Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and
MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this
petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on
November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads: 4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new
one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered
under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want
of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for
the issuance of a decree be issued.

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over
648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. 6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction."
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD
1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G").
Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the
 instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice
of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides: 8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose;
the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the
Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the
same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume
jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally
infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that
the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. 9

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding —

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official
Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to
comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation
is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and
present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any
party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.

The Court's Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing
reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. —

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to
all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a
certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the
due process rationale behind the publication requirement.

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon
the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule
in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in
the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the
Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing
by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the
law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed
provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly
be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be
barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner
seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence
not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the
applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the
application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property
is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and
opportunity to oppose.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have
already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is
not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be
owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents
did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. 19 There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must
be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly
complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,

vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO
PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S.
PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual,
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court
and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:

Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
 Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to
wit:

Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by
the following:

Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate
estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of
Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own
knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband

Digest: People v. Mapa (GR L-22301, 30 August 1967)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas , digests
 

People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967  (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur

Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14
August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession
of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the
lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one
year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental
duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision
made for a secret agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the
extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a
‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the
present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

 

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116719             January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248,
in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with
said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:

MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH PENETRATION
TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE
COLON.

thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
because of the timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.

(p. 1, Rollo.)

to which he pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime of murder,
to wit:
 That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed
with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his
death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.

(p. 3, Rollo.)

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the accused
is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the
amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

(p. 32, Rollo.)

Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial court in
imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.

The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General and as
borne out by the evidence, are as follows:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located at No. 166-
A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home,
situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn
Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son, who were all seated at the front seat beside
him while a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5;
TSN, March 31, 1992)

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota
Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital,
Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw was
heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the comer of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991,
p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and operated
by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.

Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera
and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada
who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)

Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not looking," to which Virgilio retorted,
I did not see you". (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 16)

While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a passenger of
Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and
advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)

A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him not to
interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)

Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is it you?" With a
ready answer Benito said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese,
wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)
 Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapsed of about one minute,
Patricio returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once again, "You are a Chinese, is it
not?" To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)

Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a five inch
knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by pushing
Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the
injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced him and
thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (ibid.
pp. 8, 10, 22)

It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare her father
tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid. p. 10)

Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted
for help, since there were already several people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her
consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father lay
seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side of his body that she was able to open
the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)

After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own blood,
embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several
people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)

Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she was not able to
overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the
Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended
to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)

While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed
wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU
and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)

In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila and
was directly confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito
expired. CAUSE OF DEATH — SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has already
circulated in the blood all over the body. (ibid. pp. 6-7)

(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No.
7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of
murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing
happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from
death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision,
ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)

The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muñoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989])
thusly:

In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death
penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua," thereby eliminating death as the original
maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Atencio, divided the
modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in
People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that
the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III,
Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be
said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The
majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the
more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and
thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium.
These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by
the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and,
if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain
enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, for its interpretation.

xxx       xxx       xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to
prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also
meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the
death penalty.

It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section
19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have
been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its
meaning.

One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the
personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said
another or — strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.

The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the
unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the
Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it
is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its
mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for
the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid
once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden
path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a
new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we
hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced
by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1)
does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of
the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
 The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death
penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance
will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty
than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question
of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who
was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in
the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the hoe
jurisdiction of the court over the person. An appearance may be madt agree with me for a penny?

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by
statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and
have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We
should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted
and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for
each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity
for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in
line with the present policy.

(at pp. 120-125.)

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz (216
SCRA 476 [1992]).

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads
for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding
their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the
executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na

kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang
gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa
'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.

Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own

merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam
kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka
puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang
mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka
ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

 ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan
mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka

na. Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October
6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No.
4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation
and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person
other than a participant to the communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order
of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense,
the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that
the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those
involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of
R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a
"private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent
was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties
to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of
R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not
appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but
by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but
would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor,
that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence
to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without
the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should
know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

 Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where
a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the
people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are
being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks
of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what
is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if
a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the
speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does
not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded
as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings
or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the
bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact
that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the
privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless
 to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations
between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found
in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held
that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other
things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are
acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of
two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and
his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was
apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal of
the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico
Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting,
but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the
crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of
compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue
of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the
claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a
result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that
he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his resolution
dated March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and
imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment."
In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of
the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in
effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides
for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the
question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the
claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court.
Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere
fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in
itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment
for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for
conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such
proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he
be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must be
given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is
contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be
given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the
provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who
was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his
conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these
reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but
because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the
evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient
to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with
homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless
the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case to pay the
accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his
liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to compensation
under sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of the accused
but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with
guilt," 4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed
to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly
convicted." As this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we
are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of
innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved
him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. 5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than
with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his
conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust.
That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for
compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of
the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be
shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted
without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and
care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly
imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its
inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also
wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the
required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable
guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust
judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had
reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of
Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that.
Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or say anything on
the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have committed any act
at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito
Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes
charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that
conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit
murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the
coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the
said crimes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the dark shadows of that
night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and other
circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the
fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer
be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold
that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave
abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, 
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
 
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would mean
the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was
Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities.
The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara,
indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with
Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often
recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders
airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud
petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company reglations by
involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a
witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of
the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under
preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to,
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include
illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and
disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate
private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would
have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral
damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution dated December
29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the
backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two
(2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as
technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated
with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders
airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances,
preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation.
By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges
she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's
property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.  5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she was
promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of
October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went
directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a
chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual separation
from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not merely lost
her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due
process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized
by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further than the
1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it
was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good."8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social
Justice,viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights.  9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford  full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled tosecurity of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall
also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be
provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of
Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State is mandated to
protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give
primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore
accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to the present
formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on
Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special
importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social
justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor Code,
it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause
provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor
enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor
Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved
employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this
liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took
effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full
backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the
former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the
word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed"  15 and in the
latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,
would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming and
the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the
case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of
time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the
employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best
interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which
make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere
of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and
the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or solely
separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is
clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . .
and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-
meaning rule or  verba legis  derived from the maxim index animi sermo est  (speech is the index of intention) rests
on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will
and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither
does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for
non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement
may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and
confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may
be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the employee is a
Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the
Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a
position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is
a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts.
by foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can
never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee
who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the
pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may have
created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits
its employees from involving themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently,
when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra
which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as
petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create a conflict of
interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement
of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing
basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies
and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held
countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some
basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and
suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it
"presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's
investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone
the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from
speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the
findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations'
support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar
might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on
May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained
obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of
Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been
unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated December
29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to
pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, 
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
 
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.  1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a
license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a
cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the
Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all
valid and legal claims  arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance
with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment
and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that
the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against the principal in
connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the
surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited
by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of
the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period
as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required
appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of
such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond  issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as
required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the
escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary
award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment
of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to
employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for
violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter
may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only
as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may
be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could
initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if
this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making
them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is
the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is
a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of
the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is
usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds
and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign
principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be
taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation,
the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the
earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but
we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4,
Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to
post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an
appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the
Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner, 

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF
OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES
INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN,  J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R.
SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition
for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:

On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan
and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 1548 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles
City.

On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and
stating  inter alia that:

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property
owing and belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any
other persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the
transfer of any property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1,
Comment).

Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid
order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner
herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the personal and real property which have
been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final determination of the petition
aforementioned." (Annex 3,  Ibid).

On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order
and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an
urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit
the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent
debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic) appealed in the
Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has
already shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused
to be investigated the real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan
and they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were already transferred
to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such development, it is their submission that
without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as early as
March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized.
(Annex "C").

On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the
insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer
certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex "D").

On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.

On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion
and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered
by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E").

On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real
properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil
Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which
properties were not redeemed within the period of redemption, respondent court issued an order
disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as
assignee of all the registered claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof,
the said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00
and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and discharge
his functions, as such.

