Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gemini Sumary Conference
Gemini Sumary Conference
22161
-r--
f
NATIONAL
--.
----- ----
-
- --
AERO-NAU~ICSAND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
- -
_ _ _ ^ . ---I c
r -
T..
24
~
NOTICE
T H I S DOCUM.ENT HAS B E E N R E P R O D U C E D
F R O M T H E BEST C O P Y F U R N I S H E D US B Y
T H E SPONSORING AGENCY. A L T H O U G H IT
ARE ILLEGIBLE, IT IS B E I N G R E L E A S E D
I N T H E INTEREST O F MAKING AVAILABLE
GEMINI
SUM MARY CONFERENCE
/- February 1-2, 1967
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas
e-
-_ Washington, D.C.
. *
--
--_
. . - . - . . __. . . .
AX-'
-& .
GEMINI SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY
I
Gemini > 1
.
Unmanned Jan. 19, Demonstrated spacecraft systems performance.
I1 SuborbitaI 1965
Quit i f i c i t i o n
- .... ._ - . .. . ..
-. . - ... . . . . . . . - .. .-. >
FOREWORD
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1
By George E. Mueller
Operational Experience
V
Preceding page blank
..... . . ..
VI GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
Gemini Summarization
APPENDIXES
A P P E N D I X A-NASA C E N T E R S AND O T H E R GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES .............................................................................................................. 34 1
A P P E N D I X B-CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS, AND VENDORS 343
1. INTRODUCTION
By GEORGEE. MUELLER.Associate Adriiiriis/ralor 10,. il/lnrincil Space Flight, \ r A S A
The Gemini Program is over. The papers proficiency in manned space flight. The very
in this report summarizing the program were successful flight program of the United
prepared by some of the people who con- States has provided vivid demonstration of
tributed to the overall success. In each case. the achievements in each of these objective
the authors were actual participants and pro- areas.
vide a cross section of what may be called the The long-duration flight objective of Gemini
Gemini team. As is true in any undertaking was achieved with the successful completion
of this magnitude, involving many diverse of Gemini VI1 in December 1965. The pro-
organizations and literally thousands of peo- gressive buildup of flight duration from 4
ple, a vital element of the Gemini success may days with Gemini IV, to 8 days with Gemini
be traced t o teamwork. In the purest defini- V and 14 days with Gemini VII, has removed
tion of the word, wherein individual interests all doubts, and there were many. of the capa-
'and opinions are subordinate to the unity and bility &f the flight crew% and spacecraft to
efficiency of the group, the Gemini team has function satisfactorily for a period equal to
truly excelled. that needed to reach the lunar surface and
Much has already been written concerning return. Further, ,this aspect of Gemini pro-
the Gemini achievements, and many of the \Tides high confidence in flight-crew ability
achievements are presented again in greater to perform satisfactorily on much longer
depth within this report. By way of introduc- missions. The long-duration flights have also
tion, and to set the stage for the following provided greater insipht into, and apprecia-
papers, a few words are necessary to assess tion of, the vital role played by the astro-
the achievements in the context of the goals nauts, the value of flexibility in mission
of the national manned space-flight program. planning and execution, and the excellent
Only in this way is it possible to evaluate the capability of the manned space-flight control
significance of the Gemini accomplishments. system. As originally conceived, the Gemini
The Gemini Program was undertaken for Program called for completion of the long-
the purpose of advancing the United States duration flights with Gemini VII, which was
manned space-flight capabilities during the accomplished on schedule.
period between Mercury and Apollo. Simply One of the more dramatic achievements
stated, the Gemini objectives were to conduct has been the successful development of ;I
the development and test program necessary variety of techniques for the in-orbit ren-
to (1) demonstrate the feasibility of long- dezvous of two manned spacecraft. The prep-
duration space flight for a t least that period aration for this most complex facet of Gemini
required t o complete a lunar landing mission ; missions was more time consuming than any
(2) perfect the techniques and procedures other. That it was performed with such per-
for achieving rendezvous and docking of two fection is a distinct tribute to the Gemini
spacecraft in orbit ; ( 3 ) achieve precisely team that made it possible: the spacecraft
controlled reentry and landing capability ; and launch-vehicle developers and builders,
(4) establish capability in extravehicular ac- the checkout and launch teams. the flight
tivity; and (5) achieve the less obvious, but crews and their training support. and the
no less significant, flight and ground crew mission-planning and mission-control people.
1
2 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
I 1 I I I I
+X
I I I I
v <
'~ 40
Gemini XI
Ahead-Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
1. Spacecraft insertion;
00:06:21
2. Phase adjustment
.
4. Coelliptical maneuver
N 2, AV 52.7 fps;
02:20:32
9
.-
e -
= IO-minute time marks
N = 1, AV = 53.4 Ips; 5. Terminal-phase initiation ,--Velocity match (TPF)
00:59:39
3. Corrective combination
N = 1.75, AV 0.8 fps;
9
AV 32.4 Ips;
9
03:27:07, wt 130'-
6. Velocity match (TPF)
AV = 25.5fps
/ g.e.1. = 01:14:52
01:57:00 AV 41.6 fps: 03:59:52 ,,Terminal-phase initiation
90 seconds before apogee
FIGURE
2-5.-Typical relative trajectory. Gemini.
9. e. t. = 00:49:43
IX-A and XI1 missions.
-
Ahead+ Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
0
A
,/' 9. e. 1.
-
- 01:'19:52
- 5 m i n u t e time marks
FIGURE
Z-&-Typical relative trajectory, terminal
phase. Gemini IX-A and XI1 missions.
AV - 131.2 Ips
apogee height and phasing. This correction was applied based upon the time the line of
was based upon onboard navigation infor- sight to the target vehicle crossed the local
mation obtained from the spacecraft guidance horizontal. The time and the magnitude of
system. At 90' after insertion, a second out- the terminal-phase-initiation maneuver were
of-plane correction, also based upon onboard determined from visual angle observations,
information, was performed. Terminal-phase and an 80' transfer was initiated when the
initiation occurred just prior to first space- Sun was nearly overhead. Two vernier cor-
craft apogee with the spacecraft 10 nautical rections also based upon visual angle meas-
miles below and 15 nautical miles behind the urements were applied, and rendezvous
target vehicle. A 120' transfer was used k i t h occurred just prior to sunset. I t was a re-
two vernier corrections at 12-minute inter- quirement that the spacecraft be in a station-
vals after the terminal-phase initiation. keeping mode prior to entering darkness
After a manual braking and line-of-sight with a passive target.
phase, rendezvous was completed within the A second re-rendezvous technique (figs.
'
Sequence of events
1. Phasing maneuver
2. Height maneuver
VI
U
3. Coelliptical maneuver
4. Terminal-phase initiation
"
-
.-
e 5. Terminal-phase finalization
%I
8 II 1
to
-
B
0
W
v v v v B
m
I I I 1 I I I 1 I
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 10
Horizontal displacement, n. mi. Ahead +Behind
FIGURE2-l0.-Relative trajectory profile for re-rendezvous from above. Gemini IX-A mission.
'F
2 t
.
Terminal-phase
AV 23.3 fOS:
. .
k:32:50- ...-
----_
u 5
.n
.-
e
W
L
> I
34O Correction 1:04:40
I I 1 I I
5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Ahad -I- Behind
'\6 14 12 10 8 6 24 0 2 Horizontal disolacement. n. mi.
Ahead4Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi. FIGURE
2-12-Gemini XI stable orbit re-rendezvous.
the terminal-phase maneuvers. The commit- the out-of-plane displacement relatively small
ment to conduct such a rendezvous reflected for a long period of time (fig. 2-13). By
the confidence that was established during varying the launch azimuth so that the space-
Gemini in the capabilities of the 'ground- craft would be inserted parallel to the tar-
tracking, computation, and control facilities. get-vehicle orbital plane, the out-of-plane
In addition to the primary and re-rendez- displacement of the launch site at the time of
vous missions, a dual rendezvous was per- launch becomes the maximum out-of-plane
formed by the Gemini X crew. The target displacement between the two orbit planes.
vehicle launched during the Gemini VI11 mis- The out-of-plane displacement could also be
sion was left in orbit and was the passive minimized by using the variable launch-azi-
target for the dual operation. One problem muth technique with guidance in yaw during
encountered during the development of the second-stage powered flight. This is accom-
Gemini X mission was obtaining precise plished by biasing the launch azimuth of the
state vectors for the passive target vehicle, spacecraft so that the launch azimuth is at
and making accurate predictions f a r enough an optimum angle directed toward the tar-
in advance to find acceptable launch windows. get-vehicle orbital plane (fig. 2-14). As a
Because of the inaccuracies in drag predic- rewlt, the out-of-plane distance would be re-
tion, it was necessary for launch date, lift-off duced prior to the initiation of closed-loop
time, and catchup sequence to be flexible. guidance during the second-stage flight. This
The catchup sequence included a series of technique would effectively use the launch-
maneuvers by the docked Gemini X space- vehicle performance capability to control the
craft and Gemini X target vehicle for gross out - of - plane displacement. Sufficient per-
catchup, and another series of maneuvers by formance capability existed in the Gemini
the undocked spacecraft for fine catchup. The Launch Vehicle to control the out-of-plane
capability for large changes in altitude dur- displacement to within k0.55" (table 2-11).
ing the gross catchup sequence allowed a n The maximum allowable wedge angle of
acceptable wide variation in the initial-phase t 0 . 5 5 was not needed on any of the rendez-
angle. The terminal approach was coelliptical vous missions. By selecting an inclination qf
with an altitude differential of 7 nautical
miles ; the terminal-phase guidance employed
was the same as for the optical rendezvous
conducted on Gemini IX-A.
I
FLaunch window
,Launch-site
1 1
1................ Mar. 23, 1965 -24 min
IV .............. 1................ June 3, 1965 -16 min
V ................I12 ................ Aug. 21, 1965 On time
Target V I ..............1 1................ -
vehicle VI-A .......... ' 2 ................ Dec. 15, 1965 On time
VI1 ............ II
~
I---
" Target launch-vehicle failure.
Targeted out-of-plane
Gemini mission displacement, deg that rendezvous operations, booster perform-
ance permitting, are operationally feasible
VI-A ...................................................... 0.20
a t any orbital inclination.
VI11 ............................ .............................. 21 Initial analyses of countdown methods
IX-A ...................................................... -.50
X ............................................................ -.077 indicated that the highest probability of mis-
XI ............................ i ............................ -.131
XI1 .......................................................... -.16 sion success could be achieved by simultane-
ously counting down both vehicles. Even
though simultaneous countdowns have been
28.87", 0.53' above the launch-site latitude, used extensively in Gemini, nothing in the
and by using a variable launch-azimuth tech- results clearly indicates that this is a neces-
nique, the out-of-plane displacement could be sity.
controlled to within 0.53' for 135 minutes.
Systems Requirements
During the early planning phases of the
Gemini Program, a relatively large launch A primary consideration in the develop-
window (table 2-111) was considered man- ment of the rendezvous operations was the
datory ; however, later experience indicated area of systems requirements. The require-
that reliable countdown procedures could be ments for the systems design were based
developed, and it is now the general opinion upon design-reference missions. As the de-
that large launch windows are not required. signs became established, however, the op-
Since Gemini V, the launches have either erational missions were developed to exploit
been essentially on time, or the launch has the systems capabilities, and. of course, the
been scrubbed. By suitable planning. minor missions were ultimately limited by the sys-
launch delays can be easily absorbed in the tems capabilities. For example, a desired
count, and if major problems occur, large objective during the Gemini XI1 mission
launch-window lengths a r e not particularly planning was to complete a rendezvous tlur-
helpful. An on-time launch capability pro- ing the second orbit ( M -= 2 ) . Accomplish-
vides a tremendous potential in planning op- ing this objective within acceptable disper-
erational rendezvous missions and indicates sions would have required a trajectory cor-
16 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
rection based on radar range a t a point out- The need for lighting conditions (fig.
side the spacecraft radar-range capability. 2-15) compatible with backup procedures
As a result, the second-apogee rendezvous affected all the rendezvous missions. The de-
plan was eliminated. sired lighting situation for a n active target
was that the crew (1) see the target by re-
Crew Procedures flected sunlight prior to and at terminal-
Further requirements were imposed to phase initiation, ( 2 ) see the target acquisi-
achieve workable crew procedures. The ma- tion lights against a s t a r background during
jor requirements in this area were the fol- the terminal transfer, and (3) see the target
lowing : by reflected sunlight for docking after exit
(1) Sufficient time for the crew to com- from darkness. This lighting situation en-
plete the necessary activities abled the crew to maintain target visibility
. ( 2 ) Approach trajectories which are rea- throughout the terminal-rendezvous opera-
sonably insensitive to insertion dispersion tions, and established the capability f o r mak-
and to errors in midcourse maneuvers ing inertial line-of-sight angle measurements
(3) Lighting conditions which a r e com- in the event of a guidance platform failure.
patible with backup procedures The lighting requirement was a factor in se-
( 4 ) Low terminal-approach velocities and lecting the location of the terminal-phase-
line-of-sight angular rates initiation point, the central angle of the
(5) Backup procedures for guidance-sys- transfer, and the terminal-approach angle.
tems failures The desirable lighting conditions f o r ren-
The requirement to allow sufficient time
dezvous with a n active target were different
for crew procedures had an effect on several
than for rendezvous with a passive target
of the .Gemini missions. For example, the
first orbits of the Gemini VI-A and VI11 mis- (fig. 2-16). Since a passive target would not
sions were free of rendezvous maneuvers, After terminal-phase ,Prior to and at terminal-phase
allowing the crew sufficient time to verify the initiation (target ,e' initiation (target visible in
satisfactory operation of all spacecraft sys- lights visible),. reflected sun I ight)
tems. The Gemini X primary rendezvous Stars,
was changed from a third-orbit to a fourth-
orbit rendezvous to allow the crew sufficient
time 'to conduct the heavy procedural work-
load required by the star-horizon onboard
orbit determination.
The second procedural requirement, ap- Earth \ II .Sun
proach trajectories which a r e reasonably in-
sensitive to insertion dispersion and errors
in midcourse maneuvers, was also important
i n the development of the fourth-orbit ren-
dezvous. An objective was to develop a mis-
sion which could effect a near-nominal ter-
minal-approach trajectory notwithstanding
insertion dispersions, spacecraft equipment Docking (target visible
in reflected sunlight1
degradation, or ground tracking and compu-
tation errors. This objective established the T - Target vehicle
need for the development of backup termi- S - Spacecraft
nal-phase procedures in the event of a guid- FIGURE%15.-Desired lighting situation for
ance-component failure. primary rendezvous.
SUMMARY OF RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS 17
/
tion, since the correction required in this
Darkness ----Line-of-sight particular instance was small (2 ft/sec) .
However, on Gemini XII, a failure of a pri-
Spacecraft orbit-- mary guidance-system component required
the use of the backup procedures. The radar
system failed prior to the terminal-phase-
FIGURE2-16.-Desired lighting situation for
initiation maneuver on this mission, and
passive rendezvous.
backup procedures were employed through-
out the terminal phase to complete the ren-
be visible in darkness, the terminal-phase dezvous.
portion of the Gemini X dual optical rendez- The terminal phase of a rendezvous opera-
vous was conducted entirely in daylight. The tion involves precision maneuvers and care-
desired terminal-phase initiation occurred f u l control of closing and line-of-sight rates.
near the midpoint of the daylight period. Table 2-IV compares fuel expenditures en-
Earlier initiations would have placed the countered during terminal-phase operations
sunline too near the line of sight to the target, with the theoretical minimum. A consider-
thereby obscuring target visibility. Later able variation exists between the ratio of
initiations would not have allowed adequate actual-to-minimum propellant for various
time in daylight for completing the rendez- types of terminal-phase conditions, and also
vous. Gemini experience has shown that for different flights using the same or similar
lighting is not a major constraint for an ac- terminal-phase conditions. This variation
tive rendezvous provided the spacecraft reflects the critical nature of the task, in that
guidance system does not fail during the ter- fairly small velocity vector errors can cas-
minal approach ; but lighting is a major con- cade to high propellant consumption or fail-
straint for an optical rendezvous. ure to complete the rendezvous. The braking
The fourth requirement was that the ter- operation is particularly critical. Braking
minal trajectory allow a low terminal-ap- too soon will increase line-of-sight control
proach velocity and low line-of-sight angular requirements, and require more time to con-
rate. The requirement was important in se- trol the spacecraft during the closing se-
lecting the trajectory parameters for the quence. .
coelliptical and the first-orbit rendezvous An additional comparison of rendezvous
plans. The 130 transfer utilized on several performance is shown in table 2-V where
of the missions was chosen primarily because the actual terminal-phase vernier corrections
of the low line-of-sight angular rate near are compared with the preflight minimal pre-
intercept. The biased apogee approach was dicted. This comparison provides a n espe-
selected for Gemini XI because the direct cially good measure of guidance-system per-
tangential approach would have resulted in formance, since the maneuvers were nomi-
a high closing velocity. nally very small and became large only with
Throughout the Gemini Program, there degradation of guidance-system performance
was a question of the level of effort to be or with control difficulties.
applied to the development of backup pro- A number of terminal-phase rendezvous
cedures to accommodate guidance-system operations were satisfactorily completed
failures. During the Gemini XI first-orbit during the Gemini Program by using optical
18 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
I I Propellant usage, lb
Gemini mission I Type of rendezvous Conditions at start of
terminal phase I Actual 1 Minimum Ratio
VI-A ..........
I
' M =4 .................... A h = 15 n. mi.
A X = 25 n. mi.
..................................
....................
130
I...............81 ..............1.60
! I
Coelliptic :
XI1 ........................ M =3 ..................... A h = 10 n. mi. .................... ..............112 .............. 55 .............2.04
A X = 20 n. mi. ....................
I I
i First Second First Second
!
VI-A
VI11
..........................II ..................................
............................ 1 .................................
11
15
I .................................
i .................................
7
9
................................. 1 ' .................................... 2
I,
.................................................................... 0
form is highly desirable. During simulations, li&ff ; using only ground-supplied informa-
rendezvous have been effected without plat- tion; or by using a of onboard
form information ; however, the probability
and ground-supplied
of success is relatively low.
21
Preceding page Hank
22 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
plan was selected which afforded rendezvous maneuver was a phase adjustment which oc-
in the fourth spacecraft revolution with the curred at the second spacecraft apogee. Out-
following salient features : of-plane errors were removed with a maneu-
(1) The Gemini Launch Vehicle was tar- ver at the common node following the second
geted to provide the desired altitude differ- apogee. Subsequent radar-tracking informa-
ential between the target and spacecraft tion indicated the need for an additional
orbits at spacecraft apogee. Also, a dogleg adjustment to the altitude differential a t
launch trajectory was flown in order to insert spacecraft apogee. This maneuver was per-
the spacecraft into the plane of the target formed at perigee near the end of the second
orbit. revolution. The final midcourse translation
(2) The first spacecraft orbit was fr'ee of was a coelliptic maneuver performed at the
rendezvous activity so the crew could make third apogee. The purpose of this maneuver
the necessary systems checks, and the ground was to place the spacecraft orbit at a con-
controllers could determine the precise space- stant altitude difference below the target-
craft orbit. vehicle orbit. The same basic mission plan
(3) Preestablished maneuver points were was also successfully used on Gemini VIII.
selected to account for expected dispersions For the Gemini IX-A mission, the mid-
in lift-off time and spacecraft insertion con- course-maneuver sequence had the additional
ditions. requirement to more nearly duplicate the
(4) The site chosen to update a maneuver Apollo time line and midcourse phase planned
had acquisition so that adequate time re- for the lunar rendezvous operations. This led
mained for the crew to orient the spacecraft to rendezvous in the third spacecraft revolu-
to the maneuver attitude. tion with a somewhat different maneuver se-
The midcourse maneuver sequence can be quence (fig. 3-2). The phase-adjustment
seen in figure 3-1. Tracking during the first maneuver was performed a t the first space-
revolution indicated that the altitude differ- craft apogee. Since the phasing maneuver
ential at spacecraft apogee exceeded the ac- uas based upon a minimal amount of track-
ceptable tolerance ; thus, the initial mid- ing. a second midcourse maneuver designed
course translation was a height adjustment to achieve phasing, height, and plane require-
performed a t spacecraft perigee near the end ments was scheduled in the second revolu-
of the first revolution. The second midcourse tion. The location of this maneuver was
-
CL
$ 40-
-"
m
.-
L
Ahead+ Behind
Horizontal displacement, n. mi.
’
!
GeminiX
target-vehicle
’
~
I launch time,
Gemini VI11 Greenwich
target-vehicle mean time, Required
vector hr :min :sec apogee, n. mi.
- I
-
.3 60 -
L
0)
3/19/66 ..............................
3/30/66 .............................
3:40:58 ........................
i
3 :40:54 ........................
226
246
>
4/25/66 ............................. 3 :37:30 .........................
8080 0 8b Iko 2iO 3iO 4bo
5/16/66 .............................. 3 :37:30 ........................
470
400
Ahead+ Behind
6/ 9/66 .............................. 3:46:30 1........................ 390’
Horizontal displacement. n. mi.
5/24/66 ............................. .)..41:55 ........................
.) 360
1. Spacecraft insertion 00:06:21 4. Coelliptical combination
6/20/66 .............................. 3 :40 :26 ........................ 420
2. Phase adjustment OO:59:39 5. Terminal-phase initiation
3. Corrective combination 7/18/66 ............................. 3 :39:46 ........................ 409
6. Velocity match
FIGURE3-2.-Relative trajectory of spacecraft from ‘Column shows dates when the passive Gemini
insertion to two-revolution rendezvous in target- VI11 targct vehicle was in proper position for lift-off
centered curvilinear coordinate system. of the Gemini X mission to accomplish dual rendez-
vous.
selected to afford a maximum amount of target vehicle, they initiated midcourse ma-
tracking over the continental U.S. stations. neuvers (fig. 3-3) to achieve desired condi-
The final maneuver in this sequence provided tions for the terminal phase of rendezvous
a constant altitude differential between the with the passive Gemini VI11 target vehicle.
two orbits, and also placed the Gemini space- The Gemini X target-vehicle propulsion sys-
craft in the plane of the target vehicle. tem was used to perform these maneuvers
The initial rendezvous maneuver sequence while-the spacecraft and target vehicle were
utilized on Gemini X was identical to that of docked ; the spacecraft propulsion system was
Gemini VI-A. However, the ground control- user1 after undocking.
lers had the additional tasks of evaluating
onboard maneuver calculations based upon 240 r
star measurements and upon the Inertial
Guidance System ascent vector; and of giv-
ing a go-no-go decision on these solutions
based upon retaining acceptable terminal-
phase conditions. The flight plan also included
a rendezvous between the spacecraft and the
passive target vehicle, which had been
launched during the Gemini VI11 mission
and then placed in a higher parking orbit.
This plan created a n additional complexity, as Ahead +Behind
compared with the earlier rendezvous mis- Horizontal displacement. n. mi.
sions, and necessitated an on-time launch for 1. Phasing maneuver, 4. Coelliptic maneuver,
both the target vehicle and the spacecraft. 9. e. 1. 07:38:34 9. e. 1. 22:37:54
2. Height maneuver, 5. Terminal-phase
Table 3-1 shows the variation during the 9. e. 1. 20:21:02 initiation,
4-month period preceding flight in lift-off 3. Plane change, 9. e. 1. 47:30341
time required of the Gemini X target vehicle, g. e. 1. 2130349
as well a s the required aponee altitude for
FIGURE:L::.-Rclative trajectory of Gemini X dual
dual rendezvous phasing. After the crew com- rendezvous in target-centered curvilinear coordi-
pleted the initial clocking with the Gemini ,Y nate system.
24 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
+Behind
q .+;
L
Ahead I 1 I 1
Horizontal displacement. n. mi. 5 10 15 20 25
Ahead Behind
FIGURE
34-Relative trajectory of Gemini XI from Horizontal displacement. n. mi.
insertion to rendezvous in tarpet-vehicle curvi-
linear coordinate system. FIGURE
R-5.-Gemini X I stahle orhit re-rendezvous.
GROUND CONTROL AND MONITORING OF RENDEZVOUS 25
TABLE
3-II.-Re~ndezvous Midcourse Phase Swn.jna r.tt
~- __~___._
!
i Variation in
Velocity
-~terminal-phase Variation in
Gemini mission
1 initiation time, altitude differential,
~~~
,--------
VI-A ........................................................
~ 117 .............................. I
159 i ........................... 1
2.1 ................................ 1.1
VI11 ..........................................................
I
117 .............................. 150 ........................... 9.7 / ................................ 1.2
27
Preceding page blank
28 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
and a third component was manually com- that the height-adjust maneuver usually per-
puted and applied. This third component was formed a t second perigee was replaced by a n
a radial correction based upon a computer insertion correction. The crew procedures
readout of downrange travel, and was de- for onboard determination of the midcourse
signed to correct the phasing a t first apogee. maneuvers involved a sequence of computer
One of the procedural problems related to the and sextant usage. The first maneuver was
insertion correction was a method for avoid- made a t insertion. After this correction, a n
ing recontact with the launch vehicle after auxiliary tape memory module containing
separation and for applying the Insertion the mathematical flow f o r the orbit determi-
Velocity Adjust Routine maneuver. The prob- nation, navigation, and prediction modes of
lem was resolved by prohibiting a certain operation was entered into the onboard com-
band of velocity changes most likely to result puter. First, the orbit determination mode
in recontact, and by establishing visual con- was selected and initialized, and a series of
tact with the launch vehicle before making s t a r measurements was made and entered
retrograde corrections. into the computer. After processing these
Midcourse phase.-The onboard opera- data, the computer produced a n updated state
tions required f o r the catchup phase of a vector which was used in the orbit prediction
rendezvous mission basically consisted of de- mode to predict the spacecraft velocity at the
termining and applying the midcourse ma- following maneuver point, and the position
neuvers. Other onboard operations during a t the following apogee if no maneuver was
this phase were routine procedures such a s made. With the aid of the flight charts, this
platform alinements and system checks. For information was used to predict the desired
most of the rendezvous missions, the mid- velocity a t the next maneuver point-thus the
course maneuvers were computed by the velocity change. The other maneuvers were
ground complex and transmitted to the determined in a similar manner, and all of
spacecraft. The crew tasks in this case con- the solutions were compared with the corre-
' sisted only of achiev'ing the correct attitude sponding ground computer values. If the d i E
and of applying the thrust a t the proper ferences were within the bounds established
time. A typicaI sequence of catchup maneu- before flight, the onboard-determined ma-
vers is shown in figure 4-1. neuvers would be applied ; if not, the ground-
To demonstrate a n onboard navigation supplied maneuvers would be applied.
capability, t h e Gemini X mission procedures Several problems arose in connection with
required the flight crew to compute catchup these procedures. For example, a group of
maneuvers using the onboard orbit determi- stnr-to-horizon angle measurements from a n
nation and prediction capability. The same earlier mission indicated t h a t the apparent
basic maneuvers were computed a s on the altitude of the E a r t h horizon changed with
earlier four-orbit rendezvous mission, except time, possibly as a result of varying moon-
light conditions. These variations were large
enough to have a significant effect on the ma-
neuver solutions, and a series of measure-
-E
c
ments was required to calibrate the horizon.
-
a
l
40- A second problem was the definition of a
measurement schedule for orbit. determina-
tion. The timing, as well as the type and the
580 I I I 1
direstion, of the measurements had to be
izoo 1000 800 600 400 200 o established. Studies revealed that the meas-
Behind--( urements should be spaced over two darkness
Trailing distance, n. mi.
periods, and that n variety of directions
FIGURE4-1.-Typical midcourse maneuvers. should be used. The selected schedule con-
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 29
sisted of four in-plane and two out-of-plane puted a t regular intervals and displayed to
measurements, but the crew timing require- the crew. The time of the transfer and the
ments and the inaccuracy of the resulting number of vernier corrections were mission-
out-of-plane orbit determination led to the planning options. Generally, based on a tra-
decision to use dummy out-of-plane measure- jectory that would result in an intercept in
ments. The effect was that the out-of-plane 130" of orbit travel ( d= 130'), a transfer
component of the vector was not updated. time of about 30 minutes was selected with
Terminal phase.-The terminal-phase ren- two vernier corrections.
dezvous operations employed the onboard Brakiiig a d line-of-sight coutrol phase.-
computer in conjunction with the inertial The braking and line-of-sight control phase
platform and radar. In the rendezvous mode, which followed the final vernier correction
the computer gathered radar and platform was manually controlled. Simply stated, line-
data, and operated on the data in the sequence of-sight rate control was achieved by deter-
outlined in figure 4-2. Initially, data were mining the direction of the rate and thrust-
sampled and stored a t a crew-optional fixed- ing normal t o the line of sight to null this
time interval ; both 60 and 100 seconds were rate. The direction of the motion could be
used. After sufficient data had been stored, determined by either of two methods. The
a n estimate of the total velocity change re- first method was to fix the attitude of the
quired for a two-impulse rendezvous transfer target vehicle with respect to a body-fixed
was computed and displayed to the crew. The reticle. When movement was apparent,
estimate was updated with each succeeding thrust was applied radially in the direction
data point for use a s an aid in determining of motion. The second method, which could
the best point to initiate the transfer. The be employed when stars were not visible,
crew initiated the maneuver sequence by de- made use of the Flight Director Attitude In-
pressing the START COMP button on the dicators in an inertial mode. After the com-
instrument panel. A t this time, the velocity mand pilot had boresighted on the target,
change (in components along the three body the pilot entered a logic choice into the com-
axes) for terminal-phase initiation was dis- puter which centered the flight director indi-
played to the crew, along with the proper cator needles and subsequently deflected
attitude for application of the thrust. The them proportionately to spacecraft inertial-
maneuver was achieved when the command attitude changes. The command pilot was
pilot depressed the maneuver controller un- then able to hold the attitude that would keep
til the displayed velocity change counted -the needles centered, and to observe the tar-
down t o zero. Since equipment and applica- get drift with the optical sight. Nulling the
tion errors could produce significant disper- target motion was then accomplished in the
sions in the resulting transfer trajectory, same manner as the first method.
vernier corrections t o the transfer were com-
Monitorinl: and Backup T e c h n i q u e s
TABLE
4-L-Monitoring Data
Display
Data Units ! ' Sensor
Prime Backup
Range ............ 0.01 n. mi. ................. Radar ..................... Manual data unit .. Analog page
Range rate ............... ft/sec ......................... Radar ..................... Manual data unit .. Analog gage
Pitch angle ............... 0.1" ........................... Inertial measuring Manual data unit .. Flight director
unit. attitude
indicator,
stars
Yaw angle ............... 0.1" ............................ Inertial measuring -Manual data unit .. Flight director
unit. attitude
indicator,
stars
Roll angle .................. 0.1" ........................... Inertial measuring Manual data unit .. Flight director
unit. attitude
I indicator,
stars
:i:g.
e
i
m
E
= 20
M
to track the target and observe the increase
in elevation angle. Pertinent data were re-
corded on logging sheets at each interval as
sampiis were taken by the computer for the
computation of the closed-loop solution for
FIGURE
4-4.-Terminal-phase initiation.
( 6 ) Enter terminal-phase initiation chart nations of partial and complete failures were
to calculate AR,1 V s , and terminal-phase ini- too numerous to permit specific training for
tiation time each. Therefore, procedures were developed
( 7 ) Compare AR and A V with~ closed loop only f v - total failure of each of the three ma-
and Manned Space Flight Network jor guidance system components : radar,
computer, and platform. Partial failures
A similar technique was used for midcourse were then handled by utilizing whatever
corrections except that measurements were
valid data were available from the degraded
triggered on time after terminal-phase ini- component.
tiation rather than on pitch angle. For total failure of any guidance compo-
Fnilzire modes.-Throughout the Gemini ' nent, the closed-loop solution would no longer
Program, manual techniques were utilized be available. In this case, it was necessary t o
wherever practical to maximize the proba- rely on the ground or backup solution ob-
bility of mission success. Thus, the crew was tained by a1tern:ite methods. For all failures,
prepared at all times to continue the mission procedures were designed to obtain a maneu-
with degraded or failed systems components. ver solution in components along and normal
This required frequent reference to monitor- to the target liiie of sight. Table 4-11 sum-
ing c; a and substitution of alternate sources marizes the sensors used for the significant
whei: Lailures occurred. The different situa- failures. For radar failures, a redundant
tions that could exist for all possible combi- source of range information was not avaii-
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 33
IX-A: Initial rendezvous ............ Augmented target dock- 1 Below ................................. 12.5 .......... 130
ing adapter.
!
I
X: Initial rendezvous .................. Gemini X target vehicle ...... Below ................/I .................15 !....................130
(4) Two vernier corrections a t fixed times establishing a time for the terminal-phase
after terminal-phase initiation initiation were number of phasing orbits de-
(5) An approach from below and slightly sired and sunlight conditions. Three phasing
ahead of the target through a series orbits were required for the early flights of
of braking maneuvers at fixed ranges Gemini VI-A and VIII. As ground and on-
along an inertially fixed line board operations evolved, the number was
The major variables available for mission decreased to two for the later flights, Gemini
planning purposes can be summarized as fol- IX-A and XII. A further decrease in total
lows : time to rendezvous required modification of
(1) Time of terminal-phase initiation terminal-phase procedures on Gemini XI.
(2) Target elevation angle a t terminal- Terminal-phase lighting tradeoff s centered
phase initiation around the following :
(3) Orbit travel between terminal-phase (1) Target visibility a t termifid-phase
initiation and terminal-phase finali- initiation in reflected sunlight
zation (2) Availability of siars during braking
( 4 ) Time between vernier corrections phage t o aid line-of-sight control
(5) Braking schedule. (3) Approach to docking in sunlighc
, (6)- Altitude dif€exe,.tizl between target These considerations placed the terminal-
and spacecraft phase initiation time near sunset with mid-
The time of terminal-phase initiation was course corrections and line-of-sight control
grossly controlled by lift-off time and by phas- during the night period.
ing maneuvers prior to the circular catchup Figure 4-5 depicts the lighting conditions
orbit, with phasing maneuvers determined for the typical rendezvous from below the
on the ground. Primary considerations in target vehicle. Elevation angles of the target
ON BOARD OPERATIONS FOR RENDEZVOUS 35
VI-A 32 31 4u 7F 7u SL 4F 3u 6R
VI11 32 25 3u 12F 6U 1R 4F 7u 3R
IX-A 27 (27) .(1U) 2A 2U 3R 3F 2D OR
26 8U
x ...... .. .......
. . 32 41 (OU) 15A (14D) 1R (OF) 25D 5R
1u 22D 1F
XII.......... 22 (OU) (2U) (OR) (SA) (OR)
the Gemini IV, VIII, IX-A, X, and XI1 mis- available for the 'first-orbit rendezvous mis-
sions. The times of vernier corrections were sion, the multiorbit midcourse corrections
selected to be compatible with crew loading and circular catchup orbit could not be used.
and the anticipated accuracy of the guidance As a result, the flight plan included onboard
system. Vernier corrections 12 and 24 min- operations capable of absorbing the expected
utes after terminal-phase initiation allowed insertion dispersions in a relatively short
sufficient time for crew activities, such as time. The trajectory plan selected for the
system monitoring and platform alinement first-orbit rendezvous had a terminal ap-
v h e r e necessary, but were close enough to proach similar to the approach employed on
prevent appreciable trajectory divergence. the coelliptical rendezvous missions. How-
The relatively low deceleration capability ever, it appeared that insertion dispersions
of the Gemini spacecraft (approximately would radically affect this approach as shown
1 ft'sec2) dictated that closing velocity be in figure 4-6. Terminal-phase initiation oc-
reduced in several stages to enable the crew curred near the first spacecraft apogee with
to devote proper attention to line-of-sight a 120" central angle of transfer.
control. Early training simulations indicated In providing a capability f o r absorbing the
that braking to a maximum closing rate of insertion dispersions, several procedural
40 f t 'sec at a range of 2.5 nautical miles, and methods were required which were not em-
then down to 5 to 10 ft/sec a t a range of 0.5 ployed on previous missions. At insertion, the
nautical mile, represented a simple and effi- horizontal and out-of-plane velocity changes
cient schedule. . . were planned as usual. These corrections,.
The separation altitude selection was a however, did not remove the trailing dis-
tradeoff between total propellant and sensi- placement error at first spacecraft apogee
tivity of time of arrival a t terminal-phase resulting from downrange and flight-path
initiation to dispersions in' the catchup orbit. angle errors at insertion. This error could
As previously discussed, there were advan- have had a serious effect on the terminal-ap-
tages to certain sunlighting conditions dur- proach trajectory; to reduce the error, the
ing the terminal phase; and for a given error pilot read (from the computer) the navi-
in the catchup orbit, the dispersion in arrival gated downrange angle traveled a t insertion.
time decreased as separation altitude in- From this angle, a required value of altitude
creased. However, propellant requirements rate was determined and compared with the
for the terminal phase increased in propor-
tion to differential altitude. (An altitude dif-
ferential of 15 nautical miles was selected
for Gemini VI-A.) As knowledge of lighting
conditions was gained, and as the capability
TPI - Terminal-phase initiation
actual altitude rate read from the computer. transfer. The backup computation of these
The velocity difference was applied along maneuvers was significantly different than
the local vertical to achieve a n altitude rate for previous missions because the variation
resulting in the desired trailing displacement from the planned position of the spacecraft
a t the terminal-phase initiation point. Al- a t terminal-phase initiation was taken into
though this correction required split-second account. For example, with a radar failure,
timing on the part of the crew, it was very the earlier charts assumed a planned range
effective. in computing the correction instead of using
The second onboard-computed maneuver a predicted range based upon the actual
was an out-of-plane correction to be per- spacecraft position a t terminal-phase initia-
formed 90" after insertion. Since the maneu- tion. The use of predicted values provided
ver a t insertion was to eliminate the out-of- better accuracy for large dispersions. Table
plane velocity at that point, the node oc- 4-V is a summary of the maneuvers for the
curred 90" of orbit travel later. By observing first-orbit rendezvous.
the out-of-plane displacement a t insertion,
the pilot computed the required maneuver. Rendezvous From Above the Target Vehicle
At the expected time of the node, the cor-
rection was applied. A re-rendezvous was conducted on the
Although the .primary procedures for the Gemini IX-A mission to simulate the trajec-
terminal phase of the first-orbit rendezvous tory of a Lunar Module following abort dur-
were similar to the procedures for previous ing powered descent. The trajectory was
rendezvous missions, the effect on the larger similar to that utilized on the fourth-orbit
terminal-phase dispersions had a significant rendezvous mission except that the spacecraft
impact on the design of the backup and the approached the target from ahead and above.
monitoring procedures. The backup pro- The procedures for rendezvous from above
cedures utilized measurements of range and were very similar to the procedures for a
line-of-sight angle changes over a fixed time fourth-orbit rendezvous : the only significant
interval. These measurements were used differences were in the backup measurements
with flight charts to determine the velocity used in the event of a platform failure. Since
changes and the relative position of the the spacecraft approached the target from
spacecraft a t the time of the terminal-phase above, there was no star background during
initiation maneuver. Gemini XI was the first the terminal phase. As a result, the hand-held
mission to utilize a backup capability -"lor an sextant would have been used to make angle
out-of-plane correction a t terminal-phase ini- measurements with respect to the E a r t h
tiation. The correction reduced the disper- horizon. These measurements, like those with
sions caused'by navigation errors during the respect to the star background, required
earlier corrections. visual acquisition of the target.
Two vernier corrections were scheduled a t A significant lesson was learned from the
12-minute intervals during the terminal rendezvous from above ; the terminal-phase
TABLE
4-V.-Gemini X I Rendezvous Maneuvem
lighting conditions were more critical than Rendezvous With B Passive Target
for rendezvous from below. During the early
Gemini IX-A mission planning, i t was de- After the initial rendezvous on Gemini X,
cided that terminal-phase initiation should an exercise was undertaken to intercept the
occur after sunset so t h a t the flashing lights passive target vehicle that had been in orbit
on the target vehicle could be used for visu- since the Gemini VI11 mission. This rendez-
ally acquiring the vehicle against the dark vous with a completely passive target pre-
E a r t h background. It was believed that sun- sented several unique problems, and was
set was preferable to an early morning ter- more demanding of the crew than any other
minal-phase initiation, with acquisition terminal phase. For the exercise, there was
using reflected sunlight (over-the-shoulder no closed-loop guidance and no radar or ac-
lighting) because of the bright E a r t h back- quisition lights ; the terminal-phase maneu-
ground. However, during the Gemini IX-A vers had to be based on backup charts and
flight, the nose shroud on the target vehicle observation of the target in reflected sun-
(Augmented Target Docking Adapter) did light. Approximately 27 minutes of favorable
not completely separate, and i t was believed lighting time were available in each orbit
that the acquisition lights located in the (from about spacecraft noon until sunset),
shroud region might not be visible. The time and the entire terminal phase, including a r -
of terminal-phase initiation was then changed rival dispersions, braking, and stabilizing
from after darkness to early morning to per- position f o r formation flight through the
mit reflected light viewing. Actually, the tar- night period, had to take place within about
get was nut visible a t long range against the 108" of orbit travel. Position was maintained
bright E a r t h background, and could not be after darkness using the docking light on the
tracked visually until the range had de- spacecraft. a s a source of illumination. The
creased to 3 nautical miles. If the radar had light had a cone angle of about 6" and was
failed during this exercise, terminal-phase effective up to a distance of 300 feet. The
corrkctions would not have been possible. short period of visibility indicated that orbit
Furthermore, the rapidly moving terrain travel between t h e initiation and the finali-
background made control of the line of sight zation of the terminal phase would have to
more difficult than with a star field or even be reduced considerably from the 130" used
with a dark Earth. This experience demon- on previous rendezvous. An orbit travel of
strated the importance of terminal-phase 80" and a differential altitude of 7 nautical
lighting, and pointed out the value of the miles were selected. The terminal-phase tra-
flashing acquisition lights a s a backup to the jectory is shown in figure 4-7. This combina-
r a d a r for target tracking. A summary of the tion had several advantages in addition to a
terminal-phase maneuvers f o r the rendezvous
from above is shown in table P V I .
c- -
.--m
-In2
TABLE&VI.-Terminal-Phase Maneuvers
f o r Rendezvous from Above
-
.-
Terminal-phase
Terminal-phase 1st vernier AV,
initiation AV, fps
2d vernier AV, 3
.-
c 6 - initiation,,
fps fPS c
--__ I I 1 I I I I
short terminal phase. The 80" orbit travel based on the ground track of the spacecraft
intercept was a relatively high-energy trans- during the crew sleep period. A terminal-
fer trajectory and, therefore, was less sensi- phase trajectory covering 292" was selected,
tive to initial-condition dispersions and resulting in an elevation time history identi-
errors in maneuvers. This was particularly cal to the familiar 130" transfer. Thus, the
significant because no vernier corrections backup charts from a previous mission could
could be calculated along the line of sight be used for trajectory monitoring. The radar
without radar information. Second, the re- was not operative during this exercise ;
duced differential altitude assisted 'vis- therefore, onboard corrections along the line
ual acquisition and, combined with the 80" of sight were not possible. However, an up/
terminal phase, resulted in closing rates down vernier correction of zero was calcu-
about the same level as the 130" intercept lated, which agreed with the up down
with lbnautical-mile separation. Thus, simi- component of the ground solution. The
lar braking schedules could be used on both ground-computed maneuver was applied,
rendezvous planned for the mission. The time and braking was accomplished while track-
factor was extremely critical during the ing the target vehicle in reflected sunlight.
braking maneuver ; at sunset, all visual con-
tact would suddenly be lost beyond the range Conclusions
of the docking light. Because of the time-
critical nature of the exercise, the flight The Gemini experience has led to a num-
charts included the capability to perform ber of significant conclusions with respect to
terminal-phase initiation for a range of ele- onboard rendezvous operations.
vation angles covering a time period of 10 ( 1 ) The extensive participation of the
minutes on either side of the nominal. The flight .crew in rendezvous operations is feas-
plan was based upon the nominal elevation ible. They are capable of directing the pri-
angle being used if term:nal-phase initiation mary operations of the guidance system and
occurred between visual acquisition and 25 of performing certain phases of the mission
minutes before sunset. A solution was sent without the guidance system. In addition,
from the ground in case visual acquisition they can detect and identify system malfunc-
occurred too late for an onboard solution. tions and take action to assure the success
of the mission.
Stable Orbit Rendezvous ( 2 ) The crew can monitor the perform-
ance of the guidance and navigation system,
During the Gemini X I flight, a small posi- and determine and accomplish all rendezvous
grade separation maneuver was made, fol- maneuvers with the following basic flight in-
lowed later by a retrograde maneuver of the formation: ( a ) range to the target, ( b )
same magnitude. The purpose of these range rate, ( c ) body-attitude angles meas-
ground-computed maneuvers was to estab- ured from horizontal in-plane references. and
lish a trailing position about 25 nautical ( d ) means for tracking the target (visual or
miles behind the target vehicle and in the radar).
same orbit. This location enabled the crew ( 3 ) Fliaht charts can be developed which
to perform experiments and to sleep while provide the crew with the ability to compute
maintaining a position for a simple, economi- solutions for the terminal maneuvers in spite
cal re-rendezvous. Since the re-rendezvous of an inoperative guidance-equipment com-
was initiated from a point in equilibrium ponent. These charts can be macle simple to
relative to the target, the plan was called the use and can provide accuracies comparable to
Stable Orbit Plan. The maneuver to transfer the primary system.
from the stable orbit to an intercept trajec- (4) The onboard operations c;m be simpli-
tory was sent from the ground, and was fied by the proper selection of approach tra-
40 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
j ectories and lighting conditions. A terminal tracking of the target is a backup t o the
approach is desirable, which is insensitive to radar, and the s t a r background is a valuable
trajectory dispersions and equipment errors. aid for maintaining a collision course in the
The lighting conditions determine the visi- braking phase.
bility of the target vehicle and the s t a r back- ( 6 ) A comprehensive program of proce-
ground, thus affecting backup procedures. dural planning, evaluation, and training is
( 5 ) Visibility through the spacecraft win- necessary to the success of the mission. Man-
dow is an important consideration in termi- in-the-loop simulation is a n important p a r t
nal-phase rendezvous operations. Visual of crew training.
5. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED
CONFIGURATION
By HOMERW. DOTTS.Deputy Manager, O.@ce 01 Spacecraft Marragemertt, Gemini Program Ofice, N A S A
Manned Spacecraft Center; ROGERK. NOLTING,Dynamics Eirgineer. McDonnell Aircraft Corp.; WIL-
BURNE F. HOYLER,Ofice of Spacecraft Management. Gemini Program Ofice, VASA lk'anned Space-
craft Center; J O H N R. HAVEY,Aerodynamics Group Emqineer, McDonnell Aircraft Corp.; THOMAS F.
CARTER.JR.. Mission Planninp and Analysis Division. W A S A i?lnnnt.tl Sprccecmtl Cenler : r i n d ROBERT
T. JOHNSON, Chief Systems Engineer, Gemini Agerta, Locliheed Missiles R- Space Co.
41
42 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
erations were secondary when compared with feature. The electrical and the primary me-
the advantage gained by providing a full view chanical power devices were installed on the
of the target vehicle prior to and after dock- target vehicle because this vehicle was less
ing. With this advantage, impact velocities weight critical than was the spacecraft.
and attitudes became reasonable values and The prime contractor for the spacecraft
were determined through simulation exer- was selected to manufacture the docking
cises. Also, implementation of all target-ve- adapter to be mounted on the target vehicle.
hicle control and status display and electrical An interface plane was chosen so t h a t the
disconnects was simplified ; however, the adapter contained all equipment directly as-
structural mechanical attachment was some- sociated with docking. Only electric power,
what more complicated because of limited telemetry data, and command system signals
bending stiffness. crossed the interface. A simple butt joint,
The evolution from concept to design and consisting of mating skin-former angles and
the analysis of results from further simula- tension bolts, provided easy attachment of
tions resulted in the following design cri- the docking adapter to the target vehicle.
teria: closing velocity of 1.5 ft'sec, angular The final docking approach (fig. 5-2) was
misalinement of lo'.', and centerline displace- entirely visual, with the target vehicle pow-
ment of 1 foot with the requirement for ered up and stabilized. Visual cues were pro-
multiple docking capability. vided to indicate the status of the target
vehicle for nighttime as well as daylight
TarKrt Dockin* Adapter docking. Docking was accomplished when
three latches in the target-vehicle docking
A general arrangement of the selected con- cone engaged corresponding fittings on the
figuration is shown in figure 5-2. The se- spacecraft. Engagement of the latches com-
pleted a circuit that automatically secured
lected collision-course maneuver was similar
the cone against the rigid structure ; this was
to a jet pilot's experience in refueling opera- the rigidized mode. Undocking was the re-
tions, was the simplest design approach, and verse of this procedure, with provisions f o r
was acceptable from a control and safety emergency undocking furnished by pyro-
standpoint. For similar reasons, the probe technic devices which would dislodge the
and drogue design was chosen and a docking three spacecraft fittings.
bar was installed to provide the indexing Figure 5-3 shows some of the major com-
ponents of the Target Docking Adapter.
Seven dampers were clustered a t three loca-
tions and damped relative motion in all three
axes ; they also returned the cone to the ready
configuration. A small electric motor pro-
vided the power to retract the cone by means
of a torsion cable drive to three-gear motors
which operated the overcenter bellcrank and
linkage devices. Final motion caused the
latches to close down on the spacecraft fit-
tings, effecting a rigid connection. Undocking
Discharge fin+
Approach \- was simply a reversal of this sequence. Some
of the other major components were the tar-
get-vehicle status display indicators, acquisi-
FIGURE
&2.-Docking and rigidizinp sequence. tion lights, and spiral and dipole antennas.
Acquisition light
Dipole antenna*
5
:,
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION
s
1, Spiral antenna
Before impact
43
After impact
I
1 I I I I I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mass ratio, M,IM,
FIGURE
5-4.-Two-degree-of -freedom energy
requirements.
Initially, no control-system effects were in- from the program. The maximum single-
cluded. This model permitted detailed investi- point contact load between t h e vehicles was
gation of the forces and motions which oc- determined to be approximately 800 pounds,
curred during free docking. and occurred when the spacecraft impacted
Figure 5-5 presents a set of typical re- on the bottom side of the docking cone ap-
sponse parameters plotted against time for proximately 1 foot from the latch plane.
the case of the spacecraft impacting the Figure 5-6 shows the effect of having the
docking cone with a horizontal relative-ve- stabilization systems of both vehicles on dur-
locity component of 1.5 ft/sec and a vertical ing docking. This case has the same initial
relative-velocity component of 0.5 ftlsec, the conditions a s the previous case when the
design-limit velocities. The initial point of stabilization systems were off. The main dif-
impact a t time 0 is near the leading edge of ference in vehicle response between the two
the top inner surface of the docking cone, cases is that the spacecraft attitude r a t e is
26 inches along the docking-cone surface now reduced to the 0.2 deg/sec deadband
from the latch plane. The motion of the space- level instead of maintaining the 3.5 deg./sec
craft-leading edge down the cone surface to level shown in figure 5-5. The target vehicle, .
the latch plane is represented by the curve on the other hand, acquires a slightly higher
labeled D. The force F between vehicles attitude rate with the systems on. The higher
varies from a peak of nearly 300 pounds for rate occurs because the spacecraft system is
this case, to a small grazing valde after the more powerful and, in stabilizing the
about 0.4 second. The figure also shows the spacecraft, i t overpowers the stabilization
inertial angular rates produced by F for each attempts of the target-vehicle system. Conse-
vehicle; these rates were initially zero. A t quently, by the time the spacecraft reaches
about 1.5 seconds the spacecraft reaches the the latch plane, larger angular eccentricities
base of the docking cone, and the mathemati- between the vehicles result with the stabili-
cal model no longer applies. The impact zation systems on rather than off and assum-
essentially has 2-degree-of-freedom charac- ing the same errors at initial contact. This
teristics after this point. The damper strokes becomes less important when the ease with
a r e not shown on the figure but a r e available which the pilot can control initial errors in
.-e a - P
ai
v d
c u
, " B
b'
0-
0 .a .a 1.2 1.6
.. .
Time, sec Time, sec
the stabilized mode is compared with the un- TABLE5-I.-Docking Model Scale Factors
stabilized mode. Simulator training showed I
better pilot control when docking in the
spacecraft rate-damping mode (the stabi-
Parameter i model/prototype
~ Scale factor,
1/4
While the 8-degree-of-freedom study was Time ........................................... I 1/4
Mass ............................................ moo
being made, a docking test was conducted
with a lh-scale dynamic model. The objec-
Derived :
Velocity .....................................
i
~ 1/1
tives were to confirm the design of the dock- Acceleration ............................... 4/1
ing system by providing the following Spring rate ............................... , 4/25
Kinetic friction .......................... I 1/25
information :
Preload force ............................. 1/25
(1) Stability of the shock-absorbing Moment of inertia ................... 1/1600
modes Angular velocity ........................ 4/1
(2) Maximum loads in shock-absorbing Angular acceleration ...............
Velocity-squared damp
' 16/1
system components constant. 1/25
( 3 ) Time histories of the accelerations of ~
ing frequency of the moored configuration, ground vibration test was conducted using
stability studies indicated that a n inadequate the test setup shown in figure 5-9. The space-
gain margin existed in this mode. The Agena craft was moored to a Target Docking
autopilot system was modified by adding a Adapter bolted to a target-vehicle forward
5-cycle-per-second attenuation filter to the auxiliary rack that was cantilevered from the
electrical compensation networks. Later esti- laboratory floor. Data from this cantilevered
mates, however, indicated that the actual configuration were then related to the actual
first bending frequency was considerably spacecraft /target-vehicle free-free configura-
lower than the estimated 5 cycles per second tion, which could not be conveniently simu-
and was closer to 3 cycles per second. This lated in the laboratory. Various axial load
seriously affected the performance of the and clocking-adapter bending-moment condi-
newly designed control system. tions were simulated to correspond with in-
As shown in figure 5-8, the new control puts from the target-vehicle Primary
system failed to provide a minimum desir- Propulsion System. The data of primary im-
able gain margin of 6-dB and 25" phase mar- portance were those needed in the Primary
gin in the dominant rigid-body mode for the
Propulsion System stability study-minimum
applicable damping values of the first bend-
first bending-mode frequency and damping,
ing mode of the system. As computed here,
gain margin is 10 times the common loga- and maximum cross-axis coupling. The mini-
rithm of the ratio of the upper critical gain mum first free-free bending-mode frequency
to the lower; that is, a ratio of 4 gives 6 dB. was determined to be 3.3 cycles per second.
The upper critical gain corresponded to in- The damping ratio (C'C,.) of the first mode
stability of the first bending mode, and the varied considerab!y with test conditions from
lower gain corresponded to rigid-body in-
- stability. The clashed portions of the figure
a r e extrapolated values obtained from the
actual damping regime that was studied. To
improve the gain margin available, the con-
trol system was modified by altering the con-
figuration of the lead-lag network to
accommodate the 3-cycle-per-second first
bending frequency. The gain margins were
significantly increased.
To determine the structural dynamic char-
acteristics of the docked configuration, a
16 r
/*-- /---
U /-- Modified control system
.-c */
Minimum desirable gain margin..
c
Standard control s y s t e m y - - -
*e--*
1 I I 1 I I I 1
0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
First bending mode damping ratio, percent
a minimum of nearly 3 percent to a maxi- tions. The accelerometer signals were trans-
mum of almost 5 percent. A minimum damp- mitted through the spacecraft telemetry
ing ratio of 2.34 percent was used in the system to a ground network station. The net-
study to account for possible high-tempera- work station relayed the signals, in real time,
ture effects on the docking-adapter dampers. to the Manned Spacecraft Center where the
The cross-axis response in the test configura- data were evaluated prior to t h e first firing
tion was frequently 50 percent of the in-axis of the target-vehicle Primary Propulsion
response, indicating that spring coupiing System.
coefficients of 3 to 6 percent should be in- Table 5-11 compares the inflight test data
cluded in the stability study equations of with corresponding data from the cantilever
motion. Inclusion of the spring coupling ground test. The first bending-mode fre-
effect in the study showed it to be only quency was 4 cycles per second and was about
slightly destabilizing ; this effect is included 10 percent higher than the frequency indi-
in figure 5-8. cated from the ground test at corresponding
amplitudes of vibration. Due to the thrusters
Inflight Bending-Mode Test firing, the moored vehicle was bent through
an angle of 1 minute a t the docking-adapter
When i t became apparent that the original latch. The observed damping ratios varied
Agena control system was going to perform from approximately 4.5 t o 6.5 percent and
marginally during the docked Primary Pro- were considerably higher than the ground-
pulsion System firings, a simple test was de- test value of about 3 percent. The differences
vised to determine inflight values of the first could have been caused by low temperatures
bending-mode frequency, damping, and that sharply increased the contribution of
cross-axis coupling. Determination of these the dampers to the total damping of the first
parameters under actual flight conditions
bending mode. The temperature of the
would have increased the confidence in the
gain margins for this system (fig. 5-8). dampers was unknown. Cross-axis coupling
When the decision was made to replace the was evident and was approximately the same
standard control system with a modified sys- level a s indicated in the ground test. Since
tem, the inflight bending-mode test was re- all measured values of frequency and damp-
tained in the flight plan as a final check on ing were higher than the predicted values,
the docked configuration structural param- and cross coupling was equal t o the predicted
eters. values, the configuration was considered safe
The test was performed during the Gemini for maneuvers using the target-vehicle Pri-
X mission. After the spacecraft and target mary Propulsion System.
vehicle were docked and rigidized, the com-
mand pilot fired a pair of spacecraft pitch- TABLE5-II.--Comparison of Inflight Data
plane attitude thrusters for 3 seconds; this With Ground-Test Data
was immediately followed by a 3-second fir-
'
I I
I I
ing of the opposing pair of pitch-plane i
I Frequency,
thrusters. The procedure produced three I percent ' coefficient,
separate sets of vibrational motions for the percent
first bending mode of the vehicles. Each set
Ground 3 (Ambient 3 to 6
contained about 10 cycles. The same pro- temperature )
cedure was repeated in the yaw plane of the I
docked vehicles. Accelerometers having full- Inflight I
I
4.0 I 4.6 to 6.5
1 (Temperature
I p 3 t 0 6
scale values of 0.02g were located in the i
I unknown)
spacecraft adapter section to sense the vibra- I I
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION 49
Target-Docking Simulatioiie and Training the systems in the target vehicle, and of the
The next evaluation of the target-docking mooring system of the Target Docking
systems was simulator training by the flight Adapter. Visual observation of the target-
crews to develop proficiency for the docking vehicle status display (fig. 5-10), located
and docked maneuvering phases of the actual above the docking cone, provided this infor-
flight. The first training phase was performed mation. Figure 5-10 shows a normal system
on the Translational and Docking Simulator condition as observed before docking. Green
which provided a full-scale simulation of DOCK and PWR lights indicate that the
close-in formation flying and docking maneu- mooring system is satisfactory for docking.
vers. The target-vehicle systems are verified by the
green MAIN light, indicating that the hy-
Differences' in orbit-plane positions be-
draulic system pressure and the differential
tween the two vehicles were provided by
pressure between fuel and oxidizer a r e nor-
lateral translation of the spacecraft mockup.
mal; by the green SEC HI and SEC LO
A displacement of 22 feet either side of the
lights, indicating that the Secondary Propul-
center position was available. Differences in
sion System is in a satisfactory condition;
orbit altitude were represented by the verti-
and by the green ATT light indicating that
cal movement of the target-vehicle mockup
the target-vehicle colcl-gas attitude system is
with a total displacement capability of 33
activated. Upon clocking, the green DOCK
feet. Closing or opening rates were simu-
light is deenergized; when the vehicles a r e
lated by moving the target vehicle toward or
rigidized a green RIGID light is observed.
away from the spacecraft along a 125-foot
The second training phase was directed
horizontal track. Docking, latching, and
toward utilizing the target-vehicle systems,
rigidizing were accomplished with hardware
principally for attitude and translational
similar to that to be used on the flight ve-
maneuvers of the combined vehicles. This
hicle. Relative attitudes of both vehicles
training was performed on the Gemini Mis-
were provided by the ability of the spacecraft
sion Simulator a t the Manned Spacecraft
to move in all three axes: 45" to either side
Center. The flight-crew control of the target
in yaw. 45' to either side in roll, and 40
vehicle and of the mooring system was
down and 50- up in pitch.
through the encoder and docking-adapter
The realism of the docking simulator was controls, as illustrated on the spacecraft in-
successfully demonstrated by comparing the strument display in figure 5-11. The docking-
conditions observed through the window of adapter controls on the center control panel
the trainer with those observed during the
actual flights. The simulated closing and
docking sequence started from a position
slightly left of and below the target vehicle.
The command pilot first maneuvered the
spacecraft to aline the two vehicles, then
translated forward with a relative velocity
of approximately 1 ft,;sec. The docking cone
and docking bar adjusted for small aline-
ment errors a t impact and the docking cone
absorbed the impact loads. After impact
oscillations were damped, the spacecraft and
target-vehicle mockups were rigidized and
prepared for combined maneuvers.
Another part of the docking training was
crew recognition of the status and safety of FIGURE
5-10.-Tar~etet-vchicle status display panel.
50 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
v
Docking
Adapter figured for the maneuver. The spacecraft and
H2 control target vehicle were then maneuvered to the
* U T O I P u L S E
Encoder
proper heading ; the Attitude Control System
was adjusted for a Primary Propulsion Sys-
FIGURE
5-11.-Spacecraft instrument display. tem firing and for the desired velocity input ;
and the engine was activated. Sixteen seconds
were utilized for backup to the automatic after the command to fire the Primary Pro-
rigidizing sequence and encoder-commanded pulsion System, the Secondary Propulsion
unrigidizing signal. The crew used the en- System fired to establish the proper ullage
coder (located below the right-switch/cir- configuration. The Primary Propulsion Sys-
cuit-breaker panel) to send commands to the tem initiate would not occur until 84 seconds
target-vehicle propulsion, guidance, and after the PPS ON command, with automatic
Spacecraft
commandno.
I, Command title Function
' 460 Attitude Control System gain low Establish necessary attitude con-
310 Roll horizon sensor to yaw trol for Primary Propulsion Sys-
Inertial Reference Package ON . ter firing
Spacecraft
command no.
1 Command title
I
I
Function
I
500 I Primary Propulsion System cutoff ' Disable the Primary Propulsion
460 1 Attitude Control System gain low System and reset attitude con-
370 1 Attitude Control System pressure low trol for nonthrusting operation
451 Attitude Control System deadband wide
271 Power relay reset I
shutdown occurring after the desired velocity gree of proficiency. Gemini VI11 was the first
was achieved. A backup to the engine shut- mission in which a Gemini Agena Target
down was performed by the flight crew by Vehicle was placed in orbit. After a success-
placing the engine switch to STOP. After ful rendezvous and final station keeping, the
shutdown the Primary Propulsion System following events occurred. The spacecraft
was deactivated and the Attitude Control was maneuvered to a position directly in line
System was transferred to a nonthrusting with the Target Docking Adapter at a dis-
configuration. tance of approximately 3 feet. The spacecraft
Crew training for the rendezvous and attitude control system was in the rate com-
docking portions of the Gemini X, XI, and mand mode. After the command pilot had in-
XI1 missions consumed an average of 89 spected the status panel, the docking cone,
hours per mission. This time would be ap- and the latches, he initiated the final ap-
proximately doubled if i t included the docked proach by firing the aft-firing maneuver en-
maneuvering simulation training a t Kennedy gines. Contact occurred with less than 2
Space Center. inches of linear displacement, and with very
little angular misalinement a t a velocity of
Docking and Undocking Flight Experience about :y$ft/sec. Onboard sequence pictures
of the event show a smooth operation with no
Actual flight experience with docking and evident reaction by the target vehicle. The
undocking of the spacecraft and target ve- latches appeared to engage immediately, fol-
hicle demonstrated that the design was lowed by cone retraction and illumination of
sound, t h a t testing had been adequate, and the rigid light. The Target Docking Adapter
that crew training had provided a high de- data indicate accelerations less than l g
52 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
peak-to-peak in the horizontal and vertical curred but the hardline command was not
axes, and less than 1/lzg in the longitudinal used for the remaining undockings on this
axis. About '12 hour later, a spacecraft atti- flight.
tude-control problem caused a n unscheduled On all missions, while in the docked con-
emergency undocking. Although the com- figuration, attitude control was excellent
bined vehicle rates a t this time were 3 deg/ when using the various modes provided by
sec in pitch, 2.5 deg/sec in yaw, and 5 deg/ both vehicles. Spacecraft rate command was
sec in roll, the undocking was smooth and used for random maneuvers when relatively
orderly. fast operation was desired ; very precise, but
With one minor exception, all docking and slow, cardinal-heading changes were made
undocking operations during the Gemini X, using the target-vehicle gyrocompassing ma-
XI, and XI1 missions were equally smooth neuver. Spacecraft fixed-attitude control
and uneventful. The exception was the second modes, such as platform or platform with
docking during Gemini XII. Flight-crew ob- orbital rate, provided good general control
servations, onboard sequence pictures, and of the vehicles. However, for very precise
telemetry data indicate that the following pointing of the docked vehicles such as was
probably occurred during this docking. Final required during photography, the target-
approach of the spacecraft to the Target vehicle Attitude Control System in the iner-
Docking Adapter was a t a low velocity, and tial mode was f a r superior to anything ob-
the point of contact was somewhat low. These tainable from the spacecraft systems. Be-
factors caused the bottom docking latch to cause of the constant need to conserve space-
engage: however, the relative motion be- craft propellants for later phases of t h e mis-
tween the two vehicles stopped and the upper sions, the target-vehicle control system was
two latches did not engage. Sensing this, the used whenever possible.
command pilot immediately fired the aft- . One of the most exciting aspects of the
firing engines : but because the two vehicles entire Gemini Program, and the primary rea-
were in contact, the thrust was insufficient to son for rendezvous and docking, was the
complete the dock. After about 40 seconds of capability to utilize the target-vehicle pro-
unsuccessful maneuvers, a pitchup maneuver pulsion systems to greatly increase the
coupled with forward-firing engines caused maneuvering potential of the manned ve-
successful separation. This condition had hicle. This capability was not exercised on
been encountered during tests and i t was Gemini VI11 because of the spacecraft con-
recognized t h a t it could occur in flight; how- trol problem However, Gemini X made very
ever, tests demonstrated that maneuvers, good use of this capability. First, as previ-
such a s successfully employed in this case, ously stat.-rl. a n inflight test was performed
would either separate the vehicles or would to assurc that the dynamic characteristics of
complete the dock, and no design changes the docked configuration would permit safe
were made. use of the target-vehicle Primary Propulsion
An unexplained anomaly occurred after System. Three Primary Propulsion System
the second undocking maneuver during the maneuvers and three Secondary Propulsion
Gemini XI mission. The undocking was ac- System maneuvers were performed on
complished by direct hardline signal from the Gemini X. The maneuvers were all part of
spacecraft. Postseparation telemetry data in- 1114 highly successful and spectacular dual
dicated t h a t the latches of the Target Dock- rendavous of the docked vehicles with the
ing Adapter had not reset; this was con- Gemini VI11 passive target vehicle which had
firmed by crew observation. The crew re- been in orbit 4 months. Table 5-IV outlines
cycled the unrigidized sequence usinrr 3 the purposes of these maneuvers, the in-
radiofrequency command, and proper re creased velocities realized, and the resulting
setting followed. No further difficultie~ oc- orbital changes. It should be noted that the
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOCKED CONFIGURATION 53
actual velocities gained during the Gemini X The vehicle excursions represent the normal
firings were greater than the command val- control-loop linear response in the presence
ues. The error was caused by a characteristic of center-of-gravity offsets. A typical atti-
of the target-vehicle velocity meter that al- tude response is presented in figure 5-12. The
lowed velocity errors to build up when the target vehicle for the Gemini VI11 mission
meter was activated for relatively long had particularly large yaw center-of-gravity
periods ( 4 minutes) of time prior to a firing. offsets because running light batteries were
On subsequent flights, the velocity meter was added to assist in-orbit visual sighting by the
activated only 20 seconds prior to a firing and flight crew. In-plane and out-of-plane velocity
was set with a positive null torque instead of errors resulted from attitude transients
a negative value. caused by Primary Propulsion System firing
The modified lead/lag stabilizing networks and from affected orbital maneuvering accu-
of the target vehicle were first utilized in the racies.
Gemini VI11 mission. Larger-than-expected On missions subsequent to Gemini VIII.
initial yaw-attitude transients were noted the center-of-gravity offset problem was
during the undocked Primary Propulsion minimized by adding ballasts on the target
System firings. The transients, in conjunc- vehicle to locate the center of gravity a t the
tion with the slow response of the autopilot, approximate intersection of the lateral geo-
were directly related to the offset angle be- metric alinement axes. Offsets were reduced
tween the vehicle center of gravity and the to within alinement and center-of-gravity
geometric alinement axes measured from the location uncertainties of the system. From
engine gimbal point. Relatively large vehicle target-vehicle insertion firing data, the mag-
displacements and rates were required to nitude of the heading errors resulting from
position the engine so that the thrust vector alinement uncertainties could be approxi-
would pass through the center of Eravity. mated to provide inflight programing correc-
TABLE
5-IV.-Dockcd Manewers D W n g Gerni/riX
-[
.-_._ -. .. -
Height adjust, N C A Z
System
Primary
I '70:20:1? 0 340.0 346.2
Propulsion i
System
Circularization, N n R Primary ~ 22:37:06 X'L.2
Propulsion
System
Phase adjust, N ci Secondary 22:4.5:36 :0 7.7 9.7
Propulsion i I
System I I
Plane change, N Pr Secondary i 11:04:26 18 i 14.8 16.0
Propulsion I
System i
Phase adjust. N ci Secondary ! 41::15:50 4.4
Propulsion
System
54 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
Concluding Remarks
__- -
Initiation of
maneuver Length of Desired Actual Resulting orbit
Effect of maneuver ground elapsed firing, velocity, velocity, apogee/perigee,
time, hr:min:sec sec It /sec ft /sec n. mi.
-- __--__--- __ - - - - _- -
Plane change 4:28:48 3 110.0 109.8 164.2/154.6
Raise apogee 40:30:15 "5 920.0 919.6 741.5h56.3
Lower apogee 4352355 22.5 920.0 919.47 164.2A54.6
6. OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES
By DAVIDD. LANG,Flight Crew Support Division, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Cenler; and ROGER K.
NOLTING,Dynamics Engineer, McDonnell Aircrall Corp.
Analytical Studies
s5
56 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
to have negligible effect on short-term tether oscillation was relatively insensitive to tether
operations such as spinup and despin ma- damping.
neuvers. These studies predicted the dynamic Figure 6-3 illustrates the effectiveness of
behavior of tethered-system response to ini- tether damping in eliminating a slack,'taut
tial conditions and to simple, digitally simu- tether mode of oscillation. This run started
l a t d , control-system inputs ; however, there with an initially slack tether that quickly be-
was need for a study to reflect the interaction came taut, causing the slack: taut tether
of man with the tethered system. oscillation. A time history of the distance be-
To supplement the digital studies, a 12- tween tether attachment points is provided.
degree-of-freedom, real-time, man-in-the- Since the unstretched tether length was 100
loop simulation of the tether problem was
implemented. This simulation was used to
---Without damping
study the effects of pilot real-time inputs into -With damping
the motion of a tethered-vehicle system by 8:
V
in the tether, and the yaw angle of the space- .- 100 150 200
craft relative to the target vehicle. it can be n Time, sec
seen that while the tension in the tether was FIGURE
fi-:i.-Effect of tether datnpmK on slack/taut
strongly affected by damping, the attitude oscillations.
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 57
feet in this run, any time the distance be- studied analytically to determine specific dy-
tween the tether attachment points was less namic behavior.
than 100 feet the tether was slack. It is ap-
parent from figure 6-3 that with no tether Operational Aspects
damping, the slack, taut condition continued
throughout the run ; but with tether damping, The operational procedure for spinning up
the slack/taut condition was quickly con- the tethered spacecraft/target-vehicle sys-
trolled and resulted in a constantly taut tether tem consisted of backing the spacecraft away
condition. from the target vehicle until the tether was
Spacecraft tni*get-vehicle tethered config- almost taut, then firing the translational
tiration.-The second phase of the analytical thrusters to provide thrust on the spacecraft
study involved choosing a specific configura- normal to the line between the vehicles. This
tion for the spacecraftltarget-vehicle teth- imparting of angular momentum to the
ered system. The selection of a specific con- tethered system generally resulted in a net
figuration primarily involved the hardware change in velocity of the center of mass of
and operational aspects. This freedom of the system, and subsequently changed the
choice was possible because the first phase orbit of the vehicles. This effect would not
study verified that a rotating tether-system have been present if the system spinup had
operation was feasible and safe; besides, at been accomplished with a pure couple; how-
this point in time, any possible configuration ever, due to the passiveness of the target ve-
could be thoroughly studied. The tether hicle in the exercise, the spinup moment on
length was specified as 100 feet as a compro- the system had to be supplied solely by the
mise between maintaining safe separation of spacecraft translation-control system.
the spacecraft and the target vehicle and for The first complication associated with the
minimizing fuel usage to obtain a given angu- operational implementation of the spinup
lar rate for the system. The tether size and tether exercise involved the fact that the
material were dictated by an early program spacecraft lateral translation thrusters had
objective of producing significant artificial a significant component of thrust in the for-
gravity effects (high tether loads). The ward longitudinal direction. As a result, an
tether spring rate of 600 pounds per foot was attempt to spin u p the system by firing only
intentionally high so the tether could be the lateral thrusters resulted in a significant
broken by impact loading as a backup means closing rate between the vehicles. This clos-
of jettisoning the tether and the. target ve- ing rate produced an appreciable period of
hicle if the primary jettisoninn procedure tether slackness. culminating in an extensive
should fail. Dacron webbing with a breaking slack taut tether oscillatory mode. The
strength of 6000 pounds was chosen as the alternatives to this spinup procedure were to
tether material. The tether attachment points orient the spacerraf+4') that its lateral thrust
on the two vehicles were determined on the vector was. in fact. .iormal to the line be-
basis of minimum hardware implication on tweeri the vehicle:. or to simultaneously
the Gemini Program. Attaching the tether t o thru.:t aft a n d latwvill*h,thus holding the
the spacecraft docking bar also provided a tether in tension durinp the spinup maneu-
convenient scheme for jettisoning the tether. ver. Both methnds h a d merit, depending upon
After it was decided that large artificial the der.ree of spin rate desired for the sys-
gravity effects would not be attempted in the tem. Siiice the later:,I 2nd aft firing technique
Gemini Program, an 800-pound break link was ;tpplicable in ; i l l cases and was opera-
was installed in the tether to lower the re- tionally simple. it Y . Y . ~ chosen as the opera-
quirements on the spacecraft propulsion sys- tional technique for spinup of the system.
tem for impact breaking. of the tether. The For lona-duration spinups, the aft thrusting
final tethered-vehicle configuration was then could be terminated eventually, because the
58 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
tether would remain taut during the re- native despin procedure involved applying
mainder of the spinup due to the motion of thrust to reduce the line-of-sight rate to zero
the system. by visual observation of the spacecraft/
During the spinup procedure, attitude con- target-vehicle line-of-sight motion. The de-
trol was required to maintain accurate thrust- spin maneuver invariably left the target
ing to establish a desired spin plane. After vehicle with residual angular rates when the
the spinup was accomplished, neither the tether eventually became slack ; however,
safety nor success of the exercise required this could be controlled by activating the tar-
further attitude control. Because tether get-vehicle control system in the despin pro-
damping did not prove to be an effective cedure. An interesting phenomenon was
means of damping attitude oscillations. ac- discovered during the operational studies of
tive attitude control was required when it the despin maneuver. Due to the location of
became desirable to rapidly reduce spacecraft the spacecraft attitude-control thrusters, and
oscillations. I t was found through simulation to the fact that attitude control of the space-
that the spacecraft control system could ef- craft caused translation (the attitude-control
fectively reduce the attitude oscillations of moments not being couples), it was possible
the spacecraft ; also, when the target vehicle to automatically despin the rotating tethered
was oscillating, those oscillations would ulti- system. By activating the rate-command atti-
mately be propagated through the tether to tude-control mode in the spacecraft and by
the spacecraft. commanding zero attitude rates, the attitude-
It was evident from the analyses that a control system would attempt to drive the
differential rolling motion of the spacecraft spacecraft body rates to zero and produce a
relative to the target vehicle would probably net translational thrust which slowly, but
be excited during the spinup maneuver. This surely, would despin the system.
mode of oscillation would be difficult to con-
trol with the spacecraft attitude-control sys- Crew Training
tem. Probably more difficult t o control would
be a rolling motion in which the target ve- The crew training in preparation f o r the
hicle and the spacecraft were rolling to- spinup tethered-vehicle exercise was pri-
gether. Stopping this latter mode would marily familiarization through simulation
require inducing a relative roll oscillation so practice. To provide a realistic simulation of
that the tether could be used as a torsional the interaction of two vehicles tethered to-
spring which, although weak, would exert a gether, a real-time simulation of the tethered-
roll moment on the passive target vehicle. vehicle system was implemented.
Since mild rolling motions would not jeop- The simulation facility consisted of a high-
ardize the tether exercise, there was no rea- fidelity crew-station mockup, a planetarium-
son for undue alarm. type projection visual display, and a
From a safety-of-operation standpoint, hybrid-computer complex. The equations of
establishment of a despin procedure was motion describing two unconstrained rigid
necessary. Such a procedure would enhance bodies ( 6 demees of freedom per body) con-
the probability of successful jettisoning of nected by a massless elastic cable were solved
the tether at the termination of the exercise. in real time on the hybrid-computer complex.
The despin maneuver was essentially the in- This mathematical model included the off-
verse of the spinup maneuver. One pro- symmetrical tether attachment points on the
cedure for despinning was to locate the spin spacecraft and target vehicle, as well as the
plane of the system, either visually or with actual inertia properties of the vehicles. Best
body-rate information available in the space- estimates of the tether-spring constant and
craft, and then apply thrust in the spin plane dampinK characteristics were used for the
and opposite the direction of spin. An alter- training simulations. Included in the solution
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 59
of the governing equations of motion was a the tether simulation, valuable engineering
simulation of the spacecraft attitude and knowledge was gained concerning the gen-
translational control system. This simulation eral behavior of the tethered systems as well
allowed real-time astronaut control inputs to as of the specific configuration selected for
properly effect the motions of the tethered Gemini. I t was possible to observe in real
vehicles. All basic flight instrumentation, as time the response of a tethered system to
well as engineering parameters, were dis- very complex forcing functions (that is, in-
played in real time in the crew station. puts by a pilot). Although not directly asso-
The visual presentation consisted of a ciated with the flight maneuvers, the
planetarium-type gimbaled Earth-scene hori- functions nevertheless yielded insight into
zon and star-field projection. The visual the system behavior. The simulation allowed
presentation of the target vehicle consisted the design engineer to personally intervene
of two spots of light from dual-target pro- in the scientific solution of the tether motion
jectors. The two spots represented the ends by way of a control system. The simulation
of the target vehicle. This presentation al- was used to determine system response to
lowed a visual recognition of maneuvering control thrusters stuck in the ON position.
relative to the target vehicle, as well as ob- Before the Gemini XI mission, the simula-
servation of the attitude oscillations of the tion was used to determine the effects of a
target vehicle. In flight, the tether would degraded thruster prior to and in support of
supply a visual cue concerning the separation the actual spinup. Fuel usage for the spinup
distance between the two vehicles ; however, procedures was also determined in this train-
in simulation, visual representation of the ing simulator.
tether was not possible and the cue was sup-
plied by a display in the crew station. Flight Itesults
The training simulations usually began
with the spacecraft undocked, but close to During the Gemini XI mission, a total
the target vehicle. The astronaut was then lateral thrusting of approximately 13 seconds
required to translate away from the target was applied to the tethered system and re-
vehicle to a tether-extended position where sulted in a system spin rate of approximately
the spinup maneuver would be initiated. 0.9 degree per second. Slack taut tether
After the system achieved the desired spin oscillations were induced during the spin
rate, the astronaut was free to observe the following the termination of a f t thrusting.
subsequent motions and obtain a feel for the This was due primarily to the fact that the
behavior of the tethered system. Attitude tether tension associated with the low spin
control could be attempted in a direct, pulse, rate was smaller than the tether tension in-
or rate-command mode of attitude control. duced by thrusting a f t ; hence, a t termin at'ion
Typical training exercises consisted of in- of aft thrusting, the tether simply catapulted
tentionally inducing large attitude oscilla- the vehicles toward one another. After
tions in the spacecraft by means of the approximately 1 orbits of the Earth, the
attitude-control system, and subsequently spinup operation was terminated with a
reapplying control moments to reduce these despin type of maneuver and the tether was
oscillations. Following these maneuvers, the jettisoned.
astronaut could finish the exercise by prac- The results of the rotating tethered-vehicle
ticing the despin procedure. Practice in maneuvers during the Gemini XI mission
breaking the tether with impact loading was were essentially as anticipated. By compar-
also possible, since tether tension levels re- ing the motion pictures of the maneuver
sulting from various maneuvers were dis- taken during the mission with the observa-
played to the astronaut. tions in the training simulation, it is evident
In addition to the crew training usage of that the simulation was quite accurate in
60 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
predicting the general behavior of the ceed into a constantly taut tether configura-
tethered system. The flight crew found that tion and the tethered system would be
the active damping of oscillations with the captured by the gravity gradient. This cap-
spacecraft attitude-control system was easier tured behavior would be manifested by
in flight than in the training simulation. This oscillation of the system about the local
effect was probably due to the degraded sen- vertical.
sory information available to the astronaut
in the simulation as compared with the actual Analytical Studies
flight. It was observed that cable slack/taut
oscillations damped out more rapidly in Analytical studies of the gravity-gradient
flight than in the simulation. This discrep- tether exercise ranged from simple feasi-
ancy was traced to a conservative value for bility studies to fairly sophisticated analyses.
the tether damping constant which corre- While the operational feasibility of gravity-
sponded to a room-temperature tether rather stabilized satellites was well established, the
than a cold tether which would have a higher stability of two rigid bodies tethered to-
damping constant. As anticipated by analy- gether in orbit was questionable. Therefore,
sis, the differential roll motion between the analytical studies were first aimed at ex-
vehicles did, in fact, occur and was approxi- ploring the basic behavior of a tethered
mately to the extent predicted. system in a gravity field, and then at estab-
An interesting event occurred during the lishing the operational aspects of obtaining
deployment of t h e tether. Near t h e end of a gravity-gradient-stabilized tethered sys-
deployment, a cable-dynamics phenomenon tem.
known as the skip-rope effect became signifi- The first feasibility studies were conducted
cant. This behavior, although obviously pop;-' using a mathematical model that consisted of
sible, had not been predicted by the .tether two point masses (each with 3 degrees of
analyses employed in the design of the tether freedom) subject to an inverse-square cen-
maneuver, since the studies did not include tral force field. The two point masses were
tether degrees of freedom. After the skip- assumed to be connected by an elastic tether
rope mode of oscillation subsided, the spinup which satisfied a linear force-elongation re-
maneuver was successfully conducted with lationship. The equations describing this sys-
no evidence of significant cable-dynamics tem were numerically integrated in a digital
effects, thus confirming the analytical as- computer program to yield time histories of
sumption t h a t cable dynamics were not sig- the significant parameters in the analysis.
nificant in the rotational behavior of this This phase of the analytical study established
particular tethered system. that at least two point masses could be
tethered together and gravity gradient sta-
Gravity Gradient bilized. This study, of course, had applica-
bility to the actual situation since it could be
The gravity-gradient tether exercise was argued that two rigid bodies connected with
accomplished during the Gemini XI1 mission a tether of sufficient length would exhibit
to study the feasibility of using gravity- particle-like behavior. Since there was no
gradient effects in the stabilization of effective damping mechanism in the pro-
manned spacecraft. The exercise consisted posed tethered system, and since the gravity-
of tethering the orbiting vehicles together, gradient exercise could continue over but a
then arranging the vehicles one above the few orbits, the success of the exercise was
other at the ends of the extended tether (that strictly a matter of giving the tethered sys-
is, along a local vertical). By imparting the tem the proper initial conditions. This being
proper relative velocities to the vehicles in the case, the first phase of the study consisted
this arrangement, the vehicles would pro- of determining the response of the tethered
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 61
system to various combinations of initial attitude response of the spacecraft and the
conditions. target vehicle during the gravity-gradient
The initial conditions for a perfect start exercise, and to confirm the validity of the
were established ; these included a slightly cor,clusions drawn from the point mass
taut tether, and a relative velocity of about analysis. From the results of this rigid-body
0.138 ft/sec for a 100-foot tethered space- study, it was found that ( 1 ) there was good
craftbarget-vehicle combination. The per- agreement between the rigid body and the
fect start, of course, also included an initial particle analysis concerning capture limits
alinement along a local vertical and an ap- and tolerance to starting perturbations ; and
proximately circular orbit for the system. ( 2 ) there could be considerable rigid-body
Response to the perfect start consisted of rotation of the target vehicle and the space-
continued alinement of the two point masses craft during the gravity-gradient exercise.
along the local vertical and of a constantly Figure 6-5 illustrates a typical time history
taut tether. Perturbations to this perfect provided by the planar rigid-body analysis.
start involved off-nominal relative velocities Of importance was the determination that
which were not compatible with continued the capture sensitivity of the system was
motion along the local vertical, or a n initially not significantly related to the rigid-body-
slack tether with or without range rate be- attitude initial conditions. This fact was
tween the bodies. The tethered point masses certainly welcome from the operational
were found to be reasonably tolerant of off- standpoint of setting up a captured system.
nominal starting conditions. For small per- On the other hand, the large rigid-body ex-
turbations, the solutions to the motions of the cursions of the vehicles would. have an op-
tethered point masses were in agreemert erational implication on such things as
with linearized dumbbell-satellite theory. observation of the total system motion during
This point-mass analysis was eventually the gravity-gradient exercise. While this
modified to include an oblate earth as the at- rigid-body study provided valuable informa-
tracting force on the point masses. This tion, there were still a few questions concern-
change was found to have negligible effect on ing the rigid-body response of the vehicles
the behavior of the tethered system. From and the stability of the system with all de-
the first phase of study, it was concluded that grees of freedom present.
gravity-gradient stabilization could possibly To answer these questions, a final study
be obtained with the spacecraft and target phase was implemented. The final phase con-
vehicle in the tethered configuration. Figure
6 4 illustrates typical results obtained from
the point-mass analysis on the sensitivity of
the system motion to initial relative velocity m
---
-------
Velocity error = 0.015 ftlsec
Velocity error = .060 ftlsec
Velocity error = .150 ftlsec
4-Q
between the point masses. 401-
The second phase of the analytical studies
was conducted using a mathematical model
consisting of two rigid bodies in planar mo-
tion subject to an inverse-square central
force field, and connected by an elastic tether.
The equations of motion describing this
mathematical model were integrated numeri-
cally in a digital computer program to pro-
vide time histories of significant parameters. l i m e , sec
This phase of the study was implemented to FIGURE&&--Effect of off-nominal relative velocity
answer questions concerning the rigid-body on motion of gravity-gradient tethered system.
GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
Operational Aspects
L
-4oL
0)
50
L
* k t ; u t n e s ; I , I
I114 orbit
,
tion along a local vertical. The proper
starting conditions consisted of a slightly
slack tether and a relative velocity of 0.138
ft/sec. Although it was relatively easy to
position one vehicle directly over the other
2 Slack tether region with a slightly slack tether, it was much more
z -2
0 200 400 600 800 loo0 1200 1400 1600 difficult to obtain a relative velocity of 0.138
Time, sec f t sec between the vehicles. A deviation of
more than 0.23 ft/sec from the perfect rela-
FIGURE 6-5.-Effects on rigid-body attitutlc responsr
during gravity-gradient motion due to initial
tive velocity would mean that the gravity-
- tether slackness of 1 foot. gradient torque on the system could no longer
contain the oscillations of the system around
sisted of solving the equations of motion de- the local vertical: the system would then
scribing two rigid bodies (each with 6 cartwheel, or be spun up.
degrees of freedom) in an inverse-square The problem of obtaining the correct rela-
central force field and connected by a linear ti\re velocity between the spacecraft and the
elastic tether. This study confirmed the ap- target vehicle was approached as follows.
plicability' of the lesser analyses that had The perfect initial relative velocity corre-
been performed, in that good comparisons of sponded to that relative velocity which would
capture limits and response to perturbat'ions exist between the separated bodies if they
were obtained. As expected, the results of were both attached to the same radius vector
the final study indicated that a captured sys- from the center of the Earth and rotating at
tem would still be likely to have large rigid- orbital rate. It was decided to make use of
body-attitude excursions : however, of even this fact in the starting procedure. The capa-
more significance, was the finding that there bility existed on board the spacecraft to pro-
were no unforeseen instabilities in the be- vide information to the flight crew from
havior of the proposed gravity-gradient ex- which the longitudinal axis of the vehicle
ercise. This final phase of study was primarily could be made to coincide at all times with the
concerned with the spacecraft./target-vehicle local vertical direction. By positioning the
configuration which would be used in the spacecraft directly above the target vehicle
mission. with the longitudinal axis of the spacecraft
This concluded the analytical study phase maintained continuously along a local verti-
of the tethered-vehicle gravity-gradient ex- cal, deviations from the perfect relative-ve-
periment. With the theoretical validation of locity conditions would be manifested as drift
the exercise completed, the problem then was of the target vehicle relative to the space-
OPERATIONS WITH TETHERED SPACE VEHICLES 63
craft. This drift could be detected quantita- rapid recovery of the system from, a n ini-
tively by the flight crew using the optical tially slack tether. The gravity-gradient ef-
sight, and could be converted to a n equiva- fects would soon draw the tether taut (this
lent drift rate. From the drift rate, the being the stable configurations for the tethered
deviation in relative velocity from the perfect system) for the remainder of the operation.
start could be determined; hence, an appro- The penalty paid for an initially slack tether
priate velocity correction could be applied was an increase in the angle of oscillation of
with the spacecraft translational thrusters. the system relative to a local vertical.
