Opening the Door a Crack

American Cryptology During the Korean War

Thomas H. Johnson

Editors Note: The Korean penin Headquarters (GCHQ) had been

sit/a was divided at the 38thpara lie! willing to divulge, until, at last,
aspart of war settlements deck/ed at enough pressure was mounted for
the Potsdam conference in July a more general declassification
1945. Less than five years later, on effort. Larger and larger volumes of

25Ju 7W 1950, North Korean forces World War II documents emerged

invaded South Korea. In response to into public view, until by the end
a Un i/ed Nations (UN) callfor of the century virtually no bars
troops to restore peace, the United remained to a complete release.
States committedground, aft; and
navalforces conflict before
to the With Korean war cryptology, we
With Korean war
the end ofJune Pushing north are still in the early stage of declas
ward, UNforces reached the China sification fifty years after the
cryptology, we are still in border on 20 Novetnbet triggering outbreak of the war. NSA has
the early stage of Chinese assault the Yalu
a across recently declassified a few histori
declassification fifty river into Korea.Fighting eventu cal summaries, but has not yet
stalemated the original
years after the outbreak ally release any reports from
near
begun to

border bet wee;z the two Koreas. An the itself.2 So what do

of the war. war we

armistice, signed on 27July 1953. know about cryptology in Korea?

providedfor/he continued pres Some of our knowledge preceded
ence of US troops on Korean sot!. the official declassification effort.
The United States suffered more his
When Clay Blair wrote history
than 140,000 casualties during the of the Korean war in the 1980s, he
engagement. A peace treaty hasP incorporated some tantalizing bits
never been signed. and pieces about the role of
exploited North Korean messages,
... ... ...
especially as it related to the Pusan
perimeter.3 More recently,
Allied silence about the role of
researcher Matthew Aid has
cryptology in World War II was bro
ken tn 1974 by the publication of 2As of July 2001, NSAs website

Frederick Winterbothams The Ultra (www nsagov) listed five papers related to
Dr. Thomas R. Johnson is a
Korea Jill Frahm, so Power Can be Brought
Secret. The world had waited
35-year veteran of cryptology into Play, SIG1NT and the Pusan Perimeter.
almost 30 years for the beginning David A. Hatch and Rohen L. Benson, The
operations. Currently associated
of a declassification program for Korean War. The SIGINT Backgroond; Tho
with CIAs Center for the Study of the
mas W Johnson, General Essay on

he is the author of World War II communications intel

Intelligence, a Korean War, originally published in Ameri
classified four-volume history of ligence (COMINT). A few spare can Cnptologv Dunug the Cold War 1945-

historical accounts written during 1989, Book / The stntggfe for Cent ral:za non.
American cryptology during the
1945-1960 (Fort Meade NSA, 1995), pp- 36-
Cold War. and immediately after the war rep SIGINT and Cold-
56, Patrick D. Weadon,
resented most of what the National SEC Help Save the Day at Pusan, and cryp
rologic Background to the Chinese
Security Agency (NSA) and the UK
Intervention, by an anonymous retired NSA
Government Communications officer.
3Clay Blair. The Forgotten War America ii,
This article is unclassified in its New York
Frederick Winierboihani, The (litre
W, secret Korea, 7950-1953 (New York
(New York~ Harper and Row, 1974) Times Books, 1987)
entirety.

29
Cryptology

Within years of the end

of World War II,
American cryptology was
ferreted out a larger part of the distance by setting up its headquar
a hollow shell of its
story.4 When we put what they ters in San Antonio. Texas.
have published together with the former self.
accounts recently released by NSA, Amid all the bickering came signs
we can assess what we know and, of professional failure. Until 1948,
by implication, what we do not yet the Army and Navy had been read
know. believed that the codebreakers ing many of the codes of the new
could do anything they set their prime target, the Soviet Union.
minds to and that their successes Then, in the space of less than a

