UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI BOLOGNA DIPARTIMENTO DI FILOLOGIA CLASSICA E MEDIOEVALE CENTRO DI STUDI RETORICI E GRAMMATICALI PAPERS ON GRAMMAR Xx EDITED BY GUALTIERO CALBOLI HERDER EDITRICE ROMA 2008Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of Ayo" Donna Shalev in fond and respectful memory of Prof. Haim B. Rosén, with whom I first read the Poetics in Arabic L Austin to Aristotle and Back: Grammar and Logic When John Austin first gave his William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1955, lectures which were subsequently published in his renowned How to Do Things with Words, he ascribed the ideas there to the year 1939, noting the place of their first appearance, the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. The first lecture in Austin’s fundamental book opens with a discussion of the essence of the concept ‘statement’ and in particular with the essence of the common space between philosophers and grammarians, as may be seen, in fuller context, in passage (1) below: (1) LL. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Lecture 1): “It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely. Grammarians, indeed, have regularly pointed out that not all ‘sentences’ are (used in making) statements: there are, traditionally, besides (grammarians’) statements, also questions and exclamations, and sentences expressing commands or wishes or concessions. And doubtless philosophers have ” This paper develops thoughts arising from my presentation of theories of discourse in antiquity, in a paper read (in Hebrew) in June, 2004 in Jerusalem, on the occasion of the retirement of Shoshana Blum-Kulka. The current paper focuses more closely on the reflexes of Aristotelian (and other) definitions in the Arabic tradition, and is partly funded by ISF Grant 1266/05. I would like to thank colleagues from the Hebrew University, in the Depts. of Classics, of Arabic Language and Literature, of Philosophy, and of Jewish Thought, who patiently discussed points with me.244 Donna Shalev not intended to deny this, despite some loose use of ‘sentence’ for ‘statement’. Doubtless, too, both grammarians and philosophers have been aware that it is by no means easy to distinguish even questions, commands, and so on from statements by means of the few and jejune grammatical marks available, such as word order, mood, and the like: though perhaps it has not been usual to dwell on the difficulties which this fact obviously raises. For how do we decide which is which? What are the limits and definitions of each?” In his fluent manner, Austin already here recalls what is on offer beyond the statement, according to the grammarians (“questions and exclamations, and sentences expressing commands or wishes or concessions”). Austin’s following words imply that the grammarians did in fact recognize the plurality of acts that are involved in sentences, and indeed he sets up an opposition between this and between philosophers’ analyses in practice, where they do not exclusively mean “statement” when they use the term “sentence”. After Austin admits the com- plex nature of identifying sentences that are not statements (“it is by no means easy to distinguish even questions, commands, and so on from statements”), he focuses on a philosophical treatment, and naturally, unfolds his well-known breakthroughs.” To my mind, the terms “grammarians” and “philosophers” in passage (1) above are loaded: they point to a tension between formal criteria and criteria of meaning and function — less dependent on form, more amenable to abstraction and generalization. All the same, there is no escaping the fact that Austin’s examples are mostly from English,” and he does use the semantics of verbs in defining the speech acts which verbs signal.” Is it possible that Austin is hinting * Precursors for the concept ‘performative’, and a consistent terminology — perhaps Austin’s most well-known breakthrough but one not discussed in our current study — have been suggested in the medieval and later Arabic tradition, in a broad range of disciplines, in the reading of Larcher (1993) under the term ‘insha’ and its derivatives. ? There is also an example from Classical Greek (a quotation on p. 9 of Euripides, Hippolytus 62, and from other languages (e.g. Latin, p. 65). Likewise it is well worth remarking Austin’s sensitivity to cultural differences (rather than the blind universalism found in the work of many theoreticians), as it shines through from his examples and their discussion. * Leech elaborates on this in chapter 9 of his book Principles of Pragmatics.Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of Ayo 245 here, among other things, at Aristotle and his many commentators? At the Stoic thinkers on language (who forged flexible relations between the formal category mood and the function and intention of an expression’)? Is he giving expression to ripples of the debate between logic and grammar which have reverberated since medieval times under the widening influence of Aristotle’s Organon? The early stages in the evolving continuum from Aristotelian logic to Austinian speech act theory have been charted and surveyed in the exemplary studies of Schenkeveld (1984) — to whom I owe much in this discussion - of Nuchelmans (1973) for later Western tradition, and of Versteegh (1977) for the transition into Arabic culture. The tension between grammarians and philosophers lived on in the Arabic tradition as a dynamic debate between upholders of traditional Arabic philology, and innovating, universalizing logic. The debate, as played out in the belletristic tradition by two illustrious figures in 10° century Baghdadi intellectual circles,’ has received richly-textured attention in the work of Endress,” of Mahdi (1970) and others in their wake. We will see in the texts below that along with philosophers and grammarians, others were entered into the foray: from dramatic and oratorical performers (in the Greek tradition) to theological dialecticians (the ‘mutakallimiin’ of the Arabic tradition). * Cf. E.g. Pinborg (1975: 91) on the Stoic division by meaning — as opposed to a category that is grammatically identifiable, For Aristotelian classification “almost coinciding with the division into grammatical moods” see Versteegh (1977: 146 with note 144) and his reference to Steinthal. * The debate took place in 932 AD (320 after the Hijra) in the salon of Ibn al-Furat, vizier of the caliph al-Mugtadir. The Christian translator and logician Abii Bisht Matta ibn Yinus (unsuccessfully) defends logic in the attack of the theological dialectician (mutakallim, practicer of kalam) and philologist/grammarian Abii Sa‘id as-Sirafi. It is documented, inter alia, in the belletristic texts in dialogic format by Abii Hayyn at- Tawhidi, in the “eighth night” (1, 108-128, Cairo edition) of the collection of conversational soirées called On Pleasure and Conviviality. ° His most well-known work on this debate was published in 1986, but important contributions were made by Endress much earlier. The broader chronological and textual context of this debate has been surveyed in the monograph of Elamrani-Jamal (1983), with translations giving non-Arabists access to important texts.246 Donna Shalev The flexible and internally varied list of forms and modes of speech within the traditional treatments, and speech acts and speech act types as suggested by Austin himself in (1) above, ultimately gelled into a trinity of questions, commands and statements. These three modes recur consistently in many modern treatments of pragmatics, speech act theory, and grammar, as expressed in the terms of the respective fields. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) derive a tripartite scheme from their observations of discourse situations in the classroom, in which the initiating moves may be ‘statement’, ‘question’, or ‘command’;” Halliday and Hasan (1976) introduce ‘question’, ‘statement’ and ‘command”,’ as a framework for analyzing the structural and other cohesive ties between their three pairs of initiating and reactive moves (within a much larger study of mechanisms for cohesion, not necessarily in dialogue but limited to spoken modern English). Lyons (1977: Il §16.1) gives the statements, questions, and commands in terms of their functions, and Levinson (1983) in terms of sentence type, which are universal.” Exceptionally, the division in A Grammar of Contemporary English of Quitk et al. (1972: §7.53) breaks this scheme by adding the exclamation to the 0 statement, question and command." At the risk of prematurely exposing the material before its natural place in the discussion, I observe that in almost all the passages” listing and discussing ” Sinclair and Coulthard (1975: 26-28). These three situations are put into parallel with three discourse categories (informative, elicitation, and directive) as well as with three ‘grammatical categories (declarative, interrogation, and imperative). "Along with their respective reactions in Halliday and Hasan (1976: §4.4.3): question::response, statement::assent, and command::assent. * Levinson (1983: 242): “There are certain recurring linguistic categories that do need explaining, e.g., it appears that the three basic sentence types interrogative, imperative and declarative are universals...” Interestingly the section title (and it alone) pays lip service to the ‘holy trinity’ of statement, question and command. "ari, De int., in passage (4) below, does not include ‘question’ (but the commentators give all); Quint. JO, (8) below, does not include command; and al-Farabt in (11) below does not include ‘question’ (for his ‘request’, talab, see n. 56 below). The following passages will be discussed: D.L, 9.53 (2); D.L. 7.65-8 (3); Ari. De int. 16633ff (4); itsSpeech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of X4y0¢ 247 types or forms of speech’” in the variety of ancient traditions surveyed, in some form or another the three acts of ‘statement’, ‘question’, and ‘command’ (viz., declarative, interrogative and directive sentence types) recur consistently,” but not exclusively. What is interesting is which others are included, and in which traditions. The detailed sub-classification of ‘questions’, not only in the Stoic tradition, and the cross-over between ‘requests’ and ‘commands’, merit some comment; likewise the expression of these nuances in later tradition. In this study I examine the Arabic tradition. In the coming pages, extra attention will be devoted to the ‘statement’ type, its terms and definitions and their internal variety. Those which are somehow derived from or defined in terms of (or are otherwise related to) the statement or to the declarative form are most interesting, in particular the so-called (so- translated) ‘narration’, ‘response’, and the ‘exclamation’. In the Arabic tradition one must further address the influence of the expanded Organon on the choice of terms and the treatment of material in works such as the Poetics, all the while recalling the intellectual and cultural setting for these texts. medieval Arabic translation by Ishaq ibn Hunayn (ed. Pollak) (4”); Ari. Po. 1456b8ff (5); its medieval Arabic translation by Abii Bishr Matta ibn Yanus (edd. multi) (5°); Sa‘adia Ga’on Elements of Hebrew Poetry, Arabic introd. (6); Sincere Brethren Epistles 1.410 (7); Quint. 10 11.3.176 (8); Judah ha-Levi Kuzari 11.72 (9); Ammonius ad De int, 2.96 (10); al-FarabT ad De int., 51ff (ed. Kutsch-Marrow) (11). Other texts are introduced in the notes for comparison and contrast. ® ‘As Adyou, in passage (2) below, mubuévec Adyov (2); kext abtoredf (3); oxfpara AekEas in (5), and eX6n AGyoo in (9). In the Arabic tradition agsam al-gawl (6), agawil (4) and (7), ashkal al-maqiila (5°). Versteegh (1977: 147) refers to ‘andsir al-kalam, reminiscent of mo0uéves Adyav in (2) * Statement/declarative et sim.: @dcty in passage (2); d€ioua in (3); dnopavitxds ‘Abyos in (4, 9); St¥yMors in (5); hadith in (5"); Khabar in (6) and in (7); indicant in (8); djazim (4’), and in (10); enuntiativa in translations and commentaries of (4) by Boethius and Moerbeke. Command/directive et sim. &vtoAy (2, 5); moootaxtixds Adyos (3, 9), further along in (5) émitaktc; amr in (5’), in (6, 10) and all medieval Arab sources; imperativa in commentary of Boethius. Question/interrogative et sim.: éeérno1g in (2 - all three taxonomies) in (5); égérnia, miopa, éxanogntixdv nodypa in (3); Egatnrarixdg Aéyos"in (9); su’al in (5°) and in (7); mas’ala in (6); interrogant in (8).248 Donna Shalev I. _ Protagoras the First Inventor, Diocles the Stoic A figure from antiquity to whom general notions on discourse are ascribed is the Sophist and rhetorician Protagoras. It is true that his writings were not preserved, but we are familiar with the span and nature of his oeuvre through a fair body of ancient sources, as collected in Diels-Kranz’ Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. In Greek culture, with its penchant for invention and discovery, it was common practice to attach to suitable mythical, and historical, figures, the label ‘first inventor’, maGtoc edgery¢. It is in this context that one must understand the description by Diogenes Laertius of the ‘invention’ of the division of Adyog into types, and its ascription to Protagoras. Passage (2) below, a catalogue of innovations of Protagoras, is taken from Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers:”” (2) Diogenes Laertius, Lives 9.52-54: obtog medtog po8dv cicengdtato pvéc éxardv' xai meGtos WEEN YOdvov Srdgice xai xaLgow Sivayry EEeBero xai ASyov GyGvas éxorjoato xai cogiopata tois MeayHaTOoYOHaI mQOG- faye: xai thy Sidvorav dqeic neds tobvoua SeAéxOn xai td vov ém- nodaLov yévog THY EqroTixay éyéwnoev iva xai Tiwwy @noi negi abtod... 53. oBrog xal td Eaxgatixdy eiS0¢ tav Myov meGtos éxivnce. xai Tov “AvrioBévoug Adyov, TOV MELQGHEVOV dnoderxvberv tg obx EoTLy avriAEyeLv, odt0g motos Sieidexrar, xaO4 Qnor TAdtav év EdOvdipuc, xai medros xaréderée Tag mOds Thc Boer Enrxergioers, di Pow “Agrenibwgos 6 Biadextixds év ta Mgd¢ Xevdormnov. Kai nestog tiv xadovuévny THAN, &q’ jig Td Pogria BactdCovary, edgev, di gnaw ’ AgiototéAng év tai Tegi rardeias’ poguopdgos vag iv, a> xai “Enixougds rod prot. betdé te tov Rbyov nEGTOs cic TETTaQA’ EdxwAHV, EgdtnoL, EmbxQuary, EvTOLIV. oi 8% cic Enta Sutynow, égdtnow, andxguow, évtodhy, amayyediav, ebyody, xdjow, obc xai mOpévac cine Moyo.’ AAxtdduac 8& téTTagas yous Enot: Pdouv, andpacry, EQStnoLy, nosayogevoLv. ** On the inventor as a phenomenon in the ancient world, see the article by Thraede s.v. “Erfinder” in the Reallexikon fiir Antike und Christentum. In the context of language among the Greeks, and the figures of Prometheus and Palamedes, see Gera (2003, 123 ff). °° For Protagoras as arch-inventor in the language arts, from later ancient Greek sources, and the place of passage (2) above within the composition of those sources, see Shalev (2006); for the formulation of the narrative of Protagoras and others as founding figures in select Ancient Greek (and medieval Arabic) traditions, see Shalev (forthcoming).Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of A6-yog 249 “This man [Protagoras, D.S.] was the first to exact a fee of a hundred minae [for tutoring D.S.] and the first to distinguish the parts of time," to emphasize the importance of seizing the right moment, to institute contests in debating, and to teach rival pleaders the tricks of their trade. Furthermore, in his dialectic he neglected the meaning in favour of verbal quibbling, and he was the father of the whole tribe of eristical disputants now so much in evidence... He too first introduced the method of discussion which is called Socratic. Again, as we learn from Plato in the Euthydemus, he was the first to use in discussion the argument of Antisthenes which strives to prove that contradiction is impossible, and the first to point out how to attack and refute any proposition laid down: so Artemidorus the dialectician in his treatise In Reply to Chrysippus. ...He was the first to mark off the parts of discourse into four, namely, wish, question, answer, command; others [say he, D.S.] divided into seven parts, narration,” question, answer, command, rehearsal, wish, summoning; these he called the basic forms of speech, Alcidamas made discourse fourfold, affirmation, negation, question, address.” (transl. Hicks). In a broader context of the description of Protagoras as a founding figure in the technique and theoretical analysis of questions in discourse,"* he appears as the inventor of the taxonomy of speech types. Among the innovations and inventions of Protagoras in the language arts and in discourse, Diogenes includes the division of time into parts, timing, rhetorical contests, sophistic trickery and a variety of developments in genres of argumentation. Diogenes ision attributed to Protagoras, but this does not refers to two versions for the di minimize the fact that he is the father of this division, at least in a cultural, if not a purely historical conception. Likewise, from a retrospect of eight hundred years which separate the period of Diogenes from that of Protagoras, Diogenes adds to his ‘tradition’ an element of complexity, and a credible scientific aura, as it were, by mentioning an alternative founding figure, the sophist Alcidamas, "© In Hicks’ translation, “tenses of the verb”. I adopt here the interpretation in Dunn (2001). " Thus Hicks. This is not an ideal translation; although the term Suijynoug comes to mind, no connotation is felt of the Greek term’s rarer, technical use for ‘statement’ (on which see in particular discussion for (5) below). *® For emphasis in D.L. on language arts in his invention passages, see Shalev (2006: section 3, with conspectus).250 Donna Shalev whose list is of a different nature and orientation than either of the two lists ascribed to Protagoras. Diogenes’ account does not enter into illustration or correlation of the types of speech with formal sentence types, or with grammatical moods (pace Hicks, in a note ad locum). The subject at hand is elements of speech (rrv@névec