A perfect relative-velocity start would result
in a zero-drift rate of the target vehicle rela- ('rcw Training
tive to the spacecraft, as long a s the longi-
tudinal axis of the spacecraft was continu- Crew training for the gravity-gradient
ously along a local vertical. Figure 6-6 shows tether exercise consisted of briefings and
a flight chart from which the flight crew simulator exercises. The significant flight-
could take quantitative drift measurements control task involved measuring the drift of
(as angular drift in the optical sight) over the target vehicle in the optical sight, then
a measured period of time and find the applying the proper translational thrust to
equivalent drift rate in the form of a relative- correct the relative velocity of the vehicles.
velocity correction. The flight chart indicates The training was accomplished in the Gemini
the expected maximum oscillation of the sys- Mission Simulator, which had the capability
tem from a local vertical for a given error in to start a flight simulation run with the
relative velocity. After the flight crew had spacecraft docked with the target vehicle.
ascertained that a n acceptable initialization The simulation exercise could then proceed
had been accomplished, the flight plan re- with the undocking, followed by a maneuver
quired t h a t all thrusting be terminated and to reach a position approximately 100 feet
the drifting system observed to determine above the target vehicle. From this position,
the success of the initialization. While a per- the use of the flight chart for the gravity-
fect starting condition dictated a very gradient starting procedure could be prac-
slightly taut tether, it was operationally more ticed. The mission simulator did not include
feasible to s t a r t the system with a definitely tether dynamics or a visual simulation of the
slack tether, and a zero-closure rate. This tether. This deficiency did not greatly hinder
was due to the minimal perturbation to, and training for the gravity-gradient exercise',
since the cable was not supposed to be taut
tlurinn the startinn procedure. The signifi-
Half amplitude
cant task t o be practiced in training was t o
I
molion after 112 min maintain a local vertical with the aid of the
spacecraft instrumentation, and to detect and
remove target-vehicle drift rates relative to
the spacecraft.
F l i Kht Itcsu I t s
b 5-
7. LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR
ACTIVITY
the pilot t o perform the assigned extrave- sors, neck dam, wrist dams, parachute har-
hicular tasks. ness, and stowage pockets for the flight-data
The basic Gemini space suit was a multi- books and charts (fig. 7-1). Equipment
layer fabric system generally consisting of a added to the space suit for extravehicular
comfort liner, a gas bladder, a structural re- missions included : (1) extravehicular cover-
straint, and an outer protective cover. To layer, ( 2 ) pressure thermal gloves, (3) visor
permit easy donning and doffing of the suit temperature-control coating, and (4) sun
and components, quick disconnects were lo- visor.
cated a t the wrists for glove connections, at
the neck for helmet connections, and at the (;ernini IV Mission
waist for ventilation-gas connections. Suit
entry and body waste management were pro- The Gemini IV mission objectives included
vided by a structurally redundant pressure- short-duration extravehicular activity and
sealing zipper. Internal to the suit, a gas dis- evaluation of the basic extravehicular equip-
tribution system directed a flow of oxygen ment. The basic (G3C Series) Gemini suit
to the helmet area for metabolic use and was adapted for extravehicular use (fig.
thermal control, and over the limbs and body 7-2) by incorporating the following :
for thermal control. (1) The extravehicular coverlayer con-
Accessories provided on the suit included sisted of nylon felt material f o r micrometeo-
handkerchiefs, pencils, survival knife, scis- roid protection, seven layers of aluminized
/-
----Neckdam stowage
-- --Parachute harness--
FIGURE
7-l.-Gernini G4C extravehicular space suit.
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 69
Gemini l
S! coverlayer Gem in i3rm cove rlayer
construct ion construction
HT-1 Nylon
/I _____------
------protective layer
__--______----
Superinsulation
micrometeoroid ___------
absorber _----------
-_-_--_-_ Coated Nylon inner
w
Super insulation --------- -_-_ micrometeoroid
--
____________________I. stopper layers
/---
r- -*.-
' >
2
\ ' i t 1
J w
FIGURE
7-2.--Gcmini 1V anti VI11 e x t r x v e h i c u l a r SPIICC' suit.
indicated the need for an inflight application were utilized. For Gemini X and XI, a 50-
of antifog solution to preclude visor fogging. foot and a 30-foot umbilicnl. respectively,
performed the combined function of the elec-
Gemini S. XI. and XI1 Missinns trical cable and &foot umbilical.
The space suits for the Gemini X, XI, and Vcntilrtion Chntrol Module System
XI1 missions were generally of the same con-
figuration as the suits provided for the The Ventilation Control Module (fig. 7-3),
Gemini VIII and IX-A missions. The spe- flown on Gemini IV, was mounted on the
cific experiments and operations of each pilot's chest by Velcro straps attached to the
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
Communications and
r-- bioinstrumentation
I connector
I
I
I
I
I ;.-Tether
\’--z..=-.L..z+:
n i b a - : ‘ repressurization valvt?
Spacecraft
oqgen tank
J
FICURE
‘i-X-Geniini IV Exti.avehicul;iy L i f e - S u p p o r t System.
parachute harness, and was connected t o the Extravchicular I,ife-Suppurt System Chest Pack
suit-ventilation outlet fitting through a
multiple gas connector. The Ventilation Con- The Extravehicular Life-support System
trol Module was an open-loop system; the chest pack (fig. 7-4) was flown-on the Gem-
gas was not recirculatetl throukh the system. ini VI11 through XI1 missions. This system
In operation, oxygen flow of approximately was designed to provide greater heat-rejec-
9 lb/hr was supplied to the suit to provide tion capability than the Gemini IV system,
ventilation and for oronasal carbon-dioxide while requiring no more oxygen makeup flow
washout for metabolic rates not greater than from the spacecraft. The chest pack was se-
1000 Btu ‘hr. The oxygen was supplied from cured hy Velcro straps attached to the para-
the primary spacecraft oxygen supply chute harness. a n d wis connected to the suit
through a %-foot umbilical and a flow re- ventilation inlet and outlet fittings through
strictor. The exhaust flow from the suit was two multiple gas connectors. The chest pack
controlled by a demand regulator so that suit was ;I semi-open-loop system : approximately
pressure was maintained a t approximately 75 percent of the ventilation gas was recir-
4 psia. The emergency oxygen supply in the culatetl through the system (fig. 7-5). The
Ventilation Control Module was capable of chest pack was designed to xcommodate
supplying oxygen for 7.5 to 9 minutes. The average metabolic rates of 1400 Btu h r with
pilot could have activated an emergency peaks of 2000 Btu hr. Tests showed that the
system II.‘;LScapable o f higher heat loads, piw-
oxygen valve to initiate oxygen Bow directly
vitlecl the higher loads were not imposed at
into the helmet by means of an adapter in-
startup. Normally, oxygen was supplied at
stalled in the helmet feed port. If a leak had approximately 90 psig from the spacecraft
developed in the suit, a makeup flow of oxy- through i i quick-tliscoiinect titting ;ittached
gen, sufficient to maintain suit pressure, to the cabin repressurization valve ; however,
would have been initiated automaticall,v from the Extravehicular Support Package and the
the emergency supply. Astronaut Maneuvei.ing IJnit backpacks c a ~ -
72 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
-----Oxygensupply fitting
Umbilical
*.- .
FIGURE
74-Gernini VI11 through XI1 life-support system.
If a leak in the suit loop had developed and overheated. The Ventilation Control Module
caused the suit pressure to drop below 3.4 System operated within the specified limits ;
psig, makeup primary oxygen would have however, high metabolic heat loads could not
been automatically metered to the system be sustained because of the inherent limited
through a demand regulator to maintain suit rate of heat rejection.
pressure. The semi-open-loop system was flown on
The majority of the cooling for the Extra- Gemini VI11 ; however, because of the early
vehicular Life-Support System was provided termination of the mission, extravehicular
by the recirculating ventilation gas from the activity was not conducted. Gemini IX-A
suit passing through an evaporative heat ex- was the first mission to evaluate the perform-
changer. In the condenser portion of the heat ance of the semi-open-loop Extravehicular
exchanger, the gas was cooled to approxi- Life-support System. Due to the formation
mately 45" F by the evaporation of stored of fog on the visor and the resulting reduced
water. Since the gas from the suit was about visibility, the planned extravehicular activity
85" F with a relative humidity of 85 percent was not completed. Higher-than-expected
(nominal), this cooling removed the water workloads were evident throughout the 2
vapor by condensation. The condensate was hour 7 minute extravehicular period. The
then wicked to the evaporative portion of the chest pack was designed for a nominal
heat exchanger to provide additional evapo- metabolic rate of 1400 Btu/hr and a maxi-
rative water. This type of boiling-condensa- mum of 2000 Btu/hr for short periods.
tion-reboiling technique is called bootstrap- Medical data, crew comments, and metabolic
ping. simulations all indicated that much higher
If the normal oxygen flow to the chest workloads were experienced. Tests after the
pack had been interrupted, decreasing pres- mission showed that visor fogging occurred
sure in the umbilical would have automati- a t metabolic rates above 2400 Btu/hr, al-
cally actuated a 30-minute emergency though no fogging occurred a t lower rates.
supply of oxygen. A visual and audio warn- The high rates, in effect, overpowered the
ing system on the chest pack indicated when capabilities of the evaporator-condenser.
oxygen was being used from the emergency Even in medium flow the cooling capability
supply. Visual and audio warning also de- for physiological comfort was adequate, but
noted decreasing suit pressure. A special the evaporator-condenser could not overcome
regulator acted to maintain suit pressure the thermal load sufficiently to prevent fog-
above 3.3 psi in the event of a suit leak, and ging. Visor fogging was further induced by
the supply to this regulator was arranged high respiration rates (30 t o 40 breaths per
such that makeup flow could be drawn from minute) which humidified 55 t o 75 percent
the spacecraft, the self-contained emergency of the total gas flow to the helmet to near
supply, or simultaneously from both sources. saturation. This high humidity raised the
Additional warning devices were available dewpoint enough so that visor fogging oc-
if the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit had been curred even at normal operating tempera-
used. tures. The pilot commented that the only time
he became uncomfortably warm was during
Mission Itesults and Implieatinns
ingress. From this statement and from post-
flight examination of the evaporator-con-
The Gemini IV extravehicular activity
lasted 36 minutes, and the pilot reported good denser, it was evident that the evaporator-
thermal control except during high work condenser performance was degraded due to
periods such as ingress. Ingress into the dryout at some period during the extrave-
spacecraft and closure of the hatch were dif- hicular activity. That period probably oc-
ficult tasks, and caused the pilot t o become curred very close to ingress.
74 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
The Gemini X extravehicular activity was ments have also indicated the desirability of
terminated early because of spacecraft prob- eliminating bulky packages from the chest
lems unrelated to the Extravehicular Life- area, and of reducing the volume of self-con-
Support System. Comments by the pilot and tained life-support systems. Umbilicals from
the biomedical data gathered during the 39- the spacecraft permit the use of smaller life-
minute extravehicular activity indicated that support packages, and the use of umbilical
the Extravehicular Life-support System op- systems should be considered for future ex-
erated completely within specifications. travehicular applications.
The Gemini XI extravehicular activity was
prematurely concluded after 33 minutes. The I Jm hi 1icals
pilot stated that the Extravehicular Life-
Support System provided adequate cooling : Several types of umbilicals have been used
however, the pilot stated that he was fa- in accomplishing the Gemini extravehicular
tigued after a relatively brief period of ac- activities. These include the %-foot umbilical
tivity outside the spacecraft. Because of a used on Gemini IV, IX-A, and X I I ; the 50-
problem in securing the sun visor during the foot umbilical used on Gemini X ; and the
preparations for the extravehicular activity, 30-foot umbilical used on Gemini XI. Except
the pilot experienced high workloads and for the Gemini IV umbilical, which inter-
profuse perspiration. After egress, difficul- faced directly with the space suit, all um-
ties involved in the pilot's attempts to attach bilicals were designed to interface with the
the extravehicular camera and the space- Extravehicular Life-support System chest
craft/target-vehicle tether resulted in high pack.
respiration rates and rapid fatigue. It is be- The 25-foot umbilical (fig. 7-6) used for
lieved that the chest pack was saturated with Gemini IX-A and XI1 supplied gaseous oxy-
warm, moist gas before proper evaporator- gen, either directly to the space suit or
condenser operation could reduce the tem- through the Extravehicular Life-support
peratures resulting from the problems before System. The 50-foot and 30-foot umbilicals
egress. (fig. 7-7) supplied gaseous oxygen only
During the 2 hours 8 minutes of Gemini through the Extravehicular Life-support
XI1 extravehicular activity, the Extra- System and supplied gaseous nitrogen to the
vehicular Life-support System operated Hand Held Maneuvering Unit. The gaseous
completely within specifications. The prob- oxygen was supplied from the spacecraft pri-
lem of excess workload was resolved by the mary supply a t a nominal flow rate of 8 to
use of improved restraints for body position- 9 l b ' h r at 90 psia and 65" F. The gaseous
ing and frequent rest periods. This mission nitrogen was supplied from tanks in the
proved that at workloads within the design spacecraft adapter section ( a t the inlet to
limits, the Extravehicular Life-support Sys- the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit) a t a nom-
tem would function normally, and would pro- inal flow rate of 2 lb 'min at 75 psia and 0" F.
vide a comfortable suit environment. During the standup extravehicular ac-
In summary, the Ventilation Control tivity, short hose extensions connected the:
Module System operated satisfactorily within pilot's space suit to the spacecraft Environ-
the design capabilities. Other than the pos- mental Control System. In this closed-loop
sible depletion of heat-exchanger water at operation, no interface with the Extrave-
the end of Gemini IX-A extravehicular ac- hicular Life-support System was required,
tivity, the Extravehicular Life-support and the normal spacecraft ventilation flow
System performed exceptionally well. It is rates were provided.
evident, however, that future systems of this All of the umbilicals were of similar ma-
type will require increased cooling and meta- terials and of the same basic design. Each
bolic heat-rejection capabilities. Crew com- umbilical consisted of wire-reinforced, sili-
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 75
-
cone rubber-lined hose ; a 1000-pound test tethers were designed so that during the
nylon structural tether : and wiring for voice worst conditions of stretch under applied
communication, electrical power, and meas- load, no strain was imposed on the oxygen
urements of heart and respiration rates. For and nitrogen hoses, or on the electrical wir-
the %-foot umbilical, the oxygen hose was ing antl connections. In all umbilical designs,
3/16-inch inside diameter. For the 50-foot the load was transmittetl to the spacecraft
and 30-foot umbilicals, the oxygen hose was through ii tether attachment point located on
%-inch inside diameter antl the nitrogen hose the egress hantlle just inside the cabin. The
Yn inch. loads were applied through the parnchute
The umbilicals utilized multilayers of My- harness of the extravehicular pilot. The 25-
lar superinsulation for thermal protection. foot umbilical was attached by ;I hook to the
The temperature of gaseous oxygen supplied upper part of the parachute harness ; the 50-
to the Extravehicular Life-support System foot antl 30-foot umbilicals were attac*hetl to
had t o be maintained above -15.' F to pre- the parachute h:irness a t the pilot's hip.
vent freezing in the ejector. Because of the The extensive test program for the 25-foot
proximity of the cold nitrogen line t o the umbilical contributed to the development of
oxygen line, thermal control was more criti- the 50-foot and 30-foot umbilicals. The i w i -
cal for the 50-foot and 30-foot umbilicals terials and the design experience gainetl
than for the 25-foot umbilical. from the development of the 25-foot umbili-
The umbilicals were covered with nylon cal were used extensively in the fabrication
fabric, and chafing protection was provided of the longer umbiliculs. Based upon the pre-
where required, particularly in the area vious experience, the test program was re-
where the umbilical emerged from the cabin tlucetl to Pressure-temperwtu1.e perforni;ince,
and contacted the hatch sill. The structural leak tests. electromagnetic interference, ant1
GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
Spacecraft end Suit end
Nitrogen umbilical
connect assembly
(mates Hand Held
Maneuvering Unit)
‘.Electrical connector
(males chest pack)
parachute harness)
FIGURE
7-’7.--Extravehicular Life-Support System, 30-foot umbilical.
The 50-foot umbilical is similar.
static and dynamic structural tests. As in the Gemini spacecraft, umbilical size may not be
case of the %-foot umbilical, extensive un- a problem ; however, excessive length would
manned altitude-chamber tests were con- still be undesirable. The donning of the um-
ducted, as well as several manned chamber bilicals proved quite easy and allowed a
tests for end-to-end con-firmation of the um- complete system checkout prior to the extra-
bilical and the interface with other equip- vehicular activity. Incorporation of the pro-
ment. pulsion system supply proved satisfactory ;
The Gemini Program has shown that ex- this has many possible future uses, such ;is a
travehicular activity with umbilicals is a power supply for tools.
useful, operational mode. The umbilical pro- The umbilical concept is particularly ap-
duced no unfavorable torques or forces on the plicable to near-vehicle operations o r opera-
extravehicular pilot; in fact, the pilot was tions in close quarters where the bulk of a
hardly aware of the umbilical. Because of self-contained life-support pack would be un-
the length and bulk, some difficulty was ex- desirable. Umbilical-based life-support sys-
perienced with the !%foot umbilical during tems would be less useful for operations that
ingress. Therefore, any umbilical should be involved approaching a tumbling vehicle.
kept as small as practicable. Assuming that However, the ease of development and the
future spacecraft will be larger than the successful utilization of umbilicals during the
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 77
straint evaluation was to determine what pit to the a f t end of the spacecraft. The lim-
type of restraints were required for repre- ited suit mobility and interference by the
sentative extravehicular tasks. life-support system chest pack required the
pilots to traverse the handrail by moving the
Restraint Equipment hands one after the other to the side, rather
than hand over hand. The Gemini X pilot used
The use of restraint devices for extrave- the handrail to travel from the hatch to the
hicular activity on the Gemini Program is end of the adapter retrograde section and re- .
summarized in table 8-1. Descriptions of turn, and then a s a handhold while making
these devices and results of their use follow. and breaking the nitrogen connection on the
50-foot umbilical. Comments by the pilots
Rectangular Handrail indicated that the configuration of this hand-
rail was the best for travel between two
Two rectangular handrails (fig. 8-4) were points on the spacecraft surface. A rectan-
installed along the spacecraft adapter section gular, rather than a cylindrical, cross section
to assist the extravehicular pilot in moving
from the cockpit to the adapter equipment
section where various tasks were to be per-
formed ; for example, donning the Astronaut
Maneuvering Unit. The handrails. were flush
Equipment
with the spacecraft surface a t launch, and ada ple r
were 1.5 inches above the spacecraft surface handrail
when deployed. The a f t handrail deployed automatically
automatically when the spacecraft separated deployed
from the launch vehicle. The forward hand-
rail was manually deployed by the extrave-
hicular pilot. Retroadapter handrail
manually deployed
The Gemini IX-A and XI1 pilots used the
handrails to travel the 8 feet from the cock- FIGURD
8-4.-Extendable handrails.
Rectangular handrail X ;I x
Large cylindrical handrail (1.38 in. dia) ' x
Small cylindrical handrail 10.317 in. dial Ix
Telescoping handrail ix
Fixed handhold X / X
Rigid Velcro-backed portable handhold X
Flexible Velcro-hacked portable handhold
Waist tethers X
Pip-pin handhold/tether-attach device X
Pip-pin antirotation device X
U-bolt handholdhether-attach device X
Foot restraints
Standup tether ?(
Strap.. on space-suit leg X
BODY POSITIONING A N D RESTRAINTS DURING E X T R A W H I C U L A R ACTIVITY 83
was preferred because the rectangular shape torques required to position their feet in the
offered more resistance to rotation for a given foot restraints. The diameter (1.38 inches)
hand force, and allowed better control of body of the cylindrical handrails was the most
attitude. In a pressurized Gemini suit, the favorable size.
width of the rectangular handrail (1.25
inches) was a good size for gripping. Small Cylindrical Handrails
-. . . -.
. I
FIGURE
B-'l.-Handrail on right side of target vehicle.
\
Three fixed handholds (fig. 8-10) were ft - -4 -4
provided on the back of the docking cone on
the Gemini XI target vehicle to provide re-
straint for the spacecraft/target-vehicle
tether attachment. Two identical handholds
were provided on the back of the docking
cone on the Gemini XI1 target vehicle. The
_- "'8"'
-
FIGURE
8-lO.-Target vehicle extravehicular work FIGURE8-12.-Rinid Velcro-backed portable
station and handhold. handhold.
86 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
the usefulness of the devices. For example, the tethers in the spacecraft adapter section
best utilization requires that the Velcro be and on the target vehicle. The pilot used
placed in shear rather than tension, and this about six different pairs of tether-attach
complicates the usage. Also, the restraint points which had been selected during train-
force should be significantly greater than the iny. At one time, because of the lack of good
required applying force; this is not true of control of body attitude, the Gemini XI1 pilot
nylon Velcro. Polyester Velcro is better, but experienced a slight difficulty in moving a
has not been evaluated as thoroughly as the tether to a new attach point. With one hand
nylon. The use of steel Velcro would make occupied in making a waist tether attach-
these devices feasible, but the potential haz- ment, the pilot had to use the other hand to
ard to the space suit is not tolerable at this control body attitude. Therefore, a pair of
time. handholds or other restraints near each pair
of tether-attach points was desirable. Also,
Waist Tethers it was determined that the waist tether-
attach points should be a s f a r apart as pos-
The Gemini XI1 waist tethers (fig. 8-13) sible, consistent with the pilot’s reach in the
were made of stiff nylon webbing with a pressurized suit. The attachments were
length-adjustment buckle and a large hook easier to make when the attach points were
for attachment to the various tether-attach located a t the pilot’s sides rather than di-
rings. The waist tethers were looped around rectly in front of him: and torques were can-
the pilot’s parachute harness and were fas- celled hetter with widespread tether-attach
tened with two large snaps. A large fabric points. The pilot observed that few adjust-
tab was provided to facilitate opening the ments were required to the tether length;
snaps of a pressurized suit. A D-shared ring consequently, provisions for adjustments
was provided for making length adjustments, coiild be eliminated from future body tethers.’
and was used several times by the pilot. The With only the waist tethers for restraint,
adjustment buckle, a conventional single-loop the pilot was able to use a conventional torque
huckle, allowed length adjustment between wrench to install and tighten a bolt to about
approximately 32 and 21 inches. 200 inch-pounds on the spacecraft adapter
The tether attachment to the pilot, slightly section work station (fig. 8-14). Again, with
!!elow waist level, was considered well located only the waist tethers for restraint, the pilot
hy the pilot. A special device, consisting of a was able to pull nylon Velcro pile strips 4
thin metal plate with a ring on each end for
attaching the waist tether hooks, was pro-
vided to restrain the waist tethers while not
in use. The device was slightly longer than
the front width of the life-support system
chest pack and was attached with Velcro. The
pilot used a variety of devices for attaching
Hook
Adjustment
buckle
Y 1 _ /_- 12 inches - I
inches long and 5 inches wide from both nylon drifting into an unknown and uncontrolled
and steel Velcro hook, and to disconnect and body position, while performing work or
reconnect three electrical connectors. The while resting. The waist tethers permitted
pilot also made a variety of hook and ring the Gemini XI1 pilot to relax completely dur-
connections, including hooks and rings of the ing the designated rest periods and a t any
same sizes which had proved impossible for other desired time. During previous umbilical
the Gemini IX-A pilot to connect. extravehicular activity, the pilots had been
The waist tethers, when attached to the required to hang on with one or both hands
tether-attach points on the target vehicle and rest, as well as possible, in this condition.
(fig. 8-15), provided the required restraint Of course, the work required to control body
for the Gemini XI1 pilot to attach the space- position eliminated the I:,~ssibilityof com-
craft/target-vehicle tether : activate the Ex- plete rest.
periment SO10 Agena Micrometeorite Col-
lection package ; and disconnect and connect l’ip-Pin Handhnld/Tether-Attach Devices
fluid connectors and a n electrical connector.
The pilot used the Apollo torque wrench to Seven pip-pin handhold, tether devices
exert greater than 100 inch-pounds of torque ; (fig. 8-16) were used during Gemini XII.
he concluded that man’s capability is even These devices used a conventional pip-pin
greater, and could be determined in the mechanism with ball detents for attachment
underwater zero-g simulation. The pilot was to the spacecraft. The T-shape of the pip-pins
able to perform these tasks with one waist facilitated their use as handholds, and a loop
tether attached and one hand on a handhold, M‘LLS installed for tether attachment. The pilot
and then to repeat the tasks without using iised the devices as handholds during changes
waist tethers. He strongly-‘ recommended, in body position and as waist tether-attach
however, that body tethers be included in the points during some of the work tasks on the
restraint systems for future tasks involving tnrjret vehicle.
torque. It is probable that body tethers will The T-shaped pip-pins were a convenient
provide a greater capability for applying shape and size for hand gripping. When the
torque; minimize the effort required in con- rotational freedom of the devices was re-
trolling body position; and, if a tool should moved, the devices made excellent handholds,
slip, eliminate the possibility of ‘it drifting ilntl allowed complete control of body atti-
away. tude. The elimination of rotational freedom
One of the best features of body tethers is also made waist tether attachment much
the elimination of the constant anxiety of easier.
FIGURE
&15.-Tarmt vehicle extravehicular work
station. FIGURE
8-16.-Pip-pin device.
88 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
Foot Restraints
FIGURE
8-l9.-Gemini XI1 adapter provisions for
extravehicular activity.
Standup Tether
Concluding Remarks
Adjustment buckle
-_ 1
I .
.li
L.\
Provision of adequate body restraints is
one of several factors which can assure the
FIGURE
8-20.-Standup tether. siiccess of a n extravehicular activity mission.
90 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
Based on the extravehicular experience accu- satisfactory during the Gemini Program in-
mulated in the Gemini Program, it was con- cluded :
cluded that thorough analysis and detailed (1) Gemini XI1 foot restraints, for rest
training for extravehicular activity must be and localized work
continued, and that the body-restraint re- ( 2 ) Gemini XI1 waist tethers, for rest and
quirements indicated by the analysis and the localized work
training must be met. During the extra- ( 3 ) Rectangular handrail, for translating
vehicular activity, restraints must be pro- ~ L C I W S :I spacecraft surface
vided for rest as well as for work tasks. ( 4 ) Pip-pin devices, for combination
The restraints that were found to be most tether-attach points and handholds
9. EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE
VEHICLES
By HAROLDI. JOHNSON, Flight Crew Support Divisiort, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; WILLIAMC .
HUBER,Engineering Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; EDWARDH. WHITE11, Astronaut,
Astronaut Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and MICHAELCOLLINS,Astronaut, Astronaut
Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
The purpose of this report is to summarize Prior to the development of the Hand Held
what has been learned from the Gemini Pro- Maneuvering Unit utilized on the Gemini IV
gram concerning extravehicular maneuver- mission, several experimental hand-held gas-
ing in the near vicinity of the spacecraft. expulsion devices were evaluated at the Air
Maneuvering with the Hand Held Maneuver- Bearing Facility, Manned Spacecraft Center.
ing Unit was scheduled for the Gemini IV, While working with the early Hand Held
17111, X and XI missions, and with the Astro- Maneuvering Units, some preconceived ideas
naut Maneuvering Unit for the Gemini IX-A were abandoned and some new ideas were
and XI1 missions. generated. The following were learned from
The evaluations of the maneuvering equip- the early concepts:
ment planned f o r Gemini VIII, IX-A, X, and (1) For translating, the tractor mode was
XI were not completed because of problems inherently stable and easiest to control.
with spacecraft equipment before the evalua- (2) Tractor nozzles placed f a r apart and
tions were scheduled. Because of increased parallel provided much less yas-impingement
emphasis on the evaluation of body-restraint loss than nozzles placed side by side and
problems, the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit canted outward.
was not carried on Gemini XII. (3) Due to lack of finger dexterity in pres-
Even though only limited extravehicular surized gloves, the trigger operating the
maneuvering was accomplished during the pusher and tractor valves had to be operated
Gemini Program, a number of significant by gross movements of the hand as opposed
maneuvering systems were readied for flight to finger or thumb manipulation.
and were actually carried into space. One pur- ( 4 ) Because of the constraints placed on
pose of the first portion of this report is to arm and hand movement by the pressurized
describe, in general, the maneuvering equip- suit, together with the need to easily aline
ment used for extravehicular activity during the thrust with the operator's center of yrav-
the Gemini Program. The second portion de- ity, the handle of the space gun had to be on
scribes the ground training equipment and top, and certain angles had to be built into
the methods used in preparing the flight the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit to insure
crews for extravehicular maneuvering. The easy aiming of thrusters when the pilot's
third portion recounts the brief, but interest- arm anti the hand were in a natural hard-suit
ing, flight results obtained with the Hand position.
Held Maneuvering Unit during Gemini IV ( 5 ) Precise attitude control was enhanced
and Gemini X, and draws a comparison be- by utilizing a proportional thrust system,
tween flight performance and ground train- rather than a n off-on system, for controlling
ing indications. thrust level.
91
92 GEMINI S U M MARY CONFERENCE
Tractor
Gemini IV Hand Held Maneuvering Unit
nozzle,
Pusher Handle
The configuration for the Gemini IV Hand valve,\ assembly\
valve
Held Maneuvering Unit (fig. 9-1) was Pressure
evolved from early concepts, mission require-
ments, and available qualified components.
The 4000-psi storage tanks were the same as
the emergency bailout bottles used in the
Gemini ejection seat. The pressure regulator
had been used in the Mercury Environmental
Control System.A summary of the operating
characteristics of the Gemini IV maneuvering
unit is provided in table 9-1, and a cutaway
drawing is shown in figure 9-2.
---Fill valve
Mission requirements dictated that the Shutoff
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit be stowed in- - valve
side the spacecraft cabin. This required the
FIGURE
9-2.-Cutaway drawing of Gemini IV
selection of a propellant gas which would not Hand Held Maneuvering Unit.
contaminate the spacecraft atmosphere if
leakage occurred : oxygen in the gaseous form
TABLE9-I.-Gemini ZV Haqrcl Held
was chosen as the propellant. Since very lim-
Ma,reuve?.ing U n i t Characteristics
ited storage space was available, the Hand
Held Maneuvering Unit was stowed in two Thrust, Ib .............................................................. 0 to 2
sections: the handle assembly and the high- Total impulse, Ib x sec .......................................... 40
Total available l V ,ft/sec .................................... G
pressure section. The two sections were
Trigger preload, lb .............................................. 15
joined by connecting a coupling at the regu- Trigger force at maximum thrust, Ib .............. 20
lator and inserting a pin adjacent to the Storage-tank pi~essure, psi ................................ 4000
pusher nozzle (fig. 9-2). Regulated pressure, psi ...................................... 120
Nozzle-area ratio .................................................. 50:l
Empty weight, Ib ................................................ 6.8
Oxygen weight, Ib ................................................ 0.7
Gross weight, lb .................................................... 7.5
compact storage. The pusher and tractor onds), its density was almost three times a s
valves were actuated by depressing the trig- great, therefore providing more total im-
ger. The amount of force applied to the pulse for a slight increase in total mass. This
pusher or tractor valve determined the thrust can be illustrated by the following calcula-
level. A force of 15 pounds applied to the tions :
valve poppet initiated gas flow to the nozzle :
as the force was increased to 20 pounds, the 7 lb 0, x 59 lb x sec,/lb =
thrust level increased proportionately from 413 lb x sec total impulse
0 to 2 pounds.
The gas storage tanks held only 0.7 pound 18 lb Freon 14 x 33.4 Ib X sec/lb =
of oxygen. This provided a total impulse of GOO lb x: sec total impulse
40 lb x sec, or 2 pounds of thrust for 20 sec-
onds. If used continuously, this total impulse The calculations indicate a 45-percent in-
would accelerate the extravehicular pilot and crease in total impulse for Freon 14 over
the life-support system (215 pounds) to a oxygen a t the same maximum tank pressure
velocity of 6 ft/sec. (5000 psi). Inasmuch as the weight of the
extravehicular pilot with all gear except pro-
Gemini VI11 Hand Held Maneuvering Unit pulsion gas was about 250 pounds, the use
of Freon 14, rather than oxygen or nitrogen,
In the Gemini VI11 mission, the total im- was an excellent tradeoff as f a r as the
pulse was increased to 600 lb x sec (15 times change-in-velocity capability was concerned.
more than the Gemini IV unit). A summary
of the Gemini VI11 maneuvering system char-
acteristics is given in tabl’e 9-11. Eighteen
pounds of Freon 14 gas were’stored at 5000
psi in a 439-cubic-inch tank. The tank was
mounted in a backpack (fig. 9-3) which also
housed a n identical tank filled with 7 pounds
of life-support oxygen. Freon 14 was chosen
a s a propellant because, even though its spe-
cific impulse (33.4 seconds) was lower than
oxygen (59 seconds) . or nitrogen (63 sec-
TABLE
9-II.-Gemiiii VZZZ H a n d Held
Maneuvering Unit Characteristics
/‘
sec, amounting to 84 ft/sec change in velocity
of the extravehicular pil9t. A list of other
pertinent characteristics is provided in table
9-111. ,
-.’.
I
Velocity
I
Velocity
’-Target
1 / 1
I
tu
1- +d -t -I -d I--
tu
Lead the rotations by the control Lead the rotations by the control
displacements in order to displacements in order to
eliminate the rotations eliminate the rotations
FIGURE9-9.-Rules for attitude control during translation with Hand Held blanvuvcring Unit.
98 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
stant-amplitude snaking oscillation as the erally facing the target, thrust is applied to
operator translates toward or away from the produce a forward velocity proportional to
target. the range to be flown. As soon as this ve-
The foregoing procedures first appear com- locity is achieved, yaw 90” away from the
plicated and overly sophisticated. In actual original attitude and coast toward the tar-
practice, the pilot never consciously thinks of get. The line-of-sight drifts of the target can
the rules while using the Hand Held Ma- be eliminated by using the up-and-down and
neuvering Unit. Application of the pro- fore-and-aft translational thrusters. Just
cedures may be compared with the actions prior to ar‘riving at the target, yaw back to
and reactions required to ride a bicycle. The the original attitude facing the target and
skilled operator of the Hand Held Maneu- apply braking thrust.
vering Unit looks directly at the target. The This control procedure involves only two
control loop is closed directly from the target discrete yaw rotations and no roll o r pitch
motion to the eyes and brain of the operator, rotations. The control procedure minimizes
with resulting error signals feeding the op- attitude-control fuel requirements because
erator’s muscular command system. The con- the inertia of the extravehicular pilot is a t a
trol system of the Hand Held Maneuvering minimum about the yaw axis. Also, the con-
Unit is a personal adaptive control system. trol procedure is probably the simplest f o r a
The accuracy of this system in space with all maneuvering unit that does not have lateral-
the 6 degrees of freedom active is not yet translation cnpability.
known, inasmuch as the planned Gemini
flight evaluations did not cover this point. ,\ir-lkariiiK Traininf Equipment
On the 3-degree-of-freedom air-bearing fa-
cility, using any one of the three rotational The most important requirement for an
axes and two translation axes, the accuracy air-bearing facility, and the most difficult to
of a skilled operator is within less than 1 inch achieve antl maintain, is a flat, hard, smooth
of the intended target (from distances of floor. The floor of the Air-Bearing Facility a t
approximately 25 feet). A t longer ranges, the Manned Spacecraft Center consists of 21
the same degree of accuracy could be main- cast-steel machinist’s layout tables each 3
tained because the control logic is a termi- feet wide l)y 8 feet long. Each table weighs
nal-guidance type. Also, the operator’s axis about 2200 pounds and is flat to within ap-
svstem does not have to be alined with the proximately 0.0002 inch. The pattern is
direction of motion while using the Hand seven tables wide antl three tables long com-
Held Maneuvering Unit. The operator must prising a total floor area of 21 by 24 feet.
physically see the target and point a t the tar- After leveling, the joints between adjacent
get while keeping the thrust force through tables are x c u r a t e to about 0.0004 inch, and
his center of gravity. With reg:ird to ease of the overall floor is estimated to be flat within
use, the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit was approximately 0.002 inch. The 1eveling.pro-
designed so that when held in the operator’s cedure must be repeated about every 6
right hand with the thrust line along the op- months. due to settling of the building foun-
erator’s X-axis. the muscles in the right arm dation. This degree of floor accuracy allows
and hand are in ;I completelv unutrained free movement of simulators with a i r cush-
position. ions approximately 0.001 inch thick. Such
low flight altitudes a r e desirable because the
Astronaut Mancwvering Iiiiit Contrnl Lopic required airflow is quite low, and the atten-
dant possible turbine-blade ( j e t propulsion)
The control logic preferred by the pilots effect resulting from iineven eshaust of the
of Gemini IX-A and Gemini XI1 follows. air from the air bearings is negligible. This
From an initially stabilized position, gen- turbine-blade effect is extremely untlesirable
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 99
FIGURE g-lO.--Sinc.le-pad air-hearing simulator for FIGURE !)-12.-Three-pad air-lwarina simulator dur-
yaw-axis training with Hand Held Maneuverina ina pitch-axis trainina with Hand IIcld Manru-
Unit. w r i n g Unit.
100 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
Amount of Training
Training,
Missiov hr
IV .............................................................. ..12
VI11 ............................................ i ...............20.5
IX-A .......................................................... 3
X ................................................................ 13.25
XI ................................................................ 20
‘A?
of a combination of pitch, roll, and yaw together. was mounted on a plane oblique to the angle in
I felt that I could have corr’ected it, but I knew t h a t which I wanted to translate. I remember from our
i t would have taken more fuel than I had wanted to air-bearing work t h a t every time you got a n angle
expend with the gun, so I gave a little t u g on t h e from the perpendicular where your tether w a s
tether and came back in. This is the first experience mounted, i t [the tether] gave you a nice arching
I had with tether dynamics and it brought me right trajectory back in t h e opposite direction. You’re
back to where I did not want to be. I t brought me actually like a weight on the end of a string. If you
right back on top of the spacecraft, by the adapter push out in one direction and you’re at a n angle
section. from the perpendicular, when you reach t h e end of
This is the first time it had happened. I said [to a tether, i t neatly sends you in a long a r c back in
command pilot]: “ A l l right, I’m coming back out the opposite direction. Each time this a r c carried me
[to front of sparecraft] again.” This is one of the right back to the top of the adapter, to t h e top of
most impressive uses of the gun t h a t I had. I started the spacecraft, in fact, toward the adapter section.
back out with the gun, and I decided t h a t I would One thing though t h a t I’ll say very emphatically-
fire a pretty good burst too. I started back out with there wasn’t any tendency to recontact the spacecraft
the gun, and I literally flew with the gun right down in anything but very gentle contacts. I made some
along the edge of the spacecraft, right out to the quite interesting contacts. I made one t h a t I recall
f r o n t of the nose, and out past the end of the nose. on the bottom side of the right door in which I had
I then actually stopped myself with the gun. T h a t kind of rolled around. I actually contacted the bot-
was easier than I thought. I must have been fairly tom of the spacecraft with the back of my head. I
fortunate, because I must have fired i t right through was faced away from the spacecraft. and I j u s t
my cg. I stopped out there and, if niy memory serves drifted right up against i t and just very lightly con-
me right, this is where I tried,a couple of yaw ma- tacted it. I rebounded off. As long as the pushoffs
neuvers. I tried a couple of yaw and a couple of a r e slow, there just isn’t any tendency to get in a n
pitch maneuvers, and then I started firing t h e gun uncontrollable attitude.
to come back in [to t h e spacecraft]. I think this was
the time t h a t the gun ran out. And, I w a s actually Gemini S Extravehicular Activity
able to stop myself with i t out there t h a t second
time too. The longest firing time t h a t I put on t h e
gun was t h e one t h a t I used to start over the doors It was intended that the Gemini X pilot
up by the adapter section. I started back out then. 1)erform an extensive evaluation of the H a d
I probably fired i t for a I-second burst or somethink Held Maneuvering Unit induding precise
like that. I used small bursts all the time. You could anjwlar attitude changes and translations.
put a little burst in and the response was tremen- However, the flight plan for the extravehicu-
dous. You could s t a r t a slow yaw or a slow pitch.
I t seemed to be a rather efficient way to operate. I
lar activity required a number of other ac-
would have liked to have had a &foot bottle out tivities prior to this evaluation. One of the
there-the bigger the better. It was quite easy to planned activities \vas to translate to the
control. twwt vehicle at very short range using
The technique t h a t I used with the gun was t h e manual forces alone and to retrieve the Ex-
technique t h a t we developed on the air-hcaring plat-
form. I kept my left hand out to the side [fig. 9-17]
periment SO10 Agena Micrometeorite Col-
and t h e gun as close to my center of gravity as I lection package attached near the docking
could. I think t h a t the training I had on the air- cone. The pilot described the use of the Hand
bearing tables was very representative especially in Held Mmeuvering Unit a t this time ;is fol-
yaw and pitch. I felt quite confident with t h e gun lows :
in yaw and pitch, but I felt a little less confident in Okay. we’re in this EVA. I got back and stood up
roll. I felt t h a t I would have to use too much of iny in thc. hatch and checkrd out the gun and made sure
fuel. I felt t h a t i t would he a littlr more difficult to it was squirting nitrogen. That’s the only gun check-
control and I didn’t want to use my fuel to take out out I did. In the nirantinie. John maneuvered the
my roll combination with the yaw. spacecraft over toward thc end of the TDA, just as
As soon as m y gun ran out [of fuel] I wasn’t able we hitd planned. He got in such a position t h a t my
to control myself the wuy I could with the Eun. With hcwl wits 4 to 5 feet from thc docking cone. I t was
t h a t gun, I could dccidc to yo to ii part of a spncr- upward a t about a 45” angle. just as we planned.
craft and very confidently go. I I)elieve a t one time there you said you had trouhle
Now I was working on taking sonie pictures and seeing it, and I gave you [command pilot] some in-
working on the tether dynamics. I immediately rea- structions iil)out “forwnrtl. forward.” “stop, stop.”
lized what was wrong. I realized that our tether So I actually sort of talkcd .John into position.
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 105
I translated over by pushing off from the space- ward pitching moment. So I did damp out the pitch.
craft. I floated forward and upward fairly slowly I converted t h a t downward pitch moment into a n
and contacted the Agena. I grabbed hold of the dock- upward pitching moment, and then I w a s able t o
ing cone as near as I can recall, at about t h e 2 o'clock stop my pitch entirely. But in the process of doing
position. If you call the location of the notch in it, that, I developed a n inadvertent up translation,
the 12 o'clock, I was to the right of that-at about which nearly caused me to miss the Agena. AS a
the 2 o'clock position and I started crawling around. matter of fact, 1 came very close to passing over
No, I must have been more about the 4 o'clock posi- the top of the Agena; and I was just barely able to
tion, because I started crawling around at the dock- pitch down with the gun and snag a hold of the
ing cone counterclockwise, and the docking cone docking cone as I wrnt by the second time.
itself, the leading edge of the docking cone, which
is very blunt, makes a very poor handhold in those During further technical debriefings, the
pressure gloves. I had great difficulty in holding on Gemini X pilot made several other comments.
to the thing. And, as a mattzr of fact, when I got Concerning the response characteristics of
over by the SO10 package and tried to stop my mo- the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit, he stated
tion, my inertia [the inertia of] my lower hody, kept that the thrust levels of 0 to 2 pounds were
me right on moving and my hand slipped and I fell
about right. These levels provided adequate
r?ff the Agena.
When I fell off, I figured I had either one of two translational response without making the
things to do. I could either pull in on t h e umbilical rotational response seem overly sensitive. The
and get back to the spacecraft, o r I could use the Gemini I V pilot made the same comment.
gun. And I chose to use the gun. I t was floating free With respect to ability to transfer the con-
at this time. I t had come loose from the chestpack. trol skills acquired on the 3-degree-of-free-
So, I reached down to my left hip and found the
nitrogen line and started pulling in on i t and found
dom air-beafing simulators to the 6 degrees
the gun, and unfolded the a r m s of the gun and o f freedom existing in space, the Gemini X
started looking around. I picked up the spacecraft pilot stated that the transfer was easy and
in view. I was pointed roughly toward the space- natural. He WLLS, perhaps, a little surprised
craft. The spacecraft was forward and below .me on that the pitch degree of freedom gave more
my left. The Agena was just about over my left
shoulder and below me, or down on my left side and
control troihle than the yaw-degree of free-
below me. I used the gun to translate back to the dom. Due to ;i very low hotly inertia about the
cockpit area. Now, I was trying to thrust in a yaw axis, yawing motions generated with the
straight line from where I was back to the cockpit, Hand Held Maneuvering Unit are naturally
but in leaving the Agena I had developed some tan- much faster than either pitch or roll motions.
gential velocity, which was bringing me out around
the side and the rear of the Gemini. So what hap-
Finally. in answer to the question of
pened was, i t was almost as if I was in a n airplane whether he had acquired any rolling motions
on down wind for a landing, and in making a left- during brief periods of maneuvering with
hand pattern I flew around and made a 180" left the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit, the Gemini
descending turn, and flew right into t h e cockpit. I t X pilot stated that no rolling motions what-
was a combination 'of just luck, I think, being ablc
to use t h e gun. A t a n y rate, I did return to the
ever had heen experienced. This is sipnificant
cockpit in t h a t manner, and John again maneuvered fr)r two reasons:
the spacecraft. When I got to the cockpit, I stood ( 1 ) Rased upon indications of the inertia
up in the hatch and held on to the hatch. John ma- coupling model, and upon the Gemini IV ex-
neuvered the spacecraft again up nc-xt to the Apena. ti*avchicul:ir activity, the Gemini X pilot had
This time we were, I think. slightly f a r t h e r away,
because I felt t h a t rather than trying to push off 1 t rained speci tic:tlly to avoid rolling motions,
would use the gun and translate over. And I did, in and to stop them immediately if they should
fact, squirt the gun up, depart the cockpit and trans- occur.
late over to the docking cone using the gun as a ( 2 ) If rolling motions can he totally elimi-
control device. The gun pot me there. It wasn't ex- nated. then control with the Hand Held Ma-
tremely accurate. What happened was, as I w a s
qoing over, I guess in leaving the cockpit, I some- ueuvrring Unit is rctliicetl practically to a
how developed a n inadvertent pitch-down moment, siml)le ::-tlegree-of-freedom situation involv-
and when I corrected this out with the gun, I de- i n g yawing and pitching rotations, and linear
veloped a n upward translation as well as a n up- t i*anslations.