Postwar Letdown would continue into the trackless year, the lights went out. The USSR
future. changed everythingits codes and
Korea can best he understood in ciphers, its communications proce
terms of World War II, which has Within years of the end of World dures, and the very equipment that
been described as a SIGINT sig War II. however, American cayptol it used. The cryptologic commu
nals intelligence] War.5 By the end ogy was a hollow shell of its former nity referred to what had happened
of the war, the Americans and Brit self. When the soldiers and sailors as Black Friday. In fact, it didnt

ish, with help from the Canadians went home in

1945, so did the happen on a Friday, but evolved
and Australians. were able to read cryptologists. Permanently lost to over several months. The bottom
most of the important crypto cryptology were William P. Bundy, line was the
same: the cornucopia

graphic systems that the Axis Lewis F. Powell, Edwin 0. Reis ofexploitable messages disap
nations employed. Harry Hinsely, chauer, Alfred Friendly, and Telford peared and Washington was caught
the British intelligence historian and Taylor, as well as mathematicians short.
direct participant in matters crypto Joe Eachus, Andrew Gleason, and a

logic, has written that the war was host of others. And this was just on Woe piled upon woe. In 1949,
probably shortened by six months the American side. The British lost, Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan,
as a result of SIGINT successes. I among others, Alan Turing, cred and Mao and the Communists came

would put the number at four to six ited by some as the inventor of the to power on mainland China. Their
months. Even if it were only four modern digital computer. The loss communications were no more

months, try cunning the numbers of talentwas accompanied by a cat exploitable than those of the Soviet
on likely additional Allied casual astrophic budgetary collapse. Union.
ties over that period. Or. looking at

the issue in another way, if the Rus The lack of resources was com In 1949, the feuding cryptologic
sian troops were on the Elbe in pounded by bureaucratic infighting. agencies attempted a union of

May 1945, how far might they

west A wartime feud between Army and sorts, called the Armed Forces
have moved by September? Navy cryptologists continued into Security Agency (AFSA). AFSA,
the post-war period. Then a new however, lacked the authority to

Among the generals and admirals groupthe Air Force Security Ser control its nominal subordinates.
who benefited from COMINT, Vice (USAFSS). established on Instead of one umbrella agency
expectations rose. knowing or Not 20 October 1948joined the fray. overseeing three military service
understanding the black arts by Although the USAFSS began as a departments, four more-or-less
which these things were done, they weak sister, it benefited from the coequal organizations competed for
Air Forces ability to get money resources in a shrinking pool.
4Marihew M, Aid, u.s. Humint and Comini
from Congress and soon became Moreover, as a creation of the Joint
in the Korean War From the Approach of
War the chinese
the largest of the three service cryp Chiefs of Staff (JCS), AFSA gave pri
to iniervenuon, InteIl~gence
and National Secants Vol 14, No 4, Winier tologic agencies. It also became the ority to military requirements,
1999
most parochial, separating itself resulting in bitter complaints from
Waiter Laqucur. A World of Secrets The Uses
and L,niits
from the cryptologic community by civilian customers, especially the
of iiztellige#zcu (New York Basic
Books. 1985), physical as well as psychic CIA and the State Department. At
 Cryptology

When it came to COMINT

on Korea, the Armed
Forces Security Agency
AFSAs founding, the United States however, it took the first
had no arrows In its
was already unable to exploit the designated Army SIGINT unitthe
communications of its two princi quiver. 60th Signal Service Company at Fort
pal antagonists and it was just Lewis, Washingtonthree and a
months short of its next major war.
half months the
to arrive on scene.

(ROK) armed forces numbered

Wake Up Call in Korea barely 100,000 poorly armed and the Breach
Filling
inadequately trained infantry troops
When it came to COMINT on against a North Korean army of The Air Force actually beat ASA to
Korea, AFSA had no arrows in its about 135,000 fully trained soldiers
Korea. Its first I U.
representative,
quiver. Like the rest of the Intelli with tanks and artillery. The United
Edward arrived in
Murray, Taegu
gence Community, it had only the States had only a 500-man Korean
on 19 July 1950, almost two months
most tenuous and insubstantial Military Aid Group on the penin ahead of hisArmy counterparts.
requirements to work withkeep sulait was designed to show the
Using equipment borrowed from
ing a general eye on the Soviet flag, notdefend the country. The
the USAFSS unit in Tokyo, he
posture on the peninsula and little US contingency plan for Korea was
attempted to set up a tactical SIG
else. No one in the US Govern to evacuate posthaste to Japan.
TNT organization to support the 5–
ment seemed worried about Korea,
and AFSA, preoccupied with juris After initial
hesitation, the United
Air Force. Murray, however, found
dictional little that the 5– Air Force already had
disputes, gave it Statesresponded to the UN call for
It had SIGINT support, courtesy of
attention plenty of other troops and entered the fray. Presi one