The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of
course, of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals,
which the respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with
their principals, shall have already been reported.

The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in
the actual or constructive custody and management of the receiver previously
appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under
this actual or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as
the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having become
a superfluity. (Annex "F").

On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946,
issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to
issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").

In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of
television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro
Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of the
petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on
attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of
spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry
of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").

On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private
respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and
severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14%  per annum from October 12, 1979
until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment).
After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and executory, a
writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981,
respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos.
18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly
issued in its favor.
 On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor
of petitioner.

On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things,
that subject motion is improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the
insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos.
18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the
determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is
devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a
coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").

Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed
extended order with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in
pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby
denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to
participate in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by the
duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").

On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition
forcertiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid
petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated July 1, 1986.

Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI  IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION

ONLY; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY
OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the
insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:

Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall,
by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the
real and personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers
relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation
of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the assignee, although the same
is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to
vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It
shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced
within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set
aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior
to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on attachment
against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No.
35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City,
Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance
of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties
overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:

Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of
proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the
plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the
property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that
the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was
issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and
pursuant to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties
in its name.

Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency
Law is very clear — that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any
action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30)
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period —
one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the
insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of
the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is
proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut
maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its
every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious
with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent
transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the
case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70
contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming
within the orbit of their operation.

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of
respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in
the insolvency proceedings.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil Case
No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which were
not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable
by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET
ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course
and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.

Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.

Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and
application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.

The facts are undisputed.

The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by
virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The
said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on
December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the
property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of
P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas,
cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now
covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on
November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the
petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet,
Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.

For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was
instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held
on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public
auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of
Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private
respondent.

On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a
motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the
motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private
respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the
property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the
possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August
15, 1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private
respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and
instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal
offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private
respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.

Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of
a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying
their motion for reconsider consideration.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the petition; required
the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial
court and the private respondent from executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of
possession until further orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court:
 It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248,
was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the
property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year
period to repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been
dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be
the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4

xxx xxx xxx

Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold that the five-year period
of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of
reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the
property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31,
1984, the period had clearly expired.

In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their motion apparently went
for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this
petition.

Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to repurchase within
five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the
petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals  6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7

On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states that the sale of the
contested property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said
property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section
119 of the Public Land Act. 8

In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have the right to
repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the
question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.

We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do
so subsists.

Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of
five years from the date of the conveyance.

From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to
repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private
respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes
of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The
petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the
very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on
this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act,
in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be to
contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee
every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward
for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses
Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to
repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that
between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that the five-year
period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable
to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case.
In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the
question raised there was whether the five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the
date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has
become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore
understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title, ownership,
and, generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor  a retro to
repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.

The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present facts that are quite
identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either
through homestead or free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon
failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled
that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135
begins on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed
thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that the
mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on
February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to
repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within
the prescribed five-year period.

Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners
should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the
rate of one per centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes
on the property that the private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last named amount
at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7,
1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984
of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one
ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed
of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and
the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both
amounts up to November 17, 1983.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, 
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2
December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service
as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
 Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as
well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-
INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on
30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same;
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her
letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not
conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government
employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of
government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement.
Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed,
the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of
the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special
projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like.
There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.

xxx xxx xxx 2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:

xxx xxx xxx

We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of
satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be
on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date
of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in the coverage.

Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the
service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall
sustain its original decision.

xxx xxx xxx 3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she
is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:

It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1
requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status.
Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1,
implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:

"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:

a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform

specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in
Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.

b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of

the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).

c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the
service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with
 pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an
amended, or vice- versa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this
law and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation

from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided
that if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period
for the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if
acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by
the head of office concerned."

Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a
full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service
Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the
Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683
with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A
and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be
similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of
Republic Act No. 6683, because:

1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative
Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control
Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31
December 1988, after which petitioner's position became  functus officio.

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She
belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on
the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can
expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under
the GSIS law.

