MORI DocID. 570370 yowograged to a SECRET 26 Sessrve pear corr 0 p70 TACOS DocuENTATION STUDY 41) * a aun, ( appeibix ¢ 2 ATRBORNE OPERATIONS Page 2 Q a Pan 1. paoKenOMND ACS 6. Gb cero ae ees fe PCIE ee bn Ha) fee oy a c. (8S EVOLUTION OF MISSION AND OBJECTIVES... - C-b-2 aa ne. 2.(psh 965 developments. 5 ss + Oe n . 3. 6G Polley eens 2B 4, A8S) 3967 Developments. 6. | BS B o PART IZ. RESOURCES (U). . . Onbeg B he ete ae ww i. aw 3 pa aa of the Organization . . . . G-b-10 20 4. (wef Reorganisation - 1968 - . . . . . Cdd10 a ct 397 t ie a 2 t sonnel en 23 eee a eS ST) 26 D. (BY AGENT CLEARANCES ©. |... . . Oban 2 ‘ E. G2SY AGENE-PAY AND ALLOWANCES ©. 5... Gebea2 er eae 2B eee or Payment. 5 5 5 se ee Gebeae Ey 3. Pay Scales» + + + 6 «© + 4 + + Cob-13 2 : Bxclueed #F0n autonatic ff) deciaast= (35-27 : gs-30b TOP SEC} = SENSITIVE ea =A Annee a0, ot dopendix € . : —, CRigT TPS auttomee eee . poc 17eis eeeae AS Tyerntoy — Camp Long Thawte + STRATA Team Training - 1968 feMmone ee Resupply Communications. es IAL, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: 1ST Mission (BS Resupply... D. (197Long ~ Term Agent Team Operations 2,08) operations - 1964 2. (Bes Operations 1965 - 1967. « 3. [PSF Operations 1968 - 1969+ + - 4 per Basen summary ss ee 3 WGgoh somarn vargets 5 + ga tarees hocations «5+ ». iG-Sayauenon operons. Tew pocy so. ee ee iil Xy 2. iS) pérarish ana Pergola 2 3 (PH aray Singleton Operations » + KR oe (SENSITIVE — G~bedd “TongTerm Agent Team Chronology - MORI DocID Gees + Cxbe62 + OebeT6 + Gebe76 + Ceb-83, Annex B to ‘Appendix C 1 2 1S II TE IG IS TE IS we te Is Sia iss IE 23 570370 ‘win oaMORI DocID: 570370 sop steer Pose «go pavenssomaty opemarions. 2, ) eb Bk ' Ce oe ee 2 ee eee ora emo ee PART IV. PROBLEM AREAS (U) - - - s G+D-90 G A. $96 PpoeteH ANGAS = AIRBORNE OPERATIONS... . GeDyo 7 B. pe qmononoay se ek Ce : = PARE V, EVALUATION (U) . 5. , Gxbeg6 ee ee Bt fesf conusuacy EVALUATION = 1966. . 2... Gebeg7 LL c. fas) SROMMETEDD REPORT 2957-1958... . . . . Geb-IOL 12 erase oes ay 2. (359 CINCAG STRATA TEAM EVALUATION «© © +s Cebe06 4 h C sensitive o-b-444 Annex B to ‘appendix C o —_MORI DocID- 570370 ANNEX BO APPENDIX © AIRBORNE OPERATIONS aR? z. Bacorounp (ga Dernopuerson d his ANNEX describes in some datet? Atshorne operations 2 from 1964 untt1 June 1969. Ineluded, in addition to the study 3 and evolution of the original long-term agent teams, 4s the develop- ment of the STRATA Toams, employment of singleton agente, and the later development of the diversionary program. These 5 6 operations were referred to as Airborne operations, or Agent Team oper- 7 ations, until the code word TIMBERWONK(G) was assigned in 1967. 6 9 "he meanings of other code words sppearing in this Annex con be foungth Tab A to the general section of this voluse. 7 2 te 13, : 5 6 ” 18 ww The first mission statement for the airborne 20 sectién was, “to assist and supervise ARVN counterparts in the 2. acoonpLishuent of sus denolition operations, snaii-acele intelli 22 Bence collection, temporary interdiction of lines of communication, eae Afmited psychological operations, and creation of general narass- 2k ment in DRV gs set forth in OPLAN-34A."* coy Tatory, AACS $. T1-8. (SACSA) ‘annex A to ACV Conmand History 1964," ‘nop segné?. smistrIve ae ‘| Annex B to cae Appendix ¢MORI DocID: 570370 or seefy ~ sensrecwm © oS yy (ON OF MISSTON AND ESEGTIVES i La The mission and effectiveness of the long 2 term agent teams were in a state of continuous reevaluation 3 from 1905 Unti4 the sumer of 1968, ynen ati Eoams were JuOgeN AE pro~ 4 naply compronised. During tnis pericd of tine, thinking cnanged trong the belief that the teams represented a valuabie asset in 6 accomplishing S0G's mission to the later opinion expresses by 1 CINCPAC that the Long-term agent teans were a "complete fatiure 8 + Am terms of the useful intelligence produced." tn the para- 9 graphs that follow, the mission changes will be traced and he 10 Polictes outiined that supported the missions. Por 2 summary n of evatuatign- material, see Part IV of this Annex. ~ 2 2 1965 Deveropnents. 3 New Op-Order, The mtasion given to the Airborne Section u SF MACSOG by CINCPACEY An thie October 1965 OpadrderFeflected — a5 “Sthe evolution of SoG's mission to emphasis on intelligence 16 collection: w "auch guerriia in-place teams and teans to be nfirtrated Anto'Niti W431 conduct intelligence, sabotage, psychological, ‘and escape and evasion (EXE) operations, SICA’ seams are authorized to recruit and support local agents in VW for Intelligence end EXE nets. Prysteal destruction operations nay be conducted against selected targets by Sick guerrilla Beans providing gecurisy of intelligence and EAE nets 1a Rot jeopardized. 