PEARL HARBOR(On 7 December 1941)

On 7 December 1941, the Japanese surprise attack on the American

<aHREF="23213.htm"onMouseOver="drc('bahriyeye/donanmaya ait','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>naval</b></a> base at Pearl Harbor destroyed a
large <a HREF="23213.htm " onMouseOver="drc('parça','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>portion</b></a>of the U.S.
Pacific<aHREF="23213.htm"onMouseOver="drc('filo','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> fleet </b></a>and thrust the United States into the
Second World War. Following a moving speech by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congress
declared war on Japan the following day. Roosevelt stated that the "United States of America
was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the empire of Japan."
However, was the "day which will live in <a HREF="23213.htm "onMouseOver="drc('rezalet-
alçaklık','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> infamy
</b></a>"really a surprise attack, or were some high level American and British
officials, possibly even Roosevelt and Churchill, aware of Japanese intentions well
in advance?<br><br>
The attack came on the heels of the Japanese government's decision, under
Premier Hideki Tojo, that the United States would take an active role in the Pacific
theater in the event that Japan attacked Southeast Asia. With the dramatic
decrease in the amount of American oil and other <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc(' ham','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b> raw </b></a> materials being shipped to the Japanese, they realized
that the only way to maintain the <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('dürüstlük','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> integrity </b></a> of the Japanese military machine would be
to <a HREF="23213.htm " onMouseOver="drc('üye olmak','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> assimilate </b></a> the natural <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('kaynak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>resources </b></a> of Southeast Asia into
the empire. Therefore, war with America was <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('kaçınılmaz','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b>inevitable</b></a> and <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc(' önlenemez','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> unavoidable</b></a> . With this in mind, the Japanese began
<a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('görüşme','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>negotiations</b></a> with the United
States while <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('aynı zamanda olan','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b>simultaneously</b></a> preparing invasion plans of the American
Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya.<br><br>
One major <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('parça-bileşen','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> component
</b></a>of these invasion plans was to <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('etkisiz hale getirmek','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>neutralize</b></a> the greatest threat to
Japanese operations, the American Pacific fleet. With the presence of such a
formidable <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('rakip','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> opponent </b></a>, which had
established its home base at Pearl Harbor in May 1940, the Japanese realized that
it would be difficult to <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('boyun
eğdirmek','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b>subjugate</b></a> Southeast Asia. If the majority of the fleet was
eliminated in one <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('ani ve büyük
taarruz','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>massive
assault</b></a>, not only would they be able to <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('fetheden-zapteden','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>conqueor</b></a>these territories, but
they would also be able to <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('güçlendirmek','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b>fortify</b></a>them as well. <br><br>
The attack on Pearl Harbor was <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('planlamak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> devised </b></a>by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-
in- chief of the Combined Japanese Fleet. The surprise air attack against the
American fleet was a very high gamble. First, the Japanese fleet of six <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('uçak gemisi','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> aircraft carriers </b></a>, two <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('savaş gemisi','IELZ HELP:');
returntrue;"onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>battleships</b></a>, and a
number of <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('kruvazör','IELZ HELP:');
return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> cruisers</b></a>,
destroyers, and support <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('
gemi,tekne','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b>vessels</b></a> had to proceed undetected to within striking
distance of the <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('liman ','IELZ HELP:');
return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> port </b></a>. Then, once
the attack was completed, the fleet, with its <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('boşaltmak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> depleted </b></a> <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('cephanelik,silah deposu ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>arsenal</b></a>, had to return under the
threat of a counter attack. <br><br>
Under the direction of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the attack fleet <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('toplamak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>assembled </b></a> near the Kurile
Islands on 22 November after leaving Kure Naval base on 10 November. In order
to avoid detection, the fleet followed a storm front and kept strict radio silence
while Tokyo broadcast false commands to <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('tuzak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b> decoys </b></a>in other locations. The Japanese fleet arrived to
within 275 miles of Oahu and sent its first attack wave into the air at 6:00 AM.
This force, composed of 49 bombers, 40 <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('torpil','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b> torpedo </b></a> planes, 51 dive bombers, and 43 fighters, arrived
at Pearl at 7:55 AM (1:50 PM Washington time) and continued the <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('hücum,ani atak','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> assault </b></a> until 9:45 AM.