3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term
of office (i.e., duration of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but
reorganization5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the
purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will
not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period.
This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits
just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the
WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to
define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).

Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October
1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely
includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in
the public sector.

The appointment status of government employees in the career service  is classified as follows:

1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is
made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof; 7

2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available. 8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in
scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate
merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental

or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration
of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.

Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal
or confidential staff;

4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a

special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available
in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed
one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a
minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.

5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

There is another type of non-career employee:

 Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic
and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)

Consider petitioner's record of service:

Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer

holding emergencystatus with the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24
March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with temporary status on the same project.
On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1
January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated
Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management
& Erosion Control Project) retaining the status oftemporary employee. While with this project, her
designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the
status became permanent  until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The
appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the
Project.

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is,
they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project
(CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).

Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service.

Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission
is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees
of the national government;

WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services by
an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are
considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered
oncontractual, emergency  or casual status are non-creditable services;

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual,
emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the
Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or
casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as
creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)

1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or

other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary
proof of said services;

2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the
effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and
fulfill the service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or
contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989
CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous  with the NIA projectwhich in
turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee—

(3) Co-terminous status  shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized
by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent
with his tenure.
 The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-existent with the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or
subject to the availability of funds for the same;

b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-existent

with the tenure of the appointing authority.

c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-existent with the

appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of
the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and

d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" —

the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is
deemed abolished.

It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is
the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the
appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific
period.

A co-terminous employee  is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid

reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted
that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual andemergency  employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not
have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these
legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al.  v.  NLRC, et al.,  16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-
hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years.
Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

. . . In  Felwa vs.  Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class. 17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we
to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should
not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication  which holds that:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always
an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to
be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future.
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction
used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
 its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to
include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser,
expressed in the Maxim,  in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman
Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1)
year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is
irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire
under this, then he is covered.

It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the
Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified
group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:

Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total
of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term "contractual
employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a
limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected output.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated
positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the
officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have
to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-
terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement
presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early
retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by
granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in
such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of
excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be
included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which
need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual  or co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil
Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-
terminous personnel  who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social
legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants"  22 After all, co-terminous
personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with
the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner
had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she
originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice,
her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981

CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants, 

vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES, INC.,respondents-
appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (½%) realty tax imposed by the City of Manila.

Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the
annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1-½ %).

On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on
January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum  on the assessed value of real property in
addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall
not exceed a maximum of three per centrum.

That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three percent. So, by
means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third
quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads:

SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short a total of three
percent (3%) realty tax  (1-½% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act No.
5447; and ½% per this Ordinance) on the assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.

Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent realty tax for the
third quarter of 1972 on its land and machineries located in Manila.

On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the said
amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter
nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).

After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to
Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).

The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax.

The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax ordinance is still in force; that
Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a two percent tax on commercial real
properties (like the real properties of Esso and that that two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special
Education Fund Law gives a total of three percent realty tax on commercial properties.

Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981, revealed that up to this
time it has been paying the additional one-half percent tax and that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of
P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real properties.
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No.
464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not
less than one half of one percent but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property".

Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special Education Fund in
addition to the basic two percent realty tax.

So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under the Real Property Tax
Code. What is in controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax for the two-year period
from the third quarter of 1972 up to the second quarter of 1974.

We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that the
additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law
that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.

The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part
of it as that which is expressed" (In re  McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).

While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the other hand, the
1968 Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as the maximum  real property tax of which one
percent would accrue to the Special Education Fund.

The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations.
Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent  the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.

And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax at two percent  confirms
the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed
intention of the questioned ordinance.

In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the Special Education
Fund Law refers to a contingency where the application of the additional one percent realty tax would have the
effect of raising the total realty tax to more than three percent and that it cannot be construed as an authority to
impose an additional realty tax beyond the one percent fixed by the said law.

At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact remains that the city charter
fixed the realty tax at 1-½% and the later law, the Special Education Fund Law, provides for three percent as the
maximum realty tax of which one percent would be earmarked for the education fund.