106 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
107
108 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
On Gemini IX-A, X, XI, and XII, preflight time lines during simulations and preflight
and postflight exercise tests using the bicycle planning. The use of heart-rate and respira-
ergometer were performed on the pilots. tion-rate data, when coupled with voice con-
During the tests, the subject performed a tact and a n understanding of programed
measured amount of work in increasing in- activities, proved a n extremely important and
crements while heart rate, blood pressure, useful method for real-time monitoring of
and respiration rate were monitored ; peri- extravehicular pilots.
odic samples of expired gas were collected The major factors which apparently pro-
for analysis. The data were translated into duced the highest workload prior t o Gemini
oxygen utilization curves antl heat-energy XI1 were high suit forces, insufficient bocly-
plots (fin. 10-1). Using the plots and the position restraints, and thermal stress. This
heart-rate (lata obtained during each flight was intlicutecl when the Gemini XI pilot ex-
(figs. 10-2 antl IO-?,), ;in approximate work- pentled an exceptionally high effort in attach-
load curve \vas plotted against the time line i n g t h e spacecraft 'target-vehicle tether to
for the extravehicular activity. The derived the docking bar. Difficulties in maintaining
data were not entirely believable, since there I)ody position in the weightless environment
is no method to account for the effect on heart made the task much more difficult than had
rate resiiltinx from thermal o r other environ- Iwen expected.
mental variations. Also, the psychogenic ef- The pilot used the larne torso and leg
fect of a new and different environment could muscles in attempting to straddle the space-
certainly increase the heart rates without it craft nose and found that he had to work
corresponding change in metabolic rate. The ;tgainst the pressurized space suit in order t o
plots were useful in evaluating the workloads force his legs into a n unnatural position. The
for the Gemini XI1 extravehicular activity. h i g h workload subjectively described by the
The accuracy of the plots may be expected to Ijilot was con firmed by heart and respiration
increase as the oxygen consumption increases rates (fig. 10-2 ( d ) ) . The high respiration
toward maximum oxygen utilization. This rates also indicate the possibility of increased
value varies with individuals and with the ciirhon-dioxide level. The Extravehicular
degree of physical conditioning, and is de- life-Support Systt!m was not designed t o
pendent upon the amount of oxygen which handle workloads of the magnitude indicated
can be transported from the environment to t)v these rates i n terms of either thermal con-
the body tissues. trol or carbon-dioxide removal. It is probable
The area of major interest in evaluating that the thermal antl carbon-dioxide buildup,
\vorkloads during extravehicular activities is along with psychogenic factors which were
during high workload periods. Furthermore, certainly present, contributed to the high
any error introduced by unknown factors heart rates recortletl. However, this would
would increase the ohserved heart rate f o r mxkc heart rate and respiration rate data no
a given workload level. This tends to increase less useful in the real-time monitoring of it
the usefulness of such it plot for preflight C I W V during flight if stress or potential dan-
planning antl for inflight monitoring of extra- cer wore in fact present.
vehicular activities. When (lata from previous I n planning for Gemini XII, it was deemed
flights, altit utle chamher tests. 1c walk-
important to avoid workloatls which uwiild
t h yo ugh s, a ntl 11ntle rwa t e r zero-g si m 111atio 11s
t~xceetl the capacity of the Extravehicular
;ire examinecl in t h i s manner, ii quantitative
indication may I)e derived of work expended 1.i fc-Si1plm-t System. It had been determined
O R various tasks (fig. 1 0 4 ) . This is impor- that the Estrnvehicular 1,ife-Support System
tant in the postflight assessment of the rela- wis c:ipal)le of handling 2000 Btu h r while
tive physiological cost of various tasks, and maintaining ;t carbon-dioxide level equal t o
in determining acceptable tasks and realistic iil)l)ro?timately6 mm of mercury. During the
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 109
N +
N O L
-c
0
~~=
._
.>
0N .-e
n
W
VI
z
j:
W
c
h
-
.-c
0
.-.a
'D
L
W
VI
E
110 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
'.
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF G E M I N I EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 111
N
N
0
ci
.>
!I
I
N
0
'2
,>
\
U
.-0
W
-
L
n
-
W
'D
L
W
yl
-
c
0
._
1
m
L
._
a
W
VI
CT
s.-
E:
U
T
?
W
>
0
aJ
U
I
/,/ ,'
i
W
10
L
.-6
e
m
L
.-n
W
yl
LT
-I
0
112 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
u
c ” E-
w
!I
I
Jo
Em
._
-
L
VI
0
a
TP
1
U
>
P)
s
P)
1
N
. u -
e - rn
0
w 02
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 113
the pilot was asked to decrease the activities, of each fight was inatleqiiate, and prel)itra-
heart rates returned to ;i resting level in less tion activities for t~strnvehiculnrmaneuvers
than 1 minute. U * ( ~ I Y - tletitiled and fatiguing. Furthermore,
During each period of standup extrnve- thc p:tc.c of pi-eflight activities aiid the pres-
hicular activity in Gemini XII, two sessions si!l*es of plitiining, tritining, :tnd prepnration
of programed exercise were performed. The to meet i t tlight schedule predisposed the crew
exercises consisted of moving the arms to fatigue. During the tinal weeks of prepa-
against the restrictive forces of the pressur- I*ittionfor i t flight, each crew found that time
114 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
r
U
e
m m
V I S
VI I
\
c
C
.s'i6L
7 - L
W V I
La L
l W
L
m
a
L
Id-
s
U
-ma
L
.-
S
al
I
c
W
al
0
E
CT
-: I
n
-
B
m
L
0
w
al
P -
L
I--
m
W
L
al
U
c e
-
m u
m .%
nn
-m
L
s2
.-
3
U
L
5
-
m
L
x
al
al
m
c
m o
I-
S
V
m
B w
E
0
e
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 115
-z
as
2o’
a
3
92-
L
.-c
.E
$: 20-
E5
’= 3
V
a n
I L
I I I I I I 1 I I 1 I
LT
r Egress
Move to Target .
Move to target vehicle
7 c
Work on adapter tasks
Target vehicle work
tasks without tether
I-
Docking Adapter
7 rest ringress
- 400
60 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I - 0
%-
f3
3 94-
0
F"."
0
.-
;
Y
92-
cn
90 I I I I I I 1 I 1 I I I 1 I I I
EI 2 0 -
Z C
tv-
10-
z- I 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I I 1 1
-Heart
lwr-----
rate
Respiration rate r:t:2 mation which will be invaluable in planning
future missions. There have been no indica-
tions that the efficiency of miin during extra-
vehicular activities is significantly altered.
"I
The major factor.; which appear to have pro-
duced the highest workload during the extra-
vehicular activity a r e high suit forces, insuffi-
10
0 cient I)ody-position aids, and thermal stress.
The success of Gemini S I 1 conclusively tlem-
701
0
'
10
'
20
'
30 40
' 50
I '
60 70
'
80
'
90 onstrated that these factors can be minimized
Elapsed time, min through careful planning. Evaluation of
physiological factors during the cxtrnvehicu-
( a ) Gemini I V pilot. liir activitv has h t w significnntl! compro-
FIGURE
10-3.-Physiological (lata during umbilical mised by the lack of arleqtiate instrumentit-
extravehicular activity. tion. Much can Iw leai.nctl about the physi-
ological responses to csti*;ivehicular act i\.ities
for rest, relaxation, and even physical condi- from simu1ation.s i i i the zcro-g aircraft ant1
tioning was a t a premium, and often these i n m tincler\\atci* mockul). Without sllecitic
activities were omitted. knowledge of the thermal and environmental
The possibility exists that hematological or contlitions. howe\w, ;I realistic simulation of
cardiovascu1;ir changes observed i n weight- estix\~ehiciilai.activities will he incomplete
less flight decrease the metabolic efficiency of ;I IN1 1 )ossihl y m is leild i ng.
man during the extravehicular activities re- 'l'hti s~ic.cessfiilcoml)letion of thti Gemini
quiring a relatively high workload. Until
c~stt.avrhicitl~ti. activities indicates that life-
more detailed information is available from
support planning has heen essentially sound.
well-founded medical experimentatioii during
flight. the relative importance of such factors The sticcess of Gemini XI1 indicates that
cannot be assessed. w i t h i n the limitations of the experience
gained. timc lines and work tasks can be
Conclusions tailoi.ec1 so that flight objc1ctivt.s can be accom-
plishetl. 7'hei.c itre no medical contrainctica-
The experience gninc?d from the Gemini tions to presently planned estravehicular
extravehicular activities has provided infor- xtivities.
11s GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
r
Open hatch
r Extravehicular
Life Support System
to high flow
Remove docking-bar mirror
200
Deploy handrails; sunrise: r c h e c k i n g Attronaut
u mbil ical evaluation Maneuverinq Unit
,-Return to cabin
180
160
.-Ec
--
VI
m
a
l
n
-
&
m
L
140
120
f
Io
W
30
20 100
‘%Respirationrate
.L
a
10
W
I I I I I I I I I
20 43 63 80 103 120 140 160 180
Elapsed time, min
180
Extravehicular
Factivity
terminated
. :ti clo~ef
160
Fpilot- egress target vehicle 1 .', \
(.
- Pressiire
' 5.6 Dsia
FDepressurize cabin F Experiment SOK
package retrieval
/
I
r Experiment SO12 retrieved
i
,,Respiration rate
80
I 1 I I
60
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Elapsed time, min
( c ) Gemini X pilot.
10-3.-Continued.
FIGURE
120 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
( d ) Gemini XI pilot.
FIGURE10-3.-Continued.
MEDICAL ASI'ECTS OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES 121
0
m
m
c
E
c
0
.-
amd
L
.-n
m
Ln
LT
GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
120 r
110 -
I I
--I-Post-exercise -
.- Preflight exercise
- loo-
E
(D
.a
6 90
-
L
m
L
7
m
80 -
G I
I I
'-c--
110 -
C
._ First inflight exercise I
I
,E 100 -
v)
-
ai I
I
I
I
I
I I
l l l l l l l l l l ~ l Il I I I ,
60
-
L
I I
X
70- I I
I I
I I ! I l l 1
.-c
E
e:I
-e 70 -
a-
,, Respiration rate
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Elapsed time. min
( u ) Gemini X pilot.
FIGURE
10-5.--Physiolo~ical (lata during standup extravehicular activity.
Hatch
7
Camera
installed 7
pictures
Of Houstonl
Crew napping
Taking star pictures
I
- ngress
disconnect 7
,-,Taking
pictures
I
---- -
'- /- - -- /'- - - -'--
I I I I I I I I I
J
6o0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Elapsed time, min
( b ) Gemini XI pilot.
FIGURE
10-&-Continued.
124 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
5
L
.-W
'A .c
'D
W
W
x
W -
0
'A
u
c
0
U L
W
m
W
L
5
U
-(0
L
3
.-U
f
-e
W
-IU
L
-c
'A
.-n
c
'D
U
W
.-L-
N
3
'A
'A
W
L
n
W
n
L
EXTRAVEHICULAR MANEUVERING ABOUT SPACE VEHICLES 125
110
90
-
.-c
E
v)
H
-e
6 70
L
L
IV 1 I'LM
I
I 25
I
Hand Held
-Maneuvering
036 None 0:36
Unit
VI11 ELSS, ESP Hand Held Nonc None None
Maneuvering
Unit
IX-A ELSS, .-\MU I 2 .i Astronaut 2:07 None 2:07
X ELSS
r Maneuvering
Unit
30 Hand Held 0%) 0:50 1 :"9
iManeuvering
Unit
XI ELSS 30 Hand Held 0:3Y 2:lO ?:A3
I Maneuvering
I
I Unit
XI1 ELSS I 2 5 None . 2:06 324 5:30
I
I
6:Ol I 122.5
1
. FIGURE
11-5.-Gemini IX-A adapter provisions f o r
extravehicular activity.
solution should be applied to the space-suit for the type of body restraints required and
helmet visors immediately prior to the extra- the magnitude of the forces involved. An
vehicular activity on future missions. Each overshoe type of positive foot restraint wits
extravehicular task planned for the succeed- installed in the spacecraft adapter and was
ing missions was analyzed in greater detail tlesigned to be used for the extravehicular
FIGURE
ll-(i.--Gernini IX-.A cxtravehicular time line.
S U M M A R Y OF G E M I N I EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 133
tasks planned for Gemini XI and XII. The in stowage volume over the %-foot single
analysis showed that all extravehicular tasks umbilical assembly used on Gemini VI11 and
planned for the Gemini X, XI, and XI1 mis- IX-A. The extravehicular equipment for
sions could be accomplished satisfactorily. Gemini X is shown in figure 11-7. For the
As another corrective step, underwater sim- standup extravehicular activity, short exten-
ulation was initiated in a n attempt to dupli- sion hoses were connected to the spacecraft
cate the weightless environment more accu- Environmental Control System to permit the
rately than did the zero-gravity aircraft pilot to stand while remaining on the space-
simulations. craft closed-loop system. The pilot also used
a fabric-strap standup tether to take any
Gemini X loads required to hold him in the cockpit.
The standup activity commenced j u s t after
The prime objective of the Gemini X extra- sunset a t an elapsed flight time of 23 hours
vehicular activity was to retrieve the
Experiment SO10 Agena Micrometeorite
Collection package from the target vehicle
that had been launched for the Gemini VI11
mission. The package was to be retrieved
immediately after rendezvous with the Gem-
ini VI11 target vehicle, and the umbilical
extravehicular activity was to last approxi-
mately one daylight period. In addition, it
was planned to continue the evaluation of the
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit; to retrieve
the Experiment SO12 Gemini Micrometeor-
ite Collection package from the spacecraft
adapter ; and to conduct several photographic.
experiments. Photography was scheduled for
1% orbits during a period of standup extra-
vehicular activity. r===
The extravehicular equipment included the
Extravehicular Life-support System, the im-
proved Hand Held Maneuvering Unit, and
the new tio-foot dual umbilical. One hose in
the umbilical carried the normal spacecraft -
.1. . - .
If
oxygen supply to the Extravehicular Life-
Support System. The other hose carried
nitrogen for the Hand Held Maneuvering
Unit. The umbilical was designed so that the
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit and all oxygen
fittings could be connected before the hatch
was opened; however, the nitrogen supply
for the Hand Held Maneuvering Unit had to
be connected outside the spacecraft' cabin. -.
The configuration and operation of this um-
bilical were simpler than the complicated
connections with the Gemini VI11 and IX-A
equipment. The 50-foot umbilical had the dis-
advantage of requiring a substantial increase FIGURE
L
ll-:.-Gemini X extravehicular system.
134 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
24 minutes, and proceeded normally for the crew elected to terminate the standup.activity
first 30 minutes (fig. 11-8). The pilot was a t this time.
well restrained by the standup tether, and The eye irritation subsided gradually after
since there were no unusual problems with ingress and hatch closure. The cause of the
body positioning, ultraviolet photographs of eye irritation was not known, but was be-
various star fields were taken with no diffi- lieved to be related to the simultaneous use
culty. Immediately after sunrise, both crew- of both compressors in the spacecraft oxy-
members experienced vision interference gen-supply loop to the space suits. The crew
caused by eye irritation and tears, and the verified that, prior to the umbilical extrave-
hicular activity, no significant eye irritation
was experienced when only one suit com-
pressor was used while the cabin was de-
compressed.
The Gemini X umbilical extravehicular ac-
tivity was initiated at an elapsed flight time
Sunset of 48 hours 42 minutes, immediately after
Hatch open
23:25 Equipment jettisoned rendezvous with the Gemini VI11 target ve-
Experiment SO13 camera mounted
IPilot standing in open hatch
hicle. The sequence of events is indicated in
Experiment SO13 photography
figure 11-9. The pilot retrieved the Experi-
ment SO12 Gemini Micrometeorite Collection
Left shoulder strap restraining pilot
package from the exterior of the spacecraft
Pilot feeling warm adapter, then moved outside to connect the
23:35 nitrogen umbilical supply line for the Hand
Held Maneuvering Unit. The pilot then re-
Eight exposures for Experiment SO13 turned to the cockpit. Meanwhile, the com-
2340 mand pilot was flying the spacecraft in close
Pilot starts to cool off
formation 'with the target vehicle (fig.
11-10). With the docking cone of the target
23:45 Twelve out of twenty Experiment SO13
photographs obtained
vehicle approximately 5 feet away, the pilot
pushed off from the spacecraft and grasped
Body positioning no problem the outer lip of the docking cone. In movinp
LmO
I
around the target vehicle to the location of
the Experiment SOlO Apena Micrometeorite
Collection package, the pilot lost his hold on
23:55
the smooth lip of the docking cone and drifted
Sunrise
Experiment SO13 completed away from the target vehicle. He used the
24:OO
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit to translate
Experiment SO13 camera handed to command pilot approximately 15 feet back to the spacecraft.
Pilot lowered sun visor and received The pilot then used the Hand Held Maneu-
Experiment M410 color plate vering Unit to translate to the target vehicle.
24:05
Photographeo color plate On h i s second attempt to move around the
Eye irritation first reported tlockinF: cone, the pilot used the numerous
Color plate discarded
24: 10 wire bundles and struts behind the cone as
Experiment Sa13 bracKet discarded hantlholds, and was able to maintain satis-
Hatch closed factory control of his body position. Re-
0 Day
24:15 INight trieval of the Experiment SOlO Agena
Micrometeorite Collection package was ac-
FIGUREll-8.--Gemini X standup extravehicular complished without difficulty. While carrying
time line. the package, the pilot used the umbilical to
SUM MARY OF GEM IN1 EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 135
I ’.
‘,Experiment SO10
package
-
- Pilot checked out Hand Held Maneuvering Unit hatch was then closed normally. Fifty min-
- lPilot pushed off from spacecraft to target vehicle utes later the crew again opened the right
-- IPilot let go of target vehicle. Translated to space-
1 craft with Hand Held Maneuvering Unit (15 feet)
hatch and jettisoned the Extravehicular Life-
- 49:Oo Extravehicular Life Support System on high flow Support System, the umbilical, and other
- XTranslated to target vehicle with Hand Held miscellaneous equipment not required for the
- Maneuvering Unit (about 12 feet)
-
- remainder of the mission.
- 49:05 Experiment SO10 removed from target vehicle During the umbilical extravehicular ac-
-- Hand-over-hand return using umbilical tivity, the pilot reported the loss of the 70-mm
- Loss of TO-mm still camera reported
- still camera. The camera had been fastened
-
-
49:lO to the Extravehicular Life-support System
Hand Held Maneuvering Unit nitrogen line
- disconnected near hatch with a lanyard, but the attaching screw came
- Ingress commenced
r loose. It was also discovered that the Experi- .
49:15 Pilot untangling umiiilical ment SO12 Gemini Micrometeorite Collection
package had been accidentally thrown out
i
4920 Hatch Closed
or had drifted out of the hatch. The package
had been stowed in a pouch with an elastic
top, but appeared to have been knocked free
49:25 while the 50-foot umbilical was being un-
tangled.
Sunset
0 Day The principal lessons learned from the ex-
49:30 Night . travehicular phase of this mission included
the following:
FIGURE11-9.-Gemini X umbilical extravehicular (11 Preparation foi- extravehicular ac-
time line.
tivity was an important task for which the
full-time attention of both crewmembers was
pull himself back to the cockpit. At this time, desirable. Combining a rendezvous with a
the spacecraft propellant supply had reached passive target vehicle and the extravehicular
the lower limit allotted for the extravehicu- activity preparation caused the crew to be
lar activity and the station-keeping opera- rushed, and did not allow the command pilot
tion, and the extravehicular activity was to give the pilot as much assistance as had
terminated. been planned.
During the first attempt to ingress, the ( 2 ) The tasks of crew transfer and equip-
pilot became entangled in the 50-foot umbili- ment retrieval from another satellite could
cal. Several minutes of effort were required be accomplished in a deliberate fashion with-
by both crewmembers to free the pilot from out excessive workload. Formation flying
the umbilical so that he could ingress. The with another satellite could be accomplished
136 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
Gemini XI
Day
Night
Ground elaDSed time
24:OO Seven minutes after sunrise
-
- Hatch open
-
- Standing in hatch
-
- 24:05 Handrail deployed
Experiment SO09 retrieved
-
-- Extravehicular camera mounted
-
- 24:10
Pilot at spacecraft nose
Resting
-- Attaching spacecraftltarget-vehicle tether
- Tether on
--- 24:15 Tether secured
Return to hatch
- Resting
FIGUREll-l2.-Foot restraints installed in the -
adapter section for Gemini XI and XI1 missions.
--- 24:20 Start film change
Oav
Night Night
Ground elapsed time 4 Ground elapsed time
V '
I
r 46:OO
F 47:10
Standing in hatch
Crew napping
Pictures of Antares
Agena Attitude Control System on
Pictures of Orion
Pictures of Shaula
Sunrise
Pictures of Orion
Pictures of Houston
0 Day
Sunrise INight
FIGURE
11-14.-Geinini XI standup est rnvchicular tinw line.
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 139
Gemini XI1
FIGURE
ll-l8.-Underwater simulation of Gemini
XI1 extravehicular activity.
FIGURE
ll-l'i.--Gemini XI1 estravchiculai~system.
The umbilical extravehicular activity prep-
arations proceeded smoothly, and the hatch
was very similar to that of the two previous was opened within 2 minutes of the planned
missions. As indicated by the time line in time (fig. 11-20). The use of waist tethers
figure 11-19, the ultraviolet stellar and the during the initial tasks on the Target Dock- .
synoptic terrain photography experiments ing Adapter enabled the pilot t o rest easily,
were accomplished on a routine basis. During to work without great effort, and to connect
the standup activity, the pilot performed sev- the spacecraft /target-vehicle tether in a n
eral tasks designed for familiarization with expeditious manner. In addition, the pilot
the environment and for comparison of the activated the Experiment SO10 Agena Micro-
meteorite Collection package on the target
standup and umbilical extravehicular activi-
vehicle for possible future retrieval. Prior t o
ties. These tasks included mounting the ex- the end of the first daylight period, t h e pilot
travehicular sequence camera and installing moved to the spacecraft adapter where he
an extravehicular handrail from the cabin evaluated the work tasks of torquing bolts,
to the docking adapter on the target vehicle. making and breaking electrical and fluid con-
The standup activity was completed without nectors, cutting cables and fluid lines, hooking
incident. rings and hooks, and stripping patches of
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 141
5
Day
Night F;m15elapsed time
r-
-
20:45
-
Hatch open -
19:30 - 20:50
Install Experiment SO13 camera -
-
Evaluate standup dynamics -
-
19:35
-- 2035
-
-
-
19:40 - 21:oo
-
-
-
Sunset -
-- 21:05
- Retrieve extravenicular camera
- 21:lO
-
Experiment SO13 photography - Sunset
-
Sunrise
Install extravehicular camera
Deploy handrail
Take down Experiment SO13 camera for
grating change
FICURE
ll-l9.-G(mini
1 -
-
-
-22:05
XI1 first standup estravc.hicular time line.
0 Day
INight
7 42 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
0
N It Night
Ground elapsed time Ground elapsed time
$ 42:35 43:45
Rest
Start ingress
Sunset Day
Torquing bolthead with torque wrench Hatch closed Night
FIGURE
11-20.-Gemini XI1 umbilical extravehicular time line.
S U M M A R Y OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 143
Velcro. The tasks were accomplished using missions demonstrated the ability to control
either the two foot restraints or the waist the extravehicular workload and to maintain
tethers, and both systems of restraint proved the workload within the limits of the life-
satisfactory. support system and the capabilities of the
During the second daylight period of the pilot. Standup and umbilical extravehicular
umbilical activity. the pilot returned to the operations were accomplished during eight
target vehicle and performed tasks a t a small
work station on the outside of the docking
cone. The tasks were similar to those in the
spacecraft adapter and, in addition, included t
Ground elapsed time
an Apollo torque wrench. The pilot further
evaluated the use of two waist tethers, one Hatch open
waist tether, and no waist tether. At the end
of the scheduled extravehicular activity, the Equipment jettisoned
pilot returned to the cabin and ingressed
without difficulty.
A second standup extravehicular activity Sunset
was conducted (fig. 11-21). Again, this ac-
tivity was routine and without problems. The
objectives were accomplished, and all the 6620
attempted tasks were satisfactorily com- Ultraviolet photography of stars
pleted.
The results of the Gemini XI1 extravehicu- 6625
lar activity showed that all the tasks at-
tempted were feasible when body restraints
Exercise
were used to maintain position. The results 66:30
also showed that the extravehicular workload
could be controlled within desired limits by
the application of proper procedures and in-
doctrination. The final, and perhaps the most
significant, result was the confirmation that
the underwater simulation duplicated the
actual extravehicular environment with a
high degree of fidelity. I t was concluded that
any task which could be accomplished readily
in a valid underwater simulation would have -
a high probability of success during actual -
extravehicular activity. -
- 6650
-
-
Extravehicular Capabilities Demonstrated -
-
- 66:55
In the course of the Gemini missions, a -
-
number of capabilities were demonstrated -
67:oO
which met or exceeded the original objectives Hatch closed
of extravehicular activity. The basic feasi- 0 Day
bility of extravehicular activity was well es- I Night
67:OS
tablished by the 11 hatch openings and the
more than 12 hours of operations in the en- FICIJRE
11-21.--Gemini XI1 second standup extra-
vironment outside the spacecraft. The Gemini vehicular time line. I
144 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
separate nighttime periods to confirm the ties on three missions and the extravehicular
feayibility of extravehicular operations a t sequence photographs taken with the camera
night. mounted outside the spacecraft cabin.
The need for handholds for transit over The dynamics of motion on a short tether
the exterior surface of the spacecraft was were evaluated on two missions. The only
shown, and the use of several types of fixed tether capability that was demonstrated was
and portable handholds and handrails was for use as a distance-limiting device.
satisfactorily demonstrated. The requirements for body restraints were
The capability to perform tasks of varying established, and the capabilities of foot re-
complexity was demonstrated. The character straints and waist tethers were demonstrated
( J f practical tasks was shown, and some of the i n considerable detail. The validity of under-
factors that limit task complexity and diffi- water simulation in solving body restraint
culty were identified. problems and in assessing workloads was
Several methods were demonstrated for demonstrated in flight and further confirmed
crew transfer between two space vehicles and by postflight evaluation.
include : (1) surface transit while docked. ( 2 ) In summary, the Gemini missions demon-
free-floating transit between two undocked strated the basic techniques required for the
vehicles in close proximity, ( 3 ) self-propul- imxluctive use of extravehicular activity.
sion between two undocked vehicles, and ( 4 ) Problem areas were defined sufficiently to
tether or umbilical pull-in from one undocked indicate the preferred equipment and proce-
vehicle to another. All of these methods were diires for extravehicular activity in future
accomplished within a maximum separation space' programs.
distance of 15 feet.
The Hand Held Maneuvering Unit was Extravehicular Limitations and Solutions
evaluated briefly, but successfully, on two
different missions. When the maneuvering While most of the Gemini extravehicular
unit was used, the extravehicular pilots ac- activities were successful, several areas of
complished the maneuvers without feeling significant limitations were encountered.
disoriented and without loss of control. Space-suit mobility restrictions. constituted
Retrieval of equipment from outside the one basic limitation which affected all the
spacecraft was demonstrated on four mis- mission results. The excellent physical capa-
sions. One equipment retrieval was accom- bilities and conditions of the flight crews
plished from an unstabilized passive target tended to obscure the fact that moving
vehicle, which had been in orbit for more around in the Gemini space suit was a sig-
than 4 months. nificant work task. Since the suit design had
Gemini X demonstrated the capability for already been established for the flight phase
the command pilot to maneuver in close prox- of the Gemini Program, the principal solu-
imity to the target vehicle while the pilot was tion WRS to optimize the tasks and body re-
outside the spacecraft. The close-formation straints to be compatible with the space suits.
flying was successfully accomplished by coor- For the 2-hour extravehicular missions, glove
dinating the thruster firings of the command mobility and hand fatigue were limiting fac-
pilot with the extravehicular maneuvers of tors, both in training and in flight.
the pilot. No damage nor indication of immi- The size and location of the Extravehicular
nent hazard occurred during the operation. Life-Support System chest pack was a con-
Photography from outside the spacecraft stant encumbrance to the crews. This design
was accomplished on each extravehicular \‘:as selected because of space limitations
mission. The most successful examples were within the spacecraft, and the crews were
the ultraviolet stellar spectral photographs continually hampered by the bulk of the
taken during standup extravehicular activi- chest-mounted system.
SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 145
The use of gaseous oxygen a s the coolant Equipment retention during extravehicular
.
medium in the space suit and Extravehicular activity was a problem for all items which
Life-Support System was a limiting factor were not tied down o r securely fastened. By
in the rejection of metabolic heat and in pilot extensive use of equipment lanyards, the loss
comfort. The use of a gaseous system re- of equipment was avoided during the last two
quired the evaporation of perspiration as a missions.
cooling mechanism. At high workloads, heavy
perspiration and high humidity within the Concluding Remarks
suit were certain to occiIr. These factors were
evident on the missions where the workloads The results of the Gemini extravehicular
exceeded the planned values. As in the case activity led to the following conclusions :
of suit mobility, the cooling system design (1) Extravehicular operation in free space
was fixed for the Gemini Program; hence, is feasible and useful for productive tasks if
any corrective action had to be in the area adequate attention is given to body restraints,
of controlling the workload. task sequence, workload control, realistic sim-
Work levels and metabolic rates could not ulations, and proper training. Extravehicular
be measured in flight; however., the flight re- activity should be considered for use in future
sults indicated that the design limits were missions where a specific need exists, and
probably exceeded several times. Inflight where the activity will provide a significant
work levels were controlled by providing
contribution to science o r manned space
additional body restraints, allowing a gen-
erous amount of time for each task, and flight.
establishing programed rest periods between ( 2 ) Space-suit mobility restrictions were
tasks. These steps, coupled with the under- significant limiting factors in the tasks which
water simulations techniques, enabled the could be accomplished in Gemini extravehicu-
Gemini XI1 pilot to control the workload well lar activity. For future applications, priority
within the design limits of the Extravehicular efforts should be given to improving the mo-
Life-support System. tility of space suits, especially a r m and glove ,
The Gemini XI results emphasized the mobility.
limitations of the zero-gravity aircraft simu-
(2) The Extravehicular Life-support Sys-
lations and of ground training without
weightless simulation. These media were use- tem performed satisfactorily on all Gemini
f u l but incomplete in simulating all extra- missions. The necessity for a chest-mounted
vehicular tasks. The use of underwater simu- location caused some encumbrance to the
lation for development of procedures and for extravehicular pilots. The use of gaseous
crew training proved effective for Gemini cooling is undesirable for the increased work-
XII. loads which may be encountered in future
The sequence in which extravehicular extravehicular activity. ~
(5) 1,oose equipment must be tied down at capabilities or limitations of this equipment.
ill1 times dining extravehicular activity to Further evaluations in orbital flight should
avoid loss. be conducted.
( 6 ) The Hand Held Maneuvering Unit is ( 7 ) The Gemini Program has provided a
pi-omising as a personal transportation device foundation of technical and operational
i l l free space: however, the evaluations to knowledge on which to base future extra-
date have beeii too brief to define the f u l l vehicular activity in subsequent programs.
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
12. RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT HIGH ORBITAL
ALTITUDES
By PETERW. HICCINS.Space Physics Division, Science nnd Applications Directorale, N A S A Manned Space-
cralt Center: JOSEPH C . LILL, Sprrce Physics Division. Science iind Applicntions Directorate, NASA
Manned Spacecrall Center: and T I M O T H Y T. Wi I ITE. Space Physics Division, Science arid Applica-
tiorrs Directorate, .KAS.4 Manned Spacecmfl Center
Environment Model
Sohh
Atlantic
FIGURE
12-3.--South Atlantic anomaly diagram.
.4 .8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2
-
FIGURE
12-2.-Proton distribution in the Earth’s the tilt of the dipole rotates the region of
field. close q ~ p r o a c hsouthward from the equator
to the general vicinity of the South Atlantic.
The higher energy protons are quite pene- Since the Earth’s magnetic field rotates with
trating and would contribute a radiation the Earth, the region remains in this loca-
within almost any spacecraft. tion, and has been named the “South Atlantic
Electron and proton intensities and spectra wnomaly.” In this location, the radiation belt
for near-Earth space have been carefully ana- extends to the top of the atmosphere. Figure
lyzed and all of the recent satellite data have 12-4 shows the South Atlantic anomaly as
I)een assembled into an environmental model viewed on a constant altitude contour of 160
(refs. 1 and 2 ) . Since the electrons are time nautical miles.
dependent, the environment was presented The radiation fluxes and associated spectra
a s that which would have existed in August of the trapped electrons and protons in the
1964. With the use of equation ( l ) ,this envi- South Atlantic anomaly have been measured
ronment can be modified to apply to other by the following experiments flown aboard
times. several Gemini flights :
Although the spacial distribution of the M404 .........I Proton-electron IV, VI1
trapped radiation is generally symmetrical spectrometer
M406 ......... Tri-axis magnetometer IV,VII, X,XI1
in azimuth, the exception to this is quite M408 ......... Beta spectrometer x, XI1
important at lower altitudes. I t should be M409 .........1 Bremsstrahlung x,XI1
spectrometer
i.ecalled that the magnetic field of the Earth -.
is approximately that which may be described
l)y a dipole magnet at the center of the Earth These experiments measured the exterior
(fig. 12-3). Actually, this idealized dipole spacecraft radiation environment during all
magnet is both displaced from and tilted with four flights and the interior cabin radiation
respect to the rotational axis of the Earth. environment during Gemini X and XII. The
Recause of the displacement of the imaginary p~.eliminaryresults of these experiments pro-
dipole location, a region of trapped radiation duced a valuable description of the radiation
(indicated by dots in fig. 12-3) is closer to levels in the South Atlantic anomaly a t Gem-
the Earth’s surface on one side. In addition, ini altitudes. At these altitudes the previous
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT H ICH ORBITAL ALTITUDES 151
FIGURE12-4.-Location of radiation fluxes in the South Atlantic anomaly for 1G0-nautical-mile altitude, 28.5"
orbital ground track.
satellite model environments relied on very al)out ii point on the body of a crewman intro-
limited (lata and were consequently inaccu- dtrces another error factor into the calcula-
rate. tions. I n the case in point, the shielding atten-
The experiment results obtained duri.ng iiiiticn protluced by the Gemini spacecraft,
Gemini IV and VI1 were used in the pre- Ihe shielcling geometry is quite complex. The
mission planning of the Gemini X and XI .<hielcling description resulting from a n ex-
flights to define it realistic time rate of artifi- ;!mination of the Gemini spacecraft mechani-
cial electron belt decay. cal drawings is estimated to be accurate only
to within ii factor of 2 in the siibseyiient cal-
culatioii of txtliation dose within. Fina!ly,
al'tei- assumption of' an environment and the
Katliation-dose calculations itre made hy de- :ttteilLtiltion of the environment by the space-
term i ni ng the ratliu t ion environment within craft shielding, ii proLd~leerror i*esiilts in
the spaceci*aft and its i.esult:tnt effect on the the c~ilculationof ii tissue close to it men.-
c i ~ wThe
. exterior environment, the attenua- mt.ml)et.. The' error arises from the iincer-
tion by the spacecraft, and the. response of tttinty t h a t i t s an individual piwton or elec-
the body to the i*;ttli;ition must till he con- ti.on 1)rogresses into t h e h u m m body, it will
sitletwl in the c:tlculiitions. In practice. the deposit its energy in ii certiiin volume of the
c:tlculaiion of ratli:ttion (lose is performed a t tissue, and from the uncertainty that the
intervals itlong the spacecr;ift trajectory and l i s s i i c b will respond in it precise biological way
then summed to expi'ess it total close. to the dose. The conversion from tlux a t the
A 1)recise calculatiori of radiation dose re- (lose point to dose i n the Gemini calcul.'1 t'10ns
ceived by ii ciwvmitn is prohibited by the is also estimatetl to I)e :tccut*ate to within ii
ti 11certain facto rs i n the calculations. The fitctol. of 2 o r :3.
tlefinition of the radiation environment used The uncertainties just described rarely add
is cwtimatetl to represent the actual environ- a t the same point in the ca1cul:ition. Instead,
ment only to within ii factor of 2 or :: each uncertainty may Le treated a s a mathe-
when the variations of particle flux, energy. mutical distribution with the factor men-
and tlii.ection of motion itre considered. In tioned a s it deviation from the mean. I n any
addition, the description of the shielding oiie calculation for an individual particle, the
152 GEMINI S I I M M A K Y CONFERENCE
i.esiiltaiit error ;ipproxim:ites a random sam- lhc Gemini X projected (lose was within the
])ling from each of th(1 three distributions. ;illouablc ixtfiation limits f o r space flight.
I n the end. all the uncertainties mentioned The !)i*edicted dose for the two-revolution
r-onibiiie to prodi1c.c an uncertainty factor of high-altitude portion of the Gemini XI mis-
;tl)oiit 3 i n the published dose. sioii \vas less than 1 millirad, and indicated
I n figure 12-5, the 1)refiirht estimate of the that the Gemini XI high-altitude passes
radiation tlose per revolution is i i function of would subject the flight c r e u to an insirsnifi-
oi'bital position for 21 160-nautical-mile cir- c;itit amount of radiation. This seemed rea-
culm orbit. The dashed curve represents the son;il)le since the Gemini XI flight would
dose using the A i i g ~ i s t 1964 model without :ichie\.o ;tpogee away from the anomaly, but
consideration of' decay : the solid line shows not high eiiough to penetrate the intense
the dose dec;iyed to time of flight. The orbits i*egionsof' ti*apl)eclrtitliation.
are identified l)y ii symbol \vhich is used again
t o denote the dose per revolution foi- each P r o t e c t ion o f SOO!) Experiment Package
i.evolution. The effect of the South Atlantic
;tnomaly is clearly indicated. At this altitude, 'I'hca high-altitude excursion of Gemini XI
vii*tualIy a11 of' the i*atli;ition dose is received MYIS not exlbected to pose a crew safety prob-
during the six orbits passing through the lem sincc the radiation doses were anticipated
anomaly. 1 ( I Le \.el.\' loa. ; however, the exterior flux of
The preflight estimate of the radiation dose piwt ons at these high altitudes presented a
per revolution is shown in figure 12-6 for the t h i w t to an importmt onboard experiment
Gemini X high-altitude orbits. The dose a s of' i);tck:igv. The I)ackaze w a s t h e Gotldard Space
August 1964 and the dose decayed t o the time Flight Center/ Naval Research Laboratories
of flight tire plotted. Figure 12-6 illustrates cosmic-ray tletectoi. designated as scientific
the dramatic increase in dose diie to achieving Eslwriment. Soon, Nuclear Emulsions. If the
high altitudes in the anomaly. In this case, c>xperiment werc successful, an unshielded,
the decayed dose increased by a factor of up time-differentiated, nuclear emulsion would
to 50 in comparable revolutions : however, h e exposed ;it several magnetic latitudes out-
FIGURE
12-5.-Variation in radiation dose in South Atlantic anomaly. Circular orbit, 160 nautical miles.
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AT HIGH ORBITAL ALTITUDES 153
FIGURE12-6.-Variation in radiation dose in the South Atlantic anomaly for Gemini X. Orbit, 160 by 400
nautical miles.
side the Earth’s atmosphere for the first time. in the Southelm Hemis1)hei.e over Australia)
Subsequent identification of the cosmic rays satisfied the minimum protqn flux condition
recorded in the emulsions was considered of and the flight-plan constraints. The numerical
prime scientific importance in determining results of t h i s analysis are indicated in figure
-
the composition of cosmic rays. Therefore, it 12,7. A third revolution was considered as a
was. considered imperative. that the high- safety factor, i n the event that descent to a
altitude excursion of Gemini XI not jeopard- lower altitude had to be postponed for one
ize the success of this experiment by exposure two1ution.
to the higher fluxes of Van Allen belt protons The electrons were not expoctetl to produce
(fig. 12-2) present at the higher altitudes. i i hackground in the emulsion because .the
These protons could have rapidly ruined the. experiment package, located on the exterior
emulsion in the experiment by producing an surface of the spacecr;ift atllipter, was to be
intense background from which the charac-
~ i*etrioved 1j.v the extixvehicu1;il- pilot and
teristic cosmic-ray tracks could not have been placed in the crew ntatioii footwell before t h e
distinguished. high-apogee orbits. The i*elatively heavy
In establishing the flight plan for Gemini shielding pi*ovitled by the footwell would
XI, many possible locations for firing the screen the lightly penetrating electi*ons, but
target-vehicle Primary Propulsion System to woultl not completely attenuate the protons.
achieve the high-altitude orbits were exam-
ined for potential proton exposure. The high- lnfligh t Measurements
altitude damage threshold of the Experiment
SO09 package was established us 2 x 10; During the Gemini X tincl X I missions, ;in
proton/cm2 within the emulsion. Upon exami- active radiation dosimeter was utilized to
nation, most of the possible locations for enhance flight safety by providing ii real-
initiating the firing had to be discarded. The time measurement of the r:idiation-dose anti
result of this analysis showed that initiating (lose rate. and to take :itlvnnt;ige of the high-
the high-altitude maneuver over the Canary :tltitutle portio11 of the flight to obtain valu-
Islands (so that the apogee would he achieved dile r:itli;ition tltita. This instrument (fig.
GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
Orbit 28
(2.6 X lo5 )
West + East
Longitude, deg
During the two high-altitude flights, the presents the inflight crew radiation reports .
Gemini Radiation Monitoring System was of the readings from the Gemini Radiation
stowed aboard the spacecraft until shortly Monitoring System. In neither mission did
before the maneuver for attaining the high- the readings have any influence on the flight,
apogee orbits. After the Gemini Radiation since the reported values were well below
Monitoring System was unstowed, it was the preplanned mission allowable dose limits.
placed a t head height between the crewmen Passive dosimeters have been worn by
on the Gemini X mission, and was affixed to crewmembers on all manned Gemini flights.
the inside of the left hatch on the Gemini XI The passive dosimeters were packaged in
mission. In either case, the instrument was plastic (fig. 12-9) and contained : thermal
read before the high-altitude excursion in luminescent powder which, when heated, ra-
order to establish a baseline reading. Subse- diates visible light proportionate to the radia-
quent readings were made near the high tion absorbed ; and various nuclear emulsions
apogees, and the dose values were reported which, under microscopic analysis, determine
to the ground flight controllers. Table 12-1 the extent of radiation exposure. The meas-
Mission
Greenwich mean
time, hr:min
Ground elapsed
time, hr:min Reading netwnrk station
I
. Dose, rad
I1
.03
(After background
removed)
I
IX-A
X
11 hours
3 days
3 days
All dosimeters
read less than
0.010
.018
.770
10’t
r I
Undecayed dose
7
Electron dose decayed
XI 3 days .025 to 7/17/66
XI1 4 days .015
fi ; b o; 1;
Time after initation of high-altitude maneuver, h r
1’2
I Calculated Measured
Based on
On track full-lift
reentry Altitude. thousands of feet
290 250 210 190 150 100 %!
Range
extension
Fly to left
velocity and measured acceleration. Figure the target ; RC is the crossrange component;
13-3 illustrates the rolling reentry technique and RP is the predicted zero-lift range. A
employed during the Gemini Program; this bank angle BC is commanded based upon the
technique was based on a zero-lift reference ratio of RC EN-RP. The control technique
trajectory. The control logic commanded the simultaneously nulls the downrange and
direction of the spacecraft lift vector neces- crossrange trajectory errors by continuously
sary to steer to a zero-lift trajectory which updating BC based upon the ratio of range
would terminate at the target. A lifting pro- errors, until the predicted zero-lift range
file was flown until a zero-lift trajectory co- R P is equal to the downrange distance to the
incided with the target point. At this point target RN. At this point, if the crossrange
a constant roll rate was commanded to error is greater than a 1-nautical-mile dead-
neutralize the effect of the inherent lifting band, a 90. bank angle is commanded, the
capability of the spacecraft. direction depending on the sign (plus o r
Figure 13-4 illustrates the guidance logic minus) of the crossrange error. When the
for the rolling reentry technique where RN crossrange error is within the deadband, a
is the downrange component of the total zero-lift trajectory is initiated by command-
range between the spacecraft position and ing a constant roll rate. The rolling portion
of the trajectory is interrupted occasionally
,,Roll initiation in order to command any additional lift
necessary to steer back to the zero-lift tra-
jectory. The predicted zero-lift trajectory is
purposely biased early in the reentry to
always place the spacecraft in a n undershoot
condition, thereby eliminating the need f o r
negative lift in order to reach the target.
This guidance logic was used on Gemini 111,
TV, VITI, TX-A, X, XI, and XII.
Figure 13-5 illustrates the constant bank-
ansle reentry technique. This technique is
I
iarget.
...J I ,-
Range Maneuver
I- capability 4
FIGURE
13-3.-Gemini rolling reentry technique.
I Present position
; of spacecraft
Present position
-6
/ of spacecraft
Gemini
-9nc
L r: 20 m,,' Planned tarqet
, 'Target
Half-lift - -.
point -5
m
301 '
100 90
' I
80 70 60 50 40
' I
30 20
I I
10 0 10
I
-
E West 4 East
Impact landing distance from target, n. mi.
