at a designation port of entry and, therefore, it
ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to
Russia. The petitioner was then under custody to await the arrival
of some Russian vessels. After repeated failures to ship this
deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison
where he has been confined. Commissioner of Immigration
believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him
under detention while arrangements for his departure are being
made.
> The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and said
that "temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of
exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to
hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable
length of time."
> "The meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the
circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport,
the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with
the governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the
deportee away;" but the Court warned that "under established
precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus."
> Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was
promulgated, the Government has not found way and means of
removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight,
although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities,
it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take
the petitioner.
> The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he
was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de
facto government whose decrees were law during the occupation.

RULING:
YES. Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution
entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10,
1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights
as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there
resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree
and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other
status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art.
8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile" (Art. 9); etc.

case of the ten Communists, depends upon the discretion of the

court, whereas the right to be enlarged before formal charges are
instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no
charges pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of
bringing any against him are slim and remote.
Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the
respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these
terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the
immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner
as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be
available when the Government is ready to deport him. The
surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of
reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of
First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall
also put up a bond.

It was said or insinuated at the hearing of the petition at bar, but

not alleged in the return, that the petitioner was engaged in
subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or
aid the disloyal elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind
the Government's allegation in its answer that "the herein
petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces,
and the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the United States
or the Philippines nor identified with the countries allied against
these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or
committing hostile acts prejudicial to the interest and security of
this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists,
still the petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be
unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of
the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual,
present, or uncontrollable. After all, the Government is not
impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure as
that just outlined.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented,
its underlying principle is of universal application. In fact, its ratio
decidendi applies with greater force to the present petition, since
the right of accused to bail pending appeal of his case, as in the

KURODA vs JALANDONI
FACTS:
> Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army.
> He was charged before a military Commission with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of
war".
> Kuroda seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No.
68 of the President of the Philippines.
> PETITIONERs Contention: "That Executive Order No. 68 is
illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact
(that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based
on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues
"That in view off the fact that this commission has been
empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order
this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 68 is valid?
RULING:
YES. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National
War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the
trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the
Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that
this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of
international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all
those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in

violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and

civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted and policies of international law which are part
of the our Constitution.

United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained
in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and
obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If
at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right
on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes
against crimes against our people.

The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the

President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed
forces.

. . . The change of our form government from

Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during then Commonwealth because it is an
offense against the same sovereign people.

War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After

cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may remain pending
which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to
seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in
their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated
the law of war. Indeed the power to create a military commission
for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of
waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission
has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the
effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty
agreement.
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully
empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely
the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no
Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second
only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of
the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In
fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention, such rules and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines
was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle
of international law as continued in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys

namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of
his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court
and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative
of our national sovereignty.
Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a
special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary
civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68
which provides for the organization of such military commission is
a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive
order which requires that counsel appearing before said
commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the
Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of
our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States,
which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her
government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be
allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were

allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of
United States and thus we were equally bound together with the

AGUSTIN vs EDU

RULING:

REYES vs BAGATSING

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early

seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed \as being violative
of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the
rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of
legislative power. A temporary restraining order as issued and
respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner
et. al. The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be

dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself
quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions
to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned
with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices; * * * " It cannot be disputed then that this
Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land * *
*." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality.

FACTS:

FACTS:
> The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos,
issued on 1974.
> The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and
the United Nations Organization which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices.
> Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, already properly equipped when it came
out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229.
> For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of
our compassionate New Society." He contended that they are
"infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public;" are "one-sided, onerous
and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of
car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
warning device.
> The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise
of the police power.
> POLICE POWER - state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Letter of Instructions No. 229 is
valid?

> Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the AntiBases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
peaceful march and rally starting from the Luneta, a public park,
to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks
away. There will be a delivery of two brief speeches, a petition
based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the
International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace
and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila,
would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of
its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the
United States Ambassador.
> Such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact
as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a
permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time
and at the place applied for." To be more specific, reference was
made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any
assembly or congregations where a large number of people is
expected to attend." Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in
accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities,
that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the
Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the
participants themselves and the general public may be ensured."
> Court granting the injunction on the ground that there was no
showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of permit was valid?
RULING:
NO. There is a novel aspect to this case, If the rally were
confined to Luneta, no question, as noted, would have arisen. So,
too, if the march would end at another park. As previously
mentioned though, there would be a short program upon reaching
the public space between the two gates of the United States
Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the
handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the
closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a
signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine
Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification was

signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter

deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on
November 15. As of that date then, it was binding on the
Philippines. The second paragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. The
receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the
mission or impairment of its dignity. " The Constitution "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention
is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of
international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That
being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any
intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission,
or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the
denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the
Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of
rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet
from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its
invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in
view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly.
Also from him came the commendable admission that there were
the least five previous demonstrations at the Bayview hotel Area
and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United States Embassy where
no untoward event occurred. It was made clear by petitioner,
through counsel, that no act offensive to the dignity of the United
States Mission in the Philippines would take place and that, as
mentioned at the outset of this opinion, "all the necessary steps
would be taken by it 'to ensure a peaceful march and rally.'
As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than
500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it
come, then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar
and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high
estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable
assembly demands nothing less.
It may be noted that the peaceful character of the peace march
and rally on October 26 was not marred by any untoward incident.
So it has been in other assemblies held elsewhere. It is quite
reassuring such that both on the part of the national government
and the citizens, reason and moderation have prevailed. That is
as it should be.

RAQUIZA vs BRADFORD
FACTS:
> Petitioners filed a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus for they
have been restrained and deprived" of their liberty in the
Correctional Institution for Women that, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford
and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army be directed to
appear before this Court and produce the bodies of petitioners,
and to show cause why petitioners should not forthwith be set at
liberty.
> Respondents in return - that by virtue of the proclamation issued
by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners was arrested by
U.S. Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No.
385.
The person named and described above is deemed a
risk to the security of the U.S. Forces.
> Petitioners were charged of "Espionage activity for Japanese",
"Active collaboration with the enemy", and "Active collaboration
with the Japanese."
> PROCLAMATION (Southwest Pacific Area): PROVIDING FOR
MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE
APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO
VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID, COMFORT AND
SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of
the Army, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief
Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it
to be my purpose to remove such persons, when
apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold
them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter
I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its
judgment upon their respective cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippines court has jurisdiction over
the case involving U.S Army?
RULING:
NO. In the very nature of things, the Commander in
Chief of the Army of liberation at the time of issuing that
proclamation had to act upon the evidence then before him. The
exigencies of the mighty military operations that he had then but
recently begun for the destruction or defeat of the powerful enemy
who was at that time occupying the Islands, did not permit of any

other procedure. And to deny him the exclusive power and

competency to determine the strength and sufficiency of such
evidence would have been destructive of that military efficiency
with which, in the interest of all the citizens of the Philippines
themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners, the operations
for their liberation had to be conducted. And once having
apprehended the persons to whom the proclamation referred, the
same exigencies required that the said Commander in Chief be
invested with the exclusive power and authority to decide when
he should deliver them to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
And even if the war had terminated, we are of opinion that under
the aforesaid proclamation the petitioners, who are held in
restraint thereunder, would continue legally under custody of the
proper military authorities of General of the Army MacArthur's or
his successors' command, for a reasonable time after termination
of the war.
If General of the Army MacArthur had, in express terms, declared
in his aforesaid proclamation that after termination of the war he
will release the persons therein named to the Philippine
Government within a reasonable time, we think that he could have
done so within his legitimate powers as Commander in Chief of
the United States Army; and not only this, but that for obvious
reasons he should be the best and, therefore, the only judge of
how long or how short that time should be under the
circumstances. And in order to give his proclamation a reasonable
construction, we are of opinion that this should be implied from
the context. Otherwise, we would be giving to this solemn
document the irrational interpretation that said Commander in
Chief thereby announced a purpose which would be physically
impossible for him to carry out; namely, to make delivery to the
Philippine Government immediately upon termination of the war of
persons under restraint whose number he could not then foresee
but which he could reasonably expect to be more or less
considerable, with their respective charges and pertinent
evidence, papers, and the like. It was not a matter of delivering a
certain quantity or amount of personal property but human beings
who although under custody, had to be properly housed,
maintained and otherwise treated as becoming the "dignity of the
human person," which is one of the cardinal principles of
democracy for which the United Nations have fought in this war.
The fact that, as this Court can take judicial notice of, delivery of
certain persons under custody of the United States Army pursuant
to the said proclamation has already begun does not mean that
the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, which it
clearly has not. Such delivery is undoubtedly within the power of
the proper military authorities to make even before the termination
of the war. The existence of the military necessity to which
General of the Army MacArthur refers in his proclamation, as well