The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional one-half percent realty
tax since the contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not arise in the City of Manila.

It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy a tax should be expressly
granted and should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to impose a realty tax is not controverted.
What is disputed is the amount thereof, whether one and one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep.
Act No. 2264.)

As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code,
in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the
pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for
recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14129             August 30, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

RESOLUTION

REGALA, J.:

This resolution refers to a motion for reconsideration filed by the counsel for defendant-appellee, Guillermo
Manantan.

Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court's ruling in the main case. He concedes that a
justice of the peace is covered by the prohibition of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes exception
to the dispositive portion of this Court's ruling promulgated on July 31, 1962, which reads:

For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is
remanded for trial on the merits.

It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of remanding the case to the lower court for trial
on the merits is to place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of this
Court to the fact that when the charge against him was dismissed by the lower court, jeopardy had already
attached to his person. To support his claim, he cites the case of People vs. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 27,
1960.

Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of
double jeopardy. When the government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could
have raised that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his
brief, he could have argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion did he do so. He
must, therefore, be deemed to have waived his constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court's
ruling in the cases of People vs. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16, 1961 and People vs. Pinuila, G.R.
No. L-11374, May 30, 1958, hereunder quoted:

. . . defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a discussion of the merits of the appeal.
Thus, she not only failed to question, in her brief, either expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution
to interpose the present appeal, but also, conceded in effect the existence of such right. She should be
deemed, therefore, to have waived her aforementioned constitutional immunity.1äwphï1.ñët

It is true that in People vs. Hernandez (49 O.G. 5342), People vs. Ferrer, L-9072 (October 23, 1956),People
vs. Bao, L-12102 (September 29, 1959) and People vs. Golez, L-14160, we dismissed the appeal taken by the
Government from a decision or order of a lower court, despite defendant's failure to object thereto.
However, the defendants in those cases, unlike the defendant herein, did not file any brief. Hence, they had
performed no affirmative act from which a waiver could be implied. (People vs. Casiano, supra).

In his appeal brief, appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy, confining himself as
he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that defense
may be waived, and, that  failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of
double jeopardy.(People vs. Pinuila, supra).

There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for reconsideration. The Court, however,
does not believe that they were well taken.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it is hereby, denied.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and
SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA
AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
 
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735
covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625
hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).

On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located
at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the
land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has
an area of three hundred eighty-three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title
issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they
discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed
Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which
leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.

Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain
irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds
of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of
the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or
basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735
allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are
included therein.

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from
proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in
lieu of oral argument.

The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the
issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No.
735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it might
have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom
was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all
decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65
SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or
incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez
and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil.
615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity
Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs.
Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in
Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer
open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the
court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc.
vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case
No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR CACPAL,
CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of the Intermediate Appellate
Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and ordering
the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner. The
focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the
said bond. In the Resolution of September 25, 1985 2 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course
to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint
of.

The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum
of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency
of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon
the posting of a supersedeas bond. 3 The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4 thru
petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.

On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and judgment is
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Varian Industrial Corporation, and the
latter is hereby ordered:

1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12% interest per
annum from the date of default until fully paid;

2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;

3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for attorney's fees; and
 5. To pay the costs of suit.

Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for
execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. Varian was required to file its
comment but none was filed. In the Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the execution pending
appeal as prayed for. 6 However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the
previously attached personal properties upon demand. In a Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent
Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. 7 In compliance with
the Resolution of August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment. 8 In the Resolution
of September 12, 1985, 9 the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this action.

It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for reconsideration of the
questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a general rule a motion for reconsideration has been
considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply when special
circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It has been held further that a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had been ordered and the need for relief
was extremely urgent. 11

The counterbond provides:

WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was issued against abovenamed
Defendant;

WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order of attachment
issued against them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file a counterbond in the sum of
PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal and the PHILIPPINE
BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety, in consideration of the above and of the lifting or
dissolution of the order of attachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the
above Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY
(P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiff recovers
judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver the attached property so
released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be applied to the payment of the judgment,
or in default thereof, the defendant and Surety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of
the property released.

EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12

Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:

SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. — The officer executing the order shall without delay attach,
to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the party against whom the
order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient
to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the
court from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount
sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the property
which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any judgement ment which he
may recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit
and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found within the province.

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. — At any time after an order of
attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person
appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who
granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order
discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing,
 order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the
attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where
the application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by
the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the
action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the
attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the
provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be
delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of
the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become,
insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond, the attaching
creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.

SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — If the execution be
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant
to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on such
counter- bond, and bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under
the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and
summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intended to secure the
payment of  "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it
provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of
thejudgment shall become charged on such counterbond."

The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as
provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third
paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment." Neither the
rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is
specified that it applies to the payment of any judgment  that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical
conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe
charged against such a counterbond.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.  Ubi lex non
distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos.  13 "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general
words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule
requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other
so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the
application of a statute where none is indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and
without regard to consequences. 17

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute
grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for
unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
residential, or mineral.19 Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any
exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be
interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.

All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as outlined in the case of Towers
Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart, 20

Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety on the
counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the principal debtor and
that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a
demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety be given
notice and a summary hearing on the same action as to his liability for the judgment under his
counterbond.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued on September 25,
1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April 28,
1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.

On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC
imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.

In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).

Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April
28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We dismiss the petition.

II

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every

candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the
election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of
all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.

No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the
statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails
to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
 Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in
connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an
administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging
from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of
the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall
be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the
offender.

It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal
delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates  residing in
his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and
expenditures.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine
shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the
discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification
to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).

To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated
on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and
Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:

Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements.

Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the
regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the
election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who
filed their certificates of candidacy  with them to comply with their obligation to file their
statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election
registrar shall also advise all candidates  residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation
(Emphasis supplied).

Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein
required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails
to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.

(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection
with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an
administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging
from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the
Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall
be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the
offender.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine
shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of
the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold
public office.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures
because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing.
Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should
have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions
and expenditures.

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos  (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150
SCRA 520 [1987]; cf  Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who
pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348
categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."

Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute
implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in
favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).

The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of
the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures
of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made
for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus,
laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec.
4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166,
Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).

Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the
United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of
statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also
regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 287). These laws are designed to
compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the
improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections §
289). These statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the
contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of
Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).

State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel.
Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky.
423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)

It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too
remote.

It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have
received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is
in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a
candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending
obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."

Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever
civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his
candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and
ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
 
PARAS, J.:p
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision * of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc.
and Roberto Z. Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on
account or for value a Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987,
payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check when presented to the
drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the
reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to
pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner
moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic
Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:
Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made
payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside
thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks
drawn against current accounts in foreign currency.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by respondent court
in its order dated September 6, 1988, and which reads:
Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by
the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.
The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in
foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p.
1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The
Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp.
20-22).
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September
6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he contended:
(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a
foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not
contemplated extending its coverage over dollar accounts;
(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private transaction
between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be legally paid in dollars as it
would violate Republic Act No. 529; and
 (c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void and is not
enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such premises, petitioner
concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check cannot be said to have violated the provisions
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p.
6) but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
Hence, this petition. In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p.
81).

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in
question.

The petition is without merit. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that
is, for hearing and deciding cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the
action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned.
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:
Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof
occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it
was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the
offense charged.
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487
[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information."
The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila
and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of
People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the
issuance of the check."
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People
vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December
15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2) the place
where the check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was
executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to
its consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua,
October 28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero,
Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14).
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private
respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a
foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly
ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and
issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]).
More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil.
125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos,
82 SCRA 318 [1978]).
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to
whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully
sustains this view, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.
MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who
interpellated that any check may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are
talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our
currency, and many others.
THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a
check in whatever currency. This would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks.
The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If
drawn, then this bill will apply.
MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA.
JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO,
GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.
 
AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts,
applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the
latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor
more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information
against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay,
municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a
portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.
as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919,
accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land;
said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use
thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from
grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-
occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello
were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832,
1833 and 1839, respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9,
1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land
through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the
rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression
"with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner".
The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not
include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes
reference to the affluent class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of
merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble
shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions
in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated
October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications,
Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential
Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City
and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros
and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private
property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private
lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and
nefarious practice.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property.
It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of
public health, safety and peace and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in
this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to
forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy,
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such
public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any
other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by
the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still
remains in the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force
another to commit such acts.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case.
Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to
when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28
C.J.S. 1049-50).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 147749             June 22, 2006
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,* Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) assails
the July 19, 20001 and April 3, 2001 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59139.
SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and
other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total
amount of P8,182,182.852 representing deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax, 3 among other
deficiency taxes,4 for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller’s tax was imposed on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to
United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible
oil as manufactured products.

SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest
to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for review docketed as CTA Case No. 5423.
In its March 10, 2000 decision, the CTA cancelled SPMC’s liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the sales of
corn and edible oils but upheld the Commissioner’s assessment for the deficiency miller’s tax. SPMC moved for the
partial reconsideration of the CTA affirmation of the miller’s tax assessment but it was denied.
SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review of the CTA decision insofar as it upheld the
deficiency miller’s tax assessment. In its July 19, 2000 resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
principal ground5 that the verification attached to it was signed merely by SPMC’s chief financial officer ― without
the corporate secretary’s certificate, board resolution or power of attorney authorizing him to sign the verification
and certification against forum shopping. SPMC sought a reconsideration of the resolution but the same was
denied.

Hence, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed SPMC’s appeal?
SPMC contends that its appeal should have been given due course since it substantially complied with the
requirements on verification and certification against forum shopping. It insists on the liberal application of the
rules because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude
oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence,
not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates two exemptions from the miller’s tax: (a) the milled
products in their original state were actually exported by the miller himself or by another person, and (b) the milled
products sold by the miller were actually exported as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article by the buyer
or manufacturer of the milled products. The exportation may be effected by the miller himself or by the buyer or
manufacturer of the milled products. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled products, subsequently exported
said products, SPMC should be exempted from the miller’s tax.
The petition must fail.
Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals should be verified. A pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.6
Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 43 requires a sworn certification against forum shopping. 7 Failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.8

A corporation may exercise the powers expressly conferred upon it by the Corporation Code and those that are
implied by or are incidental to its existence through its board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and
agents.9 Hence, physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly
authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of directors. 10 In the absence of
authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the officers of the corporation, can bind the
corporation.11

SPMC’s petition in the Court of Appeals did not indicate that the person who signed the verification/certification on
non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. SPMC merely relied on the alleged inherent power of its chief
financial officer to represent SPMC in all matters regarding the finances of the corporation including, among others,
the filing of suits to defend or protect it from assessments and to recover erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even
admitted that no power of attorney, secretary’s certificate or board resolution to prove the affiant’s authority was
attached to the petition. Thus, the petition was not properly verified. Since the petition lacked proper verification, it
was to be treated as an unsigned pleading subject to dismissal. 12

In PET Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the Court upheld the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition on the
ground that the verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by PET Plans, Inc.’s first vice-
president for legal affairs/corporate secretary without any certification that he was authorized to sign in behalf of
the corporation.

In BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court ruled that the petition should be dismissed outright on
the ground that the verification/certification against forum shopping was signed by BPI Leasing Corporation’s
counsel with no specific authority to do so. Since the counsel was purportedly acting for the corporation, he needed
a resolution issued by the board of directors that specifically authorized him to institute the petition and execute
the certification. Only then would his actions be legally binding on the corporation. 15
In this case, therefore, the appellate court did not commit an error when it dismissed the petition on the ground
that it was signed by a person who had not been issued any authority by the board of directors to represent the
corporation.

