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Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism
Religious Diversity and Democratic Institutional Pluralism
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RELIGIOUSDIVERSITYAND
DEMOCRATICINSTITUTIONALPLURALISM
VEITBADER
Universityof Amsterdam
AND
I. A TYPOLOGYOF INSTITUTIONAL
POLICYARRANGEMENTS
Whatpoliticalphilosophersminimallyshouldlearnfrom a criticalsociol-
ogy of religion is the following: (1) Most modem societies are normally
understoodto be 'secular', but contraryto predominantmythology,we can-
not detect any inevitable decline of religious beliefs and practices,nor any
inevitableprivatizationof religion in modem societies; and the institutional
differentiationof 'Western'state-societies into relatively autonomoussub-
systems should not be misconceived as strict or 'complete separationof
churchandstate'.Insteadof one 'necessary'or 'optimal'Americanpatternin
the relationshipbetweenchurches,state,andnations,we find the coexistence
andcompetitionof differentpatternsthatcan be inductivelygeneralizedinto
many empiricaltypes (see Martin1978, 59). Church-staterelationshipsare
institutionallyhighly diverse. (2) This diversity is also characteristicof the
variety of contradictoryconstitutional,legal, administrative,and cultural
arrangementsandpolicies in statesthatall sharethe sameprinciplesof liberal
democracy. Different states, or states in different epochs, or different
branchesand levels (central,provincial,local) of contemporarystatesgrant
or forbid legal or administrativeprivileges to religions like tax exemptions,
gatheringtithes,exemptionsfromcompulsorymilitaryservice (withor with-
out alternativecompulsorycivil service), exemptionsfrom certaingenerally
applicable laws or directives (antidiscriminationin employment, Sunday-
closing, workinghours,educationalstandards,prohibitionof drugsandalco-
hol, zoning and building requirements,parking requirements,etc). They
allow or forbidsubsidiesto religious organizationsfor education,charitable,
and welfare activities. They interpretand apply religiousfreedoms differ-
ently, and they balance competing rights of individual and collective reli-
gious autonomy,or of free exercise versus antidiscrimination,in different
ways.
Bader / DIVERSITYAND INSTITUTIONALPLURALISM 269
tionship between the Churchof England and the British state so as to create a plural
religion-state-link"(Modood 1996, 3) by requiringthe new constitutionalestablish-
ment of organizedminorityreligions. It would be compatiblewith, althoughnot fully
expressive of, priorityfor democracy.It may be explicitly guidedby principlesof rela-
tional neutralityand fairness as evenhandedness.
4. 'Nonconstitutionalpluralism' (NCP) combines constitutional dis-establishment or
nonestablishmentwith restrictedlegal pluralism (e.g., in family law), administrative
institutionalpluralism (de jure and de facto institutionalizationof several organized
religions), institutionalizedpoliticalpluralism,5andthe religio-culturalpluralizationof
the nation. NCP is a variety of democraticinstitutionalpluralismdefined by two core
aspects of power-sharingsystems: (1) the existing pluralityof organizedreligions must
notjust be-more or less formally-recognized, it must also be integratedin the politi-
cal processes of problem-definition,deliberation,presentationof decision alternatives,
and decision making.NCP requiresspecific informationrightsfor organizedreligions
andcorrespondinginformationdutiesby stateagencies regardingcontestedissues, par-
ticipationin publicforaandhearings,inclusionin advisorycouncils, andcorresponding
consultationrightsand duties to listen, and so on. (2) This recognitionand integration
has to be combinedwith a fair amountof actualdecentralizationandde facto autonomy
to decide on specific issues. On the nation-statelevel, the models of the Netherlands
after the constitutional reforms of 1983, Belgium, India, Australia, and Germany
approximatethis ideal type, though,obviously, this is not an uncontestedpolicy model
in these countries.6With regardto specific fields like education,health care, and other
welfareservices, organizedreligions(amongother 'secular'nonstateserviceproviders)
play an important,officially recognized and subsidized role in most countries (see
Monsma and Soper 1997; see also note 3). NCP expresses the principleof priorityfor
democracymorefully thanthe othermodels of religious institutionalpluralism,andit is
explicitly guidedby principlesof relationalneutralityandfairnessas evenhandedness.