FIGURE13-6.-Constant bank angle reentry
guidance logic. FIGURE
13-'i.-Relative landing points.
CONTROLLED REENTRY 163
I1
111
IV
1 14
60
44
1.2
.8
Footprint shift
Lift-drag reduction
Footprint shift, inoperative computer
V 91 Invalid position update
VI-A 7 ~ 4742.5 No radar below 180 000 ft
VII.. 6.4 2.3 I Lift-drag reduction
VI11 1.4 Emergency reentry
IX-A .38 2.2
X 3.4 4.2
XI 2.65 4.0 i Automatic reentry
XI1
i 2.6 2.4 1 Automatic reentry
ously rolling the spacecraft from the point the downrange or crossrange error was
of 0.05 g until an altitude of 80 000 feet was nulled, the crew would fly the commands
attained. The zero-lift point shifted 14 nauti- generated by the spacecraft computer. The
cal miles due to the retrofire maneuver, and Gemini I11 spacecraft experienced a de-
the spacecraft landed 14 nautical miles from crease of approximately 35 percent in the
the planned' touchdown point. The footprint lift-to-drag ratio, resulting in a loss of ap-
shift was caused by a combination of a pitch- proximately 160 nautical miles in the down-
attitude error of 3.2" during retrofire and a range maneuver capability. The loss in capa- o
retrograde-velocity- increment 'that was 1.1 bility, combined with the shift of the foot-
.percent low. Postflight analysis showed that print due to the tleorbit maneuver, caused the
the navigation accuracy at guidance termi- target to be on the edge of the maneuver
nation was 1.2 nautical miles. envelope of the spacecraft. Following the
The first manned mission of the Gemini planned procedure, the hpacecraft landed GO
Program was Gemini 111, a three-orbit mis- nautical miles from the target. Postflight
sion. To assure spacecraft reentry in case of analysis indicated that if the crew had fol-
retrorocket failure, a preretrofire orbit ma- lowed the commands Kenerated bv the space-
neuver was performed with the spacecraft craft computer during the entire reentry, a
propulsion system. This maneuver was com- miss distance of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 nautical
pleted 1.2 minutes before retrofire and re- miles would have occurred. Navigation ac-
sulted in a vacuum perigee of 45 nautical curacy on this mission was 0.8 nautical mile.
miles. The combined retrofire and preretro- Gemini TV was ii 4-day mission. A planned
fire maneuver resulted in a footprint shift of preretrofire maneuver was to he followed 12
48 nautical miles. The retrofire maneuver minutes later I)y a normal retrofire. Rased
accounted for 24.9 nautical miles of this upon the results of Gemini 111, it was planned
shift. Before the deorbit maneuver, the tar- for the crew to use the rolling reentry guid-
get point was situated on the 60" contour ance logic and to manudly follow the com-
line of the footprint, and was offset from the mands from the spacecraft computer during
centerline approximately 10 nautical miles the entire reentry. However. hecause of an
toward the south. The planned guidance inoperative computer, it was necessarv to
technique was to fly the backup bank angle, flv open loop by manually rolling the space-
which would simultaneously null the cross- craft throuchout reentry. The preretrofire
range and downrange errors. When either orbit manenver and the retrofire produced
164 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
a footprint shift of 50 nautical miles, 10 update was sent to Gemini V, the range
nautical miles resulting from the retrofire angle was in error by 7.9". This caused a
maneuver. The spacecraft was to be rolled navigation error in the Gemini V computer
at a rate of 15 deg sec ; however, because the of approximately 474 nautical miles. There-
roll-rate gvro had been turned off, the yaw fore, throughout the reentry the computer
thruster produced an acceleration in the roll displayed erroneous range data, and by the
direction which was not damped. This caused time the crew determined that the computer
the roll rate to build to a maximum of 60 was in error, the spacecraft did not have the
deg sec; the spacecraft was still rolling maneuver capability to steer to the target.
more than 50 deg sec at drogue parachute The spacecraft landed approximately 91
deployment. With the open-loop reentry, nautical miles from the target. Postflight
there was no way to compensate for the pre- analysis indicated that after compensating
retrofire and retrofire errors ; thus, the space- for this initial-condition error, the naviga-
craft landed 44 nautical miles from the in- tion accuracy was 2.5 nautical miles. The
tended landing point. footprint shift due to retrofire was only 5
Gemini V was a n %day mission and was nautical miles. The velocity increment pro-
the first mission scheduled to use the con- duced by the retrorockets was 0.2 percent
stant bank-angle reentry guidance logic. As lower than predicted.
stated previously, the constant bank-angle Gemini VI-A was a l-dag rendezvous mis-
logic commands were based upon a compari- sion ; the constant bank-angle guidance logic
son of the range differences (actual range was used in the same manner as on Gemini
minus predicted half-lift range) with a set V. Retrofire occurred in approximately a
of stored maneuver-capability data. Because 161-nautical-mile circular orbit with a re-
of the large reduction in the lift-to-drag sultant footprint shift of 22 nautical miles.
ratio experienced by the Gemini spacecraft, The shift was due to a 0.6-percent high in-
the set of stored data was no longer valid; crement in the retrorocket velocity. The
therefore, errogeous commands were gen- spacecraft landed 7 nautical miles from the
erated by the spacecraft computer. Because target, and postflight evaluation indicated
of the short time between missions, it was the navigation accuracy was approximately
impossible to update the constants in the 2.5 nautical miles.
program.for Gemini V and VI-A. However, Gemini VI1 was a 14-day mission t h a t em-
the computer calculations of the range errors ployed the constant bank-angle logic. Modi-
( R C and RN-RP) were displayed to the
fications made to several of the guidance
crew and, as a result of preflight training,
the crew could interpret these calculations constants improved the usefulness of the
to obtain the correct bank angle needed to bank command generated by the spacecraft
attain a small miss distance. Therefore, i t computer; however, the primary crew dis-
was planned for the crew to modulate the play was still the range-error display. Retro-
spacecraft lift verior based upon the display fire occurred in approximately a 161-nauti-
of these range errors. cal-mile circular orbit with a resultant foot-
The Gemini spacecraft normally required print shift of 41 nautical miles. The space-
a navigation update before retrofire. This craft touched down approximately 6.4 nauti-
consisted of a n Earth-centered inertial posi- cal miles from the target, and the navigation
tion and velocity vector, and a range angle accuracy was 2.3 nautical miles. A 40-nauti-
through which the Earth had rotated from cal-mile loss-of-maneuver capability was due
the initial alinement of the Earth-centered to an overprediction of the movement of the
inertial system (midnight before lift-off) to center of gravity during the 14 days of the
the time that the vector was valid. Wher, -he mission.
CONTROLLED REENTRY 165
Gemini VIII, a scheduled 3-day rendezvous 215 nautical miles. The footprint shift was
mission, was terminated by a n emergency re- approximately 43 nautical miles, and the
entry into a secondary landing area. The spacecraft landed 3.4 nautical miles from the
reentry was ordered after the flight crew target with a navigation accuracy of 4 2
were forced to use the propulsion capability nautical miles. The rather large navigation
of the Reentry Control System to stop a high error was caused by a yaw misalinement in
roll rate caused by a yaw-thruster anomaly the inertial platform.
in the primary spacecraft propulsion system. Gemini XI, a 3-day rendezous mission, was
Because of the requirement for the propul- the first to use the automatic mode of the
sion capability of the Reentry Control Sys- attitude-control system coupled with the
tem to control the spacecraft attitude during guidance commands to steer the spacecraft
reentry, one of the mission rules required to the target. Using the rolling-reentry logic,
that activation of the Reentry Control Sys- the spacecraft landed 2.65 nautical miles from
tem would require spacecraft reentry in the the planned target with a navigation ac-
next planned landing area. The Gemini VI11 curacy of 4 nautical miles. A comparison of
spacecraft landed in the Western Pacific zone the bank-angle profile flown by the automatic
(area 7-3) in the seventh revolution. system on Gemini XI with the profile man-
The rolling-reentry logic was used for ually flown on Gemini VI11 and X showed
Gemini VI11 and all subsequent Gemini only minor differences. The automatic sys-
flights, and enabled the crew to manually fly tem responded immediately to any change in
the bank-angle commands generated by the the direction of the bank angle commanded
spacecraft computer. Retrofire occurred by the spacecraft computer, whereas a time
from approximately a 161-nautical-mile cir- lapse occurred between command and re-
cular orbit and caused a 12-nautical-mile sponse when the flight crew manually flew
footprint shift. The spacecraft computer cal- th;! bank commands. This time lapse, how-
culated that the spacecraft was 1.4 nautical ever, had no noticeable effect on the final
miles from the planned target a t drogue landing point of the spacecraft.
parachute deployment, and the spacecraft The last flight in the Gemini Program,
was sighted on the main parachute by the Gemini XII, was a 4-day rendezvous mission.
recovery aircraft. Because of the area in Gemini XI1 used the rolling-reentry logic
which the spacecraft was forced to land, no and was the second mission that employed
reentry tracking was possible : therefore, no automatic reentry. The spacecraft landed
navigation accuracy was determined for this approximately 2.6 nautical miles from the
flight. planned target, with a navigation accuracy
Gemini IX-A, a %day rendezvous mission, of 2.4 nautical miles. For the fifth time dur-
used the rolling-reentry logic. The retrofire ing the Gemini Program, the spacecraft
maneuver produced a footprint shift of ap- descending on the main parachute was
proximately 55 nautical miles. The rather sighted by the recovery forces.
large footprint shift was caused by a retro-
rocket velocity that was 1.06 percent high Concluding Remarks
and by a spacecraft pitch-attitude error of
2.3". The crew manually flew the bank-angle The reentries performed during the
Gemini Program have shown the following:
commands generated by the spacecraft com-
( 1 ) The guidance technique had to be de-
puter and landed 0.38 nautical mile from the
signed to be insensitive to large changes in
target. Postflight evaluation showed a navi- spacecraft lift capability. The use of the con-
gation accuracy of 2.2 nautical miles. stant bank-angle guidance technique was
Gemini X was a %day rendezvous mission. dependent on an accurate estimate of maneu-
Retrofire occurred from an orbit of 161 by ver capability. It W;IS, therefore, ineffective
1G(i GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
for ;I mission of long duration whe~.ea large error did occur, as on Gemini X, the effect
center-of'-gr;t\.it~, \.ariation Uas present o r of the error on touchdown miss distance was
where spacecraft aerodynamic character- small, because navigation errors built up
istics were uncertain, it:; on Gemini VII. The slowly before the region of maximum load
r~lliiig-reentr\~ guidance technique dit1 not factor, then increased sharply; at the same
require a knowledge of the spacecr;tft lift time, the maneuver capability decreased to a
capability, and \vould steer to a plirticular small fraction of the total near-maximum
target as long its that .target was within the load factor. Although the control commands
footprint. were incorrect late in reentry, because of
(2) Displays h u l to I)e available so the large navig;ttion errors, the commands could
crew could evaluate the performance of the not disperse the trajectory to a great extent
guidance and navigation system, and back- because of the small maneuver capability. In
up procedures hiid to be developed to assure addition, the computer navigation equations
safe reentry and accurate landing in the and integration techniques had been judici-
event of a guidance-system failure. These ously selected to he compatible with digital
displays had to provide enough information computer operation.
to the crelv to permit an intelligent evalu- ( 4 ) Reentry of the Gemini spacecraft was
ation of the primary guidance system. If the successfully controlled both manually and
e\-;duation indicated ;I failure of the primary automatically. The ability of the pilot to ade-
system, then backup procedures had t o be quately control the spacecraft under high
available to meet the following criteria : ( ( 1 ) load-factor. conditions after long periods of
assure safe capture, ( 1 ) ) avoid violatiiig weightlessness was demonstrated. The de-
heating and / o r load-factor limits, and ( c ) sirability of manual versus automatic control
function with a degree of accuracy such that was dependent upon the severity of the con-
the recovery of the spacecraft could be ac-
trol-accuracy requirements, the frequency of
complished in a reasonable amount of time.
thecontrol commands, and the complexity of
( 3 ) Consistently accurate navigation
could be accomplished during reentry be- the control limits imposed for crew safety.
cause of a navigation-system design which Reentry from Earth orbit required some de-
performed adequately in the presence of ex- gree of control accuracy but did not require
pected inertial-measurement-system uncer- an immediate response to displayed com-
tainties. Even when a large inertial-platform mands.
14. LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
By ALFREDJ. GARDNER.Program Director, Ceniini Tnrgel Vehicle. Hendqcinrrers Space Systems Division,
Air Force Space Systeriis Coinmaiid
167
168 GEM i N I SUM M A R Y CONFERENCE
Highlights of Air Force Technical Support every known vehicle charact,eristic, and every
operational plan was primarily viewed
One of the most difficult aspects of system against the framework of a formal pilot-
program management is the need to freeze safety program plan prior to any other con-
designs in order to produce hardware on sideration of the change. This primary con-
schedule versus the ever-present need to in- sideration resulted in other studies and
troduce changes. Reliability, time, and econ- chanfes.
om>' depend upon strict control of configura-
(iemini Launch Vehicle
tion and maximum standardization of
production items. However, program evolu-
Within the Air Force Space Systems Divi-
tion invariably leads to changing or cx-
sion, the Gemini Launch Vehicle Program
panded mission requirements. I n anything
Office was assigned the responsibility for de-
but a pure production contract, unexpected
veloping and procuring the Titan I1 as a
and difficult design problems and technical
launch vehicle and for the technical super-
difficulties a r e encountered. In addition,
vision (under a NASA Launch Director) of
attractive and desirable improvement areas
the launches of these vehicles. In this func-
a r e developed a s the base of program knowl-
lion, the Air Force Space Systems Division
edge broadens a n d progresses. All of these
akted as a NASA contractor, and established
sources of change are excecdinnly difficult or
the necessary agreements and contracts t o
impossible to predict or schedule, and often provide all of the necessary services, equip-
require significant expenditures of resources. ment, and vehicles.
Program histories. however, support the
premise that one of the keys to program suc- The objectives of the Air Force program
cess is the manner of administrative and office, based upon the requirements outlined
technical response to such changes. The by the NASA statement of work, were ex-
organization must incorporate a flexibility t o panded and established as the basis for all
change emphasis and absorb tasks. Technical resulting agreements and contracts. The fun-
talents must be available. Financial support damental objective was to exercise maximum
management and technical control to strictly
must be timely and of sufficient magnitude.
minimize changes to the basic Titan I1 ve-
Skillful schedule planninR must introduce
hicle. Changes were to be limited to those in
the changes to provide maximum realization
the interest of pilot safety, to those necessary
of improvements with minimum impacts on
to accommodate the Gemini spacecraft as a
reliability, manufacture, test, and training.
payload, and to those necessary to increase
Finally, the motivation of all concerned must
the probability of mission success. Implicit in
be adequately planned in order to define and
the basic objective were economy, high reli-
maintain desired goals and purposes. During
ability, maintenance of schedule, and maxi-
the development of the Gemini hardware, all
mum cooperation with the NASA Gemini
of the typical change influences were en-
Program Office.
countered and dealt with within the frame-
work of the basic Gemini objectives. Some During the early months of the program,
extensive and intensive studies, analyses, and
influences never progressed beyond the
tests were conducted to firmly identify all
analysis and study stage, while others were
required changes to the basic Titan 11; t o
translated into actual hardware configura- identify all tests, procedures, and experi-
tion changes, and still others were expanded mental programs; and to provide the basis
into major programs having critical effects for a set of detailed, comprehensive specifica-
on the overall program. tions for the vehicle.
Throughout the development of the Gemini In February 1962, a Technical Operating
Launch Vehicle, every potential change, Plan was coordinated between the Space Sys-
~
tems Division and the Aerospace Corp. The pleted, culminating in a combined systems
plan outlined areas of effort and responsi- test of the vehicle. After the spacecraft was
bilities of the Aerospace Corp. support of the mated with the launch vehicle, a series of
Space Systems Division by providing general joint tests was completed, including joint
systems engineering and technical direction guidance and flight controls, simulated par-
of the Gemini Launch Vehicle Program. tial countdown and launch ascent, tanking
As part of the established mission, func- exercise, and, for missions involving the tar-
tion, and organization, the 6555th Aerospace get vehicle, simultaneous launch demonstra-
Test Wing is a n extension of the Space Sys- tion.
tems Division at Cape Kennedy and the East-
ern Test Range. The Wing represented the Gemini Launch-Vehicle Payload Margins
Air Force in the launch-site acceptance, test-
ing, data evaluation, and launch of various Drvolopwwit of pa!jload capability and
vehicles. In addition, the Wing provided man- t i v jcvdoi*!l prediction twhniques.-At the be-
agement control of the various vehicle con- ginning of the Gemini Program, all trrtjec-
tractors, and integrated contractor and Gov- tory and payload performance predictions
ernment efforts, and assured Range support were based upon nominal values for all pa-
and data during the checkout and launch se- rameters. Therefore, all launch vehicles had
quences. In support of the Gemini Launch the same payload capability except for varia-
Vehicle, various reliability, crew-safety, op- tions due to mission differences. As vehicle
erational, and other committees and working parameters became available they were in-
groups were organized o r supported. One corporated, and frequently created substan-
of the outstanding achievements of the tial changes in predicted payload capability.
Gemini Program was the scheduling and ac- Each parameter update was incorporated as
complishment of the Gemini Launch Vehicle soon as available in order to maintain the
turnaround required for the Gemini VI1 and most up-to-date prediction possible. This was
VI-A missions leading to the historical first tlrsii*ed to keep NASA continually informed
rendezvous of two manned space vehicles of the payload capability margin for each of
(December 1965). Reference 1 contains a the vehicles, so that mission changes could
brief review of the development of the Gem- he made to improve capability or to take
ini Launch Vehicle ant1 of the flight results advantage of excess capability. I t was also
of the first seven Gemini missions. '
desired to show the necessity of making per-
formance improvement changes to the Gem-
Typical Gemini Launch-Vehicle Test ChronoloKy ini Launch Vehicle. A number of performance
improvements were considered f o r t h e Gem-
After final assembly of the Gemini Launch ini Launch Vehicle during the early and mid-
Vehicle at the Baltimore plant of the Martin- phases of t h e program.
Marietta Corp., the propulsion and hydraulic Figure 14-1 illustrates the changes in pre-
systems \\'ere checked for leaks, and the elec- dicted Gemini Launch Vehicle minimum pay-
ti-ical system WLS checked for continuity. The load capabilities compared with time, and the
vehicle was then tested in the Baltimore Ver- ch ;Ln ges i n spacecraft weights, without ex-
tical Test Facility; this included a series of periments, compared with time. Since experi-
cwntdowns antl simulated launches. All oper- ment weight averaged about 1GO pounds, the
ations were either performed or accurately actual margins between predicted capabilities
simulated and recorded. and sp:icecraft weights were less than those
The two stages of the vehicle were trans- shown. Near the end of the Gemini Program,
ported by a i r to Cape Kennedy, erected, antl it was common for the predicted payload
asseml,letl on Launch Complex 13. A detailed capability margin to be negative. The worst
checkout m t l verification test series was com- case was -282 pounds for Gemini IX-A.
170 G E M I N I S U M MARY CONFERENCE
sions and 7250 pounds for the rendezvous dow under dispersed propellant temperature
missions. It quickly became apparent that conditions also resulted in performance de-
these weights would be exceeded. The early creases. For certain missions the require-
spacecraft-weight growth rate was approxi- ments for high initial apogees and for launch
mately 35 to 40 pounds per month, and not azimuths considerably less or greater than
until deletion of the paraglider configuration 90" degraded the payload capability. Finally,
was some relief obtained. Increase in the size the requirement to have the launch vehicle
of the spacecraft propellant tanks provided steer out as much as 0.55" of wedge angle to
another impetus in the search for higher increase the availability of spacecraft pro-
launch-vehicle payload capability. Ultimately, pellant reduced the probability of achieving
the spacecraft weights increased to the point the desired insertion conditions. Propellant
where predicted launch-vehicle performance temperature-conditioning equipment was in-
margins relative to the minimum (99.4 per- cluded in the areospace ground equipment so
cent probability) payload capability were that launch-vehicle propellants could be
consistently negative. Comparison between chilled to 20" F for oxidizer and 26" F for
actual spacecraft weights and achieved pay- fuel before loading. This chilling would allow
load capabilities is shown in figure 14-2. greater propellant masses to be loaded in the
. In addition to spacecraft-weight increases, fixed tank volumes, thus increasing payload
changes in mission requirements had a sig- capability. Attention was also given to the
nificant effect on launch-vehicle payload capa- performance gain available by reducing the
bility. On early flights a 5-hour launch-win- minimum ullages in the propellant tanks
dow requirement was imposed, necessitating from the values used on the Titan 11 weapon
large ullage volumes in the propellant tanks system. Structural studies and engine start
to allow for propellant temperature increases. tests at reduced ullages were incorporated in
This meant fewer propellants loaded and a the Gemini Propulsion System Test Program.
reduced .payload capability. Optimizing the Early in 1963, the Martin Co. proposed a
mixture ratio for the worst case in the win- study of the feasibility of removing the low-
I
PT-A
c Final predicted payload capability range, minimum to maximum. --A Actual normalized postflight payload capability.
E Final normalized predicted minimum payload capability. +SC Actual spacecraft launch weight.
level propcl1;int shutdown sensors from the impulse biases were incorporated into the
shutdown circuits 011 both launch-vehicle Gemini IV launch-vehicle preflight predic-
stages. Removing these sensors would elimi- tions, the added efficiency of Stage I resulted
nate the large possibility of premature shut- in overlofting of the Stage I trajectory. This
downs due to faulty level seiisor operation was disadvantageous for two reasons: first,
and would also incre:ise payload capability high-dispersed trajectories could result in
by reducing the amount of trapped propel- pitch look angles which exceeded the exist-
lants. Data from exhaustion shutdowns on ing allowable limits ; and second, overlofting
the test stand and on the Titan I1 flights indi- caused excessive gravity losses and Stage I1
cated that such shutdowns (lid not noticeably pitch maneuvering. Because of these consid-
jeopardize mission success. The shutdown erations, a new pitch program, developed
function of the sensors was eliminated, al- for Gemini IV, eliminated the over-lofting
though the>- were retained for instrumenta- and resulted in an improvement in the pay-
tion purposes ant1 for closed-loop operation load capability.
if later found desirable. M issio it -depc It d e t?t perf o i.?nancechaiig es .-
Changing the Tit;in I1 engi.ne target mix- Correct predictions of trajectory and pay-
ture ratios on acceptance tests from 1.93 for load capability also had to be based on dif-
Stage I and 1.80 for Stage I1 to approxi- ferences and changes in the Gemini missions.
mately 1.05 and 1.84 would have allowed For example, if the apogee were changed for
complete filling of both oxidizer and fuel a specific Gemini mission, it was necessary
tanks to ullage limits when the engines were to adjust the predicted launch-vehicle pay-
operated in t h e anticipated flight environ- load capability accordingly. Similarly, if the
ment. However, as the mixture ratio in- launch azimuth and/or yaw steering were
creased. the specific impulse decreased for changed, the payload capability effects were
both stages. Some of the other areas investi- computed and. incorporated in the predicted
gated were : ( 1 ) engine effects, such as heat launch-vehicle capability. F o r each of the
transfer and combustion stability: ( 2 ) pos- rendezvous missions, i t was also necessary
sible mission changes; and ( 3 ) impact of to determine payload capabilities for the
other potential performance improvement alternate missions which would be attempted
items, such as further reduced minimum if the primary mission could not be com-
ullages and constant temperature propellants. pleted.
As a result of these studies, the Stage I1 Flight-test perfoivntawce.-0btaining ac-
engine mixture ratio change was eliminated curate preflight predictions and postflight
because there was no payload advantage. The analyses of vehicle propulsion performance
Stage I engine target mixture ratio was was of great importance throughout the
changed to 1.945, effective for the Gemini Gemini Program. The launch-vehicle payload
IV launch vehicle. capability and trajectory performance were
Titan I1 and launch-vehicle engine per- highly dependent on the propulsion param-
formance data were monitored throughout eters of mixture ratio (the major contributor
the Gemini Program. By May 1965, sufficient to propellant outage), specific impulse, and
data had been accumulated to indicate that thrust for both stages of the vehicle. Propel-
significant changes in the form of biases were
lant outages for Stage I and Stage I1 were
likely to occur between acceptance test and
flight. This analysis included the results of the two largest factors in payload capability
10 Stage I flights and 16 Stage I1 flights. For dispersion allowances. Postflight analysis of
Gemini IV through X, the biases indicated each Gemini Launch Vehicle trajectory was
by the analysis were included in preflight conducted to define the reasons f o r deviations
trajectory and performance predictions. from nominal and to determine changes to
When the Stage I thrust bias and specific be made in predictions for subsequent ve-
.' LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 173
hicles. Table 14-1 compares predicted with revealed similar occurrences on seven Titan
achieved payload margins for all missions. I1 flights. The same anomaly oc'curred dur-
ing the Gemini XI1 mission; however, this
Gemini Launch Vehicle Stage I Tank Staging Anomaly occurrence was followed by the apparent
rupture of the Stage I fuel tank and the
High-speed long-range camera coverage of breakup of Stage I just forward of the Mar-
the Gemini X launch vehicle showed a large tin/Aerojet interface. The results of the
orange-red cloud appearing from Stage I study and a review of all available Titan I1
shortly after staging and indicating a pos- and Gemini flight data showed no detrimental
sible breakup of the stage. A detailed review effect on mission success or crew safety due
of the films revealed that the oxidizer tank to this event.
vented approximately 1.2 seconds after Stage
I1 ignition. A study of Stage I1 telemetry Gemini Launch Vehicle Switchover/Switchback
data revealed no indication of this event. Studies
Stage I telemetry was inoperative a t this
time, having been disabled 0.7 second earlier. With the incorporation of a redundant
A thorough study of the tank rupture iso- flight control system, a detailed system eval-
lated the following as the most probable uation was conducted to reassess the vehicle
causes : ( 1 ) Stage I turning after separation, airframe, the switchover logic, and the sen-
resulting in the Stage I1 engine sub- sor limits. The evaluation indicated. that the
assembly exhaust impingement and burn- initial selection of sensor limits, structural
through of oxidizer tank barrel; (2) break- safety factor, and switchover logic did not
ing of the ablative coating on the oxidizer result in optimum switchover capability. It
tank dome, due to dome flexing caused by became apparent that a switchover during
dome overheating and subsequent structural Stage I flight from a loss of hydraulic pres-
failure, resulting from high local pressures sure would result in the secondary flight con-
a t Stage I1 engine s t a r t ; and (3) dome or trol system being used throughout Stage I1
tank barrel penetration by transportation flight. This could have resulted in discarding
section debris. A review of the staging films a good, reliable, primary flight control system
-__ - ___.
1
~~
during Stage I1 flight. To alleviate this situ- consisting primarily of newly developed
ation, thc capiil~ilityof slvitching back to the \,om\) pulsing techniques derived t o estab-
primary system was incorlmr;itd. It \\'iis lish inst;ibility triggering thresholds. The
planned that s\Yitchback \voultl only be xtu- selected prototype injectors were then tested
;itetl i n the ci.ent the s ~ ~ i t c h o ~\vas
. c i *initi;itcvl i i t the engine level for system compatability.
by loss 01' hytlraulic pressure ant1 \voultl 1w A finiil cantlitl;ite injector then underwent a
activated I)etween staging ant1 guitlancc modified qu;ilification test program which
en a b1e. was integrated into a n engine improvement
The s\vitcho\.ey flight loatls during the high progr:im verification test series. To provide
niasimum dynamic pressure region were furthei. ;tssur;ince of the adequacy of this in-
found to be in excess of the structural design jector for m;innetl flight, it was flight tested
criteria. ('onsequently, the concept was op- I)? ;I Titan I J l C vehicle, and subsequently in-
timized bj. selecting the sensor limits that corporated into the Gemini VI11 launch ve-
masimizetl crew safety. A corresponding hicle.
hardware change was made t o reduce the
angular rate slyitch settings. The structural Gemini Agena Target Vehicle
loatl-carrying capability was reevaluated in
the light of probability considerations, which A s with the Gemini Launch Vehicle, the
resulted i n a reduced factor of safety for Air Force Space Systems Division was the
switchover from 1.25 to 1.10. A deliberate NASA contractor for the development and
flight-test switchover IYW discussed ; how- procurement of the Gemini Atlas-Agena Tar-
ever, because of difficulty in initiating the get Vehicle system. However, an attempt
switchover, and the significance of the lim- was m a l e to add the effort t o an existing
ited results, it was decided not to perform A F 'NASA organizational arrangement al-
the test. ready established for the procurement and
launch of the Atlas-Agena combination f o r
Gemini Launch Vehicle S t a g e I1 EnKine Stability other programs. Accordingly, NASA con-
Improvement Program tinued t o use the Marshall Space Flight Cen-
ter in the ". . . role of procurement contractor
One of the major concerns in man rating ant1 technical advisor t o the Project Office in
the Titan I1 vehicle was the possibility of the development, procurement and launch of
combustion instability during the Stage I1 Atlas 'Agena Target Vehicles f o r the Project
start transient. The ground-test history of Gemini Rendezvous Missions. . . ." The Air
the original Stage I1 engine utilizing the pro- Force added the development, procurement,
duction quadlet injector gave rise t o certain and systems integration of the target-vehicle
dynamic combustion stability questions for system to an existing program office charged
man-rating requirements. The quadlet in- with procurement and payload integration of
jector had a demonstrated instability inci- Agena vehicles for other NASA programs.
dent rate of about 2 percent during ground In March 1962, the target-vehicle program
tests. Even though this rate was extremely was initiated by NASA-Defense Purchase
low, the effect of an instability during Request H-30247 with the details of the ob-
manned flight caused concern and resulted in jectives and statement of work t o be evolved
the A F NASA decision to develop a more in working sessions.
dynamically stable Stage I1 injector, one t h a t In January 1963, the Manned Spacecraft
would be capable of accepting limited puls- Center assumed direct control of the Space
ing without instability. The development of Systems Division effort with the withdrawal
the new injector required evaluation of sev- of Marshall Space Flight Center from the
eral injector types. These injectors were program. At the same time, organizational
screened by thrust-chamber assembly tests realinements began at the Space Systems
LAUNCH AND TARGET I'EHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 175
m a n d s from the ground or from the manned pyrotechnics, propellants, and batteries were
spacecraft. The vehicle also had to be capable inst:illetl ;it the launch stantl.) The vehicle
of maneuvering a s part of the spacecraft was then erected with the Atlas Target
after docking. Launch Vehicle. The major remaining tests
In late 1964. it Technical Operating Plan were the .Joint Flight Acceptance Composite
Test m ~ the l Simultaneous Launch Demon-
for the Target Vehicle Program had been
established, ant1 the responsibility for prn- stration. The vehicle wiw then ready f o r F-1
day, precoiint. ant1 final coiii1t tests.
viding technical surveillance of the Lockheetl
contract was assigned t o the Aerospace Corp. For the actual launch of the Gcmini *4geni1
In keeping with the norm:il relationships m t l Target Vehicle. the role o f e w h coutr:ictol.
operations of the Space Systems Division and inclutletl the following :
the 6555th Aerospace Test Wing a t Cape ( 1 ) Lockheed Missilvs S: Sp;ice C o . f u t * -
Kennedy, the target-vehicle launch responsi- tiisheti thc (kmini Agcqi:i Tatyet Vehicle.
bilities were assigned to the SLV-3 Director- ;ind :issoci:itetl reference trajectory, range-
ate of the Wing. safety package. a n r l f l i ~ h t - t e r m i ~ ion
l : ~ t sys-
176 ( , E M IN1 SI1M MARY CONFERENCE
pad hold period and a subsequent 5-day alti- engine ignition had been gained from the 27
tude coast storage period. Phase I and Phase I1 altitude tests completed
A pressure switch relay box was designed by March 4, 1966, to assure flightworthiness
for the initially proposed configuration, and of the Gemini VI11 target vehicle and to
the development and flightworthiness dem- allow commitment of the modified engine de-
onstration tests were conducted on this com- sign to flight. Significantly, the postulated
ponent in December 1965 and January 1966. target-vehicle flight failure mode was con-
Vibr;, ion, shock, humidity, acceleration, firmed during the altitude malfunction tests ;
altituc:?. and electrical tests were conducted. antl showed that a fuel lead on the XLR
A rela:- failure occurred during development 81-BA-13 engine would produce hard starts
vibration tests ; and after a subsequent re- when tested a t the proper altitude and that
liability analysis, the relay was removed and a reasonably high probability of hardware
the relay box w a s converted to ti junction damage existed. Reevaluation of the Gemini
box. VI data indicated that the engine damage
The proposed engine modification involved incurred during the flight was similar to that
the addition of two pressure switches in the observed during the last fuel-lead test. In
engine control circuit to provide the required addition to the successful flightworthiness
thrust chamber oxidizer-lead start sequence. demonstration of the modified engine, the
Turbine pump assembly test results indi- altitude tests provided data on altitude ig- .
cated a high-frequency actuation-tleactuation nition characteristics over a temperature
cycling characteri4c of the backup oxidizer range from 100 F to below zero.
feed pressure switch during a normal engine- An unexpected destructive hard start oc-
s t a r t sequence. Pwssure-switch durability curred during a checkout firing early in the
and vacuum tests were conducted, with no altitude test program. Post-test data analysis
observed degradation of the microswitch con- antl testing showed that excessive water and
tacts, successfully demonstrating switch dcohol contamination (approximately 85
operational capability at the Gemini mission percent) was introduced into the engine fuel
altitude for a minimum 5-day period. system during the prefire propellant loading
Vibration, shock, and hot-fire tests were operation. The fuel system became contami-
conducted as part of the engine sea-level nated with water during test-cell downtime
flightworthiness demonstration program. for instrumentation and hardware repair.
Satisfactory structural design of the new antl An abbreviated isopropyl-alcohol flush pro-
modified component installations was veri- cedure was conducted to remove water from
fied. The 42 hot-fire tests demonstrated satis- the engine: however, the water antl alcohol
factory operation and sequencing of the were not completely removed from the fa-
modified engine configuration, and verified cility fuel system, resulting’ in entry of the
successful implementation and checkout of contaminated fuel load into the engine. Full-
the modified engine test and servicing pro- scale and subscale thrust-chamber ignition
cedures. tests were instituted to evaluate the effects
A total of 42 engine flightworthiness tests of fuel contamination. Results showed that
a t simulated altitudes ranging from 257 000 significant increases in ignition delay antl
to 453 000 feet, and two checkout firings a t peak pressures occur as the quantities of
85 000 feet, were conducted. The ignition-con- alcohol and water in the fuel a r e increased.
fidence, simulated-mission, low-temper.<it ure. Further analysis antl tests clearly supported
antl malfunction tests at an average simu- the conclusion that the checkout test failure
lated altitude of 356 000 feet successfully was caused by contaminated fuel.
demonstrated the high-altitude flightworthi- Further ignition tests invest i giitetl thrust-
ness of the modified XLR 81-BA-13 engine. chamber ignition characteristics with fuel,
Sufficient confidence in the reliability of the oxidizer, and simultaneous propellant leads
1‘78 GEMINI SllMMARY CONFERENCE
. the thrust chamber manifold cavities during tests must be conducted as final proof that
the fuel-lead starts a t Arnold Engineering complete simulation of all factors affecting
Development Center. The hard-start re- the ignition process for a specific configura-
actions occurred in the combustion chamber tion have been demonstrated.
and divergent nozzle. Results of Project Sure Fire were positive
( 6 ) The fuel-lead hard-start mechanism and on March 17, 1966, the engine was com-
appears to involve the chemistry of the re- mitted to launch. The engine performed as
action during the induction period. Lack of desired through all phases of the mission, in-
an excess of oxidizer apparently prevents a cluding demonstrations of multiple starts
satisfactory oxidation reaction from occur- and maneuver capability.
. ring relative to that for an oxidizer-lead
start sequence. A very long ignition delay Gemini Target Vehicle Stability During Docked
occurs, allowing an accumulation of a re- Engine Firing
actable oxidizer-fuel mixture which probably
contains high-energy intermediate com- The target-vehicle control system was
pounds formed during this delay. originally designed to provide stable flight
for an Agena vehicle with a conventional
(7) The XLR 81-BA-13 engine gas gen-
erator assembly provides reliable ignition payload. For Gemini, the control system was
with a fuel-lead start sequence within the required to provide stability during Primary
range of operating requirements. Low peak Propulsion System firings while in the
pressure and very slow pressure rise rates docked configuration. The original system
a r e always obtained. These characteristics was designed to filter all Agena body-bending
appear to be due to the large volume of the modes greater than 8 cycles per second. The
gas generator assembly, to the low potential system could be modified by a gain change to
energy in the chamber at ignition, and, per- handle frequencies as low as 5 cycles per sec-
haps most important, to a preignition pres- ond. However, the docked spacecraft "target
sure buildup probably attributable to a pre- vehicle had a fundamental body-bending
igniter oxidizer flow. mode with a frequency between 2 and 4
cycles per second. A lend-lag circuit was de-
(8) Testing a t the proper simulated alti-
signed by Lockheed to cope with this mode,
tude to determine engine ignition reliability
and stabilitv studies were performed to
is a necessary and extremely important
check out the modified system.
phase of space-flight engine development.
The fundamental mode in question in-
(9) Propellant triple-point (phase) data
provide a reliable guideline for defining the volved rigid-body motion of the spacecraft,'
target vehicle with ii flexible spring, the
minimum altitude test requirements. Further
Target Docking Adapter. connecting them.
studies on the relation of phase data, propel-
Preliminary stiffness data showed both in-
lant injection. and expansion dynamics a t
hard vacuum, and presence of excess fuel or plane and out-of-plane response when incor-
oxidizer, are recommended in order to ad- porated in the model. and indicated the in-
vance the state of the art. ability of the modified system to provide
(10) Existing ground-test technology is stability. A dynamic response test was per-
more than sufficient to properly simulate re- formed to provide better data for the analy-
quired altitude conditions for medium-size sis and resulted in considerably more out-of-
rocket engines. plane coupling in the fundamental mode than
(11) Sea-level and altitude subscale igni- had been expected. The frequency of this
tion tests, and full-scale sea-level ignition mode was between 2.5 ;uid 3.0 cycles per sec-
tests can be a valuable adjunct to full-scale ond. depending on the weight condition.
altitude testing. However, full-scale altitude Structural damping varied between 2.0 and
180 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
5.0 ~ ) e ~ * e e In
n t . the course of evaluating the cv-is accuracies when making out-of-plane
test data, errors in haiidling the out-of-plane orbit changes. This yaw-heading error was
response were discovered in the model. With due to a combination of yaw center-of-
the model corrected and with the use of lower gravity off set, slow control-system response
bound t1;iniping v;ilues, the lead-lag niodifi- time, and vehicle dynamics. The yaw center-
cation proposed by Lockheed M';N shown to of-gravity offset was approximately twice
provide a(1equ;ite stability. The modification that of the standard Agena due to the added
w i s f l o ~oni the Gemini VI11 and subseyuent weight resulting from the addition of two
Gemini Agena Target Vehicles. running light batteries. The slow control-
As soon as the modal response of the system response time was caused by the re-
docked sl);iceci.aft target vehicle had been design of the flight-control electronics pack-
established by studies at the Massachusetts age. The redesign had been reyuired to
Institute of Technology iind the results ac- provide stable control-system operation dur-
cepted by the contractors affected, the flight ing the docked mode.
control electronics compensation was estab- Orbital altitude errors ranged to approxi-
lished. Previous studies by Lockheed had mately 120 miles during Primary Propulsion
shown that a modification to the lead-lag System operation. The errors were much
shaping network already in existence could more pronounced when the vehicle was in a
handle both the ascent dynamics and the +90" configuration and a plane change was
docked dynamics with a minor change in loop
attempted. This was due to the offset being
gain between two flight modes. The simula-
tion of t h e vehicle was increased t o include in the yaw direction and the velocity compo-
the flight control system, and the potential of nent error combining directly with the orbi-
the'revised lead-lag was confirmed. tal velocity. These errors greatly exceeded
Lockheed proceeded. to mechanize and 3-sigma values derived in prior error anal-
optimize the lead-lag design with the use of yses and on-orbit guidance computations.
a single-axis digital computer simulation. Various solutions to the center-of-gravity
Hardware components and tolerances were problem were investigated. These consisted
evaluated. The most difficult development of removing batteries, realining the engine,
item in the change was the perfection of the adding ballast, off-loading the Secondary
temperature-stabilized operational amplifier. Propulsion System propellants, and prepar-
Actual breadboard parts were tied into the ing correction tables for use in trimming out
single-axis simulator for temperature tests potential dispersions. A parametric study
as well as system performance evaluations. was performed which related pitch-and-yaw-
This phase was also used to perfect test pro- attitude errors to center-of-gravity offsets
cedures and tolerances that would insure for the target vehicle during Primary Pro-
proper system performance. pulsion System operation. Attitude errors
were determined as a function of firing time,
Gemini Target Vrhiclr Center-of-Gravity
OBsrt Problem vehicle center-of-gravity offsets, and vehicle
weight. Results were plotted as a family of
A major problem occurred on the Gemini curves to provide programed attitude cor-
VI11 target vehicle during undocked, in- rection data for desired orbit changes. Aver-
orbit, Primary Propulsion System powered age attitude error and actuator position for
flight. A significant vehicle yaw-heading various times of Primary Propulsion System
error existed ; the resulting velocity vector firings. along with transient attitude and
error affected the orbital guidance computa- actuator position response curves, were pre-
tions and resulted in adverse orbital ephem- sented.
LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT O F DEFENSE 181
Atlas SLV-3 Target Launch Vehicle vehicle booster adapter. Space Systems Divi-
sion was also required to perform the soft-
The basic planning of the Gemini Program ware work necessary to place the Aug-
directed the use of the Air Force Atlas mented Target Docking Adapter into orbit,
SLV-3 as the launch vehicle for the Gemini using only SLV-3 boost capability.
Agena Target Vehicle. The overall develop-
ment of the Gemini Atlas-Agena Target Program Requirements
Vehicle system was assigned to the Air
Force Space Systems Division. The target- The Augmented Target Docking Adapter
vehicle program office used the existing inter- was originally designed as a backup vehicle
nal Space Systems Division management for the Gemini VII’VI-A rendezvous mis-
*
structure for the procurement of the SLV-3 sion and for the Gemini VI11 mission. At
vehicles. The SLV-3 contracts covered neces- first, it was not known if the hard start ex-
sary services and equipment from General perienced by the Gemini VI target vehicle
Dynamics/Convair, Rocketdyne, Acoustica, could be corrected before the Gemini VI11
General Electric, Burroughs, and the Aero- mission. The Manned Spacecraft Center re-
space Corp. Seven Atlas SLV-3 vehicles quested a vehicle that would permit docking
were procured and launched during the even though it would have no maneuver
Gemini Program. capability. The Augmented Target Docking
After final assembly-at the factory, the Adapter consisted of a target-vehicle shroud,
tanks were mated to the engine section; a Target Docking Adapter, an equipment
various subassembly kits were installed and section, a Gemini spacecraft Reentry Con-
tested prior to a final composite test of the trol System module, and a battery section.
complete vehicle. The vehicle was then The insertion conditions required a near-
shipped to Cape Kennedy where the SLV-3 circular orbit of 161 nautical miles with dis-
underwent inspection and final installations persions no greater than 7t20 nautical miles
in the hangar prior to erection. After the and a n inclination angle of 28.87”. The steer-
vehicle was erected on Launch Complex 14, ing mode was to be the crossing of the
the principal tests were the SLV-3 Flight ascending mode. A 2500-pound payload was
Acceptance Composite Tests and the overall used for planning.
