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Judge Blue Ruling
Judge Blue Ruling
CR07-0241859
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
) ) )
NEW HA VEN JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SUPERIOR COURT
v.
STEVEN HAYES
JUNE 30, 2010
CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
RE MOTION REQUESTING SEALING OF CERTAIN PLEADINGS
FILED BY THE DEFENDANT
& MOTION REQUESTING CLOSURE OF COURTROOM
I. INTRODUCTION.
The defendant, Steven Hayes, stands accused of three murders arising out of an alleged
2007 home invasion in Cheshire. The State is seeking the death penalty. The case has been a
cause celebre, and the trial, scheduled to begin on September 13, 2010, will be a matter of
considerable public interest. Notwithstanding the notoriety of the case, an impartial jury has been
selected, and each selected juror has specifically been instructed to avoid all publicity concerning
the case until such time as the verdict has been delivered.
On June 23,2010, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress ("motion to
suppress") certain verbal statements that he allegedly made following his apprehension on July
23,2007. On the same date, he filed a separate motion in limine ("motion in limine") contesting
the admissibility of a certain library book.
Also on June 23, 2010, accompanying the motions just described, the defendant filed two
additional motions now before the court: (1) a Motion Requesting Sealing of Certain Pleadings
Filed by the Defendant ("Sealing Motion"), and (2) a Motion Requesting Closure of Courtroom Judicial District of New Haver,
SUPERIOR COURT FILED
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JUN 30 2010
~HIEF CLERK'S OFF"
("Closure Motion"). The Sealing Motion seeks to seal the motion to suppress and the motion in
limine. The Closure Motion seeks to close the courtroom during the hearing on the motion to
suppress and the motion in limine.
On June 23,2010, immediately after the filing of the Sealing Motion and the Closure
Motion, pursuant to P.B. §§ 42-49(e) & 42-49A(e), the Court calendered a hearing on these
motions to be held on June 29,2010. On June 24,2010, the New Haven Register published a
story concerning these motions on its front page. Under these circumstances, ample notice has
been given to all interested parties.
The Hartford Courant Company ("Courant") has intervened and opposed the Sealing
Motion and the Closure Motion.
The Sealing Motion and the Closure Motion were heard on June 29,2010. The State
takes no position on the motions in question. The issues have been joined by the defendant and
the Courant.
The defendant informed the court at the hearing that, based upon certain representations
by the State, he would not claim the motion in limine. He requested that, pursuant to P. B. § 7-
4B(d)(I), the Clerk return the lodged motion in limine to him and not place it in the court file.
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Neither the State nor the Courant opposed this request.
The evidentiary hearing addressed by the Closure Motion is presently scheduled to
commence on July 14, 2010,
IT. DISClTSSION.
Under the Practice Book; there is "a presumption that documents filed with the court shall
be available to the public." P. B. § 42-49A(a). There is a corresponding "presumption that
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courtroom proceedings shall be open to the public." P.B. § 42~49(a). These presumptions maybe
overcome "only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an
interest which is determined to override the public's interest" in "viewing such materials" and
"attending such proceeding." P.B. §§ 42N49(c) & 42N49A(c).
The Practice Book rules just cited are rooted in fundamental constitutional principles. The
First Amendment protects the freedom of the press, and the Sixth Amendment protects the right
of public trial. Public trials ensure that judges and prosecutors "carry out their duties
responsibly," encourage "witnesses to come forward," and discourage perjury. Waller v. Georgia,
467 U.S. 39,46 (1984). "These aims and interests are no less pressing in a hearing to suppress
wrongfully seized evidence." Id.1 Hence, the party seeking sealing or closure "must advance an
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overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced." Id., at 48.
The "overriding interest" asserted in the motions now before the Court is the defendant's
constitutional "right to a fair trial by an impartial jury." The existence of this right is, of course,
fundamental to the rule oflaw. There has, however, been no showing that the sealing and closure
sought here are necessary to protect the right in question. As mentioned, an impartial jury has
1 Two somewhat dated Connecticut authorities cited by the defendant - State v. Couture, 37 Conn. Supp. 705, 707, 435 A.2d 369 (App. Sess. Super. Ct. 1981) & State v. Burak, 37 Conn. Supp, 627, 630,431 A.2d 1246 (App. Sess. Super. ct. 1981) - expressly proceed on the assumption that a lesser level of scrutiny applies to the review of pretrial courtroom closures. After Waller, this distinction is no longer viable. In addition, it appears that the proposed courtroom closures at issue in the Connecticut authorities just cited were pre-voir-dire closures, designed to avoid contamination of the jury pooL The same is true of a Mississippi precedent relied upon by the defendant. Mississippi Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So.2d 1163, 1164 (Miss. 1987). As discussed in the text, the post-voir-dire posture of the motions at issue in the present case is quite different. For the same reason, the pre-voir-dire decision of Damiani, J. to redact certain portions of the search warrant application in the present case addressed issues quite different from those now before the Court.