938 ‘This mission statenent led to the development of meaningful, w long-range prograns of activating operational areas Tor intelligence 19 “gathering around eajor routes leading fren NVI Anto, Iaos.*#* 20 >. EVOIS. “The Early Marning Observation Teams (EWOTS) concept 21 was developed in 1965 to neet the requirement of the ehansing 2 mission. NACSOG proposedst#* that EVOTS/Rosdwatch Operatioris Be” 23 Tee, "AC, DAG"1604372 Nov 68, (SACSA) S) Jis6, CINCPAC’"38A Basie Op Order®, DFG 30D2KI2 oct 65. A “ ) . 5 i Sg, NACV, Dt 607122 oct 65. nop gether. sexstrive c-b-2 Annex B to 7 ‘Appendix ¢ Trt yes) MBB, MALY, UEU LOUTLz2 Let OD,MORI DocID undertaken as a matter of prority in areas south of 20° and @ that future reinforcenent efforts be built around the need to Anerease team viability and provide capabilities for an expanded Intelligence collection. The scope of this effort was to inelude surveillance over enemy major roads from AVN Anto Laos. oc, Heltoopter Enetivration concept, The fixed wing airerert (0-123) avatlable to $0¢ in 1965 were unsatisfactory for accurately placing and resupplying agent teams. 1966 Policy ‘a. New Progran. In May 1966, MACSOG published a conprehen- sive review of OPLAN-34A operations and proposed objectives and prograns for the subsequent 15 months.** A brief summary of ‘the proposale for airborne operations 15 outlined below. (2) As originally conceived, airborne operations (infiltration teams) were intended to build a resistance movement tn NYN which would, "exert pressure against the NVN Government, divert Fesources and make continuous support of the war in RVW less attractive."## as discussed earlier in this report, the imple- mentation of tne resistance movenent was never authorized at the Wasningtoy Level and, therefore, airvorng operations were con ducted under anoigiously worded aisilon statements that pernittea sab0tuge, Anteréiotion and haraccnoat in NVa.s IE, WWERE Bangkok, DTG 2110372 Sep 65. (SACSA) SGA) nenire micsOg, Ssdo Missions opfectives and Prograns ‘Y—uyo-FI-67 (U),""20 May 66. (SKCSA' se GS) Iwi.) Bo Ont ror seGhen- sevsterve C-b-3 Anoex 8 te ‘Appendix ¢ . TRE Gs) apag., pe oot 28 570370 tn ie wa)WORT DecID 570370 (2) The ‘program reviewed the interest DIA and the Joint ? Chiefs of Staff had taken an the capabalaty of SOG agent teams ‘3 2 3 to qUtein intelligence. Copeern over possible CHICO inter vention, infiltration pf DRY forces Ante South Vaetnan, and Sovigt and CHICOH mi2itary ald to mt pronpted 2 reorientation 5 of the teams mission, "Zt was deternines that eakinon enphasis should be placed upon dntelligence collection and establish- 7 rent of civilian contacts with secondary emphasis on paycholo- potage." (3) Based on thie re-evaluation, the following concept was prapared f9r CINCPAC approval. gical operations, E&E and (a) Develop an operational area astride every major oc leading from NVN into Lace and emplacing operational foams in these areas. "(b) Reorsent atl in-place teams to the primary mission of intelligence collection by roadwatch, raii- . Wateh, and rivervaten.. "{¢) Develop civiatan contarta tn every operational area to expand the intelligence base and provide lintted Jogisticsl support, thus lessening team reliance on external support. (a) Lemtt operations intttatly to the development of new operations) areas and of the came tine make inoparae tive teams viable egain."* : (4) To dmplenent the new concept, team training was altered 12 to place prinary emphasis on intelligence gathering. Three = 23 types of operational teams were being trained as shown in a4 the brief sumary below: Boy ype Strength Mission : a 20 agents Roadwatch/early warning observation. Onganise Safe areas. Frepare to Peseive reinforcements. 8 Sagents Reinforce Type § team. Bstablish civilian contacts, Urganize ané operate intelligence nets. Conduct PSYOrS. ce 20 agents Reinforce Types A ané B teans, Team adda limited strike/interdictior ‘capability to operational area TEES B78. _. 10(25) itistory, NACSOG, "Annex M to MAC Command History 1966," 7 B58. (SACSA ‘ror_spefien zs no Annex B to PS SENSITIVE Cobol. jones Be pdb. (Sausn) 7