as its continuance, is a question exclusively for the military

authorities to determine, as regards each and every person under
detention. For obvious reasons, the civil courts should not here
interfere, and it is to be presumed that in the judgment of said
military authorities that necessity no longer requires the detention
by them of the persons whom they have already delivered to the
Philippine Government.

sovereign to whom they belong. And, again, by analogy, the

agreement, for the stationing of the United States Army or a part
of its forces in the Philippines implies as a waiver of all jurisdiction
over their troops during the time covered by such agreement, and
permits the allied general or commander in chief to retain that
exclusive control and discipline which the government of his army
may require.

It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a

friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its
government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and the criminal
jurisdiction of the place. "In such case, without any express
declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this right of
passage has been granted, it would certainly be considered as
violating his faith. By exercising it, the purpose for which the free
passage was granted would be defeated, and a portion of the
military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted
from those national objects and duties to which it was applicable,
and would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose
power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the
exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a
free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over
the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general
to use that discipline and to inflict those punishments which the
government of this army may require."

Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the present petitioners,

while under the custody of the United States military forces, may
be considered as prisoners of war.

In the case of the United States Army of liberation, not only has
the Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States
Government agreed, that it come and be stationed in the
Philippines, but it is here for the very realization of the overruling
and vehement desire and dream of the Filipino to be freed from
the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and to see this was brought to
a victorious end. If a foreign army permitted to be stationed in
a friendly country, "by permission of its government or
sovereign," is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction
of the place, with much more reason should the Army of the
United States which is not only permitted by the
Commonwealth Government to be stationed here but has
come to the islands and stayed in them for the express
purpose of liberating them, and further prosecuting the war
to a successful conclusion, be exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of this place, at least for the time
covered by said agreement of the two Governments. By
analogy, an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over
the United States Army before such period expires, would be
considered as a violation of this country's faith, which this Court
should not be the last to keep and uphold. By exercising it,
paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the purpose for which the
stationing of the army in the islands was requested or agreed
upon may be hampered or prejudiced, and a portion of said
military force would be withdrawn from the control of the

These military authorities, we can safely presume, will not deny to

the petitioners any remedy which may be available under the
military laws and under the prevailing circumstances. The
United States army forces which have come to the Philippines for
the express purpose of liberating the Filipinos and to restore them
the blessings of liberty under a democratic government, just as
fast as the military situation would permit, would not be we can
justly assume the very ones to take from them any of those
liberties without legal reason or justification. But the present state
of the world is such that military exigencies or military necessity
may, under certain circumstances, still require some limitation on
the restoration or enjoyment of those liberties. The present case
is, in our opinion, one such situation.

BAER vs TIZON
FACTS:
> Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for
injunction with the Court of First Instance against petitioner,
Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in
Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of
logging in an area and that the American Naval Base authorities
stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging
operations. A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge
(Tizon). American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their
appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a
foreign sovereign without its consent. That in directing the
cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the
Naval Base, petitioner was entirely within the scope of his
authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the
Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern
and most important duty of the Commander of the Base. In reply
to petitioner's motion to dismiss by respondent Gener, relying on
the principle that "a private citizen claiming title and right of
possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said
property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the
Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same
from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that
they are acting for the Government."
> Respondent Judge issued an order granting respondent
Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
> Petition for certiorari was filed with this Court. The prayer was
for the nullification and setting aside of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by respondent Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case will prosper?
RULING:
NO. The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit
of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate. More
specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is concerned, the
starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford. "It is well settled that a
foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to
be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place."