Abyov). The interesting elements in the classifications ascribed to Protagoras are the inclusion of améxguoic and ebx6An in both the shorter and the longer lists (both of which also include Egdrnotc and évroAr) which go well beyond the modern (English-oriented) triad ‘question, command, statement’ described in section I. above. In fact, ‘statement’ (pdoic, Grdpavoic, anopavtixds Adyoc), as we expect it from our experience of Aristotle’s”” Organon and its derivatives is not represented in Protagoras; however, the ‘answer’ (dndxguatc) has affinities to the statement in some of its functions and essence, and — according to some ~" is formally germane to the declarative sentence type. In fact, two of the three” 26yot added in the longer list ascribed to Protagoras in passage (2) above — those termed duijynoic and énayyedia, are not commonly found in the repertoire of proposition theory presented in Greek logical texts, and the activity they imply is close to varieties of performance of descriptions and accounts. "° Although of course historically subsequent to Protagoras by more than a generation, Aristotle’s treatment, in the narrow, early Organon has long been considered more canonical and commands priority and influence. ® In my view, more work needs to be done on the formal characteristics of the sentence patterns used when performing the acts of response, assent, and consent, and on comparing and contrasting these patterns with declarative sentences in non-reactive moves. See Shalev (2003). " The act termed xAfjo1c does emerge under other terms: xAntixdg Adyog in Ammonius, passage (8) below; nid’ in (10) and (11), and possibly in (6) (where it has been interpreted as exclamatory); vocativa in Boethius’ commentary to (4) and a parallel t0 (8). * GmayyeMa is given as a terminus technicus in Emesti’s Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae, where, aside from equating it with AéEtc (elocutio), he cites it as a specific term for a historical account, from D.H. on Demosthenes. It is also used in (‘non-logical’) Aristotle, as a mode of presentation/delivery (c.g. Po. 6.1449b26). ItSpeech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of 2670S 251 ‘The chapter on Protagoras (whence his ist of AGyor) in Diogenes’ work appears among the chapters on Sophists. ‘An alternative tradition of division of speech types, in (3) below, is excerpted by Diogenes from Diocles of Magne- sia” in Diogenes’ Life of Zeno, in a sequent of chapters on Stoic philo- sophers. The terminology, reasoning, and examples are those associated with the Stoic theory of nexte @) from DL. Lives 7.65-68: déloua 86 dorw 8 Eorw Aas f YedBos fy modyua abrorehs drrompaveov foov 69" Eavtii otov fpéga Eort, Aiov megunatet cststement is that which is either true oF false, oF act complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself e.g, ‘It is day’s ‘Dion is walking’ ” (chry- sippus, Dialectical Definitions). sraipéoer 8° dEioua nat Egor xc qua re rooaToneTUay Hal BQnLHdY mak Garey wai OriodeTeAdy 7a ooaayopeutxy xai rodyua Guotoy ae ioport werhere is a difference between statement, Yes-no question, wh question, com- mand, oath, prayer, supposition, address, and quasi-statement”. _ ‘would be interesting what emerges from a collection and analysis of technical uses in the corpus of Rhetores graeci (e-8. Spensel) = ‘The ‘fragment’ of Diocles in D.L’s Life of Zeno of Citium begins VIL49, with the following introduction: “mai ate eri KEES AOnor Aroxnjig Méyvng év tHe “Emébgopit tov prhosdpov, aéyov obtas'--- Scholars such as Sandbach doubt the length of ‘the excerpt from Diocles, but ‘Schenkeveld (1984: 301 n. 23) includes our section within it. 2 Drovisionally defined in Schenkeveld (1984: 301) “contents of thought to be expressed in words”. 2% the content of (3) is an abridged version of the passage in D-L., in a list rather than continuous form. My translation often departs from Hicks’: ¢-8- ‘statement’ for his judgement’; more function-based terms Tor bis sentence-types or formal-based list interrogation, inquiry, imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative’. Further con, heavily indebted to Schenkeveld’s igcussion of this passage, T attempt in my translation of the individual treatments to put mo emphasis on the relationship between viterance and the act involved, as felt in the Greek wording of the Stoic analysis of tyPes of modryua or Rexroy. In general Gyn [translate as ‘act’. Sluiter (1997) also treats parts of this passage.252 Donna Shalev Giana yég Eotw 5 Aéyovtes énoparvdueda, Smeg A GAnNdés Eorry # tpedsoc. [Statement differs from the other acts expressed in sentence form] for a statement is [a sentence] which when we utter [it] we are performing an assertion, an [object of utterance] which is either true or false. Egdrmna 8 gorr nea abtotehic pév, dg xai Td dEioua, aityrxdy 8 Groxgiceuc, otov “&ga ye Téea éori;” A yes-no question is, like the statement, an act complete-in-itself, yet [unlike the statement, a verbal act] performing a demand for an answer (e.g. “Is it day?”); robto 88 obte GAnBs gorw obtE WedS0s' Hote tO pev “ipéga gotiv” GEiopa got, 1 88 “Goa ye twéga gotiv;” égdrnna. And this [ie. the yes-no question involving a demand for an answer] is neither true nor false; consequently the [utterance] “It is day” is a statement, whereas the [utterance] “Is it day?” — a yes-no question. mbopa 86 Bort MEGyHA MEd 6 GUEBOALXdS ox Zot aroxgiveddar, dg Eri Tod Eguthatos, Nai, GAG Set cinciv “oixet év chibe Ta Toman.” A wh question is an act to which it is not possible to reply in a token manner, as [one can reply] to a yes-no question [with a mere] vai, but [to a (wh) question such as “where does he live?””"] it is necessary to answer [more fully with] “he lives in such and such a place.” moostaxtixdy 8 éott moayua, 6 Abyovtes neoatécoopEV, olov “od HEV BédiCe tag én’ Ivdxou bode” A command is a [verbal] act which when we utter [it] we perform a command, e.g. [the utterance] “Go thou to the waters of Inachus” (Nauck Adesp. fr. 177). (The definition and example for the oath are missing in the text). 86 gott medyya 6 ei AEyor Tic, MeoGayogetor dv, olov Argei&n x0dtaTe, dvak dvégav’ Ayduepvov.” is a [verbal] act which, if someone should utter [it], he would be performing an address, e.g. “Most glorious son of Atreus, lord of men, Agamemnon.” ({1. 9.96). Bporov 8 gotiv dEduani 8 thy sxqoodv Zxov cEronatixiy magé trvos pogiov meovaopov 4 ndos So nintet tod yévous tav dELandtov, ofov “nabs y’ 6 nagbevov”, “ig TIgrapismory Eucpegiig 6 BouxdAos,” *° Supplied from an apparently typically recurring example for a wh-question, found elsewhere in the literature (see von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2, section entitled megi Aextév adtotehév).Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of .6yo¢ 253 ‘A quasi-statement is [an act] which, [although] its utterance has the features of a statement, by dint of an addition of some part (of it] or [by dint of] pathos,” it falls outside of the statement type, e.g. “Indeed the Parthenon is beautiful.”, “How like Priam’s sons the cowherd is (Nauck Adesp. fr. 286).” “Bott 88 xai énanogntrxdy tt meGyua Srevyvoxds dErdparos, db ei Aéyor TG, Grogoin dv “8g” Eott ovyyeves Tt Abr xi Biog;” ‘There is also as it were (r1) an act of hesitation [lit.: aporetic utterance], differing from the statement, [an act] which if someone should utter it, he is probably [expressing] being in an impasse (lit: aporia): {e.g.] “Can it be that pain and life are somehow akin?”, In the context of the passage from which (3) is excerpted, Diogenes quotes in fact the Stoic theory of language which did not survive in a composition of its own. The taxonomy reveals a cocktail of sentence types and patterns, of speech act types, and of very specific speech acts. In contrast to Schenkeveld, who focuses on the Stoic theory, with comments on its relationship to non-Stoic theories, the present study attempts a less subtle overview over a broader habi- tus. Passage (3) is for us merely a sample passage representative of the whole Stoic body of thought on modes of speech, which significantly contributed to the way we look at types or modes of speech today. What stands out in this passage, and also renders it a paragon of Stoic passages, are the examples, * the blend of form and meaning, the subtle distinctions which lead to many items, and the heterogeneous natures of these items (the above-mentioned ‘cocktail’). The group ‘questions’ as treated in (3) raises interesting points in termino- logy, sub-classification, relationship between speech act and sentence type, and 77 The translation of this passage is very difficult, and can be misleading of the message in the original. The translation given in Sluiter (1997: 237) is helpful, in particular involving the term tAcovacp6v: “...that which having the form of an axiom falls outside the class of axioms because it exceeds it by an extra word or by emotion...”