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Constitution A Law II Reviewer 1
Constitution A Law II Reviewer 1
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Administrative Due Process
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore
not even required to be conferred by the In administrative proceedings, the
Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, elements were laid down in the case of Ang
and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary
notably the due process, equal protection and rights" in justiciable cases before
non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting administrative tribunals:
the exercise of these powers by imposing on
the State the obligation to protect individual a. There must be a hearing, where a
rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the party may present evidence in support of his
State, notably the government, telling it what it case.
cannot do to the individual. b. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to
A. Due process - Procedural and decide the case correctly, its decision must
Substantive be supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the
Civil Procedural Due Process decision must be substantial. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a
In civil cases, the SC laid down its reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino support a conclusion.
v. Palanca: e. The evidence must have been
presented at the hearing or at least contained
a. Court with jurisdiction over the in the record and known to the parties affected.
subject matter. f. The tribunal must rely on its own
independent consideration of evidence, and
b. Court with jurisdiction over the not rely on the recommendation of a
party-defendant subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and
c. Judgement rendered according to the law in such a way that the parties can
law. know the issues involved and the reasons for
the decision.
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to
be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)
Substantive Due Process
challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
trial court sustained the confiscation of the vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
animals and declined to rule on the validity of guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the law on the ground that it lacked authority to the said officers must observe when they make
do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. their distribution. VV.
Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC B. Due Process and Police Power
jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide final judgments of Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
lower courts" in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures, lower Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and
courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in Holiday s Valid.
the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A
the slaughter of these animals (except where and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in
there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however,
female upon the issuance of the necessary those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL
permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC
for farm work or breeding and preventing their (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works,
improvident depletion. We do not see, Transportation, issued memo. providing
however, how the prohibition of the penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine,
interprovincial transport of carabaos can confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, registration. The petitioners brought suit
considering that they can be killed any where, questioning the validity of the LOI on the
w/ no less difficulty in on province than in ground that it was discriminatory and a denial
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in of due process. The resps. denied the
one province will not prevent their slaughter petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit
there, any more than moving them to another amounted to a request for advisory opinion.
province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's
be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement them would deprive them of prop. They,
of the live animals for the purpose of preventing therefore, have standing to challenge the
their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should validity of the LOI.
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. on its face. It has behind it the presumption of
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut
were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station such presumption is unavoidable. As
commander, were returned to the petitioner underlying the questions of fact may condition
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery the constitutionality of legislation the
and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered presumption of validity must prevail in the
confiscated upon his failure to produce the absence of some factual foundation of record
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
EO defined the prohibition, convicted the conservation measure; it is an apporpriate
petitioner and immediately imposed response to a problem.
punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal
measures struck him at once and pounced upon protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to
the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate
heard, thus denying him elementary fair play. equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not
(4) It is there authorized that the include others does not render it invalid. The
seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all
institutions and other similar institutions as the or none."
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection (4) To the extent that the Land
Commission may see fit, in the case of Transpo. Code does not authorize the
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra
see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase vires. VV.
may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and
Constitutional Law II
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983) compensation, and (3) upon observance of
due process.
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from
Rendering Massage Services Valid. Article III, Sec. 9. Private property
shall not be take for public use without
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two- just compensation.
fold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to
collect a fee for operating massage clinics Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may,
separately from those operating barber ships in the interest of national welfare or
and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might defense, establish and operate vital
probably arise from the construction of separate industries and, upon payment of just
rooms. compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in enterprises to be operated by the
sustaining ordinances based on general welfare government.
clause. VV.
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) 1. Taking either for public use or
public purpose.
F: The petitioners are operators or
nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed Public Use
prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue
from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the Public use is equivalent to public
operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the
alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to public at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it
operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a
the ordinance and dismissed the petition. large group of people short of the public in
Hence, this petition for certiorari. general (e.g. expropriating property for the
relocation of squatters).
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the
operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA
regulated but not prevented from carrying on 220
their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted,
granted municipalities the power to regulate F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought
the establishment, maintenance and operation the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay
of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit
on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of
w/c purported to give municipalities the power the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take
not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the immediate possession of the property. The
operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire
of the law remained the same so that the power through condemnation proceedings lands for
granted to municipalities remains that of tourist zone development of a sports complex.
regulation, not prohibition. To construe the The petitioners who are occupants of the lands,
amendatory act as granting mun. corporations filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They
the power to prohibit the operation of contended that (1) the taking was not for public
nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that use; (2) the land was covered by the land
it violates the constitutional provision that reform program; and (3) expropriation would
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which impair the obligation of contracts.
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) HELD: The concept of public use is not limited
speaks simply of the power to regulate the to traditional purposes for the construction of
establishment, and operation of billiard pools, roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that
theatrical performances, circuses and other "public use" means "use by the public" has
forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. been discarded. As long as the purpose of the
VV. taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be
C. Due Process and Eminent beneficially employed for the general welfare
Domain satisfies the requirement of public use. The
petititioners have not shown that the area being
The taking by the State of private developed is land reform area and that the
property in an expropriation proceeding must affected persons have been given emancipation
be: (1) for public use, (2) with just patents and certificates of land transfer. The
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contract clause has never been regarded as a Amigable cases, supra), and using the
barrier to the exercise of the police power and conversion rates at the time of taking
likewise eminent domain. VV. (because according to those cases, Art. 1250
of the Civil Code applied only to contractual
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) obligations).
his law-making powers exercises this power, the against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del
public use and public necessity of the Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.
expropriation and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature and HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
the courts must respect the decision. streets is arbitrayr and should not receive
judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
procedures adopted and the powers given to minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is choice between the two lines. The factor of
summarily proclaimed a blighted area and functionality strongly militates against the
directly expropriated by decree without the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets,
slightest semblance of a hearing or any while the factor of social and economic impact
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
instant and automatic to take effect Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No down to a choice between people, on one hand,
deposit before the taking is required. There is and progress and development, on the other, it
not provision for any interest to be paid upon is to be remembered that progress and
unpaid installments. Not only are the owners development are carried out for the benefit of
given absolutely no opportunity to contest the the people. VV.
expropriation, or question the amount of
payments fixed by the decree, but the decision
of the NHA are expressly declared beyond
judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared
unconstitutional.
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar (1990)
now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM
Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to F: De Knecht was one of the owners of
designate the particular property to be taken several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del
adn how much may be condemned thereof Pan streets which the Government sought to
must be duly recognized, leaving only as a expropriate to give way to the extension of
judicial question whether in the exercise of such EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities.
competence, the party adversely affected is the De Knecht filed a case to restrain the
victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now Government from proceeding with the
rules that such singling out of properties does expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the
not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed
such expropriation by legislative act the lower court decision and granted the relief
transgresses the due process and equal asked for by De Knecht ruling that the
protection and just compensation guarantees of expropriation was arbitrary. The case was
the Constitution. VV. remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite
the SC decision until two years later, in 1983,
when the Government moved for the dismissal
3. Due process must be of the case on the ground that the Legislature
observed has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose. The
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal.
(1980)
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment
F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite the case between the parties, it is equally true
Coastal Road Project, originally called for the that the right of petitioner to take private
expropriation of properties along Cuneta properties for public use upon payment of just
Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the compensation is so provided in the Constitution
Ministry of Public Highways decided to make and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding
the proposed extension pass through Fernando may be undertaken by the petitioner not only
Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the by voluntary negotiation with the land owners
protests of residents of the latter, the but also by taking appropriate court action or by
Commission on Human Settlements legislation.
recommended the reversion to the original When BP 340 was passed, it appears
plan, but the Ministry argued the new route that it was based on supervening events that
withh save the government P2 million. The occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on
government filed expropriation proceedings the De Knecht case was rendered. The social
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impact factor which persuaded the Court to the expropriation. The price or value of the land
consider this extension to be arbitrary had and its character at the time of taking by the
disappeared. Govt. are the criteria for determining just
Moreover, the said decision is no cmpensation. Charo.
obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances D. Equal Protection
then pravailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of properties in Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be
question and thereafter by enacting the deprived of life, liberty or property
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. without due process of law, nor shall any
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity person be denied the equal protection of
of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision the laws.
of the Court must yield to the subsequent
legislative fiat. Charo. Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress
shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measure that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) wealth and political power for the common
good.
F: For the construction of its 230 KV To this end, the State shall
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor's regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
lines have to pass the lands belonging to and disposition of property and its
respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations increments.
for the acquisition of the right of way
easements, Napocor was constrained to file
eminent domain proceedings. 1. Economic equality
recognizing the right of labor to its just There are areas of economic activity
share in the fruits of production and the which can be limited to Filipinos. The
right of enterprises to reasonable returns Constitution itself acknowledges this in various
on investments, and to expansion and places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII,
growth. Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art.
XII, Sec. 10), to name a few.
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155
shall, upon recommendation of the (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law
economic and planning agency, when the which nationalized the retail trade. For the
national interest dictates, reserve to protection of the law can be observed by the
citizens of the Philippines or to national interest.
corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage
as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)
formation and operation enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. But there are areas where aliens cannot
In the grant of rights, privileges be kept away for the simple reason that they
and concessions covering the national cannot be deprived of a common means of
economy and patrimony, the State shall livelihood, especially when they are admitted to
give preference to qualified Filipinos. the country as immigrants.
The State shall regulate and
exercise authority over foreign In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86
investments within its national jurisdiction SCRA 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city
and in accordance with its national goals ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens
and priorities. who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the
Id., Sec. 2. xxx uniformity of taxation, and deprived aliens of
The State shall protect the nation's the right to earn a common livelihood.
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment (1978)
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the prohibited the employment of aliens in any
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and occupation or business unless they first secured
adequate legal assistance shall not be a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a
denied to any person by reason of fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in
poverty. Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court void.
shall have the following powers:
xxx HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In
(5) Promulgate rules concerning imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider
the protection and enforcement of substantial differences in situations among
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, aliens and for that reason violates the rule on
and procedure in all courts, the admission uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, guide for granting/denying the permit and
and legal assistance to the therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for denies aliens due process and the equal
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be protection of the laws. VV.
uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979),
substantive rights. Rights of procedure of Sec. 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the
shall remain effective unless disapproved warning that the milk is harmful for infants, was
by the Supreme Court. struck down as unconstitutional on the ground
that it did not require the same labeling in the
case of filled milk (coco-fat added)
Constitutional Law II
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the F: This is a petition for mandamus
people to be secure in their persons, presented to secure the annulment of a search
houses, papers and effects against warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. judge, &
unreasonable searches and seizures of the restoration of certain documents alleged to
whatever nature and for any purpose, have been illegally seized by an agent of the
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant Anti-Usury Board.
or warrant of arrest shall issue except Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury
upon probable cause to be determined Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
personally by the judge after examination Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of
under oath or affirmation of the the law "to search the person, house or store of
complainant and the witnesses he may the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits,
produce, and particularly describing the receipts, documents & other papers relating to
place to be searched and the person or her activities as userer."
things to be seized. On the same date, Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to
Sec. 3. The privacy of the office of the petitioner, and after showing
communication and correspondence shall the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, &
be inviolable, except upon lawful order of w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill
the court, or when public safety or order and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the
requires otherwise as prescribed by law. execution thereof. Two packages of records & a
Any evidence obtained in violation locked filing cabinet containing several papers
of this or the preceding section, shall be and documents were seized by Almeda and a
inadmissible for any purpose in any receipt thereof issued by him to Salas.
proceeding. Separate criminal cases were filed against
petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of
the documents seized. Bu motion, pet.
1. Requirements for Search challenged the legality of the SW and the
Warrants devolution of the documents demanded. By
resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the
petitioner's motion for the reason that though
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940) the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the
part of the petitioner.
F: By virtue of the sworn application of The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order
Almeda, the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be
Board, a SW was issued to search the store and nullified in these proceedings.
premises of the petitioner, accused of violating
the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches
other articles were seized and retained in the and seizures is declared a popular right and for
possession of the Anti-Usury Board. a SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of be determined by the judge himself and not by
valid SW were complied with. the applicant or another; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
application, swore that "he made his own complainant and such witnesses as the latter
personal investigation and ascertained that may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must
petitioner is lending money without a license, particularly describe the place to be searched
charging usurious rates." The witness he and persons or things to be seized.
presentted testified before the judge and swore In the instant case, the existence of
that he knew that YEE was lending without a probable cause was determined not by the
license because he personally investigated the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the
victims who secured loans from the petitioner. judge did was to accept as true the affidavit
Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, made by agent Almeda. It does not appear that
they could be held liable for perjury. The he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if
existence of probable cause has been any. Even accepting the description of the
determined by the justice of the peace before prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the
issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently
the warrant itself. Charo. detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop.
Constitutional Law II
seized were not delivered to the court w/c believe that an offense has been committed
issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, and that the objects sought in connection with
they were turned over to the resp. provincial the offense are in the place sought to be
fiscal & used by him in building up cases searched. When addressed to a newspaper
against petitioner. Considering that at the time publisher or editor, the application for a
the warrant was issued, there was no case warrant must contain a specification stating
pending against the petitioner, the averment with particularity the alleged subversive
that the warrant was issued primarily for materials he has published or intending to
exploration purposes is not w/o basis. publish. Broad statement in the application is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
IS THERE A WAIVER? No express requirement of probable cause. Another factor
waiver. that makes the search warrants constitutionally
IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None. objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas,
To constitute a waiver of constitutional the US SC declared this type of warrant void.
right, it must appear first that (1) the right VV.
exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; (3) that said person Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not F: Respondent Judge issued a search
object to the legality of the search when it was warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used
made. She could not have objected bec. she by petitioner in committing the crime of
was sick & was not present when the warrant sedition. Seized were printed copies of the
was served upon Salas. Certainly, the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies,
constitutional immunity from unreasonable typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape
searches and seizures, being a personal one, recorders, video machines and tapes. The
cannot be waived by anyone except by the petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his
person whose rights are invaded or one who is motion was denied.
expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf. The failure on the part of the petitioner HELD: The statements made in the affidavits
and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy
execution of the warrant does not constitute an the requirement of probable cause. The
implied waiver of the consti. right. It is but a language used is all embracing as to include all
submission to the authority of the law. The conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
delay in making the demand for the return of regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
the documents seized is not such as to result im The search warrant under consideration was in
implied. waiver. RAM. the nature of a general warrant which is
objectionable. VV.
Illegal search of newspaper offices and press F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through
freedom Rev. Examiner de Leon filed an application for a
SW against Bache & Co. and its pres.,
F: On the basis of two warrants issued by Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the
the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan NIRC. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a
Mail and the We Forum were search and hearing, the deposition of de Leon and his
printing machines, paraphernalia, motor witness, Logronio, was taken by the Dep. Clerk
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, of Court. The deposition was later read to the
publication and distribution of the newspapers judge who asked the witness to take an oath as
as well as papers and other literature seized on to the truth of his statements. The judge then
the ground that they were used in the signed the SW and accordingly issued the same.
commission of the crime of subversion.
Petitioners brought and action to annul the ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of
warrants and compel the return of the things valid SW were complied with.
seized.