Neither can the Court subscribe to SPMC’s claim of substantial compliance or to its plea for a liberal application of
the rules. Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate
the orderly administration of justice.16 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance
such as the requirement on non-forum shopping, 17 as well as verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction. 18
But even if the fatal procedural infirmity were to be disregarded, the petition must still fail for lack of merit.
As the CTA correctly ruled, SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s tax. Section
168 of the 1987 Tax Code provided:
Sec. 168. Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm
oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories. Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central and
mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a tax equivalent to
three percent (3%) of the gross value in money of all the rope, sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava flour or starch,
dessicated coconut, manufactured, processed or milled by them, including the by-product of the raw materials
from which said articles are produced, processed or manufactured, such tax to be based on the actual selling price
or market value of these articles at the time they leave the factory or mill warehouse: Provided, however, That this
tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or
manufactured and dessicated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated
coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and
are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or
part of any manufactured article or products: Provided further, That where the planter or the owner of the raw
materials is the exporter of the aforementioned milled or manufactured products, he shall be entitled to a tax
credit of the miller's taxes withheld by the proprietor or operator of the factory or mill, corresponding to the
quantity exported, which may be used against any internal revenue tax directly due from him: and Provided, finally,
That credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes paid on raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall
not be allowed against the miller's tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory
as provided hereunder. (emphasis supplied)
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied
only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their
original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of
the factory or by the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it
provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the
manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not
within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code.
SPMC’s proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption
must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the State has granted in express
terms all it intended to grant and that, unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor
would be intended beyond what was meant. 19
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its
effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
language of the statute cannot be placed therein. 20 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.21
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. 22 Its application in this case is
consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim
for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and
Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented
by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.
 
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners,

Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias,
Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of
the National Center for Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify
Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in
the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-
21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-
ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed
against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest
partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).

On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes
to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring
developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, the
STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p.
177).

On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1,
1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association
submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in
said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-
267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case
No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).

The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:

(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy,
ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7,
1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order
(Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and
outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings
(Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).

On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent
Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached to Rollo without
pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).

On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a)
"despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status quo,
respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the
clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of
petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c)
respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension
and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in
violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992
immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached to
Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-614 thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status which
preceded the present controversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the
petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their
respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of
their respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully entitled
to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain
from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until
further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).

On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental
Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no
direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government
official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions
have not been met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the
Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees connected with his office. Petitioners also refuted
private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollo without
pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to Lift
Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman
but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by
the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which
case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.

Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the
Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension
of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the
preventive suspension himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have
inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
 Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct
powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against public officials or employees at
fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel
compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that
what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or
employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
"suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure.
Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co
Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and
employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive
suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to
conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or
destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman
should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively
suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if
a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of
an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code
prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler,
140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task
committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with
procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution.
Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the
charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal,
then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who
are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee under
his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with
preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or
employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or
employees, in his bureau or under his authority."

However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service
Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the Department
Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was
deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions
that the proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).

The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read
"suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be
deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or
employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and
employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office" or in other
offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the
respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent
should be placed under preventive suspension.

In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the
charges against them during the preliminary conference and even after petitioners had asked for the
disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General
contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public
officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned order remains null and
void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December
3, 1992, pp. 11-19).

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even
without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner
therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not preventively suspend him before he could file his
answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by
holding that the suspension meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are heard . . . (Nera
v. Garcia., supra).

There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive
suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees under
investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence
of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of
guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the
Ombudsman issued the order of preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the
administrative complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the
charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of
harassment by petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complainant and the respondents in the administrative case
agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-
348).

Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted
with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the
Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing
their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the
Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was
filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were
legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of
their clients.

On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents
hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions,
etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp.
4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written,
must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral
attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive
language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the
court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat
than light.

The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to
questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges
and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart
from the present special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into
between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. The facts stipulated
upon read:
a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before January 21,
1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24,
1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of collection;
f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was
dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this case.

At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of Exhibits "A," "B" and
"C." At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence
and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted
petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. 1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:
The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985,
which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.

Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the
pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and
signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases
are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil.
820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978,
84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs.
Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).

The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the
lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because
Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should
have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to
submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the
accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused
cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.

Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be
presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an
attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613
[1928]).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED
and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of
evidence.
SO ORDERED.