Professional Documents
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A Future For Politics Ways To Reform Our Political System
A Future For Politics Ways To Reform Our Political System
A Future For Politics Ways To Reform Our Political System
FOR POLITICS
Ways to reform our polical system,
by the UK’s leading think tanks
Edited by Tim Finch and Carey Oppenheim, ippr
©ippr2009
CONTENTS
Contributingthinktanks..................................................................... 4
Introduction.......................................................................................... 5
TimFinchandCareyOppenheim,ippr
Don’tjustblametheMPs................................................................. 11
JulianAstleandAlasdairMurray,CentreForum
Theroleofcitizensaftertheexpensesscandal .............................. 18
DanielLeighton,Demos
Anti-politicsandthecrisis................................................................ 27
SunderKatwala,FabianSociety
Remakingpolitics.............................................................................. 36
RickMuirandGuyLodge,ippr
Insearchofreform,notgimmicks ................................................... 43
NeilO’Brien,PolicyExchange
Timetoturnpoliticsonitshead...................................................... 52
JessicaAsato,Progress
Fitforgovernment............................................................................. 60
NickBosanquet,Reform
3
CONTRIBUTING THINK TANKS
CentreForumisanindependent,liberalthinktankseekingtodevelop
evidence-based,long-termpolicysolutionstotheproblemsfacingBritain.
www.centreforum.org
Demos isathinktankfocusedonpowerandpolitics.Itsearchesforand
communicatesideastogivepeoplemorepowertoshapetheirownlives.
Demos’svisionisademocracyoffreecitizens,withanequalstakeinsociety.
www.demos.co.uk
TheFabianSociety developspoliticalideasandpublicpolicyontheleftof
centre.Thesocietyisademocratically-constitutedmembershiporganisation
affiliatedtotheLabourPartybuteditoriallyandorganisationallyindependent.
www.fabians.org.uk
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr) istheUK’sleading
progressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicy
ideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.
www.ippr.org
PolicyExchange isanindependent,non-partisaneducationalcharity.Itworks
withacademicsandpolicymakersfromacrossthepoliticalspectrum.Itis
particularlyinterestedinfreemarketandlocalistsolutionstopublicpolicy
questions.
www.policyexchange.org.uk
ProgressistheNewLabourpressuregroupwhichaimstopromotearadical
andprogressivepoliticsforthe21stcentury.
www.progressonline.org.uk
Reformisanindependent,charitable,non-partythinktankwhosemissionis
tosetoutabetterwaytodeliverpublicservicesandeconomicprosperity.
www.reform.co.uk
Theviewsexpressedinthispublicationdonotnecessarilyrepresentthoseofthe
contributors’organisations.
ThisbookletwasfirstpublishedinNovember2009.©ippr2009
Copy-editing,designandproductionbyGeorginaKyriacou,ippr
4
INTRODUCTION
Itissafetosaythat,whateverelsedividesthethinktanks,weareunitedinbelieving
thatthepracticeofpoliticsisvitalforagoodsocietyinwhichindividualscanthrive.
Soitiswithparticulardismaythatipprandtheotherthinktankshaveseenthe
expensesscandalunfold.Initsdarkestdepths,asthereputationofpoliticianshassunk
toanabysmalnadir,therehasbeenlittlecomforttobedrawnbyanyonewhocares
aboutpoliticsandthinksthatitmatters.Politicsinthepublic’smindhasbecomenot
thesolutiontothemanyissuesthatconfrontus,buttheproblem.Trustinthepolitical
processandinthosechargedwithmakingitworkcollapsedandthemuchoverused
word‘crisis’didnotseemhyperbolic.
Andyetasthefinancialcrisisoffereduptheopportunitytolookafreshathowour
economyisstructured,sothepoliticalcrisishasstimulatednewdiscussionsabout
changesandreformstoourpoliticalsystem.Oncepeoplehadstoppedreelingfromthe
immediateshockoftheDailyTelegraph’srevelations,ideassuchasProportional
Representation,electingtheHouseofLords,givingmorepowertotheCommons,state
fundingofparties,compulsoryvoting,openprimariestoselectparliamentary
candidates,decentralisingpowertolocalbodiesandchangingourrelationshipwiththe
EuropeanUnionstartedtobedebatedwithrenewedvigour,afteryearsinthe
doldrums.Therewasarealsensethatsuchreforms,sooftenfrustratedbyinertia,the
powerofvestedinterests,andtheargumentthatotherissuesweremorepressing,
couldactuallybeimplementedthistime.Awindowforreformhadbeenblownopen.
Surelytheprocesscouldnotstoponcetheexpensessystemhadbeencleanedup?
Perhapssomerealgoodcouldcomeoutofthemess?
Certainlythepoliticaljunkiesthoughtso–intheearlysummerof2009thereform
agendawaseagerlydiscussedinpamphletsandontheblogosphere,atseminarsand
meetings.Onlinepetitionsweresetupandcampaignsstarted.However,itwasnot
clearwhetherthewiderpublic–indignantastheywereaboutMPs’greed–werefired
upbythisreformingzeal.AsProgressputitintheiressay,politicalreformhasalways
sufferedfroman‘imageproblem’.Duckhousesandpornfilmsareonething;
ProportionalRepresentationandthecommitteesystemquiteanother.
Perhapsmoresignificantly,asothernewsreplacedtheexpensesscandalinthe
headlines,thesenseofexcitementthatrealreformwaspossiblewasreplacedbythe
familiarfearthatthepoliticalleadershadalreadylostinterestandturnedtheir
attentiontoothermatters.Therewasaparallelwiththecreditcrunchagain:theworry
wasthatoncetheimmediateairofcrisishadliftedtherewouldbeadepressingdrift
backto‘businessasusual’.Bythetimeofthepartyconferences,politicalreform
seemedtoberatheroldnews.
Ofcourse,sincethenwehavehadthedoubledipintheexpensesscandal,withtheSir
ThomasLegg’sreviewofexpensesre-ignitingafirestormthatseemedtohavedied
down.Butevenso,thefocushasallbeenon‘whoclaimedwhatforwhat’and‘how
muchtheyshouldpayback’ratherthanthebiggerpoliticalquestions.Thereisstilla
dangerthatwiderpoliticalreformwillbelostinallthefurore.
5
Introduction
Itisinexactlythesesituationsthatthinktankscanplayanimportantrole.Wearenot
sodrivenordiverted(oratleast,shouldnotbe)bythemarchofeventsorfastmoving
newsagendas.Fascinatingasallthesqualiddetailofexpensesis,weshouldbeableto
riseaboveitandmaintainthemomentumfordemocraticreform.
ItwasinthisspiritthatipprapproachedcolleaguesinotherleadingUKthinktanks
withdifferingperspectivestocontributetheirconsideredthoughtsonthesubject.The
resultisthisshortvolumeofessays.
Itisimportanttomentionattheoutsetthatfixingthesystemisnotenoughinitself,as
indeedanumberofcontributorspointoutintheiressays.Theexpensesscandalwas
notjustaconsequenceofinadequatepoliticalmachinery;itwasasymptomofa
discreditedpoliticalculture.Muchhasbeenwritten(inthisvolumeandelsewhere)
aboutthedistancethathasopenedupbetweenpoliticiansandthepeopletheyserve–
asevidenced,notleast,byfallingvoterturnoutandthecollapseinpartymembership.
Toachieverealrenewalinthedemocraticlifeofthiscountryweneedtoreversethe
dangerousdisengagementbetweenpoliticsandpublic.Theproblemisthatthemost
difficulttimetorenewyourvowsiswhenonepartnerintherelationshiphascheated
ontheother.
Weacknowledgethatthereisadeeper,wideragendahere,butdonotallowourselves
tobedivertedbyit(ordispiritedbyitsimmensity).Thisisavolumemoreaboutideas
forfixingtheessentialplumbingofourbodypoliticthanitisaboutrevivingitsguiding
philosophy.Wehavedelimitedourscopepartlytomakeconfrontingitlessdaunting,
butalsotogiveourselvesafightingchanceofcomingupwithideasthatarerealistic,
pragmatic–doable.
Ininitiatingtheproject,wewantedtolookattherangeofideasthatourcontributors
cameupwith,butinparticularwewereinterestedtoseewhatsortofconsensusmight
emergearoundthemostdiscussedareasforreform.Ifitistruethatfromtheruinsof
theoldsystemwecouldbuildanewJerusalem,whichelementsofitsarchitecture
couldbeconstructedfromasharedvision?
Asyouwillseeinreadingtheessays,wedonotallagreeoneverything–theleast
surprisingelementoftheproject.Toextendourmetaphor:thereformsthatsomebuild
up,othersknockdown.Anynewsystemthatwejointlyconstructedwouldnotfitthe
perfectdesignofanyoneofus–insomecasesthemosttreasuredelementwouldbe
missingaltogether,inothersthecompromisesolutionwouldhavetobecobbled
together.Butwearenotleftwithaheapofrubble.Farfromit.Thelevelofconsensus
onmanyareasisimpressive–andperhapsheartening.Itiscertainlythecase,we
wouldargue,thatthereisenoughheretoestablishanagendaforreformwhichcould
beseenasabasisforabroadconsensusonthewayforward.
Forastart,thereisgeneralagreementthattheexpensesscandaldidrepresenta
seminalcrisisinconfidenceinourpoliticalsystemwhichdemandsmorethanjusta
cleanupoftheFeesOfficeandaclear-outofMPs.Therewassomeconcern
(notablyfromtheFabianSocietyandCentreForum)thattheoutrageamong
sectionsofthepublicandpresswasoverdone,ifnotdownrighthypocritical,and
thatthecrisisisindangerofbeingmanipulatedbythosewhoarefundamentally
‘anti-politics’.Nonetheless,thosevoicingthisnoteofcautionareaseagerasthe
6
ippr
restofthethinktanksinwantingtoseesignificantreformsacrossanumberof
areas.
Thereisastrongagreement,too,abouttheneedforgreatertransparency.Asthe
FabianSocietyargues,itwasthetransparencyofferedbytheFreedomofInformation
Actwhichexposedtheexpensesscandalinthefirstplace,albeitintheteethof
parliamentaryresistance;andasseveralcontributorspointouttransparencyinMPs’
affairs,postthescandal,isnowadonedeal.Noargument;and,tothislimitedextent,
problemsolved.Thelatestanalysesofexpenses(seeHencke2009)suggestsclaims
havedroppeddramatically.Butwegenerallyagreetoothattransparencyand
accountabilityneedtoextendwellbeyondParliament.Allthosepaidbyandspending
taxpayers’moneyshouldbesubjecttodemocraticscrutinyandbeaccountablefor
theiractions,includingseniorcivilservantsandthequangocracy.Ideasincludefixed-
termappointments,subjecttoparliamentaryhearingandapproval.
Anotherareawherethethinktanksaremoreorlessofonemindistheneedto
strengthentheroleofParliamentinrelationtotheExecutive.Astrongercommittee
systemisadvocatedbyall.IdeasincludegivingSelectCommitteessomeroleininitiating
legislation,aswellasinholdingministersandotherseniorofficialstoaccount.Standing
expertcommitteestoimprovethedetailedscrutinyofgovernmentlegislationarealso
backed.ThereisgeneralagreementthattheMPs’roleasnationallegislatorsshouldbe
re-invigorated,andsomewayfoundtoallowthebestpoliticianstobuildacareerasa
parliamentarianthatcommandsrespectandfulfilsambition.
Itisfairtosay,perhaps,thatwewouldallliketoseeoursystemproduceitsownTeddy
Kennedys–politiciansofnational,eveninternationalstandingnotbecauseoftheir
roleingovernmentbutbecauseoftheirroleinthelegislature.Allofuswould
sympathisewiththelamentofProgressthatatpresenttheonlyMPsthatanyone
takesanynoticeofareministersormavericks–andwhilethe‘socialworker’element
oftheconstituencymembershouldnotbedisparaged,itisoverwhelmingsomeMPs,
draggingthemdownintoaninappropriatelevelofminutiae,anddivertingthemaway
fromtheircrucial–andprimary–roleofscrutinisinglegislation.
WhileweallwanttoseeParliamentstrengthenedwithrespecttotheExecutive,we
allalsoargue,albeitwithdifferentdegreesofemphasis,thatpowerneedstobe
distributedoutofWestminster.Weareallmoreorlesslocalistsnow,itseems,
thoughitisinterestingtonotethatwhilesomearguethattheproblemofcentralism
islargelystructural(CentreForum)othersseeitasanissueofpoliticalculture
(PolicyExchange).Still,givingmorepowerstodemocraticallyelectedlocal
authoritiesisgenerallypopular–thoughtheextenttowhichthisdevolutionshould
includegivinggenuinefiscalautonomytolocallyelectedpoliticiansisnotasclear.
Wearegenerallyofmind,too,withperhapsoneexception,inwantingtoseeincreased
citizenpower,throughcitizens’initiatives,petitionsandreferendums.Demosputsthe
needforenhancedpopularsovereigntyandex-post accountabilityofelected
representativesbycitizensfrontandcentreofitscontribution,drawingonclassical
andrevolutionaryconcepts,suchaspublicaccusationsandcitizensconventions.Most
oftheotherthinktankssharesomeenthusiasmforgreateractivecitizenparticipation
–notleastindrawingupthereformagenda–thoughCentreForumbreaksrankshere
7
Introduction
invoicingmorescepticismabouttheefficacyof‘powertothepeople’,arguingthatitis
aroutetopolicyincoherence.
AstothesortofMPswewant,therewasratherlessagreementonthat,thoughitis
fairtosaythatwewouldallliketoseeMembersofParliamentdrawnfromawider
circlethanatpresent.CentreForumridesgallantlytothedefenceofthemuch
maligned‘careerpolitician’,arguingthatthereisgoodreasonwhytheyoftenriseto
thetop.Inessence,theirargumentisthatgoodpoliticiansmakegoodpoliticians,and
talentinbusinessoranotherwalkoflifedoesnotnecessarilytranslateacross.The
FabianSocietymeanwhilearguesthatinseizingpowerfromthe‘politicalclass’we
needtobeclearwhowearegivingitto(andwhattheywoulddowithit).Thereisno
enthusiasmfortheolddaysofMPshavingoutsidejobsandkeeping‘clubhours’at
Westminster–butthereisageneralsensethatdoinganotherjobfirst,oratleast
enteringtheCommonsratherlaterinlife,wouldbenobadthing.Thatsaid,itis
probablytruetosaythatallthethinktankswouldagreewithouripprcolleagueswho
sayintheiressaythattheanswertoourproblemsiscertainlynota‘Parliamentof
EstherRantzens’.
Thereisgeneralsupportfortheuseofprimariesasawayofchoosingparliamentary
candidates.Progressishugelyenthusiasticaboutprimaries,andarguesthatissuessuch
asthehighcostcanbeovercomebysettingspendinglimits.Othersaremorecautious–
themaincaveatbeingthattheredoesneedtobearolereservedforpartymembers,
otherwisepartymembershipwillwitherstillfurther.Thisinturnleadstoanarea,and
animportantone,wheretherearequitestrongdifferences.Parties:goodorbad,
problemorsolution?
PolicyExchangeidentifiesoverlystrongpoliticalpartiesasthe‘biggestpartofthe
problem’,whiletheFabianSocietyandReformmountequallystrongdefencesof
partiesaskeyelementsofourdemocraticsystemandfortheirroleinaggregatingthe
differing,andsometimescontradictory,viewsoftheelectorateintosomesortof
coherentpolicyprogramme.PolicyExchangewouldripoffthepartyrosettesandmake
parliamentarycandidatescampaignasindividuals.Inthisway,theyargue,wewould
getmoreindependent-mindedMPswhowouldstandupfortheirconstituents’
interests,ratherthantoeingthepartyline.CentreForumsuggeststhatvotingreform
(moreofwhichlater)wouldproducegreaterindependenceamongMPswithoutthe
needfor‘independents’assuch.
DespitethesedifferencesthereiscommongroundthatMPsshouldhavemore
controlovertheparliamentarytimetableandbestrongerinholdingthe
Governmenttoaccount.Thereisbroadconsensustoothatreducingthesizeofthe
‘payrollvote’bycuttingthenumberofMPswhocanbeministerswouldbeauseful
stepinrestoringabetterbalanceofpowerbetweenExecutiveandlegislature.But
thentheconsensusbreaksdownagainoverhowmuchcontrolpartyleaderships
shouldexertovertheirMPs.PolicyExchangesaystheyhavea‘stranglehold’;the
FabiansquotePhillipCowleywhohasdescribedthisas‘cobblers’,showingthat
MPsinrecentyearshavebecomenotmoresupine,butmorerebellious.
Nowwearegettingtotheareaswherethereisnoagreement.Compulsoryvoting?Not
anissueformost,althoughipprcomesoutstronglyinfavour(withsupportfrom
8
ippr
Progress)asawayofaddressingtheverylowturnoutamongpoorandyoungpeople,
andPolicyExchangestronglyagainst.AnelectedHouseofLords–well,thereissome
agreementthatmorereformisneeded,butexactlywhatreform?
Allofusseemtohavedifferentideasanddifferentdegreesofenthusiasm.
CentreForumbacksfullelectionasthe‘leastbadwayforward’,butwantsallpeers
tobeindependentofparty;theFabianSocietywantsafullyelectedhouseviaaPR
system;andforProgressanythinglessthanafullyelectedsecondchamberwould
be‘chickeningout’.ReformwouldleavethefuturecompositionoftheLordstoa
referendum,whilePolicyExchangesayselection–atleastonthesamebasisasthe
Commons–wouldleadto‘disastrousgridlock’–thoughtheyarepreparedtoaccept
anelectedelement.Onthisissue,thethinktanks’differencesbegintoshow
throughmoreclearly–evenmoresowhenitcomestostatefundingofparties.
CentreForumbelievesalowcapondonationsiskeywithacasefortaxreliefona
portionofthosedonations.PolicyExchangeandReformaredeadagainst.Afterall,
theyargue,itwasstatefunding(intheformofallowances)thatgotusintothis
mess.
Interestingly,theissueofEuropeisnotmuchdiscussedatall(mostoftheessayswere
writtenbeforetheIrishReferendumontheLisbonTreaty,itshouldbesaid),andwhere
itis,thedividinglinesareperhapsmorenuancedthanwemighthaveexpected.There
aresomeareasofconsensus,notablytheneedformuchbetterscrutinyofEuropean
legislationinWestminster.MostofusseemtothinkareferendumontheUK’s
relationshipwithEuropewouldbeagoodidea–theonlyproblemiswearenot
arguingforthesamereferendum.
AndfinallythereisProportionalRepresentation.Herethefaultlinesarepredictable
andprobablymoreorlessunbridgeable.Thesinglemostimportantchangeforsomeis
asideshoworstepinthewrongdirectionforothers.Reformarguesforcefullythat
throughfirst-past-the-postBritaingetsthegovernmentitwants;justasforcefully
CentreForumarguesthatthecurrentsystemis‘grotesquelyunfair’.CentreForum,
Demos,theFabianSociety,ipprandProgressallcomeoutforPR.PolicyExchangeis
firmlyopposed.
Aboutthebestwecancomeupwithinthewayofajointpositiononelectoralreform
–andeventhismaybestretchingthings–istosuggestthatwemightjustagreethat
theoptionofPRbeputtothepeoplethroughareferendum.Wewouldcertainlybe
campaigningondifferentsides,however.Andwewouldprobablydisagreeontiming
aswell.
Apowerfulcallforreform
Where,intheend,doesthisleaveus?Itisourbeliefthatthecollectedviewsof
theseseven,diversethinktanksamounttoapowerfulcallforrealreform.We
must,ofcourse,acknowledgethatabunchofthinktanks,howeverdiverse,are
goingtocomeatthisissuefromaparticularperspective.Wearequintessential
insiders,membersofthe‘politicalclass’which,assomeoftheessayauthorspoint
out,isalmostasdistrustedanddislikedastheMPswhohavetakenthebruntofthe
public’srighteousfury.
9
Introduction
Wecannotdenywhoweare–allwecansayisthatevenwe,withourumbilicallinkto
Westminster,wereshockedbytheextentoftheexpensesscandal–soifnothingelse,
thisstandsasourcontributiontosortingoutthemess.
Itistruethatwecannotclaimtospeakforaparticularlywideconstituency–wespeak
onlyforourselves.Butofcoursewedonotformourviewsorexpoundoursolutionsin
avacuum.Webelievethatwhatisbeingespousedinthisvolumerepresentsapretty
goodsynthesisoftheviewsofthosepeoplewhoarepoliticallyinterestedandengaged
inoursociety,ifnooneelse.Assuch,wewouldhopethatthoseinapositiontomake
thepoliticalreformhappen–MPs,peersandthepoliticalleadersinparticular–willbe
galvanisedbythispublicationtokeeponwithreform.Ifthethinktankscanagreeon
whatamountstoasolidagendaforchange,thereisnoreasonwhythepoliticalparties
cannotdoso.Thenextstepwouldbetomovefromgeneralareasofagreementtoa
specifictimetableforaction.Again,thisshouldbepossible–indeedwewouldargueit
wouldbeagravebetrayaloftheelectorateifitdidnothappen.
Thethinktanksaregenerallyunitedthatalthoughtheexpensesscandalhasdone
severedamagetoourpoliticalsystemandtothepublic’srespectforpoliticiansand
politicsmoregenerally,theworstreactionwecouldhaveinthefaceofthiscrisisisto
despairandtodonothing.Andthosewhobroughtustothispassstillhaveachanceto
starttheprocessofreform.
Thesepagesarenotgivenovertoscathingattacksandwitheringscorndirectedatour
politicians.Indeed,thereisconsiderablesupportandunderstandingshownforagroup
ofpeoplewhowegenerallyregardashardworkingandhardpressed,evenifthey
havemessedupbigtimeoverallowances.Inthisspirit,thepoliticians–particularly
thoseatthetopoftheirparties–cantakeourideasastheadviceof‘criticalfriends’–
peopleinterestedinseeingthemsucceed,noteagertoseethemfail.Butthisvolume
alsorepresentsachallenge–achallengetoseizethisopportunityforreform,notto
duckitortofunkit.
IfthisParliamentaddsafailuretotakestepstowardsseriousreformtoitsrecordof
abusingtheallowancesandexpensessystem(andscandalouslytryingtocoveritup)
thenitwillsurelygodownasoneofthemostreviledinhistory.If,however,itusesthe
nextfewmonthstoworktogethertobringinrealreforms,itsreputationcouldbe
redeemedconsiderably.Politicianshavealotontheirplatesinthenextfewmonths–
rebuildingtheeconomy,tacklingthepublicdebt,makingprogressonclimatechangeto
namebutafew–butallthethinktanksinthisvolumewouldconcurinsayingthat
advancesontheseissuesandotherswillnotbedelayedorsetback–indeeditwillbe
expedited–iftimeisfoundtodiscussandagreetheprogrammeofdemocraticreform
thatissolongoverdue.
TimFinchisDirectorofStrategicCommunicationsandCareyOppenheimCo-Directorof
ippr.