Atlas-Agena Target Vehicle system test
(Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test). Gemini At las-Aigena Target Vehicle
Finally, an SLV-3 tanking test was accom- Launch History .
plished to establish flight readiness of the
launch vehicle. Gemini VI Mission
Augmented Target Docking Adapter Since the Gemini VI mission was to be the
Program first Gemini rendezvous mission, the primary
objective was the rendezvous and docking of
Program 1)euelopment the Gemini spacecraft with the Gemini
Agena Target Vehicle. Another objective in-
In December 1965, the Manned Spacecraft volved checkout of the target vehicle while
Center delineated the Air Force Space Sys- docked, and included commands from the
tems Division and contractor support re- spacecraft to the target vehicle, determi-
quirements €or the Augmented Target Dock- nation of target-vehicle safety status, and
ing Adapter mission. The Air Force Space test of target-vehicle attitude maneuver
Systems Division was to supply the follow- capability. A small Secondary Propulsion
i n g hardware: an SLV-3 vehicle, ;i Gemini System firing in the docked configuration
target-vehicle shroud, and a Gemini target- was also planned, although no docked Pri-
1x2 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
niiii’y 1’rol)ulsion SJxteni firi iig \vas p1;innetl. )il;inr miineuver, or iiiclination-adjust ma-
This mission ]viis also the first simultaneous ner~ver,antl ayrrain resulted in ii Inrge in-plane
countdown for the 1:iuncIi of two vehiclcs velocity coml)onent. I t was later determined
( t h e Gemini A t l a s - A ~ e n a Titrget Vehicle that thesc errors were caused by ;I large
; i i i t l , 101 minutes later, thc Gemini Launch (.(.nler-of-gi’avity offset from the centerline,
Vehicle iinti sp;icecr:ift) . ant1 hy the dyniimic response of the guidance
The Gemini Atl;is-Agena Target Vehicle and control system being too slow to correct
for thc Gemini VI mission iviis launchetl :it for cc~titei.-of-Rni\rit?‘errors. It was decided
10 a.m.. eiisterii st;intlii~*tltime, October 25, that :idtlitioniil out-of-plane maneuvers
1963. The ascent Imrtion of the flight was ivoultl not be made.
~iormiil u i i t i l tinic for the target-vehicle An in-plnne r e t r o ~ r a d emaneuver resulted
Primary P~*opulsionSystem to firc Cor the i n lowering the ;ipogee to 200 nautical miles,
insertion rniiiiiwver : thc c i i K i n c s suffered ;I ant1 the results were nrarly perfect. The yaw
haid s t a r t ;uid sul)sc~luentcisl)losion, lind the o f f 4 w a h again noted, hut the firing was
vehicle failetl to achieve orbit. short ; slight yaw-heading errors have much
less effect on the resulting orbit when the
miineuver is performed in-plane. Based upon
this success, two more in-plane maneuvers,
The Gemini A tlas-Agena Target Vehicle dwell initiate and dwell terminate, were per-
for the Gemini VI11 mission was launched a t formed to deplete some of the propellants
10 :O: :On a.m., eastern standard time, March and to achieve ti circular orbit of 220 nauti-
7 6. 1966. Thcb ascent ph;ise was very close t o cal miles. These maneuvers were very suc-
nomimil lvith insertion into an orbit 161.4 by cessful ant1 accurate, although the yaw off-
1 G l . i n;iutic;il miles. The insertion param- set was noted during each firing. The center-
. eters were as follows: of-gravity offset problem was the only major
system problem during the mission. -
Semimajor axis, n. mi. .................... ::602.0.5
Inclination a n ~ l e d. c ......................
~ 28.86 Operation of the Secondary Propulsion
Eccentricity ........................................ 0.0006 System was desired until the propellant was
Period, min ........................................ !)0.47 depleted ; however, because of the excessive
Folloiving undocking and reentry of the control-gas usage during the spacecraft mal-
spacecraft. eight orbital firings were per- function, only 15 pounds of Attitude Control
formed by the target-vehicle Primary Pro- System gas remained when the first Sec-
ondary Propulsion System firing was to be
pulsion System during Gemini VIII. The
initiated. The operation was planned f o r 20
duration ranged from the 0.85-second mini-
seconds to provide the first actual in-orbit
mum-impulse firing to a 19.6-second plane
operation of the Secondary Propulsion Sys-
change, with the majority between 1 and 3
tem antl to verify control-gas usage rates.
seconds. Of the eight firings, five utilized the
The first Secondary Propulsion System Unit
short 22-second A-ullage sequence, and the
11 operation occurred over Grand Canary
other three used the 7-second C-ullage se-
Island in revolution 41. The firing was per-
quence. Based upon the iiv-ailable data, the
formed using flight control mode FC-7 t o
Primary Propulsion System performed nor-
mally during all eight firings. During the reduce velocity-vector errors caused by cen-
19.6-second out-of-plane maneuver, a major ter-of-gravity offset. Over the Eastern Test
systen: anomaly became apparent. The ve- Range during revolution 42, the second op-
hicle attitude in yaw was considerably off the eration of the Secondary Propulsion System
intended heading. resulting in a large in- was performed at the existing heading of
plane velocity component. This same heading -90 . This maneuver was also performed
offset was also noted on the second out-of- with clocked gains to reduce thrust-vector
LAUNCH AND TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 183
errors caused by center-of-gravity offset. The was launched from Cape Kennedy a t
maneuver appeared nominal, except that 5 10 :00 :O2 a.m., eastern standard time, June
pounds of control gas were expended. The 1, 1966. The Target Launch Vehicle was
target-vehicle orbit after the final Secondary steeretl into ii predetermined coast ellipse and
Propulsion System firing was 220 by 222 nodal crossing. The insertion orbital ele-
nautical miles with a 28.867 i n c h a t’ion
~ ments were as follows:
angle. Xpogce altitude, n. mi. .......................... lIi7. I
During the Gemini VI11 mission, 5439 PeriKee altitude, n. mi. ........................ l!il.O
commands to the target vehicle were sent, Period. tnin .............................................. !10..50
accepted, and executed. The Gemini Atlas- Inclination, d e r .................................. 28.87
Agena Target Vehicle was launched within
1 second of the scheduled lift-off time.
The Gemini IX-A Target Launch Vehicle The launch wiis origiiidly schetluled for
with the Augmented Target Docking Adapter September 9, 1966 : however. it i v a s tlelayetl
184 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
1 day due to an oxidizer leak in the Gemini Sciniinajor axis, n. mi. ........................ :160:1.0
Launch Vehicle. The second scheduled launch Inclination angle, dcg ........................ 28.86
Eccentricity .......................................... 0.0009
on September 10, 1966, was scrubbed at Period, min ............................................ 90.56
T--140 minutes due to a suspected autopilot
m;ilfunction in the Target Launch Vehicle. The launch was originally scheduled for
During the ascent I’rimwy Propulsion Sys- November 9, 19GG; however, the launch was
tem firing, it was determined that the magni- delayed 2 days due to a malfunction in the
tude of the center-of-gravity offset problem secondary autopilot of the Gemini Launch
encounteretl during Gemini VI11 had been Vehicle. During the target-vehicle ascent ma-
successfully eliminated. The target-vehicle neuver, an apparent anomaly occurred 140
command system responded properly to all seconds after Primary Propulsion System
ground and spacecraft commantls- during the initiation. At this time a 30-psi drop occurred
mission. in thrust-chamber pressure for approxi-
mately 1 second, then returned to normal for
the remaining 42 seconds of the firing. This
did not affect the Gemini Atlas-Agena Ve-
hicle insertion conditions. The docked posi-
The Gemini Atlas-Agena Target Vehicle grade Primary Propulsion System maneuver
for the Gemini XI1 mission was launched at originally planned was canceled due to un-
2 :07 :59 p.m., eastern standard time, No- certainties about the significance of the
vember 11, 1966. The ascent phase was nomi- chamber-pressure-drop anomaly.
nal with insertion into an orbit of 163.6 by
159.0 nautical miles. This was the most ac- Reference
curate insertion for the target vehicle in the
Gemini Program. The insertion parameters 1. ANON.: Gcmini Midpro~ramConference, Includ-
were : ing Experiment Results. NASA SP-121, 1966.
15. MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Rs ROYCEG . OLSON.Director, Departrrient o/ Delense Manned Space Flight Support Ofice, Patrick Air
Force Rase, Florida
185
186 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE
FIGURE
15-l.-Gemini network stations.
national range resources were realined. As dures with the Manned Space Flight Coordi-
a result, the operations of the Hawaii and the nator and with NASA to assure proper
Canton Island sites were transferred to integration of the DOD stations with the
NASA; and the operation of the California Manned Space Flight Network.
site, to the Western Test Range. Twenty-four hours prior to launch, the
Westew Test Ra?ige.-The Western Test DOD Manager assumed operational control
Range (U.S. Air Force) facilities operated of all DOD forces supporting the mission.
the California tracking site. Although not The Assistant for Network was part of the
considered a Gemini network station, the operational staff and provided the DOD Man-
U.S. Navy ship Rnnge T)m3cer participated ager with network-readiness reports, and
in the Gemini 111 through Gemini X missions assured that the DOD stations operated in
with radar, telemetry, and communications. accordance with the plans and procedures
White Sands Missile Rauge.-The White specified for that mission.
Sands Missile Range (U.S. Army) facilities The entire integrated network during the
provided C-band radar support throughout mission was controlled by the network con-
the Gemini Program. trollers on the staff of the NASA Flight Di-
Air Proving G1*ourid Center.-The Air rector at the Mission Control Center-
Proving Ground Center (U.S.Air Force) fa- Houston. They conducted the network count-
cilities provided C-band .radar support down, conducted premission simulations and
throughout. the Gemini Program. tests, and issued last-minute instructions.
NoTth Ame?.ican Ail. Defense Command.- They also directed network activities during
The North American Air Defense Command the flight,. as necessary, to assure that the
support to manned space flight began with required network support for the mission
Project Mercury. T h e ability to skin track was provided to the flight controllers. The
and catalog orbiting objects, and to compute network controllers were assisted by a joint
impact data and separation distances, was Goddard Space Flight Center/DOD Network
beneficial to the Gemini Program. The North Support Team. This team of specialists in
American Air Defense Command assisted each major category of network instrumend
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in com- tation served as technical advisors to the
puting launch-vehicle impact points ; pro- network controllers.
vided ephemeris information on the Gemini During Project Mercury, and f o r the first
Agena Target Vehicles left in orbit; and pro- portion of the Gemini Program, the network-
vided the capability t o skin track the space- control function was performed solely by
craft. DOD. After relocation of the Mission Control ~
Quebec, were not required to support this mission was terminated during the seventh
mission. orbit because of a spacecraft control-system
G m i n i ZZ.-Gemini I1 was unmanned and malfunction after docking. The U.S. Navy
ballistic, requiring only Eastern Test Range ship Kingsport was added for this mission.
tracking facilities. The Rose Knot Victor was Excellent network support was available
located up range under the ground track ; the throughout the spacecraft emergency and the
Coastal Sentry Quebec was located near the reen try.
landing point. The Antigua radar tracked Gemini IX-A through Gemini XZZ.-Gem-
the spacecraft through the communications ini IX-A was a 3-day rendezvous mission
blackout period. with the Augmented Target Docking
Gemini ZZZ.-Gemini I11 was manned and Adapter. Both Gemini X and XI were 3-day
orbital and was the first exercise of the entire rendezvous missions with the Gemini Agena
network. The US. Navy ship Rnnye Tracker Target Vehicle. Gemini XI1 was a 4-day ren-
was added to the network. The communica- dezvous mission with the Gemini Agena Tar-
tions from the Coastal Seatry Quebec were get Vehicle.
augmented by the US. Navy ship Kingsport The Gemini IX-A through Gemini XI1
and the SYNCOM I1 satellite. This was the missions required identical network support.
first time NASA and DOD recovery commu- Network tracking was excellent ; failures
nications augmented one another. All radars were a t a minimum and had no effect on the
that had been committed to the spacecraft missions. On Gemini IX-A and X, the Com-
reentry phase obtained track. puter Acquisition System allowed the Eastern
Gemini ZV.-Gemini I V was a 4-day, Test Range radars to acquire and to track the
manned, orbital mission and used the same spacecraft on reentry. On Gemini XI, a com-
network configuration as Gemini 111. An puter was made available a t the Western Test
Eastern Test Range subcable break was suc- Range, and a vector was sent from the Real
cessf ully bypassedby using alternate routes. Time Computer System at the Eastern Test
Telemetry monitoring of launch-vehicle re- Range to the California site for acquisition.
entry and breakup was available through Tracking data were returned t o the Real Time
radar tracking from Patrick Air Force Base Computer System for computing acquisition
and Kennedy Space Center. information for the Eastern Test Range
Gemitti V.-Gemini V was a n %day, radars.
manned, orbital mission and full network
support was provided. The North American Summary of Network Support
Air Defense Command successfully tracked
and provided impact prediction on the second Significant progress was realized during
stage of the launch vehicle. the Gemini Program not only in improving
Gemini VI-A and Gemini VZZ.-Gemini basic tracking and data transmission, but
VI-A and Gemini VI1 used combined flight also in streamlining operation and test pro-
plans. Gemini VI1 was a 14-day manned mis- cedures to assure more efficient use of the
sion; Gemini VI-A was a 2-day, manned, available equipment. Network problems, such
rendezvous mission. Full network support as communications failures, inadequate radar
was provided. The ship Wheeling was sub- tracking, and difficult troubleshooting t h a t
stituted for the ship Range Tracker. No sig- occurred during Project Mercury, were re-
nificant network failures occurred during t h e duced so t h a t a fully operative network be-
14-day mission. The performance of the came a routine occurrence at launch time and
remote-site data processor was superior to throughout the mission.
that obtained during previous missions. Modifications and improvements to the
Gemini VZZZ.-Gemini VI11 was planned as C-band radars provided more accurate track-
a 3-day rendezvous mission; however, the ing, easier acquisition, and more rapid proc-
MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 189
essing of the radar data. Using pulse code run on subsequent missions. Refinements
modulation, the Telemetry System allowed a were made and by the time of the Gemini
much greater volume of spacecraft data to IX-A mission, data from the White Sands
be transmitted and displayed a t one time. The radar, processed by the Real Time Computer
Digital Command System allowed more com- System, allowed the Eastern Test Range
plex and a greater number of commands to radars to acquire and track the spacecraft
be sent to the spacecraft; by computer proc- during reentry, proving the advantage of the
essing, a fail-safe system was provided to system. Additional computers will be made
assure that the proper command was, in fact, available a t the DOD ranges to add to the
transmitted. The more extensive use of com- system so that the final configuration can be
puters, both on site and at the Mission Con- realized.
trol Centers, provided for near real-time The Impact Predictor System was a n out-
transmission, reduction, and display of the growth and refinement of a capability that
volumes of data made available by the net- had existed a t the Eastern Test Range since
work. The Gemini Program provided the first the Real Time Computer System became oper-
real operational testing of many of these new ational. This system used radar data from
systems and the improvements of older sys- other DOD ranges and the downrange East-
tems. The Digital Command System and ern Test Range sites. The data were processed
Telemetry System, for instance, are gradu- by the Real Time Computer System and pro-
ally replacing older systems on the national vided a near real-time plot of the spacecraft
ranges. ground track during reentry. The spacecraft
The Computer Acquisition System was one drag factor and the maneuvering information
result of the Gemini network support de- were not entered in the computer program,
veloped on the DOD ranges. The reentry pro- but the quantity of available downrange data
file and the primary landing area of the offset this deficiency in the terminal phase
- of reentry.
Gemini spacecraft were such that, to provide
adequate radar tracking during reentry .for
landing-point computation, the radars had Recovery Support
to acquire during the blackout period. With-
out highly accurate acquisition information, The primary mission of DOD recovery
this was almost a n impossible task ; however, forces during the Gemini Program was to
the means were devised to solve the problem. ‘locate and to retrieve the flight crew and
Prior to blackout, radar-track data were pro- spacecraft, and to deliver them to NASA pro-
vided to a central computer that had been gram managers. This responsibility began
programed for reentry. These data could be with the launch of the spacecraft and ended
. translated into a n accurate driving signal to with the delivery of the recovered spacecraft
be fed to the radar which would acquire the to NASA.
spacecraft during blackout. The accuracy of Planning for the spacecraft-location func-
the data enabled the radar to follow the actual tion assumed that information would be
spacecraft track and to find the weak beacon available from several sources. One source in
signal through the ion shield. By use of com- computing a probable landing point was the
puters associated with each radar, data could information obtained from the ground track-
be fed in both directions, and the radars could ing stations. In addition, the spacecraft was
operate independently. A lack of equipment equipped with a high-frequency radio beacon
a t the DOD ranges precluded early imple- which enabled the worldwide DOD high-
mentation of the system. Using the Real Time frequency direction-finding network to pro-
Computer System at Cape Kennedy, a suc- vide fixing information. The spacecraft was
cessful test of the theory was accomplished also equipped with a n ultrahigh-frequency
on the Gemini V mission ; further tests were radio beacon which could be received by air-
190 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
borne forces. The airborne forces used elec- The use of functionally descriptive call
trouic homing for all Gemini missions. An signs for the recovery forces was instituted
additional electronic source of information during Gemini VI-A and VII. This procedure
not originally anticipated was shipboard aided the clarity of recovery force com-
radar. Radar information from ships sta- munications and was used in all subsequent
tioned in the Primary Landing Area was missions.
~)articularlyvaluable ; and a contact in excess
of 300 miles was reported by the primary Recovery Areas
recovery ship during recovery of the Gemini
\T 11 spacecraft. Since recovery planning was concerned
Location p l m n i n ~also provided for visual with all conceivable landing situations, the
search if electronic means failed. The space- most effective approach was to orient the
craft was provided with a sea dye marker to planning about certain geographical areas.
aid in daytime visual location and with a These were the Launch Site, Launch Abort,
high-intensity blinking light for nighttime Contingency, Secondary, and Primary Areas.
search. During the later missions, the loca- All except the Contingency Area were con-
tion task was qimplified when the spacecraft, sidered planned landing areas.
descending on the main parachute, was visu- Lauiich Site Area.-The Launch Site Area
ally sighted. (fig. 15-2) was that area where a landing
Retrieval of the flight crew was accom- would occur following a n abort in the late
plished by helicopter on all but two missions. stages of the countdown or during early
The Gemini VI-A and Gemini IX-A flight flight. For planning purposes, the area was
crews elected to remain in the spacecraft for centered on Launch Complex 19 at Cape Ken-
pickup by the recovery ship. Spacecraft re- nedy and extended 3 miles toward the Banana
trieval was accomplished by the primary re- River and 41 miles seaward, with the major
cnvery ship on all missions except Gemini axis along the launch azimuth. The actual
VIII, which landed in the West Pacific Sec- positioning of launch-site forces was oriented
ondary Landing Area. In this case, the swim- about a much smaller area, with the size and
mers were deployed from a n aircraft on the location determined by the launch azimuth
scene at spacecraft landing. The team at- and local winds.
tached the flotation collar to the spacecraft,
and the recovery was made by the destroyer
The.typical launch-site recovery force in-
cluded four C H 3 C amphibious helicopters,
supporting the area.
During Gemini I1 and Gemini 111, control
of DOD recovery forces by the DOD Manager Reduced area based on
was accomplished from the Mission Control winds at time of lift-off
Center-Cape Kennedy. For all subsequent
missions, the DOD Manager and his staff
operated from the Recovery Control Center,
Houston.
An early problem in the command and con-
trol area was the lack of real-time voice infor-
mation from the recovery scene. For Gemini
IV, procedures were developed whereby the
flight-crew air-to-ground voice circuit could
be used for on-scene recovery operations and
could be relayed to the Recovery Control Cen-
t e r ; this procedure was followed f o r all sub-
sequent missions. FIGURE15-2.-Typical launch-site recovery area.
MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT..OF DEFENSE 191
four lighter amphibious resupply cargo positioned adjacent to these zones. Target
(LARC) vehicles, two M-113 personnel car- points were selected in each zone for each
riers, two landing vehicle tracked recovery time the ground track passed through the
(LVTR) , two rescue boats, and one salvage zone. These target points were then covered
vessel for in-port standby. The launch-site by the supporting ship. The aircraft were on
recovery forces were not required to effect 30-minute strip alert and ready for a n imme-
an actual recovery during Gemini. diate takeoff.
Lazinch Abort Area.-The Launch Abort The Atlantic zones were covered by the
Area was along the launch ground track be- ships and aircraft which had also provided
tween Cape Kennedy and the west coast of Launch Abort Area coverage during the
-4frica. An abort might have occurred in this launch phase of the mission. The East At-
area during the launch phase of flight prior lantic Secondary Landing Area was normally
to Earth-orbital insertion. The recovery force supported by a destroyer and a fleet oiler.
posture in the Launch Abort Area underwent For Gemini XII, the ship access-time require-
considerable change during the Gemini Pro- ment for this area was increased, and suffi-
gram as confidence in the launch vehicle and cient coverage was provided by a fleet oiler
spacecraft systems increased. For example, equipped with communications and recovery
the on-station launch-abort recovery force equipment as well as medical personnel.
for Gemini I11 consisted. of eight destroyers, The value of Secondary Landing Areas
one fleet oiler, one fleet tug, and nine fixed- and assigned forces was significantly demon-
wing aircraft. The on-station launch-abort strated on the Gemini V and VI11 missions.
force for Gemini XI1 was reduced to three During the early part of Gemini V mission,
destroyers, one aircraft carrier, one fleet the spacecraft developed electrical power-
oiler, and four fixed-wing aircraft. The source difficulties. For several revolutions
launch-abort recovery forces were 'not re- after the problem developed, the spacecraft
quired to make a n actual recovery during did not pass through the Primary Landing
Gemini. Area. However, the spacecraft did pass
Contin.gency Recovery Area.-The Contin- through the Mid-Pacific Secondary Landing
gency Recovery Area comprised the area Area where a i r and surface forces were
along the spacecraft ground tracks outside ready to provide support if necessary. The
the planned landing areas. Forces supporting problem was eventually corrected, and the
this area consisted of Air Force Aerospace mission was completed a s planned.
Rescue and Recovery Service aircraft de- The value of the Secondary Landing Areas
ployed to various worldwide staging bases. was even more evident during the Gemini
These forces were capable of reaching any VI11 flight. Following a successful rendez-
point along the spacecraft ground track vous-and-docking maneuver, the docked ve-
within 18 hours. There were no actual con- hicles developed severe gyrations. The crew
tingency-area recoveries during Gemini. was forced to take emergency action which
Secoridnry Landing Areus.-The Second- resulted in a low-fuel state in the Reentry
a r y Landing Areas which were established Control System. In accordance with pre-
for the long-duration missions consisted of planned mission rules, the decision was made
four circular zones. Each zone had a radius in this case to land the spacecraft in the West
of 240 nautical miles. The zones were located Pacific Secondary Landing Area. The sup-
in the West Atlantic, East Atlantic, West port ship and seven aircraft were alerted,
Pacific, and Mid-Pacific. Each zone was sup- and the first aircraft on the scene sighted the
ported by a destroyer o r a fleet oiler and, in spacecraft descending on the main para-
some cases, by a destroyer and a n oiler in chute. The aircraft deployed the swimmers to
company. In addition, Air Force Aerospace attach the flotation collar to the spacecraft
Rescue and Recovery Service aircraft were and to report the condition of the flight crew.
192 - GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
The destroyer arrived on the scene and re- provided. Recovery of the flight crew and
trieved the spacecraft and flight crew. Re- spacecraft was televised for all subsequent
covery was completed 3 hours 10 minutes missions except Gemini VIII. The Gemini
after landing. VI-A and VI1 missions established the DOD
P r i ~ ~ i a i yLanding Area-The Primary capability to provide recovery support for a
Landing Area was located in the West dual mission.
Atlantic, and the primary recovery ship was
assigned to this area. An Amphibious As- Planned Versus Actual Statistics
sault Ship was the primary recovery ship
for Gemini X and Gemini XI. A support air- Table 15-1 presents a compilation of the
craft carrier was used for this function in all total DOD resources dedicated to each
other missions. Gemini mission. The general trend toward
reduction of forces as the program pro-
The addition of the Amphibious Assault
gressed is shown.
Ship has provided DOD planners more
flexibility in scheduling support for manned The second column of table 15-11 indicates
space-flight missions. This type of ship the distance between the planned .target
operates more economically and does not re- point and the actual landing point of the
quire a rescue destroyer in company. The spacecraft for each Gemini mission. This
aircraft carrier has proved to be an effective table also shows the time interval between
primary recovery ship, since i t .serves as a the spacecraft landing and the arrival of the
launch and recovery platform for helicopters flight crew aboard ship. Column 4 shows the
access time established by NASA for the
and provides excellent facilities for postmis-
applicable recovery a r e a ; the access time is
sion evaluation of the flight crew. Helicopters
a r e used in the Primary Recovery Area for the principal criterion established for recov-
the 'electronic location of the spacecraft and ery-force operations. This. is the elapsed time
for the transport of the Swim teams to and from spacecraft landing until first-level
from the spacecraft. During most of the mis- medical care can be provided the flight crew.
sions, separate heIicopters were used for each Thus, a comparison of the times in columns
of these functions. In Gemini XII, the func- 3 and 4 provides a n indication of recovery-
tions were combined bv placing the swim force performance.
teams aboard the search helicopters. This
satisfactory arrangement proved economical Communications
and operational.
Communications support by DOD forces
Fixed-wing aircraft were utilized for air-
evolved from a simple network for support-
borne control of aircraft in the recovery area ing a ballistic missile launch to complex
and for providing a commentary of recovery communications networks of ships, aircraft,
operations between the recovery forces and ground stations, and worldwide recovery
shore installations. This information was re- bases and forces for supporting orbital space
layed t o the Mission Control Center-Hous- flights.
'
ton in real time through relay aircraft. The In 1960, the Air Force Eastern Test
relay aircraft provided network support Range was committed to support the first
prior to landing and provided recovery sup- flight of the manned spacecraft program,
port after landing until the flight crew were Mercury-Redstone 1 mission. Cape Kennedy
retrieved. (Cape Canaveral) and Grand Bahama
Beginning with Gemini VI-A and VII, Island, Eastern Test Range stations, were
live television broadcasts and recovery oper- the primary ground stations providing track-
ations in the Primary Landing Area were ing and telemetry support. Other stations
MISSION SUPPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 193
. were being established to form a worldwide single-sideband radio and selected ground
tracking network. The network included air- stations. The DOD communications responsi-
borne platforms for automatic voice relay bilities increased as mi.ssions progressed
from a manned spacecraft to the Mission from suborbital to orbital. The responsibil-
Control Center by means of high-frequency/ ities involved the Eastern Test Range, the
1
Mission date hr:min Personnel Aircraft ship spacecraft recovery Ocean
---_____ ___
I-- ~
I1 (unmanned) ... Jan 19, 1965 0:18 6 562 67 16 USS Lake Champlain') Atlantic
I11.................... Mar. 23, 1965 4:53 10185 82 27 USS Intrepid Atlantic
IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 3,1965 97:56 10349 134 26 uss Wasp" j Atlantic
v. ....................... Aug. 21.. 1965 19055 10265 114 19 USS Lake Champlain 1 Atlantic
1I Atlantic
VI. ......................... Oct. 25, 1965 "0:OO 10125 125 16
VI1......................
VI-A,. ................... Dec. 15,1965
VI11.....................
IX-A" ....................
Dec. 4, 1965
' Tracking time, no recovery intended. Gemini I X aborted May 17 due to failure of tar-
Aircraft carrier. uet
- vehicle.
Mission aborted. ' Amphibious Assault Ship (helicopter carrier).
'Destroyer. Mission terminated in Secondary
Landing Area. USS Boxer was planned recovery
carrier.
TABLE
l&II.-Gemini Recover??Operations
I
Time from landing
Landing distance to flight crew I
from target point, aboard recovery Maximum ship I
Mission .n. mi. ship, min access time, hr 1 Remarks
__
I I -l I
i
I Unmanned No recovery intended
I1 14 Unmanned
I11 60 70 4
IV 44 57 4
V 91 89
I
4
VI-A I 7 66
I 4 Crew remained in space-
IX-A,. .......................
6.4
1.1
0.38
33
190
52
4
6
4
I
i
i
Landing in West Paciflc
Zone
Crew remained in space-
craft
x ......................... 3.4 28 4
X I ............................ 2.65 24 4
XI1 .......................... 2.6 30 4
I
194 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
Eglin Gulf Test Range, the White Sands and a vast network of dedicated, common-
Missile Range, and the Pacific Missile Range, user circuits connecting the worldwide de-
a s well as associated ships and aircraft inte- ployed forces on a near real-time basis was
grated into one network under a DOD- available for Gemini XII. This system was
designated network controller. The Air capable of supporting a s many a s 131 air-
Force Western Test Range, organized in craft, 28 surface vessels, 30 land-based sites,
1965, includes Vandenberg Air Force Base, and 5 major recovery control centers. Each
Calif.; Hawaii; Eniwetok; and ships and recovery force was given a complete test
aircraft supporting the Pacific area. prior to each mission to assure readiness to
During the Mercury and Gemini manned support nominal a s well a s nonnominal mis-
space flights, many new theories, different sions.
support and response, and mechanics of ac- Under the direction of the DOD Man-
complishing the missions were developed by ager’s Assistant for Communications, the
DOD. The transmission of high-speed radar DOD communications assets were activated
data for manned missions; the use of air- and tested approximately 7 days prior to
borne platforms for tracking, telemetry, and flight. The assets were tested for station-to-
automatic voice relay ; and the procedures station alinement procedures, alternate and
f o r integrating the DDD Service and Na- diverse routing, and equipment and man-
tional Ranges with the NASA stations were power readiness. F o r orbital support, the
improved. NASA and DOD tracking/telemetry stations
While much consideration was accorded a integrated the communication functions sys-
buildup of networks to support the orbital tems for network simulations about 15 days
portion of a flight, action was also taken to prior to flight.
provide the worldwide deployed recovery In addition to insuring that necessary cir-
forces with communications systems t h a t cuitry was available and ready to support
were allequate, responsive, and reliable. The the mission, key individuals were deployed
complete resources of DOD were made avail- by the Assistant for Communications to key
able through the facilities of the Defense communications locations. These individuals
Communications Agency, Unified and Speci- were to provide quick response to unforeseen
fied Commands, as well as through the situations, to assist field commanders with
resources of the separate commands. Progres- any communications problem that could not
sion was evident in the method of providing be resolved locally, and to insure t h a t DOD
teletype communications (written copy) serv- forces conformed to documented and last-
ice. Early in Project Mercury, the facilities of minute communication needs a s a single and
the Army, Navy, and Air Force were used to integrated system. Possible improvements to
provide teletype information to the forces communications equipment, terminal loca-
and bases under the command of each of the tions, and procedures were constantly
services. To gain operational control, to im- studied to assure t h a t the best possible s u p
prove response time, and to insure real-time port was available to manned spacecraft mis-
reaction, the Army ( F o r t Detrick, Md.) was sions.
given the responsibility for the automatic
Meteorology
relay-switching center, interconnecting the
recovery staff of the DOD Manager with the The short duration of the Project Mercury
deployed recovery forces. Voice communica- missions allowed confirmation of acceptable
tions links were also made available from the weather conditions in the recovery areas. In
Defense Communications Agency, commer- the planning stage of the Gemini Program,
cial carriers, ranges, and military commands. however, it became apparent t h a t weather
Recovery communications support increased ; conditions in the planned recovery areas
~
tions concerning man's support and response though there were also several effects noted
to this environment with the reality of the which were not predicted.
findings from the actual experience.
The space-flight environment predictions General Aspects of the Flight Program
are compared with the actual observations in
table 16-111. In evaluating the results of flight pro-
The human responses to space flight which grams, i t is important to realize t h a t man is
were predicted a r e compared with the obser- being exposed to multiple stresses and t h a t
vations in table 16-IV. There were more pre- i t is impossible at the present time to evalu-
dicted system effects than were observed, ate the stresses singly, either inflight o r post-
Flight I Crew
I Launch date 1 Description
-__- -- I- -I
Duration, hr:min
I
M R-3
M I<-4
MA-6
' Shepard
Grissom
Glenn
May 5, 1961
July 21, 1961
Feb. 20, 1962
Suborbital
Suborbital
Orbital
O:l5
O:l5
4 :56
MA-7 1 Carpenter May 24, 1962 Orbital 4:56
MA-8 1 Schirra Oct. 3, 1963 Orbital 9:14
MA-9 i Cooper May 15, 1963 Orbital 34 :20
Duration,
Gemini mission Crew Launch date Description day :hr :min
___-___- ---___ -
I11 Grissom Mar. 23, 1965 Three revolution manned test 0:04:52
i
XI1 Lovell Nov. 11, 1966 Rendezvous and docking; umbilical and 2 3:22:37
Aldrin standup extravehicular activity periods;
tether exercise
I
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 199
Dysbarism
Predicted
I None
Observed
Fatigue Minimal
observations can be applied to the ground predictions concerning the effects of long-
situ -ion. duration flight upon man. The sensors and
I . is necessary to provide the capability to equipment should not interfere with the com-
monitor the physiologic state of man during fort and ‘ l i e function of the crew. Whenever
flight activities. A great deal of consider- possible, tie procurement of data should be
ation has been given to the definition of a set virtually automatic, requiring little or no
of physiologic indices which might be easily action on the part of the crewmen. A great
obtained in the flight situation and which deal has been learned concerning the use of
could be meaningfully monitored. Routine minimal amounts of data obtained at inter-
parameters have included measurements of mittent intervals while a spacecraft is over
a tracking station. The extravehicular crew-
voice, two leads for electrocardiogram, res-
men have been monitored by means of one
piration, body temperature, and blood pres-
lead each of electrocardiogram and of res-
sure (fig. 16-1). Other functions were added piration-rate measurement obtained through
for the experiments program, but were not the space-suit umbilical. Additional physi-
monitored in real time. The monitoring of ologic information, such as suit or body
man’s physiologic state in flight is necessary temperature and carbon-dioxide levels, could
to provide information for real-time decision not be obtained due to the limited number of
making concerning the accomplishment of monitoring leads available in the umbilical.
additional flight objectives; to assure the The medical objectives in the manned
safety of the flight crew; and to obtain ex- space-flight program are to provide medical
perimental data for postflight analysis for support for man, enabling him t o fly safely
in order .to answer the following questions :
(1) How long can man be exposed to the
space-flight environment without producing
significant physiologic o r performance decre-
ment?
(2) What a r e the causes of the observed
changes ?
(3) Are preventive measures or treat-
ment needed, and if so, what a r e best?
Attainment of these objectives will involve
tasks with different orientation. The most
urgent task is obviously to provide medical
support to assure flight safety through the
development of adequate preflight prepara-
tion and examination, as well as inflight
monitoring. The second is to obtain informa-
tion on which t o base the operational deci-
sions for extending the flight duration in a
safe manner. The third task differs from the
operational orientation of the first two in
that it implies an experimental approach to
determine the etiology of the findings ob-
served. Frequently, many things that would
contribute to the accomplishment of the last
task must be sacrificed in order t o attain the
FIGURE16-l.-Gemini biosensor harness. overall mission objective. This requires con-
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 201
South Atlantic anomaly. The onboard radi- night. The physiological response in heart
ation measuring system and the personal rate to the regime used on the l k d a y flight
dosimeters attached to the crewmen con- is shown in figure 16-2.
firmed that the radiation intensity was at
the lower end of the calculated range. In a Gravity Load
160-nautical-mile. orbit, the crew received
approximately 15 millirads of radiation in During space flight, the increase of grav-
each 24 hours of exposure. Table 16-V indi- ity load during launch and reentry, and the
cates the total doses received on the flights to nullification of gravity load and production
date. of a state of weightlessness during actual
flight, were expected to produce detrimental
Light and Darkness effects. Actually, gravity loads during the
missions were well within man's tolerances,
Many predictions were made concerning with two 7g peaks occurring a t launch, and
the effect of the changing light and darkness with g-forces varying from 4 to 8.2g a t re-
producing a day and a night every 90 min- entry. Much concern was expressed about a
utes. It was generally predicted that this decreased tolerance to gravity following
would totally disrupt the circadian rhythms, weightless flight. No evidence of this has
producing grave consequences. Certainly no been observed; following 4 days of weight-
overt effects of the 45 minutes of day and 45 less flight, the Gemini IV crew sustained a
minutes of night were observed on the short peak of 8.2g without adverse effects.
missions. A s knowledge of sleep in the space- Weightlessness has been the subject of
fliFht environment increased, it was deter- innumerable studies and papers. It has been
mined best to arrange the work-rest cycles so produced for brief periods in parabolic
t h a t sleep occurred a t the normal Cape Ken- flight in aircraft, and simulated by water
nedy sleep time. The spacecraft was artifi- immersion and bedrest. The Gemini Pro-
cally darkened by covering the windows, and gram has produced a fair amount of evidence
a s f a r as the crew were concerned, i t was concerning the effect of the weightless space-
flight environment on various body systems.
TABLE 16V.-Radiation Doses nn Gemini
Missions' Skin
1 1
~ --_, ___ ~
B
VI11................ 0:10:41 4 10 10
IX-A .............. 3:01:04 17f1 22f1
x ................... 2:22:46 670*6 765*10 r40
ru .-Aifl-oft. ,,.,,., ,,,, ,.,.., ,..,, ,..,,
X I .................. 2:23:17 29fl 26+1
XII. ............... 3:22:37 4 20 <20 4 16 48 80 112 144 176 208
Ground elapsed time, hr
'.Dosimeters located in helmet, right and left
chest, and thigh. FIGURE
16-2.-Gemini VI1 pilot heart rate.
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIOYS VERSIJS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 203
noted during the immediate postflight period, Psychological tests have not been conducted
but this was easily treated with lotion. There as distinct entities unrelated to the inflight
have been no infections, and there has been tasks. Instead, the evaluation of total human
minimal reaction around the sensor sites. performance has provided an indication of
Dandruff has been a n occasional problem, adequate central nervous system function.
but has been easily controlled with preflight There has been no evidence, either during
and postflight medication. flight or postflight, of any psychological ab-
normalities.
Central Neri-ous System The electroencephalogram (fig. 16-3) was
utilized to evaluate sleep during the 14-day
The best indication of central nervous mission. A total of 54 hours 43 minutes
system function has been the excellent per- of interpretable data was obtained. Vari-
formance of the crew on each o f the missions. ations in the depth of sleep from Stage 1 t o
This was graphically illustrated by the de- the deep sleep of Stage 4 were noted in flight
manding performances required during the as in the groundlbased data.
aborted launch of Gemini VI-A: the ren- Numerous visual observations have been
dezvous and the thruster problem on Gemini reported by the crews involving inflight
VI11 ; the extravehicular activity on Gemini sightings and descriptions of ground views.
IV, IX-A, X, XI, and X I I ; and the many The actual determination of visual acuity has
accurate spacecraft landings and recoveries. been made in flight, as well as in preflight and
FIGURE
1F-::.-Electroencephalogram equipment.
204 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
postflight examinations. All of these tests conjunctival infection has been noted, but
support the statement that vision is not has lasted only a few hours and is believed
altered during weightless flight. to have been the result of the oxygen environ-
As previously noted, there has been much ment. During the early portions of the flights,
conjecture concerning vestibular changes in normally the first 2 or 3 days, some nasal
a weightless environment. There has been no stuffiness has been noted. This also is un-
evidence of altered vestibular function dur- doubtedly related to the 100-percent oxygen
ing any of the Gemini flights. Preflight and environment and is usually self-limited. On
postflight caloric vestibular function studies occasion, the condition has been treated 10-
have shown no change, and special studies cally or by oral medication.
of the otolith response have revealed no sig-
nificant changes. There have been ample mo- Jtenpiratory System
tions of the head in flight and during roll
rates with the spacecraft. There has been Preflight and postflight X-rays have failed
no vertigo nor disorientation noted, even dur- to reveal any atelectasis. Pulmonary function
ing the extravehicular activity with occa- studies before and after the 14-day mission
sional loss of all visual references. Several revealed no alteration. There have been no
crewmen have reported a feeling of fullness specific difficulties o r symptomatology in-
in the head similar in character to the full- volving the respiratory system ; however,
ness experienced when one is turned upside some rather high respiratory rates have been
down, allowing the blood to go to the head. noted during heavy workloads in the extra-
Hnwever, there has been no sensation of vehicular activity. Even when these rates
being turned upside down, and the impression have exceeded 40 breaths per minute, they
is that this sensation results from altered have not been accompanied by symptoma-
distribution of blood in the weightless state. tology.
To clear the record, two of the Mercury pilots
developed difficulties involving the labyrinth ; Cardiovascular System
the difficulties were in no way'related to the
space flights. One developed prolonged ver- The cardiovascular system was the first of
tigo as the result of a severe blow over the the major body systems to show physiologic
left ear in a fall, but he has completely change following flight; as a result, it has
recovered with no residual effect. The other been extensively investigated by various
crewman developed an inflammation of the means (fig. 16-4). As previously reported,
labyrinth some 3 years after his l b m i n u t e the peak heart rates have been observed at
space flight, and, while he continues to have launch and at reentry (table 16-VI) ; the
some hearing loss, there have been no further rates normally reached higher levels during
vestibular symptoms. It is interesting to note the reentry period. The midportions of all
this absolute lack of any inflight vestibular the missions have been characterized by more
symptoms, in spite of the fact t h a t a number stable heart rates a t lower levels with .ade-
of the pilots have developed motion sickness quate response to physical demands.
while in the spacecraft on the water. The electrocardiogram has been studied in
detail thoughout the Gemini missions. The
Eye, Ear. Eiose, and Throat only abnormalities of note have been very
rare, premature, auricular and ventricular
There have been two inflight incidents of contractions. No significant changes have
rather severe eye irritation. One was the re- been detected in the duration of specific seg-
sult of exposure to lithium hydroxide in the ments of the electrocardiogram.
suit circuit ; the cause of the other remains a Blood-pressure measurements obtained
mystery. In a few instances, some postflight during the Gemini VI1 mission revealed that
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 205
-
FIGURE16-4.--Gemini cardiovascular evaluation techniques. .
systolic and diastolic values remained within during lift-off, reentry, and extravehicular
the envelope of normality and showed no activity. The higher values observed for the
significant changes throughout. 14 days of tl iiration of systole and for electromechanical
flight. As previously reported, this included delay in certain crewmembers suggest a pre-
the pressures taken at the time of reentry. ponderance of cholinergic influences (vagal
Some insight into the electrical and me- tone). An increase in adrenergic reaction
chanical phases of the cardiac cycle was (sympathetic tone) was generally observed
gained during the Gemini flights, The data during lift-off, reentry, and in the few hours
were derived through synchronous phono- preceding reentry.
cardiographic and electrocardiographic mon- As a further measure of cardiovascular
itoring. In general, wide fluctuations in the status, Experiment M003, Inflight Exerciser,
duration of the cardiac cycle, but within determined the heart-rate response to a n
physiological limits, were observed through- exercise load consisting of one pull per second
out the missions. Fluctuations in the duration for 30 seconds on a bungee device (force at
of electromechanical systole correlated closely f u l l extension of 12 inches equaled 70
with changes in heart rate. Stable values were pounds). The responses for one crewman on
observed for electromechanical delay (onset the Gemini V mission a r e shown in figure
of ventricular activity, QRS complexes, to 16-5. The results of the 4-day Gemini IV and
onset of first heart sound) throughout the the 14-day Gemini VI1 mission did not differ.
missions, with shorter values observed dur- This variant of the step test revealed no
ing the intervals of peak heart rates recorded physical or cardiovascular decrement after
206 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
TABLE l&VI.-Peak Heart Rates Duii/i,g tilt heart rate for each of the Gemini crews,
Launch and Reentry the postflight increases a r e from 17 to 105
__ -- __ percent greater than those exhibited pre-
Peak rates Peak rates flight. The increasing trend in these values
Gemini Crewman during during ixas evident through the 8-day mission. A
mission launch, reentry!
beats/min beats/min multiplicity of altered factors, such as better
_____ _____-- - _ __ _ diet, more exercise, desuited periods, and no
I11 CP 1v2 165 extravehicular activity, make the improved
P 120 130 postflight response to the 14-day mission very
IV CP 148 140 difficult to interpret (fig. 16-7).
P 128 126
170
For purposes of comparison, flight data
V CP 148
P 155 178 and data from bedrest studies were viewed
VI-A CP 125 125 in a like manner and show a very similar
P 150 140 trend ; however, the magnitude of the changes
VI1 CP 152 180 shows marked differences, again illustrating,
P 125 134
VI11 CP 138 130
perhaps, the influence of factors other than
P 120 90 those simulated by bedrest.
IX-A CP 142 160 When the tilt-table tests a r e considered,
P 120 126 postflight leg volume was universally greater
X CP 120 110
90
than preflight. Postmission observations
P 125
XI CP 166 120 ranged from 12 to 82 percent increase in
P 154 117 volume over premission values.
XI1 CP 136 142 The Gemini V pilot wore intermittently
P 110 137 occlusive lower limb cuffs for the first 4 days
- of the 8-day mission. The Gemini VI1 pilot
CP indicates command pilot; P indicates pilot. wore the cuffs for the entire 14-day mission;
however, his heart-rate increases and pulse-
as much as 14 days in a space-flight environ- pressure narrowing were greater than f o r the
ment. command pilot ; the cuffs seemingly did not
In contrast to the Project Mercury results, alter the variables.
orthostatism resulting from any Gemini mis- Average resting heart rates have ranged
sion has not been detectable except by means from 18 to 62 percent higher after missions.
of passive tilt-table provocation. Typically, In spite of higher resting pulse rates, the
the heart-rate and blood-pressure response changes resulting from tilt were still greater.
to a 15-minute, 70" tilt performed postflight The exception presented by the Gemini VI1
are compared with identical preflight testing crew is more apparent. The bedrest data a r e
on the same crewmen. Consistently, such test- not remarkable.
ing has demonstrated a greater increase in To date, the observations of the effect of
heart rate, a greater reduction in pulse pres- space flight on body systems have shown sig-
sure, and a greater increase in leg volume, nificant changes involving only the cardio-
as interpreted from lower limb circumference vascular, hematopoietic, and musculoskeletal
systems. Even these changes appear adaptive
gages during the preflight tilt (fig. 16-6).
in nature and a r e measured principally dur-
The changes observed in these variables may
ing the readaptive phase to the l g environ-
be most significantly illustrated by examining ment. It appears that adequate information
the heart-rate changes observed during pre- has been obtained to permit anticipation of
flight and postflight tilt-table studies. When R nominal lunar mission without being sur-
the postflight increases in heart rate during prised by unforeseen physiologic changes.
tilt a r e expressed as percent of the preflight Medical results from the U.S. space flights
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 207
FIGURE
16-5.-Heart-ratc response to hungec exercise, Gemini V pilot.
appear to differ from the results reported by shown variability between flights in the same
the U.S.S.R., where there seems to be a manner as have diffecent men on the same
unique problem in the area of vestibular flight. Figure 16-8 shows the heart rates for
response. In the cardiovascular area, the one crewman during t h e launch phase of both
United States has not confirmed the U.S.S.R. his Mercury mission and his Gemini mis-
reports of electromechanical delay in cardiac sion. The two curves show little correlation
response, and the U.S.S.R. has not confirmed and could as easily have come from different
the US. findings of decreased red-cell mass. individuals. Obviously, confidence in the re-
The Gemini flights have also provided some sults and the definition of variability will be
excellent examples of human variability and improved as more information is gained on
have emphasized the necessity for care in future flights. Also, these are gross system
making deductions. In making projections findings, and much must still be accomplished
IJased on very limited results in a few people, in the laboratory and in flight if the mecha-
the current trend is to bank heavily upon nisms of the findings a r e to be understood.
comparisons in a given individual ; that is, -4lthough physiological adaptation is diffi-
differences between baseline data and re- cult to define, it might be stated as any altera-
sponses observed during and after a flight. tion or response which favors the survival of
The crewmen who have flown twice have a n organism in a changed environment. This
208 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
70"
Beain vertical End
,Gemini
al-
L
-E
L
m
al
5
I I I I I
2 4 6 8 10
Elapsed time, min
FIGURE
16-8.-Command pilot heart-rate
comparisons.
