Viewing cable 08MADRID186, SPANISH REACTION TO KOSOVO'S

INDEPENDENCE
Reference ID CreatedReleased Classification Origin

08MADRID186 2008-02-21 09:09 2010-12-13 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid

VZCZCXRO3415

PP RUEHAG RUEHROV

DE RUEHMD #0186/01 0520909

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 210909Z FEB 08

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4297

INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 3317

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000186

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KOSOVO MONITORING GROUP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018

TAGS: PREL UNMIK UN PGOV YI EU KV SP

SUBJECT: SPANISH REACTION TO KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE

REF: A. STATE 16319

¶B. MADRID 174

¶C. MADRID 162

MADRID 00000186 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: FM Moratinos' Chief of Staff Javier Sancho told DCM February 20 that it was
politically impossible for Spain to support the Kosovar UDI at this time, and that this is the position of
both the ruling PSOE government and the opposition Partido Popular (PP). Sancho said the Spanish have
tried to be as constructive as possible in Brussels and have stuck to the position they have consistently
elaborated with high-level USG officials in Washington and Madrid: UNSCR 1244 does not provide for a
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo; therefore, Spain wants a new UNSCR or a negotiated
settlement between the parties. Nevertheless, Sancho said, Spain did not try to oppose an EU statement
on Kosovo in Brussels, instead crafting a consensus text that focuses on the EU's commitment to the
Balkans while leaving the issue of recognition to the individual member states.

The GOS will continue to support KFOR, EULEX, and the OSCE presence in Kosovo. Sancho said this is the
final GOS position on Kosovo until after the elections. If Zapatero wins reelection, the GOS will be willing
to discuss further avenues for progress toward peace and stability in the Balkans and to work
constructively with the U.S. Ambassador Aguirre will have lunch with Deputy FM Bernardino Leon
February 21 and will press Leon on how Spain can move forward in the Balkans after the elections.

END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) The DCM delivered ref A demarche to Javier Sancho, Chief of Staff to Foreign Minister Moratinos.
Moratinos, who is running for Parliament representing Cordoba, was unavailable from the campaign
trail in Andalucia as he was under the weather.

¶3. (C) Sancho told the DCM that it was politically impossible for the GOS to support Kosovo's unilateral

declaration of independence in the middle of a hotly contested campaign, and to have expected
otherwise was not realistic. Sancho noted that both the ruling PSOE government and the opposition PP
opposed the UDI and had said so publicly numerous times in the months leading to February 17.

Sancho said that the GOS had maintained this position consistently both in Brussels and with high-level
USG officials, but had tried to be as constructive as possible in supporting an EU consensus. Sancho
noted that Moratinos had led the GAERC in producing a consensus conclusion on Kosovo that did not
discuss recognition, when he could have proposed a text opposing the UDI.

¶4. (C) Sancho told the DCM that there would be no more public statements from the MFA on their
Kosovo position prior to the elections, adding that the GOS wants it out of the headlines. If Zapatero
wins reelection March 9, Sancho said the GOS would be open to further discussions on working with the
U.S. and toward EU consensus for peace and stability in the Balkans.

//MORATINOS PRESS COMMENTS//

¶5. (U) Major international and Spanish media seized on Moratinos' comments in Brussels prior to
entering the February 18 GAERC, in which he said, "The Spanish government will not recognize the
unilateral act proclaimed yesterday by the Kosovar assembly, and it will not recognize it because we do
not believe it respects international legality... The Spanish government has always defended respect for
international legality. It defended it when it decided to withdraw troops from Iraq, and it defends it
again now when talking about the secession of a state... If you examine the nations who are against this
recognition, they are the countries that know best and are the most similar to the West Balkans."

¶6. (U) Moratinos went on to say that Kosovar independence would be legal if brought about by a new
UNSCR or by a negotiated agreement between the parties, and that Spain wished to uphold the
international principle of territorial integrity. He also said Spain would continue to support stability and
security for the Balkans. The GOS has stated that it will maintain its presence in KFOR and its support for
EULEX and the OSCE mission in Kosovo.