5. Nonestablishmentand privatepluralism (NEPP) declares strictlegal separationof the
state from all religions as well as strict administrativeand political separation.It is
opposed to legal, administrative,and political institutionalizationof religions. Reli-
gious pluralismis allowed only in 'civil', not political, society or the state. It cannot,
however, preventde facto administrative,political, and culturalpluralism.It may or
may not contest existing religio-nationalestablishmentsor aim at religious pluraliza-
tion of the nation.The model of the United States approximatesthis type, thoughwe
must stressthe inevitabledistancebetween 'model andmuddle'.Any 'completesepara-
tion of state', let alone of politics or culture,from religion in the United Stateswouldbe
a radicalliberalor libertarianutopia,not an accuratedescriptionof the existing stateof
affairs.NEPP clearly expresses priorityfor democracy,but it is predominantlyguided
by principles of difference-blindneutralityand a 'hands-off' conception of fairness
(Carens2000). The crucialdifferencewith NCP is thatinstitutionalpluralismis strictly
relegatedto the so-called privatesphereof civil society andis not allowed to spill over
into political society or the state, particularlynot into decision making.
The second, third, and fourth model represent different forms of demo-
cratic institutional pluralism; the fourth and fifth option represent two forms
of constitutional nonestablishment. For the purpose of practical evaluation,
the most important dividing line runs between the three versions of demo-
cratic institutional pluralism, on one hand, and NEPP on the other hand, both
272 POLITICALTHEORY/ April 2003
II. RELIGIOUSFREEDOMS
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedomto changehis religionof belief andfreedom,eitheralone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private,to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching,practiceandobservance.(2) Freedomto manifestone's religion or beliefs shall
be subjectonly to such limitationsas areprescribedby law and arenecessaryin a demo-
craticsociety in the interestsof public safety,for the protectionof public order,healthor
morals, or for the protectionof the rights and freedoms of others.
whereasnegativefreedomfromillegitimatestatecontrolseems to require'no
aid' or 'no interference'(Galanter1966, 288 if; HarvardLaw ReviewNote
1987, 1632 if). As with all othernegativefreedoms,however,the freedomof
individual believers and of religious practices from persecution requires
some state involvementfor two reasons. First,it is not only directedagainst
state interference,but also against all forms of illegitimate interferenceby
otherreligions as well as by "secular"groupsand organizations(Shue 1995,
13). The state has the obligationto protect all religions from such interfer-
ence. Second, religious freedomprotectsnot only individualfreedomof con-
sciousness and religious practicebut also collective practices of organized
religions. These associational or collective freedoms often contradictindi-
vidual religious freedoms, particularly in cases of deeply illiberal,
antidemocratic,fundamentalist,or totalistic religions. Such conflicts have
for long been the subjectof legal debatesaboutchurchautonomyversuspub-
lic prerogatives,scrutinyor interference.
The cases range from conflicts about churchproperty,internaldecision-
making processes and authority,appropriateforms and degrees of public
accountabilityand scrutinyin cases of tax exemptionandpublic subsidies,to
cases in which the nomos of religious groups, that is, their normativeuni-
verses, laws, and customs, conflicts with state-enforcedprivatepersonallaw
(particularlymarriageand divorce law) or with criminal law (Glendonand
Yanes 1991;McConnell 1992). Theoreticalpositionsandpolitico-legalstrat-
egies include (1) complete deference or "full autonomy" (Swaine 2001,
320 if) to the nomos ('ecclesiastical law' andcustoms), decision makingand
authorityof religions as defendedby radicallibertarians(on the assumptions
of voluntarinessor free, informedconsent by adults:free entry,free exit) and
by traditionalistcommunitarians(on the completely opposite assumptionof
protectinggiven communitiesandtheirculture);(2) internallyhighly differ-
entiated ways of balancing associational freedoms or collective autonomy
with individualreligious freedomsand otherhumanrights; (3) radicalpoli-
cies of 'liberal-democraticcongruency'(insensitive,universalistliberalindi-
vidualismor insensitive democraticuniversalism).Both 'absolutist'associa-
tional autonomy or 'absolutist free exercise' and 'absolutist individual
freedoms'or unrestrictedliberal-democraticcongruencyarecounterproduc-
tive (Robbins 1987, 148; Rosenblum1998, 79; 2000a, 166). The absolutism
of the first position reduces the moral and legal constraintsof humanrights
and 'priorityfor liberaldemocracy'practicallyto zero. The absolutismof the
secondpositiontriesto impose thicknotionsof liberalautonomyanddemoc-
racy in a self-contradictoryway on all associations. If, in contrastto these
absolutepositions, one recognizes the need to balance individualand asso-
276 POLITICALTHEORY/ April 2003
ciational autonomy (Selznick 1992, 288; Etzioni 1996, 191), one cannot
expect easy answers or one universalformulaapplicableto all cases.