10
DON’T JUST BLAME THE MPS
11
Don’tjustblametheMPs
changeorenergysecurity),itissurelybetterthattheyaregiventhefreedomtopursue
apolicythatmaybevigorouslyopposedbyanactiveminorityoreven,onoccasion,a
majority.ThedeathoftheManchesterroad-pricingschemeinareferendumin
December2008providesagoodexampleofjusthowdifficultitistomakerealpolicy
progressonthebasisofplebiscite.BygivinglocalpeopleavetoovertheGovernment’s
transportpolicy,short-termconsiderationsandparochialconcernswereallowedto
trumpthesignificantlong-termsocietalbenefitsthatwouldhaveaccruedfromthe
extensionofpay-as-you-driveschemesacrossthecountry.
Noneofthisistosaythatpoliticiansknowbest,ofcourse.Simplythattheyshouldbe
giventhechancetoimplementtheirpolicyagendaand,fourorfiveyearslater,to
standforre-electionontheirrecord.Thealternativeapproach,inwhichvoters
regularlyreceiveissue-specificballotpapersthroughtheletterbox,usuallyleadsto
democraticdysfunction,asthepeopleofnear-bankruptCaliforniahavediscoveredto
theircost.Thelesson,accordingtoFinancialTimescolumnistJohnKay,isclear:‘Ifyou
askpeoplesimplequestionsthatcanbeansweredyesorno,you’llgethonestanswers.
Butthereisnottheslightestreasonwhytheseanswersshouldadduptoacoherent
policyprogramme’(Kay2009).
Indefenceofthepoliticalclass
Somearguethatpoliticiansshouldhaveexperienceofthe‘realworld’andshould
thereforefeelfreetopursuearangeofoutsidecommercialinterests.Anditis
certainlytruethatifParliamentcontainedmoreformerdoctors,teachers,soldiers,
farmers,businessleadersorbankers,manyoftheimplementationproblemsthat
arisewhenlegislationisdrawnupbypeoplewithlittleornofrontlineexperience
mightbeavoided.
Butthisisanargumentforpeopleenteringpoliticslater,notforMPsmaintainingan
extensivelistofoutsidecommercialinterestsonceelected.Weknowfrom
experiencethatasysteminwhichpoliticiansdohalfaday’sworkoutsideParliament
beforescurryingovertotheCommonsfora2:30pmstart,leadstoanumberof
seriousproblems.
First,thereareconstantquestionsaboutpotentialconflictsofinterest.Second,it
takespoliticiansawayfromtheirprimarydutytotheirconstituents.Andthird,it
resultsinalegislaturethatconvenesattimesthatmostmothers(andfatherswho
wishtoseetheirchildrenoccasionally)wouldfindunacceptable,andthatpeople
withnooutsideinterestsorindependentwealthfindunaffordable.
Whatismore,theassumptionthatpeoplewhosepreviousexperienceispolitical
havelittletooffershouldnotgounchallenged.Itisnocoincidencethatthe
MilibandsontheGovernmentside,orCameronandOsborneontheConservative
side,haveallreachedseniorpoliticalpositions,whilemanyoftheircolleagueswith
more‘realworld’experience,havenot.NodoubtArchieNormanthoughtpolitics
wouldbea‘doddle’afterrunningagiantretailerlikeAsda.Buthe,likeagoodmany
othersbeforeandafterhim,foundthatreachinghighofficeinpoliticsrequiredan
entirelydifferentskillsetfromthatwhichworksinbusiness.Politicsisabout
influencing,persuadingandcommunicating.Businessisaboutcommandandcontrol.
12
CentreForum
PracticalmeasurestostrengthenParliament
Theromanticmythoftheindependent-mindedpoliticianbravelyholdinggovernment
toaccountwhileshapingkeylegislationshouldnotbeoverstated.Membersofthe
HouseofCommonshavealwaysrepresentedawiderangeofinterests–andtalent–
whiletheExecutivehaslongfoundmyriadwaystoassertitsauthority.Butthereis
littledoubtthatinrecentdecadestheaveragebackbenchMPhasseenhisorherstatus
erodedincomparisonwiththeExecutive.Thedemandsofmodernpolitics,withits
emphasisonunityandrapidreactiontoarollingmediaagenda,hasfurther
marginalisedtheroleofbackbenchMPs.
YetavibrantandeffectiveHouseofCommonsremainscentraltothehealthofour
democracy.Intheshortterm,MPscouldintroduceaseriesofpracticalreformsthat
wouldhelpredressatleastpartiallytheimbalancebetweengovernmentand
Parliament.
First,theindependenceofSelectCommitteesshouldbeenhancedbymakingthe
selectionofchairssubjecttosecretballotratherthancontrolledbythewhipsasis
currentlythecase.TheCommonsasawholeshouldsetitsowntimetable,astheHouse
ofLordsalreadydoes,whileensuringtheGovernmentisgivensufficienttimetocarry
throughitslegislativeprogramme.Thepartiesshouldalsopermitmorefreevotes.
Second,itisvitaltoreducethesizeoftheGovernment.Therearenowaround140paid
andunpaidgovernmentpositions,including26whips,ensuringthattheGovernment
wieldsfartoomuchpatronagepoweroverMPs.
Inthelongerrun,thereisaneedtoconductavigorousdebateaboutwhetherthe
separationbetweentheExecutiveandlegislatureshouldbecomemoreformalised.
Britishpoliticsisincreasinglyquasi-presidentialinscopebutdoesnotpossessthe
checksandbalancesthatareintegraltomostpresidentialsystems.Onesuchcheck
couldbecreatedbyallowingtheCommonstoscrutiniseandpotentiallyblock
ministerialappointments.
ElectingtheHouseofLords
Atatimewhengovernmentsareunderincreasingpressuretorushthroughimportant
legislation,itisvitalthattheHouseofLordscontinuestofulfilitsscrutinyroleinan
atmospherelesspartisanthantheCommons.Todothis,itwillneedtodrawonawide
rangeofexpertiseandpossesssomeindependencefromthepartysystem.
However,thereislittleagreementonhowtoachievethisgoal.Atpresent,thepower
ofappointmentresideswiththeGovernment:aclearconflictofinterestwhichtoo
oftenhasledtotheennoblingofpoliticalmediocrityforreasonsofexpediency.Some
havearguedthatthistaskcouldbefarmedouttoanindependentauthority.Butthis
wouldinvariablyraisequestionsabouttheprejudicesofthe‘greatandthegood’on
thenewbody.Therewouldalsobesomethingdeeplyunpalatableaboutanunelected
quangoappointingpeopletoplaysuchanimportantroleinthedemocraticprocess.
TheelectionofLordsisthereforethe‘leastbad’wayforward.Theobjectionsthatare
normallyraisedtoademocraticchoiceofpeersarehardlyinsurmountable.TheLords’
secondarystatustotheCommonscanbeclarifiedinlaw.Itwouldbestraightforwardto
13
Don’tjustblametheMPs
establishcampaigningruleswhichforbidrunningonapartyticket.Shornofparty
labelsandtheconstituencylinkofMPs,thereislittlereasontobelievethattheLords
wouldbecomeheavilypoliticisedorathreattotheCommons.
TheindependenceofthenewLordscouldbeprotectedbyfixinglonger-termlimits
thantheCommons–perhaps12years.Therelativestabilityofthebodycouldalsobe
ensuredbyelectingathirdoftheLordseveryfouryears,ideallyongeneralelection
dayattheendofeachfixed-termParliament.Thereisalsonogoodreasonwhywe
needthe700-plusPeerswehaveatpresent.Achamberwith360members–electedin
groupsof120–wouldsuffice.Theelectionscouldbephasedinoverthefirst12years
ofoperation,givingtheexistingLordsthechoiceofrunningoraperiodofgracein
whichtostanddown.
Increasingaccountability
Localismthatworks
TheexperienceofScotlandandWalesexposesthemythoftheUK’suniquely
‘centralisedpoliticalculture’.Experienceshowsthatoncepowershavebeenhanded
overtoasub-stateauthority–explicitly,asaresultofanagreedconstitutionalreform,
peoplequicklyadjusttothenewreality,understandwherepowerandresponsibility
nowlieandbehaveaccordingly.Differenttiersofgovernmentmaytrytoblameeach
otherwhenthingsgowrong,butvoters,journalistsandcivilsocietygroupstendto
knowwherethe‘buckstops’.Ourcentralisedpoliticalcultureisaproductofour
centralisedpoliticalsystem,nottheotherwayaround.
Sotherealquestionisnotwhetherlocalismispossible–itis–butwhetheritis
desirable.Ultimately,thiscomesdowntowhatsortofcountrywewanttolivein.
Despitepayinglip-servicetothelocalismagenda,successiveConservativeandLabour
administrationshavetendedtohoardpowerinWhitehall,creatingapoliticalsystem
that,inrevenue-raisingterms,isnowthesecondmostcentralisedintheEuropean
UnionafterMalta.IntheConservatives’case,thiscentralisinginstinctstemsfroma
profounddistrustoflocalgovernment;inLabour’scase,fromastrongbeliefinthe
abilityofthecentralgovernmentbureaucracytodeliversocialprogresswhileironing
outgeographic(andother)inequalities.
Theliberalapproachisdifferent.Itrestsonthepluralistprinciplethatpowershouldbe
widelydispersedandexercisedasclosetothepeopleaspossible.Thismeans,for
example,allowingthepeopleofScotlandtocreateforthemselvesadifferentsocial
compactfromthatwhichexistsinEngland.IftheScotswantenhancedservicesinreturn
forhighertaxes,thatistheirprerogative.Andthesameshouldgoforthelocalities.
Theprocessof‘localising’ourpoliticsisnotonethatcontrollingministersin
Westminsterwillfindcomfortable:givingpeoplefreedominevitablymeansgiving
themthefreedomtomakemistakes.Butovertime,thebenefitsof‘competitive
localism’–sofamiliartopolicymakersinfederalcountriesliketheUnitedStates–
wouldmakethemselvesapparentasthedifferentcommunities,towns,cities,regions
andcountriesoftheUnitedKingdomwatchedandlearnedfromeachother’spolicy
innovationsandexperiments,andstrovetooutperformtheirneighbours.Suchamodel
should,ifgiventimetodevelop,leadtoageneralratchetingupofstandards.
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Weshouldbeundernoillusionsofthedifficultiesinvolvedinachievingsuchachange.
Allowinglocalcommunitiestofashiontheirownlocalpolicyresponsestolocal
circumstancesmaysoundlikecommonsense,butforapoliticalcommunityobsessed
witheliminating‘post-codelotteries’itwillrequireabigshiftinoutlook.
RenewingtherelationshipwithEurope
TheproblemsthatbesettheBritishpoliticalsystemaremirroredinEurope.Thereare
manyreformsatEUlevel–notleastamoredirectlinkbetweentheEuropean
ParliamentelectionsandtheelectionofthePresidentoftheEuropeanCommission–
thatwouldbedesirableinthelongerterm.Butgiventhelackofappetiteamong
governments–andevenmoreso,voters–forafurtherboutoftreatyreform,theEU
isbetterofffocusingonworkingwithinitsexistingtreatyframeworkandimproving
itsrecordondeliveryatthisjuncture.
However,theUKcantaketwoconcretestepstobetterholdtheEUtoaccountand
resolvethequestionofitsrelationshipwithEurope.First,Parliamentneedstoimprove
itsscrutinyrecordofEuropeanlegislation.TheSelectCommitteesshouldhavean
opportunitytocommentondraftlegislationbeforetheGovernmentreachesadecision
intheEU’sCouncilofMinisters.MPsshouldalsobepreparedtomakeuseofthe
provisionsintheLisbonTreaty(andemploytheseinkindevenifthattreatyisnot
ratified)toforcetheEuropeanCommissiontoreconsiderlegislationthatstraysbeyond
itsremitorisnotjustified.
Second,Britain’srelationshipwiththeEUhasbecomesodysfunctionalthatonlya
referendumonmembershipcanprovideclarityofdirection.Thereluctanceof
governmentsoverthelasttwodecadestoclearlyexplainorengagepositivelywith
EuropehasdamagedBritain’spositionwithintheEUandunderminedtheconfidence
oftheBritishpublicinthebenefitsofEurope.
AreferendumontheLisbonTreatywouldonlyfurthercloudratherthanclarifythis
relationship,leadingtoanambiguousansweronacomplexsetofquestions.A
referendumonmembershipwouldgivebothsidestheopportunitytoairtheirarguments
andanswermorefundamentalquestionsaboutBritain’sfutureroleinEurope.
Reformingthewaypoliticalpartiesoperate
Statefunding
Britishpoliticalpartieshavebecometooreliantonthemoneymen.Thishasledtothe
widespreadperceptionthatasmallnumberofindividualsholdunfairswayoverparty
policies,orareseekingspecialfavourfromtheGovernment.Butafurtherincreasein
directstatefundingwoulddolittletoforcepartiestore-engagethepublic.Thiswould
bebetterachievedbycappingdonations.
Acapondonationsat,say,£10,000wouldnotonlylimitthepotentiallymalign
influenceofafewverywealthindividualsonthebodypolitic.Itwouldmeanparties
seekingmoneyfromthemanyratherthanthefew,somethingthatwouldforcethem
tolookbeyondtheirownmemberships.Tohelp,thereisacasetobemadeforatax
reliefondonations,sayuptohalftheleveloftheoverallcap,treatingpolitical
donationsmorelikedonationstocharitiesandothercampaigninggroups.
15
Don’tjustblametheMPs
Acaponconstituencyspendingacrossaparliament,combinedwithacaponnational
partyspending,shouldencouragepartiestoengagemorewidelythantheydoat
present.Withbothdonationsandspendingcapped,politicsmightjustbecomeabattle
ofideasonceagain.
Primaries–apartialsolution
Primariescouldproveausefultooltoopenupthecandidateselectionprocessinsome
constituencies.Partiesshouldbeencouragedtoexperimentfurther.Butitremainsto
beseenjusthowmanyvoterswouldparticipateoncethenoveltyhadwornoff–the
dangeristhatinmanyplacesparticipationwouldbereducedtoasmallcabalofalready
engagedparticipants.Primariesarealsoexpensiveandunlesscandidatesaregiven
someformofequalmonetarysupport,theyriskdiminishingratherthanbroadening
representation.AsystemofrecallcouldalsoplayaroleinensuringthatsittingMPsare
moreaccountablefortheiractions,althoughthetermswouldneedtobecarefully
definedtopreventabuseandprotectMPsfromtheeffortsofwellorganisedminorities
determinedtodestabilisethem.
Ultimately,however,theonlyrealwaytoloosenthegripofthepartymachineryisto
reformthevotingsystem.Votingreformwouldallowtheelectoratetodistinguish
betweencandidatesfromthesameaswellasdifferentparties.Itwouldalsogive
smallerpartiesafarbetterchanceofupsettingthestatusquo,extendingrealchoice
anddiversity.Inaddition,itwoulddrasticallyreducethenumberofsafeseats,
increasingtheaccountabilityofMPstotheirconstituents.
ProportionalRepresentation–thecentralreform
Inouropinion,votingreformshouldbetopoftheagenda.
First,theminorissues.Thereisacaseforloweringthevotingageto16,thoughitis
highlyunlikelytoleadagreatriseinparticipationrates.Movingpollingdaytothe
weekendandexperimentingwithe-votingandotherpollinginnovationsmightalso
makesomedifferenceatthemargins.Thereislittlegoodcause,however,tointroduce
compulsoryvotingasittendstomask,ratherthanaddress,theunderlyingproblemof
voterapathy.Peopleshouldhavethefreedomnottoexercisetheirvoteandpoliticians
shouldheedthemessageofthosewhochoosenottogotothepolls.
Totackledisengagementwiththepoliticalsystem,weneedabroadersetofreforms
thatobligethepartiestore-engagewithallpartsoftheelectorate.Andthekeytothis
changeisProportionalRepresentation.
ThatthecurrentsystemofelectiontotheHouseofCommonsisgrotesquelyunfairis
unarguable.Whileeverypost-wargeneralelectionhasthrownupitsowndistortions
andinjustices,somehaveillustratedthepointmorestarklythanothers.In1983,for
example,theSDP/LiberalAlliancereceived3percentoftheseatsinreturnfor26per
centofthevote,whiletheLabourparty,whichgainedfractionallymorevotes(27per
cent),receivedninetimesasmanyseats(209,or32percent).Ittook32,776votesto
electeachConservativeMP,40,463votestoelectaLabourMPandanastonishing
338,302votestoelectaLiberal/SDPMP.Thingsmayhaveimprovedabitinrecent
elections,butin2005itstilltooknearlytwiceasmanyvotestoelectaConservative
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MPasitdidaLabourMP,andnearlyfourtimesasmanyvotestosendaLiberal
DemocrattoWestminster.
Whatismore,thecurrentfirst-past-the-postsystemhastheeffectofcreatinglarge
numbersof‘safe’seats.Intheleasteventfulelectionofrecentyears(in2001)only27
seatschangedhandsoutof659,thoughtheaverageinrecentdecadeshasbeencloser
to50.Butthatstillleaves600seatswherenochangetakesplace,insomecasesfor
decades.
Supportersofthechallengersintheseseatsarestatisticallymorelikelytoberunover
andkilledonthewaytothepollingstationthantheyaretoseetheirpreferred
politiciangetelected.Littlesurprise,then,thatmillionsofvotersareturningaway
frompolitics,withvoterturnoutfallingfrom84percentin1950to61percentin
2005.Littlesurprise,also,thatthepartiesareincreasinglyturningawayfromvoters,
targetingtheirresourcesandtheirpoliciestothehalfmillionorsoswingvoterslucky
enoughtoliveinaswingseat.
Somearguethatnoneofthisreallymatters–unlessyouareaLiberalDemocrat,that
is.OrrathertheyusedtountilsomerecentresearchcameoutshowingthatMPswith
safeseatsabusedtheexpensessystemfarmorethanMPsinmarginalseats.This
shouldnotsurpriseuseither:ifyouarecertaintoholdyourseat,youareunlikelyto
spendmuchtimeworryingwhatyourconstituentsthinkaboutyou.Whichprovesthe
pointthatpoliticiansareconstantlytellingeveryoneelseinthepublicsector:
accountabilityiskey.Wantapoliticsthatmakeseverypoliticianaccountable?Create
anelectoralsystemthatmakeseveryvotecount.
Astowhichproportionalvotingsystemswouldrepresentanimprovementonthe
currentone,theanswerissimple:allofthem.Butthesingletransferablevote(STV)or
Jenkins’AV[AlternativeVote]-pluswouldgetour(firstpreference)vote.
JulianAstleandAlasdairMurrayareDirectorsofCentreForum.
KayJ(2009)‘Truedemocracyisnotjustabouttakingpart’,FinancialTimes,28July
17
THE ROLE OF CITIZENS AFTER THE EXPENSES SCANDAL
TheFrenchRevolutionaryMirabeauobservedthatelectedrepresentativeshavea
tendencytotransformthemselvesinto‘akindofdefactoaristocracy’whichclaims
autonomyforitself.HiscontemporaryMadameRolandunderlinedthepointwhenshe
declared‘representativegovernmentsoonbecomesthemostcorruptofallifthepeople
ceasetoscrutiniseitsrepresentatives’(Rosanvallon2008).Andthenineteenthcentury
MPRobertWallaceobservedoftheBritishpoliticalsysteminhiserathatitwas
composedof‘twotraditionaloligarchies…managingthemembersofitsparliamentary
followingthroughadexterousblendingofmenace,cajoleryorreward’(citedin
Sutherland2007).
Allthreewouldsurelyhavefeltvindicatediftheyhadbeenaroundtoobservethe
currentMPs’expensesscandal.Theobviousriposte,ofcourse,isthatthepeoplehave
thevoteastheultimatesanctiontoridthemselvesofwaywardrepresentatives.Yet
therearestronggroundsforarguingthatelectoralmechanismsarenecessarybut
woefullyinsufficient.
Themostpertinentquestiontoaskinthewakeoftheexpensesscandalisnot‘howcan
werestoretrustinParliamentandourrepresentatives?’but‘howcanwegivecitizens
morecontrolandoversightoverParliamentandtheirrepresentatives?’Thisopensupa
neglectedterrain,oftenmissedincallstoreformtheelectoralsystem,astohowwe
decentralisepowerorincreaseparticipationindecision-making,sothatcitizenscan
holdtheirrepresentativestoaccountfordecisionsthattheyhavealreadymade,rather
thanthosetheypromisetoundertake–socalled,ex-post accountability(Blaug2008).
TherushbyallpartyleaderstointroducesomesystemofrecallformiscreantMPs
indicatesaninchoatesensethatgreaterex-post accountabilityisneeded.Our
preferencewouldbeforasystemthatdrawsonclassicalmodelsofpublicaccusation,
enablescitizenstopubliclysanctionparliamentariansorministersbetweenelections
butthat,unlikerecall,wouldnotneedtobeinitiatedatconstituencylevel.This
republicanperspective,groundedasitisinthenotionofpopularratherthan
parliamentarysovereignty,providesadifferenttakeonthequestionofrestoringtrust
inParliament.Itsuggeststhatasimportantasproposalstostrengthenthepowerofthe
ParliamentovertheExecutivemaybe,thesearesecond-orderissuescomparedwith
theneedtoputParliamentinitsplaceinrelationtocitizens.
ThequestionoftheultimatesourceofauthorityintheBritishConstitutionisfamously
obscuredbythedecaying,butstillcentral,doctrineofparliamentarysovereignty.We
needtoclarifyandrestoretheprimacyofcitizensovertheinstitutionstowhichthey
delegatepower.Citizensratherthantheirrepresentativesshouldbetheprimary
decision-makerswhenitcomestoreformsofthedemocraticprocess.Whatemerges
fromthisrepublican-inflectedperspectiveisthatcitizensneedtogofrombeingthe
occasionalauthorisersofpoliticalpowertotheownersandcustodiansofit.
Accountabilityandtheoverburdenedvote
Accountabilityinvolvestheex-post judgementofthepastperformanceofpublic
officialsorpoliticians.Itinvolvesbothscrutinyandsanction.Scrutinyentails
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examinationandevaluation,whereassanctionentailsempoweredactiononthebasis
ofsuchevaluation.ThekeymechanismforthepublictosanctionMPsinmodern
representativedemocraciesisthevote.Yetinbetweenelections,scrutinyandsanction,
theoreticallyatleast,areexercisedbyarangeofotheragents–byParliamentover
government,judgesoverParliament,byseniormanagersoversubordinates,andina
morediffusewaybythemediaoverthestateingeneral.
Itisworthexploringthenatureoftheelectoralmechanisminmoredetailtoclarifythe
sortofaccountabilityitaffordscitizens.Inelections,thecitizenryactsasaPrincipal
thattheoreticallybothscrutinisesandsanctionselectedofficialsastheirAgents.Yet,in
thewordsofBlaug,‘thisisquiteaparticularkindofPrincipal/Agentrelationasit
involvestheauthorisationex-ante[i.e.beforetheevent]ofanempoweredand
autonomousagentthatcanruleoverpeople’(2008:105).Electionsthuscombineex-
ante andex-postaccountabilityinonemove:citizensbothauthorisenewleadersto
governandexpressajudgementonincumbentperformance.