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally
HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with examine the complainant and his witnesses.
merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as The judge did not have the opportunity to
such facts and circumstances which would lead observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to propound initial and follow-up questions which
Constitutional Law II
his judicial mind, on account of his training, was description of the offense as "illegal possession
in the best position to conceive. This is of firearms, etc." This suffices to cure the
important in arriving at a sound inference on defect.
the all-importatnt question of w/n there was The fact that the word "etc." was added
probable cause. Charo. to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not
violate the rule on single offense, for
notwithstanding that possession of firearms,
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990) explosives and ammunitions are punished in
different sections of the PD, they are treated as
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. belonging to a single specie. An exception to
Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of the rule that a warant shall be issued for a
Witness," executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a single offense is when existing laws prescribe a
search warrant for the search and seizure of single punishment for various offenses. Charo.
arms, ammunitions and explosives in the
premises of the PUP which were supposed to be
in possession of Dr. Prudente. In enforcing the Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
warrant, 3 fragmentation grenades were found
in the bathroom of the office of Dr. Prudente. F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by
resp. judge was invalid. They also question the
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid. extrajudicial confession taken from them
without according them the right to assistance
RULING: NO. of a counsel. The articles seized by virtue of the
(1) The warant was not issued on the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted
basis of personal knowledge of the applicant as evidence for violation of RA 6425 or
and his witness. The probable cause required Dangerous Drugs Act.
under the Constitution for the issuance of a
search warrant must be in connection with one RULING: While it is true that the caption of the
specific offense, and the judge must, before SW states that it is in connection with "the
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the violation of RA 6425," it is clearly recited in the
form of searching questions and answers, in text thereof that "there is probable cause to
writing and under oath, the complainant and believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his
any witnesses he may produce, on facts possession and control, marijuana dried stalks
personally known to them and attach to the which are suject of the offense stated above."
record their sworn statements together with Although the specific section of the law is not
any affidavit submitted. However, in the case at stated, there is no question at all that the
bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in his specific offense alleged to have been
application that his knowledge was based "on committed as basis for determining probable
gathered infrmation from verified sources." The cause is alleged. Furthermore, the SW
same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles. specifically described the place to be searched
Moreover, the judge did not examine and the things to be seized.
Angeles in the form of searching questions and
answers. What appears on the record are As to the extrajudicial confessions of the
leading questions answereable by yes or no. accused, the same are deemed inadmissible
against them. In People V. Galit, the Court
(2) As to the claim that the SW failed to declared that: " At the time the person is
particularly describe the place to be searched, arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
the SC ruled that the description of the place to officer to inform him of the reason for the
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his
and identify the place intended to be searched. constitutional rights to remain silent and to
Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with counsel, and that any statement he might make
its address and specifically mentioned the could be used against him. The person arrested
offices of the "Dept. of Military Science and shall have the right to communicate with his
Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
the President at the 2nd floor and the other most expedient means - by telephone if
rooms in that floor." This is deemed sufficient. possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see
(3) There was also an issue as to w/n the to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
SW was issued for one specific offense. The investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866 the presence of counsel engaged by the person
which punishes several offenses. While there arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
was failure to state the particular provision of appointed by the court upon petition either of
the law violated, the warrant itself qualified the the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
Constitutional Law II
The right to counsel may be waived but the Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, 1920 and EO 1022, POEA Administrator
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or Achacoso ordered the closure of the
in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence." recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having
verified that she had no license to operate a
These requirements were even made recruitment agency. He further ordered the
stricter under the 1987 Constitution which seizure of the documents and paraphernalias,
provides that the rights of a person under being used or intended to be used as the
custodial investigation cannot be waived except means of commiting illegal recruitment. This
when made in writing and in the presence of order was enforced on 26 January 1988.
counsel. Charo. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing Philippine Times were subversive were held to
expedition, which violated the sanctity of be not personal knowledge, and thus the search
domicile and privacy of communications. To warrant issued was not valid.
establish the requirement of probable cause,
the rule is: One crime, one warrant. e. The search warrant must describe
particularly describe the place to be
b. As determined by a judge searched and the things to be seized.
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a Failure to state with particularity the
judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and place to be searched and items to be seized
much abused phrase "and other responsible makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a
officer as may be authorized by law" in the general warrant) which is void.
1973 Constitution has been removed
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the
c. After personally examining under oath description which read "subversive documents,
or affirmation the complainant and his leaflets, papers to promote the objective of the
witness. Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a
Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement"
The examination conducted by the were held not to be particular descriptions, thus
judge takes the form of searching questions. making the warrant a general warrant.
The requirement that the judge must In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure
personally examine the complainant and his of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine
witnesses means that the actual examination Times, subversive documents, articles, printed
cannot be delegated to someone else, like the matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and
clerk of court. typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again
invalidated for the description was not at all
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) particular or specific, thus making the warrants
v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when general warrants.
the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court
in the middle of a hearing, the judge suspended When it comes to printed matters, the
the hearing and directed the branch clerk to offensive material need not be set out in full. It
examine and take the testimony of the is enough if it specifies the issues and the title
witnesses in his chambers. After he was of the articles. The instruction to seize
through with the hearing, he went back to his "subversive materials" is not valid because the
chambers and finding that the examination was determination of whether a material is
finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses subversive or not is not for the police officer to
if they affirmed what they what they testified decide; no unfettered discretion must be
to, after which he issued the search warrant in granted to him.
question.
The matter is different if goods were
d. On the basis of their personal searched and seized because of their intrinsic
knowledge of the facts that they are quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled),
testifying to. than if the goods were searched for the ideas
they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper
The determination of the is sought). In the latter case, a more detailed
reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be description of the physical features of the item
based on the affidavit of one who has personal is required to avoid delegating the appreciation
knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. of ideas, and thus threaten free expression.
The testimony cannot be based on mere belief.
Neither can it be based on a report. Otherwise, 2. When Search May Be Made without a
the warrant is void. Warrant
Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 (a) When search is made of moving vehicles
SCRA 800 (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a The reason is the person may escape
military report that the newspaper We Forum easily if a warrant has to be applied for the
was used for subversive were held to be not a mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code,
personal knowledge and so was inadmissible. customs agents are specifically authorized to
search and seize vehicles even without a
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA warrant.
541 (1985), the testimony based on
investigation reports that certain items in the
Constitutional Law II
Checkpoints are valid in some instances turn against the captor; and if the documents in
depending on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search
suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. would no longer be justified since there is no
probable cause that the criminal is inside the way for Roque to go back to the apartment and
car). There is no question that when a child has destroy the documents, having been arrested
been reported kidnapped in a community, the already.
police can stop all cars and check if the
detained child is in any one of them.
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985)
(b) When search is an an incident to a
valid arrest. F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested
together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident Constabulary Security Group. Milagrso had been
to lawful arrest.-- A person lawfully wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The
arrested may be searched for dangerous arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6,
weapons or anything which may be used 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
as proof of the commission of an offense, were searched and 428 documents, a portable
without a search warrant. (Rules of typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that
Court.) day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant
for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of
A person arrested may be searched for the documents seized, charges of subversion
dangerous weapons or anything that proves the and rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office
commission of the offense. It follows that the merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
search can only be made within the area of possession of subversive materials. Milagros
control of the arrested person, and within the asked for suppression of the evidence on the
time of the arrest. ground that it was illegally obtained. The search
warrant described the things to be seized as
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 "Documents, papers and other records of the
(1985); Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx".
were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and
Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a.m., having been HELD: The search warrant is void because it
wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 fails to describe with particularity the things to
noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks be seized. It does not specify what the
away, was searched and some documents subversive books and instructions are and what
seized. The SC at first held that the search was the manuals not otherwise available to the
valid even if the warrant issued was void for public contain to make them subversive. There
failing to describe with particularity the things is absent a definite guideline as to what items
to be seized, because it was an incident of a might lawfully be seized, thus giving the officers
valid arrest. discretion regarding what articles they should
seize. It is thus in the nature of a general
But after the EDSA revolution, the warrant. But the seizure of the articles could be
reconstituted SC granted the motion for justified as an incident of a valid arrest. It is a
reconsideration and held that just because general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
there was a valid arrest did not mean that the the place of premises where the arrest was
search was likewise valid. To be valid, the made can also be searched without a search
search must be "incidental" to the arrest, that warrant.
is, not separated by time or place from the
arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental (c) When things seized are within plain
searches is looked into, one can see that this view of a searching party
situation is not one involving a valid incidental
search. Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
The law allows the arresting officer to F: The challenged SW was issued by the
search a person validly arrested (by frisking him resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner's house
for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the was searched 2 days later but none of the
arrested person may be turned against his articles listed in the warrant was discovered.
captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the The officers conducting the search found 1 colt
crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they
for a search warrant from a judge. confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was
conducted 30 minutes after the arrest, there is
no longer any danger that the captured may
Constitutional Law II
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration
is hereby declared null and void and of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
accordingly set aside. warrant sought was issued forthwith.
premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that
Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a defective an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a
warrant. There is a greater reason in this case peace officer or private person, among others,
to reprobate the questioned raid, in the when in his presence the person to be arrested
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. has committed, is actually committing, or is
The fact that the instant case involves an attempting to commit an offense, or when an
obscenity rap makes it no different from offense has in fact, just been committed, & he
Burgos, a political case, because speech is has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
speech, whether political or "obscene". that the person arrested has committed it.
The authorities must apply for the At the time the peace officers identified
issuance of the a search warrant from the judge themselves and apprehended the petitioner as
, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. he attempted to flee, they did not know that he
They must convince the court that the materials had committed, or was actually committing, the
sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a offense. They just suspected that he was hiding
clear and present danger of an evil substantive something in the buri bag. They did not know
enough to warrant State interference and what its contents were. The said circumstances
action. The judge must determine WON the did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant.
same are indeed "obscene": the question is to However, there are many instances
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o
judge's sound discretion. If probable cause necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
exist, a search warrant will issue. foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW
at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this
(d) Stop and Frisk Court in Valmonte v. de Villa.
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure
Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990) (S & S) conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereof in the case
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the
members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom latter is more reasonable considering that,
assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St., of a probable cause. The probable cause is that
Davao City. While they were w/in the premises when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed probable cause that he was concealing
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached something illegal in the bag and it was the right
the petitioner and identified themselves as and duty of the police officers to inspect the
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to same.
flee but was stopped by the 2. They then It is too much indeed to require the
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where police officers to search the bag in the
they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson possession of the petitioner only after they shall
revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a . have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an
38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was much too late.
brought to the police station for further As the Sol-Gen said:
investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the "The assailed S & S
RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not may still be justified as akin to a
guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision was 'stop and frisk' situation whose
rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA object is either to determine the
affirmed the appealed decision in toto. identity of suspicious individuals
or to maintain the status quo
Hence, the petition for review, the momentarily while the police
main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful officers seeks to obtain more info.
arrest or search and seizure, the items w/c were ... The US SC held in Terry v.
confiscated from the possession of the Ohio that "a police officer may in
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against appropriate circumstances & in
him. an appropriate manner approach
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. a person for the purpose of
12, R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested investigating possible criminal
may be searched for dangerous weapons or behaviour even though there is
anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a no probable cause to make an
commission of an offense, w/o a SW. arrest." In such a situation, it is
reasonable for an officer rather
Constitutional Law II
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact RULING: NO. There was no showing that
that the person consented or did not object to accused was then assisted by counsel nor his
the search, for it many happen that he did so waiver thereto put into writing. (The rejection
only out of respect for the authorities. The of these evidence would not affect the
waiver must be expressly made. conviction of the accused in view of the
abundance of other evidence establishing his
guilt.) Bam.
People v. De lara
F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy- People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6,
bust operation was conducted by the police, as 1994)
a consequence of which, accused was arrested.
The accused already pocketed the marked F: The incidents involved in this case took
money and handed two foils to the police when place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in
he sensed the presence of police operatives. December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando
He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was de Gracia was charged in two separate
prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by informations for illegal possession of
running inside his house. The police pursued ammunition and explosives in furtherance of
him and were able to subdue him. The accused rebellion, and for attempted homicide.
admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of
house. He even showed the arresting officers a firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was
blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. acquitted of attempted homicide.
The team, together with the accused, Surveillance was undertaken by the
proceeded to WPD headquarters for military along EDSA because of intelligence
investigation. During the investigation, accused reports about a coup.
was apprised of his constitutional rights to Members of the team were engaged by rebels
remain silent and to have the assistance of in gunfire killing one member of the team. A
counsel. When appellant was asked to give a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office.
written statement, he refused to do so pending They were able to find and confiscate six
arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4
arrest and the seizure of the bag containing dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and
prohibited drugs was null and void. He also "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
contends that he was not assisted by counsel belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia
during custodial investigation, where he was was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano,
forced to sign the photocopy of the marked holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through
money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the a door. The team arrested appellant. They were
Booking and Information Sheet. then made to sign an inventory, written in
Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the confiscated by the raiding team. No search
accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were warrant was secured by the raiding team.
valid. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession
of firearms.
RULING: YES. The accused was caught in That judgment of conviction is now
flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. challenged before us in this appeal.
There was no need for a warrant. The
policemen were not only authorized but were Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search
also under obligation to apprehend the drug and seizure in this case.
pusher even without a warrant. The
policemen’s entry into the house of the accused Ruling: YES
without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
Constitutional Law II
It is admitted that the military Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked
operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office because the first is an offense punished by a
were not armed with a search warrant at that special law while the second is a felony
time. The raid was actually precipitated by punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with
intelligence reports that said office was being variant elements.
used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes
raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the the death penalty where the illegal possession
premises wherein the surveillance team was of firearms and ammunition is committed in
fired at by a group of men coming from the furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense
Eurocar building. When the military operatives charged in this case was committed under the
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused governance of that law, the imposition of the
to open the door despite requests for them to death penalty was proscribed by the
do so, thereby compelling the former to break Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia
into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of
obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted
an armory or arsenal which are the usual out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It recommendation in connection therewith.
is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual 3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and
quantity of high-powered firearms and "areal target zonings."
explosives could not be justifiably or even color-
ably explained. In addition, there was general Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp w/ the mission of conducting security operations
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral
forces. The courts in the surrounding areas areas, for the purpose of establishing an
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
building and houses therein were deserted. and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain
our considered opinion that the instant case peace and order, the NCRDC installed
falls under one of the exceptions to the checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the MM.
first place, the military operatives, taking into Petitioners aver that, bec. of the
account the facts obtaining in this case, had institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was residents are worried of being harassed and of
being committed. There was consequently more their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their capricious and whimsical disposition of the
action. Furthermore, under the situation then military manning the checkpoints, considering
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity that their cars and vehicles are being subjected
to apply for and secure a search warrant from to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order.
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be Their alleged fear for their safety increased
dispensed with. when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down
There are two separate statutes allegedly in cold blood by members of the
penalizing different offenses with discrete NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed
penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
rebellion as a crime apart from murder,
homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and
illegal possession of firearms, that might apprehension at being harassed by the military
conceivably be committed in the course of a manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,
and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal. No proof has been presented before the
illegal possession of firearms committed in the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
course or as part of a rebellion. checks, the military, indeed, committed specific
Subject to the presence of the requisite violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful
elements in each case, unlawful possession of search and seizure of other rights.
an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion The constitutional right against
may give rise to separate prosecutions for a unreasonable searches and seizures is a
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. personal right invocable only by those whose
1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. infringed.
Constitutional Law II
Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal The victim may or may not get back the
property to be seized.-- A search warrant thing seized, depending on whether it is
may be issued for the search and seizure contraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it
of the following personal property: would not be returned, and only its suppression
(a) Subject matter of the offense; can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other party can ask for its return, even if no criminal
proceeds or fruits of the offense; and prosecution has yet been filed, as in the
Stonehill case.