work to keep it busy. Even worse, dent Truman ordered Gen. Douglas Donald Nichols. A murky figure,
AFSA had no technical expertise on MacArthur in Japan to Nichols lived in Seoul, had a
scrape
Korea. It had only one self-taught together a defensive force and send reserve commission as an Air Force
Korean linguist, no Korean dictio it to Korea. American forces began major, and headed the local Office
naries, no Korean typewriters, and arriving the South Korean port of
at of Special Investigations. Quite on
no books on Korea. Until April Pusan in late June, and Gen. Wal his own, he had set up a hip-

1950, it had no Korean communica ton Walker, commander of the US pocket SIGINT intercept and
tions collection of any kind. As it 8ih Army, hastily assembled Ameri reporting service using native Kore
happened, late in 1949 one of its can forces and remnants of the ans The most prominent of these
units in the Far East had collected ROK Arm) to try to hold a line.
were Cho Yong II, a former North
some traffic that looked like Soviet
Korean Army radio operator and
communications, but, when finally ASA, the Armys cryptologic organi
cryptanalyst, and Kim Se Won, a
analyzed months later, turned out zation, was caught just as flat
captain in the ROK navy. Kim had
to be Korean. On 21 April 1950, footed everyone else. Initially,
as
served with the Japanese SIGINT
AFSA tasked an Army Security Walker had little or no SIGINT sup
service in World War II and, hav
Agency (ASA) unit near Kyoto, port The first ASA contingent did
ing been interned in Hawaii for a
Japan, to collect more Korean traf not arrive until 9 September, six
fic. By mid-June, however, Kyoto days before the US behind period of time, had a good grasp of
landing
had collected virtuatly nothing. enemy lines at Inchon. This contin English. Together, they had a going
advance unit from concern. Nichols, in turn, reported
gent was an

Following World War II, Korea had Hawaii, with minimal the material as thinly disguised
capability
been teft outside the American HUMINT. The 5h Air Force didnt
ASAs plan was to support 8t1 Army
defensive perimeter in the Far East. with one communications recon want Murray. After taking posses
When the North Koreans invaded naissance battalion sion of his
badly needed
at Army level,
the South in June 1950, they met lit and a battalion assigned to each of equipment, they sent him back to
tle opposition. Republic of Korea the three subordinate corps; Japan.
Cryptology

The SIGINT
improvements came just
in time for Gen. Walkers
This development did not accord the attack, permitting him to shift
defense of the Pusan
with either the plans of Mac his forces in time.

Arthurs intelligence chief (G2) or perimeter.

US cryptologic doctrine. Murray
back Predicting Chinas Intervention
was sent to Korea twice,
finally managing to set up a direct
The SICINT improvements came The 8th Army rolled north after the
support organization. In Novem
just in time for Gen. Walkers 15 September landing of US forces
ber, he repossessed his equipment
defense of the Pusan perimeter. at Inchon. By the end of the
and incorporated the unit estab
Walker established his defensive month, American and ROK troops
lished by Cho for language support.
31 July, the last US stood at the 38th parallel.
poised
Kim and Cho had had
perimeter on as
By this time,
troops fled across the Naktong river Syngman Rhee, the committed anti-
a falling out, and Kim had hooked
Communist who headed South
near Taegu, north of Pusan. With
up with ASA to provide language
interior lines but inferior forces, Koreas government, scarcely hesi
support, while Cho remained with tated before ordering his troops
Walker frantically shuttled his
Nichols and the Air Force. \Vith the the postwar divide into
across
troops to points of North Korean
appearance of a full-fledged North Korea. MacArthur, too, gave
attack. He was able to hold the line
USAFSS direct support unit, Nichols a green light, and the US Army
largely due knowing where
to the
seems to have disappeared from steamed into the north.
North Koreans were going to
the cryptologic scene.
attack, information coming prima
The US objective was the Yalu
rily from SIGINT reports. From
Although cryptologic
the service river, which marked the Korean
31 July until the Inchon invasion in
agencies were not yet on duty in border with Manchuria. The JCS
September relieved the pressure by
Korea, AFSA was already hard at considered this risky in view of
North Korean forces, Walker contin
work on the problem. \Vithin a few possible Chinese intervention in the
ued to juggle his forces using
and questioned MacArthur
days of the North Korean invasion, information from North Korean
war