However,when,aswasthecasewiththeexpensesscandal,adivideopensupbetween
citizensandthepoliticalclass,thevoteisafairlybluntinstrument.Thisisespecially
thecaseintheUKwherepowerisfusedbetweentheExecutiveandthelegislature,
makingamockeryofthenotionofaseparationofpowers,andwheretheelectoral
systemcreatesthehugedistortionsbetweenvotescastandseatsgainedbythe
majorityparty.
HowarewetointerpretthefactthattheLabourgovernment’sshareofthevote
droppedinboththe2001and2005generalelections,butinthefirstitwona
‘landslide’andthesecondithadamorethanworkablemajority?Wastheelectorate
sanctioningitforitsperformanceinofficeorauthorisingittocontinueasbefore–or
bothatonce?Thetruthisthatunlessthereisahungparliamentthesanctionof
dwindlingsupporthasnoimpactontheauthorisationofpowerforanotherfouryears.
Whileelectionsprovideauthorisationex-ante,itislesscleartheycanprovideeffective
ex-post accountability.Thevoteisthereforeoverburdenedwithadualfunctionthatit
cannoteffectivelyperform,whichinturncreatesapoliticalcultureandpolicy
environmentthatinfantilisetheelectorate.Yearsoffrustration,resentmentand
despairneedtobebuiltupbeforeapartyisremovedfromgovernmentbyan
apparentlymanicswinginthemoodoftheelectorate.Onesetofelitesisexchanged
foranother,buttheconductoftheelitesonceinofficerarelychanges.
CanPRrescuethepoliticalclassfromitself?
Couldachangeofvotingsystembearthedualburdenofaccountabilitymore
effectively?Thereareanumberofpositiveeffectsthatmightcomewithamoveto
ProportionalRepresentationbuttheyareunlikelytodealeffectivelywithproblemsof
ex-postaccountability.EvenapartialformofPRsuchastheJenkinsAV[Alternative
Vote]-pluscouldchangetheunwarrantedwinner-takes-alleffectoffirst-past-the-post
elections.Thiscouldhaveanumberofindirectbenefits,notablyifcoalition
governmentforcedamoreconsensualandconsistentstyleofpolicymaking.Ifone
partycannotguaranteethepassageofitspreferredlegislationitwillbeforcedto
bargainwithcoalitionpartnersorsupportpartiesinordertolegislate.Bydispersing
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Theroleofcitizensaftertheexpensesscandal
poweramongmorevetoholders,PRmightprovideafunctionalequivalenttothe
separationofpowersthatislackinginthecurrentfusionofexecutiveandlegislature.
InturnPRmightopenupthepoliticalprocessbeyondthetwogreatpolitical
oligarchiesthathaveoccupiedParliamentforthelastcentury.
However,thosecallingforPRasadirectresponsetotheexpensescrisismissthe
fundamentalproblemitbroughttolight.Whereaspreviousscandalshaveprimarily
affectedthegoverningparty,theexpensesscandalaffectedthepoliticalclassasa
whole.Itreflectedaworryingtendency:‘thattherealdivideinBritishpubliclifeisno
longerbetweenthemainparties,butbetweenthepoliticalclassandtherest’(Oborne
2008:xvi).MPsfromdifferentpartieshavemoreincommonwitheachotherthan
theyhavewithvotersandlikeanyspecialinterestgroupthepoliticalclassfightshard
tomaintaincontroloveritsownregulations,payrates,pensionsandmeansbywhichit
isheldtoaccount.
Theexpensesscandalpowerfullyrevealedthissenseofseparationbetweenpolitical
classandthepublic.Italsorevealedaprofoundsenseofpowerlessness:thevotecan
sanctiononefactionofthepoliticalclass,butitcanneverservetosanctionitasa
wholeandbythetimeanelectioncomesarounditmaybetoolatetodoanything
aboutspecificactsofmalfeasance.Inallrepresentativesystems,onceelecteda
politician’sprimaryloyaltyandaccountabilityaretohisorherparty;between
electionsalltheincentivesandsanctionsonconductarepossessedbytheparty
leaderships.Inthissensepoliticiansarenodifferenttoanyoneelse–theyrespond
rationallytotheincentivesandsanctionstheyexperiencewithintheirenvironment.
Theproblemisnotwithpartiespersebutwiththeirmonopolyovertherulesofthe
game.Themostsensibleresponseisnottotrytoturnhumanbeingsintoangelsbutto
removethemfromobviousconflictsofinterest.
WhileOborne’sacerbicaccountofthepoliticalclassisconvincing,itoverplaysthe
noveltyofthephenomenon:itmisseshowitisaconsequenceofthedemocratisation
ofthegentlemanlyeighteenthcenturypoliticalarrangementshepinesfor.Despite
aimstocreateamoreequalandlesscorruptsystemthepoliticalclasshasbecomea
self-perpetuatingoligarchythatjealouslyguardsitsprivileges.Itispossiblethat
primariescouldenhancepopularcontrolofpoliticiansbygivingthemstronger
incentivestobeloyaltotheconstituencythatselectedthem.Yettheexpensesscandal
arguablyrevealstheneedforcitizenstofindaspaceandrolewithinthepolitical
processthatisnotdesignedorpremisedonthelogicofthepartysystem.
Democraticdualism:authorisationandoversight
Therehasbeenapersistentconcernsincethebirthofmoderndemocracyto
compensateforthedysfunctionsofelectoralrepresentationandthe‘arrhythmia’of
theballotbox.Perhapsthemostwellknownintuitionalmanifestationofsuch
democraticdistrustistheRecallandInitiativeprocedures,somecombinationofwhich
isusedin27states.
Throughoutthemodernerareformershavecalledforsupplementaryprocessestothe
vote,throughwhichcitizenscouldcontrolofficeholdersinmassdemocracies.Thiswas
lessaboutmassparticipationindecision-makingandmoreaboutensuringarolefor
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citizensinoverseeingrepresentativesaftertheyhadgainedthelegitimacyoftheballot
box.Thesemechanismssoughttoenlistthecapacityofthecitizensinajudicialrather
thanalegislativecapacity.AsRosanvallonputsit,theconcernwas:‘Toinstitutionalize
socialvigilanceandtounderstandsovereigntyintermsofadynamicandpotentially
conflictualrelationshipbetweenarepresentativepowerandapowerofoversight,both
emanatingfromthepeople’(2008:92).
Theroleofthepublicaccusation1 inthedemocraticimagination
Whiletheneedforlimitationsongovernmentpowerhasbeenaconstantofmodern
democracies,suchstructuralchecksandbalanceshavebeenliberalratherthan
democraticininspiration.Thisistosaytheyhavesoughtnottoenhancethe
sovereigntyofcitizensoverrepresentativesbutpreventanall-powerfulgovernment
encroachingonindividualliberties.Thishasmeantthatliberaldistrusthasbeenmore
successfullyinstitutionalisedandthattheexpressionofdemocraticdistrusthas
mutatedandevolvedoutsideformalinstitutions(Rosanvallon2008).
Throughouttheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturiesreformersconsistentlydrew
inspirationfromtheaccountabilitymechanismsexercisedintheAthenianPeople’s
Courtandthe‘tribunesoftheplebs’intheRomanrepublic.Bothinstitutions
empoweredcitizenstolaunchpublicdenunciationsagainstofficials,whichwouldthen
beputtoajuryofcitizenstodecide.Thedenunciationenabledanycitizenstoinitiate
anaccusationofmalfeasanceagainstofficeholders,includingmilitaryleaders.
Sanctionscouldinvolveanythingfromcommendationtoostracismandexecution
(Blaug2008).AndduringthefledglingyearsoftheAmericanandFrenchRepublics
reformerssoughttograftancientaccountabilitymechanismsontothevotetocontrol
theemergingclassofprofessionalpoliticians(seeRosanvallon2008).
Theexpensesscandalisanexampleofhowtheexpressionofpopulardistrustis
channelledandoftendistortedbyascandal-hungrymediawhichcannotbeheldto
accountforitsownconduct.TouseMachiavelli’sterminology,itishardtodistinguish
betweengenuinedenunciationsand‘calumnies’thatunjustlyruinreputationsand
careers.TheTelegraph’scampaignofterroroverthepoliticalclasseswassoeffective
becausethepoliticalclasscolludedincoveringuptheirexpenses.Yetbeyondthe
generalelectionthereisnoinstitutionalroutebywhichcitizenscanexpress
dissatisfactionorsanctionsontheirownterms.Bygoingthestandardrouteof
appointingacivilservanttoreportonanewexpensessystem,theGovernmenthas
failedtogivethepopulacean‘opportunitytoventtheiranimus’againstthepolitical
class.MPs’combativeresponsetotheLeggreviewsuggeststhatasolutiononrepaying
expenseswillbeyetanotherclosedcompromisewithinthepoliticalclass.
TheghostofpopularsovereigntyintheUK 1.InrepublicanRome
thosebringingfalse
Allconstitutionspremisedontheconsentofthepeoplearebesetbyparadoxesof accusationor
authorityandownership.LaughlinandWalkerdescribethisparadoxasultimately ‘calumnies’warranted
beingputontrial.
beinggeneratedbythe‘tensionlinking–andalsothequestionoftheprioritybetween Machiavelliargued
–aconstituentpower(the‘people’)andconstitutionalform,politicsandlaw’(2007: thatcalumnieswere
‘asinjurioustoliberty
1).Yetsuchquestionsareparticularlydifficulttopose,letaloneanswer,intheUK. asaccusationsare
Althoughthemodernconceptofconstituentpowerwasfirstarticulatedbythe beneficial’.
21
Theroleofcitizensaftertheexpensesscandal
LevellersinthemidstoftheEnglishCivilWar,itfailedtogainanyrecognitioninthe
1688Settlement.ThelatterhasbeendescribedbyLaughlinasrestingonadeliberate
obfuscationbygoverningelites:‘theinvocationofpopularsovereigntybutlocated
onlyinaparliamentaryformandthecharacterizationofthisrevolutionarychangeas
beingdesignedtorestoretheancientconstitution’(2006:42).Thequestionof
constituentpowerhasbecomesodeeplyburiedthatMPsliterallydonotthinkit
exists.Theexpensesscandalisonlythemostbanalconsequenceofaconstitutionthat
isparasticuponthenotionofpopularsovereigntywhilerefusingtoformally
aknowledgeit.
Overtime,vestingsovereigntyinthe‘CrowninParliament’hasrestedonafurther
obsfuscation,whereinthepowerofthecrownhaspassedtothehandsofthePrime
MinisterandgovernmentwithinParliament.Thedoctrineof‘parliamentary
sovereignty’hasbeendemocraticallydentedwiththeadventofuniversalsuffrageand
hedgedfromabovebytheEuropeanUnion.Yetrecognitionoftherightofthepeople
toelecttheirrepresentativessaysnothingabouttheirroleinmodifyingorradically
alteringthedemocraticandconstitutionalrulesofthegameinwhichrepresentatives
operate.Preciselybecauseparliamentarysovereigntyoccludesthepeopleas
constituentpower,itprovidesnomeansofarticulatingclearandconsistentprocedures
wherebycitizenscouldorshouldbepartytofundamentalchangestodemocraticrights
andprocesses.Yetthisispreciselywhatiscalledfortoday.
Animmodestproposal:citizensasownersandcustodiansofthepolitical
system
TheexpensesscandalandMPs’bemusedreactiontothepublicangeritgeneratedis
indicativeofbasicconfusionovertheroleandstatusofcitizensinthepoliticalorder.
Thiscrisisofpoliticalownership,whileamplifiedinasocietyofmoreindividualised
anddemandingcitizens,hasbeencenturiesratherthandecadesinthemaking.Gordon
Brown’sattempttoaddresscitizendisengagementanddistrust–fromtheGovernance
ofBritain paper(HMGovernment2007)tothecurrentconstitutionalreformbill–
singlyfailstoconfrontthisconfusion.Theprocessof‘tamingtheprerogativepowers’is
longoverdueandtobewelcomedbuttherelationshipbetweencitizenandParliament
issidesteppedagainandagain.
Thefirststeptopreventingrepresentativesfrombecomede-factoaristocraciesisto
recognisecitizensastheformalownersoftheirconstitution.Todothisweneedto
reclaimtherepublicandistinctionbetweenconstituentpower ofthepeopleandthe
institutionscreatedtorepresentandactonbehalfofthispower.Followingtheradical
reformersoftheeighteenthcenturyanewconstitutionalsettlementshouldrecognise
thepowerofrepresentationandoversight,withbothstemmingfromthepeople.This
callsfordirectandpublicformsofaccountabilitythatenablethepeopletorehearse
anddisplaytheirsovereigntyoverrepresentatives.Whilethevoteauthorisesthe
representativestoactonthepeople’sinterests,thepowerofoversightandsanction
needstoremaindistinct,visibleandthreateningafterthefactofauthorisationto
ensurethattheydo.
TotheextentthataBritishBillofRightscouldbeaboutbuildingonratherthan
underminingtheHumanRightsAct,theprocessofwritingoneshouldnotsimply
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catalogueexistingrightsandobligations.Rather,itshouldbeseizedontospecifynew
rightsandobligationofpoliticalownershipandoversight.Havingmadethepeoplethe
ownersoftheconstitution,innovativenewmechanismsbywhichtomakethemthe
custodiansneedtobeexperimentedwith.
Whatmightsuchmechanismsandprocesseslooklikeandwhatshouldtheyfocuson?
Isuggesttwodistinctcategories:newmechanismstoinitiatepublicaccusationsand
newproceduresforcitizencontroloverdemocraticrule-making.Inbothinstances
citizenswouldbeempoweredintheircapacitytomakebindingjudgementsinthe
pubicinterestratherthandirectlyparticipatingineverydaylegislation.Thisisdistinct
fromthenotionofcitizenjuriesasconsultativebodiesonissuesofpublicpolicy.While
suchprocessescanhaveafunctionalutilityinimprovingpolicymakingtheydolittleto
empowerthecitizenasanoverseeroftheirrepresentatives.
Publicaccusations
Anewaccusationsystemcouldreplace,parallelorbecomepartoftheformalinquiries
andcommissionsthatarecurrentlylaunchedbypoliticiansintotheirownconduct,
ofteninresponsetomediapressure.Atpresenttheseoftenexacerbateratherthen
diffusedistrust.Taketheexampleofthemultipleinquiriesthathavebeenheldtodate
ontheIraqWar.Regardlessofthevalidityofthejudgments,thefactthatthePrime
MinistersetsthetermsofreferencesandappointstheInquirymembersgivesthe
perceptionthattheywereriggedfromtheoutset.Infusingtheseprocesseswith
randomlyselectedcitizenswouldenablethecreationofanindependentjudgmentthat
wouldcreateanalternativefocusforpublicdebate.
Citizenscouldinitiatepublicaccusationsthroughapetition:ifareasonablyhigh
thresholdofpublicvoteswerereached,ajuryofrandomlyselectedcitizensanda
judgewouldbeindependentlyappointed.Publicsanctionscouldrangefromhighly
symbolicblackmarksonthereputationofthosedeemedguiltytoamodernequivalent
ofpoliticalostracism,whereinpoliticianscouldbebannedfromtakinganyformof
publicofficeinthefuture.
AswasthecaseintheAthenianandRomanrepublics,apublicaccusationsystem
shouldincorporate‘twostepaccountabilitydevices’which‘holdtoaccountthose
officialswhoholdofficialstoaccountfornogoodreason’(Elster1999:274).Theissue
offalseorfrivolouschargespresentedaseriouschallengetothelegitimacyofthe
accusationprocessinbothAthensandRome.Bothpolitiesexperimentedwitha
numberofwaystolimitfalsecharges,principallybyimposingcostsonthecitizen
bringingtheaccusation.Theseincludedfinesandfuturebansonmakingaccusation.
Democraticrule-making
Theimmediateresponsefrompartyleaderstotheexpensescrisiswastoshowerthe
electoratewithdemocraticgiftsfromabove–fromrecallandinitiativesontaxto
electoralreform.Yetthequestionofhowcitizensshouldvotefororremuneratetheir
representativesorthecapacitiestheyshouldhavetoaffectthepoliticalprocessare
questionselectedpoliticiansarenotinagoodpositiontoanswer.Theyhavean
inherentconflictofinterestbetweenpreservingtheirownstatusandtheirparty’s
prospectofretakingorregainingpoweranddecisionsthatmightenhancethe
23
Theroleofcitizensaftertheexpensesscandal
democraticprocessoverthelongterm.Thechoicebetweenpartyandcountryisnot
alwaysazero-sumgame.Yetthepressuretooptforshort-termgainisintense
withinthepartysystemsprevalentinmodernpoliticalsystems.Indeed,thereform
proposalsofferedbyboththeToriesandLabourareshotthroughwithpartisan
logic:theToriessay‘yes’toinitiativesontaxation,‘no’toareferendumonPR,
whereasLabourispromisingareferendumonPRbutonerestrictedtoachoiceover
thesingletransferablevote(STV).
Ratherthanhavingtojustifytheinclusionofcitizensinmakingdecisionsaboutthe
democraticprocess,theburdenofproofshouldbeonthosewhowouldseekto
excludethem.Certaincategoriesofdecisionrelatingtothedemocraticprocess
shouldautomaticallybypassrepresentativesandgotoaspeciallyconvened
assemblyof‘citizenrepresentatives’.Citizenrepresentativebodieshavebeen
definedasthoseinwhich‘membersareselectedorselfselected,orauthorized
throughinitialelectionalone–ratherthanfunctioningasprofessional
representatives’(Warren2007:50).
Theexemplarmodelofademocraticallylegitimatecitizenrepresentativebodyisthe
BritishColumbiaCitizensAssemblyonElectoralReform.TheCitizensAssembly,
initiatedin2004followinganelectionpromise,consistedof160randomlyselected
citizensempoweredtosetthetermsofreferenceonreferendumonwhetherthe
province’sSingleMemberPlurality(SMP)electoralsystemshouldbechanged.The
newelectoralsystemproposedbytheAssembly,aformofSTV,wasnarrowly
defeatedinareferendumin2005.Theoutcomeinthisinstanceislessimportant
thantheprocess.Thekeylessonsconcernthewayprofessionalpoliticianswere
screenedoutoftheselectionprocessforAssemblymembers,thedirect
empowermentofacitizenbodytosettheagendaandthepassingofthefinal
decisiontothecitizenryatlarge.
Wheretheresponsibilityforadministeringsuchprocessesshouldsitisanopenand
contentiousquestion.OnepotentiallocationcouldbethenewSupremeCourt.
Alternatively,anewarms-length‘OfficeofCitizensControl’couldbecreatedaspart
ofnewconstitutionalsettlement.Inthefirstinstancethereshouldbeaseriesof
discretecitizenassembliesempoweredtosettheagendaonarangeofdemocratic
processissues:whethertochangetheelectoralsystem,andwhethertoinstitute
recallandonbothfundingofpartiesandtheremunerationofMPs.Demoshelda
60-strongconventiononMPs’expensesinJune2009andparticipantsfromarange
ofbackgroundsnotonlycameupwitheminentlysensibleproposalsforreform,
theyalsoappearedtoimmenselyenjoytakingpart.
Itisimportanttonotethatneitheraccusationsnorcitizens’conventionsarelikely
totakeplaceonaregularbasis.Justasmostpeopleareonlylikelytoserveona
criminaljuryonce,itisunlikelythatcitizenswouldbeaskedtoserveinacitizens
assemblyorpoliticaljurymorethanonceintheirlifetime.Aswithcriminaljuries,
theireffectivenessislessaboutthenumberofpeopletakingpartsomuchasthe
typeofpeopletakingpart.Randomlyselectingcitizenrepresentativestooversee
suchprocesseswouldsymbolicallyandpracticallyprisethehandsofthepolitical
classawayfromthedemocraticprocessitself.
24
Demos
Conclusion
WhiletheideathatsovereigntyresidesinthepeopleisnewterritoryforBritain’s
representativeinstitutions,itdrawsonthelongandrichtraditionofdemocratic
republicanisminBritain–atraditionthatshouldprovidetheanimatinglogicofanew
constitutionalsettlement.Whatwouldemergeisanewroleforcitizensinoverseeing
politicalpowerthatcouldenhancetrustinthepoliticalsystem,notleastbyreducing
thatpopulistmediabacklashthatoccurswhenMPsmakedecisionsinwhichtheyhave
aclearconflictofinterest.
Thiscallformoredirectcitizenoversightisnotintendedasapanaceatothemultiple
pathologiesofpowerthatbesetthecreakingWestminstermodelofdemocracy.Power
isandhasbeenfordecadesbothmassivelyover-centralisedandover-concentratedin
theExecutive.Addressingthelackofconstitutionalstandingforlocalgovernment
mustbepartofaconstitutionalreformpackage.EnshriningandobservingtheCouncil
ofEurope’sCharteronLocalSelfGovernmentwouldprovideonemeansofenacting
thischange.TheenhancedroleoflocalgovernmentwouldpotentiallyfreeupMPs
frombecomingconstituencysocialworkers.Yettheextenttowhichtheycouldbecome
respectedandtrustedrepresentativesofthenationrequiresaconfrontationwiththe
fetishisationofpowerinthefigureofthe‘crowninParliament’.Thisnotonlyoccludes
thefactthatallpowerhaspassedintothehandsoftheleaderofthemajorityparty
butalsoconflatesthepowerofrepresentativeswiththoseofthepeople.Focusingon
theproblemofcitizenoversightremindsusthatParliamentandthepoliticalclassneed
savingfromthemselves–andthatordinarycitizenscanandshouldplayakeyrolein
thistask.
DanielLeightonisaresearcheratDemos.
BentleyT(2005)EverydayDemocracyLondon:Demos
BlaugR(2008)‘Directaccountabilityattheend’inWhiteSandLeightonD(Eds)BuildingaCitizen
Society:TheemergingpoliticsofDemocraticRepublicanismLondon:LawrenceandWishart
BrownG(2009)SpeechtoLabourPartyConference,September
CameronC(2009)‘Anewpolitics:weneedamassiveradicalredistributionofpower’,TheGuardian,
25May
CleggN(2009)‘Barthegates.Nosummerholidaybeforetheoverhaul’,TheGuardian,27May
ElsterJ(1999)‘AccountabilityinAthenianPolitics’,inPrezworsksiA,StokesSandManinB(eds)
Democracy,AccountabilityandRepresentationCambridge:CUP
HMGovernment(2007)TheGovernanceofBritain Norwich:TSO
LaughlinMandWalkerN(eds)(2007)TheParadoxofConstitutionalism:ConstituentPowerand
ConstitutionalFormOxford:OUP
LaughlinM(2007)‘ConstituentPowersubverted:FromEnglishPositionalArgumenttoBritish
ConstitutionalPractice’inLaughlinMandWalkerN(eds)opcit
MarquandD(2007)Britainsince1918:ThestrangecareerofBritishDemocracy, Weidenfieldand
Nicolson
OborneP(2007)TheTriumphofthePoliticalClass PocketBooks
25
Theroleofcitizensaftertheexpensesscandal
26
ANTIPOLITICS AND THE CRISIS
politicalclassstilldon’t‘getit’.Therhetoricofsweepingreformmaybecombinedwith
effortstoworkoutwhatminimalreformswillsuffice.Yetthisisalsotoosimplean
indictment.Theresponsibilityforreformdoesnotliewiththepoliticiansandthe
politicalinstitutionsalone.Havetherestofusincivicsocietyarticulatedacoherent
argumentastopreciselywhatitisthatthepoliticalinstitutionsaresupposedto‘get’?