Constitutional Law II
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) averments thereof w/ respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
F: Upon application of the officers of the was impossible for the judges who issued the
govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp. warrants to have found the existence of a
judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants probable cause, for the same presupposes the
against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c introduction of competent proof that the party
they were officers, directed to any peace against whom it is sought has performed
officer, to search the perons named and/ or the particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
residences, and to seize several personal prop. General search warrants are outlawed
as the "subject of the offense; stolen or bec. they place the sanctity of the domicile and
embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or the privacy of communication and
"used or intended to be used as the means of correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
RPC." all records of the petitioners and the
Alleging that the aforementioned aforementioned corporations, whatever their
search warrants are null & void, said petitioners nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari, command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things
prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ to be seized be particularly described-- as well
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the as tending to defeat its major objective: the
papers, documents, and things seized from the elimination of general warrants. RAM.
officers of the corporations; but the injunction
was maintained as regards those found & 7. Civil Action for Damages
seized in the residences of petitioners.
A civil case for damages can also be
ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
seized in the offices of the corporations, w/n
petitioners have cause of action to assail the In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if
validity of the contested warrants. the privilege of the writ is suspended, the court
(2) In connection w/ those found & can nevertheless entertain an action not only
seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the against the task force but even against the top
search warrants in question and the searches ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to
and seizures made under the authority thereof recover damages for the illegal searches and
are valid. seizures made in a despotic manner. By so
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n doing, one can indirectly inquire into the validity
said documents, papers and things may be of the suspension of the privilege.
used in evidence against petitioners.
HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of 8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and the seizure made in pursuance People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
thereof bec. said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the
from the personality of petitioners. The legality Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
of a seizure can be contested only by the party Job Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita
whose rights have been impaired thereby and Reyes, following standard operating procedure,
that the objection to an unlawful search and opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied opened appellant's box, a peculiar order
of by 3rd parties. emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a) Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cellophane wrapper protruding from the
cause to be determined by the judge in the opening of one of the gloves. He made an
manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
shall particularly describe the things to be took several grams of the contents thereof.
seized. Job Reyes reported the incident to the
None of these requirements has been NBI and requested a laboratory examination of
complied w/. It was stated that the natural and the samples he extracted from the cellophane
juridical persons has committed a violation of wrapper.
CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific offense It turned out that the dried leaves
had been alleged in said applications. The were marijuana flowering tops as certified by
Constitutional Law II
the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
the NBI. Consti. is not meant to be invoked against acts
Thereafter, an information was filed of private individuals finds support in the
against appellant for violation of RA 6425. deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject individual and the state. Its concern is not the
of the imputed offense had been obtained in relation between individuals, between a private
violation of his consti. rights against individual and other individuals. xxx"
unreasonable searches and seizures and (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas.)
privacy of communication and therefore argues The constitutional proscription against
that the same should be held inadmissible in unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint
evidence. directed only against the govt and its agencies
tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
The case at bar assumes a peculiar could only be invoked against the State to
character since the evidence sought to be whom the restraint against arbitrary and
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
by a private person, acting in a private capacity It the search is made at the behest or
and w/o the intervention and participation of inititiation of the proprietor of a private
state authorities. establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and w/o the intervention
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, of police authorities, the right against
allegedly in violation of appellant's unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only
constitutional rights, be invoked against the the act of private individuals, not law enforcers,
state? is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence committed by private individuals so as to bring
of governmental interference, the liberties it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
guaranteed by the Consti. cannot be invoked the govt.
against the State. This constitutional right
refers to the immunity of one's person, whether 9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST,
citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx as distinguished from SEARCH warrants,
(Villanueva v. Querubin.) the judge may rely simply on fiscal's
The contraband in the case at bar certification as to probable cause
having come into possession of the govt w/o the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of
unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S), the arrest) with Rule 126, Sec. 4 (on search
Court sees no cogent reason why the same warrants.)
should not be admitted against him.
Appellant, however, would like this Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of
Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal arrest may issue.-- (a) By the Regional
search and seizure of the evidence later on Trial Court.-- Upon the filing of an
used in prosecuting the case. The arguments of information, the Regional Trial Court may
appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or the issue a warrant for the arrest of the
lack of it. accused.
First, the factual considerations of the (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.--
case at bar readily foreclose the proposition If the municipal trial judge conducting the
that NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of preliminary investigation is satisfied after
the prohibited merchandise. Records of the an examination in writing and under oath
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, of the complainant and his witnesses in
the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who the form of searching questions and
made the search/ inspection. Such inspection answers, that a probable cause exists and
was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. that there is a necessity of placing the
Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. delivery respondent under immediate custody in
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
Bureau of Posts. he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Rules
Second, the mere presence of the NBI of Court.)
agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S
proscribed by the Consti. Merely to observe Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of
and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search. complainant; record.-- The judge must,
Having observed that w/c is open, where no before issuing the warrant, personally
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is examine in the form of searching
not search. questions and answers, in writing and
Constitutional Law II
under oath the complainant and any a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that
witnesses he may produce on facts the accused commited the crime charged.
personally known to them and attach to
the records their sworn statements HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY
together with any affidavits submitted. INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE
The requirement in the case of warrants of ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING
arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely on JUDGE OR OFFICER.
the certification of the fiscal that the latter has
conducted the preliminary investigation and has Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is
found probable cause on the part of the conducted on the basis of affidavits to
accused. The judge can issue the warrant on determine whether or not there is sufficient
the basis of the information filed by the fiscal ground to hold the accused for trial. To
and the certification of probable cause. determine whether a WA should issue, the
investigating judge must have examined in
The SC has allowed this practice in
writing and under oath the complainant and his
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers;
that it has been practice long settled and that a
he must be satisfied that a probable cause
judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis
exists; and there must be a need to place the
of the certificate.
accused under immediate custody in order not
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not
can always ask the fiscal to submit the records obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
of the preliminary investigation, so he could investigating judge to issue a WA, for the
determine for himself if, on the basis of the determination of whether it is necessary to
affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the
satisfied with the affidavits, he need not ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
summon the affiants. discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956) information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a Bam.
preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
complaint for robbery filed by complainant
Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
palay from a portion of her land directly
adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint
transmitted the records of the case to Provincial for libel against the petitioners, who were
Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star,
prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in based on the following statement in Beltran's
the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous
Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that
will recall, during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the
the transmittal of the records was “premature”
Pres. hid under her bed, while the firing was
because Judge Samulde failed to include the
going on-- perhaps the first Commander-in-
warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused.
Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal
Instead of submitting his counter-
Salvani stating that although he found that a affidavit, Beltran moved to dismiss the
probable cause existed, he did not believe that complaint. The fiscal deniend his motion after
Arangale should be arrested. finding a prima facie case against the
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case petitioners and filed the case in court w/c
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the
WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for
that the fiscal had not shown that he has a certiorari and prohibition.
clear, legal right to the performance of the act
to be required of the judge and that the latter HELD: The addition of the word "personally"
had an imperative duty to perform it. after the word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and
Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to the deletion of the grant of authority by the
issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to "other
of the 1985 Rules of Court. responsible officer as may be authorized by
law," has apparently convinced petitioner
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the Beltran that the Consti. now requires the judge
investigating judge to issue a WA of the to personally examine the complainant and his
accused in view of his finding, after conducting witnesses in his determination of probable
Constitutional Law II
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The key element in the first case is that
This is not an accurate interpretation. What the the offense was committed "in his presence".
Consti. underscores is the exclusive and The key element in the second case is that he
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to has "personal knowledge".
satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of (1986), the arrest made by the constabulary
arrest, the judge is not required to personally without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of
examine the complainant and his witnesses. information that he was a subversive was held
Following established doctrine and procedure, unconstitutional, since there was no personal
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and knowledge of the offense itself.
the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause The gun and subversive documents
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of found by the officer and admitted by the former
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no to be his were likewise held inadmissible
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's because the admission violated the Miranda
report and require the submission of supporting rule.
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable a. Strict enforcement of rule
cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar
hearing and deciding cases filed before their Masamlok, the appellant was arrested while
courts. plowing his farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on
xxx May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38
10. When arrest may be made without a caliber revolver was found buried under his
warrant house. Subversive documents were also seized
from a place near his house. Two arresting
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without officers testified that the appellant had readily
warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or admitted ownership of the gun and the
a private person may, without a warrant, documents. The appellant was found guilty of
arrest a person: the charge and sentenced to 20 years of
(a) When, in his presence, the reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion
person to be arrested has committed, is perpetua, as maximum, and the gun and
actually committing, or is attempting to documents were ordered confiscated.
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the
just been committed, and he has personal arresting officer must have personal knowledge
knowledge of facts indicating that the that the crime has been committed, is being
person to be arrested has committed it; committed, or is about to be committed, in
(c) When the person to be order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped offense must also be committed in his presence
from a penal establishment of place where or w/in his view. There is no such personal
he is serving final judgment or temporarily knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest of the
confined while his case is pending, or has appellant was illegal.
escaped while being transferred from one (2) Consequently, the incidental search
confinement to another. and seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm
In cases falling under paragraphs and document are inadmissible in evidence.
(a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested (3) The prosecution argues that the
without a warrant shall be forthwith appellant admitted ownership of the gun and
delivered to the nearest police station or claims that it was he who pointed to the place
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in where the subversive documents were hidden.
accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7. However, as the appellant was not informed of
(Rules of Court.) his constitutional rights at that time, his
admission is inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12
(1).] It is true that 6 days later he executed a
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of
arrests", cases where an arrest can be made counsel, but it was then already too late.
either by the peace officer or a private person (4) As the remaining evidence against
without need of a warrant. the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. and it
is uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant
Constitutional Law II
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and When questioned, he refused to give a written
thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an statement, although he admitted that he was a
info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double staff member of the executive of the NUFC and
Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in a ranking member of the International Dept. of
authority." the CPP.
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and arrived at RC's house. When arrested, he
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since readily submitted to the military agents that he
the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that
crim. case, who has been released on bail. he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in Mong," referring to RC and other members of
the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he the rebel group. Also found in Buenaobra's
arrested after the commission of said offense possession was a piece of paper containing the
for his arrest came a day after the shooting jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of
incident. However, Dural was arrested for being Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to
a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place
organization. Subversion being a continuing about 11 AM. After identifying themselves as
offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is military agents and after seeking permission to
justified as it can be said that he was search the place, w/c was granted, the military
committing an offense when arrested. agents conducted a search in the presence of
The arrest of persons involved in the occupants of the house and the barangay
rebellion whether as its fighting armed captain of the place.
elements, or for committing non-violent acts The military found the place to be
but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. They
capturing them in the course of an armed found firearms, subversive documents, ledgers,
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the journals, vouchers, among others. Amelia
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in admitted ownership of the documents seized.
court for a statutory offense. The arrest, Roque was brought to the Caloocan City
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. charging her
in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed. Another info. for
determination by a judge of the existence of viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial Roque and also to Buenaobra.
warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. At the
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or hearing, Buenaobra manifested his desire to
capturing persons committing overt acts of stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame,
violence against govt forces, or any other Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the behalf is now moot and academic.
rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile.) III
Dural was found guilty of the charge and
is now serving the sentence imposed upon him Anonuevo v. Ramos.
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no
longer available The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A)
and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
II At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C
arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo surveillance. The military noticed bulging
Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified. objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the
agents found them to be loaded guns. They
In view of the revelations made by were asked to show their permit or license to
Rogelio Ramos, a former NPA, the Constantino possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but
house in Marikina Heights was placed under they could not produce any. Hence, they were
military surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant brought to PC HQ for investigation.
to a search warrant , a search of the house was At the PC stockade, A was identified as
conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the "Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by
course of the search were found several their former comrades.
firearms, regular power supply, antennae, On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/
speaker and subversive documents. viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) 8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this
could not produce any permit or authority to Court.
possess the firearms, ammunition, radio, etc.
He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation.
Constitutional Law II
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the
unlawfully arrested bec. there was no previous arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a
warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result
they were carrying unlicensed firearms and of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses
ammunitions in their person when pointed no less than by former comrades of the
apprehended. petitioners.
There is also no merit in the contention VI
that the info. filed against them are null and
void for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info., Espiritu v. Lim.
w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC. Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of PISTON. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of
the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did 11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home
petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was awakened by
informations had been filed against them in his sister who told him that a group of persons
court. wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went
down to talk to them, he was immediately put
IV under arrest. When he asked for the warrant,
the men bodily lifted him and placed him in
Ocaya v. Aguirre. their owner type jeepney. He demanded that
his sister be allowed to accompany him, but the
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC men did not accede to his request.
Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art.
PC-INP Command, armed w/ a search warrant, 142, RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against
conducted a search of a house located at him.
Marikina Green Heights, believed to be In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a
occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP- press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-
NPA. In the course of the search, Ocaya media was heard urging all drivers and
arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. operators to go on nationwide strike on
Subversive documents and several rounds of 11/23/88 xxx."
ammunitions for a .45 cal. pistol were found in Policemen waited for petitioners outside
Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought to the PC the NPC in order to investigate him, but he gave
HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce the lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about
any permit or authorization to possess the 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and
ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. Rivera was "Bukas tuloy and welga natin ...
released from custody. hanggang sa magkagulo na."
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o
on behalf of these 2. warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of
R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/ the
delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is competent court, he may not be released on
justified. No. prel. inv. was conducted bec. she HC.
was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, VII
pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
V
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms, Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects
ammunitions and subversive documents alleged in the killing was Ramil Regala who was
to have been found in their possession, when arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon
arrested, did not belong to them, but were questioning, Regala pointed to Nazareno as one
planted by the military to justify their illegal of his companions in the killing of Bunye II. In
arrest. view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked
The petitioners, however, have not up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ
introduced any evidence to support their claim. for questioning.
On the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on xxx
the part of the arresting officers that could On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the
cause the said officers in these cases to accuse RTC-Binan, Laguna, issued a resolution denying
the petitioners falsely, has been shown. the petition for HC, it appearing that said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
Constitutional Law II
respondents by reason of an info. filed against PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR
him w/ the RTC-Mkti., MM. RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S
DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by
the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not
113, ROC, after he was positively implicated by rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or
his co-accused; and after investigation by the NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant.
police.
The obligation of an agent of authority We find no merit in the motions for
to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does reconsideration.
not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant
a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, is justified as it can be said that, w/in the
it is sufficient that the agent or person in contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113, ROC, he was
authority making the arrest has reasonably committing an offense, when arrested, bec.
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an Dural was arrested for being a member of the
act having the characteristic of a crime and that NPA, an outlawed org., where membership is
the same grounds exist to beleive that the penalized, and for subversion w/c, like rebellion
person sought to be detained participated is, under Garcia v. Padilla, a continuing crime.
therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.) Dural did not cease to be, or become
less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF
ARREST, simply bec. he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural
was identified as one of several persons who,
VIII the day before his arrest, w/o warrant, had shot
2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Dural,
In all the petitions here considered, given another opportunity, would have shot or
criminal charges have been filed in the proper would shoot other policemen, anywhere as
courts against the petitioners. The rule is that if agents or representative of an organized govt.
a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is It is in this sense that subversion and rebellion
in the custody of an officer under process are anchored on an ideological base w/c
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or compels the repetition of the same acts of
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or lawlessness and violence until the overriding
make the order, or if such person is charged objective of overthrowing organized govt is
before any court, the writ of HC will not be attained.
allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.) His arrest was based on "probable
cause."