¶7. (U) Asked by reporters February 19 whether Spain's elections impacted its policy on Kosovo,
Moratinos denied this and said, "Yesterday we made a proposal to guarantee a minimum of unity
among EU partners, and above all, to support and monitor stability and security in the region, which is
part of Europe and which we are interested in preserving and guaranteeing."

//SPANISH ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT//

¶8. (U) As both the GOS and the PP predicted privately to post, Kosovo's independence has prompted
numerous provocative statements by nationalist parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Catalan
Left (ERC) spokesman Joan Ridao said February 18 that Kosovo was "a very important precedent" for
Catalonia and the Basque Country, adding that "when the people want independence, it must be
accepted... Any country or nation under the scope of the EU in the 21st century can achieve its
independence if it is democratically decided... no one can avoid this." In a blog entry entitled, "Spain
does not have the balls to send tanks against us," ERC Parliamentarian Joan Puig wrote that Kosovo was
"another proof that our nation will be independent if a political and social majority decides it. Spain
understands this very clearly, which is why it has reacted in this way." Josep Carod-Rovira, vice president
of the Catalan Generalitat and renowned Catalanista, called on the GOS to recognize Kosovo as soon as
possible on January 18, as did Artur Mas, the president of Catalan centrist party Convergence and Union
(CiU). On February 20, representatives from CiU and ERC announced they would travel to Kosovo to
"study the secession process."

¶9. (U) Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) spokes woman Miren Azkarate said Kosovo's independence was
"a lesson in how to resolve conflicts of identity and belonging in a peaceful, democratic manner... the
will of the people is the key to resolving entrenched political problems... Kosovo is a new example of the
vigor of the democratic right to self determination enshrined in international law, and it betrays once
more those who maintain that this right does not exist in democratic nations."

¶10. (U) By contrast, the PP has maintained staunch unity in its position against Kosovo's independence.
PP founder and elder statesman Manuel Fraga said February 19 that Spain must not support Kosovo
because one could "draw the same conclusions about Spain in (the Basque town of) Galdakano or in a
Catalan town. Spain cannot accept that any group whatsoever can declare itself independent with all the
complications this has implied" in the Balkans. Fraga also called on the GOS to withdraw its forces from
KFOR.

¶11. (U) PP President and presidential candidate Mariano Rajoy said February 18 that Spain "should not
send or maintain the presence of civilian officials" in Kosovo after its UDI, which he said was "contrary to
international legality." Speaking on a conservative news program, Rajoy said, "If there is no agreement
between the parties and no new resolution from the UN Security Council, this is against international
legality, such that I believe Spain should not recognize Kosovo as an independent state." Rajoy went on
to add that the situation had nothing to do with nationalist movements in Spain. He said, "Spain is the
oldest nation in Europe with more than 500 years of history... In Kosovo there is a military and religious
conflict, and here there is absolutely nothing of the sort." The next day, February 19, Rajoy took it one
step further, calling on President Zapatero and Moratinos to explain the "incongruity" of opposing
Kosovo's independence yet maintaining support for international missions to Kosovo. He added that he
would have preferred "that Spanish diplomats had better managed this fight."

¶12. (U) Gustavo de Aristegui, PP foreign affairs expert and ranking member of the Spanish Foreign
Affairs Commission, wrote February 18 in EL MUNDO that, "the unilateral declaration of independence is
unacceptable, illegal and a defiance to the peace and stability of all of Europe."

//MAINSTREAM EDITORIAL PRESS//

¶13. (U) The tone across the entire political spectrum of Spanish press expressed concern for the
potential ramifications in Spain and Europe. An ABC editorial declared, "Kosovo is going to be an
economic and political burden for the European Union, but a sweet gift for the U.S., which will have a
new ally and a gigantic military base in the only majority-Muslim country in the world where U.S. flags
are sold in kiosks." A February 18 editorial in liberal EL Publico stated, "The negotiations of the Spanish
foreign ministry and of Aznar failed in Washington. The attempts to convince the U.S. of the danger that
independence implies did not convince." Pilar Bonet wrote in the Catalan paper LA VANGUARDIA
February 18, "Kosovo's independence opens up a Pandora's box and reopens healed wounds in the
territorial configuration of the successor states to the Soviet Union." Andres Ortega wrote in EL PAIS
February 18, "More than a declaration of independence it seems like a declaration of dependence.
Kosovo does not appear to be a prepared or viable country." A February 20 op-ed in conservative La
Razon stated, "Europe has set a very dangerous precedent, one that will affect the territorial integrity of
some nations that have supported the process."