Naturally,acrisisofpoliticallegitimacyhasoftenbeenusedtoreinvigorateawide
varietyofpre-existingagendasforpoliticalreform.Wewillallthinkthatsomeofthe
proposalsmootedareimportant,necessaryandincreasinglyurgent–andthatothers
wouldbeadistractingstepinthewrongdirection.Allthatwedisagreeaboutiswhich
reformsbelongineachcategory.
Disagreementsaboutwhatshouldchangeshouldbenosurprise.Itisinthenatureof
politics.Buthowseldomthatisacknowledged,notleastbecauseitmightcomplicate
thelambastingof‘thepoliticians’fortheirstubbornandselfishrefusaltodowhat‘we,
thepeople’want.
Thetriumphofanti-politics?
Thecentralquestionforreformersthenbecomeshowtoseizepoliticsbackfromthe
politicalclassonbehalfofcitizens.PaulJudge,founderoftheJuryTeam,putshisfaith
inwhathecalls‘independentpeople’:‘Wethinkindependentpeoplecanmakegood
decisions.Weusethatmodelforjuries.Ifyouputagroupofsensiblepeopletogether
andshowthemthefacts,they’llmakegooddecisions’(Judge2009).Fromtheright,
supportersoftheminimalstatearguethattheConservativesshouldlearnfromthe
RepublicansintheUS:‘Aseriesof“anti-politics”policies,rangingfromtermlimitsfor
legislatorstolimitationsonbudgets,helpedtoestablishinthepublicmindthatatleast
someRepublicanswerewith“us”against“them”–with,thatis,thecountryagainstits
apparat.This,aboveall,iswhattheBritishConservativesneedtodo’(Carswelletal
2005).
ThePowerInquirymakesthecaseforliberalreform,arguingthatthecurrentvoting
systemisregardedbymillionsofcitizensasawasteoftime:‘Manycitizensfindparties
andelectionsunappealingbecausetheyrequireindividualstocommittoaverybroad
rangeofpolicieswithwhichtheymightnotentirelyagree...itisvitalthatclear
processesexistforcitizenstoinfluenceandchallengethespecificareasofgovernment
andpolicythatconcernthem’(ThePowerInquiry2006).
Thesearedifferentreformagendas,withdifferentpoliticalmotivations.TheJuryTeam
explicitlyeschewsideology.Iftheproblemwithpoliticsisthepoliticians,theansweris
toreplacethemwithnon-politiciansofhonestyandintegrity–MrSmithgoesto
WashingtonremadeasEstherRantzengoestoLutonSouth.
Thepropositionisthatallvotersofgoodwillwantarecandidatesofgoodwill.Ifonly
theycanbefreedfromtheconstraintsofparty,thetyrannyofthewhips,anyshared
orcollectivebodyofbeliefsoramanifestoofspecificcommitmentstovotersacrossthe
rangeofpolicy,theywillbeabletoarriveunhinderedinParliamenttorise‘above
politics’andgovernsensiblyinthecommoninterestsof‘thepeople’.
28
FabianSociety
Yet,foranemerginggenerationofConservativeParliamentarians,similaranti-political
grievancescanbeputtomorefocusedideologicalpurpose.ForDouglasCarswelland
DanielHannan,theanti-politicsargumentisnotsimplyananti-incumbencytactic,but
isexplicitlyadvocatedasawayfortheConservativerighttotake‘ourstandonthe
defenceoftheindividualagainstthestate’,underminingcollectiveprovisionand
promotingtheideaofshrinkingthestatesothat‘thecitizenshouldbeasfreeas
possiblefromstatecoercion’(Carswelletal 2005).Yetanuncannilysimilar‘themand
us’argumentisvoicedinsupportofabroadlyoppositemotivationbythePower
Inquiry.
Ithasbecomefashionabletoassertthatabetterinformedelectorateismuchmore
awareoftheweaknessesofpoliticiansandthepoliticalsystem.Asaresulttheyare
withdrawingfromformalparticipationinpoliticsandinsteadchannellingtheirenergies
intocommunityactivismandcampaigninggroups.Yettheoldpoliticiansmaintain
theirholdonthesystem,therebystoppinganeweraofdemocracy.
AsmycolleagueattheFabianSociety,TimHorton,haswritten:‘Ifthisistheproblem,
thesolutionisobvious:changetheinstitutions,changetheparties,getthepoliticians
intheirplaceandput“thepeople”inchargewithouthavingtoworkthroughthe
formalpoliticalstructures...etvoila!Wewillallcomerushingbacktoengageinanew
goldenageofcitizendemocracy.Ifonlyitwerethatsimple’(Hortonetal 2007).
Thattheargumentissopopularonleft,rightandamongthosewhorejectthose
categoriesaspartoftheproblemsuggestsatideofopinionrunningheavilyinits
favour.Inthatcase,thiscrisisoflegitimacyofourpoliticalinstitutionsisalso
highlightingadeeper,foundationalweaknessinourunderstandingofwhatpoliticsis.
Afalsehistory
Howdidwegethere?Everybodyknowsitisaboutthecorruptionofallthatwasnoble
inParliamentandpolitics.DanielHannanMEPrecentlylamentedintheDaily
TelegraphthatMPsnow‘contractouttheiropinionstothewhips’andthus‘ceaseto
representtheirconstituents’;this,hesuggested,wascontrarytotraditionsof
Parliamentthroughmostofitshistory(Hannan2009).
ThePowerInquirysimilarlyassertsthat‘thewhipshaveenforcedpartydiscipline
morefullyandforcefullythaninthepast’.ThisistheJuryTeam’scentralcomplaint,
too.Youmighthearthislamentinanypubintheland,andfromalmostevery
newspapercolumnist.
PhillipCowley,however,saysthatthisis‘cobblersfromstarttofinish’.Hegoeson:
‘Thisideathattherehasbeenadeclineinbackbenchindependenceisnotjustwrong,
itistheoppositeofthetruth’(BritishAcademy2007).Therewasalmostnobackbench
dissentatallinthe1950s.TheConservativegovernmentsafter1951lostone
Commonsdivisioninthirteenyears,comparedwithsixgovernmentdefeatsduringthis
Parliament,whileonlyonedivisionineveryfiftyduringthe1950ssawany 1.Afulllistof
backbenchervoteagainsthisparty;bythe1970soneineveryfivedivisionsdidso. Commons
governmentdefeats
TheMajor,BlairandBrownerashaveseeneverincreasinglevelsofbackbench canbefoundat
independenceandNewLabour’ssupposedly‘supine’backbenchesturnouttobethe www.election.demon.
co.uk/defeats.html
mostrebelliousinpost-warParliamentaryhistory1.
29
Anti-politicsandthecrisis
Thismythicalhistoryisunlikelytomakeforasuccessfulfoundationstoneforcallsfor
astrongerParliament.
Misunderstandingpolitics–andforgettingthatnoteverybodyagreeswithme
Thepopulistcaseforreformisequallyweakinitscontemporaryunderstandingof
whatpoliticsisabout.
What,forexample,arewetomakeofthePowerInquiryargumentthat,‘Formillions
ofcitizensitseems,votingissimplyregardedasawasteoftimebecausethecandidate
orpartyyoufavouriseithernotstandingorhasnochanceofvictorywhilethe
candidateorpartythatdoesstandachanceofwinningispositivelydisliked’?There
arecertainlylegitimatecriticismstobemadeofanelectoralsystemwhichgivestoo
littlevoicetosmallerparties,orgivesdisproportionatepowertothelargestparties
whentheyhaveapluralityofthevote.Butthiscomplaintgoesmuchdeeperthanthat.
AcandidateIpositivelydislikecanonlyhavemorechanceofwinninganelectionthan
myownfavouriteiftheyhavemoresupport fromotherpeople.Noelectoralorpolitical
systemcanaddressthegrievance,howeverirritating,thatotherpeopledon’talways
agreewithme.
Thefailuretounderstandpoliticsasnotonlyabout‘havingmysay’butalso
aggregatingpreferencesandnegotiatingdisagreementdrivesmuchofthefrustration
with‘formalpolitics’.ThePowerInquiryfindsthatthepoliticalpartiesareoften
unattractivebecauseoftheir‘broad-brush’approachwhilecampaigngroupsare‘much
morefocusedandrequireonlythatanindividualsupportschangeinonearea’.True–
sowhowillthenaggregateandtrade-offthesenoisy,clashingdemands?
Thecaseforpoliticsrestated
Inhisseminalworkof1962InDefenceofPolitics,BernardCrickarguedthatonly
politicscanfindoutwhatthepublicwantsandreconcilethesedifferent,and
sometimescontradictory,demands.Butitwillalwaysdosoimperfectly,andthis,as
AndrewGamblehaspointedout,leadstodisappointmentorevencynicism:
Democraticpoliticswilloftenbescornedbymanyonleft,rightandcentre
becauseitissomessy,unprincipled,approximateandbecausepoliticiansso
oftenappeardevious,evasiveanduntrustworthy.Theynevermeasureupto
expectations.Crick’shardpointisthattheyneverwill,andinexpectingthemto
doso,wefindourselvesperpetuallydisillusioned,whichiswhysomanypeople
disengagefrompoliticsaltogether,seekingcomfortelsewhere. (Gamble2004)
ThisargumenthasbeendevelopedinrecentseparatecontributionsfromGerryStoker
(2006)andMegRussell(2005),whoeachconsciouslydevelopCrick’sarguments,
particularlytoexaminehowaconsumeristsocietyseemstofinditincreasinglydifficult
tounderstandthecollectivenatureofpoliticaldecision-making.Negotiationand
compromisecanbetime-consumingandboring.Thatiswhymanypeopleleavepolitics
totheexperts–untilaparticularissuebothersus.Thenthetestistheconsumeristone:
didIgetwhatIwantedonceIbotheredtoturnup?Ifnot,‘thesystem’hasfailed;
‘politicsisbroken’.Yet,asRussellargues,thecentralpointisthat‘politicsdoesnot
alloweveryonetogetwhattheywant’.
30
FabianSociety
Thecurrentdebateaboutthepoliticalcrisismayberatifyingatriumphofanti-politics
overpolitics,asastronglymediatedpublicdiscourseincreasinglystrugglestotellthe
differencebetweenthetwo.Thismaynowbeacentralbarriertoseriousengagement
inaprojectofpoliticalreform–andespeciallytothechancesofreformssuccessfully
increasingengagementandreversingalienationinanenduringway.
Thisisnottoarguethatreformisnotnecessary.Itis.Northatthecurrentpolitical
responseisadequate.Ithasnotbeen.Thedilemmaisthatnoreformagendacould
satisfythosediscontentswhicharevoicedagainstacurrentcropofpoliticiansandthe
formalpoliticalinstitutionsascurrentlyconstituted,iftheyoftenturnouttobe
essentiallyprotestsattheinherentlimitationsofpoliticsitself.Theriskisofasterile
stand-offanddialogueofthedeaf.Thepoliticalclasswillbesatirisedaswishingto
dissolvethepeopleandelectanother,asacycleofcrisis,reform,disappointmentand
crisisdeepenspoliticaldisenchantment.
Indeed,reformhelpedtogetushere.Theprincipleoftransparencyhasbeenextended:
forthefirsttime,weknowwhogivesmoneytopartiesandwhatMPsspendon
expenses.Butgreatertransparencywillnotincreasepublictrustinthepoliticalprocess
ifwhatisrevealedlackspubliclegitimacy.Thetransparencygenieiswellandtrulyout
ofthebottle–andcouldhardlybereversed.
TheLabourgovernmenthasoftenbeencaughtintheconsequencesofitsownhalf
measures.OnMPs’expensesthereislittleexcuse:sunlighthasactedasadisinfectant
andtheprinciplesofamorelegitimatesystemarenotdifficulttodefineorimplement.
But,elsewhere,noalternativetoadiscreditedstatusquomaycommandsufficient
publicconsensustoendure:thereis,forexample,nopublicconfidenceinpolitical
competitionbeinglargelyfundedbyrichindividuals,corporatedonationsandtrade
unionsyetneitheristheresupportforanyalternativesystem,particularlyonethat
makesanygreaterdemandsonthepublicpurse.
Reformtostrengthenpoliticalengagement
Theanswertothepoliticallegitimacycrisisispolitics.Therecanbenomagicbullet
solutiontowhatisprimarilyaquestionofpoliticalcultureandpoliticaleducation.
Buttheoverridingpriorityshouldbetopursuepoliticalreforminawaythatis
engagingandeducativeofthenatureofpoliticsitselfandthatbringsabout
practicalresults.
Thisstrengthensthecaseforaconstitution-makingmomentinBritishpolitics–and
fordoingsothroughsomeformofcitizens’convention.
Thismaynotwork.Theill-fatedEuropeanConstitutionalTreatyarosefromsimilar
motivations,backin2001,thoughthelackofaEuropeandemos presentedan
additionallayerofdifficulty.Butitmustbeworthtrying.Perhapssuchabodycould
bepartiallyindirectlyelectedfromdemocraticinstitutions,partlyelectedandpartly
selectedbylottery.Thepreciseformthatthistakesmatterslessthanitsethos,breadth
ofengagementasafocalpointforpublicdebate.Ultimately,thecentraltestofpolitical
engagementcanonlybetheextenttowhichthosewhoseviewsdonotprevailonany
particularissuedobelievethattheirviewswerefairlytakenintoaccountindrawingup
thenewrulesofthegame.
31
Anti-politicsandthecrisis
ChallengecriticstoengagewithstrengtheningParliament
Perhapsmoreimmediately,thereisasignificantopportunitytostrengthenParliament’s
powersofscrutinyovertheExecutive:theelectionofanewSpeakerandthe
appointmentofTonyWrightMP–acommittedreformer,effectiveSelectCommittee
chairandstrongpublicadvocateforParliament–tochairaninquirytomake
recommendationsonCommonsreformisapositivesign.
AparliamentaryreformagendacouldincludeputtingExecutivepowersexercised
underRoyalPrerogativeonastatutorybasissoensuringthefullrangeofExecutive
actionsareopentoparliamentaryscrutiny;makingSelectCommitteestylepre-
legislativescrutinythenorm;givinggreaterpowerstoinitiatedebatestobackbenchers
andSelectCommittees,includingafocusonensuringtopicalissuesareregularlyaired
intheHouse;strengtheningthepowersofSelectCommitteesbyremovingthewhips’
controlovertheirmembershipandroutinelydebatingtheiroutputsmorefullyinthe
fullChamber;andmoreeffectivescrutinyanddebateofEuropeanlegislationthrougha
collaborativeprocessinvolvingbothWestminsterchambersandBritishMEPs.Several
otherareasforreformhavebeenmooted,includingduringtherecentelectionfor
Speaker.
However,changesofthisnaturearesurelynot–bydefinition–likelytosatisfythe
manyhighlyvocalchampionsofastrongerParliamentwhoappeartobeentirely
oblivioustotheworkingsofParliamentandtoarecentParliamentaryhistoryentirely
atoddswiththeirheartfeltnarrativeofalostgoldenage.
Still,suchareformagendashouldbepursuedonitsmerits.Themoresubstantiveitis,
themoreitmightdosomethingtochallengetheprevailingmythofaneverweaker
Parliament,thoughevenanaccurateaccount‘fromwithin’islikelytobedismissedas
specialpleading.Again,thebestapproachwouldgobeyondthenewSpeaker’srolein
improvedpubliccommunicationbyseekingtomaximiseexternalengagementwiththe
Parliamentaryreformprocess,forexamplethroughpublichearingsthatseektoengage
externalexpertsandreformersinthechallengesofbringingaboutreform.
Experimentwithdirectdemocracy,butconnectittorepresentative
institutions
Callsformore‘directdemocracy’shouldnotbedismissed.Takentoextremes,thesecan
offeranincoherentRossPerot-stylefantasyofapush-buttondemocracy.Butthese
toocould,despiteanti-politicalmotivationsfortheiradvocacy,alsohaveapositive
pro-politicseducativeeffect.
Moreeffortshouldbemadetointegratedirectandrepresentativedemocratic
institutions.TheweaknessoftheDowningStreetpetitionmechanismisthatalarge
numberofsignaturessimplygeneratesanofficialdefenceofexistingpolicy.Abetter
approachcouldbedevelopedfromthePetitionsCommitteesinScotlandandWales:a
certainnumberofsignatureswouldgenerateCommitteeconsideration,orafull
Commonsdebate.
Inanyevent,ourpoliticalsystemincreasinglyincorporatessomeelementsofdirect
democracy.Althoughthe1975referendumontheEuropeanEconomicCommunitywas
32
FabianSociety
largelyanexerciseinpoliticalmanagement,thedevolutionreferendumsinScotland,
Wales,London(carried)andtheNorthEast(defeated)haveestablishedsomething
ofathresholdforsignificantsystemicreformstobeapprovedbypublicvote.It
wouldbepossibletolegislateforclearercriteria,orintroducearightofcitizens’
initiative.Withathresholdofperhaps10percentofaconstituencyelectorateto
triggerarecallballotonasittingMP,orofacouncilornationalelectoratetoputa
citizens’initiative,therewouldbeapoliticalchallengeforthoserailingagainstthe
statusquo:cantheygeneratesufficientsupporttobringaboutchangeandthenwin
apublicargumentforit?
Electoralreformisimportant,butnopanacea
Thereisagoodcaseforregardingelectoralreformasthesinglepoliticalchangethat
mighthavethemostlong-termimpactonthepoliticalculture,butanyargumentthat
itwouldsomehowremovethefrustrationsofdemocraticpoliticsisanotherrouteto
disappointment.
The‘voteforachange’campaign2,(whichIsupport)seekingareferendumatthenext
generalelection,hassoughttotapintothezeitgeistmoodbyrunningan‘outsider’
campaignforchangeforwhatis,atheart,apro-politicsargument.Thatmaymake
tacticalsensebutthereisatensiontoo.
Electoralreformwouldleadtoalessnarrowlyfocusedpolitics,inwhichmoreminority
viewswouldberepresented.Thiswouldalsoentailapoliticalcultureinwhich
governingpowerwoulddependmoreonthepoliticalartsofnegotiationand
compromise,andthemajorpartieswouldstillneedtoconstructbroadelectoral
coalitions.BritainunderProportionalRepresentationmighthavefiveorsixparty
politics,andmightbecomesomewhatclosertothetypeofpoliticsandpartysystemin
Germany.Thereisgoodcomparativeevidencethatmorepluralistsystemsdeliverbetter
socialoutcomes;perhapslessthattheydosobyenormouslyincreasingasenseof
politicsasasiteofcompetingideologies.Thenatureofourpoliticstodayreflectsthe
typeofsocietyweare,andnotjustthenatureofourpoliticalinstitutions.
Still,therearemanyfaultsinourcurrentsystem,notleastthatshiftingpolitical
geographymakesitschancesofpickingtheright‘first-past-the-post’winner
increasinglyamatterofRussianrouletteshouldtherebeacloseelection,afairly
fundamentalflawdisguisedbytheone-sidedelectionsofthelastthirtyyears.Thereis
noperfectalternativewhenitcomestobalancingandtrading-offtheobjectivesof
choosingagovernment,anationalParliamentandlocalrepresentatives,butthecase
forthestatusquoisextremelyweak.
Mostimportantly,theargumentforsuchachangeneedstobewon.This,too,isa
matterofpolitics.Toooften,reformersengageintheologicaldebatesabouttheperfect
electoralsystem,ratherthanthestrategicchallengeofbuildingasufficientcoalitionto
bringaboutchange.Supportforelectoralreformisbroad,butitcouldalsobeshallow
inashort,myth-ladenreferendumcampaign.(Again,thecitizens’conventionrouteto
reformmayhavestrongerprospects.)
Theideaofpoliticsasnegotiatingandsharingpowerhasneverbeenastrongonein 2.www.votefora
theBritishpoliticalculture.ThatispartofthereasonwhyengagementintheEuropean change.co.uk
33
Anti-politicsandthecrisis
Unionissodifficult:leadersfeeltheymustdeclaregame,setandmatchtoBritain
ratherthanexplainingwhythegive-and-takeofapoliticaldealcanservemutualand
sharedinterests.ItisalsowhytheJenkins’Commissionproposedahybridreformthat
couldcombinemorepluralismandgreaterproportionalitywithatendencytomajority
governments– somewhatmoreconstrained.
PRisnottheonlypossibleconstraintongoverningpower:theelectoralreform
debatehasremainedsurprisinglyisolatedfromthebroaderchecksandbalances
whichhave,albeitinapiecemealway,beguntochallengethe‘electivedictatorship’
ofthesuper-centralisedBritishpolitywhichCharter88firstmadeamainstream
issuetwodecadesago.
Thefirstpreferenceofmanyreformersis‘PRorbust’.Thatisalegitimateargument,
butthereisalsoadecentcasethataconstrainedmajoritarianisminvolvingthe
AlternativeVote,aPR-electedsecondchamberalongsidePRinlocalgovernmentand
entrenchedrightswouldevolveamajorpluralistadvance.
Openuppartypoliticstogreaterparticipation
‘Politicsandparliamentinthiscountryareaboutparty.Withoutpartyneither
responsiblegovernmentnorresponsibledemocracyispossible.…Forparliamentary
government,asforeveryothergoodthing,thereisapricetobepaid:andthatpriceis
party’(Powell1974quotedinHeffer1999).Thecaseforpartywasputmost
powerfullybyanunlikelyadvocate:EnochPowellwasperhapsthefrontbench
politicianofthetwentiethcenturywhodidmosttochafeagainsttheconstraintsof
partyloyalty.Hemadethespeechatanunusualmoment–inBirminghaminFebruary
1974whenexplainingwhyhewasresistingcallstostandasanindependent,so
advisinghissupporterstovoteLabour.Powellwaswronginhisprophecyofexistential
nationalsuicide,andonthelosingsideinthesubsequentEECreferendumtoo,butthis
argumentaboutpartybeingtheessentiallinkbetweenthepublicandpoliticsina
representativedemocracyendures.
Changingthevotingsystemcanchangethebalanceofpoliticalpowerandthepolitical
culture,butcannotinitselfdoagreatdealtotransformopportunitiesforparticipation.
Experimentsindirectdemocracycanofferopportunities,perhapsespeciallyfora
popular‘veto’politics;theycanlesseasilypromoteconstructivereform.Butgreater
politicalparticipationmaycentrallydependontheunfashionablecauseofreviving
partypolitics.