On the Ilagan Doctrine. Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2
conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1)
As the Court sees it, re-examination or the person to be arrested has just committed an
re-appraisal, w/ a view to its abandonment, of offense and (2) the person arresting has
the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
answer and the better practice would be, not to person to be arrested is the one who committed
limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to the offense.
w/n the court w/c issued the process, It has been ruled that personal
judgement or order of commitment, or bef. knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant
whom the detained person is charged, had must be based upon probable cause, w/c
jurisdiction or not to issue the process, means on actual belief or reasonable grounds
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the of suspicion.
case, but rahter, as the court itself stated in The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the when, in the absence of actual belief of the
court must inquire into every phase and aspect arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
of petitioner's detention-- "from the moment to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
petitioner was taken into custody up to the the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
moment the court passes upon the merits of supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny in themselves to create the probable cause of
can the court satisfy itself that the due process guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
clause of our Constitution in fact has been suspicion therefore must be founded on
satisfied." probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Said confidential info. received by the
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA was
being treated for a gunshot wound was based
Constitutional Law II
People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784 Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person
under custodial investigation for the
F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a commission of an offense, shall have the
“buy-bust” operation. The two marked ten-peso right to be informed of his right to remain
bill were retrieved from him. He was asked to silent and to have competent and
sign his name on the two marked bills. The ten independent counsel preferably of his own
handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the choice. If the person cannot afford the
accused were submitted for examination. After services of counsel, he must be provided
finding these positive for marijuana, a case was with one. These rights cannot be waived
filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. except in writing and in the presence of
Linsangan denied the charge. The trial court counsel.
found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of (2) No torture, force, violence,
the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial threat, intimidation, or any other means
court erred in not holding that when the which vitiate the free will shall be used
policemen required him to initial the marked against him. Secret detention places,
bills, they violated his constitutional right to solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate forms of detention are prohibited.
himself while under custodial investigation. (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or sec. 17
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence
VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE
and civil sanctions for violations of this
TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
section, as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
HELD: Although the accused was not assisted
similar practices, and their families.
by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that
the police found tucked in his waist, his right
against self-incrimination was not violated for Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
his possession of the marked bills did not (1966)
constitute a crime; the subject of the
prosecution was his act of selling marijuana According to Chief Justice Warren, when
cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
presence of his initials on the marked bills, but atmosphere and run through menacing police
on the fact that the trial court believed the interrogation procedures, where compulsion is
testimony of the policemen that they arrested forcefully potential and his will is likely to be
him while he was actually engaged in the subjugated, the officers must undertake to
selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the afford proper safeguards by the reading of the
arresting party. The trial court gave more "Miranda rights" at the outset of the
credence to their categorical declarations than investigation to ensure that the statements
to the appellant’s denials. That is as it should made are truly the product of free choice.
be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to
Constitutional Law II
Any person under custodial or police rule is not yet applicable; otherwise, people who
investigation has the right to be informed of the could otherwise explain their innocence would
following rights: be arrested.
3. Right to counsel before and during the Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
interrogation Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61
Phil. LJ 409
a) To mitigate the dangers of
untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS
inherent pressures initially overcome by the PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY
right to remain silent may again run unless CONFESSIONS.
coupled with the right to counsel.
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion Since the introduction of the American
by the police. accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the
Phils., the rule has been that involuntary
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford confessions are inadmissible in evidence
counsel, then one will be provided for him by against the accused.
the state. The question is on whom the burden of
proof is placed. The early rule placed the
a) To inform him that if he does not burden of proving that the confession was
have counsel or cannot afford one, he does not voluntary and, therefore, admissible in
have to defend himself alone. evidence, on the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No.
b) To inform him that his poverty is no 619.) It was held that a confession not shown
reason why he should lose his right to counsel. to have been voluntarily given could be
objected to at any stage of the proceedings,
(The reading of these rights is no less even for the first time on appeal in the SC.
indispensable even if the person arrested is a Act No. 619 was later repealed by the
prominent Constitutional lawyer. Although he Admin. code of 1916, w/c placed the burden of
may already know these rights, the purpose is proof on the accused to show that his
not so much to inform him, as to assure him confession was involuntary. Under the new
that his interrogators are willing to respect his rule, it was sufficient that the confession was
rights amidst the pressure of custodial given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie
investigation.) its admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place
The reading of these rights is required when the SC held in Peo. v. de los Santos that
during "custodial investigation". "A confession, to be repudiated, must not only
be proved to have been obtained by force and
A police investigation consists of 2 stages: violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for
the law rejects the confession when, by force or
1) "General exploratory investigation" - violence or intimidation, the accused is
when the investigation consists merely of compelled against his will to tell a falsehood,
general questions to find out who might be the not even when such force and violence he is
culprit, but without being directed at anyone's compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of
guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda Peo. v. Villanueva, the Court stated "the
Constitutional Law II
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon
DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT the start of an interrogation, when the police
TO COUNSEL. officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit
info. and/ or confessions or admissions from the
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain accused. As the police line-up in this case was
warnings to be given by police interrogators not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner
bef. a person in custody may be interrogated, was not entitled to counsel xxx.
w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
has a right to remain silent. The purpose is to
apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled
Constitutional Law II
Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that he used against the accused. Certainly,
killed Pagdalian because he was abusive. these are blatant violations of of Sec. 12,
Art III of the 1987 Constitution which
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the protects the rights of the accused during
jeep was admissible in evidence. custodial investigation. Suzette.
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra- 1. Miranda rule not applicable to
judicial confession of the accused in evidence, confessions executed before January 17,
violated his Constitutional right to be informed, 1973
to remain silent and to have a counsel of his
choice, while already in police custody. Since
the extra-judicial confession was the only basis 2. Not applicable to res gestae statements
for the conviction of the accused, the trial
coust’s judgment was reversed. Bam. People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things
done") is an exception to the rule against
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 Hearsay evidence. Res gestae is based on the
belief that because certain statements are
F: After he and his wife were made naturally, spontaneously and without
individually hogtied and their house deliberation during the course of an event, they
ransacked, Atty. Garay was found dead leave little room for
with 3 gunshot wounds . For his death misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon
and the loss of their things on the hearing by someone else( i.e. by the witness
occasion thereof, Bandula, Sidigo, who will later repeat the statement to the court)
Dionanao, and Ejan were charged in court and thus the courts believe that such
for robbery with homicide. On the basis of statements carry a high degree of credibility.
the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) Evidence which can be admitted into evidence
allegedly made by Bandula and Dionanao as Res gestae fall into three headings:
during their custodial investigation which
the court found to "have all the qualities Words or phrases which either form part of, or
and have complied with all the explain a physical act,
requirements of an admissible confession, Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to
it appearing from the confession that belie concoction, and
acussed were informed of their rights Statements which are evidence as to someone's
under the law regarding custodial state of mind.
investigation and were duly represented
by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it disregarded 3. Not applicable to statements given in
the defenses interposed by the accused administrative investigations
and convicted Bandula. The 3 other
accused were acquitted for "insufficiency People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
of evidence".
It should at once be apparent that
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
of Bandula conformed with the dealt with in the section, namely:
constitutional requisites for its validity,
hence admissible in evidence. 1) the right against self-incrimination
i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to
HELD: NO be a witness against himself set out in the first
From the records, it can be sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
gleaned that when accused Bandula and Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution,
Dionanao were investigated immediately and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
after their arrest, they had no counsel Amendment of the American Constitution, and
present. If at all, counsel came in only a 2) the right of a person in custodial
day after the custodial investigation with interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect
respect to Dionanao, and 2 weeks later "under investigation for the commission of an
with respect to Bandula. And counsel who offense."
supposedly assisted both accused was
Atty. Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution
Tanjay, whose interest is admittedly indicates much more clearly the individuality
adverse to the accused and who is not an and disparateness of these rights. It has placed
independent counsel. On top of this, the rights in separate sections. The right
there are telltale signs that violence was against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is
Constitutional Law II
now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1) he shall have the right to remain
1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
custodial interrogation, which have been made such right,
more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 2) no force, violence, threat,
of the same Article III. intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him; and
Right Against Self-Incrimination 3) any confession obtained in violation
of these rights shall be inadmissible in
The first right, against self-incrimination, evidence.
mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who Miranda rights
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, He must be warned prior to any
or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT questioning that he has the right to remain
to "be compelled to be a witness against silent, that anything he says can be used
himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to against him in a court of law, that he has the
answer incriminating questions and not a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a he cannot afford an attorney one will be
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a must be afforded to him throughout the
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. interrogation. After such warnings have been
However, the right can be claimed only when given, such opportunity afforded him, the
the specific question, incriminatory in character, individual may knowingly and intelligently
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be waive these rights and agree to answer or make
claimed at any other time. It does not give a a statement. But unless and until such warnings
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to and waiver are demonstrated by the
decline to appear before the court at the time prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
appointed. as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
The right against self-incrimination is
not self-executing or automatically operational. The objective is to prohibit
It must be claimed. It follows that the right may "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in
be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
failure to claim it at the appropriate time. self- incriminating statement without full
warnings of constitutional rights."
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
The rights above specified, to repeat,
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-
Constitution also treats of a second right, or custody interrogation of accused persons."
better said, group of rights. These rights apply And, as this Court has already stated, by
to persons "under investigation for the custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" initiated by law enforcement officers after a
under investigation by police authorities; and person has been taken into custody or
this is what makes these rights different from otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
that embodied in the first sentence, that any significant way."
against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As
in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or Regards Giving of Testimony
administrative.
In fine, a person suspected of having
This provision granting explicit rights to committed a crime and subsequently charged
persons under investigation for an offense was with its commission in court, has the following
not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly rights in the matter of his testifying or
derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme producing evidence, to wit:
Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision
described as an "earthquake in the world of law 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN
enforcement." COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having
Section 20 states that whenever any been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
person is "under investigation for the of his liberty in some significant way, and on
commission of an offense"-- being interrogated by the police: the continuing
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
Constitutional Law II
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, describing the latter as a "mestizo." Two days
violence, threat, intimidation or any other later, Ongue was invited by the police to
means which vitiates the free will; and to have identify the suspect in a police line- up. Hatton
evidence obtained in violation of these rights was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Hatton
rejected; and alleges that at the time that he was made to
stand in the police line-up, he was not assisted
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN by counsel. Hence, his identification therein by
COURT Ongue is inadmissble.
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), 7. What may be waived: The right to
the SC noted that the stereotype "advice" remain silent and to counsel, but not the
appearing in practically all extrajudicial right to be given "Miranda warnings"
confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a legal form. The right to remain silent and to
Investigators automatically type it together with counsel, which are the effectuations of the
"opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign Miranda rights, can be waived.
it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style What cannot be waived are:
does not create an impression of voluntariness
or even understanding on the part of the 1. The right to be given the Miranda
accused. warnings. (For how can one waive what one
does not know?)
Whenever a Constitutional protection is
waived by one entitled to that protection, the 2. The right to counsel when making
presumption is always against the waiver. the waiver of the right to remain silent or to
Thus, the prosecution must prove with strongly counsel.
convincing evidence that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his
confession, and knowingly and deliberately 8. Exclusionary rule
manifested that he was not interested in having
a lawyer assist him during the taking of that Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
confession. (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) against him.
not admissible to prove the guilt of the accused, evidence in the subsequent criminal
it may be used against him to impeach his prosecution.
credibility by showing that he is lying in court,
so ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). C. Right to bail
of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it (f) The weight of the evidence
the suspension of the right to bail. Habeas against the accused;
Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail (g) Probability of the accused
refers to legal detention, or even detention that appearing in trial;
started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a (h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
case in court. (i) The fact that accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it (j) The pendency of other cases in
is a matter of discretion which the accused is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not required.
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
It is a matter of discretion in case the Where the right to bail exists, it should
evidence of guilt is strong. In such a case, not be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum
according to People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 that is excessive, otherwise, it becomes "a
(1966), the court's discretion to grant bail must promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a
be exercised in the light of a summary of the teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a
evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus, pauper's will" (Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De
the order granting or refusing bail must contain la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by the conclusion on whether or not In this case, a bail of P1.195 million
the evidence of guilt is strong. imposed against Mayor Camara for charges of
12 murders and 12 frustrated murder was found
The only time bail may be denied is excessive.
when (a) the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and (b) the evidence of guilt is The SC laid down the following
strong. guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967), later
With the abolition of the death penalty contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114.
(III, 20), and the automatic commutation of a
death sentence to reclusion perpetua, it is 1. Ability of the accused to give the
contended that when the 1987 Constitution bail.
denies the right to bail in offenses punishable 2. Nature of the offense.
by reclusion perpetua, it is meant to apply only 3. Penalty for the offense charged.
to those crimes which were once punishable by 4. Character and reputation of the
death. For if it includeds even those crimes accused
which before and now are really punishable by 5. Health of the accused.
reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very 6. Character and strength of the
spirit of the Constitution. evidence.
7. Probability of the accused appearing
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991) in trial.
8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
3. Bail in courts-martial 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested.
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991) 10. If the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases.
4. Standards for fixing bail
Even when the accused has previously
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail. the
guidelines.-- The judge who issed the remedy in this case is to increase the amount
warrant or granted the application shall of the bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
fix a reasonable amount of bail
considering primarily, but not limited to 5. Right to bail and right to travel
the following guidelines: abroad
(a) Financial ability of the accused
to give bail; Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode
(b) Nature and circumstances of and of changing the same within the limits
the offense; prescribed by law shall not be impaired
(c) Penalty of the offense charged; except upon lawful order of the court.
(d) Character and reputation of Neither shall the right to travel be
the accused; impaired except in the interest of national
(e) Age and health of the accused;
Constitutional Law II
greater reason. After all, "those who have less had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March
in life must have more in law." Justice should 1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that
never be limited to those who have the means. the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that,
It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had
scales should always be balanced and should abused complainant. This allegation as well as
never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor the fact that complainant failed to lock the door
one party over another. to the bathroom could only have been due to
It is with this thought in mind that we the fact that there was consent. The charge was
charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more filed, according to defense counsel de oficio,
circumspect with the duty imposed on them by only because the complainant's mother caught
law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) them.
so that courts will be above reproach and that This theory of the defense on appeal
never (if possible) will an innocent person be that there had been consent from the
sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor complainant, fails to generate doubt as to the
the guilty allowed to go scot-free. accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous
In this spirit, the Court ordered the situation indeed to believe that one, so young
appointment of a counsel de oficio for the and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world,
accused-appellant and for said counsel and the would permit the occurrence of an incestuous
Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very
upon submission of which the case would be own mother. The Court notes the sudden swift
deemed submitted for decision. in the theory of the defense from one of total
denial of the incident in question, by way of
From the records of the case, it is alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the
established that the accused- appellant was alleged consent of the complainant. This new
charged with the crime of rape in a verified version could only be attributed by the Court to
complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, the fact that counsel on appeal is different from
duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal the counsel in the trial court. Although the
Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal, Solicitor General has suggested that this
which reads as follows: sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought
That on or about the 24th day of by the accused or a desperate effort to get
March, 1984, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, himself acquitted, the Court deems it more
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the likely that this shift was caused by counsel de
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief
named accused, by means of force and without examining the entire records of the
intimidation did then and there wilfully, case. If the appointed counsel for the accused,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal on appeal, had read the records and transcripts
knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua of the case thoroughly, he would not have
against her will. changed the theory of the defense for such a
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, shift can never speak well of the credibility of
the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido the defense. Moreover, the rule in civil
Manalo of the Makati CLAO office, as counsel de procedure, which applies equally in criminal
oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on
charged. appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more
xxx conscientious, he would have known that the
The trial court found the accused- sudden shift would be violative of
appellant guilty of the crime of rape. aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental
to the cause of the accused-appellant (his
The theory of the defense at the trial client).
level was grounded on alibi. The accused The Court hereby admonishes members
claimed that at the time of the alleged com- of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties
mission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. as advocates of their clients' causes, whether
This claim was corroborated by the accused's acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest
brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as requires that an attorney exert his best efforts
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
submission of the voter's affidavit executed by client's cause." Lawyers are an indispensable
the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 part of the whole system of administering jus-
March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in tice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who
Romblon. performs that duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interests of his client; he
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
changed the theory of the defense. The new the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
theory presented by counsel de oficio is that community to the legal profession. This is so
Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant because the entrusted privilege to practice law
Constitutional Law II
carries with it correlative duties not only to the The right to a speedy trial means one
client but also to the court, to the bar and to that is free from vexatious and oppressive
the public. delays. Its objective is to free the innocent
While a lawyer is not supposed to know person from anxiety and expense of a court
all the laws, he is expected to take such litigation, or otherwise, to have his guilt
reasonable precaution in the discharge of his determined within the shortest possible time,
duty to his client and for his professional compatible with the presentation and
guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to consideration of whatever legitimate defense
uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts. the accused may interpose.