The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What

was sought by private respondent and what was granted by
respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the
performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in
accordance with the powers possessed by him under the
Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This point was
made clear in these words: "Assuming, for purposes of argument,
that the Philippine Government, through the Bureau of Forestry,
possesses the "authority to issue a Timber License to cut logs"
inside a military base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise
of rights under a timber license issued by the Philippine
Government to the exercise by the United States of its rights,
power and authority of control within the bases; and the findings
of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine
and United States Governments, that "continued logging
operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval
Base would not be consistent with the security and operation of
the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. .. The
doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would
result in a pecuniary charge against the sovereign or would
require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a
sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and
immediately to the most important public function of any
government - the defense of the state is equally as untenable
as requiring it to do an affirmative act." That such an appraisal is
not opposed to the interpretation of the relevant treaty provision
by our government is made clear in the aforesaid manifestation
and memorandum as amicus curiae, wherein it joined petitioner
for the grant of the remedy prayed for.
The renewal of his license expired on July 30, 1964, and to date
his license has not been renewed by the Bureau of Forestry.
"The enclosed map shows that the area in which Mr. Gener was
logging definitely falls within the boundaries of the base. This map
also depicts certain contiguous and overlapping areas whose
functional usage would be interfered with by the logging
operations.

TANADA vs ANGARA

ISSUE:

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by

the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three
multilateral institutions inspired by that grand political body, the
United Nations. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to
address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and
later developing countries; the second, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems;
and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which
was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to
minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge,
even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of
reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the
ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was
only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT
was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of
treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the
agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO

AGREEMENT CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS.
10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations,

the world finally gave birth to that administering body the World
Trade Organization.

Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are

Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the
Constitution.

Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as

articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos.

Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

FACTS:
> ARGUMENTS: (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to
place nationals and products of member-countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO
"intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this
Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the
1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Give
preference to qualified Filipinos and promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
> Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The
Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco,
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations.
> Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 that the Senate
concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.

RULING:
NO. This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the
petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the
Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by
the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses
scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations
and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos.
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment"
and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First"
policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional
conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the
clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to

ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative

procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions
contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in
national development and negate the preferential treatment
accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General
counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing
and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic
portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be
read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions
of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read
properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution;
and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to
protect developing countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.

its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross"

arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal
hostility" in such exercise.
--------------------------------JURISDICTION: Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty
"to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three
annexes.

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of

principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the
1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation"
by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII
are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time,
it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage
the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs GSIS

FACTS:
> Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel. In a close bidding only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share.
> Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. Petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust
Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
> Perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating
the sale to the Malaysian firm.
> PETITIONERs contentions:
- Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture.
- To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony.
- Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.
> RESPONDENTs contentions:
- Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate,
there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions
under which business may be done."
- Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila
Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony

which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters,

minerals
- Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of
the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 10 of Article XII of 1987
Constitution is self-executing?
RULING:
YES. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely
declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command
the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government providing
for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action.
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is
not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the

legislature without impairing

constitutional provisions.

the

self-executing

nature

of

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still

enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is

addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument
again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of
the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact
alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state
action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident
that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of
"state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is
no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
HEAD MONEY CASES