AFSA analysts were working closely. President Truman was so

messages. It was a classic illustra
24 hours a day As many collection concerned that he flew to Wake
tionof the adage that intelligence is
Island to discuss the military situa
positions as could be spared from appreciated primarily by the defen tion with MacArthur in mid-
Soviet and Chinese intercept duty
sive side
were diverted to Korean cover
October. The general contended
that there was nothing to worry
ageinitially twelve positions, all The highlight of this early phase of about from the Chinese.
located in Japan. the stmggle was an offensive near
Walkers headquarters at Taegu on
All the time, however, AFSA had
In those early days, North Korean An AFSA report based
31 August. been publishing reports pointing to
communications were mdimentary on exploited North Korean mes
probable Chinese intervention. The
and exploitable, and AFSA set
sages contained much of the North great bulk of the information came
about to attack them. After three Korean battle plan. We know little from Chinese civil communica
weeks of work, AFSA had its first about how Walker got this sup tions, which cartied large votumes
breakthrough against North Korean port. ASKs units had not yet of routine logistics and movement
communications on 14 July, fol arnved and there appears to have orders for Chinese military units. As
lowed by a string of additional been no mechanism for Walker to early as July, AFSA had began not
successes The 16-31 July issue of receive AFSA reports; the general ing referencesto army units

the AFSA Semi-Monthly Report may have been relying ROK

on
moving north. Rail hubs in central
noted that North Korean communi intelligence from the Kim and Cho China were jammed with soldiers
cations matters were much unit. In any event, the information on their way to Manchuria. By Sep
improved. reached Walker two days before tember, AFSA had identified six of

32
 Cryptology

Ignoring the SIGII4T

reports on Chinese troop

movements was one of
the nine field armies that were later the Chosen reservoir in northeast
the most famous
involved in the fighting in North Korea A Marine radio company,

Korea and had located them in

miscalculations in trained for COMINT support, was at

Manchuria, near the Korean bor modern American Camp Pendleton in California, but
der. Ferries at Anshan (on the Yalu did deploy Korea because it
military history. not to

river) were being reserved for mili lacked the necessary equipment
tary use. Maps of Korea being
were and was not considered combat
ordered in quantities large enough The system of tactical inter
ready.
to equip 30 divisions. On 7 Novem cept support to Marine units that
Committee had changed its
ber, inradiotelephone
a
had been established so labori
conversation intercepted and pub
opinion, saying that, although there
was convincing evidence that star
ously in World War II had almost
lished by AFSA, an East European
tling numbers of Chinese forces disappeared. It took the entire
ambassador in Beijing stated, We
were in Manchuria, the time for Korean war to reestablish a sem
are already at war here
intervention had blance of what had been available
passed. They con

cluded that the Chinese would not earlier.