The fact that he merely volunteered his
services or the circumstance that he was a While reasonable delay may be allowed
counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters as determined on a case to case basis, an
the degree of professional responsibility owed unreasonable delay on the part of the
to his client. The ethics of the profession prosecution to present its case, thereby causing
require that counsel display warm zeal and the threat of penal liability to remain hanging
great dedication to duty irrespective of the over the head of the accused for an extended
client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any period of time, violates the right of the accused
attempted presentation of a case without to a speedy trial.
adequate preparation distracts the
administration of justice and discredits the Bar. The remedy of the accused in this case
is habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his
4. Right to be informed of nature and liberty, or certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
cause of accusation for the final dismissal of the case; and dismissal
based on the denial of the right to speedy trial
The arraignment in criminal prosecution amounts to an acquittal.
is precisely intended to comply with the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento,
cause of the accusation against him. As noted 36 SCRA 247 (1970), a case involving the
in Vera v. People, procedural due process prosecution for damage to property through
requires that the accused must be informed reckless imprudence which had been pending
why he is being prosecuted and what charge for 6 years, the last step taken being the start
he must meet. of the cross-examination of the complaining
witness, who did not appear thereafter. The SC
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977) ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, thus
acquitting the accused.
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
(2) Public Trial
F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical
injuries in the City Court of Cebu. After one A public trial does not require that the
postponement due to petitioner's failure to entire public can witness the trial. It is enough
appear, the case was reset. Again, petitioner if it is conducted at a place where one's
failed to appear, despite notice to his relatives and friends can be accommodated and
bondsman. The court then allowed the the public may know what is going on.
prosecution to present evidence despite the
fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. The right is not absolute. The court can
After the offended party had testified and order the public out of the trial room in the
presented documentary evidence, the court interest of morality and order.
found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed the
decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari. In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
(1970), the SC dismissed the contention of one
HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave party that the trial was conducted inside the
abuse of discretion and his decision is void. chamber of the judge on the ground that the
Because petitioner was not arraigned, he was objection came too late (the party only
not informed of the nature and cause of complained after the 14th hearing) and that the
accusation against him. Arraignment is an place was agreed upon by the parties for their
indispensable requirement in any criminal mutual convenience (the judge's room was air
proceeding. conditioned).
has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be Then, too, reference may also be made
accorded the constitutional right to public trial. to the undisputed fact at least fourteen
hearings had been held in chambers of the city
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of court Judge, without objection on the part of
the judge violative of the right to a public trial? respondent policemen. xxx
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of F: Mario Abong was originally charged with
identification; (b) implied waiver when the homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be
accused without any justifiable cause is absent arraigned, the case was reinvestigated on
at the trial on a particular date of which he had motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
notice; and (c) implied waiver when the accused reinvestigation, an amended information was
under custody who had been notified of the filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
date of trial escapes. pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced but while it
In cases in which there have been a was in progress, the prisoner took advantage of
waiver of the right to be present, whether the first information filed and succeeded in
expressed or implied, the trial may be held "in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting
absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in him bail and ordering his release. The
absentia are: (i) the accused has been respondent Judge, learning of the trickery,
arraigned; (ii) he was duly notified of the cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
hearing; and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone.
unjustified. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the
hearing continue in accordance with the
There can be no valid trial in absentia constitutional provision authorizing trial in
unless the accused has been arraigned, ruled absentia. The respondent Judge denied the
the SC in Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 motion and suspended all proceedings until the
(1977), a case involving a charge for slight return of the accused. Hence, this petition.
physical injuries where the accused failed to
appear and so the trial court allowed the HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v.
prosecution to present its evidence even if the Avanceña has been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19
accused has not yet been arraigned. [now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution]
Arraignment is crucial because it informs the which allows trial in absentia. The prisoner
accued of the nature and cause of the cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
accusation against him. Conviction without prosecution and possible eventual conviction
arraignment violates due process and ousts the provided only that (a) he has been arraigned;
court of its jurisdiction. (b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (c)
his failure to appear is unjustified. The right to
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra. be present at one's trial may now be waived
except only at that stage where the prosecution
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia intends to present witnesses who will identify
deprived petitioner of his right to be heard by the accused. The defendant's escape will be
himself and counsel. The indispensable considered a waiver of this right and the
requirement for trial in absentia is that it should inability of the court to notify him of the
come after arraignment. VV. subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. VV.
People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) F: For repeated failure of the accused
Dario Gamayon to appear, respondent Judge
Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases declared the bail bond forfeited and required
the bondsmen to produce the accused within
thirty days and to show cause why no judgment
Constitutional Law II
should be rendered against them. However, on 1. Generally, the accused has the right
motion of defense counsel, who invoked the last to be present at all stages the trial (from
sentence of Art. IV, section 19 [now Art. III, sec. arraignment to rendition of judgment).
14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent Judge
reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial 2. If the accused is in the custody of the
could be conducted after the accused has been law, his presence during the trial is a duty only
arraigned and identified, the conclusion is if the court orders his presence to enable the
inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of prosecution witnesses to identify him. (People
the bail bond is premature." The prosecution v. Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military
filed a petition for certiorari. Commiission, infra. modifying People v.
Avancena, infra.)
HELD: The innovation introduced by the
present Constitution goes no further than to 3. Although the accused is not in the
enable a judge to continue with the trial even if custody of the law (and more so if he is in the
the accused is not present under the conditions custody of the law), his presence is required in
therein specified. It does not give the accused the following cases:
the right to jump bail. VV.
a) Arraignment, regardless of
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988) the offense;
The doctrine contended for by appellant F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal
would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of case pending before the Court of First Instance
a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and
his identity. Such an application of the Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime
prohibition under discussion certainly could not of adultery. The court ordered the defendant
be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to the
features by the court or by witnesses, can not examination of one or two competent doctors to
violate the privilege granted under the determine if she was pregnant or not. The
Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused refused to obey the order on the
accused as a witness it does not call upon the ground that such examination of her person
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. was a violation of the constitutional provision
Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she
way from the accused, is not testimony but his was found in contempt of court and was
body his body itself. ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination
required by the court.
The accused can be ordered to expel
the morphine from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to
Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)). permit her body to be examined by physicians
to determine if she is pregnant, violates that
U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917) portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights
Counsel for appellant raises the Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no
constitutional question that the accused was person shall be compelled in any criminal case
compelled to be a witness against himself. The to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
contention is that this was the result of forcing prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
the accused to discharge the morphine from his incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
person of an accused is along the same line as accused is permissible. The proviso is that
requiring him to exhibit himself before the torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts
court; or putting in evidence papers and other fall within or without the rule with its corollary
articles taken from the room of an accused in and proviso must, of course, be decided as
his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking cases arise.
a substance from the body of the accused to be It is a reasonable presumption that in an
used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced examination by reputable and disinterested
construction of the paragraph of the Philippine physicians due care will be taken not to use
Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, violence and not to embarass the patient any
substance, or thing taken from a person more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
accused of crime could not be given in objection to the physical examination being
evidence. The main purpose of this made by the family doctor of the accused or by
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial doctor of the same sex can be seen.
compulsion by oral examination in order to
extort unwilling confessions from prisoners The taking of footprint sample to see if it
implicating them in the commission of a crime. matches the ones found in the scene of the
(Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.) crime is allowed (People v. Salas and People v.
Sara).
The accused can be made to take off However, making the accused take
her garments and shoes and be photographed. dictation to get a specimen of her handwriting
(People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)). is not allowed, for this involves the use of the
mental process. [Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil.
485 (1937).]
A woman accused of adultery can be
compelled to show her body for physical Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor
v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed F: In connection with this administrative
against present standards, however, it is case, said respondent filed, six letters which, for
possible that this method of determining purposes of identification, were marked as
pregnancy would violate due process as being Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He contends that
too barbaric. said six letters are the complainant's, but the
latter denied it while she was testifying as a
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920) witness in rebuttal.
Constitutional Law II
interest and tacit admission of the crime he could secure a restraining order from a
charged. The second paragraph of the competent authority.
Certification is a self-incriminatory statment A decision was rendered by the lower
made at a time when the spouses were not court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of
assisted by counsel and under circumstances petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and
(in the course of or immediately after the prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling
search of the residence and seizure of the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
quantities of shabu) which render intelligent the complainant in said investigation without
waiver of their right against self-incrimination his consent and against himself."
open to serious doubt.
The Court considers that there is HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of
nothing to prevent admission of the his license as a medical practitioner, for some
“Certification” to substantiate the fact that a an even greater deprivation.
search warrant issued by a judge had been Why it should be thus is not difficult to
brought to the attention of the spouses in the discern. The constitutional guarantee, along
course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried with other rights granted an accused, stands for
out at their residence and that in the course a belief that while crime should not go
thereof, no force or intimidation had been unpunished and that the truth must be
exercised upon the spouses. revealed, such desirable objectives should not
Notwithstanding such, the accused were be accomplished according to means or
convicted of the crime charged against them. methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and
2. In what proceedings available more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those
The privilege is available in any suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
proceedings, even outside the court, for they due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren,
may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution. "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must
In Pascual v. Board of Medical accord to the dignity and integrity of its
Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969), the SC held citizens."
that the privilege against self-incrimination Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The
extends to administrative proceedings which Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
it was held that a doctor who was being which government may not force to surrender
investigated by a medical board for alleged to his detriment." So also with the observation
malpractice and would lose his license if found of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to
guilty, could not be compelled to take the a private enclave where he may lead a private
witness stand without his consent. life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." In the light of the above, it could
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA thus clearly appear that no possible objection
344 (1969) could be legitimately raised against the
correctness of the decision now on appeal. We
F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, hold that in an administrative hearing against a
filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
prayer for preliminary injunction against the consistently with the self-incrimination clause,
Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent- compel the person proceeded against to take
appellant. It was alleged therein that at the the witness stand without his consent.
initial hearing of an administrative case for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the
announced that he would present as his first privilege was held to extend to fact-finding
witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the investigation by an adhoc body.
respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. Respondent- A person can be compelled to testify provided
appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of he is given immunity co-extensive with the
such a plea, at the same time stating that at the privilege against self- incrimination
next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965,
petitioner-appellee would be called upon to F: The respondents led by General Fabian
testify as such witness, unless in the meantime Ver and Major General Prospero Olivas testified
before the Agrava Board looking into the killing
Constitutional Law II
of former Senator Benigno Aquino. They were of a witness. The problem concerns the extent
subsequently accused of murder in two cases of immunity that the State must grant in order
for the killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando to protect the privilege against self-
Galman. They were charged as accessories in incrimination.
both. The prosecution offered in evidence the
testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava Transactional Immunity
Board, but on the latter's objections, the
Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. The In a transactional immunity, a person is
private and public prosecutions filed petitions given immunity from prosecution of the crime in
for certiorari. connection with which he gave his testimony.
The immunity is from the prosecution, not
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before merely from the use of the testimony. Thus,
the Agrava Board were "under investigation for even if the guilt of the person testifying can be
the commission of the offense" within the proven by independent means, he can not be
meaning of Art. III, sec. 12. It is to be noted that prosecuted anymore.
the framers of the Constitution did not adopt
the Miranda reference to "custodial Use and Fruit Immunity
investigation." The subject matter dealt with
and the questioning before the Agrava Board In a use and fruit immunity, a person is
indubitably evinced purposes other than merely exempted from the use of his testimony as well
determining the surrounding facts and as the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened
circumstances of the assassination. The up in a criminal prosecution arising from what
respondents were called to determine their he testified on. The immunity in this case is
probable involvement in the crime. Yet they from the testimony given. Thus, if the state can
were not informed or at the very least warned procure evidence, independent of the testimony
of their right to remain silent and that any and its fruits, it can prosecute the person
statement given by them may be used against testifying nevertheless.
them. The first portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886
denied them the right to remain silent, and
gave power to the Board to punish refusal to History in the United States
testify. The SC said it is not satisfied that when
they testified they waived their constitutional In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the
right not be compelled to be a witness against SC ruled that the only way to respect the right
themselves, much less their right to remain against self-incrimination is to give
silent. The SC also said it cannot be contended transactional immunity; anything less violates
that the privilege against self- incrimination the constitutional right.
applies only to criminal prosecutions. Art. III,
sec. 17 of the Const. provides that "No person Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the
shall be compelled to be a witness against Compulsory Testimony Act, providing for
himself." transactional immunity.
Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission Board, but not immunity from prosecution by
on Human Rights shall have the following reason or on the basis thereof. VV
powers and functions
xxx
(8) Grant immunity from 4. Exclusionary rule
prosecution to any person whose
testimony or possession of documents or Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
other evidence is necessary or convenient (3) Any confession or admission
to determine the truth in any investigation obtained in violationof this or Section 17
conducted by it or under its authority. hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Use and Fruit Immunity
The paradigmatic application of the
On the other hand, "use and fruit exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced
immunity can be found in P.D. 1886, which confession, and not so much on uncounselled
created the Agrava Fact Finding Board, and statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of a
which was the subject-matter of Galman v. person cannot be used in evidence against that
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985). person.
In this case, Ver and other high-ranking 5. Effect of denial of the privilege by
AFP officials were made to testify before the court
Agrava Board investigating the double murder
of Sen. Aquino and Galman. Under P.D.1886, When the privilege against self-
every person summoned by the Board has to incrimination is violated outside of court, say,
appear and testify on pain of being held in by the police, then the testimony, as already
contempt. Any testimony made, in turn, was noted, is not admissible under the exclusionary
exempted from being "used" in a criminal rule.
prosecution. Despite this however, a case was
file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan, and one When the privilege is violated by the
of the evidence presented was the testimony he court itself, that is, by the judge, the court is
made before the Board. When objected to, the ousted of its jurisdiction, all its proceedings are
Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. And so null and void, and it is as if no judgment has
the matter was raised to the SC on certiorari. been rendered. A classic case is Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968).
The SC held that the testimony could Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968)
not be used in a subsequent proceeding. it
hinted that were it not for the provision in the F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented
decree conmpelling attendance and testimony in his original and supplementary petitions
on pain of being held in contempt, the accused invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is
could have invoked the right against self- entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from
incrimination. But since the state needed the imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial
testimony, it gave them immunity and so now, which resulted in his conviction he was denied
the State must honor its obligation and disallow his constitutional right not to be compelled to
the use of the testimony in the criminal testify against himself. There is his prayer, too,
prosecution. that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
supra. dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and
of mandamus to direct the said court to forward
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally his appeal to this Court for the reason that he
classified into two: one, which grants "use was raising purely questions of law.
immunity" and the other, which grants what is Accused Chavez was made to testify
known as "transactional immunity." The as a witness for the prosecution without him
distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" being considered a state witness inspite of
prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony objections by his counsel.
and its fruits in any manner in connection with Roger Chavez was found guilty. The
the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
other hand, "transactional immunity" grants offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an testimony as witness for the prosecution
offense to which his compelled testimony establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
relates. PD 1886, sec. 5 grants merely immunity The trial court branded him "a self- confessed
from use of any statement given before the culprit".