FIGURE
Preflight
16-ll.-Urine
Inflight Postflight
FIGURE
11 I
Preflight
lG-l2.-Urine
, lnflight
17-hydroxycorticosteroids,
Gemini VI1 command pilot.
Postflight
a
14-
3
marked increase in the bound hydroxyproline, m
day
while larger quantities of calcium were ex- flight
creted later in the flight than during the
early phases of the flight. This is consistent FrcunE 1&13.-Bound plasma hydrosyproline,
with a change in bone structure. Gemini VII.
212 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
* Not available.
____--
Metabolic rate based
an oral and usually a suppository laxative
*
were used within 2 days of launch. On the
0 Pilot on carbon-dioxide
_ _ _ . Average caloric intake output shorter extravehicular missions, this pre-
flight prepay :ion has generally allowed the
FIGURE
16-14.-CaIoric intake on Gemini IV. crew to avoic defecation in flight.
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 213
2333
2000 ~n
-1
3 4 5 6 7 8 . 9 10 11 12 13 14
Mission duration, days
Command pilot - Provided on board
--- Average caloric intake
0 Pilot _---- Metabolic rate. based on
Average caloric intake carbon-dioxide output
Metabolic measurement during U.S. space The criws have never slept well on the first
flights has been limited t o the determinations night in s p i c e . and many factors other than
of the total carbon-dioside production by the iveightlessness may be active in limiting the
chemical analysis of the spent lithium- sleep oltained. regardless of flight duration.
hydroside canister. This method is of value All crewmembers have 1-eported a tendency
only in establishing the average heat-produc- to slecl) with the arms folded a t chest height
tion rate for crewmen during space flight. aiid the fingelas interlocked. The legs also teiid
Figure 16-20 shows close agreement between to iisstime a slightly elevated position. On
metabolic data from the U.S.S.R. and the return to the l g environment, the crews are
American space flights. The higher metabolic ~ ~ W I I Yof the readaptation period because
rates observed during the Mercury flights are they are an.ii1.e for a short time that the arms
explained by the fact that these were short- ant1 legs have weight and require effort to
duration flights in which the crewmen did not move. There has been some postflight muscle
sleep. stiff ness following the prolonged missions
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 215
-Preflight .
al
k 240r
-- Postf Iight
(D
c
V
600 tC700 3oi loo0
mg Ca mg Ca mg Ca
5 3001 .-J-
g 200
0' 100
3
0
E--
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 0 2 4 6
Elapsed time, min
" 4davs a days 14 days
600 t i 7 0 0 300 lo00
mg Ca mg Ca mg Ca FIGURE16-19.-Preflight and postflight exercise
- capacity test results, Gemini IX-A.
16-18.-Change in density of hand phalanx
FIGURFI
. . Vostok
on Gemini IV, V, and VI1 missions.
0Mercury
that may be more associated with the con- Gemini
finement of the spacecraft than with weight-
lessness.
The amount of inflight exercise by the
crew has varied even on the long-duration
flights. On the 14-day mission, there were
three 10-minute exercise periods programed
and completed per day. On t h e short-duration
flights with great demands upon the crew f o r
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
rendezvous and extravehicular activity, no Mission duration, days
specific conditioning exercises have been con-
ducted. There appears to be a need for a
FIGURE
lG20,-Average metabolic rates during
definite exercise regime on long-duration actual space flight.
flights.
nous. In the single-man flights of the Mercury disease in flight as a result of preflight ex-
series, there was always ample ground con- posure and the lack of symptoms or signs
tact and certainly no feeling of isolation or which can be detected in a preflight exami-
monotony. In the two-man Gemini flights, the nation.
same was true ;and of course there has always Quarantine of the crews for a period of
been a companion crewman, thus avoiding time preflight has been discussed, and has
isolation. The crews have exhibited remark- been rejected as impractical in the missions
able psychomotor performance capabilities, to date. The immediate preflight period is
and by performing a number of demanding very demanding of crew participation, and
tasks under stress they have demonstrated a efforts have been directed a t screening the
high level of central nervous system function. contacts insofar as possible to reduce crew
exposure to possible viral and bacterial in-
Drugs fections, particularly the upper respiratory
type. A number of short-lived flulike syn-
A number of predictions were made t h a t dromes have developed in the immediate pre-
man would require the assistance of drugs to flight period, as well as one exposure to
cope with the space-flight environment. I n mumps and one incident of betahemolytic
particular, sedation prior to launch and streptococcal pharyngitis. Each situation
stimulation prior to reentry have been men- has- been handled without affecting the
tioned. As a result of the early planning for scheduled launch and, in retrospect, the
space flight, a drug kit was made available policy of modified quarantine has worked
for inflight prescription. The crews have well. Stricter measures may have to be
been pretested to each of the drugs carried; adopted as longer flights a r e contemplated.
thus, the individual reaction to the par-
ticular drug is known. Aspirin and APC’s Fatigue
have been used in flight for occasional mild
headache and for relief of muscular discom- It was predicted t h a t markedly fatigued
f o r t prior to sleep. Dextroamphetamine sul- flight crews would result from the discom-
f a t e has been taken on several occasions by fort of flight in a suited condition, a.confined
fatigued crewmen prior to reentry. A decon- spacecraft, and inadequate rest. In review-
gestant has been used to relieve nasal conges- ing the flight program to date, it appears t h a t
tion and alleviate the necessity for frequent the crews obtained less sleep than in similar
clearing of the ears prior to reentry. The circumstances on the ground, but were not
anti-motion-sickness medication has been unduly fatigued. Intermittent periods of
taken in one instance prior to reentry to re- fatigue have resulted from the demiuiding
duce motion sickness resulting from motion mission requirements and from the fasci-
of the spacecraft in the water. -An inhibitor nation of the crew with the unique opportun-
of gastrointestinal propulsion has been pre- ity to view the universe. This has been cyclic
scribed when necessary to assist in avoiding in nature and on the long-duration flights
inflight defecation. No difficulty has been has always been followed by periods of more
experienced in the use of these medications restful sleep. No interference with per-
which have produced the desired and ex- formance has been noted due to inflight
pected effects. None of the injectors has been fatigue.
used in flight.
Inflight Disease
Medical Support
Preventive medicine enthusiasts have pre- In preparing for the medical support of
dicted the possible development of infectious manned space flights, the possibility of in-
PRE-GEMINI MEDICAL PREDICTIONS. VERSUS GEMINI FLIGHT RESULTS 217
j u r y at the time of launch and recovery was medical support area. The entire manned
carefully evaluated. A detailed plan of sup- space-flight program has required the strict-
port involving medical and surgical special- est cooperation and understanding between
ists in the launch and recovery areas was physician and engineer, and i t is believed
evolved and modified a s the program pro- that this has been accomplished. The medical
gressed. I n retrospect, it might appear t h a t management of the diverse personnel neces-
the support of surgeons, anesthesiologists, sary to provide proper niedical support for
and supporting teams in these areas has been manned space missions has provided experi-
overdone in view of the results. This is ences of great value to future progress.
always a difficult area to evaluate, however, In reviewing the flights, the orderly plan
because none of the support is needed unless of doubling man’s flight duration, and ob-
a disaster occurs. The best that can be said serving the results in relation to the next
a t the moment is that this support will be step, has been successful and effective. There
critically reviewed in the light of the experi- is no reason to alter this plan in determining
ence to date and rendered more realistic in the next increments in manned space flight.
the demands placed on highly trained medi- In general, the space environment has .
cal personnel. been much better than predicted. Addi-
When originally established, the preflight tionally, man has been f a r more capable in
and postflight examinations were aimed a t this environment than predicted, and weight-
identifying gross changes in man resulting lessness and the accompanying stresses have
from exposure to the space-flight environ- had less effect than predicted. While all
ment. The examinations have been tailored these items a r e extremely encouraging and
along standard clinical lines, and, although a r e the medical legacy of the Gemini Pro-
these techniques have been satisfactory, lit- gram, it is important to concentrate on some
tle in the way of change has been noted. The of the possible problems of very long-dura-
procedures have been modified to include tion future flights, and the application of
more dynamic tests, such as bicycle ergom- Gemini knowledge. Consideration must be
etry, and to reduce the emphasis on those given to the -following: (1) obtainifig addi-
static tests which showed little or no change. tional information on normal baseline re-
Increased use of dynamic testing should con- actions to stress in order to predict crew
tinue in the support of future manned space- response ; (2) determining psychological
flight programs. implications of long-duration confinement
and crew interrelations; (3) solving the
Concluding Remarks difficult logistics of food and water supply
and of waste management; and ( 4 ) provid-
There has been increased scientific inter- ing easy, noninterfering physiologic moni-
est in the effect of the space-flight environ- tori ng.
ment on man. The scientific requirements for The first steps into space have provided a
additional information on man’s function rich background on which to build. I n addi-
must be evaluated in regard to operational tion to the information provided for plan-
and mission requirements and the effect upon ning future space activities, benefits to gen-
future manned space flight. The input of the eral medicine must accrue as smaller and
crews and the operations planners must be better bioinstrumentation with wider appli-
weighed along with the basic medical and cability to ground-based medicine is devel-
scientific requirements, and a realistic plan oped; a s normal values are defined for
must be established to provide needed various physiologic responses in man ; and
medical answers a t the proper time and allow as ground-based research is conducted, such
projections of man’s further exposure. This as bedrest studies. These result.; should vield
has been one of the most difficult tasks in the a large amount of information applicable to
218 GEM IN1 SUMMARY CONFERENCE
hospitalized patients. I t has been observed flight environment will certainly prove to be
how the human body ciin adapt to a new and a vital laboratory, allowing study of the
hostile situation and then readapt in a sur- basic physiology of body systems, such as
prisingly effective manner t o the normal l y the vestibular system. Even incidental find-
Earth environment. Continued observation ings, such as the red-cell membrane changes
of these changes will help determine whether which are markedly applicable to hyperbaric
the space environment may be utilized for app1ic;itions in medicine, may be of benefit
any form of therapy in the future. The space- to general scientific and medical research,
GEMINI ONROARD EXPERIMENTS
17. GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY
By NORMANG. FOSTER,Test arid Operations Ofice, Science a i d Applica1ion.s Directorate, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center; and OLAV SMISTAD,Test and Operations Ofice, Science and Applications Direc-
torate, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Center
Spacecraft Center organizations concerned which had been approved b u t not performed
with experiments support. The Panel re- during Project Mercury. The experiment was
viewed the block of experiment proposals and highly successful and proved t h a t communi-
the comments from each affected organiza- cation was feasible through the blackout
tion concerning the experiments. Minutes of phase during reentry. It was also evident
the panel meetings reflected the Manned from this experiment that a n increased
Spacecraft Center position of incorporating capability for real-time mission operation
each experiment studied into a particular support was necessary for successful experi-
mission. This information was presented to ment accomplishments. A second experiment
the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board was supplied by the Atomic Energy Commis-
along with the recommendations of the Office sion to determine synergism between weight-
of Space Science and Applications, the Office lessness and radiation on human blood. The
of Advanced Research and Technology, the experiment was successfully conducted as
Medical Office, and the Department of De- planned, and results seemed to indicate t h a t
fense. After reviewing the material, this synergistic effects did exist.
Board would make specific mission assign- The third experiment was conducted f o r
ments for each approved experiment. the Ames Research Center to determine
The number of experiment proposals in- effects of weightlessness on sea urchin egg
creased as the program approached the growth. The experiment utilized modified
operational phase. In recognition of the ex- equipment originally constructed for a n un-
panding workload and in order to firmly manned satellite. The manual handle manip-
aline the organizational support to the prin- ulator failed during the mission, and an
cipal investigators, in 1964 the Manned internal seal prematurely leaked fixative into
Spacecraft Center formed and staffed an some of the egg chambers. Objectives of the
Experiments Coordination Office in the En- experiment were compromised, and the fail-
gineering and Development Directorate. The ure served to realine the objectives of the
purpose of this Office was to manage the Gemini Experiments Office from integration
overall implementation of experiments into of supp€ied experiments to a more compre-
manned missions. hensive role of integrating and assuring suc-
In June 1965, the Experiments Coordina- cessful experiment operations.
tion Office and the Gemini Experiments A functional verification review of experi-
Office were combined as part of the newly ments assigned to a particular mission was
formed Experiments Program Office. The initiated and conducted prior to the par-
scope of responsibility of the Experiments ticular mission flight-readiness review. All
Program Office included the Apollo experi- affected elements of the Manned Spacecraft
ments program and future experiments pro- Center were represented in the review. After
grams and planning. The Experiments Pro- detailed evaluations of the experiment equip-
gram Office became part of the Science and ment design and test history, the functional
Applications Directorate in December 1966. verification review panel determined flight-
worthiness of the experiment or additional
Operations operations required to make the experiment
flightworthy.
The first three formal Gemini experiments Late in the preflight phase of Gemini IV,
were conducted during the first manned mis-
three Department of Defense experiments
sion, Gemini 111, on March 23, 1965. All
were canceled due to the addition of extra-
three required crew participation and real-
time communications. The Langley Research vehicular activity. Although many Gemini
Center proposed that a reentry communica- experiments were planned for two missions,
tions experiment be conducted similar to one with the second mission serving a s an alter-
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 223
nate, it became evident that the original ob- mission, and immediate preparations were
jectives of some experiments had been ex- made to perform this activity. However, the
panded and required multiple missions. The Gemini VI-A launch was delayed, and
Gemini IV experiment cancellations in- although the capability to photograph the
creased the emphasis on successfully ac- comet was successfully accomplished, the
complishing assigned experiments. Gemini actual launch time prevented the spacecraft
IV also revealed that personnel involved with from being in the correct location for obtain-
the development of a n experiment and with ing photographs of the comet.
a detailed understanding of the objectives The Gemini VI11 mission was prematurely
must participate in real-time mission sup- terminated shortly after docking with the
port so that continuity would not be lost and target vehicle. One onboard experiment pack-
experiment objectives compromised. For the age contained live frog eggs, and much data
Gemini V mission, the Experiments Program could be retrieved if certain onboard oper-
Office increased the support to the crew- ations were conducted within a restrictive
training program, and the Flight Operations time period. Real-time operations proved
organization included the Experiments Pro- successful in relaying information to the
gram Office in the decision-making cycle for crew after the spacecraft had landed in the
the real-time mission planning related to Pacific. Much of the experiment was saved
experiments. by utilizing capabilities and supporting func-
In the final preflight phase of Gemini VII, tions established as a result of knowledge
i t was decided to incorporate equipment and gained from previous experiment missions.
crew procedures on the spacecraft to conduct Late in the Gemini XI1 preflight phase, the
a photographic study of dim-light phe- decision was made to obtain ultraviolet
nomena. Photographic equipment for such photographs of dust entering the Earth’s
a study was not readily available, and it was atmosphere, to record information on an ex-
apparent that the stated objectives were not pected meteor shower as the Earth moved
* compatible with practical crew activity. Im-
through the remains of the tail of a comet,
mediate action was taken to effect compati- and to rendezvous with the shadow of the
bility and the Gemini VI1 crew obtained the Moon a s it moved across the Earth. The
desired data. Gemini XI1 mission had previously been ex-
Experience during Gemini showed that tended from 3 to 4 days to accommodate the
late perturbations to the general flight plan, crew activity schedule. The personnel con-
to onboard equipment, and to crew activity cerned with experiments assured availabil-
should be expected: Since the nature of sci- ity of required equipment onboard the space-
entific investigations varies somewhat with craft, briefed the crew, and programed the
the calendar and with the specific days in mission for the added objectives without
orbit, many of the perturbations are more compromising previous mission planning.
directly related to the experiment-type activ- Subsequently, the launch was postponed
ity than to the basic mission, and have to be until 2 days later than had been planned;
resolved by the personnel concerned with the however, it was decided to accomplish the
experiments program. objectives as previously planned. The imme-
When Gemini VI-A was in the terminal diate and effective response by operational
phases of revised preflight planning for ren- personnel in adjusting the orbital mechanics
dezvous with the Gemini VI1 spacecraft, the displaved precision ; the intricate rendezvous
comet Ikey Seicki was discovered and was with the lunar eclipse was successful.
determined to be moving through the Sun’s No experiment was deleted from a mission
corona. It was decided to attempt to photo- because of flight equipment not being avail-
graph the comet during the Gemini V F A able a t launch time. The capability to sup-
224 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
port the experiments program was developed medical. There were 17 scientific experi-
as necessary to meet expanding support re- ments conducted during the program. The 27
quirements and was possible because of the technological experiments were conducted in
flexible structure of the Manned Spacecraft support of spacecraft development and oper-
Center organizations which allowed the ational techniques. The eight medical experi-
Center to meet the demands of the program. ments were directed toward determining
more subtle effects than might be determined
Scope of Program from the regular operational medical meas-
urements and preflight and postflight exami-
The complement of experiments in the nations.
total Gemini Program numbered 52. In gen-
eral, each experiment was flown several I’rincipal Investigators and Affiliations
times to take advantage of varying flight
conditions and resulted in 111 experiment The Gemini experiments were proposed
missions, an average of 11 experiments per from many sources including universities,
mission. The largest number of experiments, laboratories, hospitals, industry, and various
20, was carried on the 14-day Gemini VI1 Government agencies. Several investigators
mission. were often associated with a single experi-
Table 17-1 summarizes the experiments ment and they, in turn, may have had differ-
conducted during the Gemini Program. The ent affiliations. Table 17-11 presents the
large number of experiments, representing principal investigators for the Gemini ex-
many disciplines, precludes a detailed de- periments a n d their affiliations, together
scription of all experiments in this paper. with the missions for which the experiments
Reference 2 contains a brief description of were assigned.
the equipment and preliminary results of the Subsequent to the selections of the experi-
experiments conducted during the Gemini ments and the principai investigators, a very
111 through VI1 missions. close personal association was maintained
The experiments were divided into three among the experimenter, the spacecraft con-
categories : scientific, technological, and tractor, the crew, the mission planner, and
the real-time operations personnel. Of these,
TABLE
17-1 .-Experiment Program the experimenter-crew relationship was of
particular significance. The following para-
Summary graphs provide some insight into the inte-
gration of the experiments with the many
Total
Number of experiment program elements.
Sponsoring agency , experiments missions
Scientific :
Experiment Equipment Integration
Office of Space Science
and Applications ....... 17 47 The selected experiments were integrated
Technological: into the spacecraft on a minimum interfer-
Office of Advanced ence basis, based on the participation of the
Research and Tech-
......................... flight crew. Three specific examples illus-
1
nology 2 2
Office of Manned Space trate the various categories. The simplest is
Flight, Manned the stowage category ; the equipment is
Spacecraft Center ...... 10 18 stowed in one of several areas or compart-
Department of Defense 15 26
ments, and is unstowed and operated accord-
Medical ................................ -8 -.
18
ing to a preplanned schedule. Examples of
Total ........................ 52 111
this type of equipment include the hand-held
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 225
Scientifie
0 t h of Space Science and
Applications:
Zodiacal light photography.. E. Ney ............................. University of Minnesota ......... V, VIII, IX-A, X
Sea urchin egg growth.......... R. Young .......................... NASA Ames............................ I11
Frog egg growth .................... R. Young ......................... NASA Ames .......................... VIII, XI1
Radiation and zero-g on M. Bender ........................ Atomic Energy Commission ... 111, X I
blood
Synoptic terrain P. Lowman ....................... NASA Goddard IV, V, VI-A, VII,
photography x , XI, XI1
Synoptic weather K. Nagler and S. Soules.. U.S. Weather Bureau IV, V, VI-A, VII,
photography x , XI, XI1
Cloudtop spectrometer........ F. Saiedy.......................... Natl. Environ. Sat. Center v, VI11
Visual acuity .......................... S. Duntley ........................ University of California v , VI1
Nuclear emulsion. ................. M, Shapiro and NRL and NASA Goddard VIII, X I
C. Fichtel
Agena micrometeorite C. Hemenway .................... Dudley Observatory................ VIII, IX-A, X, XI1
collection
Airglow horizon M. xoornen.................. NRL.. ................. IX-A, X I , XI1
photography
Micrometeorite collection. ... C. Hemenway .................. Dudley Observatory I X ~ A x, , XII
Ultraviolet astronomical K. Henize .......................... Dearborn Observatory, x , XI, XI1
camera Northwestern University
Ion wake meamarement ........ D. Medved ....................... Electro-optical Systems, Inc. x , XI
Libration regions E. Morris .......................... U.S. Geological Center XI1
' photographs
Dim sky photographs C. Hemenway .................... Dudley Observatory XI
. orthicon
Daytime sodium cloud Jacques-Emile Blamont.. . Centre Natl. de la Recherche XI1
photography Scientifique
Technological
oface of Advanced Research
and Technology:
Reentry communications...... L. Schroeder ....................... NASA Langley ............. .: . . . . [I1
Manual space navigation D. Smith and B. Creer ..... NASA Ames............................ XI1
sighting
Office of Manned Space Flight:
Electrostatic charge............... P. Laffeity......................... NASA MSC........................... rv, v
hton-electron J. Marbach ........................ NASA MSC ............................. rv, VI1
Spectrometer
Triaxis fluxgate D. Womack ....................... NASA MSC rv, VII, x , XI1
magnetometer
Optical communication......... D. Lilly............................. NASA MSC ......................... VI1
Lunar ultraviolet spectral €2. Stokes............................. NASA MSC ............................. K
reflectance
Beta spectrometer ................. J. Marbach ...................... NASA MSC............................. K, XI1
Bremsstrahlung R. Lindsey......................... NASA MSC ............................... K, XI1
spectrometer
Color patch photography ..... J. Brinkman ...................... NASA MSC ............................... K
L-color Earth's limb M. Petersen .................... Massachusetts Institute of [V
photographs Technology
Landmark contrast C. Manry ........................... NASA MSC .............................. VII. x
measurements
226 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
Department of Defense:
Basic object photography A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB V
Nearby object photography A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB V
Mass determination AFSC Field Office NASA MSC (DOD) VIII, XI
Celestial radiometry A F Cambridge Lab USAF-Hanscom Field v , VI1
Star occultation navigation A F Avionics Lah Wright-Patterson AFB VII, x
Surface photography A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB V
Space object radiometry A F Cambridge Lab USAF-Hanscom Field v , VI1
Radiation in spacecraft A F Wwapons Lab Kirtland AFB IV, VI-A
Simple navigation A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB IV, VI1
Ion-sensing attitude control A F Cambridge Lab USAF-Hanscom Field x , xrr
Astronaut Maneuvering AFSC Field Office NASA MSC IX-A
Unit
Astronaut visibility S. Duntley University of California v , VI1
UHF-VHF polarization NRL N RL VIII, IX-A
Night image intensification Air Development Center U.S. Navy VIII, XI
Power tool evaluation A F Avionics Lab Wright-Patterson AFB VIII, XI
Medieal:
Cardiovascular conditioning L. Dietlein NASA MSC v , VI1
Inflight exerciser R. Rapp NASA MSC IV, v , VI1
Inflight phonocardiogram R. Johnson NASA MSC IV, v , VI1
Bioassays of body fluids H. Lipscomb NASA MSC VII, VIII, IX-A
Bone demineralization P. Mack Texas Woman's University IV, v, VI1
Calcium balance study D. Whedon National Institutes of Health VI I
Inflight sleep analysis P. Kelloway -Baylor Medical School VI1
Human otolith function A. Graybiel U.S. Navy, Naval Aerospacf v , VI1
Medical Institute
cameras used to conduct the zodiacal light, radiometry experiments DO04 and D007.
weather, and terrain photography experi- Figure 17-5 shows an outline of the space-
ments. Figures 17-1 and 17-2 a r e typical ex- craft and the location of the elements of the
amples of stowage. equipment; figure 17-6 depicts the opera-
A second type of integration includes tional mission configuration of Gemini VI1
equipment mounted in the pressurized cabin as viewed from Gemini VI-A.
area during the mission. This is exemplified
by the radiation and zero-g effects on blood
cells experiment (fig. 17-3) and the f r o g egg
growth experiment (fig. 1 7 - 4 ) , both of which
were mounted on the spacecraft hatch.
The most complex type of integration
involves equipment with some o r all of
the following requirements : structurally
mounted ; automatically deployed for taking
measurements ; thermally controlled ; exten-
sive data requirements involving onboard
tape recordings of the measurement and
radiofrequency transmission during the
flight. These requirements a r e typified by the FIGURE17'-l.--Photographic equipment stowage.
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 227
FIGURE
17-2.-Photographic equipment stowage FIGURE
174-Radiation and zero-gravity effects
compartment. on frog-egg growth experinient package.
Environmental control
system module TV
Panel controls,.
Recorder
FIGURE
17-5.-Location of radiometry equipment for Experiments DO04 and DOOi.
FIGURE
17-6.-Operational mission configuration for Prelaunch
Experiments DO04 and D007.
The impact of experiments on the overall
be integrated with the other primary mission mission time line and spacecraft propellants
activities. The experiments generally had a is summarized in tables 17-111 and 17-IV.
variety of requirements which often con- The experiment hardware followed the same
flicted or interacted. The zodiacal light philosophy and supported the identical per-
photography experiment was conducted only formance specifications and spacecraft
during nighttime conditions. The visual checkout schedules as the operational space-
acuity experiment required clear skies and a craft systems and crew-stowed operational
constraining inclination angle above the equipment.
GEMINI EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 229
I
Planned Mission time
Planned total experiment planned for scope of monitoring and approval of environ-
Mission mission time, activity time, experiments,
hrn hrh percent mental testing, and of a more extensive
____--
i
checkout interface involving actual flight
111.................. 0.5 5 hardware in the spacecraft, together with
IV .................... 14; 22 16 additional bench checks.
v .................... 288 49 17
From a practical standpoint, checkout per-
VI-A,. ............ 66 8 12
VI1.................. 392 86 22 formed a t the spacecraft contractor's plant
VI11................ 90 19 21 and a t Kennedy Space Center identified
IX-A. .............
I
90 19 21 engineering problems which could affect
x .................... 90 33 37
hardware design and mission performance.
XI.................. 90 26 29
In these cases, the combined experience of
XII................
1 1377
122 37
299.5
30
22
the experimenter, the Gemini Program
Office, and the spacecraft contractor team
Total.j enabled the experiment to be conducted with
little or no change to.hardware procedures or
mission planning.
I
(50-frame capacity) secured conventional The following representative photographs
color photographs. The red f/0.95 Canon constitute about 2 percent of the total pho-
lens and magazine permitted scientific pho- tographs secured during the Gemini Pro-
tography of very low light-level phenomena gram, and contain information of value in
231
232 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 233
the various geoscientific or aerospace fields. amine the entire collection in order to deter-
The serious geoscientist would have to ex- mine the total value t o his field of interest.
-Name I I
i Mission
FIGURE
18-2.-Film processor.
234 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
FIGURE
18-3.-Nile Delta.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 235
Figure 18-4 shows how the geology controls the course of the Nile
River for some 200 miles in Sudan and the United Arab Republic. The
river hugs the contact zone between the black basaltic intrusives east of
the river and the sedimentary rocks to the west. Much of the area visible
in this Gemini IV photograph will be inundated when the Aswan Dam is
completed and the 400-mile-long Lake Nasser is created in the Sahara.
236 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
Figure 18-5 was taken during Gemini IV from an altitude of 120 miles.
The Ras A1 Hadd area of Muscat and Oman appears in fine detail ; airport
runways can also be seen at the point. Several oases a r e perceptible at the
base of the pediment where ground water reaches the surface. Long seif
dunes a t the eastern extremities of the Rub A1 Kahli (Empty Quarter)
are visible and provide information of meteorologic value.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 237
FIGURE
18-6.--Richat structure.
FIGURE
18-'7.-FIorida Keys.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY
FIGURE
18-8.-Mouth of Colorado River.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 241
FIGURE
1&9.-West Texas.
FIGURE
18-lO.-Nile Delta.
Figure 18-10, showing a major portion of the Nile Delta, was taken
during Gemini V from an altitude of 100 miles. With the 30 million people
in the delta area and L: high population growth rate, rapid regional infor-
mation changes are most important. The photograph shows Cairo with a
population of 0ve.r 5 million; the distribution of cities and towns in the
delta; and the networks of roads, railroads, and canals.
244 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
FIGURE
l%ll.-Strait of Gibraltar.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 245
FIGURE
18-12.-Southwest Africa.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 247
FIGURE
1&13.-China basins.
FIGURE
1&14.-Hunan Province, China.
Figure 18-24 was taken during the Gemini V mission, and shows a
large natural floodway in Hunan Province, China, with the Yangtze River
at left center. The open water of the floodway is Tung 'ting Hu, a lake about
100 miles long. The Hsiang River flows into the lake from the right and
the photograph clearly shows the relationship of the floodway system t o
the surrounding topography.
250 GEM IN1 S U M MARY CONFERENCE
FIGURE
18-16.-Bahama Banks.
taken at the time of minimum snowcover, and indicates that space pho-
tography can provide data on the water runoff from snowfields of remote
and poorly explored mountain ranges.
Oceanographers a r e interested in photographs such as figure 18-16,
a view of the Great Bahama Bank taken from Gemini V. Except for the
small land areas of Great Exuma Island, Cat Island, and Long Island, all
the informational content concerns the floor of the ocean. Along the edge
of the Tongue of Ocean, which is over a mile deep, the canyons cut in the
coral banks are visible. Exuma Sound in the center drops abruptly from
rocks awash to a depth of 8000 feet. Space photography for the first time
affords a n opportunity to photograph large areas of the world’s oceans.
252 GEM IN I SUM MARY CONFERENCE
--- . -_
FIGURE
18-17.-Salton Sea.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 253
FIGURE18-18.-The Sudd.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 255
The area known as the Sudd, Arabic for the barrier or stopper, was
dramatically photographed (fig. 18-18) from the Gemini VI-A spacecraft
at a n altitude of 185 miles. The main feature in t h e photograph is perhaps
the world’s largest swamp; the area is larger than the State of Pennsyl-
vania. The White Nile flows out of the Great Rift Valleys of East Africa
into Sudan and loses over 80 percent of its volume in a tangled mass of
marsh, water hyacinth, and 15-foot papyrus grass. The river loses itself
in many channels which open and close at random, as-floating islands of
papyrus block old and create new channels. Lightning often causes the
grass to catch fire. The hostile terrain of this area has historically separated
the cultures of Arab Africa from Negro Africa. Continued surveillance
from manned spacecraft can provide much information on the river and
the swamp vegetation, and may lead to an eventual triumph by man.
25G G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
FIGURE
18-19.-Western Algeria.
F~cuRn1&2O.-Tifernine Dunes.
continues in the opposite direction down the other side of the ridge termi-
nating in a large salt flat. The photographs of this usually dry country
were made shortly after very heavy rains; the wadi is carrying surface
water and the salt flat is inundated.
Figure 18-20 was obtained with a 250-mm Zeiss Sonnar lens, and
shows the structure of a unique geologic feature, the Tifernine Dunes of
Eastern Algeria. These dunes a r e probably the world’s highest (1500 f e e t ) ,
and a r e trapped in a basin surrounded by mountains of basalt. The remote
area had been poorly photographed prior to the Gemini VI1 mission.
258 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
FIGURE
18-21.--Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 259
FIGURE
1&23.-Peru.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 263
Figure 18-25 was taken by the Gemini XI1 crew along the Texas-
Louisiana Gulf Coast and shows Houston, the Manned Spacecraft Center,
the Harris County Domed Stadium, the Houston Ship Channel, and many
other features of the area. Of greater geoscientific importance, the distri-
bution of very polluted water in Galveston Bay and other waterborne sedi-
ment in such passes as Bolivar Roads, Sabine, and Calcasieu can be clearly
seen. The movement of currents in the Gulf of Mexico is also quite evident,
and has afforded the oceanographer the opportunity to learn a great deal
about the movement and distribution of larval commercial shrimp so
important to area economy. The photograph also demonstrates the poten-
tial uses of space photography in the observation of causes and distribution
of polluted water.
268 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
FIGURE
1&-27.--Southern half of Mexico.
FIGURE
18-28.-Sahara area.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 27 1
FIGURE
1&29.-Nile River.
FIGURE
1&30.-Middle East.
FIGURE18-31.-Arabia-Somali.
FIGURE 1&32.-India.
FIGURE
1&34.-Australia.
Figure 18-34 was taken while the Gemini XI spacecraft was 851 miles
above the Earth, the highest altitude from which any photograph has been
taken by man. The western half of Australia with the sunlit Indian Ocean
beyond is visible. The horizon is nearly 3000 miles to the westward. The
photograph was made near sunset, and ground detail is poor due to low
light levels on the ground.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 277
FIGURE 18-36.--Sunset.
The meteorologist has secured much valuable data from some 2000
Gemini photographs. The unmanned meteorological satellites a r e providing
H great deal of valuable information and have been supplemented with the
finer details and color of the photographs obtained from Gemini. The study
of vortices is of particular importance in that the ultimate vortex may
result in a destructive tornado, hurricane, or typhoon. Figure 18-36 was
taken during the Gemini V mission, and shows the mile-high Mexican
island of Guadalupe (200 miles off Baja California) interrupting the
orderly flow of winds to create a bowed shockwave effect in the clouds to
windward. Two vortices have developed to the lee of the island.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 279
280 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
FIGURE
18-37.-Vortex off Morocco.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 281
Figure 18-37 shows a very well developed vortex which has been
caused by windshear at the coastal prominence of Ras Rhir in Morocco.
The photograph clearly shows the eye of the vortex and the rotational
effects on the periphery. This Gemini V photograph has become a classic
example of the meteorological data which can be obtained from manned
space-flight photography. It would be difficult to provide a machine with
the ability to select and photograph phenomena of greatest value to the
scientist.
282 GEM IN1 S U M MARY CONFERENCE
F X ~ U1&38.-Typhoon
R~ in Pacific Ocean.
A large mature typhoon moving across the central Pacific Ocean was
photographed (fig. 18-38) by the Gemini V crew. The diameter of the
system was approximately 400 miles and the circular motion can be dis-
tinguished in the photograph.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 283
Near-Object Photography
FIGURE
18-J9.-First extravehicular activity.
284 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE
Even though the Gemini VI11 mission was terminated early due to a
thruster malfunction, the aerospace engineering field has greatly benefited
from the motion-picture and still photographic documentation of the first
rendezvous and docking of a spacecraft with a target vehicle. In figure
18-41, the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle is approximately 50 feet from
the spacecraft. This photograph was taken just prior to the docking ma-
neuver and is one of a stereo pair which permits precise distance measure-
ments. The motion-picture footage of the difficulties encountered at the
time of undocking clearly illustrates the seriousness of the situation.
286 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
FIGURE
18-42.-Augmentod Target Docking Adapter.
Figure 18-42 shows the Augmented Target Docking Adapter during
one of three rendezvous accomplished by the Gemini IX-A crew. Docking
could not be accomplished because the ascent shroud covering the docking
adapter did not deploy after the vehicle was placed in orbit. The Gemini
IX-A crew maneuvered the spacecraft to within inches of the Augmented
Target Do :ig Adapter and secured 109 excellent photographs .of the
rendezvous ,nd station-keeping activities. The ablative effect of launch
heat on the shroud was photographed for the first time.
SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY 287
FIGURE
18-43.-Gemini X Primary Propulsion System firing.
FIGURE
lW.-Tethered target vehicle.
FIGURE
18-45.-Extravehicular activity.
Concluding Remarks
- .- .
.z
.,- -.
FIGURE
1%46.-Moon.
19. SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY
By JOCELYN R. GILL, Ofice of Space Science and Applications, N A S A ; and WILLIS B. FOSTER,Director,
Manned Flight Experiments, Ofice of Space Science and Applications, NASA
Number Title
Principal
investigator
____
Affiliation .
...... Zodiacal Light and Airglow Photography E. P. Ney ..............: University of Minnesota
~~ ~ ~~
so01
so02 ......, Sea-Urchin E g g Growth Under Zero-G .... R. S. Young ............ NASA Ames
SO03 ....... F r o g E g g Growth Under Zero-G ................ R. S. Young ............ NASA Ames
S004' ....... Synergistic Effect of Zero-G and M. A. Bender ........ Atomic Energy Commission, Oak
Radiation on White Blood Cells. Ridge National Laboratory.
SO06 ....... Synoptic Terrain Photography .......... P. D. Lowman ........ NASA Goddard
SO06 ....... Synoptic Weather Photography .................. K. Nagleq ................ U.S. Weather Bureau
SO07 ....... Spectrophotography of Clouds .......... F. Saiedy ................ U.S. Weather Bureau and Uni-
versity of Maryland.
SO08 ....... Visual Acuity in the Space Environ- S. Q. Duntley ........ University of California, Scripps
ment. Institute.
so09 ....... Nuclear Emulsions ........................................ M. M. Shapiro and Naval Research Laboratory and
C. Fichtel. NASA Goddard
so10 ....... Agena Micrometeorite Collection ................ C. Hemenway ........ Dudley Observatory
so11 ....... Airglow Horizon Photography .................. M. J. Koomen ........
Naval Research Laboratory
so12 ....... Gemini Micrometeorite Collection .............. C. Hemenway ........ Dudley Observatory
SO13 ....... Ultraviolet Astronomical Photography ....
IC. G. Henize ..........
Dearborn Observatory
SO26 ....... Gemini Ion Wake Measurement ..................
D. Medved ..............
Electro-Optical Systems
S028' ....... Dim Light Photography ..............................L. Dunkelman ........
NASA Goddard
SO29 ....... Libration Regions Photography ................ E. Morris ................ U.S. Geological Survey
SO30 ....... Dim Sky Photography/Orthicon ................ E. P. Ney and University of Minnesota and
C. Hemenway. Dudley Observatory.
SO61 ....... Sodium Cloud Photography ........................ J. Blamont ............
Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique.
S064' ....... Ultraviolet Dust Photography .......... C. Hemenway ........,I
Dudley Observatory
1
291
292 GEM I N I SUMMARY CONFERENCE
prised of investigations in the fields of performed on the Gemini IV, V, VI-A, VII,
astronomy, biology, geology, meteorology, IX-A, X, XI, and XI1 missions; numerous
and physics. Over half of the experiments useful pictures were also taken during Gem-
were photographic in technique, indicating ini 111. Approximately 1400 color pictures
that the investigators wished to take advan- were obtained, and a r e usable for geology,
tage of the flight crew being available to geography, or oceanography.
guide and select the targets and to return the One of the most useful photographs (fig.
film for permanent record. A photograph 19-1), taken by the Gemini IV flight crew,
frequently clarified data which otherwise shows an area about 80 miles wide of north-
were ambiguous. e r n Baja California, Mexico. The geologic
Table 19-11 shows the flight assignments structure of this mountainous region is shown
of the science experiments and indicates t h a t with remarkable clarity. For example, the .
they were concentrated in the last half of the Agua Blanca fault is visible as the series of
Gemini Program. There were 16 experi- alined valleys at lower left in the photograph,
ments with a total of 34 flight assignments parallel t o the frame of the spacecraft win-
in the last five Gemini missions. dow. Numerous other faults, similarly ex-
pressed, a r e visible north of the Agua Blanca
Terrain and Weather Photography Experiments
fault. The great need for more geologic in-
Experiment SOOfi, Synoptic Terrain Pho- formation of this area is suggested by the
tography.-Experiment S005, Synoptic Ter- fact t h a t the Agua Blanca fault, one of the
rain Photography, was devoted to a study most prominent geologic structures in Baja
of the Earth terrain, and was successfully California, was not discovered until 1956.
so01................................
-
........... + 4
so02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ........ 1
.......... ......... 2
SO04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + ....... ......... 2
SO05............................ + + + 7
SO06 ............................ + + + 7
SO07................................ .......... + 2
SO08.............................. ........... + 2
so09 .................................. ........... .......... 2
so10............................. ......... .......... 4
so11........................... .......... ........ 3
so12 ........................... ......... ...... 3
SO13.................................. ......... ......... .3
SO26................................. ......... .......... .................................... + + i ..............i 2
+ +
-i
SO28................................ ....... ....... ............................................................. 2
SO29 .................................. ....... ........... ................................................................ 1
SO30............................. ....... ......... ............................................ + .............. 1
SO51 ................................ .......... ...... ........................................................ - 1
so64 .................................... ........... .......... ............................................................ - 1
One of the photographs (fig. 19-2) taken Another Gemini XI1 photograph (fig.
on Gemini XI1 appears to have considerable 19-3) demonstrates the potential value of
potential value in the study of continental orbital photography in studies of recent sedi-
drift. Proponents of this theory consider t h a t mentation. The portion of the Gulf of Mexico
the Red Sea, which structurally is a large shown in the photograph has been exten-
graben o r down-dropped block, represents sively studied: and, when used in conjunc-
incipient continental drift: that is, the tion with the other photographs from space,
Arabian Peninsula is considered to be drift- may provide a n extremely useful standard
ing away from Africa and rotating. The pho- area for interpretation of similar pictures
tograph may provide new evidence on this of other near-shore areas.
possibility by providing a synoptic view of Expei-iment SOOG, Synoptic WeatheT Pho-
the regional geology. tography.-Figure 19-4 is a photograph
294 GEM IN1 SUM MARY CONFERENCE
l&2.-Arabian
FIGURE Peninsula and the Red Sea.
FIGUBE
1 9 - 3 . 4 u l f of Mexico.
arranged in polygon-shaped, .open cells. Sev- relatively cool air passes over warmer water.
era1 are hexagonal with taller cumulus Air is tending to sink within the cell and to
clouds where the cell corners touch. The pat- rise near the borders where the cumulus
terns illustrate a mesoscale cellular convec- clouds have formed. These open cells would
tion system that normally develops when be undetected by a standard satellite televi-
FIGURE 19-4.-Camaguey Province, Cuba.
sion picture because the cell walls are too India and into the Bay of Bengal where a lixc
thin, and the diameter is very small (ref. 8). of convective clouds has formed several hun-
The photograph of southern India and Gey- dred miles offshore. The reason for the clear
Ion (fig. 19-5) was taken by the Gemini XI region is not entirely understood, but two
crew on September 14, 1966, with a super- possibilities have been suggested. First, the
wide-angle lens attached to a 70-mm still lack of clouds may be the result of drier air
camera. A clear zone, nearly free of clouds, subsiding offshore which would have t h e ten-
and varying from 30 t o 50 miles in width, dency to suppress any cloud development.
extends along the west coast of India. The The sea breeze, or low-level winds which
zone continues around the southern tip of move the air toward land, may have caused
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 297
the a i r to descend in the clear region. Second, ture may have been sufficiently low to inhibit
there may have been cold water welYng up the development of cumulus clouds. A surface
along the coast. Surface winds in India a r e temperature change of about lL' may be
northwesterly along the west coast and enough to accomplish this. Southwest winds
southwesterly along the east coast. The north- prevail to the east of India, and the Coriolis
west winds will transport the surface water force would act to transport the surface wa-
southeastward ; however, the Coriolis force ter in a n easterly direction. Again, this would
will tend to deflect the water toward the produce a favorable condition for water t o
southwest and away from the land. This well up near the coast. Measurements of sea-
would permit the welling up of cooler water water temperatures from ships a r e scarce,
along the coastline ; also, the water tempera- but the few available reports indicate t h a t
298 GEM IN 1 SU M MARY CONFERENCE
the coastal waters were 1"or 2" cooler than analysis within 24 hours ; therefore, refrig-
sea-water temperatures farther west in the eration was not required.
Arabian Sea. 'An identical experimental package was
Experiment S007, Spectrophotography of established as a control in a laboratory at
Clouds.-The objective of Experiment S007, Cape Kennedy. It was activated simultane-
Spectrophotography of Clouds, was to meas- ously with the package in the spacecraft and
ure cloud-top altitudes. The experiment was was maintained under similar temperature
first flown during Gemini V, and was also conditions. Air-to-ground communications
scheduled for Gemini VIII, Because of the from the flight crew verified that the experi-
early termination of the Gemini VI11 flight, ment was proceeding through the various
however, the experiment could not be accom- stages exactly as planned.
plished. As a result, the National Environ- The experiment was successfully con-
mental Satellite Center has designed a sec- ducted on the Gemini XI mission. The leuko-
ond-generation weather satellite that can cyte-chromosome analysis of the blood
measure cloud-top altitude and cloud thick- showed no increase in the chromosome-de-
ness. letion frequency in the flight samples over
Experiment ,9051, Sodium Cloud Photog- the ground control samples. The result does
mphy.-Experiment S051, Sodium Vapor not confirm the preliminary results found
Cloud, was flown on Gemini XII. The purpose on Gemini 111. Preliminary results from the
of the experiment was to measure the day- neurospora portion of the experiment carried
time wind-velocity vector of the high at- on Gemini XI indicate no increase in the fre-
mosphere as a function of altitude between quency of mutations in the flight samples.