. See a looser rendering in the discussion, below. * At times from epic and tragedy, at other times invented pedestrian phrases, typical and recurring in the Stoic corpus (see Schenkeveld’s conspectus of the examples used for the different Aexté in the Stoic corpus in his table II). See also emphasis given by Sluiter (1997: 241) to the role of examples from poetry, and to the influence of the Stoics’ interest in style to later emphasis on “stylistic side and downplaying that of logic”.254 Donna Shalev axis of definition. Terms for ‘question’ in many of the ancient sources, often derived from &9@74o which in Stoic sources has been specialized for yes-no questions, are used in other sources (e.g. passages (2) above or (5) below) with- out distinguishing yes-no, wh, or other questions. Other speech acts in interrog- ative form, as, for example the &narogntixds Aoyos are considered.” We are able to distinguish what type of question the term refers to by the examples, but also because the types of questions are defined in the Stoic theory in terms of the nature of the response (token, or assent for the égétnpa and more fully formed and informative phrases for the mboua). By way of comment I add that the token (obpBoAov) used in Diocles’ example — vat, is, in some forms of dialogue at least, more typically used to mark assent (to a statement, formed as a declarative or as a rhetorical question) than to mark a response (to a question);” the term cupBoAtxiig used in the discussion in (3) of the nature of answers to yes-no questions, and cognate terms, recur elsewhere in similar contexts.” A particularly interesting type, the “quasi-statement” (Spo.ov d&tdpatt) — termed in later Stoic taxonomies “beyond the statement” — illustrated in the original by an exclamative sentence opening with dc, and by an assertive sentence, which may likewise be interpreted as exclamative, and including the particle yé as a sign of added pathos: “Indeed the Parthenon is beautiful” (xanbc y’ 6 Hagdevev), The explanation, in the text itself, is phrased in terms of form and tone: Sporov 86 éotw dEduati 3 thy expogdv” Exov ” Tn modern, post-Austinian treatments, such distinctions are also found, for English, in the Grammar of Quirk et al. For Classical Greek Tragedy, “aporetic questions” are part of the classification in Mastronarde’s map (1979: 17f) of information-seeking questions and other interrogatives. » And never in consent to a command. See Shalev (2003) for evidence from Platonic dialogue. ** In passages of a technical nature like (3), but also in exegetical and broader cultural passages (in Philo and Plutarch, respectively), as I discuss elsewhere in connection with Greek dialogue technique. * Agov i dEioua. See Schenkeveld’s table I for sources. * The manuscripts have cicqpogdv rather than éxcpogdv, a modern conjecture.Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of X6yos 255 GEroparixiy ragé twos yogiov mcovaspsy 4 ndGos wo ninter tod ‘yévoug TOV GEvopatev (in loose translation: “like a statement in form, but with some added element for pathos, therefore falling outside the [parameters of] the type ‘statements’ ”). Just as the quasi-statement is termed and defined with reference to the statement, the same technique of comparison and contrast is used in the definitions of other utterances: the égdtnua is likened to the G&iowa in one element of its essence important in the Stoic theory,’ namely its autonomous nature, but is distinct from the statement in the task it performs; the mbcpa is differentiated from the Egétnpa. A strong common feature shared by Diocles’ presentation and non-Stoic definitions is the setting of the statement apart from the other acts of utterance in terms of being either true or false. Ill. The priority given to statements in the discipline of logic The first in-depth treatments of acts of speech in Greek sources preserved in the wording of those who formulated them rather than merely in a later, retrospective quotation, are to be found in Aristotle. The Organon, the collection of works in logic which were learned as an organic unit in the schools in later antiquity, are more concerned with dialectics, with argumentation of a more formal kind in the abstract, than with a theory of discourse which is able to reflect moves in natural conversation, or in some natural(istic) medium. The list of works considered as belonging to the Organon was not yet stabilized until later Antiquity in the Greek tradition, nor was it consistent in the Arabic and later European coicule: Very roughly put, the early Organon was relatively speaking narrow.” The Arabic Organon usually included in addition to translations of the traditional works (listed in the note above), also a translation of Porphyrius’ Eisagoge, of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, * Which features a fundamental differentia of Aexté (=“contents of thought to be expressed in words”), i.e. whether they are adtoreAi or &AAun (see e.g. D.L. 7.63, and cf. other passages in SVF 2). * ari, Cat, Int, An. Pr., An. Post., Top., S.E.256 Donna Shalev and sometimes of his Poetics. It was shown in Walzer (1934) that already Greek antiquity featured a broader, more inclusive Organon.”° In his De interpretatione, quoted in passage (4) below, one of the works consistently included in the Organon, Aristotle limits the scope of his treatment of 24 y0g” to the definition of the statement, the Grocpavtixds Adyos, in the realm of logic: (4) Aristotle, De interpretatione 16633 ff: dro@aveixds 88 0b néic, GAN’ év dt vd GAnBever A PesbeoGa bndgxer- obx v Enaor 8E dmdoyer, olov A sdxh Débyos Hév, GAA ott” GAnBiig obtE evdrc. of wEv obv GAOL dpetafocay, -- Ontoguxtic yag f romntixiic oixerotége H oxérpic, -... “Not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in which there is truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false. The present investigation deals with the statement-making sentence; let the other [types of sentence] be dismissed — indeed their investigation belongs rather to rhetoric or to poetics...{emphasis D.S.}” (transl. Ackrill ) As may be seen in the words of Aristotle, a statement (éopavtixds 46y0C) is a sentence whose utterance lies on an axis of truth and falsehood. The other, *© More detail on the evolving Organon in the Latin tradition can be found in Solmsen (1944); in the Arabic tradition, in Black (1990) a survey of previous studies and her own interpretation of what is called by Arabists (c.g. Dabiyat) the context theory. *” The Greek word Ayo has many applications, and even within the pool of Aristotelian terminology used in the Organon, the term A6y0< is variously employed. In the specific context of passage (4) and related passages it is customary to translate Adyoc as ‘sentence’, ‘expression’, ‘statement’, and related terms. Schenkeveld interprets Ayo here as a “meaningful group of words” (p. 293); there are those who prefer in this passage to interpret Adyoc in the sense of “speech” or even “an act of speech”. * Some adaptations have been made here to Ackrill’s translation: I translate Geiobwcav more literally than his “we can dismiss”; the punchline effect of a parenthetical yég phrase is rendered more literal than Ackrill’s choice of subordinate clause “since consideration of them belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or poetry”. (This effect is retained in the medieval Arabic translation, where the particle idh is used with an independent phrase, rather than a dependent causal clause. See also Endress- Gutas s.v.).Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of L6yog 257 non-assertoric Adyoc (or non-declarative sentences), which do not gravitate on this axis, are not relevant to this logic and may be dismissed (éqpeto®woav).” One may posit that at this point philosophical discussion divorces itself of anything non-declarative. Modern philosophy to a certain extent perpetuated the priority of the type ‘statement’ which was so convenient for Aristotle here, at the expense of types and forms of Adyoc with non-declarative content, which philosophers “skipped over”; these were in fact treated, but ‘merely’ in rhetoric and poetics. Not only is the concept of assertion singled out here, but also the term used in this very influential passage, dropavttixdc Adyoc: This term, part of a logical conception, reflected by its terminological apparatus, is distinct from terms such as 8uiynorc, énayyeMa, éndxeratc and others; moreover, the two families of terms are usually kept apart in the literature.” IV. The discussions in “Qntogtxt... mountixh” In his poetic theory ~ In Poetics, chapter 19 Aristotle discusses patterns of expression — the Greek term used is oympava, a term with heavily formal connotations: ” The later Greek form of the verb ending may or may not be one of the sources for the confusion in the Arabic translation of this text (otherwise rendered by Ishaq quite slavishly): nahnu tdrikiiha (Iit.: ‘we are its abandoners’). Tn the Arabic tradition, both De int. and Po. (originally belonging to two distinct bodies of Aristotelian literature) shared membership in the Organon. Nevertheless, the distinction was preserved between the concept