The U.S. SupremeCourthas been very reluctantto interferewith church
autonomy,guided by a mixtureof libertarianassumptions,free exercise, and
suspicionof all stateinterventionin the 'private'sphere.In cases of property
disputes, this has resultedin unconditionaldeference to ecclesiastical law,
decision proceduresand practices as interpretedby church authority.This
rule has not been upheld in cases of tax exemptions and subsidies for
churches and related charitable and service institutions not living up to
antidiscriminationrules in labor and employment,to minimal educational,
health, and social service standards,or to rules of financial accountability.
"Certainsocial values suchas equalopportunityandracialnon-discrimination
are now viewed as partly enforceable by the state on institutionslinked to
churches"(Robbins1987, 141, 148). The enforcementis basedon the assump-
tion of the public trusttheorythat accepting public money gives the state a
specialmandateto investigate,anda greaterregulatorymandate.Even so, the
extent,degree,andtype of regulationandinterferenceareclearlycontested.9
In such matters,four argumentshave to be taken seriously:(1) Some dis-
tinctionbetween 'religious'issues and 'economic'issues is neededto prevent
an imperialisticuse of the FreeExerciseClauseto cover "allmannerof enter-
prises [e.g., of the Unification Church,Scientology] with the shield of the
FirstAmendment,therebyequatingwith freedomof worshipthe rightto pur-
sue profitableactivitieswithoutpublic accountability"(Robbins 1987, 148).
All these distinctions,however,are contested. (2) We clearly have to distin-
guish between activities and decisions centralto faith (like rules, decisions
and control over membershipof religious associations), and other, more
peripheral or nonrelated, 'secular' ones (like work and employment in
church-linkedinstitutions).Yet this distinctionis not easy to draw.10(3) One
of the explicit aims of tax exemptionsis
III. DEMOCRACY,CITIZENSHIP,
EQUALITY
Political citizenshipin the modernunderstandingis equal for all citizens
irrespectiveof their 'race', sex, gender,ethnicity,class, andreligion. Demo-
craticprinciples and the correspondingpolitical rights seem to precludenot
only strongestablishmentandreligious second-class citizenship,but also all
group rights and all forms of institutionalpolitical representationof orga-
nized religions, notablyof illiberalandantidemocraticreligions. In the latter
case, the tensions betweenthe "demandsof faith"andthe "obligationsof citi-
zenship"are strongandthe idea of "protectionof the Statefrom the Church"
seems to be particularlyappealing,precludingnot only strongestablishment,
butalso weak establishment,pluralestablishment,andNCP.23Only the com-
plete, and completely unrealistic, separationof state and civil society by
NEPP seems compatiblewith moderndemocracy.
The idea, inheringin separationismanddisestablishment,is thatthe repre-
sentationof particularinterestsandgroupsshouldremainconstrictedto civil
society and not spill over into the domain of the state. Of course, interest
groupsmay form lobbies and may try to influence political parties.But such
'politicalpluralism'is supposedto preventor forestall-for fear of 'mischief
of faction' (see criticism by Cohen and Rogers 1995)-the political
institutionalizationof particularinterests,not to recognizeor formalizeit. All
existing liberal-democraticpolitical systems, however, actually recognize
the existence and role of groups and organizationsat least to some degree
(e.g., in drawing the boundariesof constituencies, equal representationof
small states in federalsenates, guaranteeof some minorityrights),andmany
explicitly supplementterritorialgrouprepresentationwith forms of social or
functional (e.g., 'neocorporatist') group representation(Lijphart 1984).