This was not news to the RON
intervene. This judgment was not
Army. On 25 October, a ROK divi
supported by COMINT Encounters
sion had been badly mauled by with Chinese ground and air forces SIGINT Challenges
elements of the Chinese 4ui~ Army, in late October and early Novem
earlier reported by AFSA to be
ber eventually caused the Watch As the situation settled into grim
close to Korea. Five days later, Mac Committee to take another look. trench warfare in central Korea, the
Arthurs chief of staff. Ned Almond,
SIGINT organizations tried to shore
reported that he had seen Chinese
Ignoring the SIGINT reports on Chi up their capabilities. The most
prisoners being held by a RON
of
nese troop movements was one pressing problem was to find
unit. On 1 November, a Chinese
the most famous miscalculations in enough linguists. The requirement
force attacked a US unit for the first
modern American military history. to translate three different lan
time. But Charles Willoughby, Mac MacArthur determined to
was press guages severely stretched
Arthurs Cr2, preferred to believe ahead with offensive operations to
cryptologic resources throughout
that these encounters represented reach the Yalu and get the boys the war.
isolated Chinese volunteers rather home by Christmas. On the snap
than division-strength regular Chi cold of 25 November,
ping night ASA had only two Korean lin
nese Army units. thousands of Chinese soldiers fell
guistsDick Chun and Y. P.
on unsuspecting units of the Kimand both were assigned to
Throughout the fall of the year, 8thArmy. The American offensive the language school in Monter
there was great uneasiness in Wash quickly turned into a defensive,
rey. The choice was to leave
ington about what the Chinese and the defensive into a rout, with
them in California to train future
would do. Intelligence agencies casualties. Both
high Arm) and Air
Korean linguists or transfer them
started to pay closer attention. The Force SIGINT units tarried too long
Watch Committee of the to the front. Both found them
Joint Intel and were nearly overrun before
selves with tickets to Korea. Two
ligence Committee, which began escaping to the south.
linguists would hardly suffice,
noting Chinese troop movements as

however. ASA acquired a translat

early as June, concluded by Sep The Marines apparently had no
tember the basis of AFSA ing service of its own, the so-
(partly on SIGINT support throughout the
called Kim unit, named after the
reporting) that these troops were war, at least at the tactical level
Kim of the earlier Kim and Cho
moving north rather than to the The most infamous incident was

coastal provinces near Taiwan. By the retreat of the P Marine Divi unit. Cho and his unit hooked up

mid-October, however, the Watch sion, which had been trapped at with USAFSS and provided stellar
Cryptology

Many believe that the

SIGINT warning
the
operation was partly and the the
translating service throughout College Army to cam
responsible for the
war pus of Ewha College. ASA units
enormous American kill were flung along the wavering

Another critical need was
nese linguists. The SIGINT
services partially solved the prob
1cm by hiring Nationalist Chinese
officers from Taiwan. This pro
for Chi ratio in the air war. front north of Seoul. They were
organized into small tactical sup
port units, mostly with manual
Morse positions. Morse communica
tions proved difficult to exploit and

cess was slow, however. Korean communications, with a were of little value in the tactical

rear detachment in Pyongyang to environment. ASA analysts did

Finally, there was the Russian intercept Soviet and Chinese apply traffic analysis, however, to

problem. Russian air forces had messages related to the war. As UN establish an order of battle for ihe
established a communications net troops fled south in December North Korean army.
-
in China to serve military and 1950, evenPyongyang was out of
civilian aircraft at airfields in the question, and the Air Force Most of ASAs value in Korea
Korea and Manchuria by July eventually set up its operations in stemmed from its intercept of Chi
1950. Early the following year, Pyongtaek, well south of the nese and Korean voice
COMINT intercepts showed 35thparallel. Here the Air Force communications. Much of that
Soviet control offighter activity in attempted, with limited success, to came from the detection of Chi
the northernmost regions of support American ground control nese telephone conversations being
Korea, and Soviet pilots were lers with SIGINT. carried through the ground and
noted frequently in air-to-air and picked up by sensors originally
air-to-ground conversations. Once the UN forces had regained designed to detect the tramp of
the initiative, Seoul was safe, and advancing enemy troops. (Such
Before the Chinese intervention. both Air Force and Army cryptolo ground-wave intercept techniques
the Air Force had dreamed of set gists moved their headquarters to had been pioneered during World

ting up a cryptologic outpost in the western suburbs of Seoulthe War I.) This serendipitous discov

Sinanju, far to the north, for North Air Force to Chosen Christian ery resulted in the formation of
low-level voice intercept (LLVI)
units. Later, ASA units also inter

cepted Korean voice

communications, and many of the

LLVI teams wound up having to

provide translations in two lan

guages. The program was limited

only by the availability of good lin
guists By wars end, there were

22 LLVI teams in Korea, a testa

ment to success.