62 and 93 miles. The measurements were to This part of the experiment analysis will
be obtained from the deformation of a require more time, but there now appears to
rocket-made vertical sodium cloud. During be no observable synergism between radia-
the Gemini XI1 mission, two rockets were tion and space flight on white blood cells.
launched from Algeria. Although the second Experiment SOOS, Frog Egg Growth Under
launching was easily visible from the ground, Zero-g.-The objectives of Experiment S003,
the sodium release was not seen by the flight FYog Egg Growth Under Zero-g, were to
crew. Even though they did not have visual determine the effect of weightlessness on the
sighting, the pilots photographed the region ability of the fertilized frog egg to divide
of the firing using a 70-mm still camera with normally, and to differentiate and form a
a wide-angle lens. Unfortunately, shutter normal embryo. The experiment was per-
difficulties with the camera spoiled the ex- formed in one package mounted on the right
posed film. The experiment will be resched- hatch in the spacecraft. The package had
uled for the Apollo Program. four chambers containing frog eggs in wa-
ter with a partitioned section containing a
Biological Experiments fixative. Handles were provided on the out-
side of the package so the flight crew could
Experiment S004, Synergistic Efects of activate the experiment.
Radiation and Zero-g on Blood and Neuro- During Gemini VIII,early cleavage stages
spora.-Experiment S004, Synergistic Effect were successfully obtained ; however, the
of Zero-g on White Blood Cells, was first car- short duration of the flight did not permit
ried during Gemini 111, and was continued formation of the later cleavage and develop-
on Gemini XI with the addition of neuro- mental stages. During Gemini XII, the ex-
spora. A refrigeration unit was added to pre- periment was completely successful from a
serve the blood during the 4-day mission of mechanical standpoint, and later embryonic
Gemini XI. Gemini I11 was a three-orbit stages were obtained. The 10 embryos in the
flight, and the blood could be recovered for fixation chambers appeared to be morpho-
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 299
logically normal. The five embryos which The photograph clearly distinguishes the
were unfixed were live, swimming tadpoles cone-shaped zodiacal light from the narrow
when the chamber was opened on board the airglow layer visible just above the moonlit
recovery ship. Three of the embryos were Earth. Heretofore, only a n artist’s drawing
morphologically normal ; two were abnormal has been able t o represent the zodiacal light
(twinning). The abnormalities, however, a s i t would appear to a ground observer with-
were not inconsistent with the controls, and out the visual distractions of city lights, air-
no abnormalities can be ascribed to the flight glow, and faint sources of celestial light.
a t this time. The five surviving tadpoles died Experiment SO1 1, Airglow Horizon Pho-
several hours after recovery, and were fixed tography.-Experiment SOll, Airglow Hori-
for histological sectioning. The reason for zon Photography, was conducted during
death has not yet been ascertained : however, Gemini XI and XI1 a s well as Gemini IX-A.
all the eggs will be sectioned for histological The crews used the 70-mm general-purpose
study to determine more conclusive results. still camera in the f/0.95 configuration to
photograph the night airglow layer with the
Visual Acuity Experiment Earth’s limb. The camera was mounted so
that exposures of 2 to 50 seconds could be
Experiment 5’008, Visual Acuity.-The
obtained through the right hatch window.
ability of the flight crew to visually detect
The objective was to obtain worldwide meas-
and recognize objects on the surface of the
urements of airglow altitude and intensity.
E a r t h was tested during Gemini V and VI1
The camera filter system registered the
in Experiment S008,.Visual Acuity. Data
spectral regions of 5577 angstroms (oxygen
from .an inflight vision tester used during
green) and 5893 angstroms (sodium yellow)
these flights showed no change in the visual
side by side but separated by a vertical divid-
performance of the crews. Results from the
ing line. Filter bandwidths were 270 and 380
flight-crew observations of the ground’ site
angstroms, respectively. In figure 19-8, a n
(fig. 19-6) near Laredo, Tex., confirm that
example of the split-field photography taken
visual performance during space flight was
during Gemini IX-A is shown. This is a 5-
within the statistical range of the preflight
visual performance, and t h a t there was no second exposure looking west. The corre-
sponding s t a r field is shown in figure 19-9,
degradation of the visual perception during
and the bright stars Procyon and Sirius a r e
space flight.
visible in the airglow layer. The pictures a r e
Astronomical Photography Experiments being analyzed for possible height variations
in the two layers.
Experiment S O O l , Zodiacal Light and Air- During Gemini XI, an additional 6300-
glow Photography.-A series of excellent angstrom (red) filter with a bandwidth of
photographs for Experiment SOO1, Zodiacal 150 angstroms was provided to obtain pho-
Light Photography, was obtained during the tographs in a higher orbit ; however, no pho-
Gemini IX-A flight. A photograph of the tographs were obtained because of a camera
zodiacal light and the planet Venus is shown malfunction. On Gemini XII, the split-field
in figure 19-7. The apparent curvature of the filter was removed, and the entire field was
airglow layer is due to the nature of the lens. exposed with 40-angstrom-wide filters in
The presence of Venus points out that the alternate green and yellow bands. The 6300-
zodiacal light lies in the ecliptic plane. After angstrom filter was not used during Gemini
sunset, a ground observer can see the zodia- XI1 because a high-altitude orbit could not
cal light. However, he must wait for twilight be achieved. Much more work remains on
in order to see the dim-sky phenomena ; even airglow research, but the results obtained
then the view is never free of the airglow, from Experiment SOll have demonstrated
and not often of the glare from city lights. several useful lines of approach.
300 GEMINI SUM MARY CONFERENCE
FIGURE19-6.-Experiment SO08 visual acuity ground pattern near Laredo, Tex. The inset area is an
aerial photograph of the ground pattern.
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 301
Hydra
I
---
After approximately 4 months in orbit, the reenter the Earth’s atmosphere before the
package was recovered by the Gemini X package can be recovered.
flight crew. Optical scanning a t the Dudley Experiwteirt Sol’, Gemini Micmmeteopite
Observatory of the four stainless-steel slides Collection.-The package for Experiment
on the outside of the box (protected from S012, Gemini Micrometeorite Collection, was
launch) have revealed at least four craters successfully recovered from the Gemini IX-A
larger than 4 microns; these appear to be spacecraft adapter section after a n exposure
hyperballistic. Figure 19-11 shows one cra- of over 16 hours. For comparison, another
ter which has a diameter of 200 microns, a package was exposed for 6 hours during the
depth of 35 microns, and a lip height of 25 Gemini XI1 flight (fig. 19-12). This experi-
microns. This crater has been named Crater
Schweickart for the astronaut who suggested
that there be a n outside collection area on
the micrometeorite package on which micro-
meteorites could impact, even though the
pilot did not open the package during extra-
vehicular activity. The Dudley Observatory
has installed a stereoscan electron microscope
which will permit scanning the surface in
the original form, thus minimizing sample
contamination. Results of this work a r e not
yet known.
During the Gemini XI1 mission, the extra-
vehicular pilot opened the package on the
Gemini XI1 target vehicle and exposed the
sensitive collection plates to the space en-
vironment. The package was intended to be
retrieved during some future mission ; how-
ever, it is expected t h a t the target vehicle will FIGURE19-ll.-Micrometeorite impact crater.
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY :303
FIGURE
19-13.-Grating ultraviolet spectrum of Sirius.
- -
Canopus
zeroorder -
I
/ --
Target'\
/' vehicle \\
1----_
- . / shadow
Elalmer
limit
limb
FIGURE
19-14.-Grating ultraviolet spectrum of Canopus.
the solar-type star Canopus, was obtained were obtained. The prism resulted in a lower
from Experiment S013, Gemini XI, frame dispersion, but provided significant informa-
98, Dearborn Observatory, Northwestern tion on a large number of stars. The photo-
University. This spectrum was especially use- graphs recorded stars of fainter magnitude
ful for calibration purposes when compared than was anticipated, and there wilI be work
with the solar spectra obtained from rockets. to be done on the ultraviolet energy curves
In addition to the two remarkable grating for many months as a result of the photo-
spectrograms, several prism spectrograms graphs. Figure 19-15 is a reproduction of a
SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 305
Concluding Remarks
References
In troduetion Information
coordination
The DOD/NASA Gemini Experiments
Program consisted of 15 experiments, spon-
sored by several development agencies of the
Department of Defense. Experiments were
I Management 4I $%$
program
i
I
Management 1
selected which could be accomplished with
minimum effect on the Gemini Program, and
which would contribute to the solution of the DOD experience Experiment
evaluation of space technical development i n manned management
problems of interest to DOD. Participation in space flight experience
I
the experiments program provided a means Established Estakshed
DODRJASA organizational
for DOD elements to acquire data and opera- procedures and personnel
tions experience for evaluation of the ability relationships
of man to accomplish missions in space, and Technical results
provided a mechanism for the timely flow of
manned space-flight development informa- FIGURE20-1.-DOD/NASA Gemini experiments
program results.
tion between NASA and DOD.
of information significant to DOD programs ; ness can be developed only through day-to-
and provided personnel and organizational day contact with the management personnel
rapport which expedited YASA/DOD sup- HCC, vplishing the basic program.
port. The established relationships have been ‘i ,e experimenter must emphasize the sup-
most beneficial in liaison with the Apollo and port of flight-crew training. The crew must
Apollo Applications Programs. represent the experimenter at a crucial point
in what is normally a n advanced experimen-
Experiment Management Information tal process ; therefore, the crew must possess
The program has developed some specific maximum understanding of experimental ob-
conclusions related to management of experi- jectives and procedures. Training simi1!Ltions
ments conducted as secondary objectives of a using equipment identical to fi.ight hardware
basic program. Although the following con- are highly desirable. Direct contact between
clusions a r e of secondary importance as ex- the experimenter and the crew during experi-
periment program results, they a r e con- ment training is essential.
sidered significant for future management Careful consideration should be given t o
planning. scheduling the secondary experiments which
Each experiment should be scheduled on at require a large amount of crew operational
.least two flights. The probability of success- time. Because such experiments have a
ful attainment of experiment objectives on a greater probability of being affected by pri-
single attempt is too low to risk high experi- mary program contingencies, they have a
ment development cost. Because experi- lesser probability of success.
ments were considered as secondary mission Technical Results
objectives, successful experiments were
highly dependent on the accomplishment of Program technical results were good. Of
primary mission objectives. Occasions of the 15 programed experiments, 11 were suc-
higher-than-nominal fuel usage, of reduced cessfully completed (table 20-1). The four
electrical power, and of other mission prob- remaining experiments were carried on Gem-
lems resulted in the curtailment of experi- ini missions, but flight tests were not com-
ment activities and the inability to obtain pleted. Although flight test objectives of these
experiment objectives. A second experiment four experiments were not completely at-
flight was essential to success in these cases. tained, valuable data and experience were
The experiment interface with the space- acquired during experiment development.
craft should be minimized. A simplified inter- Experiments .DOOl, D002,and 0006,Basic
face will generally result in higher reliability, Object, Nearby Object, and Surface Photog-
in lower integration cost, in greater opera- ruph?j.-Photography accomplished during
tional flexibility, and in reduced effect of Project Mercury was oriented to broad
basic spacecraft hardware change. area of coverage with no specific pointing or
Colocation of the experiment manager with tracking requirements. Experiments D001,
the agency accomplishing the basic program D002, and DO06 were designed to investigate
management provides a significant advantage the ability of man to acquire, track, and
f o r all experiments, and is essential f o r those photograph objects in space and on the
experiments which have complex interfaces ground on a preplanned basis using photo-
with the basic program. Experiments a r e graphic equipment with a small field of view.
developed concurrently and interact with the Acquisition of preplanned photographs of the
basic program development, and the experi- Moon, planets, and points on the surface of
ment managers must develop detailed aware- the E a r t h clearly demonstrated the capa-
ness of basic program effects and constraints bility. The photograph of Love Field, Dallas,
to efficiently integrate the experiments. In Tex. (fig. 20-2), is representative of the data
dynamic development programs, this aware- acquired.
DOD/NASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 309
V Complete
V Incomplete
VIII, X I Complete
v , VI1 Complete
VII, X Complete
V Complete
v , VI1 Complete
IV, VI-A Complete
IV, VI1 Complete
x , XI1 Complete
DO12 Astronaut Maneuvering Unit IX-A Incomplete
DO13 Astronaut Visibility v, VI1 Complete
DO14 UHF/VHF Polarization Measurements VIII, IX-A Incomplete
DO15 Night Image Intensification VIII, X I Complete
DO16 Power Tool Evaluatian VIII, X I Incomplete
I
310 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
VI
‘t
i I
I
I
6 I
based upon data displayed by the spacecraft 2 ,’ I
4 : I
Manual Data Insertion Unit and the event / I
timer, and recorded by the flight crew. In 3 I ,: I
both cases, spacecraft t h r u s t was determined I+--Start
p’
timing
II
2
from a calibration firing of the spacecraft I (54:37:30.327) I
I I
propulsion system with the spacecraft and 1. I I
0 I I
target vehicle undocked. Resulting spacecraft ob1 1 1 ’ I I I I 1 I I 1
thrust F,. was computed from :28 :M 32 34 :36 :3a :oo A2 44
54:37:26 54:3746
Fr=-MoaV Ground elapsed time, hr:min:sec
At
where FIGURE2 0 - 3 . 4 a l i b r a t i o n maneuver. Experiment
Mo=mass of spacecraft, slugs D003,Mass Determination, telemetry method.
AV-measured incremental velocity, ft/sec
At =measured thrusting time interval, sec
I ,A
Data from the calibration and mass-determi- I ,,’ I
I I
nation firings for each method investigated I ,/” I
a r e shown in figures 20-3 and 20-4, and in U
lo[0 L@. I
table 20-11. Using these data, the mass of the * I I
4
* I I
target vehicle was computed from I I
I
I
. Depress Istop timing1
computer 11559.743d
where
START button 1 Thrusters I
(15555A7.243)-----1 Ofl---j
I I
MA,-target-vehicle mass, slugs
F,.-maneuvering thrust of the space- :M 34 :% A2 :50 :50 :58
1555536 l:%N
craft, Ib
Ground elapsed time, hr:min:sec
A t -measured thrusting time interval, sec
AV =measured incremental velocity, f t i s e c FIGUREIM.--Experiment D003,mass determina-
MG,-spacecraft mass, slugs tion maneuver, telemetry method.
DODINASA GEMINI EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY 311
Comparison with target-vehicle mass as com- and VI. Discrete measurements were made
puted from launch weight and known expend- on 72 subjects such as the following:
ables indicated a variation in results of 4.9
percent for the Telemetry Method and 7.6 (1) Gemini VI-A space- (9) Horizon-to-Earth
craft thruster nadir calibration
percent for the Astronaut Method (table plume (10) Large ground fire
20-111). (2) Rendezvous Evalua- (11) Night and day,
Experiment 0004/0007, Celestial Radi- tion Pod land and water
ometmj/Space Object Radiometry.-Experi- (3) Gemini Launch Ve- subjects
ment D004/D007 was conducted during the hicle second stage (12) Sunlit cloudtops
Gemini V and VI1 missions. The spacecraft ( 4 ) Moon (13) Moonlit cloudtops
carried two interferometer spectrometers (5) S t a r s (14) Lightning
and a multichannel spectroradiometer f o r ( 6 ) Sky background (15) Missile-powered
measurements of selected sources in the ( 7 ) Space void flight
bands indicated in figure 20-5. Equipment ( 8 ) Star-to-horizon cali-
characteristics are shown in tables 20-IV, V, bration
I I -
Telemetry ........................... 7268 6912 I -356 4 . 9
Astronaut ........................... I 7268 7820 552 7.6
I I I V I I I I I
i
5
Ultraviolet Infrared Radio
X-rays i
light light waves
b
0.39- I -0.76
I I I e l I I I 1 I
Wavelength i n microns
Radiometer, Gemini !
llI PMT PBS
U U
0.2 to 0.35 r 1to3r
FIGURE
SO-fi.--Experiment D004/D007equipment coverage.
312 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
Weight, Ib
Power input, watts
Field of view, deg
Optics, in. Cassegrain
Photomultiplier tube
Detectors, Gemini V UP 28) Lead sulfide Bolometer
Spectral band, p
1 0.2-0.35 1.0-3.0
Nominal filter width, p 0.03 0.1 .
Filters used, p .2200 1.053
.2400 1.242
.2500 1.380
.2600 1.555
.2800 1.870
.2811 1.900
2862 2.200
.3000 2.725
.3060 2.775
The measurements on items ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 5 ) , eter developed and tested during this experi-
( 7 ) , and (8) were accomplished with the ment is available for future applications.
cryogenic-neon-cooled spectrometer which
was successfully used in orbit for the first
time during this experiment. New informa-
tion was obtained on the development and the
use of cryogenically cooled sensor systems for
space application. Included in the experiment
results were the first infrared measurements
of a satellite made by a manned spacecraft
outside the atmosphere (fig. 20-6). The ex-
A
1
periment demonstrated the advantages of
using manned systems to obtain basic data
with the crew contributing identification and I I I I I I
choice of target ; choice of equipment mode ; 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
ability to track selectively ; and augmenting, Elapsed time, sec .
validating, and correlating data through on-
20-'7.-Experiment D005,Gemini X.
FIGURE
the-spot voice comments. Measurement of Vega occultation.
Integrated dose
'"E Portable dosimeter
--- Fixed dosimeter
per anomaly
revolution,
Mission Revolution mrad
1 I I I I I
Gemini VI-A .... 6 1.0 0 20 40 60 80 100
6 6.0 (6934 Q. e; t 1 ElaDsed time. min
7 5.5 1.5 1.1 1.0 11251.75 .1.75 1.251.0 1.25
I l l I I t I I I I I (
8 2.6 1.751.25 1.0 1.11.5 2.00 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.5
9 1.5 L. earth radii
'
I
Inclination, deg
I
i Right ascension of
, ascending node, deg
F 10
-W
sir A -
// \\ Ion sensor /'
I
Star set u
.E -10-
I
~
no.
1 Ground
track Sextant
i Ground
' track
I
I
, Sextant 2
-20
spacecraft position computed from radar FIGURE20-ll.-Comparison of ion sensor and iner-
tracking data. A flight-qualified sextant is tial system pitch-angle measurement, Gemini X.
available for future operational use.
Experiment DO1 0, Ion-Sensing Attitude E.rperiment 0 0 1 2 , Astronaut ManeuveTiny
Control.-Experiment DO10 developed and Unit.-Experiment DO12 was not completed
tested equipment which used specially due to the inability to accomplish the planned
adapted ion sensors to indicate spacecraft flight tests on Gemini IX-A and XII. The
yaw and pitch angles relative to the flight Astronaut Maneuvering Unit was carried in
path. The flight crew confirmed that the sys- the Gemini IX-A spacecraft, but flight test-
tem provided an excellent indication of atti- ing was terminated prior to separation of
tude. Data from the ion sensors a r e compared the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit when visor
with data from the Gemini X spacecraft iner- fogging obstructed the Sision of the extra-
tial sensor in figures 20-10 and 20-11. The vehicular pilot. Preparation of the Astronaut
system has excellent possibilities for future Maneuvering Unit for donning demonstrated
attitude indication/control applications. for the first time that extravehicular work
tasks of significant magnitude could be ac-
complished, and that adequate astronaut re-
strain t provisions were required to maintain
the workload within acceptable levels. Extra-
vehicular activity evaluation through Gemini
XI indicated that progress of extravehicular
activity development was less than desired.
Therefore, the final Gemini XI1 extravehicu-
lar activity was devoted to investigation of
basic extravehicular activity tasks rather
- inertial sensor
than to testing of the Astronaut Maneuvering
Unit. Although flight tests were not com-
pleted, the experience and data acquired dur-
-201
0
I I I I I
1 M ) 2 0 0 # ) 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 1 M
I I I I ' ing design fabrication, testing, and training
(64.a
g. e. 1.1 will be valuable in the planning and future
Elapsed time, sec development of personal extravehicular ma-
FIGURE2O-l0.-Comparison of ion sensor and iner- neuvering units. The Astronaut Maneuver-
tial system yaw-angle measurements, Gemini X. ing Unit, the Gemini space suit, and the
316 GEMINI SUNMARY CONFERENCE
321
Preceding page blank
322 GEMINI SUMMARY CONFERENCE
FIGURE
Zl-l.-Cutaway view of the Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator.
FIGURE
21-3.-Gemini Mission Simulator console
FIGURE
21-2.--Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator. area.
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT AND SIMULATION EXPERIENCES 322
u 4 ---Gemini l U - A Mission
Simulator data
FIGURE
21-4.-Gemini Mission Simulator crew FIGURE81-'i.-Dynaniic pressure and Mach number.
station.
-G e m i n i m - A flight data
-- Gemini I l l - A Mission Simulator data
begin number I pitch program
I-- Begin number 2 pitch program II---BECO SECO---H
Spacecraft separation'
.
- GeminiPI,-A flight data
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
-- G e m i n i Y l - A Mission Time from lift-oti. sec
Simulator data
FIGURE
2l-d.-Coniparison of longitudinal
acceleration.
40 80 120 I@ 200 240 280 3M 360 400
Time from lift-off. sec
One simulation problem that continually
FIGURE
21-5.-Time history of altitude and range recurred tltii*ingthe e:ii*Iy phases of the Gem-
during launch phase. ini Progi-mi was that o f providing guitlance
ant1 control functions thzit were accurate and
- Gemini n - A flight data repeatable. The Gemini 111 creiv received a
G e m i n i n - A Mission Simulator data reentry simulation that appi*o;ic.hetl the tiight
I
BECO
computer outputs only 2 weeks prior to
flirht. This situation slo\vly inil)rovetl and
the Ceniini 1'1 ci*ew received ;icc.ui*atelaunch
and reentry t h t a :ipprosimately 1 month
\ / velocitv
pi-ior to tliaht. The Geniiiii 1'111 and subse-
quent crews were provided with accui'ate
guichnce and naviration simulatiolis f o r the
entire tixining period.
I I I I I I I I I 1
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 Rendezvous
Time from lift-off, sec
Hybrid Simulator a t the spacecraft contrac- which provided a satisfactory inertial ref-
tor facility. The simulator contained the erence for this phase of training. Accurate
flight controls and displays of the spacecraft data on attitude and maneuver fuel were ob-
Guidance and Control System and of the Pro- tained, and indicated a close correlation with
pulsion System, with a mockup for the re- the inflight data.
mainder of the cockpit (figs. 21-9 and The training progressed to the Gemini
21-10). Procedures for normal, backup, arid Mission Simulator at the Kennedy Space
failure modes were developed during the Center where the total spacecraft configura-
early part of the training period. The crews tion was available. The runs were conducted
performed this phase of rendezvous training first in a shirt-sleeve environment and later
in a shirt-sleeve environment. Various in- progressed to the suited condition. Approxi-
structors were able t o stand alongside the mately 20 percent of the simulator runs dur-
simulator to observe and make comments ing the later phase of rendezvous training
during the run. The Hybrid Simulator visual were conducted with the crew wearing train-
disnlnv had n ranrlnm stnr-field harkvroiind ing suits and then flight suits. The rendez-
vous phases of the flight plans were also re-
fined during the runs. The third orbit
( M = 3 ) and the first orbit (M=l) rendez-
vous missions required that considerable ef-
fort be expended in practicing unstowage of
gear, and in cockpit configuration manage-
ment. This was a significant item in obtain-
ing a smooth work flow during a time-critical
period.
After the predicted launch date and time
were determined, the simulator optical sys-
tem was programed to provide the precise
star and constellation field. The d a y h i g h t
cycle was also included in this part of the
program. Flight experience indicated that the
visual simulations were extremely accurate
FIGURE
21-9.-Exterior view of Hybrid Simulator. with respect to the celestial field, but some-
what lacking with respect to the magnitude
and sharpness of the acquisition lights on the
Gemini Agena Target Vehicle. Starting with
the Gemini VI-A mission, the Gemini Mis-
sion Simulator and the Mission Control
Center were integrated for rendezvous net-
work simulations ; however, not until the
Gemini I X simulations could a satisfac-
tory rendezvous be achieved on a target gen-
erated by the Mission Control Center. While
wearing space suits, the flight crew per-
formed all of the network rendezvous simula-
tions and unstowed equipment in the same
manner as they would in flight. To facilitate
the rendezvous phase of the mission, the in-
formation obtained from the network ren-
FIGURE
fLl-lO.-Hybrid Simulator crew station. dezvous simulations frequently resulted in
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT AND SIMULATION EXPERIENCES 325
4
p
x 25.6
-
.-
p1
pa[ ~
6 100 Altitud
Space-f i x e d
I I
--Initiate phase-
I
adjust maneuver
I I 1
Transfer initiation
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini.Mission Simulator
Flight
First correction
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini Mission Simulator
Flight 111llllli
Second correction
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini Mission Simulator
Flight
Terminal phase
Hybrid Simulator
Gemini Mission Simulator
Flight
L I I 1 I I I I I I
0 10 20 3 0 4 0 50 60 70 80 90 100
Propellant consumed, Ib
FIGURE
21-13.-Gcmini IX-A rendezvous propellant comparison.
326 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENC'
the crew moved to the Kennedy Space Center, the actual flight data for the Gemini VI-A
practice for the normal procedures was em- mission are shown in figure 21-14. The curve
phasized; and less emphasis was placed on shows a close correlation between simulation
emergency procedures in order t o concentrate and flight data. Any variances between ac-
on the planned mission. Final systems brief- tual flight data and simulation data were
ings were conducted a t the Kennedy Space considered insignificant for crew training.
Center, and training in the operation of all
spacecraft systems was accomplished in the
Gemini Mission Simulator. Network simula-
tions involving the Mission Control Center
provided practice for all types of system fail-
ures, and provided vehicle training €or both
ground ancl flight crews. A few minor simu-
lator discrepancies were noted in the (lis-
play responses when a system condition \vas
changed. The differences between the simu- -:04 Om 98 :12 :16 :20 2 4 2 8 :32 :36
lator display and the actual spacecraft re- Ground elapsed time from retrofire, h r m n
sponses were small and did not produce any
noticeable effect on the training program or FIGURE
21-l4.-Altitude during reentry.
the crew reaction in flight.
Concluding Remarks
Reentry-Phase Training
The variety of simulations available to the
The training for the reentry phase was Gemini flight crews. produced conditions that
conducted initially at the Manned Spacecraft closely approximated those encountered in
Center on the Gemini Mission Simulator, and flight. Certain simulators were of the hybrid
later a t the Kennedy Space Center. Two design and encompassed only specific sys-
types of reset points were available for train- tems. However, the simulation of the space-
ing, one just prior to retrofire, and the other craft operation of the individual systems
a t an altitude of 400 000 feet. The reset produced excellent flight-crew training to
points provided the crew considerable flexi- accomplish specific tasks such as launch, ren-
bility in perfecting procedures and tech- dezvous and docking, and reentry. The few
niques for the retrofire and reentry sequence. discrepancies between simulator and actual
The exact constellation position for the spacecraft systems had no noticeable effect
night retrofire sequence was programed for on the overall training program or orbital
each mission. This feature of the Gemini performance. The success with which the
Mission Simulator provided excellent train- flight crews accomplished each Gemini mis-
ing for the actual mission. The Mission Con- sion was ii direct result of high-fidelity simu-
trol Center simulations were performed in lation training.
both the shirt-sleeve and the suited config- Thus it can be concluded that the wealth
urations. of knowledge gained in the Gemini Program
The computer updates for reentry were will provide the simulation and training
performed by updata link ancl by voice link. guidelines for the Apollo Program. High-fi-
The exact procedures used in flight were tlelity Apollo simulations and adequate flight-
practiced many times in the simulator by the crew training can allow us to complete the
flight crews and in the Mission Control Cen- lunar landing mission with a minimum num-
ter by the flight controllers during network ber of actual space flights. The only phase
reentry simulations. of the lunar mission that has not been pre-
The Gemini Mission Simulator data and viously experienced to ii great degree in the
328 G E M I N I S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
Gemini Program is that of the lunar descent knowledge that an accurate simulation can
and landing. This phase cannot be experi- be provided to give the flight crews a realism
enced in flight until the actual landing takes that will closely approximate the actual lunar
place. Thus we can extrapolate from present landing.
22. GEMINI RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO
PROGRAM
By WILLISB. MITCHELL,Manager, Office of Vehicles and Missions, Gemirzi Program Ofice, N A S A Manned
Spacecraft Center; OW EN E. MAYNARD. Chief, Mission Operations Division, Apollo Spacecraft Pro-
gram Ofice, N A S A Manned Spacecraft Center: and DONALDD. ARABIAN,Office of Vehicles and
Missions, Gemini Program Ofice, N A S A MnnnetE Spacecrrtll Center
329
330 GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
The passive ground-controlled rendezvous mary Propulsion System was used in combi-
demonstrated on Gemini X and XI is impor- nation with the Secondary Propulsion
tant in developing backup procedures for System to accomplish the dual-rendezvous
equipment failures. The Gemini XI first-orbit operation with the passive Gemini VI11 tar-
rendezvous was onboard controlled and pro- get vehicle. These uses of an auxiliary pro-
vides a n additional technique to Apollo plan- pulsion system add another important
ners. The Gemini XI1 mission resulted in a operational technique.
third-orbit rendezvous patterned after the In summary, 10 rendezvous exercises were
lunar-orbit rendezvous sequence, and again accomplished during the Gemini Program,
illustrated that rendezvous can be reliably including 3 re-rendezvous and 1 dual opera-
and repeatedly performed. tion (fig. 22-1). Seven different rendezvous
All of the Gemini rendezvous operations modes were utilized. These activities demon-
provided extensive experience in computing strated the capabilities for computing ren-
and conducting midcourse maneuvers. These dezvous maneuvers in the ground-based
maneuvers involved separate and combined computer complex; the use of the onboard
corrections of orbit plane, altitude, and phas- radar-computer closed-loop system ; the use
ing similar to the corrections planned f o r the of manual computations made by the flight
lunar rendezvous. Experience in maneuver- crew; and the use of optical techniques and
ing combined vehicles in space was also ac- star background during the terminal phase
cumulated during the operations using the and also in the event of equipment failures.
docked spacecraft 'target-vehicle configura- A variety of lighting conditions and back-
tion when the Primary Propulsion System of ground conditions during the terminal-phase
the target vehicle was used t o propel the maneuvers, and the use of auxiliary lighting
spacecraft to the high-apogee orbital alti- devices, have been investigated. The rendez-
tudes. During the Gemini X mission, the Pri- vous operations demonstrated that the com-
\.'&I-
- I
Demonstrated
Ground computations
Flight computations
Manual computations
Use of stars
Midcourse maneuvers
Experience
Total rendezvous
initial
Re-rendezvous
Dual rendezvous
Modes demonstrated
1;
3
1
7
) $
kI
Plane change
Height adjust
Phasing
Total rendezvous
FIGURE
22-l.--Rendezvous.
GEMINI. RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO PROGRAM 33 1
putation and execution of maneuvers for type of equipment and the crew training r.e-
changing or adjusting orbits in space can be quired. The requirements for auxiliary equip-
performed with considerable precision. ment such as handholds, tether points, and
The nine docking operations during Gem- handrails have been established.
ini demonstrated that the process can be ac-
complished in a routine manner. and that the Controlled Landing
ground training simulation was adequate for
this operation (fig. 22-2). The Gemini flight From the beginning of the Gemini Pro-
experience has established the proper light- gram, one of the objectives was to develop
ing conditions for successful docking opera- reentry flight-path and landing control. The
tions. Based on the data and experience spacecraft was designed with a n offset center
derived from the Gemini rendezvous and of gravity so that it would develop lift during
docking operations, planning for the lunar- the flight through the atmosphere. The space-
orbit rendezvous can proceed with confidence. craft control system was used to orient the
lift vector to provide maneuvering capability.
A similar system concept is utilized by the
Apollo spacecraft during reentry through the
Earth atmosphere.
After initial development problems on the
early Gemini flights, the control system
worked very well in both the manual and the
automatic control modes. Spacecraft landings
Demonstrated Experience were achieved varying from a few hundred
Operation feasible Gemini EUI 1 orbit
fraining adequate Gemini E - A 1 orbit yards to a few miles from the target point
Lighting needs GeminiX 1 orbit (fig. 22-3). The first use of a blunt lifting
Gemini XI 4 orbits body for reentry control serves to verify and
GeminiXIl 3 orbits
to validate the Apollo-design -concepts. The
FIGURFI ZZ-Z.-Docking. success of the Gemini guidance system in
controlling reentry will support the Apollo
design, even though the systems differ in
Extravehicular Activity detail.
0= Spacecraft
I I I I 1 I I I
. FIGURE
22-3.-Demonstration of landing accuracy.
and photography. The requirements for this trol of a single vehicle with no maneuvering
equipment are the same in many cases, and capability.
the Gemini experience is directly applicable. The Gemini Program involved multiple
The Apollo Program will use the same mis- vehicles, rendezvous maneuvers, and long-
sion operations organization for the launch duration flights, and required a more complex
sequence that was established during Project ground-control system capable of processing
Mercury and tested and refined during the and reacting to vast amounts of real-time
Gemini Program. data. The new mission-control facility at the
Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, was de- .
Mission Control signed to operate in conjunction with the
Manned Space Flight Network f o r direction
The Gemini mission-control operations con- and control of Gemini and Apollo missions,
cepts evolved from Project Mercury. These as well as of future manned space-flight pro-
concepts were applied during the Gemini Pro- grams. Much of this network capability was
expanded for Gemini and is now being used
gram and will be developed further during
to support the Apollo missions. Gemini has
the Apollo missions, although the complexity contributed personnel training in flight con-
of the operations will substantially increase trol and in maintenance and operation of
as the time for the lunar mission nears. The flight-support systems. As the Gemini flights
worldwide network of tracking stations was progressed and increased in complexity, the
established to gather data concerning the capabilities of the flight controllers increased,
status of the Mercury spacecraft and pilots. and resulted in a nucleus of qualified control
The Mercury flights, however, involved con- personnel.
GEMINI RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO PROGRAM 333
reservoir of flight experience derived from systems, the similarity exists in concept and
the Gemini Program. Apollo will inherit the general design. The performance of Gemini
training technology developed for the Gemini systems, operating over a range of conditions,
flight crews. The technology began with has provided flight-test data for the verifica-
Project Mercury, and was developed and re- tion of the design of related subsystems.
fined during the training of the Gemini multi- These data a r e important since many ele-
man crews. There now exists an organization ments of Apollo, especially systems inter-
of highly skilled specialists with a thorough actions, cannot be completely simulated in
understanding of the training task. Adequate ground testing. The Apollo Spacecraft Pro-
crew preparation can be assured in all areas, gram Office at the Manned Spacecraft Center,
from the physical conditioning of the indi- Houston, has reviewed a n d analyzed Gemini
vidual crewmembers to the most complicated anomalous conditions to determine corrective
integrated mission simulation. measures applicable to Apollo. The Apollo
One highly developed aspect of flight-crew Program Director has established additional
training is the use of simulators and simula- procedures at NASA Headquarters to pro-
tion techniques. A significant result of the mote rapid dissemination and application of
Gemini rendezvous experience was the 'veri- Gemini experience to Apollo equipment de-
fication of the ground simulation employed sign.
in flight-crew training. The incorporation of The Gemini missions have provided back-
optical displays in the Gemini simulations ground experience in many systems such as
was an important step in improving the train- communications, guidance and navigation,
ing value of these devices. Using high-fidelity fuel cells, and propulsion. In addition, a series
mission simulators to represent the space- of experiments was performed specifically
craft and to work with the ground control for obtaining general support information
network and flight controllers was instru- applicable to the Apollo Program.
mental in training the pilots and ground crew In the communications systems, common
as a functional team that could deal with items include the recovery and flashing-light
problems and achieve a large percentage of beacons; similar components a r e utilized in
the mission objectives. the high-frequency and ultrahigh-frequency
The Gemini Program resulted in an accu- recovery antennas. Reentry and postlanding
mulated total of 1940 man-hours of flight batteries and the digital data uplink have the
time distributed among 16 flight-crew mem- same design concepts. The major Apollo de-
bers. This flight experience is readily adapt- sign parameters concerned with power re-
able to future programs since the Gemini quirements and range capability have been
pilots are flight qualified for long-duration confirmed.
flights and rendezvous operations, and a r e In the-area of guidance and navigation,
familiar with many of the aspects of working the use of a n onboard computer has been dem-
in the close confines of the spacecraft. This onstrated and the Gemini experience with
experience is of great value to future training rendezvous radar techniques has been a fac-
programs. The experience in preparing multi- tor in the selection of this capability for the
man crews for flight, in monitoring the crew Lunar Module. The ability to perform in-
during flight, and in examining and debrief- plane and out-of-plane maneuvers and to de-
ing after flight will facilitate effective and termine new space references for successful
efficient procedures for Apollo. reentry and landing has been confirmed by
Gemini flights. The control of a blunt lifting
Technological Development of Systems and body during reentry will also support the
Components Apollo concept.
Gemini and Apollo share common hard- In the electrical power supply, the use of
ware items in some subsystems ; in other sub- the Gemini fuel cell has confirmed the appli-
GEMINI RESULTS AS RELATED TO THE APOLLO PROGRAM 335
cability of the concept. The ability of the ing, but was not isolated until the required
cryogenic reactant storage system to operate definitive data were furnished by Project
over a wide range of off-design conditions in Sure Fire on the target-vehicle engine.
flight has verified the design, which is similar In addition to medical experiments, several
for Apollo. The performance of the Gemini other types of experiments were conducted
system has provided a better understanding during Gemini and have supplied information
of the system parameters over an operating and data for use by the Apollo Program. The
range considerably in excess of the range experiments included electrostatic charge,
previously contemplated. The design of the proton-electron spectrometer, lunar ultra-
cryogenic servicing system for Apollo was violet spectrometer, color-patch photography,
altered after the initial difficulties experi- landmark contrast measurements, radiation
enced by early Gemini flights. Consequently, in spacecraft, reentry communications, man-
a fairly sophisticated system now exists ual navigation sightings, simple navigation,
which will eliminate the possibility of delays radiation and zero-g effects on blood, and
in servicing. The ability to estimate the power micrometeorite collection. Although the di-
requirements for the Apollo spacecraft equip- rect effects of these experiments on Apollo
ment is enhanced by the Gemini operational systems are difficult to isolate, the general
data. store of background data and available infor-
In the propulsion area, the ullage control mation has been increased.
rockets of the Apollo-Saturn S-IVB stage are
the same configuration as the thrusters used
for the Gemini spacecraft Orbital Attitude Concluding Remarks
and Maneuver System; the thrusters of the
Apnllo Command Module Reaction Control The Gemini Program has made significant
System are similar. Steps have been taken to contributions to future manned space-flight
eliminate the problems which occurred in the programs. Some of the more important con-
development of the Gemini thrusters, such tributions include flight-operations tech-
as the cracking of the silicon-carbide throat niques and operational concepts, flight-crew
inserts, the unsymmetrical errosion of the operations and training, and technological
chamber liners, and the chamber burn- development of components and systems. In
through. The tankage of the Reaction Con- the Gemini Program, the rendezvous and
trol System is based upon the Gemini design, docking processes so necessary to the lunar
and employs the same materials for tanks and mission were investigated ; workable proce-
bladders. The propellant control valves were dures were developed, and a r e available for
also reworked as a result of early problems operational use. The capability of man to
in the Gemini system. function in the weightless environment of
The Lunar Module ascent engine also bene- space was investigated for periods up to 14
fited from the Gemini technology: the con- days. Flight crews have been trained. and
tractor for this engine also manufactured the have demonstrated that they can perform
engines for the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle. complicated mechanical and mental tasks
Following the inflight failure of the target- with precision while adapting to the space-
vehicle engine during the Gemini VI mission. craft environment and physical constraints
a test program verified the inherent danger during long-duration missions.
in fuel-lead starts in the space environment. Additionally, the development of Gemini
Consequently, the Lunar Module ascent en- hardware and techniques has advanced space-
gine and the Gemini target-vehicle engine craft-design practices and has demonstrated
were changed so that the oxidizer would advanced systems which, in many cases, will
enter the engine before the fuel. The problem substantiate approaches and concepts for
had been indicated during ascent-engine test- future spacecraft.
33G GEMINI S U M M A R Y CONFERENCE
Finally, ])robiibly the most significant con- turing, and engineering. This nucleus of ex-
tributions of Gemini have been the training perience has been disseminated throughout
of 1,ersonnel m d organizations in the disci- the many facets of Apollo and will benefit
plines of management, operations, manufac- all future manned space-flight programs.
23. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By GEORGEM. Low. Depiily Director, N A S A Marrired SpacecrnJt Center
With the preceding paper, one of the most cessful demonstration that these difficulties
successful programs in our short history of were overcome in later missions is a great
space flight has ended. The Gemini achieve- tribute to the program, to the organization,
ments have been many, and have included and to the entire Gemini team.
long-duration flight, maneuvers in space, ren- A period of difficulty exists today in the
dezvous, docking, use of large engines in program that follows Gemini, the Apollo Pro-
space, extravehicular activity, and controlled
gram. Yet, perhaps one of the most important
reentry. The Gemini achievements have also
legacies from Gemini to the Apollo Program
included a host of medical, technological, and
scientific experiments. . and to future programs is the demonstration
The papers have included discussions of that great successes can be achieved in spite
many individual difficulties that were experi- of serious difficulties along the way.
enced in preparation for many of the flight The Gemini Program is now officially com-
missions and in some of the flights. The suc- pleted.
337
APPENDIXES
Space Labs, Inc., Van Nuys, Calif. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., Philadelphia,
Sperry Rand Corp., Sperry Phoenix Co. Di- Pa.
vision, Phoenix, Ariz. Computer Control Co., Inc., Framingham,
Sperry Rand Corp., Washington, D.C. Mass.
Texas Institute for Rehabilitation and Re- Consolidated Electrodynamics Corp., Mon-
search, Houston, Tex. rovia, Calif.
Thiokol Chemical Corp., Elkton, Md. Cook Electric Co., Skokie, Ill.
Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., Redondo Cosmodyne Corp., Hawthorne, Calif.
Beach, Calif. Custom Printing Co., Ferguson, Mo.
Todd Shipyards Corp., Galveston, Tex. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif.
Western Gear Corp., Lynwood, Calif.
. De Havillnnd Aircraft, Ltd., Dovnsview, On-
Whirlpool Corp., St. Joseph, Mich. tario, Canada
Dilectrix Corp., Farmingdale, N.Y.
Sulicontractoi.s and Vendors Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., Tulsa, Okla.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., Santa Monica,
ACF Industries, Inc., Paramus, N.J. Calif.
ACR Electronics Corp., New York, N.Y. Eagle-Picher Co., Joplin, Mo.
Advanced Technology Laboratories, division Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., Bos-
of American Radiator & Standard Corp., ton, MASS.
Mountain View, Calif. Electro,Mechanical Research, Inc., Sarasota,
Aeronca Manufacturing Corp., Baltimore, Fla.
Md. Electronics Associates, Inc., Long Branch,
AiResearch Manufacturing Co., division of N.J.
Garrett Corp., Torrance, Calif. Emerson Electric Co., St. Louis, Mo.
American Machine & Foundry Co., Spring- Emertron Information and Control Division,
dale, Conn. Litton Systems, Inc., Newark, N.J.
Argus Industries, Inc., Gardena, Calif. Engineered Magnetic Divisibn, Hawthorne,
Astro Metallic, Inc., Chicago, 111. Calif.
Autronics Corp., Pasadena, Calif. Epsco, Inc., Westwood, Mass.
Avionics Research Corp., West Hempstead. Explosive Technology, Inc., Santa Clara,
N.Y. Calif.
Barnes Engineering Co., Stamford, Conn. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., Cable
Beech Aircraft Corp., Boulder, Colo. Division, Joplin, Mo.
Bell Aerosystems Co., Buffalo, N.Y. Fairchild Controls, Inc., division of Fair-
Bendix Corp., Eatontown, N. J. child Camera & Instrument Corp., Hicks-
Brodie, Inc., San Leandro, Calif. ville, N.Y.
Brush Beryllium Co., Cleveland, Ohio Fairchild Hiller Corp., Bay Shore, N.Y.
Brush Instrument Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Fairchild Stratos Corp., Bay Shore, N.Y.
Burtek, Inc., Tulsa, Okla. General Electric Co., Pittsfield, Mass.
Cadillac Gage Co., Costa Mesa. Calif. General Electric Co., West Lynn, Mass.
Calcor Space Facility, Inc., Whittier, Calif. General Electric Co., Waynesboro, Va.
Cannon Electric Co., Brentwood, Mo. General Precision, Inc., Link Division, Bing-
Cannon Electric Co., Phoenix, Ariz. hamton, N.Y.
Captive Seal Corp., Caldwell, N.J. General Precision, Inc., Little Falls, N.J.
Central Technology Corp., Herrin, Ill. Genistron, Inc., Bensenville, 111.
Clevite Corp., Cleveland, Ohio Giannini Controls Corp., Duarte, Calif.
Clifton Precision Products Co., Clifton Goodyear Aerospace Corp., Akron, Ohio
Heights, Pa. Gray & Huleguard, Inc., Santa Monica, Calif.
Collins Radio Co., Cedar Rapids, Iowa Gulton Industries, Inc., Hawthorne, Calif.
APPENDIX B 345