Also, these forms of representationhave been extendedto include represen-
tation of ascriptiveminorities (e.g., women, ethno-nationalminorities;see
Williams 1998; Kymlicka1995) andorganizedreligions (Lehmbruch1996).
Especially in regardto the correctionof inequalitiesanddisadvantages,NCP
presentsa more promisingavenuethanNEPP,which, like all difference-and
inequality-blindsystems, tends to perpetuatethe existing state of affairs.
NCP, then, tends to tackle the actual political and cultural hegemony of
entrenchedreligious majoritiesand of aggressive secularism.In doing so, it
contributesto a viable religious diversity in civil and in political society.
Bader/ DIVERSITYAND INSTITUTIONALPLURALISM 283
IV CONCLUSION:REFUTINGSOME
REALISTOBJECTIONSAGAINSTNCP
needed, yet thresholds are not neutral, and they may have to be adjusted
upwardsmerelyto keep a system of representationworkable.And finally,the
mode of institutionalrepresentationitself has to be chosen, with the choice
having effects on the possibilities of being and getting represented.Which
religious organizationsshould be represented-constitutionally, legally, or
de facto?-on which level of governance,in which fields, concerningwhich
issues and decisions?
We claim thatNCP allows for open and context-specificanswersto these
issues insteadof resolving the matterby denying it. NCP allows for flexible
strategies,for example,by distinguishingbetweenthe levels of thresholdsof
representationandof financing.NCP, since it does not requireconstitutional
and sometimes not even legal status,enables the comparativelyeasy adapta-
tion of arrangementsandpracticesof institutionalrepresentationand is thus
bettersuitedto accommodatechanges in thereligious andsocietallandscape.
Such flexibility is particularlyimportantbecause religious associationsand
membership-compared with ascriptivecategories like 'race' or sex-can
show muchhigherdegreesof voluntarismandactualexit optionsand,conse-
quently,may be much more fluid.
Second, recognitionhas a price. Institutionalizedsystems of representa-
tion are inherently characterized by conservative tendencies and
exclusionary effects. Recognized religions will defend their privileges by
holding newcomers at bay, therebyaddingto the negative effects of thresh-
olds on new religious minoritiesand their organizations.As a consequence,
the gap between institutionalizedreligions and the actual religious state of
affairsis widening (a fact well knownin the aftermathof the Dutchhistoryof
pillarizationfrom the 1950s onward).For obvious reasons, administrations
also experience difficulties in recognizing such changes and adaptingtheir
policies accordingly,therebycontributingat least unwittinglyto institutional
inertiaand longer time lags. Again, NCP does not discardthis problembut,
once again relying on the mechanisms of an associative democracyand its
positive premiumon associative participation,it provides betteropportuni-
ties to check the relativestrengthsof religious membershipsandaffiliations.
Also, it providesmechanismsto scrutinizethe democraticlegitimacyof rep-
resentationsand to make appropriaterevisions if needed.
Third,thereis the dangerof divisive effects. Boundariesaroundcultures,
identities,and loyalties may be hardened,in particularif religious education
and religious political partiesreceive institutionalbacking. Again, however,
context and experience matter.The demandfor separatereligious schools,
for example, is more often than not a response to either a fairly complete
monopolizationof the public educationalsystem by majorityreligions (the
United States in the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom), or to an
286 POLITICALTHEORY/ April 2003
NOTES
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Bader/ DIVERSITYAND INSTITUTIONALPLURALISM 293
VeitBader is a professorof sociology and of social and political philosophyat the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam.His main research areas are theories of societies, social move-
ments, and collective action; theories of moderncapitalisms; ethics of migrationand
incorporation;and associative democracy.His books include Inequalities(1989); Col-
lective Action (1981); Racism, Ethnicity,Citizenship(1995); and Associative Democ-
racy:The Real ThirdWay (2001) (with Paul Hirst).