Shortly after the completion of the first attack, the second wave of 54 bombers,
78 <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('bombardıman uçağı','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> dive bombers
</b></a>, and 36 fighters arrived. In the end, nineteen ships were either
disabled or sunk, including all eight American battleships. In addition, 164 U.S.
planes were destroyed and 128 damaged while 2,335 American <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('denizci,bahriyeli','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> sailors </b></a>, soldiers, and
marines were killed along with 68 civilians and 1,178 were wounded. Although
Yamamoto's plan called for a third attack wave to destroy the 4.5 million gallons
of fuel oil and support facilities, Nagumo felt that the threat of a counter attack
was too great, so he ordered the fleet to turn towards home.<br><br>
When the news arrived about the attack on the continental United States,
the Americans were <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' sersemlemek
','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> stunned
</b></a>. Immediately, any talks of <a HREF="23213.htm "
onMouseOver="drc('yalıtım','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b>isolationism </b></a> or <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('barışseverlik','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> pacifism </b></a> were swept away. Yet, even though
Yamamoto's attack was a tactical success, it turned out to be a strategic failure.
With the repair facilities and fuel <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('
depo','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> depots
</b></a>still <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('bozulmamış','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> intact </b></a>, the
Americans quickly returned six of the eight battleships to active service. Also, the
<a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('denizaltı','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> submarine </b></a> facilities were still
intact, allowing the American submarine fleet to immediately threaten Japanese
shipping. <br><br>
Perhaps the most important reason why the attack on Pearl Harbor was a
strategic failure was the fact that the Pacific Fleet's three aircraft carriers were not
at Pearl. The <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('girişim','IELZ HELP:');
return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> Enterprise </b></a> was
delivering aircraft to Wake Island, the Lexington was on a similar mission to
Midway Island, and the Saratoga was being <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('yoklamak,onarmak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>overhauled </b></a> in California. Had
these carriers been at Pearl Harbor on that <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc(' hayati önemi olan ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> fateful </b></a> day, the war would have
taken a dramatically different course. As the war progressed, the Lexington was
lost at the Coral Sea after <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('yüklemek','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> inflicting </b></a>heavy losses on the Japanese military; the
Saratoga earned seven battle stars; and the planes from the Enterprise played an
important role in the destruction of four Japanese carriers at the battle of Midway.
Obviously, the loss of just one of these important vessels would have made the
American cause very difficult if not <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('korkunç','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> dire </b></a>.<br><br>
The Pearl Harbor attack led to eight investigations between 22 December 1941
and 15 July 1946. During these <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('celse','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> sessions </b></a>, a presidential
commission, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, found the commanders of
Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, guilty
of "dereliction of duty" due to the fact that there had been enough <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('dokunulabilir','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b> tangible </b></a> evidence to show that an attack was <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('yakında olacak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> imminent </b></a>.The commission concluded that the
political crisis alone was grounds for the commanders to place the entire facility
on alert.<br><br>
In order to <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('desteklemek ','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> buttress </b></a>
the <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' suçlama,itham ','IELZ HELP:');
return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> accusations </b></a>, the
Roberts commission also found four major <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc(' büyük hata ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> blunders </b></a> on the part of Kimmel and Short. First,
they discovered that in August 1941, the Army Air Corps had warned Pearl Harbor
of the possibility of a Japanese attack and that is would probably occur on a
Sunday -- a period of relative inactivity for the facility. Then, on 27 November,
intelligence officers in Washington <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('
bildirmek ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b>
notified </b></a> Kimmel and Short that Japanese ships and troop carriers were
moving south along the coast of China and that war would come at any day.
Rather than concluding that this aggressive Japanese move was a sign of a <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' kararlaştirilmamiş,askida ','IELZ HELP:');
return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> pending </b></a> attack on
American <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' tesisat,donanim ','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> installations
</b></a>, Kimmel and Short decided to turn their attentions to the prospect of
sabotage activities, since there was a large Japanese population on Oahu.