translated (and later termed by Arabic logicians) qaw! djdzim (‘statement-making sentence’) and the concepts termed hadith information, report), and generally khabar ‘information’, ‘story’, 'sentence') as we shall see with respect to passages (5) and (6) below (as well as in contexts where khabar was not used to denote ‘predicate').The term cixr} in (4) above is translated into Arabic as du‘a’, a term not used elsewhere in logical works of 'newcomers' to the Organon (in fact no two Arabic passages in our study render the term ‘prayer’ with the same term, see below in discussion to passage (11)). The term du‘a’ for ‘prayer’ is used in an 11" century taxonomy by the Andalusian theoretician Ibn Hazm, as discussed by Versteegh (1977: iD When Diogenes Laertius discusses Protagoras’ classification, he speaks in terms of the division of Adyoc (6tetAe...cov Adyov) or of the fundaments of Adyot (...00¢ xai mvOpévac Eine Adyov). In De interpretatione, Aristotle’s discussion revolves around the258 Donna Shalev (5) Aristotle, Poetics, XIX. 1456b8ff. tHv 58 megi Thy AéEw Ev pév Eotw Elb0g Gcuotac ta oxtpora tig AdECas, & dori eidéven Tig UroKgITIKiIg xat Tod iy toLabrny Exovtos dgyitextoviniy, olov ti évrody xai ti edxi xai duiynorg xai Grew’) xai Egdrnors xai embxguats xai cf tt dAdo ToLodToV. Naga YaQ Thy ToUTwV yvooLV f dyvotay OBBEv Eig Ty RoLNTUAIV Emtipmpa @pégetar 8 t xai dEov onovdig. ti yag dv Tig bmoddBor TnagriioGat & Mewraydgag enim, Str edyeoOat oidpevog émtdrrer cindy “pfivey Gere 066”; rd yag xededou, Pnotv, moreiv Tr Hp Emitaers Bottv. Avs nageiado dg GAAng xai ob tig nontixtig Sv Oedgnna. “As regards the Diction (ri Aééuv), one subject for inquiry under this head is the tums given to the language when spoken (oxiparta tig AéEewc); e.g. the difference between command (évtoAr) and prayer (cdy7), simple statement (Svyyno1c) and threat (Gre1A7), question (6gdtnotc) and answer (andxQL01¢), and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution (tijg broxgituxiic) and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criticized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer's ‘Sing of the wrath, Goddess”? — which Protagoras has criticized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command. Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and not to that of poetry.” (transl. I. Bywater). Here in the Poetics Aristotle is discussing in fact the manners of speaking in concrete terms, as they are conceived in his art of “elocution”, the technique of performance — Sroxgitixt) téxv7 in his terminology. The context of manners of speaking, then, is here not logical, not philosophical, or even semantic. We find that the tragic performer — the actor, and the epic performer ~ the rhapsode, need to distinguish between the manner in which they express a command, a plea, a story, a threat, a question, an answer, etc., in order to perform their verses correctly in Greek. At issue is not only the oral tradition, with its renowned tradition of drama, of dialogue, of oratory: the Greek language is intonational, not only in individual words, but also in its sentence patterns. It is no surprise that the sensitivity the Greeks held for factors of intonation was well developed, as reflected also in grammar, commentary of literary texts, and of logical, theoretical character of statements, in terms which point to the meaning or notion rather than the form of the statement.Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of 2.6yos, 259 the classification of acts of speech, whether for abstract logical aims, or for performance. Terms similar to the ones we saw earlier in passages (2), (3), and (4) above come to divide the logos through an entirely different prism in the Poetics: a prism of types of discourse adopted by different characters or narrators. This may perhaps explain why we find in (5) a manner of expression called 8u77yn- o1G, and not &opavtixdc Adyos, the Peripatetic term in other taxonomies, or the Stoic term a&{apa — statement. The terminology had not yet solidified, and it is important to observe that the list is open-ended, as well as flexible in its terminology: Aristotle ends his list in (5) with the expression “and so forth” (xai ef t1 GAO ToLodtov).” Likewise the areas of discussion are hetero- geneous: the term S1tynot< is introduced in order to denote a narrative mode of presentation in literary compositions, distinct from a dialogue mode, which is represented in this list by the combination of terms égatnotg xai ardxguotc: epic or tragic heroes, depending on the situation in the plot, perform for example acts of threat, of entreaty, or of command (dmevhn, edyn}, EvtOAN), as well as acts of insult, of flattery, manipulative persuasion, promise, and a wide range of other acts of speech, which constitute a significant proportion of the events which take place between personalities with sensitive egos and honour, such as Achilles in Homer’s /liad, Hippolytus in Euripides’ tragedy of the same name, and many others. The importance of this division for the theory of poetics hinges on the fact that the works were performed in front of an audience, out loud, accompanied not only by music and dance, but also appropriate gestures and intonation. Likewise the division was still discussed separately for each discourse area, with respect to its significance to the discipline in which that mode of discourse is treated. There is possibly a ‘genetic’ connection between Aristotle’s division in the Poetics, as we saw in (5) above, and the taxonomy attributed to Protagoras by Diogenes Laertius in passage (2). Not only because Protagoras is mentioned in both passages, but because the term attributed to him for the declarative “fundamental of speech” is the term dityynotc — a vestige of the original use in * Schenkeveld (1984: 298) compares Ammonius ad An.Pr. 24b18.260 Donna Shalev a context of modes of discourse in poetic and other artistic composition (in contrast, for example, with dialogic presentation).” Aristotle’s division of the turns of expression, oxmwarta tig MEEas as he terms them in the Poetics (5), blending modes of performance, discourse, and proposition, and yielding the forms évtoar, edxt, duifynotc, amern, gdrnorc, dndxgroic as part of a flexible“ and open-ended list, is preserved in the Arabic tradition. The 9" century Christian scholar Aba Bishr Matté, who probably did not know Greek, produced an Arabic translation from a text of the Poetics in Syriac.’ Another translation into Arabic was made at the end of the period of translation activity by the philosopher Yahya b. ‘Adi, but it has not survived."® Matta’s Arabic translation retains the list in its original order, more or less intact, using terms some of which reappear in the other Aristotelian treatments of Adyog in their Arabic manifestations. The patterns of expression (Ari, oxfpota tig MEewc) (ashkal al-magila) in the reading of Badawi follow:”” command (amr), entreaty (salat), report (hadith), statement (djazm), question (su’al), answer (djawab).”* Broadly speaking, a number of terms * CE. Also GmoyyeXia in (2) above, and in contrast to dramatic performance, n. 23 above. “ Command, évroAt, is later on in the same passage referred to as értitatic. The forms Egdrnots and déxguoic emerge in some readings of the passage at large as one single mode defined by the phrase Egdtnorc xai drdxguotc. See the commentary of Lucas ad loc. (In the Arabic translation, the two are connected by ‘or’ (aw).) * Only a small fragment has been recovered of the Syriac translation, the definition of tragedy, but not our passage. For details, see Peters (1968: 28) and his reference to Tkatsch (1928) I 155a-b. “° Evidence for this translation is given in Peters (1968: 28f) and discussed in Dahiyat (1974: Sff) with respect to the influence of Yahya b. ‘Adi’s (better) translation on the commentary in Arabic by Avicenna to the Poetics and divergences in that commentary to the Arabic translation of the Poetics which survives, by Abii Bishr Matta. “" ‘The whole passage in its Arabic translation offers other interesting points of comparison and contrast, well beyond the scope of this paper. “ Contrast the terms used in the commentary of Ibn Sind to the Po. (=Shi (mantig) section 9 (fann al-shi‘r): V1.25): command (amr), prayer (tadarru’), statement (ikhbar), threat (tahaddud), inquiry (istifham), advice (i‘lam). The discrepancy maySpeech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of yo 261 (salat, hadith, ?harad) in Matta's translation of the Poetics are uncommon in analogous lists elsewhere in the Arab tradition, especially of logical texts in the Organon. The discrepancy between the Greek and its Arabic rendering centers on the terms Su;norg" and dmetAt and the respective pendants hadith and djazm: the Greek ‘simple statement’ and ‘threat’ have evolved into ‘report’ and ‘statement’; or, in an alternate reading ‘report’ (hadith) and ‘? [a word of unclear meaning]’ (harad).”” By this time, the Poetics was included in the Organon, and, although it is difficult to prove, one cannot