Constitutional Law II
Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self- counted against him. His testimony is not of his
incrimination was violated own choice. To him it was a case of compelled
submission. He was a cowed participant in
Ruling: YES proceedings before a judge who possessed the
The right agianst self-incrimination is power to put him under contempt had he
"not merely a formal technical rule the chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of testifying. The court made it abundantly clear
the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a that his testimony at least on direct
defendant a valuable and substantive right; it examination would be taken right then and
is fundamental to our scheme of justice. thereon the first day of the trial.
The constitutional proscription was The course which petitioner takes is
established on broad grounds of public policy correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative
and humanity; of policy because it would place writ. It is traditionally considered as an
the witness against the strongest temptation to exceptional remedy to release a person whose
commit perjury, and of humanity because it liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
would be to extort a confession of truth by a accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.
kind of duress every species and degree of Such defect results in the absence or loss of
which the law abhors. jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial
Therefore, the court may not extract and the consequent conviction of the accused
from a defendant's own lips and against his will whose fundamental right was violated. That
an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as void judgment of conviction may be challenged
much as resort to compulsory disclosure, by collateral attack, which precisely is the
directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him function of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is
as a confession of the crime or the tendency of proper to challenge a conviction where the
which is to prove the commission of a crime. consitutional rights of the accused were
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to violated.
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the A court which denies the accused of his
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction.
exercise of his own free, genuine will. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a
Compulsion as it is understood here court without jurisdiction is void, and one
does not necessarily connote the use of imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional habeas corpus.
statements. Pressure which operates to
overbear his will, disable him from making a Notes on the case: In this case, the
free and rational choice, or impair his capacity accused Chavez was compelled by the judge
for rational judgment would in our opinion be with the threat of being held in contempt to
sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force take the witness stand, in spite of his objection
testimony from the unwilling lips of the that he had the right to remain silent and not to
defendant." be a witness against himself. And so he took
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a the witness stand and was convicted by
different tier of protection from an ordinary qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be failed to file the appellant's brief and so the
compelled to take the witness stand and claim appeal was dismissed, the judgment became
the privilege as each question requiring an final and executory, and he served his
incriminating answer is shot at him, and sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC
accused may altogether refuse to take the on habeas corpus, contending that his
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all convictioin was void because it was rendered on
questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling the basis of evidence obtained in the violation
an accused as a witness for the People would be of his right against self- incrimination. The SC
to incriminate him. granted the petition and released him.
Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case,
xxx With all these, we have no is an extraordinary post-conviction, mid-
hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to sentence, remedy. The petition for habeas
testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of corpus is such that it inquires into all questions
his constitutional right to remain silent. It of illegal detention. When the judge compelled
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. the accused to take the witness stand, he was
He did not volunteer to take the stand and in ousted of his jurisdiction and all subsequent
his own defense; he did not offer himself as a proceedings became void. Ultimately, the
witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right judgment of conviction and even the sentence
upon being called to testify. If petitioner were likewise void, thus making the detention
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of of Chavez illegal, and thus actionable by
his fear of being accused of perjury or being put habeas corpus.
under contempt, this circumstance cannot be
Constitutional Law II
The case also illustrates the difference ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused
between the ordinary witness and the accused. before a civil court. It is also clear from the
A witness can be conmpelled to take the stand; records that the acts for which Sgt. Animas was
he can only object to the questions as they charged had nothing to do with the
come, invoking his right against self- performance of official duty.
incrimination. The crime for which the petitioners were
But in the case of the accused, he charged was committed on November 10, 1971
cannot even be made to take the witness stand, long before the proclamation of martial law.
for the only purpose of such is to incriminate There was no question about the case being
him. prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil
Of course, the moment the accused courts at the time. Now that it is already late
agrees to take the stand, he is deemed to have 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past,
waived his right, and must now thus submit hopefully never more to return, there is no
himself to cross-examination. more reason why a murder committed in 1971
should still be retained, at this time, by a
E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial military tribunal.
of civilians by military courts
Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,
SCRA 406 (1986) 150 SCRA 144
F: This petition challenges the Military trial of civilians void even under Martial
jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve Law if the civil courts are open
accused persons, only one of whom is in the
military, for the offense devoid of any national F: Petitioners were found guilty of
security or political complexion and committed subversion by the respondent military
long before the proclamation of martial law, commission and sentenced to death. They filed
The petitioners were charged with a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari,
murder in connection with the alleged killing of prohibition and mandamus before the SC,
Yanson, a political leader,during the November questioning the jurisdiction of the military
11 elections. tribunal.
The accused were arrested almost a
year later, on September 21, 1972 after martial HELD: In Aquino v. Military Commission (1975),
law was proclaimed. It was only in 1974 that a the SC held that "Martial law creates and
"summary preliminary investigation" was exception to the general rules of exclusive
conducted by a PC captain belonging to the jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the
Judge Advocate General Service. The petitioners laws of war as well as those of a civil character,
were recommended for prosecution before the triable by military tribunals.xxx" Due process,
Military Tribunal, considering that one of them, however demands that in all criminal cases
petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to,
personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate among others, a trial. As explained by Justice
General filed the corresponding charge sheet, Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v.
but he modified the crime charged from Military Commission supra: "Judicial power is
"Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC
Revised Administrative Code" in Relation to and insuch inferior courts as are established by
Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential law. Judicial power exists only in the courts
Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession of Firearms which have the exlcusive power to hear and
with Murder." determine those matters which affect the life or
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of liberty or property of a citizen." Since we are
National Defense referred the case to the not an enemy occupied territory and even on
Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate the premise that martial continues in force, the
General's Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned military tribunals cannot try and exercise
the same to respondent Military Commission jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
No. 27. committed by them which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts.
Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. xxx
27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case "The presiding officer at a court martial
is not a judge whose objectivity and
Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction. independence are protected by tenure and
We apply the rule in Rolando A. de undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial
Guzman v. Hon. Alejandro R. Leopando, et al, tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially
(G.R. No. 62798, December 22, 1983 and March different rules of evidence and procedure apply
13, 1984) where the lone military personnel was in military trials. Apart from these differences,
Constitutional Law II
the suggestion of the possibility of influence on which time the petitioners may apply for bail for
the actions of the court-martial by the officer their temporary release.
who convenes it, selects its members and the The Solicitor General not unreasonably
counsel on both sides, and who usually has anticipates questions to arise as to the
direct command and authority over its availability of certain defenses to the petitioners
members is a pervasive one in military laws, upon their prosecution before the civil courts. It
despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the seems evident, however, that no breach of the
danger. VV. constitutional prohibition against twice putting
an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense would result from the retrial of
the petitioners" cases, for the simple reason
that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts
Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988) martial to try and convict the petitioners
prevented the first jeopardy from attaching.
F: Habeas corpus proceedings were Valid previous proceedings are required in order
commenced in this Court on October 1, 1986 to that the defense of double jeopardy can be
test the legality of the continued detention of raised by the accused in the second
some 217 so-called "political detainees prosecution.
arrested in the nine-year span of official martial
rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative
Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for adjudication of guilt
common crimes before various courts martial;
if any of these offenses had any political color, Bill of Attainder
this had neither been pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are A "bill of attainder" is a law which
civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military substitutes the legislative determination of guilt
personnel. for a judicial determination. Through a statute,
the legislature finds individuals or groups guilty,
Issue: Whether or not military courts have without the benefit of being proven so in court.
jurisdiction over civilians
A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill
Ruling: No of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the
As held in Olaguer: A military death penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and
jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty).
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly In People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972),
committed by them as long as the civil courts the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which
are open and functioning, and that any declared the Communist Party of the Philippines
judgment rendered by such body relating to a a clear and present danger to Philippine
civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on security, and thus prohibited membership in
the part of the military tribunal concerned such organization, was contended to be a bill of
The fact cannot be ignored, however, attainder. The SC, however, dismissed the
that crimes appear to have been committed, contention, holding that although the law
and there are accusations against herein mentions the CPP in particular, its purpose is
petitioners for those offenses. Olaguer cannot not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or
and does not operate to absolve the petitioners to justify the legislative determination that
of these charges, or establish that the same are membership in such organization is a crime
baseless, so as to entitle them to immediate because of the clear and present danger to
release from detention. It is not to be forgotten national security.
that the victims in offenses ascribed to the
petitioners have as much interest as the State
has to prosecute the alleged authors of the People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
misdeeds. Justice will be better served if the
detention of such of the petitioners as are not F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the
hereby ordered released or excepted, is constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act,
continued until their cases are transferred to which outlaws the Communist Party and other
the ordinary courts having jurisdiction, and the "subversive associations", and punishes any
necessary informations have been filed against person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
them therein, as has already been done in the acts affiliates himself, with, becomes or remains
case of petitioners Imperial D. Usman and Samu a member," of the Party and of any other
Gumal. The State should be given a reasonable similar "subversive" organization.
period of time to accomplish this transfer, at
ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.
Constitutional Law II
Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall What the Consitution further prohibits is
have the right to a speedy disposition of imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax,
their cases before all judicial, quasi- which is a tax imposed on certain persons
judicial, or administrative bodies. regardless of their property or business. The
prohibition does not apply to non-payment of
property taxes and taxes on privilege.
In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of
(1953) the SC ruled that it was the form of innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been
punishment as fixed in antiquity (pillory overturned by the prosecution
desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity,
that constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty HELD: NO.
under the 1935 Constitution. Thus a An accused is presumed innocent until
disproportionate penalty (10 years the contrary is proved. The burden of proof is
imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual upon the prosecution and until such burden is
because it is only a matter of severity of an sufficiently discharged , the accused continues
acceptable form of punishment (imprisonment). to enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the
instant case, the lower court convicted Lucrecio
The SC spoke in a different way in on the basis of its conclusion that he was
People v. Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter
sentenced and he served at the national and Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the
penitentiary for 20 years before the case came assailants, and that therefore, his defense of
to the SC. The Court said that Borja had been alibi would not prosper. Unfortunately, the
living in the shadow of death. Although the testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses
sentence was initially valid, it had become cruel did not categorically stated or proved that
by the lapse of time. And yet, this was a form Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim.
of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual.
Constitutional Law II
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for offense was made without the consent of the
the same offense. If an act is punished by fiscal and the offended party.
a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a Identity of offenses and identity of act
bar to another prosecution for the same
act. When an act gives rise to two or more
offense which are punished by the same
authority, and an individual is convicted,
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; acquitted, or the case dismissed without his
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968): consent, of one of these offense (Crime A),
there is no double jeopardy if he is charged of
Constitutional Law II
another offfense (Crime B) flowing from the court of summarily dismissing a criminal case
same act. Double jeopardy arises only when he for theft on the ground that it merely involved a
is again charged of that same offense (Crime question of ownership deprived the prosecution
A). Thus, this is called double jeopardy by of due process by denying it the chance to
"identity of offenses". introduce its evidence. This ousted the court of
its juridsiction.
But when an act which give rise to two
or more offenses is punished by two different In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
authorities (a law and an ordinance), then if an 43 (1986), the SC declared the criminal
individual is convicted, acquitted, or the case prosecution of the 26 accused in the Aquino-
dismissed without his consent, of any of these Galman double murder case a "mistrial" after
offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by the SC commission found that the
law), even if he is charged of another offense Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan
which is punished by the other auhtority (Crime prosecutors had been summoned by the
B by ordinance), there is double jeopardy, President and instructed on how to conduct the
because both offenses, one punished by a law trial. Due process is a right not only of the
and the other punished by an ordinance, flowed accused but also of the State. Once the court
from the same act. Thus, this is called double deprives either party, which in this case is the
jeopardy by "identity of act." State, of a fighting chance, then it is ousted
from its jurisdiction, and double jeopardy would
Sum: If only a law in involved, there is not apply. Thus, the accused were ordered
double jeopardy only when there is an identity retried.
of offenses. But is a law and an ordinance are
involved, there is double jeopardy when there is 1. Two situations contemplated
an identity of act.
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
Identity of Offenses:
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht
If a married man maintains as violation of Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of
concubine a married woman not his wife, the Batangas City prohibiting the installation of
man is guilty of both concubinage and electric wiring devices without authority from
adultery. From the same act (cohabiting with the city government. He admitted installing the
the married woman), two offenses arise. And electric wiring devices found by the police in
yet he can be prosecuted for both because, the order to decrease the readings of electric
two offenses coming from the same authority, current. The case was however dismissed on
there is no identity of offenses. the ground that the offense had prescribed.
Fourteen days later, the City Fiscal filed another
Identity of Act: case for theft against him. The court also
dismissed this case on the ground of double
People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987), jeopardy. The prosecution appealed contending
Relova was prosecuted under an ordinance of the offense was different.
Batangas City for the use of wiring to tap
electricity without permission from the local HELD: The contention has no merit. The first
authorities, but the case was dismissed because sentence of Art. III, sec. 21 states the general
the crime has prescribed. So the fiscal filed a rule: the constitutional protection against
case for theft of electricity under the RPC. The double jeopardy is not available where the
SC ruled there was double jeopardy already, second prosecution is for an offense that is
and so the second case could no longer be different from the offense charged in the first or
filed. For although the offenses were different, prior prosecution, although both may be based
both flowed from the same act. And in this from the same facts. The second sentence
case, the act was punished by a law and an provides an exception: that the protection
ordinance. against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance
Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy be different from the offense charged
subsequently under the national statute such as
If the court has no jurisdiction, or was the RPC provided that both offenses spring from
ousted of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the the same act or set of acts. VV.
right to due process of the parties, the decision
is null and void, the accused may again be
charged. People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154
SCRA 175 (1987)
In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166
(1985), the SC, held that the move by the trial
Constitutional Law II
F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto malum in se, which criminal intent is an
Pangilinan, was accused of violating Sec.7, in indispensable ingredient. Suzette.
relation to Sec. 11 RA 3060 and Art. 201(3) of
the RPC, in two separate informations filed with
the City Court of Manila. Upon arraignment, 2. Rules of Court provisions
accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both
charges. The other accused, Pangilinan, was Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former
not arraigned as he is still at large. Gonzales conviction of acquittal; double jeopardy.--
filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 When an accused has been convicted or
cases on the ground that said informations did acquitted, or the case against him
not charge an offense. Motion denied. Later, dismissed or otherwise terminated
he again moved to quash the information in one without his express consent by a court of
of the Criminal case on the ground of duble compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid
jeopardy, as there was according to him, also complaint or information or other formal
pending aginst him another criminal case, charge sufficient in form and substance to
where the informatin allegedly contain the sustain a conviction and after the accused
same allegations as the information in the first had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
criminal case. Court granted the motion. or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the
HELD: NO same or frustration thereof, or for any
It is a settled rule that to raise the offense which necessarily includes or is
defense of double jeopardy, 3 requisites must necessarily included in the offense in the
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have former complaint of information.
attached prior to the second; (2) the first However, the conviction of the
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; accused shall not be a bar to another
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for teh prosecution for an offense which
same offense, or the second offense includes or necessarily includes the offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense charged in in the former complaint or information
the first information, or is an attempt to commit under any of the following instances:
the same or a frustration thereof. All these (a) the graver offense developed
requisites do not exist in this case, due to supervening facts arising from the
The 2 informations with which the same act or omission consituting the
accused was charged , do not make only one former charge;
offense, contrary to private repondent's (b) the facts constituting the
allegation. In other words, the offense defined graver charge became known or were
in Sec. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the discovered only after the filing of the
exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed former complaint or information; or
by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
does not include or is not included inthe offense was made without the consent of
offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC the fiscal and of the offended party.
punishing the exhibition of indecent and In any of the foregoing cases,
immoral motin pictures. where the accused satisfied or serves in
The elements of the 2 offenses are whole or in part the judgement, he shall
different. The gravamen of the offense be credited with the same in the event of
defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of conviction for the graver offense.
any motion pictures which has not been
previously passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures. The motion picture may be Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950)
indecent or immoral but if it has not been
previously approved by the Board, its public F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI,
showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the Rizal with frustrated homicide , for having
other hand, the offense punished in Art 201(3) allegedly inflicted upon Obillo, with a kitchen
of the RPC is the public showing os indecent or knife and with intent to kill, several serious
immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just wounds on different parts of the body, requiring
motion pictures. medical attendance for a period of more than
The nature of both offenses also differs. 30 days, and incapacitating him from
The crime punished in RA 3060 is malum performing his habitual labor for the same
prohibitum in wh criminal intent need not ber period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am,
proved because it is presumed, while the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
offense punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is chargde. At 10:15 am of the same day, Obillo
died from his wounds. An amended information
Constitutional Law II
was filed charging accused with consummated prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru
homicide. Accused filed a motion to quash the reckless imprudence if the offended party dies
amended information alleging double jeopardy. as a result of the same injuries.