Thepartiesaresaidtobeinterminaldecline.Cantheyberevivedaspolitical
communities,andthereforeasvehiclesofparticipationandengagement?The
argumenthasbecomeconfusedbysomuchfocusbeingontheuseofprimaries:some
believethesecouldkillpartiesandothersthattheycouldrevivethem.Certainly,
statutorycompulsiononallpartiestoholdopenprimaries,inwhichanybodycould
standorvote,woulddissolvepartyasapoliticalcommunity.
Buttheargumentforpartieschoosingtoopenupparticipationtotheirownsupporters
isapowerfulone.Itisnotfancifultobelievethatpartiescouldinvolveseveralmillion
peopleagain,iftheywereabletodeveloplesshierarchicalandmoreopenculturesand
structures.PollingfortheFabians’FacingOut projectrevealed2.5millionLabour
34
FabianSociety
identifiers,activeinnon-partycivicengagementwhowere‘nevermembers’,a
majorityofwhomwerekeentoparticipateinarangeofwaysbeyondthepartycard
model.DavidMilibandcitestheGreekSocialistpartyPASOK’sinvolvementof900,000
peopleinaGreekpopulationof11million,whichproportionallywouldequatetofour
orfivemillionBritons(Miliband2009).Thecentralquestioniswhethercurrent
membersandactivistsseetheopportunitytofindnewalliesfortheircauses,rather
thanathreattojealouslyguardedrights.Thereisalegitimatefearthatthepromiseof
opennesswillbetrumpedbythe‘topdown’instinctsofleadershipcontrolinboth
parties;butinthatcasetheopportunitytowidenparticipationwillalsofail.
Ifthepartiescannotberevivedaspoliticalcommunities,wehavelittletoreplacethem
with.Theendofpartypoliticsisunlikelytoheraldthenewdawnofcitizen
engagementthatsomeimagine.Afterpartypolitics,populistanti-politicsmighttruly
havethefieldtoitself.
SunderKatwalaisGeneralSecretaryoftheFabianSociety.AswithallFabianoutputs,
thesearetheviewsoftheindividualauthorandnotthecollectiveviewoftheSociety.
BritishAcademy(2007)‘AreweseeinganewgoldenageofParliament?’,transcriptofdiscussion,
5July,www.britac.ac.uk/events/2007/parliament/transcript.cfm
CameronD(2009)‘Anewpolitics:weneedamassive,radicalredistributionofpower’,The
Guardian,25May
CarswellDetal (2005)DirectDemocracy:anagendaforanewmodelparty,www.direct-
democracy.co.uk
GambleA(2004)‘BernardCrick’inFabianThinkers,London:FabianSociety
HannanD(2009)‘Thereisnoharminagreeingtodisagree’, DailyTelegraph,28August
HefferS(1999)LiketheRoman:TheLifeofEnochPowell Phoenix
HortonT,Pinto-DuchinskyDandStuddertJ(2007) Facingout:howpartypoliticsmustchangeto
buildaprogressivesocietyLondon:FabianSociety
JudgeP(2009)‘Ifwewanttochangethesystem,wehavetochangetheparties’,TheSunday
Times,8March
MilibandD(2009)‘Turningthetideondemocraticpessimism’,JohnSmithMemorialLecture,6July
PowerInquiry,The(2006)PowertothePeopleYork:JosephRowntreeReformTrust/Joseph
RowntreeCharitableTrust
RussellM(2005)MustPoliticsDisappoint? London:FabianSociety
StokerG(2006)WhyPoliticsMatters:MakingDemocracyWork Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan
35
REMAKING POLITICS
PublicAdministrationSelectCommittee,TonyWrightMP,argued:‘Thereisalwaysa
tendencytothinkthataproblemcanbesolvedbyanewpieceofmachinery.Thatis
whyIhavewantedtotalkaboutculturesaswellasstructures,andwhyIhavecometo
thinkthattheformerisoftenmoredecisivethanthelatterintermsofhow
organisationsactuallywork’(Wright2009).
Wesharethisview:ourtroublesstemasmuchfromadysfunctionalpoliticalcultureas
fromtheinadequaciesofourinstitutionalarrangements,althoughthereisacomplex
interplaybetweenthetwo.Muchofwhatthepublicfindssodistastefulinourpolitics
isaboutthewaypoliticiansandthemediabehave.Ofcourse,someofthatbehaviour
isdeterminedbytheincentivesbuiltintoourconstitutionalarchitecture,butsomeofit
isnot.Inwhatfollowsweexaminetheinstitutionalandculturalcausesofthecurrent
crisisandhighlightwhatwebelievetobethemostpropitiousavenuesforreform.
Therearegenerallytwocampsinthedebateaboutwhathasgonewrong:someblame
thepoliticiansandthepoliticalsystem,whileothersarguethatourpoliticalcrisisisa
resultofasetofwidersocialchangesaffectingnotjustthiscountrybutmostother
Westerndemocraciestoo.Belowweidentifywhatwebelievetobethemost
significantpoliticalandsocialfactorsbehindthecurrentcrisis.Theseare:theroleof
thepolitician,thenatureofthepoliticalclass,thewaypoliticiansbehave,thequality
ofourwiderciviccultureandtheworryingriseinpoliticalinequality.
Whatourpoliticiansdo
Itisclearthatthereareanumberofaspectsoftheroleofthepoliticianthat
underminepublicsympathywithpolitics.Theseactivitiesinclude,forexample,MPs
appearingtoslavishlyfollowthepartylineandengageinpettypartypolitical
tribalism.PollsshowthatthepublicwanttheirMPstohaveindependentmindsand
takedecisionsontheirmerits,withintheobviouslimitsofafunctioningparliamentary
system.
ThismeansthattheroleoftheMPastheindependentscrutiniseroflegislationshould
beenhanced.ThisrequiresashiftinthebalanceofpowerbetweentheExecutiveand
thelegislaturesothatMPshavemuchmoreinfluenceoverthepolicyprocess,thus
providingthemwithadistinctandalternativecareerpathtothatofferedbya
ministerialorshadowministerialrole.Suchashiftshouldalsohelpproducealesstribal
politicalculture.
Thereareanumberofwaysthismightbeachieved.MPsshouldhavegreatercontrol
overtheirowntimetableandagenda.Aperiodoftimeshouldbesetasideeachweek
toallowMPstodebateandvoteonmattersoftheirchoosing.
SelectCommitteesshouldbestrengthened.Chairsandmembersshouldbechosenbya
freeandsecretvoteofthewholeHouseandcommitteesshouldreceivemoreresources
andstaffingtoenhancetheirabilitytoscrutiniseandholdministerstoaccount.Select
Committeesshouldbegivenconfirmationpowersoverseniorappointmentsmadeto
themajorpublicbodiesthattheyoversee.Inextremecasestheymightalsobegiven
thepowertoremoveseniorpublicservantsbyissuingadeclarationofnoconfidence.
Lessdiscussed,butequallyimportant,istheneedtooverhaulthepublicbill
committeeswhichremainhopelesslyinadequate.Specialistandpermanentlegislative
37
Remakingpolitics
committeesshouldbeintroducedtoreplacethenon-expertbillcommitteeswhich
wouldprovideformoreeffectivescrutinyoflegislationandenableMPstodevelop
expertiseinspecificareas.
TheConservativesproposehavingfewerMPsbutthatwouldmakeitevenmore
difficulttoholdtheExecutivetoaccount.IftheobjectiveistostrengthenParliament
andsavemoneyitwouldbefarbettertoreducethenumberofministersandimposea
capofjustoneParliamentaryPrivateSecretaryperdepartment.Strengthening
Parliamenthastoinvolveshrinkingthesizeofthepayrollvote.Havingfewerministers
isalsoanimportantprerequisiteforgreaterlocalism.Themoreministersthereare,the
morethingstheyconstantlytrytodotojustifytheirsalaries.Britainneedsasmaller
coreExecutivewithgreaterdevolutiondowntolocalauthorities.
Sincepublicdisenchantmentwithpoliticsstemspartlyfromthepublic’sfrustration
overtheirinsufficientabilitytoholdthosewhoexercisepowertoaccount,itiscrucial
thatParliamentisempoweredtodosoontheirbehalf.Itneedsstrongpowersin
relationtotheballooningnumberofunelectedandlargelyunaccountablebodiesthat
havecometoexercisesomuchinfluencewithinBritain.Thereshouldbeconfirmation
hearingsforheadsofquangosandregulators;therulesandconventionsprotecting
civilservantsandspecialadvisersfromfullparliamentaryscrutinyshouldbescrapped;
ministersintheLordsshouldhavetoanswerintheCommons;andthereshouldbe
regularquestiontimesessionswiththeUK’spermanentrepresentativeinBrussels.
Whoourpoliticiansare
Inadditiontochangingwhatourpoliticiansdo,wealsoneedadebateaboutthesortof
politicianswewant.Underlyingpublicdisillusionwithformalpoliticsisdisquietwith
the‘professionalisation’ofpolitics.Wehaveseentheemergenceofapoliticalclass,
perceivedtobesomehowdistinctandseparatefromtherestofsociety,andmadeupof
individualswhoincreasinglylookandsoundverysimilartooneanother.Thishas
reinforcedthepublic’sscepticismaboutpolitics:itlooksincreasinglylikeaparlour
gameforthosebentonapoliticalcareer,ratherthanbeingaboutmakingdecisionsin
theinterestofthecountry.Professionalisationhasreinforcedtheviewthatpoliticsis
somethingthatthey do,ratherthansomethinginwhichweallhaveastake.
Ofcourse,politicshasalwaysbeendominatedbycertainsocialclasses:thosewith
Oxbridgedegreesandprivateschooleducations.Therehavealwaysbeenlife-long
politicos,goingbacktoWilliamPittandBenjaminDisraeli.Indeed,theyhaveoften
provedthemostcapablepoliticalleaders.Andclearlywewillalwaysneedfull-time
politicians.Thetasktodayistodiversifytherangeofpeoplegettingintopolitics.This
meansbothbroadeningtherangeofroutesintopolitics,andexpandingthepluralityof
spacesforpoliticaldecision-making.
This,crucially,involvesreformtopoliticalparties.Thepartiesarethemaintransmitter
beltsbetweenthepublicandthepoliticalsystem:theyrecruitmembersandactivists
andtheyselectthecandidateswhoenduprunningthestatemachine.Whilepolitical
partiescontinuetodominateourpoliticalinstitutionsthepublic’sinterestand
engagementwiththemisatanall-timelow.Whereasinthe1950stheLabourand
Conservativepartiescouldgenuinelyclaimtobemassmovements,withmillionsof
38
ippr
membersandreallinkstocivicgroupssuchastradesunions,veteranassociationsand
women’sinstitutes,thesepartiesarenowhollowshellsoftheirformerselves.
Thesolutionisnottogetridofpoliticalpartiesandreplacethemwithaparliamentof
EstherRantzens.Nodemocracyintheworldfunctionswithoutpoliticalpartiesandfor
twoverygoodreasons.Effectivedemocraticgovernmentrequirestheaggregationof
thepublic’sdisparatepreferencesintocoherentprogrammesofgovernmentthatcan
commandwidesupport.Governabilityrequirescoherence.Andaccountabilityrequires
thatweknowhowourrepresentativeshavebehavedsincewelastvotedforthem–
somethingthatismademucheasieriftheyareattachedtoapartythatwecan
recognisequicklyinthepollingbooth.Withoutpartiesitbecomesmoredifficultto
assignblameand‘kicktherascalsout’.
Sopartiesarenecessarybuttheyneedopeningupiftheyaretoreconnectwiththe
widerpublic.Oneofthemostimportantrolesofthepoliticalpartyistoselect
candidatesforpublicoffice–andnothingillustratestheparlousstateofourpolitics
morethanthefactthatinverymanysafeseatsMembersofParliamentareeffectively
chosenbyasmallgroupofpartyactivists.Recentresearchhasfoundthatonaverage
just40Labourpartymembersparticipateintheselectionofprospectiveparliamentary
candidates(StrawandAjumogobia2009).Onemuch-discussedwayofprisingopen
thiscrucialrouteintopoliticswouldbeforpartiestoallowawiderpooloftheir
supporterstovoteinparliamentaryselections,throughtheadoptionofmoreorless
openprimaries.
InTotnes,Devon,thisyeartheConservativesusedanopenprimarytoselecttheir
candidatetoreplacetheexpensesoutcast,SirAnthonySteen,whichsawover20,000
votersturnouttoparticipateintheselectionprocess.Nodoubtsuchhighnumbers
wereachievedbecauseofthepublic’sangeroverSteen’sbehaviourbutinternational
evidence,especiallyfromtheUnitedStates,suggeststhatprimariescaninterjecta
dynamismandunpredictabilityintopoliticsthatourownpoliticalsystempalpably
lacks.TheepicbattlebetweenBarackObamaandHillaryClintonfortheDemocrat
nominationisanobviousandinspiringexample.
Ifprimarieswouldhelpgiveordinarycitizensagreatersayinwhorepresentsthem,
arecallpowerwouldgivethemmuchgreaterscopetoholdtheirrepresentativesto
accountoutsideofelectiontimes.Theexpensescrisisunveiledthepublic’sdeep
frustrationwithasystemthatgivesthemsolittlecontrolovertheirMPs.All
powerstodeterminethefateofbadlybehavingMPsrestwiththepartiesandnot
thevoters.
Togiveanexample,HazelBlearswasreselectedonthebackofjust31votestofight
herseat,whichcomprises40,000people.Wethereforebelievethatthereisacasefora
recallmechanismbutthattherighttotriggeroneshouldbenarrowlydefinedaround
ethicalandnotpolicyissues.Thethresholdfortriggeringarecallshouldbesethigh–
around25percentofthelocalelectorate–andthereshouldbetightregulationofthe
fundingofanyrecallcampaigns.
ThenarrowrangeofroutesintoBritishpoliticsisalsoaconsequenceofBritain’s
excessivepoliticalcentralism.Decisionsovereverythingfrompoliceforcenumbersto
hospitalwaitingtimesaremadeinWestminster,toadegreethatwouldbeunthinkable
39
Remakingpolitics
inmostotherdemocracies.Andwiththistheonlyimportantsiteforpolitical
contestationistheHouseofCommons.Givingawiderrangeofpeopletheopportunity
toaccessthepoliticalarenameansopeningupnewspacesofpoliticaldecision-making
thatareclosertothem.
Thisrequiresmoreautonomouslocalgovernment.Italsorequiresfashioninglocal
politicalinstitutionsthatarenotsimplycapturedbythetraditionalpartymachines.
Thecreationofdirectly-electedmayorseverywherefromLondontoHartlepoolhas
allowedfiguresfromoutsidethetraditionalpoliticalnetworkstosuccessfullyrunfor
office.Theadoptionofelectedmayorsinmoretownsandcitiescouldopenuplocal
politicstonewkindsofpoliticalleadership.
Howourpoliticiansbehave
Inadditiontochangingwhatourpoliticiansdoandwhoourpoliticiansare,wealso
needtochangehowourpoliticians,andotheractorsinthepoliticalarena,behave.As
DrMegRussellhasargued,someofthemostoff-puttingfeaturesofourpoliticsare
essentiallycultural.Oneexampleisthepartytribalismthatsodominatespolitical
debate,butwhichthepublicfindssooff-putting.AtatimewhenmostBritishpeople
decreasinglyidentifywitheitherofthetwo‘bigtribes’(the‘otherparties’received
over40percentofthevoteinthe2009Europeanelections),thepoliticalclassseems
trappedinatimewarpinwhicheveryinitiativefromtheGovernmentisopposedby
theoppositionandviceversa.Evenastheideologicaldifferencesbetweentheparties
havedecreased,theintensityofthepartisanrivalryappearstohaveintensified–and
inawaythattotallyfailstoengagewithalesspartisanpublic.
Anotheroff-puttingfeatureisthewaypoliticiansareforcedtospeakinthemedia.The
publicsaytheywantpoliticiansto‘behonest’,whichsoundsreasonableenough.Butit
isactuallyverydifficultforpoliticianstosaywhattheyreallythinkwhenanysignof
politicaldisagreementoranywordoutoftunewiththepartylineisrepresentedinthe
mediaasa‘split’,oranychangeofhearta‘U-turn’.Partlybecauseofourvery
competitiveandrathersensationalistmediaculture,politiciansareforcedtospeak
wearingstraightjacketsandjournalistsreadilyenjoypokingthemintoevermore
absurdcontortions,astheystruggletosticktothepartyline.Thepublicsimplystops
listening.
Buthowcanwechangecultureslikethese?Someofthetransformationcanbedriven
bychangingtheincentivesthatrewardbehaviourofdifferentkinds.Measuresthat
strengthentheindependenceofMPsandParliamentsuchasthosesetoutabovecould
helpproducealesstribalisticpoliticalculture.Anothermethodwouldbeelectoral
reformthatwouldforcepartiestoformcoalitionsinordertogovern.
Someofthesequestionsarebeyondthereachofconstitutionalengineering.How
doesonechangeasensationalist24-hour-a-daymediacultureinawaythatwould
allowformorehonestandreflectivepublicdebate,withlesstalkofsplitsandU-
turnsandmoregenuinedeliberation?Atsomepointthereisaresponsibilityforthe
actorsinvolvedtochangethewaytheyact:politicianscouldhonestlytrytotell
thingsastheyseethemandjournalistscouldchoosenottopounceonthemfor
doingso.
40
ippr
Civicrenewal
Thepointswehavemadesofarconcernpoliticiansthemselves–whattheydo,who
theyareandhowtheybehave.Butmuchofwhatiswrongwithourpoliticsisalso
reflectiveofthestateofourwidercivicculture.Wehaveseenadeclineinthe
membershipofcivicassociationsandinparticularinthoseformsofcivicactivitymost
closelyassociatedwithpartypolitics–theunionsandlocalpoliticalclubsthatusedto
actastherecruitingsergeantsforgrassrootspolitics.
Itistruethatintheirplacewehaveseentheriseofamultitudeofsingleissue
movements–butwhilethesedemonstratethatwearefarfromtheapatheticpeople
wearesometimesportrayedas,thesegroupsaregenerallyunconnectedwithformal
politicalparticipation.Moreover,asMegRussellpointsout,thepoliticalculturethey
generateisonethatratherreplicatestheconsumeristcultureofhousehold
consumption,wherepeopleissue(legitimate)demands,butalsoexpecttogetwhat
theyaskfor.Thetroubleisthatinpolitics,unlikeshopping,noteveryonecanplausibly
getwhattheywant(Russell2005).
Veryfewcitizensareengagedintheprocessofmakingthedifficultdecisionsabout
whogetswhat,whenandhow.Insteaditislefttothepoliticians,whoaretypically
condemnedforfailingtodeliver.Thiscorrosivedynamicisfedbythemedia,whichis
quicktotakeupapassinganti-politicscrusadeandcondemntherascalsforletting‘the
people’down.
Theonlywaythroughthisistoworkfromthebottomup,byfosteringnewspacesin
thelocalcivicrealmwherecitizensareabletojoininthetaskofdirectlydeliberating
overthequestionsthataffecttheircommunities.Therearesomepromisingsignsof
innovationhere:inthewayNewDealforCommunitiesinitiativesengagedresidentsin
decisionsaboutregenerationfunds,inthegrowthofTenantManagement
Organisationsinthesocialhousingsectorandintheuseofparticipatorybudgetingin
manyofourtownsandcities.ItmayevenbethataCitizensConventionofthekind
thatipprandothershasproposedtodiscussreformtoourpoliticalsystemcouldplay
sucharoleatthenationallevel.
Ofcourse,weneedtoberealistic.Weareamoreindividualisticsocietythanweused
tobe,peoplearelessrootedintheirlocalcommunities,andmanypeopleleadbusy
lives,travellongdistancestoworkandlackthetimetoattendlocalcivicmeetings.But
eventakingthesesocialchangesintoaccount,itremainsessentialthatwecreate
genuinespacesforpoliticalparticipationneartowherepeopleliveinordertorenew
ourpoliticalculture.
Politicalinequality
Thedogthathasyettobarkinthecommentarythathasfollowedthefall-outfromthe
expensescrisisconcernsthefundamentalissueofpoliticalequality.RobertDahl,the
doyenofpoliticalscience,wrotethatacentralclaimofeveryhealthydemocracyis‘the
continuedresponsivenessofthegovernmenttothepreferencesofitscitizens,
consideredaspoliticalequals’(Dahl1971).Yettherearegoodreasonsforsupposing
thattheprincipleofpoliticalequalityisunderthreatandthatpoliticsisbecomingthe
increasingpreserveoftheaffluentandthepowerful.
41
Remakingpolitics
ippr’sresearchhasshownthatpoliticalparticipationisincreasinglyskewedbysocial
class.Forinstance,theturnoutgapinelectionsbetweentopandbottomquartile
earnersintheUKhasdoubledsincethe1960s.Indeed,theHansardSociety’smost
recentAuditofPoliticalEngagementfoundthat,‘socialclasshasmoreofanimpacton
politicalengagementthatanyotherfactor.Oneverysinglemeasure[ofparticipation]
…peopleclassifiedassocialgradesAB(themostaffluent)aremorepolitically
engagedthanDEs(theleastaffluent),frequentlybyamarginofaround15to20
percentagepoints’(HansardSociety2009).
AnyoneinterestedinimprovingthehealthofBritishpoliticsoughttobeworriedabout
thesetrends.Theysuggestthatourdemocracyhasnotjustexperiencedafallinvoter
turnoutbutalsoariseinturnoutinequality.Politicalsystemstendtorespondtothe
interestsofthosethatparticipateandneglectthepreferencesofthosewhodonot.
Thisinturnbreedselectoralalienation,entrenchingapathyonthepartofthoseless
inclinedtoparticipate.AsSarahBirchofEssexUniversityhasargued,thebest,butby
nomeanstheonlyway,tobreakthecycleofdisaffectionistomakevotingcompulsory
andtherebyprovideanincentiveforpoliticalpartiestoaddresstheneedsofthe
populationasawhole.Shealsonotesthatcountrieswhichhavecompulsoryvoting
havelowerlevelsofincomeinequality,preciselybecauseitmakesitmuchmorelikely
thatallvoicesarelistenedto(Birch2009).ipprsharesthisviewandthoughsucha
movewouldbeunpopularwiththeelectorate,especiallyinthecurrentclimate,itis
cleartousthatcompulsoryvotingisthemosteffectivewayofpromotingpolitical
equality–agoalthatshouldbesharedacrossthepoliticalspectrum.
Ourcurrentpoliticalcrisisisnotsimplyaboutexpenses–therotissetmuchdeeper
thanthat.Atthesametimethisisnotthemomenttosimplydustoffalistofour
favouriteconstitutionalreformsfromtwentyyearsago.Wemustmakeinstitutional
changesbuttheymustbeaddresseddirectlyatthecausesofpublicalienation.We
havearguedthatchangesmustbedirectedattheroleofMPs,thewaypartiesrecruit
citizensintopoliticsandwiderquestionsofpoliticalculturethatrequirenotjust
constitutionalreformbutalsobehaviourialchangebytheactorsthemselves.Beyond
thepoliticalsystemweneedtoworkfromthebottomuptorenewourwidercivicand
politicalculture,andtoaddressthewideninginequalitiesinpoliticalparticipation.