Significance: The Head Money Cases expanded the powers of

Congress to control immigration, to use taxation in regulating
commerce, and to repeal treaties with foreign countries.
Before the 1880s, individual U.S. states exercised the primary
role in the admission of immigrants. In the Immigration Act of
1882, Congress moved to assume greater control over
immigration policy. In order to obtain funds to compensate the
states for the burden of financing needy immigrants, Congress
approved a federal head tax of fifty cents on every immigrant.
Owners of passenger ships challenged the constitutionality of the
tax on the grounds that the tax was not applied uniformly
throughout the United States, that the law was not passed to
provide for common defense or general welfare, and that the tax
conflicted with foreign treaties previously approved by the Senate.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected each of the three
arguments against the head tax. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Samuel F. Miller explained, in the first place, that a fee was
uniform because it operates precisely alike in every port of the
United States where such passengers can be landed. Second,
the head tax was not to be considered as an exercise of the
taxing power, but rather it was a mere incident of the regulation
of commerce, designed to mitigate the evils inherent in the
business of bringing foreigners to the United States. Finally,
because the U.S. Constitution recognized treaties and federal
statutes to be of equal authority, Congress had almost an
unlimited discretion to modify or disregard treaties.
----The Act of Congress of August 8, 1882, "to regulate immigration,"
which imposes upon the owners of steam or sailing vessels who
shall bring passengers from a foreign port into a port of the United
States, a duty of fifty cents for every such passenger not a citizen
of this country, is a valid exercise of the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations.
But in this respect, so far as the provisions of a treaty can become
the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of the country, they
are subject to such acts as Congress may pass for their
enforcement, modification, or repeal.
These suits were brought to recover back sums collected at
various times as duties on immigrants arriving in the United
States, under the provision of the act "that there shall be levied,
collected, and paid a duty of fifty cents for each and every
passenger not a citizen of the United States, who shall come by

steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within the
United States." Protests were filed against each payment. The
suit is brought to recover from Robertson the sum of money
received by him, as collector of the port of New York, from
plaintiffs on account of their landing in that port passengers from
foreign ports, not citizens of the United States, at the rate of fifty
cents for each of such passengers, under the act of Congress of
August 3, 1882, entitled " An Act to regulate immigration."
That the plaintiffs are partners in trade in the city of New York
under the firm name of Funch, Edye & Co., and carry on the
business of transporting passengers and freight upon the high
seas between Holland and the United States of America as
consignees and agents."
There arrived, consigned to the plaintiffs, the Dutch ship Leerdam,
owned by certain citizens or subjects of the Kingdom of Holland
and belonging to the nationality of Holland, at the port of New
York. She had sailed from the foreign port of Rotterdam, in
Holland, bound to New York, and carried 382 persons not citizens
of tile United States." "That, among said 382 persons, 20 were
severally under the age of one year, and 9 were severally
between the ages of one year and eight years."
"That said collector, before allowing complete entry of said vessel,
as collector decided that the plaintiffs must pay a duty of one
hundred and ninety-one dollars for said passengers, being fifty
cents for each of said 382 passengers."
"That, by the regulations of the Treasury Department, the
nonpayment of said 191 dollars would have permitted the
defendant to refuse the complete entry of the vessel, or to refuse
to give her a clearance from the port of New York to her home
port, and such imposition would have created an apparent lien on
said vessel for said sum of 191 dollars." "On the defendants'
making such demand, the plaintiffs paid the same and protested
against the payment thereof."
"That, on the same day, the plaintiffs duly appealed to the
Secretary of the Treasury from such decision of the collector.
Secretary of the Treasury sustained the action of the defendant.
"That the payment set forth in the complaint herein was levied and
collected by defendant, and the same was paid under and in
pursuance of an act of Congress, entitled 'An Act to regulate
Immigration.
On the facts as thus agreed and as found by the Circuit Court, a
judgment was rendered in favor of defendant, which we are called
upon to review. That the purpose of these statutes is humane, is
highly beneficial to the poor and helpless immigrant.

A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It

depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and
the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail,
its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress,
which may, in the end, be enforced by actual war. It is obvious
that, with all this, the judicial courts have nothing to do, and can
give no redress. But a treaty may also contain provisions which
confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the
nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake
of the nature of municipal law and which are capable of
enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the
country. An illustration of this character is found in treaties which
regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the
contracting nations in regard to rights of property by descent or
inheritance when the individuals concerned are aliens. The
Constitution of the United States places such provisions as these
in the same category as other laws of Congress by its declaration
that "this Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof,
and all treaties made or which shall be made under authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."
A treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of Congress is
whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the
private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such
rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as
it would to a statute.
But, even in this aspect of the case, there is nothing in this law
which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. The Constitution
gives it no superiority over an act of Congress in this respect,
which may be repealed or modified by an act of a later date. Nor
is there anything in its essential character, or in the branches of
the government by which the treaty is made, which gives it this
superior sanctity.
In short, we are of opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the
United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of
judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to
such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement,
modification, or repeal.
It is enough to say that, Congress having the power to pass a law
regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country with
foreign nations, we see nothing in the statute by which it has here
exercised that power forbidden by any other part of the
Constitution.
The judgment of the Circuit Court in all the cases is Affirmed.