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been selected. Each selected juror has specifically been instructed to avoid all publicity
concerning the case until the verdict of the jury has been delivered. Each selected juror has been
selected following an exhaustive individual voir dire. Each selected juror is an intelligent and
emotionally mature individual who fully understands the obligations of the juror's oath to decide
the case based on the evidence presented in court.
The Sealing Motion can be dealt with swiftly. The only document that the defendant now
seeks to seal is the motion to suppress. The motion to suppress does not set forth the content of
the statements sought to be suppressed. The Court has carefully examined this document and sees
nothing in it that would imperil the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The
defendant essentially conceded this point at argument.
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The Closure Motion merits a more detailed discussion. Given the constitutional command
of public trial, sealing the courtroom is obviously a drastic remedy. The defendant essentially
conceded at argument that there is no overriding interest in sealing the courtroom during
testimony describing the circumstances under which the defendant's statements were given. His
concern is that the public not hear (at least at this time) the contents of his statements. But his
real concern at this stage is not the public at large. His concern is what he sees as the likely effect
of what he predicts will be resulting publicity on the selected jurors.
The Closure Motion itself (we'll get to the defendant's argument at the hearing in a
moment) is impliedly premised on the assumption that these very selected jurors will disregard
the specific instructions they have been given. The granting of the Closure Motion on this basis,
restricting the fundamental right of public access to our courts, would turn the rule oflaw on its
head.
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The Supreme Court has recently explained that:
The jury system is premised on the idea that rationality and careful regard for the' court's instructions will confine and exclude jurors' raw emotions. Jurors routinely serve as impartial factfinders in cases that involve sensitive, even lifeand-death matters. In those cases, as in all cases, juries are presumed to follow the court's instructions.
CSXTransportation, Inc. v. Hensley, 129 S.Ct. 2139; 2141 (2009). See United States v.
McDonough, 56 F.3d 381, 387 (1995); State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 828, 882 A.2d 604
(2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1025 (2006). The Court reiterated this premise just last week in a
. widely-publicized criminal case involving the collapse of Enron Corporation. Skilling v. United
States, No. 08-1394 (U .S. June 24, 2010). Skilling reminds us that:
Our decisions have rightly set a high bar for allegations of juror prejudice due to pretrial publicity .... News coverage of civil and criminal trials of public interest conveys to society at large how our justice system operates. And it is a premise of that system that jurors will set aside their preconceptions when they enter the courtroom and decide cases based on the evidence presented.
ld. at 34 n. 35.·
The defendant clarified his argument at the hearing by explaining that his specific
concern is not that the selected jurors will consciously disregard their oaths but that, no matter
how conscientious they may be, they will inevitably be confronted by inflammatory newspaper
headlines displayed in public places. There is undoubtedly some risk that accidental exposure of
this nature will occur. Juries. are rarely sequestered in modem times, and our system accepts the
fact that jurors do not reside in hermetically sealed environments. But the selected jurors in this
. case understand their instructions to avoid publicity and their ultimate sworn duty to decide the
case based only on the evidence presented in court.
While the defendant's concerns are understandable, it is helpful to remember that, "The
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rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the
absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a practical
accommodation of the interests ... [involved] in the criminal justice process." Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). The Court has chosen to accommodate the interests involved
here by scheduling the suppression hearing to occur after the jury has been selected and
appropriately cautioned. Skilling reminds us that, "[jjurors ... need not enter the box with empty
heads in order to determine the facts impartially. It is sufficient if the juror[s] can lay aside [their]
. impression[s] or opinion[s] and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court."
Skilling v. United States, supra, slip op., at 34. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)
The defendant has submitted no evidence even suggesting that the carefully-selected and
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thoroughly-instructed jury in this case will he unfaithful to its instructions or its oath. Under
these circumstances, the constitutional right of openness has not been overcome.
The Sealing Motion and the Closure Motion are denied.
Pursuant to P.B. § 7-4B(d)(1), the Clerk is instructed to return the lodged motion in
limine to the defendant and not place it in the court file
Jon C. lue
Judge of the Superior Court
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