ignore the infiltration of the logical term djazm into the list, perhaps as a gloss to the term hadith, which did not find its place in the repertoire of technical terms for ‘statement’ or for ‘narrative mode’, ” either reflect the tradition of Yahya b. ‘Adi's translation (of the lost Greek manuscript). The later commentary of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) gives a list of four types: statement (khabar), question (su’a), command (amr), and prayer (tadarru‘). Two features of the list from the Poetics which saliently differentiate it from the logical tradition are maintained, in shared wording, in both commentaries: the context of delivery (al-akhdh bi 'I-wudjaih - for more on this expression as a dramatic term see Moreh, 1992: 133), and the emphasis on form (shak_). * Given in Tkatsch's edition, and rendered in Badawi's translation into modern Arabic as ‘threat’ (tahdid). My own search in the lexica has not yielded anything close to ‘threat’ for the word harad. It is not impossible palacographically that the same combination of letters, with divergent interpretation of the diacritics, were read frarad by Tkatsch and djazm by Badawi. Other possible avenues to explore are the confusion of harad with the paleographically similar term for ‘suggestion’, ‘ard, which also appears as part of a list of types of utterance meanings (ma ‘ani al-kalam) of the 10" century Grammarian Ibn Faris (Sahibi, p.179 and p.182 ed. el-Chouémi). Ibn Faris’ ten types come in pairs: ‘statement and question’ (Khabar wa-istikhbar), ‘command and prohibition’ (amr wa-nahy), 'tequest and prayer ' (falab wa-du‘a’), ‘suggestion and urging’ (‘ard wa-tahdid), and ‘wish and amazement! (tamannin wa-ta‘adjdjub). * ‘The term hadith has a lemma in the lexicon of Afnan (for Arabic and Persian terms translated from Greek philosophical texts), where it is given as a pendant (in translations by Abi Bishr Matta from Ari, Metaph. 1704b — never a part of the Organon) for the Greek iGo or its derivatives. In the Poetics, rendered into Arabic by the same translator, u000g is not translated by hadith. The term hadith is sometimes part of the hendiadys used to translate 1880c: ‘old-wives-tales and storytelling’ (al-khurdfa wa-262 Donna Shalev in texts translated from the Greek tradition or in original works on logic or grammar or style." It seems that the ‘genetic’ connection between division into modes of presentation and expression in the Poetics leaves its mark even after 1,400 years, in the work of Jewish intellectual and community leader Sa‘adia Ga’on, who wrote in (Judaeo-) Arabic during the 10” century.” In the Arabic introduction to his Hebrew-Arabic Dictionary,” Sa‘adia defined these as the modes of speaking used by "all people" (djami" an-nds). Yet Sa‘adia wrote the work as a tool for poets, and, as in Aristotle's Poetics, the modes of expression are primarily those of professional performers of compositions of an oral nature, hikayat al-hadith) — for this method of translating technical terms, see Heinrichs (1969: 123, with his references to Tkatsch); for a discussion of the concept behind this term, see Drory (2000: 36ff). The concept of narrative in the Arabic tradition and commentary of the Poetics (and the terminology involved) are treated in Stroumsa (1992). The range of terms and subtleties of their applications is laid out by Pellat in the Encyclopedia of Islam’, s.v. "Hikaya". * The terms djazm, qawl djazim, gadiyya, and khabar, all appear in logic in the technical uses revolving around statement, assertion, judgment, even declarative sentence. That they are covered in the lexica of the philosophical terms e.g. of al-Farabi by Alon (2003), or of Ibn Sind by Goichon (1938), testifies to this technical status (both these excellent lexica cover a far wider corpus of texts than the oeuvres of the respective authors). Khabar also makes the cross-over with the concept of ‘predicate’ in grammatical theory (e.g. Ghersetti 2002), and with the concept ‘narrative’ in performance and literary theory (thetoric and poetics) where it is put into opposition with ‘insha’ (see Larcher 1993) — and is used in Arabic criticism as the term for a specific (bellestristic) historiographical subgenre (as discussed e.g. in Leder (1992)). * Sa‘adia wrote in Hebrew and Arabic and, after leaving his native Egypt and subsequently Jerusalem, was active in Baghdad in the period overlapping that of the translation movements, the study of Greek science and logic, and intellectuals such as Abi Bishr Matta (the translator among other texts of the Poetics, and the defender of logic in the famous debate with the grammarian as-Siraff at the court of the vizier (see n. 6 above). * In the first, Hebrew, version under the title Collection (Egron), then, in the second, expanded, Arabic version, called Elements of Hebrew Poetry (kitdb usiil al-shi‘r al- ‘ibrani).Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of A6yos 263 such as epic and drama (although in the case of Sa‘adia's dictionary, possibly this passage is included in the introduction, in the context of poetic theory, as a conventional fixture, like similar passages elsewhere in introductions to works on poetics and grammar): (6) Tr. of Arabic Introduction to Sa‘adia Ga’on, Elements of Hebrew Poetry: "And these are the middle (elements), which are the essence of poetry, and the two end- pieces are merely guarding them — and they are, even if their types are numerous, herein... three fundamental ones: one is the parts of speaking (agsdm al-qaw)) which all people (djami‘ an-nds) speak (yatakallamu), these being the address (nida’),” the question (mas’ala), the narration (Khabar), the command (amr), the request (shifa'), >...” ** The term nida’, appearing in germane Arabic passages, e.g. the Epistles of the Sincere Brethren, passage (7) below, and al-Fardbi's commentary on De int., passage (11) below, more commonly renders terms indicating the act of address (xAntvxd¢ ROyos, xAFors), itself problematic. The modern Hebrew translation of this passage in Allony's edition of Sa‘adia Gaon's Egron suggests that the term denotes exclamation here. Possibly under the influence of Allony's interpretation, nida’ is rendered ‘exclamation’ in analogous passages elsewhere in the oeuvre of Sa‘adia himself, and in a (possible) precursor, al- Mugammas, whose Twenty Chapters, written in the first half of the 9" c., contains a taxonomy of speech act types in Chapter Fifteen, on Command and Prohibition (15.2). I bring the English translation of S. Stroumsa from her 1989 edition (with terms in the original inserted in square brackets): "... The definition of command and prohibition is: an utterance addressed by a powerful rational being to a rational being of inferior power. Now that we have presented this (definition), let us take up the subject from the start can express a command [amr], [sw’al], a wish [raghba], a call [nida] or an announcement [khabar]." The meaning of nida’ in Judaeo-Arabic texts needs further thought, in the context of Greek and Arabic sources and parallels, as well as Syriac intermediaries (as suggested by Stroumsa in pers. comm.) * ‘The term in this passage for ‘request’, shifa‘, is not part of the repertoire of logic in translation or in later derivative literature. The term for 'request' comes immediately after the term for ‘command’ (amr), suggesting a model of attenuated command addressed to a superior (as opposed to the ‘command’ addressed to an inferior). This model, in Greek commentaries, passed into Arabic logic, as is attested more fully, in al-Farabt in passage (11) below, with the three-part system of ‘command’ to an inferior (amr), ‘entreaty' to a superior (fadarru’), and ‘request’ from an equal (falab). Analogous passages in the Arabic264 Donna Shalev In the list in (6) we also have a type called ‘narration, narrative’;”* although within a literary discussion (on Hebrew poetry), the list of modes of speaking is presented here by Sa‘adia as falling within the province of normative usage, “parts of speaking which all people speak”.” Some derivatives are very close, such as translations (e.g. of passages (4) and (5) above), while others carry over the terminology and taxonomy, even the order of terms, in introductions and other set passages, such as that of Sa‘adia in passage (6) above, or native, but dependent commentaries, such as that of al- Farabi, given in (11) below. Passage (7), representing a whole body of looser derivatives, is written in a spirit of syncretism, and in an encyclopedically composed work.” Thus, the Epistles of Sincere Brethren,” of the 10" century, tradition are referred to in Alon, s.v. amr. Cf. the hierarchy in Ibn Sind as summarized in 1n. 59 below, and also the 4-part classification of commands in terms of interlocutor power-relations, in the Judaeo-Arabic of al-Mugammas, chapter 15. °° The term also appearing in other lemmata and definitions by Sa‘adia is khabar (narrative), as in others writing in Judaeo-Arabic. For details, see Allony’s commentary, p.76 with notes 200 ff. In his view the division