Success Stories

The dull trench warfare was occa

sionally punctuated by fierce battles

where SIGINT played a crucial role.
One such encounter, an attempt by

Army Security Agency Direction Finding Unit in the Mountains of Korea- (NSA photo) the Chinese Communist troops to

34
 Cryptology

take Hill 395 in central Korea in responsible for the enormous communications. Use of
1952, came to be known as the American kill ratio in the air war. frequencies above HF was still
Battle of White Horse Mountain. As the front lines moved farther experimentaL When USAFSS opera
Intercepted Chinese communica north, the USAFSS operation was tors in Korea could no longer hear

tions gave the Americans warning transferred to Kimpo airport to enemy pilots, however, they con
of the attack. ASA rushed an inter remain collocated with the Tactical cluded that the reason had to he a

cept unit the spot, and it fed

to Air Control Center (TACC), \vhich change in transmission frequency.
American commanders with hard controlled theair war. In August

intelligence the battle pro

as 1951, the TACC and its Security Ser This adverse development coin

gressed. The Chinese lost 10,000 vice unit moved again, to Pyong cided with the arrival of Lt. Delmar

troops out of the 23,000 they had Yong-Do (referred to by the GIs as Lang with the first batch of school-
committed. In March 1953, COM P-Y-Do), a small island in the East trained American Chinese linguists
INT also tipped off Chinese China Sea north of the 3~th parallel. in mid-1952. Lang took stock of the
planning for offensives at Old Here they continued the warning situation. The voice conimunica

Baldy and Pork Chop Hill. operation, called Yoke, in tandem tions that he and his people were

with the TACC. The P-Y-Do opera trained intercept were no longer
to

Air Force SIGINT operations bene tion was closed down a month later hearable. Meanwhile, the TACC had
fited from Soviet air warfare and TJSAFSS returned to Seoul. All moved from Kimpo to Cho-Do
doctrine, which called for fighter Air Force SIGINT warning was col Island, off the east coast of Korea
aircraft to be closely managed by located at Chosen Christian College, near the North Korean port of Won-

ground controllers who were where analysts had available, for son. Tactical SIGINT support now

watching the battle on radar. the first time in one geographic involved the laborious process of
USAFSS discovered Russian voice location, intercepts of North intercepting at Chosen and relay
communications in the early spring Korean, Chinese, and Soviet com ing to Kimpo, with a further relay
of 1951, and set up a mobile inter munications, both Morse and voice. to the TACC at Cho-Do. The

cept hut at Pyongtaek in central answer? Move the USAFSS inter

Korea. As they listened to the cept operation to Cho-Do.
Soviet pilots talking to the ground The VHF Complication
controllers in North Korea, their

biggest concern was security. No Thisidyllic situation began to

one on operations side was
the change almost as soon as it
cleared for the information, so they beganthe target refused to remain
had to disguise it as American radar static. Intercepts of tactical air voice

plots. They would call the informa communications began drying up.
tion over a landline connected to Air Force analysts suspected that

the operations building. The Ameri the enemy was starting to use very
can Air Force controller could then high frequency (VHF) ranges for
pass the information on to the transmission. VHF can only be

pilots, mixing it with radar plots. intercepted at locations within the

On no occasion was anyone in line of sight of the transmitter. Sub
USAFSS ever permitted to take the urban Seoul was just too far away.
next obvious step and talk directly
to the pilots in the air. VHF usage had first appeared dur
ing World War II, but had been in
The SIGINT warning operation sig~ its infancy. In the five years follow

nificantly expanded the range of ing the end of the war, the worlds
coverage beyond American radars, military organizations had contin Deirnar Lang on cho-Do isiand In 1952
and many believe that it was partly ued to use high frequency (HF) for (NSA photo)