RickMuirisaSeniorResearchFellowandGuyLodgeanAssociateDirectoratippr.
BirchS(2009)‘Thecaseforcompulsoryvoting’,PublicPolicyResearch 16.1
CampbellD(2009)‘Trustinpoliticianshitsanall-timelow’,TheObserver,27September
DahlRA(1971)Polyarchy:ParticipationandOppositionNewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress
HansardSociety(2009)AuditofPoliticalEngagement6 London:HansardSociety
RussellM(2005)MustPoliticsDisappoint? London:FabianSociety
StrawWandAjumogobiaF(2009)‘Labour’sselectionprocess:arepresentativedeficit?’,http://
clients.squareeye.com/uploads/prog/documents/Labour%20PPCs%20research%20pdf.pdf
WrightT(2009)‘Doingpoliticsdifferently’,ThePoliticalQuarterly,Vol80Issue3
42
IN SEARCH OF REFORM, NOT GIMMICKS
43
Insearchofreform,notgimmicks
good).However,itmightalsobeassumedthatopenprimarieswouldleadtothe
selectionofmorecentristMPs thanifmembersofapartydecidedalone–thus
reducingthediversityofviews.Atpresentwedonotreallyknowwhethertheywill
bewidelyadopted(theyareveryexpensive)orwhattheirlong-termeffectmight
be.
Thepublicshouldnothavetopayforparties
Theexpensesscandalhasledsometoargueagainforstatefundingofpolitical
parties.Ironically,however,statefunding(intheformofexpenses)isexactlywhat
hasdamagedthereputationofMPs.Theseriouspointaboutthisisthatthepublic
donotacceptthattheyshouldbeforcedtofundpoliticalactivitythroughtaxation.
Contrarytopopularbelief,therehasbeenno‘armsrace’inpoliticalspendinginthe
UK.AtthelasttwoelectionstheToriesspentlessinrealtermsthantheydidin
1966and1970.Labour’sspendingdidincreaseinrealtermsoverthesameperiod,
butonlytoclosethegapwiththeConservatives.Sopoliticalpartieshavecertainly
provedcapableofraisingenoughmoneytocampaigneffectively.
WealreadyhavequitealotofstatefundingforpoliticalpartiesintheformofShort
Money(theannualpaymenttooppositionpartiesintheCommonstohelpthem
withtheircosts)andCranborneMoney(theequivalentintheLords).Thistotalled
about£4.5millionfortheConservativeslastyear–oraboutafifthoftheirbudget.
Thisistheleastbadformofspending,giventhetietoresearch.Nonetheless,
ultimatelythemoneyisfungibletosomeextent.Ifpartiesdidnothaveit,they
wouldhavetocutbackelsewhere–probablyonprintadvertising.
Statefundingforpoliticalpartiesisphilosophicallydifficulttojustify.Atthe
EuropeanlevelwealreadyhavestatefundingforpoliticalpartiesandIfeeldeeply
uneasythatmymoneyisbeinggiventohelpextremistpoliticalparties.Membersof
thepublicdonotliketheMPscommunicationsallowancebeingusedtofundglossy
propaganda.
Iftakentoahighlevelthiscanhavedisastrouspracticaleffects,creatingaself-
sustainingcartelofparties,insulatedfromthepublicanddependentonthestate.It
discriminatesagainstnewideasandoutsiders,andreducestheincentivesfor
politicianstostayintouchwiththevoters.
ThenewpoliticaltechniquespioneeredbyPresidentObamaarethepolaropposite
ofstatefunding.Thechangingtechnologyofcommunicationmakesiteasierfor
outsiderstoorganise.Itmakesitpossibleforpoliticianstofundtheiractivitiesfrom
manysmalldonationsratherthanafewlargeinterests.Politiciansfundedthisway
willbemoreresponsivethanthosefundedbythestate.
Evenbeforetheexpensesscandal,theproportionofpeoplewhofelttheycan
‘changethewaythingsarerun’bygettinginvolvedinpoliticswasfallingsteadily:
from37percentin2003to31percentin2008.Centralisationisclearlypartofthis
problem:25percentthinktheyhavesomeinfluenceoverhowthingsarerun
locally,butonly14percentdonationally.Localismiscentraltore-engagingthe
voters.
44
PolicyExchange
ReformingParliament
GivingpowerbacktotheCommons
ThemainweaknessofthelegislatureisbecauseofthestrangleholdoftheExecutive
onParliament.TheExecutivehasthiscontrolbecauseofouroverly-strongparty
system.SotherearethreethingsweneedtodotoempowerParliament:
1.Takepartylabelsofftheballotpaperatelectiontime.
Politiciansshouldbeelectedbecauseoftheirownpersonalqualities,notthecolourof
therosettetheyarewearing.Until1970onlytheMP’snameappearedontheballot,
socandidatescouldnotrelyontheirpartytocarrythem.Theyhadtobelocalheroes.
MPscanbecomemoreindependentwithoutincreasingthenumberof‘Independents’.
IfMPsowedlesstotheirparties,andtheirre-electiondependedmoreontheirown
personalpoliticalbasetheywouldbemorelikelytovotewiththeirconscienceand
theirperceptionoftheevidence.ThemorethatMPsfeeltheycanstanduptotheir
parties,themore‘cliffhanger’voteswewillhave,andthemorerelevantParliament
andparliamentarydebateswillbe.Parliamentcanbeexcitingandnewsworthy.Butthe
strengthofthewhipsandweaknessoftheMPsveryoftenpreventsitfrombeingso.
2.ShrinkthepermittedsizeoftheGovernmentinParliament–theso-called‘payroll
vote’.
Wecouldestablisharuleorconventionthatnotmorethanacertainpercentageof
MPsshouldbeallowedtoholdGovernmentjobs.Thatwouldfitwithothermovesin
thedirectionofaproperseparationofpowersandresponsibilities.
3.Setalimitontheproportionofparliamentarytimethatcanbetakenupby
Governmentbusiness.
OvertimetheExecutivehascometodominateparliamentarybusinessmoreandmore.
Itmightbepossibletocreatemoreparliamentarytimeforindependentbusinessby
increasingthenumberofhoursintheparliamentaryyear,butthealternativeof
cappingGovernmenttimehastheaddedadvantageofdiscouraginglegislativeover-
productionbytheGovernment.
Thesethreereformstakentogetherwouldhaveacombinedeffect.Ifrebellingwere
lessdangerousandmoreattractive,andrebellionshadagreaterchanceofsucceeding,
andthereweremorechanceofinitiatinglegislationfromoutsidetheGovernment,
thenParliamentwouldbeamuchmoreexcitingandrelevantplace.MPswouldbe
rescuedfromtheircurrentdepressingstatusas‘pager-slaves’,jumpingtovotewhen
summonedbytheirparty.
ThelossofpowerfromParliamenttootherunaccountablebodiesisalsoimportant.Far
andawaythemostimportantistheEuropeanUnion,becauseEuropeanlegislation
nowdominatestheoutputoflegislationinWestminster.
Butthereareotherimportantproblems.Theincreaseinjudicialactivismandhuman
rightslaw,confusionoverministerialresponsibilityforexecutivedecisionswhichare
actuallymadebyofficials,andthegrowthofpolicymakingquangoshaveallweakened
Parliamentanddiminisheditsrelevance.Thepowersofallthesegroupsshouldbe
curtailed.Butequallyimportantlyweneedtoturbo-chargethepowerofParliamentto
scrutinisetheseoutsidebodies.
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Insearchofreform,notgimmicks
‘Strengtheningthecommitteesystem’soundsboring,buttheworkofthecommittees
isamongthemostusefuloutputofParliament.Makingtheircommitteechairsmore
independentispartoftheanswer,andincreasingthenumberofresearchersand
expertstheyemployistheotherpart.Itwouldpayforitselfmanytimesoverin
reducedgovernmentwaste.Insomecases,theyshouldbegivennewpowers.
LimitedreformoftheLords
AtpresenttheHouseofLordsdoesareasonablejobasarevisingchamber.Ithasbeen
alimitedcheckonelectivedictatorshipinrecentdecades–andtherehavebeenfew
otherchecks.Itisnotthebiggestproblemfacingourpoliticalsystem.
Clearlythehereditarypeerswillhavetogo.Andmovingfromappointingtoelecting
theLordsisveryisattractiveinprinciple.Butitcouldbetrickyinpractice.
ThepublicwantarangeofexperiencesinParliament.Aslongasthereissomeelement
ofappointmentintheLords,thatis–oratleastshouldbe–anidealwaytobringin
expertsfromparticularfields.Directlyelectingsomeofthememberscertainlywould
notbeadisaster.Butaboveacertainthresholdapart-electedUpperHousewouldbe
likelytofinditselfinacontestoflegitimacywiththeCommons(andafullyelected
onecertainlywould).Soifwewanttohavemorethanasmallnumberofelected
members,andparticularlyifwegoforfullelection,thenweneedtobeclearabouttwo
things:whatalternativebasisoflegitimacyshoulditsmembershave–andwhatare
thelimitsonthepowersofthesecondchamber?
Electingasecondchamberonessentiallythesamebasisasthefirstandgivingitreal
powerwouldbepointless,andpotentiallyarecipefordisastrousgridlock.InGermany
themembersoftheUpperHouseareappointedbythestates,andaretheretofight
centralisation.Thisseemstobethemostreasonablealternativebasisoflegitimacyfora
secondchamber.
ButeventhoughitonlyhascompetencetodealwithissuesaffectingtheLänder,there
havebeenanumberofexamplesofgridlockinGermany,whichisinevitableifthe
secondchamberistohaveanyrealpower.TheBundesrat,throughwhichthefederal
statesparticipateinthelegislationandadministrationoftheFederation,works
smoothlybecauseeffectivelyonly16peoplevote,onbehalfoftheirstates,whichare
largeandpowerful.ButintheUKwehave434localgovernments.Andbecauseofthe
weaknessoflocalgovernment,theyappeartobeelectedmainlyasaproxyvoteonthe
incumbentgovernment.Thisinturnmeansthetwomainpartiesexperiencewild
swingsintheirsupport,andbothhavecomeclosetototallocalwipeoutin1997and
2009.Asitstands,thiswouldnotbeareasonablebasisonwhichtobuildasecond
chamberastherewouldhavebeennocheckonLabourafter1997andnoneonthe
Toriesiftheywereelectedin2010.
Wecertainlywanttoseesuccessfullocalleadersthrownuptothenationallevel.Ifwe
wereonlygoingtoelectasmallproportionoftheLordsitcouldbeinterestingand
usefultohavesomemembersoftheLordstorepresenttheinterestsofawholearea,
forexamplethewholeofamajorcity,orthewholeofacounty.Isuspectthat
successfullocalcouncilleaderswouldmakegoodcandidates.
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PolicyExchange
Changingthevotingsystemwouldmakethingsworse
ProportionalRepresentationwouldexacerbatetherootproblemsthathavecausedthe
currentcrisisofpoliticallegitimacy.
Firstly,PRsystemsarebadfortheaccountabilityofMPstolocalpeople.Some
systemscutthetiebetweentheMemberofParliamentandthearea.Othersprevent
thevotersfrompunishingparticularMPswhoarehighuptheirpartylist.For
example,althoughalmostnooneinBritainknowsthenameoftheirMembersof
theEuropeanParliament,ifthepublicdidwanttogetridofthetop-placedmember
ofaparty’slistattheEuroelections,theywouldstruggletodoso.Infact,they
wouldhavetodrivethatwholeparty’sshareofthevotedowntoaverylowlevel.
IfformerConservativeMPNeilHamiltonhadbeenanMEP,hewouldstillhavehis
job.
Secondly,atthenationallevel,PRwouldfurtherweakentheaveragevoterrelative
tothepoliticalparties.Thekeydifferencebetweenfirst-past-the-postandallPR
systemsistheeffectonthepartysystemandthenatureofcoalitionnegotiations.
Underfirst-past-the-postthemainpartiesareeffectivelybroadcoalitions,with
theirprogrammepredeterminedandpresentedopenlyinadvanceoftheelection.In
PRsystemstherearetypicallylotsmoresmallpartiesinParliament,andthe
compositionoftheGovernmentisdeterminedbypost-electionnegotiations
betweenpoliticalparties,withverysmallpartiestypicallypunchingfarabovetheir
weight.
Forexample,inBelgiumin2007theelectionresultedinsmallmovesupanddown
forthetenmainparties.Itthentookjustunder200daystoformagovernment
becauseofthebafflingcomplexityoftheinter-partynegotiations.Insuchasystem
theoutcomeoftheelectionoftenbearsnorelationtothechangeintheactualvote
receivedbytheparties.Who‘wins’isdeterminedbysmallnumbersofpolitical
leaderswhocompetetocobbletogetherdifferentcomplexcoalitionsbetween
themselvesinprivate.PRadvocatesoftencomplainabout‘wastedvotes’.Arguably,
inPRsystemsvotingismoreofawasteoftime.
First-past-the-postofferstheelectorateaclearandopenchoice,andtheoutcome
oftheelectiondecideswhichbroaddirectionthecountrygoesin.PRshiftsthe
locusofpoweroutoftheopenandintotheprivatebackroomsinwhichdeals
betweenpartyleadersarestitchedup.
Notocompulsoryvoting
Somepoliticianslovecompulsoryvotingbecauseitcoversupgeneralisedapathyand
discontentwiththesystem;Iamstronglyagainstit.IntheBritishsystemthisis
revealedbythenumberofpeoplewhodonotvote.Philosophically,itisdifficultto
justifywhypeopleshouldbemadetovoteinafreecountry.
Itwouldalsobeoddtoextendthevoteto16-year-olds.Ifwedonotwanttoletthem
buycigarettesorabeerinapub,whyshouldtheybegiventhevote?Thissuggestion
isoftenadvancedinthecontextofincreasingturnout.Butnearlyfourintenvoters
whowereentitledtovotedidnotatthelastelection.Tacklingthisisamore
fundamentalissue.
47
Insearchofreform,notgimmicks
Empoweringthecitizenthroughreferendums
Iamahugeenthusiastforreferendums,whicharerealcitizenpower,andincreasingly
formpartofourregularpoliticallifeinBritain.Thecurrentgovernmenthascalled
several(devolutioninScotlandWales,NorthernIreland,andLondon)andpromised
more(ifitdecidestojointheeuro,orchangetheelectoralsystem).Localareashave
heldlotsmore–forexampleoncongestioncharginginManchester,theNorthEast
Assemblyandelectedcitymayors.
Weshouldnowformalisetheuseofthereferendumandmakeitarulethatonecanbe
triggeredwiththesupportofacertain(reasonablyhigh)proportionoftheelectorate.
Somepeoplelookatreferendumsasbeingaforeignimport.Infact,theideahasdeep
rootsinBritain.BothJohnLockeandthegreatconstitutionalistAVDiceywere
supporters.Diceynotedtheadvantagesofaskingthepublicspecificquestions,rather
thanrequestingthattheychoosepersonalitiesandwholepackagesofpolicies
simultaneously:
Ivaluethereferendumfirstbecauseitisdoingawaywiththestrictlyabsurd
systemwhichatpresentexists,ofactingonthepresumptionthatelectorscan
bestanswerthequestionraised...whenitisputtogetherwithsuchatotally
differentquestion...andgenerallythatitiswisetomixupsystematically,
questionsofpersonswithquestionsofprinciple,andsecondly,thoughina
certainsensemainlybecausethereferendumisanemphaticassertionofthe
principlethatnationstandsaboveparties.(1894,quotedinQvortrup2005:48)
Theargumentsagainstreferendumsaremostlyargumentsagainstdemocracyitself.
Thereissomethingcuriousabouttheideathatvoterscannotbetrustedtomakethe
rightdecisionaboutasingleissue,butcanbetrustedtochoosethe‘right’
representativestodecideforthem.
Votersarebetterinformedandeducatedthaneverandbetterabletomakedecisions
thanpoliticiansgivethemcreditfor.Forexample,inDenmarkduringthe1992
MaastrichtTreatyreferendumthepoliticalmagazine Press askedarepresentative
sampleofvoterstoidentifyanumberofsalientfactorsabouttheTreaty.Themagazine
subsequentlyaskedacross-sectionofback-benchMPsthesamequestions.Theresult
wasthatthevotersknewasmuchabouttheissuesastheMPs.
Theotherfearaboutreferendumsisthattheywillsomehowmakeprogrammaticparty
governmentimpossible.Theonlycountryinwhichdirectdemocracyplaysasbigarole
asindirectdemocracyisSwitzerland,whichishardlyteeteringontheedgeofanarchy.
Usedmoresparingly,theyarenowanormalpartofgovernmentinnearlyall
developedcountries.TheyhavebeenheldinalmosteveryEuropeancountry.They
havenotmadecountriesungovernable.
Referendumsincreasepublicengagementandknowledgeaboutpolitics.Intheirbook
EducatedbyInitiative,AmericanpoliticalscientistsDanielA.SmithandCarolineTolbert
foundevidencethatprovisionsforreferendumsincreaseturnout(foreverytwo
propositionsontheballot,turnoutgoesupby1percent)andthatreferendums
increaseinterestinpolitics(foreverytworeferendumsontheballotthenumberof
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peoplediscussingpoliticsincreasesby1percent)(TolbertandSmith2004).Thereis
similarevidencefromEurope.
Havingacceptedtheprincipleofreferendums,Britainshouldnowformaliseandwiden
theiruse.Theyhavegreatpotentialforbringingdemocracytolife.
Localismovercentralism
Evenbeforetheexpensesscandal,theproportionofpeoplewhofelttheycould
‘changethewaythingsarerun’bygettinginvolvedinpoliticswasfallingsteadily:
from37percentin2003to31percentin2008.Centralisationisclearlypartofthis
problem:25percentthinktheyhavesomeinfluenceoverhowthingsarerunlocally,
butonly14percentnationally.
Again,weneedpoliticalchangejustasmuchasstructuralorconstitutionalchange.
Despitetheoverwhelmingevidenceofthefailuresofcentralism,ourpoliticalcultureis
stillcaughtupinthedelusionofcentralomnipotence.Whichnationalpoliticianwill
admitthatsomeburninglocalissueisnoneoftheirbusinessandoutsidetheircontrol?
Whichjournalistwillwritethata‘postcodelottery’intheperformanceofsomeservice
isactuallyaperfectlyunderstandablevariationofservice,basedonadiversityof
preferencesandcontinuouslocalexperimentation?Whowilltakeastandonprinciple,
andtellwell-meaningnationalpoliticiansandofficialsthattheymustsimplykeep
theirnosesoutofalocalissue?
Localismcanbebrokendownintothreetypes:
•Nationalservicescanberuninsuchawayastobemoreresponsivetolocalneeds
•LocalGovernmentcanbesetfreetobemoreresponsive
•Nationalandlocalgovernmentcansetgroupsandindividualsfreetorunthingsfor
themselves.
Therearemanybigstructuralideasforreformingthedeliveryofnationalservicesto
makethemmorelocalist–fromschoolchoicetoelectedpoliceorjustice
commissioners.Thereisstillquitealotthatcouldbedonetoexpandonthistheme–
particularlyinthebigareasofhealthandwelfare.
ButIthinkthebigthingthatmustbedoneislessvisible:wemustabolishasmanyas
possibleofthethousandsofcentraltargetsthathavebeenimposedonpublicservices
inthemisguidedbeliefthatthisconstitutes‘management’.Aswellasbeingsetfree
fromthewhimsandfadsofthecentre,localservicesshouldbegiventhefreedomsto
managewhichtheyarecurrentlydenied–forexample,byendingnationalruleson
pay,conditionsandstaffing.
Intermsoflocalgovernment,thevisionarygoalwouldbetohavelocalauthoritiesraise
muchmoreoftheirownincome,throughamixofproperty,incomeandbusinesstaxes.
Councilscurrentlyraisejustaquarteroftheirrevenuefromcounciltax,andgetabout
halfintheformofproject-specificgrantsfromcentralgovernment.Agoodfirststep
wouldbetocompressallthesmallring-fencedpotsofmoneyintoasinglegrant,like
theold‘blockgrant’whichlocalcouncilscouldspendastheyliked,withinreason.After
thatthewholeapparatusofcentraltargetsandrequirementsshouldbeabolished.
49
Insearchofreform,notgimmicks
Thefinalstageofdevolution–toindividualsandgroups–canbedoneinvarious
ways.Itcouldmeansimplygivingpeopletheirownbudget,whichappearstobe
havingbeneficialeffectsinadultsocialcare.Oritcouldbedonebylookingathow
localandcentralgovernmentscommissionservices.Manymoreservicescouldbe
commissioned,ratherthanbeingcentrallyprovided.Andatpresentevenwherethere
iscommissioning,privateorcharitableprovidersareoftendiscriminatedagainst–
eitherbecausecommissionersandprovidersarenotsplitorbecausethepricing
frameworkisdistorted.
Localismofthesethreekindscoulddoalottorevitaliseourdemocracy–andimprove
ourpublicservices.
ReformingourrelationshipwiththeEuropeanUnion
AreferendumonthescopeofourrelationshipwiththeEUislongoverdue.Pollshave
shownthatnineoutoftenofthepublicsupportsareferendumontheEU
Constitution/LisbonTreaty.
AccordingtotheEuropeanCommission’sregularEurobarometerpoll,backin199255
percentofpeopleinBritainthoughttheEUwasa‘goodthing’and15percenta‘bad
thing’,amajorityoffourtooneinfavour.Thatsupporthasdeclinedsteadilysothat
todaytheproportionsareequal.Bytwotoone,theEurobarometerpollfoundthat
peopledonotfeelBritainbenefitsineconomictermsfromitsmembership.
Partlyforstructuralreasons,andpartlybecauseoftheweaknessofreportingonthe
EU,thepublichavelittleideahowmanydecisionsaretakenattheEuropeanlevel.The
(pro-EU)foreignpolicyexpertMarkLeonardhaswrittenthat:
Europe’spoweriseasytomiss.Likean‘invisiblehand’,itoperatesthroughthe
shelloftraditionalpoliticalstructures.TheBritishHouseofCommons,British
lawcourts,andBritishcivilservantsarestillhere,buttheyhaveallbecome
agentsoftheEuropeanUnionimplementingEuropeanlaw. (Leonard2005)
Thevastmajority(72percent)ofnewregulationsintroducedinBritainoverthelast
decadehavecomefromtheEU.Manythingsthatpeoplethinkaredomesticdecisions
areinfacttheresultofEuropeanlegislation,fromHomeInformationPackstothe
downsizingofstaffatthenationalisedbanks.EUdecisionspowerfullyshapeevery
areaofdomesticpolicy,fromenvironmentaltargetstothenumberofhoursworkedin
theNHS.
Thepublic,oratleastanyoneundertheageof52,havenotbeenaskedwhetherthisis
whattheywant.Formanyvoters,theEUisclearlyseenastheapotheosisofallthey
dislikeaboutremote,unaccountablepolitics.Onlyputtingthefutureofour
relationshipwith‘Europe’tothepublicwillreallycleartheair.