of speaking into types entered this literature before Sa‘adia, through Kara’ite sources. For a more recent discussion with an updated collection of references, see Stroumsa (2002, appendix 3). * Unless we interpret his term for ‘speak’ (yatakallamu) as ‘employing dialectic discourse’, deriving from kalam in its more technical sense. I personally do not prefer this interpretation here, both because of “all people” in the immediate context (and broader context of S,’s views on convention), and because the passage is part of a help- manual also for a more general readership. Clearly this needs to be determined by experts more versed in the uses of the term kalam and its derivatives in the corpus as a whole. ** In an analogous work not part of this study, the Kitab ash-Shifa’ of Ibn Sind (d. 1037/428), there is also a division of types of speech (see Versteegh, (1977: 147)). Ibn ‘Sina's scheme (in 1.3.5, p.31.8ff in the Madkour-Hudayri edition) is closer to the later commentaries, and integrates speech within the broader dynamics of speaker-addressee. ‘The analysis involves a distinction between communication emerging from the speaker (akhbar, with subtypes); acts seeking verbal response, isti‘ldm, istifadm); and utterances inducing action from the addressee (command from an equal iltimds, from a superior amrinafy, ot from an inferior tadarru'‘/mas’ala). On the so-called encyclopaedic nature and features in the Epistles of Sincere Brethren see Peters (1968: 113); and in Ibn Sina's Book of Healing (Kitab al-Shifa’) Peters (1968:105).Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of .yo¢ 265 in a four-book compendium of knowledge ranging from theology to magic, integrate many sources, from a variety of Moslem sub-persuasions and foreign philosophies. Epistle 12 (entitled Baramaniyas)” in Book I, integrates material from De interpretatione: (7) Sincere Brethren, transl. of Epistle 12, 1.410 (ed. Bustani): “The types of utterance are two (wa 'l-agawil naw‘an): what entails truth and falsehood, namely assertions (akhbar) ~ in affirmation (idjab) and negation (salb), and what does not entail truth and falsehood, four types: command (amr), question (su’dl), address (nida’), and wish (tamannin)”. This is certainly a remote reflection of what one finds in Ishaq ibn Hunayn's translation of the De int., closer in fact to epitomizing the commentaries of this work. Yet it is not faithful terminologically in the way the commentary of al- Farabi is, as we shall see in (11) below.” It must be said, however, that, along with the ‘assertion’, the four other types of utterance listed, including the ‘wish’, accurately echo those given in commentaries to De int., such as that of Ammonius, in passage (10) below.” * In Arabic Rasa’il Ikhwan as-Safai'. Also known as the ‘Brethren of Purity’, they were a heterogeneous group of scholars and intellectuals who were based in Basra and around whom a degree of mystery and legendary status developed. On the members of the circle and their place in the broader intellectual scene of their time, see, e.g., Kraemer (1992); on the Greek, and other foreign substrates in their Epistles, see Netton (1982). a corruption of the Greek title of Aristotle's De interpretatione, megi équnvetac, the plural of the term khabar. © The Arabic counterparts to the Greek notion termed ebyh, ebyadh, ebxtixds Adyos are more heterogeneous in their terminology: we have seen du‘d’ in the translation of the De int. (see note 41); and salat in the translation of the Po. © Statement’ in the Epistles (passage 7 above) is derived from khabar, as in passage (6), from Sa‘adia, in contrast to al-Farabi’s use of djazm/djazim in passage (11), the term used also in the translation of passage (4) from De int. “ Elsewhere in the Epistles (I11.119-120 Bustani), mention is made of the existence of multiple versions of taxonomy, varying between 4, 6, and 10 types of propositions (akhbar), the basic four being ‘assertion’, ‘question’, ‘command’, and ‘prohibition’ (Khabar, istikhbar, amr, nahy).266 Donna Shalev In the De interpretatione, as we saw in (4) above, Aristotle relegated the reader to the spheres of “rhetoric or poetics”. In Greek rhetorical theory one finds discussion of the formal classification of types of speech, or of the structure of the speech, but the focus rests on the strategies of the orator. In this context, the discussion in Aristotle, Rhetoric 11.18 revolves around the methods of constructing questions leading, through cross-examination, to aporia of the opponent: these issues remind us more of dialectic applications than of theoretical discussions on discourse, and on modes of discourse. In my view a contribution from the theory of oratory which is relevant to the development of notions and terms having to do with discourse may be found in Quintilian. The following passage, (8), written in the first century A.D., was very influential on later proposition theory. The theory of rhetoric among the ancients was highly concentrated on the performance aspects, and, as we see in (8) below, on intonation, and its links with emotions: (8) Quintilian 10 11.3.176: Quid quod eadem uerba mutata pronuntiatione indicant adfirmant exprobant negant mirantur indignantur interrogant inrident eleuant?... et ne morer, intra se quisque uel hoc uel aliud quod uolet per omnis adfectus uerset: uerum esse quod dicimus sciet. “Again, if the Delivery is changed, the same words can suggest, affirm, reproach, deny, wonder, show indignation, ask a question, mock, or disparage!... In short, if the reader... will run [a word] through the whole range of emotions, he will realize the truth of what I am saying.” (transl. D.A. Russell). Quintilian is instructing the budding orator to manipulate the modulations in his voice. The cross-section on the axis of intonations puts emotive utterances, such as the expression of wonder and anger, on a par with other, unrelated, forms of expression of a different order, such as indication or reporting, affirmation or negation, and questions. Within the same framework one may mention gestures, and recall that a fair part of the same book, Book 11 of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria is devoted to a semiotic code of manual gestures consensual among those in the profession of oratory. It must be kept in mindSpeech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of A6yog 267 that the theory of delivery in antiquity applied to oratory, to poetry, and also to non-verbal arts such as dance, Passage (9) below, from the later medieval Arabic tradition, also integrates the elements of oral performance, non-verbal elements of delivery of emotional nuance, and types of utterance, and is worth presenting alongside the passage from Quintilian in (8) above. The 12" century Jewish poet and philosopher from Spain, Judah ha-Levi, composed a polemic apologia to attacks on Judaism in a belletristic dialogue form of conversation between the king of Khazaria and a Jewish interlocutor also referred to as the Rabbi. The work was written in Judaeo-Arabic, but translated early on into medieval Hebrew by Samuel ibn Tibbon, the first of a legion of translations into other languages. Within a larger context of the argument for the supremacy of Hebrew, and of Biblical poetics, towards the end of Part II of the Book of Kuzari, the discussion turns to the advantages of oral communication (mushafaha) over writing, and to the power of oral performance in conveying subtleties of meaning, and specifically, the performance of the musical ‘accents’ of the Biblical text: (9) Judah ha-Levi, Book of Kuzari, tr. Hirschfeld, part Il. 70-72: “The Rabbi: ---Rhymed poems, however, which are recited, and in which a good metre is noticeable are neglected for something higher and more useful. 71. Al-Khazari: And what may that be?- 72. The Rabbi: The faculty of speech is to transmit the idea of the speaker into the soul of the hearer. Such intention, however, can only be carried out to perfection by means of oral communication. This is better than writing.” ... Verbal communication finds various aids either in pausing or continuing. .., according to the requirements of the sentence, by raising or lowering the voice, in expressing astonishment [a‘adidjub], © ‘The theory of performance is emphasized by Koller (1958) as another source for taxonomies, for terminology, and for analysis in the realm of language, and even to some terms and distinctions that are prevalent in the ancient theory of Grammar. Along the same lines, in another impressive culture, with family links to Greek culture — the culture of India — one also finds discussions of modes of discourse and expression of emotions within the framework of the theory of drama, in a well-known work of uncertain date, under the title Natya Sastra, ascribed to Bharata Muni. Tn the original: wa-hadha al-magsiid min al-lugha tahsil ma fi nafs al-mukhatib fr nafs al-sami‘ wa-hadha al-gasd la yutammu ‘ala kaméla illd bi ‘-mushafaha li-anna li'l mushéfaha fadlun ‘ala al-mukétaba,268 Donna Shalev question {su’al], narrative [Khabar], desire [targhib], fear [tarhib] or submission [tadarru’| by means of gestures, without which speech by itself would remain inadequate. Occasionally the speaker even has recourse to movements of eyes, eyebrows, or the whole head and hands, in order to express anger, pleasure, humility or haughtiness to the degree desired. In the remnant of our language which was created and instituted by God, are implanted subtle elements calculated to promote understanding, and to take the place of the above aids to speech. These are the accents with which the holy text is read {ie. ‘cantillation’, D.S.]