<br><br>
A third finding which led to the " <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('terketmek','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> dereliction </b></a> of duty" charge was the fact that on the
morning of the attack (4:00 AM), the American destroyer Ward intercepted and
fired upon a Japanese <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' çok küçük
,mini ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> midget
</b></a>submarine trying to enter Pearl Harbor. Although there were witnesses
to the action who claimed that the Ward had struck the submarine so as to create
a visible hole in its tail section, a report of the event did not reach headquarters
for several hours. There was even speculation after the attack that this vessel had
actually made it through the outer defenses and sunk the U.S.S. Arizona. The
fourth argument by the Roberts commission dealt with the apparent sighting of a
large force approaching Oahu from the northwest at 7:10 AM by the new Opana
radar station. The crew at Opana misinterpreted this as a group of B-17 bombers arriving from
the continental U.S., even though these American bombers would naturally be arriving from
the northeast.<br><br>
After the war, a committee was formed again in order to <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('araştirmak','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> investigate </b></a> the bombing. This <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('iki partili ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> bipartisan </b></a> committee, which
met from 15 November 1945 - 15 July 1946, obtained classified documentation
regarding the MAGIC system, a method by which the U.S. could <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('şifresini çözmek','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> decipher </b></a> diplomatic
codes sent through their "Purple" machine. After <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('dikkatle bakmak,incelemek','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> scrutinizing </b></a> this information,
their results were inconclusive. They found that although there was intense <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' denetlemek ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> monitoring </b></a> of Japanese naval
radio traffic in December 1941, the U.S. only had access to diplomatic <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('bildiri','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> communiqués </b></a> (In fact, from
March to December 1941, the U.S. missed only 4 messages out of 227 which were
sent from the Japanese <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('konsolosluk','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b>consulate </b></a>.) It wasn't until the development of ULTRA
in 1942 that the Americans could decipher any Japanese military codes.
Ultimately, the <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' tartışma ','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> debate </b></a>
over who was to <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' suçlamak ','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> blame </b></a>for
the blunder at Pearl Harbor became a partisan <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('ağız kavgası-tatışma','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> squabble </b></a>. Republicans
criticized the Roosevelt administration for their <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('ilgisizlik','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> lax </b></a> attitude while the Democrats placed the blame
entirely on the shoulders of Kimmel and Short. In the end, no one ever assumed
the <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('ağır yük','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> burden </b></a>of responsibility.
Kimmel and Short were not court <a HREF="23213.htm"
onMouseOver="drc('savaşla ilgili','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd();
return true;"><b> martialed </b></a>. <br><br>
Today, as more evidence comes to light, some scholars have claimed that
Roosevelt knew of the attack beforehand and that he allowed it to occur in order
to silence the isolationist-interventionist debate and enter the war in full <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('uzun adım','IELZ HELP:'); return true;"
onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> stride </b></a>. However, no smoking
gun has ever turned up to support this theory even though some of the details are
quite compelling. Since 1940, the U.S. had been supporting the British in their
attempts to hold back the Nazi threat while Japanese-American relations were
worsening by the day. American involvement in the Second World War was not
only becoming probable, but a <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('
zorluk- yoksulluk ','IELZ HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return
true;"><b> necessity </b></a>to the free nations of the world.<br><br>
There is even <a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' tahmin ','IELZ
HELP:'); return true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> speculation
</b></a> that British intelligence had broken the Japanese Navy's main
administrative code, JN25, in 1941 and Prime Minister Winston Churchill refused to
<a HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc('açığa çıkarmak','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> reveal </b></a> the <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' olması yatkın ','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> impending </b></a> attack to the
Americans so as to draw the U.S. into the conflict. Also, British double agent Dusko
Popov, in what became known as the Tricycle Affair, reported that Berlin had asked him to
procure information about Pearl Harbor in mid 1941 -- information which would have been <a
HREF="23213.htm" onMouseOver="drc(' nöbetleşe çalişmak ','IELZ HELP:'); return
true;" onMouseOut="nd(); return true;"><b> relayed </b></a>by the Japanese
consulate in Berlin to Tokyo through the "Purple" machine. Finally, Kimmel and
Short were not informed that spies were transmitting information from the
Japanese consulate at Honolulu about the disposition of the Pacific fleet at Pearl
Harbor; an event which surely would have place the entire installation on alert. All
in all, there is enough evidence to keep historians questioning what actually
occurred in the events leading up to 7 December 1941 -- a day which will live in
infamy but may always be shrouded in mystery. <br><br>
Prepared by Mehmet Emin ÇAĞLAR-2321
Taken from www.militaryhistory.com