IfBritainistoremainafullmemberstate,weneedtodealwiththeEUdifferently.In
totaltheEUproducesanaverageoffourpiecesoflegislationaweek,regardlessof
whethernationalparliamentsaresitting.Atpresentthislegislationfloodsthroughthe
HouseofCommonswithnorealscrutiny.WestminsterMPsshouldhavethesame
‘mandating’powersenjoyedbyMPsinDenmarkandSwedentocontrolwhatthe
GovernmentcanandcannotsignuptoinBrussels.TheGovernmentshouldbealso
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PolicyExchange
preventedfromusingthe‘scrutinyoverride’topreventtheEuropeanScrutiny
Committeefromdebatingissues(itdoesthisonaverageabout70or80timesayear,
typicallyonthemostimportantmatters.
TheremustalsobemoretransparencyaboutwhatisbeingdecidedforusinBrussels.
AweeklyquestiontimeforourPermanentRepresentativetotheEU(eitherinthe
CommonschamberorinCommittee)wouldallowParliamenttoproperlyscrutinise
whattheexecutiveisdoinginBrussels.
Conclusion
Thelevelofanti-politiciansentimentiscertainlyhigh–butdangerousorextremist
forcesarenotlikelytobreakthrough,Ibelieve,aslongaswerefrainfromadoptingPR
andthefragmentedpoliticsthatwouldcomewithit.
Gimmickswillnotsolvethepublic’sfrustrationwithpartypoliticsandthelossof
controltounaccountablebodies.
TheexpensesscandalwillcometobeseenasasalutaryexperienceforBritain’s
politiciansaslongaswedrawtherightconclusionsfromthecrisis.
NeilO’BrienistheDirectorofPolicyExchange.
HealeyJ,GillMandMcHughD(2005)MPsandpoliticsinourtime London:Dod’sParliamentary
Communications
LeonardM(2005)‘Europe’sTransformativePower’,CERBulletin,Issue40,February/March,Centre
forEuropeanReform
QvortrupM(2005)AComparativeStudyofReferendums:GovernmentbythePeople,Manchester:
ManchesterUniversityPress,2ndEdition
TolbertCJandSmithDA(2004)EducatedbyInitiative:TheEffectsofDirectDemocracyonCitizens
andPoliticalOrganizationsintheAmericanStates TheUniversityofMichiganPress
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TIME TO TURN POLITICS ON ITS HEAD
52
Progress
Toundothedamage,itishopedthatSirChristopherKelly’sreportinlate2009will
insistonmaximumtransparencyandefficiencyinexpenses.Ofcourseitisimportant
thatMPswithconstituenciesoutsideLondonhavefinancialhelptoallowthemtofulfil
theirduties.Itwouldbearetrogradestepifreformpreventedmembersfromspending
moretimewithconstituentsoronlyencouragedtheindependentlywealthytoput
themselvesforwardforParliament.Restraintwithexpenses,however,wouldbeagood
move.IfMPswishtolivethehighlifeorspendmoneytravellingfirstclass,itshould
notbeontaxpayers’money.Neitherisitfairthatmemberscanusethatmoneyto
makeprofitfromproperty.InsteadtheGovernmentshouldconsiderintroducinga
systemoffundingforhomesoutsideofLondonthatrequiresreceiptedpaymentsfor
theaveragerentorhotelaccommodationintheregion.
Butthesystemofallowancescannolongerbeallowedtobeasubstitutefordiscussing
howmuchMPsshouldbepaidinrelationtotheimportantroletheyplayinour
democracy.Nowisprobablynotthetimetohavethisdeliberationasthepublicstill
simmerswithfuryandtherecessioncontinuestocreateunemployment.Theissueof
pay,however,needstoeventuallybediscussedifwewanttoincreasetheesteemof
electedpolitics,nomatterhowdifficultthepublicconversationwillbe.Beinga
politicianshouldbeamixofacalling,publicserviceandprofessionalendeavour.It
cannotberestrictedtoawealthyorpoliticalelite,andwhilethedaysofdeferenceare
behindus,bringingrespectbacktotherolemustbepartandparcelofreforms.It
seemsabsurdthatchiefexecutivesofcouncilsandquangosarereadilypaidsalaries
withpublicmoneyabove£100,000,yetMPswhoshouldbeequallyvaluedinsociety
ifnotmoresomakedowithmuchless.Aracetothebottomofthesalaryscalein
ordertoshowadequatepenancewillnothelpthesituation.
Similarly,itwouldbeashameifpoliticiansfeltthattheonlywaytogetbackintothe
public’sgoodbookswastobecomewhatisderogatorilytermedas‘glorifiedsocial
workers’.Thereneedstobeabalancebetweenthetimepoliticiansspendwiththeir
constituents,helpingtosortoutcaseworkandunderstandingthedynamicsoftheir
area,andthetimespentinParliamentworkingonlegislation,SelectCommitteesandin
government.Modernpoliticsisfarmoredemandingthanfiftyyearsago,when
politiciansregularlyhadtimetowritepoliticaltomesandtakelongholidays.We
cannotdemandthatpoliticiansactlesslikerobotsandmorelikenormalpeople,ifwe
forcethemintoworkingpracticesthatdonotencouragefamilylife,leisureandtime
forrealscrutinyofParliament.
Parliament
OnewayinwhichalittleprominencemightbebroughtbacktotheroleofanMPisif
theirtimeinParliamentisusedmoreproductivelyandpowerfully.Atpresent,there
aretwomainwaysofbeingnoticedfromthegreenbenches–becomingaministeror
becomingamaverick.Hardworkingbackbencherswhomayperformahugevarietyof
rolesonall-partyparliamentarygroups,orincharities,orintheirconstituenciesare
eitherperceivedaslobbyfodderorsoun-ambitiousthattheyaren’tworthpaying
attentionto.
IncreasingtheimportanceofSelectCommitteeswouldbeonewaytocreatean
alternativecareerrouteinParliament,whileatthesametimestrengtheningthe
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Timetoturnpoliticsonitshead
accountabilityoftheExecutive.AgoodstartwouldbetogiveMPstherighttovotefor
SelectCommitteechairswithoutwhipping.Thiswouldensurethatchairsarechosen
fortheirabilitytoaskdifficultquestionsratherthanwhethertheyagreewiththe
Government.ItwouldalsoconfergreaterindependenceonthereportsSelect
Committeesproduce,whichareofteninstructivebutmostlyignored.Increasing
resourcesforstaffwouldalsohelpinthisrespect.
OtherwaysofbeefingupSelectCommitteeswouldincludegivingthemtherightto
initiatebills(possiblylinkedtocitizen-ledinitiatives,asproposedbythe
Conservatives)andtherighttomakemajorpublicappointments,linkedtothe
opportunitytoremovesaidappointmentsundercertaincircumstances.Ifitisdifficult
forthepublictoseeparliamentariansholdingtheGovernmenttoaccountthroughthe
barrackingofPrimeMinister’sQuestions,atleastbygivingSelectCommitteesmore
powers,theymightdeveloparespectforthoseMPswhousuallyworkhardbutdoso
unnoticedoutsideofthechamber.Americanpoliticiansbuildstrongreputations
becauseoftheirworkonCongressionalcommittees,andwhileitisunlikelytheUK
Parliamentwilladoptfullseparationofpowers,littlestepstowardsgreaterexecutive
accountabilitywouldbewelcome.
Inthisvein,onerelativelysimplewayofreducingthepoweroftheExecutivewould
betolimitthenumberofMPsonthegovernmentpayroll.Thenumberofministershas
burgeonedundertheLabourgovernment,makingwhippingeasierandthereforea
positiveoutcomefortheGovernmentmorelikely.WhileresearchbyPhilipCowley
showsthatthecommonconceptionofLabourparliamentariansbeinggovernment
lapdogsisnotnecessarilytrueinthattherehavebeenmorerebellionsinthelastthree
parliamentsthaninanyotherperiod,itistruethatthenumberofministersonthe
payrollhasrisenfrom121in1983to141in2008.Ifthewhipsarenolongerableto
relyonthethreatofsackingministers,bothingovernmentandinshadowcabinet
teams,theremightbeareturntomoreverballypersuasivemethodsofconvincing
fellowparliamentarianstosupportoropposelegislation.Debatesandforceof
argumentmightbegintotakecentralstageinsteadofpartiespurelyplayinganumbers
game.
TheHouseofLordsshouldnotescapecensureeither.Itisextraordinarythatthe
onlyelectionsthathavetakenplacesince1999areamongtheunelectedhereditary
peerswhenoneoftheirnumberdies.Itishopedthatallpartieswillbackafully
electedHouseofLordsasannouncedbythePrimeMinister.Eitheronebelievesina
principlewhichrulesthatultimatelyindividualswhohavenodemocraticlegitimacy
shouldnotpasslaws,oronedoesnot.
Wehaveover-exaggeratedtheindependentexpertiseofmembersoftheHouseof
Lords.Yes,anumberofexcellentmembersoftheUpperHousehavemade
legislationimmeasurablybetter,buttheideathatthesameindividualswouldonly
dosoiftheyhadtheprivilegeofanhonourdoesnotseemparticularlyhonourable
inthefirstplace.Eitherourmostbrilliantlawyers,scientists,artists,
philanthropists,militaristsandethiciststhinkitisanimportantdutytocometothe
aidoftheirparliamentarians,ortheydonot.Bribingthemtousetheirknowledgein
returnforapeerageseemsbesidethepoint.
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Progress
Publicengagement
NotallreformsneedtotakeplacewithinWestminster,however,andifwesimplyleave
itatthat,weareunlikelytoseeagenuinetransformationofpolitics.Onechange,
whichcouldcreateaseismicshiftinthewaythatwegoaboutourpolitics,wouldbeto
introduceamoreproportionalvotingsystem.Theargumentshavebeenwellrehearsed,
buttheybearrepeating.Atthemoment,thevastmajorityofWestminsterseatsarea
foregoneconclusionbeforetheelectioniseverheld.ThereisnopointinaLabourvoter
turningouttovoteinWitney,oraConservativeturningoutinLiverpoolRiverside.
Theprincipleofyourvotecountingisanimportantone.Whilemostpeople(87per
centaccordingtotheHansardSociety’smostrecentauditofpublicengagementwith
politics)thinkitistheirdutytovote,farfewerdo.Butweshouldnotbesurprised
aboutthis.Itisarationalresponsetotheknowledgethatmostly,theirvotedoesnot
makeablindbitofdifference.Allofthepublicengagementcampaignsintheworld
wouldnotchangethatrealityorthepublic’sresponsetoit.
Ourfirst-past-the-postsystemforcespoliticalpartiestoconcentrateonatinynumber
ofmarginalseatsandpredominantlythemiddleclasseswithinthem.Inturnthis
meansthatonly2percentoftheelectorategettheundividedattentionoftheir
politiciansatelectiontime.Thisskewsthepoliciesofpartiesastheygeartheir
messagestovotersintheSouthEastandtheM1corridorwheremostmarginalseats
aretobefound.Soitisnowonderthat85percentofthepublicfeelasthoughthey
havenoinfluenceoverdecision-makingintheircountry(HansardSociety2009).
Progressivepoliticsshouldnotviewthingsinblackandwhite.Policymakingand
politicaldecision-takingisnecessarilyafraughtandcomplexprocess.Yetinourhaste
toplacatetheworriedswingvotersinmarginalseats,politiciansfromallparties
presenttheirplatformas‘EasyPolitics’–alow-cost,mixandmatchchoicewhichwill
getvoterstotheirdestinationinrecordtime.Thishasledtohardchoicesbeingfudged
behindcloseddoorsoneverythingfromconstitutionalreformtoclimatechange,from
Europetoenergypolicy.Whenscaringoffthemiddlebecomestheballandchainon
everypolitician’sfoot,ourpoliticsbecomesneutered,devoidofrealcontentand
debate.
Changingthevotingsystemwillnotnecessarilyincreasevoterturnout,norwillit
fundamentallychangethenatureofpoliticians–aquickreadofCicerotellsusthat.
Butitcouldhelptorealignourpoliticssothatpoliticiansareforcedtoacknowledge
thattheywillhavetocompromise,buildcoalitions,andadmitthatnoteverythingisas
easyasallthat.Infact,theywillhavetoliveouttheirpoliticsalittlemorelikepeople
livetheireverydaylives.
Anothermeasurewhichthosewhobelieveinsocialjusticeshouldbeconsideringis
introducingcompulsoryvoting.Notbecausepoliticalactivistshavelosttheirtether
withthepublic,orbecausetheElectoralCommission’sadvertisingbudgetisthreatened
byapotentialConservativegovernment.Butbecausethereisarealimbalance
betweentheyoungandtheold,therichandthepoor,andwhiteandethnicminority
groupswhenitcomestovoting.Althoughturnouthasbeenindeclineamongall
demographicgroupssincethe1970s,ithasdeclinedthemostamongthelowestsocio-
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Timetoturnpoliticsonitshead
economicgroups.Inthe1960stherewasaroundaseven-pointdifferenceinturnout
betweenthehighestandlowestearners;by2005thisfigurehadincreasedtoaround
13points.Foreveryyoungpersonwhoturnedouttovotein2005,morethantwo
olderpeoplevoted.
Politicianscanthereforeaffordtoignorethepoor,theyoungandthenon-aligned,
panderinginsteadtothemiddle,theoldandthepartysupporter.Makingit
mandatorytoturnoutinelectionswouldensurethatallvoters’voicesarelistened
tobypoliticians,andafairerreflectionofvoters’prioritiesmightresult.Morethan
30countries,includingAustralia,Belgium,GreeceandSwitzerland,dosoandtheir
turnoutis15percenthigheronaverage.IntheUK,suchamovecouldshiftthe
emphasisoncanvassingandturningoutthosevoterswhohaveidentifiedwithone
partyontothenon-affiliatedanddisillusioned.Inturn,thiscouldleadpoliticiansto
advocatethosepoliciesthatmosthelpthepoorandtheyoung.
Onefinalimportantwaythatwouldreallyhelptoshapethefutureofconstitutional
reformwouldbetointroduceaCitizens’Convention.Sincepoliticianshavefailedto
comeupwithanysatisfactory,detailedconstitutionalreformplan,itmakessenseto
convenearandomlyselectedconventionofcitizenstodeliberateoneverythingfrom
HouseofLordsreformtomethodsofgreaterdevolution.Bytrustingthepublicto
designsignificantconstitutionalchange,theideathatthepublicarethearbitersofour
politicalmachinerywillgaintractionandhelptoputthembackinthedrivingseatof
radicalreform.
Politicalparties
Primariesofficiallycameofagein2009.InearlyAugusttheConservativeParty
adoptedaprimaryinitsparliamentaryselectioninTotnes,Devon,followingthe
resignationofexpensespariah,SirAnthonySteen.Over20,000voters,around23.9
percentaccordingtotheConservatives,turnedouttoselectalocalGPinwhathas
beenseenasthemostsuccessfuluseofaprimaryyet,albeitata£20,000costtothe
party.
InJuneDavidMiliband,theForeignSecretary,cameoutinfavourofthemethodina
speechgiventotheJohnSmithMemorialTrust.Hesaid,‘thetraditionalpolitical
structuresofmainstreampoliticalpartiesaredying.Shrinkingmembership,declining
affinity,fuzzyidentity,leadmanytoproclaimthatdeathhasalreadyhappened,with
fewtearsatthefuneral.’MilibandcitedthesuccessoftheGreeksocialistparty,
PASOK,whichusedprimariestoselectpartycandidatesforlocalelections,as
somethingthatshouldbeconsideredintheUK.ItlookslikePASOK’sattempttoreach
outbeyonditstraditionalpartymembershipwasonereasonforitsrecentelection
success.
TessaJowell,MinisterfortheCabinetOffice,wasthefirstseniorCabinetMinisterto
signalhersupport,inaspeechinJuneatthinktankDemos.HigherEducationminister,
andpossiblecandidatefortheLabourcandidateforLondonMayor,DavidLammyalso
supportsprimaries.HisregardforPresidentObama’sground-breakingcampaigntowin
thepresidencylastyearhasledhimtobelievethatBritaincoulddevelopitsownbrand
ofmovementpolitics.
56
Progress
Ingeneral,however,grassrootspoliticalactivistshaveviewedthisinnovationwith
distrust,seeingitasanattackontheirautonomyanduniqueroleassigned-upparty
members.Conservativemembershaveacceptedprimariesmorereadily,though
possiblybecausetheverylowturnoutsinmostselectionsdonotthreatentheirrole
andperhapsbecausetheyrealisethatopposingtheleadership’ssupportofprimaries
asitheadstowardsgovernmentwillsignaldisunity.IntheLabourParty,themain
oppositiontoprimariescoalescesaroundthreemainconcerns:howprimarieswillbe
financedandwhetherthiswillleadtoamoneyraceashappensintheUS;whatsortof
candidatewillbechosenandwhetherwewillendupwithcelebrities,middleofthe
road‘pleaseeverybodies’,orlocaldo-gooders;andwhetherthissoundsthedeathknell
fororganisedpoliticalpartieswithmembershipsandinternalpolicymaking.
Muchoftheworryaboutintroducingprimaries,however,ispredicatedonan
assumptionthattheywillbeentirelymodelledontheUSversionswiththeirglitzy
campaignsandcorporatebackers.IntheLabourPartyatleast,thereisanalternative
British-styleprimarysystemwhichmightovercomethemainobjections,andwhich
couldbringarealshiftinthewayinwhichpoliticalpartiesinvolvethepublicinthis
country.Themainelementsofsuchamodelwouldinclude:cappingspendingby
primaryelectioncandidatesregulatedbytheElectoralCommission;statefundingof
theelectiontoavoidindividualpartiespurchasingvotesbyspendingthemostmoney;
primariestobeheldonthesamedaywithvotersonlyreceivingtheballotpaperfor
thepartytheyareregisteredwith;andallowingpartymemberstochoosetheshortlist.
AprimaryruninthiswaywouldavoidthefirstandthethirdofLabourparty
members’concerns–acaponspendingwouldensurethatwedonotendupwithonly
wealthycandidates,andallowingmemberstochoosetheinitialshortlistprovidesa
reasonforjoiningapoliticalparty.Thesecondconcernaboutthetypeofcandidate
electedislesseasytodealwithexceptfortosaythatifthepublicchoosescandidates
therestofthepolitydon’tlike,wellthat’sdemocracy,isn’tit?
Butworriesaboutoverlyeccentricorcelebpoliticiansbeingelectedareoverblown.As
seasonedUScampaigner,BenBrandzelhassaid:‘Massmovementsopentoanyone…
willalwaysbepulledtowardsthecommonsensecentre.It’swhyWikipediacanself-
policeforaccuracy,whyObama’sopenforumsneverseriouslyembarrassedthe
candidateandwhytheLondoncitizens’agendacalledforthingslikeensuringthe
OlympicVillagecreatespublichousing–noterectingstatuestoChe’(Brandzel2009).
Ifanything,primariescouldhelptofreecandidatesfromold-styletop-downcentral
partyortradeunionpatronageasthosecandidateswhoaremostlikelytowinwill
havebuiltupsupportamongthepublic.Goodpublicspeakingskills,charismaand
rapportwiththepublicwillhelp:someofthethings,infact,thatthepublicand
commentariatsayislackinginourneuteredtwenty-firstcenturypolitics.
Partofthereasonwhysomepoliticiansareactivelyconsideringprimariesis
becauseofaconcernthatthereisarealdisconnectionbetweenthepublicand
parliamentaryrepresentatives.Thepublicoftensaythattheydonotfeelasthough
theirpoliticianscareabouttheirconcernsandtaketheirvotesforgranted.By
allowingthepublicagreatersayinwhostandsatanelectionmayhelptopoliticise
agroupthathasbeengrowinginapathyandalsogenerategreaterlegitimacyin
thosewhoarestanding.Insteadofonaverage200partymemberschoosingthe
57
Timetoturnpoliticsonitshead
Labourpartycandidateinaconstituencyofaround70,000,wecouldhave20,000
voting,andmoreifallpartiesheldtheirprimariesonthesameday.Apartfrom
generalelectionsthemselves,thereisnoothertimewhenweaskthepublictomake
suchapositivepoliticalact.
Thereareotherbenefitstointroducingprimaries.Forexample,itmightchangethe
waypoliticalpartiescampaign.Ifeachpartyhasaregisterofitssupporters,it
wouldbeabletoconcentratemoreofitsdoorstepactivityonthevotesofthe
unregisteredratherthanalwaysrelyingongettingoutthecorevoteatelections.
Thiswouldhaveabeneficialeffectbecauseatthemomentmostpartiesignore
voterswhodonotvote,orwhoareundecidedbecausetheycanrely,particularly
underthefirst-past-the-postvotingsystem,ontheirsolidsupporters.Byhavingto
reachouttothosewhoaredisengaged,politicianswillhavetoworkhardertobuild
consensusamongdiversecommunities.Primariessignalthatourpoliticalelitesare
willingtotrustinthemassesandshiftpowerdowntothem.Atatimewhena
chasmisgrowingbetweenthepublicandpoliticians,primariescouldhelptostart
rebuildingsometrustbetweenthem.
AnotherinnovationwhichtheLabourandConservativepartieshavetaken
tentativestepstowardswouldbetoallownon-memberstoparticipateinother
partyinitiatives,forexamplebyhelpingtoformulatepolicyorrunningcampaigns
andfundraising.ThelaunchofMyConservatives.comsuggeststhatthe
ConservativesarewillingtolearnfromBarackObama’scampaignandusethe
internettoopenuptheirusuallyclosedprocessestothepublicatlarge.TheLabour
Partywillfollowsuitifithasanysense.
OneinternalpartychangeLabourcouldconsiderwouldbetoinsistthatlocalparties
whowishtoinfluencepartypolicyneedtoshowthattheyhaveengagedwiththeir
localpublictocomeupwiththeideaspresentedtotheNationalPolicyForum.This
wouldbothhelptoreachouttothecommunityatatimewhenLabourhaslosttouch
andalsoensurethatanypolicymadewouldreflecttherealconcernsofordinary
people.Itwouldgivepolicyprescriptionsfromthegrassrootsmorelegitimacy,meaning
theleadershipwouldfinditmoredifficulttoignore.Apolicybackedby1,000local
voterswillhavemuchmorecloutthanoneendorsedbyahandfulofLabourmembers
meetingonaFridaynightinacoldcommunityhall.Theaveragemembershipinalocal
LabourPartyis280people,yettheelectorateare70,000-strong.PartofLabour’s
regenerationasapoliticalforcewillbepredicatedonwhetheritcanfindfreshideas
andnewwaysofthinkingaboutoldideas.
Statefundingforpoliticaleducationwouldalsohelpinthisregard.Weexpectthe
publictocometopoliticsfullycognisantofpoliticalphilosophy,socialpolicyand
howParliamentworks.Whilecitizenshipeducationismeanttoberemedyingthisin
school,thewiderpublicstillknowsverylittleaboutpolitics.Fundingtraining,
summerschoolsandseminarscouldhelptodeveloppoliticalactivists’capabilities
andwouldsendasignalthatwecareaboutthestateofournation’spoliticalhealth.
