Summary of Berkeley on Visual Language

A. The first step in the argument is the analysis of vision. The analysis can be roughly summarized in this
way:

1. We see distance.
2. We do not see distance in itself, nor by necessary connections.
3. Therefore we see distance mediately, i.e., by signs (this is what distance cues, like faintness, size,
and position are).
4. The same goes for all visual phenomena except light and color (size, situation, motion).
(Berkeley supports this by giving analyses of how we see things by signs, e.g., seeing distance or
size with the help of the fuzziness or faintness of the object, or the feel of our eye-muscles.)
5. The objects of sight (visual ideas) and the objects of touch (tangible ideas) are entirely
heterogeneous. (As far as their proper objects are concerned, there is nothing common to them
both. We do not feel visual sensations, or anything resembling them, and we do not see tactile
sensations, or anything resembling them.)
6. Visual ideas are related to tangible ideas in ways that are arbitrary, i.e., not necessary, but that also
can be discovered by experience and custom. (There is a connection between vision and touch.
They correlate, but not by resemblance.)
7. Visual ideas are useful for predicting (being signs of) tangible ideas. (This is important for
staying alive, since it is the way we avoid dangers and find the necessities of life.)
8. Visual ideas are capable of extremely complex and coherent sign-relationships with tangible
ideas. (We find this in analyzing our own experience.)

The basic point of Berkeley's theory of vision: Vision is a complex system of learned arbitrary reference.

B. The second part of the argument is recognizing the characteristics of a language. That is, what makes
something a language? We can cull the following from Berkeley's various comments on this subject.
(There are, of course, other ways to categorize them.)

1. Sign-relationships: Languages are semiotic.

2. Rules: The signs used in language are governed by a learnable syntax or grammar.
3. Usefulness: Languages are constructed for pragmatic purposes; they are means designed to fit
various ends. (Note that this means that linguistic rules are arbitrary, i.e., non-necessary, because
they are for particular sorts of purposes.)
4. Coherent Complexity: Languages must have enough signs and rules, organized in a relatively
unified way, if they are to serve our practical needs.

Or, to put it another way: Language is a complex system of learned arbitrary reference.

C. The third part of the argument consists in arguing that because vision meets all the essential conditions
of language, it is sufficiently language-like to be considered a language. (There is an analogy between
vision and language, and it is strong enough us to consider vision to be a language.)

1. Vision involves signs. (from A3 and A4)

2. Vision involves rules. (from A6)
3. Vision has a pragmatic purpose (again, note that this means that the sign-connections of vision are
arbitrary or non-necessary). (from A7)
4. Vision has coherent complexity. (from A8)
Or in other words, vision is a language because it is a complex system of learned arbitrary reference.

Analogy is one of Berkeley's favorite modes of argument, one at which he is exceptional; and he regularly
champions the value of it. The idea behind it, as he says in an early Guardian essay, is "that maxim of
common sense, That men ought to form their judgments of things unexperienced from what they have
experienced; he calls this the "natural rule of reasoning from analogy."

D. The fourth step in the argument consists in recognizing that languages express minds.

Consider the problem of other minds: How do we know that the other people we meet are really people,
with real minds, and not just automata? Language (in a broad sense including intelligent communicative
behaviors like gestures, facial expressions, etc.) has been a standard answer since Descartes. Berkeley
himself links the discussion to the problem of other minds.

E. The fifth step in the argument consists in combining C and D to hold that the language of vision
expresses a mind.

This is required by 'parity of reason': since vision is like a language, we must reason about the two in the
same way unless we have clear reason not to do so. Languages in general express minds; vision is a
language; therefore, we must say, if we have no good, explicit reason for thinking otherwise, that vision
expresses a mind.

F. The sixth step in the argument consists in recognizing that this mind would have to be what is called
the Author of our nature, i.e., God. Or in other words: Vision is "the universal language of the Author of
nature."

So we have Berkeley's argument that God can be proved to exist from a correct theory of vision. It is a
tricky argument to follow, but immensely clever. It is also the platform on which Berkeley builds his
surprisingly powerful philosophy of science.

Copyright (c) 2008 by Brandon Watson. All rights reserved. This summary may be copied and circulated
freely, in printed or digital form, provided that this notice of copyright is included with the copied text.