EL PAIS published a February 20 op-ed stating, "Kosovo is today an 'Ulster' in its potential for nuclear
combustion in the Balkans and beyond." Julia Navarro wrote in a February 19 op-ed for wire service
Europa Press, "In Spain we can already start soaking our beards; Kosovo's independence will have
consequences on our country, more so now that all the politicians have said you cannot compare one
situation with the other. We all know you can, and that it is simply a question of a few soulless rulers in
the United States and the European Union deciding one day that in Spain there are other Kosovos."
//WELL, SO WHAT?//

¶14. (C) If the leftist and nationalist parties are happy about Kosovo's independence, if the PSOE
government needs the leftist and nationalist parties to form a coalition government after the elections,
and if all mainstream parties agree that Spain and Kosovo are not the same, then what is the PSOE
government so worried about? The answer lies in the PSOE's need to assure the centrist, mainstream
Spanish voter that all of the PP's accusations about Zapatero "Balkanizing" Spain and "presiding over the
dissolution of the 500 year old Spanish kingdom" are groundless. By recognizing Kosovo prior to the
elections, the GOS would have opened itself up to renewed attacks from the right about pandering to
nationalist minorities, when in fact the PSOE gains nothing electoral by joining nationalist minorities on
Kosovo. These minority parties will have no choice but to join with the PSOE after the election if they
hope to govern. The nationalist parties are understandably pumping up the issue to increase their
turnout, but they too understand the state of play.

¶15. (C) The PSOE's biggest fear is not criticism from the left but abstention from the center. Low
turnout by distraught left-leaning centrists combined with the strong mobilization of the "king and
country" PP base would put a PSOE victory at risk. In this sense, the PP has left no wiggle room
whatsoever by laying out clear markers, including by former President Aznar, that the PSOE would not
be able to slide by on EU consensus on Kosovo. Speculation about how Kosovo might have fared under
the PP is somewhat pointless, but all indications are that a Rajoy government would have been no more
amenable to a UDI had the matter been pushed until after the elections. In any case, the PP can now
argue that Kosovo's independence is bad for Spain and that the Zapatero government was too weak
internationally to prevent it.

¶16. (C) For its part, the GOS is caught in a logical trap - how to reconcile their continuing military and
civilian presence in Kosovo with their refusal to recognize Kosovo's right to independence. As
statements by nationalist politicians and editorials by mainstream Spaniards show, this issue is not
completely foreign to Spanish politics, and the average Spaniard does not want Kosovo to imply a
precedent for the Basque Country and Catalonia. Their best option, and the one which they are
following, is to keep Zapatero out of it, get the issue out of the headlines, and move on.

Moratinos, Defense Minister Alonso, and former Defense Minister Pepe Bono have done the heavy
lifting. Moratinos even earned rare praise from French FM Kouchner who said "the Spaniards were
intelligent and generous" in their maneuvering at the GAERC.

//NEXT MOVES//

¶17. (C) The PSOE caught a break with the February 19 announcement of Fidel Castro's resignation,
which takes Kosovo off the front page in Spain and also allows Zapatero and the GOS to engage the
rhetorical machine on how Spain must help Cuba toward democracy. Additionally, their policy of
engagement, while obviously not a driving force in Castro's resignation, enhances GOS credibility with
the pro-Cuban Spanish populace, as well as with the pro-Castro far-left.
¶18. (C) Ambassador Aguirre will have lunch with Deputy FM Bernardino Leon February 21 and will
press Leon on how Spain can move forward in the Balkans after the elections.

AGUIRRE