SwedenandotherEuropeancountriesalreadyfundthisareaofworkinpolitical
partieswithoutcontroversy,anditwouldrepresentagrown-upstepifwecoulddo
thesameintheUK.
58
Progress
Conclusion
NeitherLabournortheConservativeshavemadethestep-changetheyneedtoifthey
aretopresentthemselvesasthetrueheirsofThomasPaine.Politicalpunditsand
activistsalikehavespenttoolonghand-wringingaboutthepublic’slackof
engagementwithpoliticswithouttakingtheboldstepsneededtomakeareal
difference.Politicalconsensusbothwithinandacrosspartieswillbehardtocomeby
onmanyofthesereforms,buttheexpensescrisisprovideseveryonewithan
opportunitytotrytogetitrightthistime.Itislikelythattheclosertheelectiongets,
themorerisk-aversetheleadershipofourmainpartieswillbecome.Butthiswouldbe
wrong-minded–whatisrequiredinthenextsixmonthsisforpoliticstobeturnedon
itsheadandforpoliticianstoacceptthatonlyradicalchangeswillhelptorestoresome
ofthelosttrust,notjustfromtheexpensescrisis,butfromthelastfewdecades.
JessicaAsatoisActingDirectorofProgress.
BrandzelB(2009)‘ABritishMovementforChange’inAnsteadNandStrawW(eds)TheChangeWe
Need:WhatBritaincanlearnfromObama’sVictoryLondon:FabianSociety
CowleyP(2005)TheRebels:HowBlairMislaidhisMajority London:Politico’sPublishingLtd
HansardSociety(2009)AuditofPoliticalEngagement 6 London:HansardSociety
59
FIT FOR GOVERNMENT
60
Reform
ReformingandstrengtheningtheroleofParliament
Fallingturnoutinelections,particularlyamongtheyoung,issymptomaticofthe
public’slowconfidenceinParliament.Internationalcomparisonhighlightstheextent
ofthisdecline.RecentfiguresgatheredbypollingconsultancyComResshowthatonly
19percentofpeopleintheUKagreewiththestatement‘Parliamentisworkingfor
me’(Kalitowski2008).ThisisinstarkcontrasttothecaseofCanada,where34.4per
centofpeoplesaidtheyhad‘Quitealot’ofconfidenceinParliament,accordingtothe
WorldValuesSurvey.QualityoflifeisalsomuchhigherinCanadathanintheUK,
rankedsixthontheUnitedNations’HumanDevelopmentIndextable,comparedwith
theUKineighteenthplace(UNDP2006).Thereisnoclearcausallink,butthereisa
strongpresumptionthatthecomparativeriftinthequalityoflifeandpublic
confidenceinParliamentbetweentheUKandCanadaislinkedtothediffering
governmentstructuresinthetwocountries.
Electoralreformwouldbeasideshow.Successiveelectionshavedemonstratedthat
Britaingenerallygetstheresultsitwants,whileproportionalrepresentationcouldend
theabilityoftheelectoratetochangegovernments.TheresultofPRwouldsimply
makethecoalitionsthatalreadyoccurwithinpoliticalpartiesmoreexplicit.Moreover,
PRcentralises,takingthevoterfurtherawayfromParliament.Withcandidateschosen
bypartyleaders,thevoterlosestheirconnectiontotheirrepresentative,removing
themfurtherfromthedemocraticprocess.
PRwouldnotchangepolitics:itwouldmerelychangethepartystructurewithout
bringingnewvoicesintoParliament,doingnothingtoresolvethedemocraticdeficit
whichBritainfaces.
ShorterParliaments,betterelections
VoterscanbegivenmorecontroloverParliamentbyintroducingshortertermsoffour
years,requiringgovernmentsandparliamentarianstoseekre-electionsooner,not
later.CountrieswiththreeorfouryearParliaments,suchasCanada,Australiaandthe
Scandinaviannations,havehigherlevelsofconfidenceandhigherelectoralturnouts
thantheUK.ShortertermsincreasevoterpowerandgiveMPsmorecontactwith
voters.Theyalsofocusgovernmentonachievingresultswithinthefour-yearterm
ratherthanonmanipulatingpolicesaroundanelectiondate.
Contactbetweenpoliticiansandvoterswillbevitaltothepublicregainingitssenseof
powerandresponsibilitywithinthedemocraticpoliticalprocess.Recentsurveys
suggestthishasbeenheavilyeroded:75percentofpeopleagreethatastrong
Parliamentisgoodfordemocracy,yetonlyathirdaresatisfiedwithhowthe
institutionworksatthemoment(Kalitowski2008).Reducingparliamentarytermsto
fouryearswouldalsostopthecharadeoflame-duckadministrationslimpingintoa
fifthyearbeforeeventuallymeetingoblivion.
Notarubberstamp
MPsmustrealisethattheirfundamentalroleisthescrutinyofgovernmentlegislation,
policyandactivity.Inrecentyears,thisdutyhasbeenneglectedasMPseitherseek
ministerialcareersorchoosetofocusonlocalmattersthataffecttheirconstituents.
61
Fitforgovernment
Withthisriftbetweenaspiringministersand‘socialworkers’,theultimatejobof
challengingGovernmentlegislationhasbeenforgotten.NotenoughMPsare
parliamentariansdedicatedtotheworkthatgoesoninsidethechamber.
Parliamentshouldbetheplacetotestlegislation,wherethecountryjudgeswhatthe
Governmentwantstodo.Inrecentyearstherehasbeenalegislativeavalanchewith
governmentspassingactafteractthathavenotbeenexposedtotheintricatescrutiny
thatisneeded.AreductioninthenumberofbillstakenthroughParliamentwould
allowformuchmoredetailedscrutinyandmoretimefordebate.Whatisneededis
fewerbillsandhigherqualityacts.
Separationofpowers
MakingMPsmoreindependentfromtheExecutiveiscrucialforbetterparliamentary
scrutiny.Currently,thepartywhipscanstifledebatetooeasilyandprotectthe
Governmentfromthepeople’srepresentatives.ThisisaconsequenceofBritain’s
dangerousamalgamationofitslegislativeandexecutivepower.Theincentiveforany
ambitiouspoliticianistotoethepartylineinexchangeforfuturecareerprospects,
ratherthanscrutinisetheExecutive.
TheseparationofpowersandtheappointmentofministersfromoutsideofParliament
wouldhavethetwofoldeffectofensuringthatparliamentarianswereabletofreely
challengetheGovernmentandthatministerswhowereappointedhadgreater
experiencederived,forinstance,frommanaginglargeorganisationsorservinginthe
publicsector.
Parliamentshouldandmuststillhavethepowertoquestionandremovethese
ministers,butoncetheministersarenolongerrecruitedfromwithintheirownranks,it
willbepossibletoholdthemtoaccountmoreeffectively,ensuringproperscrutiny.
Standardsmustalsobesetforfullparliamentaryscrutinyofprerogativeactions,such
asdecisionsonenteringarmedconflict.
Strongercommittees,moreresearch
Parliamentarycommitteeshaveavitalroletoplayintheprocessofscrutinising
legislation.Theyneedmorepowertoconfrontgovernmentandchallengelegislation,
andtheresourcestoundertakeproperresearchtobackthisup.
IntheUnitedStatescongressionalcommitteesarepowerfulbodieswhichcanconsider,
amendandreportbillsthatfallundertheirjurisdiction.Theycanimpedebillsfrom
reachingthefloorandholdhearingswithpowersofsubpoena.Incontrast,Select
CommitteesintheUKhavemuchmorelimitedpowerstoreviewlegislation,andlack
theresourcestoactasanalternativepowerbasetotheExecutive.SelectCommittee
musthavemoreauthority,particularlythepowertosignoffondepartmentalbudgets.
Theymustalsobebetterfundedandprovidedwiththegreaterresearchcapabilityand
expertiseneededtoconducteffectivescrutinyoflargegovernmentdepartments.
Finally,itwouldbedesirablefortheNationalAuditOfficetoworkdirectlyforSelect
Committees.
Atpresentthemainfocusofparliamentaryactivityisondebate.Nooneislistening
andthisactivityisrarelyreportedinthepress.ThemainworkofParliamentshouldbe
62
Reform
theeffectivedevelopmentofpolicycontributionsandtochallengegovernment
legislationthoughspecialistcommittees,backedupbymuchmoreincisiveresearch
andfactfinding.Reform’sworkisparticularlyconcernedwiththeweakperformance
ofParliamentinholdingtheGovernmenttoaccountonkeyareasaffectingpublic
spendingandtaxation.
Parliamentariansfirst
Politics,Parliamentandgovernmenthavebecomemorecomplexanddemandingsince
thenineteenthcentury;theageofthearistocraticamateurisover.Politicsrequires
determinationanddedicationandwillincreasinglymakegreaterdemandsonits
practitionersiftheyaretosucceed.Modernpoliticiansneedtobelocalactivistswitha
nationalpresence,visionarythinkerswithaneyefordetail,media-savvyoperators
andhardenedbureaucraticmanagers.
Nosinglecareerpathcanfurnishpoliticianswithalltheseskills.Politicsismorethana
full-timejobandthedifferentrolesofpoliticiansneedtobeclearlydefinedtoensure
thatMPs,ministersandpartyleadersareservingtheirpoliticalpurpose.
OnceelectedasMPs,politiciansshouldhavethefreedomandindependencetofocus
ontheirparliamentarydutytoholdtheGovernmenttoaccount.ManyMPsareideally
suitedtoquestioningministersandofficials,scrutinisinglegislationandjudgingthe
policiesofgovernment.Theywouldservethemselvesandthecountrybetterby
focusingonholdingtheGovernmenttoaccountratherthantryingtoclimbthegreasy
pole.Politiciansshouldnothavetobecomeministersinordertohavea‘career’,justas
MPsoftenwillnotmakethebestministers.
Ministerialtalents
ByselectingministersfromoutsideofParliament,wecanensurethatweattractthe
brightestandthebestandmostimportantlypeoplewhoarereadyondayone.Whatis
expectedofministersandwhattheirrolesrequirehasclearlybeenasourceof
confusion.AftersteppingdownasHomeSecretary,JacquiSmithsaidthatshehad
‘neverrunamajororganisation’before.Andwhenaskedif,whenappointedHome
Secretary,shewasworriedaboutbeinguptothejobshesaid,‘…everysingletime
thatIwasappointedtoaministerialjobIthoughtthat’(Dale2009).Meanwhile,Lord
MandelsonhasprovedmorepopularasaministerthanheeverdidasanMP.Weneed
peoplewiththecapacitytocontroladepartmentwithamulti-billionbudgetandface
downvestedinterests,notsomeonewhohasneverstrayedfromthewhip.
Reformingthesecondchamber
HowtheHouseofLordsiscomposedinthefutureshouldbedecidedbyareferendum.
Whetherelectedorselected,however,whattheHouseofLordsneedsmorethan
anythingisindependenceandauthority.
Introducingfixedsingletermsforpeerswouldalsomakethesecondchambermore
effectiveandrelevant.Expertiseneedsconstantrenewal,andtheLordsmustalways
beopentonew,independentvoices.AHouseofLordswithlong,seven-yearfixed
termswouldbemorereflectiveofandresponsivetopublicopinion,yetnotarivalto
theHouseofCommons.DetachedfromtheelectoralcycleandfreeofGovernment
63
Fitforgovernment
influence,theHouseofLordscouldbuildonitsstrengths,asanindependentUpper
House.
TheHouseofLordsshouldbeaplacewhereexpertscanreviewandreviselegislation,
notapartisanbattleground.Peersshouldbegenuinelyindependentandshouldfollow
theexampleofsomestatelegislaturesintheUSinwhichpartygroupingsarebanned.
WithatrulyindependentHouseofLordswecouldensureeffectivescrutinyofboth
Governmentandlegislation.
MembersoftheHouseofLordsshouldbeappointedforfixedtermsbyan
independentappointmentscommission,removingthemaligninfluenceofparty
politics.What’smore,oncetheneedforministerstobeMembersoftheHousesof
Parliamentwereremoved,therewouldbenoneedfortheGovernmenttomake
ministerialappointmentsfromtheHouseofLords.
Channellingcitizenpower
WhilevotersarebecomingdistancedfromParliament,activistcitizensaregrowing
innumber.Directdemocracyisalreadyhappening,andpeopleareincreasingly
tryingtotakemorecontrolovertheirlivesandfindnewavenuestohavetheirvoice
heard.Peopletaketheinitiativeeverydayasconsumerstogaintheinformation
necessarytounderstandtheservicesavailabletothemandbringchangetotheir
dailylives.Individualsarecryingoutforchoiceinpublicservicesandrightsas
patientsandparents:tochoosetheirschoolorhospital,andgetthebesteducation
ortreatmentavailable.Theinternethasrevolutionisedpoliticsandenabledthe
individualstospeakoutandparticipateinthepolicydebate.Theformationof
organisationssuchasLondonCitizenshasledtothebirthof‘Community
Organising’withintheUK.
Socitizenpowerishere–thepointisithastobechannelledintotheprocesssothatit
doesnotbecomeadistraction,orworse,adirectcompetitortoourrepresentative
system.
Democracyintheinternetage
The‘e-citizen’willhaveavitalroleinrejuvenatingthedemocraticprocess.Thereisa
strongcaseformoredirectaccesstopetitionsorcitizens’initiatives,totrigger
discussionoflegislation.TheHansardSocietysuggeststhatpeoplecouldengagemore
withpoliticsviapetitions,whichcouldbemanagedthroughanewPetitions
Committee.Anypetitionsignedbymorethan10,000peopleshouldgivethe
petitionerstherighttomakeabriefstatementandleadtoadebate(HansardSociety
2009a).
Thereis,however,ariskofdisintermediation,withthelinesofaccountabilityand
channelsofrepresentationbecomingincreasinglystrained.Politiciansshouldstriveto
ensurethatthesedifferentinitiativesandstrandsofdemocracyareconnected,thatthe
processremainsconsolidatedandthattheyremainattheheartofthedemocratic
process.Throughtechnologypoliticianscankeeptheirfingeronthepulseofpublic
opinionandopenupadialoguebetweenthemselvesandthepublic.Bute-democracy
shouldinformparliamentarydemocracy,notsupplantit.
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Reform
Makinglocalismmeaningful
TherehasbeenadeclineinconfidenceinBritishlocalgovernmentwhichhasgone
alongwithincreasingcentralisation.Thecasemadeinthemid-nineteenthcenturyby
AlexisdeTocquevillefortheimportanceoflocalismisstillhighlyrelevant(in
DemocracyinAmerica).Ashesaid,‘withoutpowerandindependenceatownmay
containgoodsubjects,butitcanhavenoactivecitizens’.Thismustinspirethemuch
neededrestructuringofgovernmentinordertorestoreitsmeaningtotoday’svoters.
Nationalrhetoric,localreality
InrecentyearstheBritishstatehasbecomemorecentralisedwhilepoliticalculturehas
becomemorefixatedontheWestminstervillage.Yetthisrunscountertothemost
effectiveformofgovernance.Localism,theprinciplewherebydecision-makingand
authorityaredevolvedtothelowestpossiblelevel,couldredefinetherelationship
votershavewithourpoliticalinstitutionsandreinvigorateconfidenceingovernment.
TheBritishstateshouldberestructuredandsimplifiedonthisprinciple.Britainneeds
fewerlayersofgovernance.LocalcouncilsshouldbeempoweredandtheRegional
DevelopmentAgenciesshouldbeabolished.
Greaterpowerandresponsibilityatlocallevelisneededforpeopletobeableto
becomeactivecitizensandre-engagewiththepoliticalprocess.AHansardSociety
studysuggeststhata73percentmajorityofpeoplebelievetheyhave‘notverymuch
influence’or‘noinfluenceatall’indecision-makingintheirlocalareas.20percentof
peopleansweredthatthiswasbecause‘decisionsaremadewithouttalkingtothe
people’,thatistosay,localgovernmentinstitutionsdonotsufficientlyengagewith
voters(HansardSociety2009b).Amorelocalisedformofgovernmentwouldsee
politicsessentiallybecomingclosertopeople’severydaylives.
Localpowerbases
Akeypartofreturningpowertoalocallevelmustbecreatinglocalpowerbasesthat
canbeheldtoaccountbylocalcitizens.TheGreaterLondonAuthorityandMayorof
Londonhaveshownthatlocalpowerbaseswork,asLondoncitizensarenowmore
engagedinthelifeoftheircityandknowwhoisresponsibleforwhat.Theyhavealso
ledtogreateraccountabilityamongpublicservicesandquangosinthecapital,as
powerfulelectedlocalpoliticiansareabletoholdtheunelectedquangocracyto
accountandasserttheirowndemocraticauthority.
EvenLondon’sMayor,however,suffersfromtoolimitedpowersandremainssubservient
tocentralgovernment.Inordertocreategenuinelocalpowerbases,everymetropolis
shouldhaveitsownelectedMayorwithextensivepowerssimilartothoseofCityMayors
intheUS.Theyshouldbeheldtoaccountbypowerfullocalcouncils,meaningthat
citizenscouldseeandfeelastakeinthedemocraticprocessintheirlocalarea.
Themajorobstacleisnotlackofinterest;itisstructural.Reform’sworkonthepolice
serviceconcludedthatlocalaccountabilitywouldbedifficulttoachieveunlessthe
territoriesofmostpoliceforceswerereconfiguredtoconnectwithlocalgovernment
boundaries.Centralisedfundingisdisconnectedfromlocalrequirements,whilepolice
authoritieshavelittlecapacitytoraisefundslocally.Furthermore,flexibilityinthe
65
Fitforgovernment
actualspendingoftheirbudgetsislimitedbytheamountofcentralgovernmenttargets
thatpoliceforceshavetocomplywith.Localfundingandlocalaccountabilityneedto
berealigned,whilelocalauthoritiesneedtobegivenautonomyandflexibilityinorder
thatparticularlocalproblemscanbesolvedmorequicklyandefficiently.Alreadylocal
authoritiesaretakingtheinitiativebyintroducingspendingconstraintsandre-
examininghowtogainmaximumproductivityfromtheirpublicservices.Local
knowledge,localdesignandlocalinitiativewillbekeybutlocalismneedsresourcesto
implementlocalchange.
Planningandhousingshouldalsobedelegatedtotherightleveltoalignthecostsand
benefits.City-regionauthoritiesorclustersoflocalauthoritiesdevelopedinto
collaborativenetworkswillenablestrategicintereststobeeffectivelymatchedwhile
localconcernsremainengagedintheplanningprocess.
Reformingpoliticalpartiestomeetnewchallenges
PoliticalpartieshaveakeyroletoplayinBritishdemocracy.Theyremainthebestwayto
undertakethegoalsofpolitics,toaggregateinterestsandtoformagovernment.Parties
recruittalentintothepoliticalprocess,generateideastotacklethefuturechallenges
facingthecountryandengagethepublicintoparliamentarydemocracy.Theyunify
differentperspectiveswithinthepartymorethantheydivideperspectivesbetween
parties.Apoliticalpartyisthemomentum,cohesionandtheactivityofpolitics.Parties
havealwayscompetedtowinthevotes,theywillnowneedtoinnovateandadoptnew
methodstomaintainthesupporttheyneed.
Openparties
ThepoliticalsphereismoreopenthanatanytimeinBritishhistory.Themedia,
internetandblogospherehavethrownopenthedoorstothecorridorsofpowerand
politicalpartiesmustnowkeepupwithamoreversatileelectorate.Arguably,political
partieshavealreadystartedtorisetothechallenge.
TheConservativesheldthefirstopenprimarytoselecttheirparliamentarycandidate
forTotnes,Devon;whileDavidMilibandhasdiscussedthepossibilityofallowingall
Laboursupporterstohaveavoteinelectingafuturepartyleader.Theseinitiatives
could,iffollowedthrough,resultingreatervoterconfidenceandstrongeraffiliation
betweenpoliticalpartiesandtheirsupporters.TheAmericanstateprimariesgenerated
majorpublicinterestontheirsideoftheAtlantic.Thedegreeofchoiceof
representationavailabletotheAmericanpubliccontrastswithBritain,wherepeople
haverelativelylittlesayoverwhorepresentsthem,prospectiveparliamentary
candidatesbeingchosenfromthetopdown.Openprimarieswouldencouragebottom-
uppoliticalengagement.
Neitherhavepoliticalpartiesbeenslowtorecognisethevalueoftheinternetand
bloggingtoengagewiththepublic.FromConservativeHometo‘WebCameron’,the
internetismakingpoliticsmoreaccessibletomorepeople.Ithaspulledsome18-to
25-year-oldsintopolitics.ThroughtheblogosphereandTwitterposts,publicinterest
andscrutinyofpoliticianshasneverbeengreater.Politicalpartiesneedtoembracethis
potential,notresistit.
66
Reform
‘No’tostatefunding
Thepublicfinancesarealreadyinaperilousstate,evenbeforetheGovernment
commitstonewexpenditure.Statefundingofpoliticalpartieswouldbevery
unpopular,aspeoplealreadyfeelthatdemocraticstructurestaketoomuchoftheir
money.Itwouldresultinpoliticiansbecomingincreasinglydisconnectedfromthe
electorateandtheirownmembers.Thenecessitytocontinuallyraisefundsfromthe
Britishpublicdrivesthe‘permanentcampaign’.Partiesmustconstantlymaketheir
caseforsupportandensurethatpoliticianswillneverstopworkingwithandforthe
public.
Wemust,however,striveforfairelectioncampaigns.Stateregulationofcampaign
spendingwouldnotdamagegrassrootsengagementbutwouldkeeppoliticalpartieson
anevenfinancialfooting.WhofundseachattemptbypoliticalpartiestotakeoverUK
PlcisnotthebiggestchallengefacingBritishdemocracy.Weneedtomakepartiesand
MPsperformwiththefundingtheyhave,notgivethemmore.
Conclusion
Ifthereformsandideasdiscussedabovearetoresultinrealchange,theymuststretch
beyondParliamentandWhitehallinordertodelivertransparencyandaccountability
acrosstheboard.Reform’sreportAnewreality:GovernmentandtheIPODgeneration
indicatedthatthe18to34agegroup,describedas‘Insecure,Pressurised,Over-taxed
andDebt-ridden’,donotknowwhattheirtaxesarespentonorwheretolookforthis
information.Theywantmorereciprocal,non-hierarchicalandtransparentauthority
relationships(ReformandIpsos-Mori2008).
Constitutionalreformneedstodelivertransparencyandaccountabilityingovernment
andpublicservices.Toomuchishappeninginpoliticsthatpeoplehavenosayover,or
worse,noknowledgeof.Thepublic’svoicehasbeenlostinthegauzeofnewsprintand
angrypressuregroups.Itistimetorefocusthepoliticalsystemonthepeopleitis
supposedtoserve.Onlythroughconstitutionalreformatalllevelscanwerejuvenate
ourdemocraticsysteminorderforParliamenttoovercomeitsdecliningpopularityand
restoreitsrelationshipwiththevoters.
NickBosanquetisaConsultantDirectoratReform.
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www.totalpolitics.com/magazine_detail.php?id=493
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