35
Cryptology

The real tragedy of Korea

was that the lessons
learned the hard way,
Tests on Cho-Do in August con The Korean war spelled the demise
firmed that enemy through battlefield of AFSA. American officers who
pilots were now

using VHF for communications and experience, were had considered readable high-level
that those communications were promptly forgotten. They enemy communications almost a

hearable from the island. Lang and had to be re-learned in birthright during World War II
the USAFSS contingent headed for voiced their unhappiness at the
Vietnam.
Cho-Do. They set up intercept turn of events. Two important cus

operations about three-quarters of a tomers, the CIA and the State

mile from the TACC, and Lang Department, viewed AFSAs organi
placed a linguist in the TACC next zational problems with alarm.
the tactical air controller. He had At the same time, AFSA was losing
to Fragmented control and duplicated
field his desk, the bureaucratic struggle to central
a phone sitting on resources, they believed, were
with the other end at the USAFSS ize American cryptology. The three resulting in the JCS squeezing CIA
service ciyptologic organizations and State SIGINT requirements out
intercept unit. Combined with the
went their own way, ignoring or
improved ability to hear, the new of the picture in favor of straight
lash-up at Cho-Do Island provided defying AFSA orders. AFSA. for our military iargets. To them, it was

the best support that LJSAFSS mus example, had established a rule all part of a palpable decline in the
tered during the entire war. In one that it would control all resources e1fectiven~ss of American SIGINT.
which Lang described the that resided at fixed field sites,
day, as
~hile the services would control In December
great Korean turkey shoot, Ameri 1951, Walter Bedell
can F-86s downed fifteen MiGs
those that were mobile. At the Smith, the crusty Director of Cen
without a loss, even though none time, virtually all sites (except those tral Intelligence, wrote a

of the MiGs was ever seen on

with tactical Army units in Korea) memorandum to the National Secu
American radar. The information were regarded as fixed. USAFSS
rity Council, recommending that a

came, of course, from the COMINT simply reversed fixed and committee he established to sur

Cho-Do. A visiting mobile. An Air Force general A.merican COMINT. The NSC
operation on vey
ASA colonel commented that it commented wryly that the sites forwarded the letter to President
ducks were about as mobil~ as the Eiffet Truman. The that ended the
was just like shooting in a events

rain barrel. Tower. With the stroke of a pen, life of AFSA and led to the estab
however, the Air Force had lishment of the National Security
removed its collection resotirces unfold.
Agency began to
Back in Washington from AFSA control.

Meanwhile, AFSA was having a With AFSA powerless to intervene In Conclusion

hard time of it. North Korean com in jurisdictional fights, a nasty row

munications, so exploitable earlier broke out between ASA and From what we can now glimpse,
in the war, dried up in the summer USAFSS about which one would the bottom line on SIGINT in the
of 1951. The North Koreans target air-related communications Korean war paralleled the overall
adopted Soviet communications The result was that both of them American experience during that
procedures, and the communica targeted the same communications, war. There were successes and
tions nets that AFSA had been while leaving other targets unat there were failures, but the failures
exploiting earlier no longer yielded tended. This approach not only tended to overshadow the suc

useful intelligence. This develop wasted resources, but also violated cesses. The war ended in a draw, a

ment made Korean war SIGINT the sense of decorum that should highly discomfiting outcome for the
mostly a tactical
problemthere have prevailed within the Intelli American public, thegenerals and
was little strategic information avail gence Community. It had become admirals who led the fight, and the
able from AFSA in Washington an all-out food fight. men and women who fought it.

36
 Cryptology

SIGINT. too, ended in a draw. What the outlines of a successful tactical

tactical successes there were, were SIGINT support system.

gained only after long delay and

prodigious effort. Unready for The real tragedy of Korea was that

Korea, American cryptologists rose the lessons learned the hard way,

unsteadily to the challenge and through battlefield experience,

were knocked down several times were promptly forgotten. They had

by enemy haymakers. Resources to he re-learned in Vietnam a

were inadequate. organization was decade later. The Army was no

sometimes chaotic, and expertise more ready for tactical SIGINT sup
had to be acquired laboriously. port in Vietnam than it had been in

Still, SIGINT did make a difference Korea. Delmar Lang had to be sent

on a number of occasions. It was to Saigon to show the Air Force

not quite what had been achieved how to do tactical warning. But that

in \Vorld War 11, hut it did establish is a story for a future article.

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