WHITNEY vs ROBERTSON
9

FACTS:
> Plaintiffs are merchants, doing business in the city of New York;
they imported a large quantity of 'centrifugal and molasses
sugars,' the produce and manufacture of the island of San
Domingo. These goods were similar in kind to sugars produced in
the Hawaiian islands, which are admitted free of duty under the
treaty with the king of those islands, and the act of congress
passed to carry the treaty into effect.
> Plaintiffs claiming that, by the treaty with the republic of San
Domingo, the goods should be admitted on the same terms, that
is, free of duty, as similar articles, the produce and manufacture of
the Hawaiian islands.
> The defendant, who was at the time collector of the port,
refused to allow this claim, treated the goods as dutiable articles
under the acts of congress, and exacted duties on them to the
amount of $21,936.
> The plaintiffs appealed from the collector's decision to the
secretary of the treasury, by whom the appeal was denied.
> They then paid, under protest, the duties exacted, and brought
the present action to recover the amount.

ISSUE:
Whether or not treaty prevails over a federal legislation?
RULING:
NO. They were pledges of the two contracting parties,
the United States and the king of Denmark, to each other, that, in
the imposition of duties on goods imported into one of the
countries which were the produce or manufacture of the other,
there should be no discrimination against them in favor of goods
of like character imported from any other country. They imposed
an obligation upon both countries to avoid hostile legislation in
that respect, but they were not intended to interfere with special
arrangements with other countries, founded upon a concession of
special privileges.'
It was never designed to prevent special concessions, upon
sufficient considerations, touching the importation of specific
articles into the country of the other. It would require the clearest
language to justify a conclusion that our government intended to
preclude itself from such engagements with other countries, which
might in the future be of the highest importance to its interests.
The act of congress under which the duties were collected,
authorized their exaction. It is of general application, making no

exception in favor of goods of any country. It was passed after the

treaty with the Dominican republic, and, if there be any conflict
between the stipulations of the treaty and the requirements of the
law, the latter must control.
By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and
made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land,
and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When
the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always
endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can
be done without violating the language of either; but, if the two are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other: provided,
always, the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is selfexecuting. If the country with which the treaty is made is
dissatisfied with the action of the legislative department, it may
present its complaint to the executive head of the government,
and take such other measures as it may deem essential for the
protection of its interests.
In these views we fully concur. It follows, therefore, that, when a
law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before
the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a previous
treaty not already executed. Considerations of that character
belong to another department of the government. The duty of the
courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the
sovereign will.

The court held that the treaty between the United States and the
Dominican Republic did not provide for any concessions of
special privileges, which exempted the imported sugar from
duties, and the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in favor
of the collector of the port.
The court held that the treaty did not cover concessions like those
made to the Hawaiian Islands for a valuable consideration.
The treaty imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid
hostile legislation that would discriminate against one country's
goods in favor of goods of like character imported from any other
country.
However, the treaties were not intended to interfere with special
arrangements with other countries founded upon a concession of
special privileges.
CONCLUSION
The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the collector of the port
who exacted duties on the merchants' goods.

------------------CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff merchants filed a complaint against defendant collector of
the port after he exacted duties on the merchants' goods and the
Secretary of the Treasury denied their appeal of the duties. The
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New
York entered judgment in favor of the collector of the port and the
merchants appealed.
CASE FACTS
Merchants, who imported sugars from San Domingo into the
United States, alleged that they should not have had to pay duties
on their imported products because the sugars were similar to
goods imported from the Hawaiian Islands, which were exempt
from duties.
DISCUSSION

10