. They ...separate question from answer, the beginning from the continuation of the speech,” haste from hesitation, command from request, on which subject books might be written...” Some of the terminology is reminiscent of that used in taxonomies found in translations of Greek logic, as well as in derivative and native logical treatises, yet on the whole this list features a heterogeneous terminology, content, and sequence. The dialogue form, the polemic setting, and the date of the text of passage (9) are far removed from those of the other Arabic and Judaeo-Arabic sources quoted in this study, but the existence of a list in the context of delivery and emotion is reminiscent of passage (8) from Quintilian and passage (6) from Sa‘adia Gaon on the one hand, and, more indirectly, of the Poetics and its Arabic translation and commentary tradition on the other. V. Nachleben and compromise Aristotle in his logical mode relegates non-assertoric speech to disciplines and to textual domains which have hosted theoretical discussions no less subtle than those in the logical repertory. As we shall soon see, the concepts addressed in these discussions outside of logic proper, along with their terminological manifestations, crept back into the discussions under the auspices of the Organon proper, primarily through the commentators of De interpretatione. It is the very passage from the De interpretatione of Aristotle, which we read in (4) above — an exclusionary definition of declarative expressions— which served as the point of departure for interpretations and elaborations in other *" tn the original, this also may denote “the subject from the predicate” (al-ibtida’ min al-Khabar); it has been suggested to me (by Prof. Scolnicov, p.c.) that the idea of beginning and continuation in cantillation is not unrelated to syntactic distribution in the conceptualization of these phenomena.Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of .6yo¢ 269 sources, as illustrated by many of the passages in this article. Since the De interpretatione in particular, and the Organon as a whole, were part of the school curriculum since antiquity, they were privileged with survival, commentary,” epitomization, translation, and wide distribution. Passage (10) below presents a summary of the comments of Ammonius from the 5" century A.D., as one representative of an entire corpus of commentary. A more detailed account may be found in Nuchelmans (1973) and Schenkeveld (1984). (10) Ammonius, commentary on De interpretatione, 2.9ff (Busse): Speech is of five types: - Speech for performing an address (xAntixdg Adyoc); e.g. 6 wdxag’ AteELsN (II. 3.182, “Oh, blessed son of Atreus”) - Speech for performing a command (ngootaxtixds Adyos); e.g. Béox’ 161, "Tot ‘raxeta,... (Il. 8.399, “Go on up, swift Iris...”) = Speech for performing a question (Egarmpatixds Adyos);” e.g, tig mb0EV E00” dvigGv; (Od. 7.238, “Who are you? From where?”) = Speech for wishing (evxtixdc A6yoc); e.g. at yde, Zed te méteEQ... (Il. 4.288 “Would, father Zeus... that...”) - And speech for stating (4mocavtixdc Adyoc), by which we make statements (Gropaiveotar)” on some fact or other (neaypareia); e.g. Beoi 86 te navta toast (Od. 4.379 “And the gods know everything.”) or tpox}) méica GBévatos. (Pl. Phdr. 245c5 “All soul is immortal.”) © The exegetical activity involving the oeuvre of Aristotle is discussed in the articles in the volume edited by Sorabji in 1990. An introduction to the commentary tradition of the De interpretatione and al-Férabi’s place in it is given in Zimmermann (1982). An introduction of the commentary tradition of the De interpretatione, with special reference to Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and the other Arab translators, commentators, and translators of ‘commentaries on this work and others from the Organon, is given by Benmakhlouf and Diebler (2000). © Interestingly, this list includes only one type of interrogative act. The term used is derived from égétna, used earlier in some theorists (e.g. Diocles the Stoic in passage (3) above) specifically for the yes-no question, and traditionally used by later theorists in opposition to méoua for the wh-question (see the progymnastic literature and other authors in Spengel’s collection). The example Ammonius gives for éowtnpatixds ASyos in passage (9) is of a wh-question. ” May also be translated: “make definitions”.270 Donna Shalev This list was particularly long-lived and had a wide influence even in cultures where Greek was not widely known, yet which was highly receptive of anything directly or indirectly to do with the “first teacher”, Aristotle. In passage (11) below one may see the accurate transfer from Ammonius, over a gap of almost 500 years, and in fact 1,300 years after Aristotle himself, in the Arabic commentary of the 9""-10" century philosopher al-Farabi. (11) al-Farabi, commentary on Aristotle, De interpretatione, pp. S1f (edd. Kutsch- Marrow, trans. Zimmermann): “Not every sentence (gaw/) is a statement (djdzim)": At this point, it is necessary to divide sentences into their primary types (anwa*), that is, command (amr), request (falab), entreaty (tadarru’), address (nida’), and statement (diazim). Despite this, we find that the formal patterns (ashkal) of the command, the request and the entreaty in languages in which we are knowledgeable (‘arafnaha) are the same formal patterns, and all fall under one part with respect to their form, and differ only with respect to the addressee (mukhdtab).” Granted, al-Farabi’s taxonomy is abstract, but stems ultimately from notions and conceptions based on facts of the Greek language. Further along in the passage al-Farabi elicits examples from the Arabic language, and he makes theoretical observations about the gap between their language and “languages in which we are knowledgeable”, in his words. Al-Farabi repeats the mention of the addressee which features in the Greek commentators; moreover, he tries to reconcile a taxonomy he received from the Greek logical tradition within a grammatical tradition bearing formal patterns. Final Remarks The ‘trinity’ we meet today, of statement, command, and question, continues three acts of speech identified, illustrated and discussed consistently and continually from antiquity. Yet up until and including Austin, these three were not exclusive. The only exclusionary trend was that of the ‘logical’ Aristotle, for example in De interpretatione, setting ‘statement’ apart (but implicitly admitting others, even when relegating them outside logic, to the fields of rhetoric and poetics). Aristotle himself treats narrative, reactive, and other modes for performing statements with a distinct terminology in his own discussion of rhetoric and poetics; most saliently, the term 3.yynotc for something close to a statement.Speech Act Theory and Ancient Sources for the Division of Myoc, am This variety in terms and concepts was maintained in translation, for example the Arabic translations of De interpretatione (by Ishaq b. Hunayn) and Poetics (by Abii Bisht Matta). However, by the time these texts were being translated, the Organon had opened up to include the Rhetoric, and sometimes also the Poetics. This may be connected with, if not lie behind, the infiltration of the logical term for statement (djazm) in the Arabic translation of the Poetics, and of the versatile term khabar and its derivatives, hailing from the worlds of grammar, historiography, and performance, into the logical writings. In the Arabic tradition, lists of modes of utterance, forms of utterance, or types of speech appear in settings not strictly logical, but often retaining some of the terminology typical of logical writings, as passages in introductions to dictionaries, to grammatical and to poetical works, as well as in passages in works of remote genres such as polemic dialogue, with seemingly little connection to their surroundings. However, often the more narrow context in which these lists appear turns out to involve performance and delivery, where these lists may have perhaps been included in homage to the locus classicus in the Poetics by the ‘First Teacher’ Aristotle. The preoccupation with the tension between logic and grammar in Arabic sources may also have played a part in the treatment of speech act types— loyalties dividing between the Greek logical tradition, the translations, and the facts of the Arabic language. 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