Motion denied.
HELD: YES
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. Well settled is the rule that one who has
been charged with an offense cannot be
HELD: NO charged again with the same or identical
Double jeopardy means that when a offense though the latter be lesser or greater
person is charged with an offense and the case than the former. However as held in the MELO
is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or case, the rule of identity does not apply when
in any other manner without the consent of the the second offense was not in existence at the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged time of teh first prosecution , for the reason that
with the same or identical offense. The phrase in such case there is no possibility for the
"the same offense" has always been construed accused during the first prosecution, to be
to mean not only that the second offense convicted for an offense that was inexistent.
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the
in the first information, but also that the two day the information was filed , and the accused
offenses are identical. There is identity was arraigned 2 days after or on October 20,
between the two offenses when the evidence to 1972 . When the information for homicide thru
support a conviction for one offense would be reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. October 24, 1972, the accused was already in
This rule of identity however does not doubly jeopardy. Suzette.
apply, however, when the second offense was
not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight
an offense that was then inesistent. Thus, physical injuries before the City Court of
where the accused was charged with physical Bacolod, the offended party being Lam
injuries and after conviction the accused dies, Hock who, according to the medical cerificate
the charge for homicide against the same issued by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, was confined
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. since April 8 1968 up to the present time for
Accordingly, an offense may be said to head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial
necessarily include or to be necessarily included Hspital. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16,
in another offense, for the purpose of 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer
detremining the existence of double jeopardy, 10 days for arresto menor. On April 18, 1968,
when both offenses were in existence during the provincial fiscal filed an information
the pendency of the first prosecution, for charging the same defendant with frustrated
otherwise, if the second offense was then murder arising from the same act against the
inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further
during the first prosecution, and consequently a diagnosis, the healing period for the injuries
subsequent charge for the same cannot caused to accused was found to be longer. A
constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette. motion to quash was filed by the accused on
the ground of double jeopardy.
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already
SCRA 637 (1983) been convicted of slight physical injuries for
injuries inflicted on Lam Hock , and had served
F: This is a petition to review the order of sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for
the City Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing frustrated murder for the same act committed
the information for homicide thru reckless against the same person
imprudence filed against Gapay, in a criminal
case on the ground of double jeopardy. HELD: NO.
Respondent court held that the accused having In order not to violate the constitutional
been previously tried and convicted of serious prohibition on double jeopardy, there is the
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for indispensable requirement of the existence of a
the resulting death of the victim would place new fact which supervenes for which the
the accused in double jeopardy. defendant is responsible changing the character
of the crime imputed to him and together with
ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted the facts existing previously constituting a new
for serious physical injuries thru reckless and distinct offense.
imprudence and convicted thereof may be
Constitutional Law II
In this case, there is no supervening fact Philippines to due process of law. The SC
which occurred to justify the non-existence of dismissed. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan
double jeopardy. The wound causing the delay rendered its decision acquitting all the accused
in the healing of the injuries caused to the of the crime charged. Respondents submitted
victim was already in existence at the time of that in view of the SB decision, the case has
the first examination of the doctor. Said delay become moot and academic. Petitioners filed a
was caused by the very superficial and motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. The
inconclusive examination then made resulting SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to look
to a later finding of fracture. Suzette. into petitioners' allegations.
Barlongay: When defense of double RULING: The report of the Commission revealed
jeopardy available.-- (1) Dismissal based on that Pres. Marcos used the overwhelming
isufficiency of evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of resources of the Government and his
denial of accused's right to speedy trial; (3) authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
accused is discharged to be a state witness. mockery of the judicial process in this case. The
unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the
When defense of double jeopardy not accused after the rigged trial would accomplish
available.-- When the case is dismissed other the two principal objectives of satisfying the
than on the merits upon motion of the accused public clamor for the suspected killers to be
personally, or through counsel, such dismissal is charged in court and of giviing them, through
regarded as w/ express consent of the accused, their acquittal, the legal shield of double
who is therefore deemed to have waived the jepardy.
right to plea double jeopardy. However, double jeopardy does not
attach where a criminal trial was a sham. A
Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959 dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as in this case is a void
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no
violation of a city ordinance. Later he was judgment. It neither binds nor bars anyone. The
charged again in another criminal case in the criminal collusion as to the handling and
same court with serious physical injuries treatment of the cases by public respondents
through reckless imprudence. Yap moved to completely disqualified them and voided ab
quash the latter information. Meanwhile, initio the SB verdict. DJ cannot be invoked
petitioner was acquitted in the first case. where the prosecution, which represents the
sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due
ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy. process.
As to the question of double jeopardy, commanding him to produce the body of the
the following requisites must have been detainee at a designated time and place, and to
obtained to invoke the constitutional protection show cause why he should continue to be
against it: detained.
(1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; The "privilege of the writ" is the right to
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the have the immediate determination of the
charge; and legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was What is suspended is the privilege of the
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his writ, and not the writ itself. The writ will always
express consent. issue as a matter of course. But when the
privilege of the writ is suspended, all the
The only remaining and decisive issue in detaining office needs to do when he receives
this case seems to be as to whether or not the the writ of habeas corpus is to show to the court
case was dismissed without the prior consent of that the detainee is being detained for an
the accused. offense covered by the suspension, and the
The SC ruled that as a general rule, court cannot inquire any further to find out if
when the case is dismissed, other than on the the detention is legal. Under the Conmstitution,
merits, upon motion of the accused, such this is so only for 3 days. After 3 days, the
dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express Court can now require the detaining officer to
consent of the accused and consequently he is produce the body of the detainees and show
deemed to have waived his right to plead cause why he should not be released.
double jeopardy and/or he is estopped from
claiming such defense on appeal by the The suspension of the privilege of the
Government or in another indictment for the writ applied only to crimes related to invasion or
same offense. rebellion. An extensive discussion was made
The exception to this is where the under the Commander-in- Chief clause of the
dismissal is sought by the accused on the President, supra. This rest of the section will be
ground that they were denied their right to a confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all
speedy trial and that the government failed to other offenses.
prosecute; in which case double jeopardy will
set in. The case of herein accused falls under In general as already noted above, the
the general rule. privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy
to question the illegality of the arrest or
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas detention, or any other restraint to liberty.
corpus When all else is lost, it is the last recourse to
get someone out of his illegal detention.
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 1. Functions of the writ
suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
it.
Habeas corpus is available not only for
those who are in actual detention but even for
In case of invasion or rebellion, when those whose liberty is merely restrained. Thus,
the public safety requires it, the President may, in Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986), the
for a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who,
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus... though temporarily released, could not travel
outside Metro Manila, could not change his
The suspension of the privilege of the residence, could not be interviewed by media,
writ shall apply only to persons judicially and had to report to the military.
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-
During the suspension of the privilege of conviction remedy
the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within 3 days,
otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec. In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, supra,
18.) habeas corpus was the remedy of one whose
confinement was the result of a void judgnment
A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ of conviction arrived at after the judge violated
directed to the person detaining another,
Constitutional Law II
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 633 Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be
(1986), supra. passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and
In Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37 petition the Government for redress of
SCRA 420 (1971), some persons who were grievance.
charged with the complex crime of rebellion
with homicide, rape, or other common crimes, Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be
did not appeal their conviction and so were detained solely by reason of his political
sentenced accordingly. The other accused, beliefs and aspirations.
however, appealed their conviction, resulting in xxx
a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to the
effect that there can be no complex crim of A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
rebellion with homicide, rape, etc., for these
common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. As a Free Market Place of Ideas
result, while those who appealed were now free,
those who did not remained in jail. The SC 1. For the discovery of political truth
ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in
jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the When men have realized that time has
legality of their continued detention pursuant to upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
the ruling in People v. Hernandez. believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the
3. Suspension of the privilege ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-- that the best test of truth is the
Art. VII, Sec. 18. power of the thought to get itself accepted in
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971) the competition of the market, and the truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely
E. Affirmative rights can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616. (1919)
1. Free access to the courts
The theory behind freedom of
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the expression is the principle that ours is a
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and democratic society, and so the only way to rule
adequate legal assistance shall not be ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which
denied to any person by reason of is possible only when everyone can speak their
poverty. minds out and compete in the free market place
of ideas.
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights 2. For self government
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
(4) The law shall provide for penal
and civil sanctionsfor violations of this
section as well as compensation to and Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
rehabilitation of victims of torture or (1984), supra
similar practices, and their families.
HELD: As a consequence of the search and
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, seizure, the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail"
victims of tortures and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx publication of said newspapers were
(4) The law shall provide for penal discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of
and civil sanctions for violations of this previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
section as well as compensation to and the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial
similar practices, and their families. of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patenly anathematic
to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the
Constitutional Law II
political enlightenment and growth of the speech), the prosecution cannot even prove
citizenry. malice-in-fact.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964) If the communication is only qualifiedly
privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the 2
3. For individual protection instances: fair and true reporting of an official
proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the
B. Prior Restraints burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove
malice-in-fact, which the defense can overcome
Thus any system of prior restraints of by proving the truth of the defamatory
expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy statement (which in the case of public officials
presumption against its constitutionality, giving may or may not constitute a crime, so long as
the government a heavy burden to show related to the conduct of his office) and good
justification for the imposition of such restraint. motive.
(New York v. United States (1971); also in New
York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v. C. Content-Based Restrictions
Publication of Pentagon Papers).
1. Test of validity of content-based
restrictions
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by
Subsequent Punishment haphazard imitation, the Philippine Supreme
Court, have evolved certain tests to regulate
And even subsequent punishment is the contents of speech.
tempered by the greater interest of promoting
free public opinion. The most significant Dangerous Tendency Test: When the
expression is the law on libel. legislative body has determined generally, in
the exercise of its discretion, that utterances of
We consider this case against the a certain kind involve such danger of a
background of a profound national commitment substantive evil that they may be punished, the
to debate on public issues being uninhibited, question whether any specific utterance coming
robust and wide-open, and that it may well within the prohibited class is likely, in and itself,
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes to bring the substantive evils, is not open to
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and consideration. In such cases, the general
public officials. The falsity of some of the provision of the statute may be constitutionally
factual statements and alleged defamations do applied to the specific utterance if its natural
not qualify the role. And just as factual error and probable effect was to bring about the
afforded no warrant for repressing speech that substantive evil which the legislative body
would otherwise be free, the same is true of might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652
injury to official reputation. (New York Times v. (1925).]
Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition.
The interest of society and good When the legislature has decided that one who
government demands a full discussion of public advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime,
affairs. Whether the law is wisely or badly the court cannot intrude. As it evolved, this test
enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. was supposed to apply when there is a statute,
Public policy, welfare of society, and the orderly in contrast to the clear and present danger rule
administration of government have demanded which applies when the speech is not prohibited
protection for public opinion. The inevitable by statute.
and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of Clear and Present Danger Test: The
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v. question in every case is whether the words
Bustos, 731 (1918).] used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, danger that they will bring about the
any defamatory statement is presumed to be substantive evils that Congress has a right to
malicious (malice-in-law), when the defense prevent. It is a question of proximity and
proves that the communication is privileged, degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47
such a presumption of malice does not arise (1919).]
because of the greater public interest involved.
The emphasis of the test is the nature of
If the communication is absolutely the circumstances under which it is uttered.
privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of The speech itself may not be dangerous. As
Constitutional Law II
Holmes said: "Many things that might be said speech or political activity, (2) the availability
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its of more moderate controls than those the State
effort that their utterance will not be endured so has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent
long as men fight." Or saying "Fire" in a with which the speech is launched. (Freund,
crowded movie house. quoted in Dennis v. United States in the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such an invasion of free 2. Applications of tests in various
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. contexts
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951),
quoting Judge Learned Hand.] a. Freedom of expression and national security
This test was meant to supplant the Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132
clear and present danger. They both SCRA 316 (1984)
emphasize the circumstances of the speech, but
this latter test consider the weighing of values. F: Petitioners are journalists and
columnists. On different dates in July 1980, they
Direct Incitement Test: The were summoned by military authorities for
consitutional guarantees of free speech and interrogation regarding their work, feelings,
press do not permit a State to forbid or sentiments, beliefs, associations and even
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law private lives. In addition, one of them was
violation, except where such advocacy or peech charged with libel by a General who sought to
is directed to inciting or producing imminent recover P10 million in damages. They brought
lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from
such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. questioning them and from filing libel suits on
444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 matters that had been the subject of inquiry by
SCRA 438 (1985).] the NIB.
The test emphasizes the very words HELD: The petition has become moot and
uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b) academic. Be that as it may, it is not idle to
What is the likely result of such utterance? It note that, while ordinarily, an invitation to
criticizes the clear and present danger test for attend a hearing and answer some questions is
being top dependent on the circumstances. not illegal or constitutionally objectionable,
Speaker may, when tested show no incitement under certain circumstances, however, such an
but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition. invitation can easily assume a different
appearance as when it comes from a powerful
Balancing of Interest Test: The court group composed predominantly of ranking
must undertake the delicate and difficult task of military officers and the designate interrogation
weighing the circumstances and appraising the site is a military camp.
substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment b. Freedom of expression and criticism of
of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v. official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice"
Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)] Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-
354 and 361-362
The test applied when two legitimate
values not involving national secuirty crimes Freedom of expression and libel
compete. Involves an appoint of the competing
interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec) Freedom of speech versus right to
reputation. Libel is the most common form of
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for subsequent punishment. Although one cannot
instance, it is a question of balancing the be prevented from saying something before he
freedom of expression of the producer and the actually says it, one can be held liable for what
right to privacy of Enrile. one has said if it causes damage to the rights of
others.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is
theat the clear-and-present danger test is over- Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167
simplified judgement unless it takes into SCRA 393 (1988)
account also a number of other factors: (1) the
relative seriousness of the danger in F: The President of the Philippines filed a
comparison with the value of the occasion for complaint for libel against the petitioners, who
Constitutional Law II
were the publisher and columnist of the newspaper, could have by himself caused the
Philippine Star, based on the following publication. It does not appear either that the
statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 report was paid for like an advertisement. At
totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino any rate, the news item is a true and fair report
Administration": "If you recall, during the of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
August 29 coup attempt, the President hid without comments or remarks. VV.
under her bed while the firing was going on -
perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so."
Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)
instead, moved to dismiss the complaint. The
fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition for F: Petitioner was sued for libel in
certiorari. connection with the publication in the Feb. 23,
1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An
HELD: xxx Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of
(3) As regards the contention of Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed
petitioner Beltran that he could not be held them as exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner
liable for libel bec. of the privileged character of moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
the publication, the Court reiterates that it is that the article was not libelous since it did not
not a trier of facts and that such a defense is single any particular individual. The trial court
best left to the trial court to appreciate after denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition
receiving the evidence of the parties. As to for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed.
petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel Thus, this appeal to the SC.
case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have
basis at this stage to rule on the point. VV. been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989) embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be that each individual in the class or group can
dismissed outright unless made in bad faith prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the the action separately if need be. The disputed
Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never
abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents singled out Sola. The news report merely stated
against petitioner's clients. Petitioner said the that the victim had been arrested by members
agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and of a special police unit brought into the area by
took her necklace and bracelet and her son's Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as
wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents were it does to an official act is within the realm of
exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges privileged and is protected by the constitutional
of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors guarantees of free speech and press. VV.
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for
damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles
Today published a news item based on "Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify
petitioner's letter to ASAC. This became the any individual, it cannot be libelous. An article
basis of an action for libel brought against must be sufficiently, specific or at least
petitioner and his clients. Petitioner moved to sweeping as to apply to all members of a group,
quash the case but his motion was denied. in order to be deemed libelous.
HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
substantive law, the charge is defective. The
letter constitutes privileged communication. It The pictures of a former mayor was
was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer inadvertently published and mistaken for
in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. another man who was a sanitary inspector and
He could also invke his civic duty as a private fooled the authorities about the Babuyan
individual to expose anomalies in the public Islands, claiming of murders there, so they
service. The complaint was addressed to the could go and he could be rescued. An erratum
official who had authority over them and could was published by the This Week magazine. The
impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, however,
index of good faith, the letter was sent found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages,
privately, directly to the addressee without any since the error in in this case could have been
funfare nor publicity. As for the news report, it checked consideringing that this was a weekly
is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an magazine and not a daily.
ordinary citizen without known ties to
Constitutional Law II
that are likely to provoke the average person to erotically dancing naked and kissing and
retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the caressing each other like lesbians. VV.
peace; and (3) the state's asserted interest in
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity does not justify the Notes: The movie involved in this case
conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
on expression is content-based, and thus wanted to cut in some part and to label "For
subject to the most exacting scrutiny, given Adults". The SC rules that movies are within
that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at the constitutional protection of freedom of
protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all expression, so that censorship is presumed to
circumstances, but only against impairments be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only
that would cause serious offenses to others and case whe the Board of Censors can order a
is aimed at protecting onlookers from being deletion is when there is a clear and present
offended by the ideas expressed by the danger of a substantive evil against national
prohibited activity, and (b) although the state security or public morals or other public
has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper interest. In all other cases, the Board can only
treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own classify.
view of the flag by prohibiting expressive
conduct relating to it and by criminally But a different standard must be
punishing a person for burning the flag as a followed in television because of the pervasive
means of political protest. and intrusive influence of the medium on
people who watch its programs without having
f. Movies Censorship to pay anything.
While prior restraint is the general rule, On the issue of obscenity, the SC held
censorship in the movies is tolerated because that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the
by the nature of the medium, it has a greater test being whether, using contemporary
impact on the audience and produces instant community standards, the dominant appeal us
reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California).
newspapers which are read by people Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion
separated by walls. of the part of the Board for subjecting the
producer to difficulty and for entertaining a
narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the
Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985) votes to rules that the abuse was grave.
F: The petitioners filed this action to Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
compel respondent government officials to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after
it had been closed for allegedly having been D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
used to incite the people to sedition. The
petitioner contended that it was denied due O'brien test: A government regulation is
process because no hearing was held and no sufficiently justified if it is within the
proof was submitted to establish a factual basis constitutional power of the government; if it
for the closure. However, before the Court could furthers an important or substantial
promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a governmental interest; if the governmental
motion to withdraw its action on the ground interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
that it had sold the radio station to Manuel expression; and if the incidental restriction on
Pastrana and that the National alleged freedom of expression is no greater
Telecommunications Commission had than is essential to the furtherance of that
expressed its willingness to grant the requisite interest. [US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968),
license. adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712
(1992)]
HELD: The case has been moot and academic.
However, for the guidance of the inferior courts 1. Regulation of political campaign
and administrative bodies, the following
guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1
primary requirements in administrative (1992)
proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR
should be followed before a broadcast station F: Petitioners herein were representatives
may be closed; 2) All forms of communication of mass media which were prevented from
are entitled to the broad protection of the selling and donating space or air time for
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the political advertisements under RA 6646.
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a
accorded to newspapers and print media. This violation of the constitutional right to freedom
limitation derives from the fact the broadcast of expression.
media have a uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly
a right to be protected against broadcasts authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
which incite listeners to violently overthrow it; regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special franchises or permits for the operation f media
protection given to all forms of media by the of communication and information. The
due process and freedom of expression clauses fundamental purposes of such power are to
of the Constitution. ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply," as well as uniform and
h. Freedom of Information reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities, in connection with "public
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the information campaigns and forums among
people to information on matters of public candidates."
concern shall be recognized. Access to Of course, the law limits the right of free
official records, and to documents and speech and of access to mass media of the
papers pertaining to, official acts, candidates themselves. The limitation however,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to bears a clear and reasonable connection with
government research data used as basis the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is
for policy development, shall be afforded precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
the citizen, subject to such limitations as space and radio and television time that the
may be provided by law. resources of the financially affluent candidates
are likely to make a crucial difference.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
Access of official records (the docket
book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial
criminal cases for a report on the peace and candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347
order situation of the municipality) is insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
Constitutional Law II
stickers on mobile places, public or private, and The written application is filed with the
limits their location or publication to authorized Office of the Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given
posting areas. of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the
application, then it is enough for filing purposes
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is if a copy is posted in the premises.
constitutional.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the application. If he does not act, it is deemed
the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. granted.
There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the kind of restriction involved in this But if he thinks that the rally creates a
case. The posting of decals amd stickers in "clear and present danger" to public peace,
mobile places does not endanger any order, health, etc., and he has proof of this, he
substantial government or public interest. should not deny the application right away. He
Under the clear and present danger rule, not should hold a hearing during which the
only must the danger be patently clear and applicant can be heard. If after hearing he is
pressingly present but the evil sought to be still not satisfied that no danger exists, then he
avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a can deny the application.
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument
to be stilled. The applicant can then go to any court
Significantly, the freedom of expression other than the Supreme Court for the review of
curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts
of the candidate or the political party. The have 24 hours to act on the petition. If the
regulation strikes at the freedoom of an judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any
individual to express his preference and, by case if the applicant is satisfied with the
displaying it on his car, to convince others to decision, the judgment becomes final and
agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a executory immediately, and no appeal can be
candidate but once the car owner agrees to taken by the local authorities anymore.
have it placed on his private vehichle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, But if the decision is not satisfactory to
primarily his own and not of anybody else. the applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt
Morever, The restriction is so broad that to appeal to the SC.
it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately owned During the rally, the police must be
vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, limited to maintaining peace and order and so
another cardinal right guaranteed under the must stay away by 100 meters from the
Constitution is violated which is that no person rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with
shall be deprived of his property without due their names visibly written. They can carry no
proocess of law. firearm except a nighstick, but they are allowed
protective devices.
2. Freedom of Assembly
If they anticipate trouble, the police
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580) must call the attention of the leader of the
rallyists. When trouble actually erupts, the
A permit to hold a rally must be filed police must not disperse the crowd right away
with the Office of the Mayor at least, five but first give a warning. If violence persists,
working days before the day of the rally. they must give a second warning. If still
violence continues, only then can they fight
But no permit from the mayor is back.
required in case the rally is going to be held in
(i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a private property If a rally does not have a permit, the
(provide with consent of the owner), and (iii) police can disperse the crowd, but they cannot
campuses of state universities (which are left to use violence. Penalty is imposed only on the
university authorities) leaders and organizers.
The application must be in writing and Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a)
must include: (1) names of the organizers and to inform the members of their duty under the
leaders, (2) date and time, place and street, (3) law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to
size (4)manner of the use of the street, (5) cooperate with local authorities in maintaining
sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must peace and order.
also have a statement of the duties of the
rallyists.
Constitutional Law II
Notes: The freedom to use public places to control, govern, and to restrain but cannot be
to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus: construed as synonymous with "suppress" or
"Wherever the title or steets and parks may "prohibit."
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust The Court quoted with approval the
for the use of the public and, time out of time decision in the American case Cox v. State of
have been used for purposes of assembly, New Hampshire, " a statute requiring persons
communicating thought betwee citizens, and using public streets for a parade or procession
discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts. to procure a special license therefor from the
Hague v. CIO) local authorities is not an unconstitutional
abridgement of the rights of assembly or of
Although under a "permit system", freedom of speech and press, where, as the
before one can use a public place, one must statute is construed by the state courts, the
first obtain prior permit from the proper licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
authorities, the principle has always been that issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
one has the right to a permit, subject only to time, place, and manner of the parade or
reasonable regulation. The validity of the procession, with a view to conserving the public
permit system has been upheld by the Court, convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provided, (a) it is concered only with the time, provide proper policing, and are not invested
place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
not vest on the licensing authority unfettered license..."
discretion in choosing the groups which could
use the public place and discriminate others.
But under the same ordinance, the SC,
As held by the SC in Primicias vs in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970),
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a
Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue group during weekdays, on a finding that
permits for parades should be construed to be everytime there was an announced rally, stores
limited to the time, place, and manner of the closed and business was gravely affected
parades socially to secure public order, because of violent incidents. It found the policy
convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the of the mayor to allow rallies only during
Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the weekends to be reasonable.
Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions
raised by the recent national election were still
high and a rally to protest election anomalies Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
could only exacerbate the matter, was
overturned by the court. F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the
Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP),
an association of students, workers and
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor
of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda.
F: This is an action for mandamus Respondent Mayor denied the application to
instituted by petitioner Primicias, campaign hold the rally on the date and time specified by
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, to petitioners in view of the events that transpired
compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to during the last demonstration held by them
issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful which ended in the destruction of public and
public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a
of petitioning the government for redress of score of other persons and the closing down of
grievances. The Mayor denied the application schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor
on the ground that passions still run high due to suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken
the recent election, and a rally to protest Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that
election anomalies might threaten breaches of the rally be held during weekends and earlier
the peace and disruption of public order. during the day so that it may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes
permit. a violation of their right to freedom of assembly.
Petitioner contended that the right of the
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the
Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the government for redress of grievances may be
Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under exercised without the prior necessity of
the Revised Administrative Code which securing a permit from the government and
pertains to the use of streets and public places, that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without
can be construed only to mean the power to the corresponding right to use public places for
regulate, which means and includes the power that purpose.
Constitutional Law II
and his family, based on the incident in the holding an illegal assembly and oral
early 70s when the gates of the palace were defamation. They were suspended for one
almost stormed. The rallyists in this case academic year. They filed a petition for
purported to merely worship at St. Jude's. certiorari in the SC.
In case a rally is held in a private place, HELD: The petititon may be considered moot
no permit from the mayor is required. and academic considering that the TRO issued
However, the consent of the owner of the place by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But
must be acquired. there is a need to pass squarely on the
constitutional question. Respect for the
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985) constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and
free speech calls for the setting aside of the
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who order of suspension. Suspending them for one
were businessmen, students and employees, year is out of proportion considering that the
met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the vigorous presentation of views was expected.
ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. The excitement of the occasion, the propensity
Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance
grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with of the youth should be taken into consideration.
clenched fists, marched on the street and
shouted anti-government invectives. They were
stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)
Presidential Security Command. They brought
an action for mandamus. F: Petitioners were officers and members
of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the University Foundation. They were refused
marchers, their fists clenched and chants of enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28,
anti-government investives support the 1982.
government's claim that the petitioners purpose
was not really to worship at the chapel but to HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in
hold an anti-government demonstration close to the course of such demonstration, with an
the residence of the President. The restricted enthusiastic audience goading them on,
use of JP Laurel Street is justified. The need to utterances, extremely critical, at times even
secure the safety of heads of states cannot be vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is understandable. They would be ineffective if
constant and felt throughout the world. The during the rally they speak in the guarded and
petitioners were not restrained in their freedom judicious language of the academe. At any rate,
of religion but only in the manner by which they even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
had attempted to translate the same into accord full credence to their fiery exhortations.
action. They take into account the excitement of the
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA occasion, the propensity of speakers to
359 (1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The
(1985), the SC upheld the right to expression of refusal of the university to enroll the students is
students who held a rally in a private a highly disproportionate penalty.
university. But since they held it beyond the Notes: Note that while the permit
time granted in a place other than the one system is not allowed in the case of publication,
allowed by the administration, their suspension it is allowed in the case of assembly. In
was condoned. publication, censorship is presumptively
unconstitutional. There is very little possibility
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) or justification for the regulation of news. The
remedy in this case is prosecution or
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme subsequent punishment.
Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta But in assembly regulation is allowed
University Foundation. They were granted a because it is needed by the very nature of the
permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger expression, when people use streets, they may
of two units of the university. On the scheduled deprive other groups which want to use the
date, the students continued their meeting streets too. So as long as only the incidents of
beyond the scheduled time and held it in a speech are regulated, the measure is
different place from that indicated in the constitutionally acceptable.
permit. They expressed in a vehement
language their opposition to the merger and as
a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541
Petitioners were placed under preventive (1987)
suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of
Constitutional Law II
F: While these cases were pending in the Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
SC, the labor unions involved intensified the the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion
pickets they had been conducting in front of the was denied. The restraining order w/c was
Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket previously issued was converted into an
quarters, at times obstructing access to and injunction after finding the strike illegal.
egress from the Court's premises. When Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The
required to show cause why they should not be latter held that since the employees of SSS are
held in contempt of court, their lawyer govt employees, they are not allowed to
apologized and assured that the above incident strike.
would not be repeated.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary
similar situations to apply the full force of the work stoppages, like workers in the private
law and punish for contempt those who attempt sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede
to pressure the Court into acting one way or the to their demands. As now provided under Sec.
other in any case pending before it. Grievances 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e. Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to
through appropriate petitions or pleadings in Self-Organization which took effect after the
keeping with the respect due the courts as initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of
impartial administrators of justice. Moreover, employment in the Govt, including any political
"parties have a constitutional right to have the subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt.
causes tried fairly in court by an impartial owned and controlled corporations with original
tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public charters, are governed by law and employees
clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not therein shall not strike for the purpose of secur-
only an affront to the dignity of this Court but ing changes thereof.
equally a violation of the above-stated right of The statement of the court in Alliance of
the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it
3. Freedom of Association and the right to furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet.
strike in the public sector workers in the private sector and govt
employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the
people, including those employed in the Since the terms and conditions of
public and private sectors, to form unions, govt. employment are fixed by
associations, or societies for purposes not law, govt. workers cannot use the
contrary to law shall not be abridged. same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to
The inclusion of the right to unionize in secure concessions from their
this article is ill-advised because while the right employers. The principle behind
to unionize is an economic and labor right, the labor unionism in private industry
right to association in general is a civil- political is that industrial peace cannot be
right. secured through compulsion of
Discussed elsewhere is the argument law. Relations bet. private
why public employees cannot engage in employers and their employees
collective bargaining and strike. rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and
SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 other labor and welfare
(1989) legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the
F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for unionized private sector are
damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. settled through the process of
against petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the collective bargaining. In govt
officers and members of the latter staged an employment, however, it is the
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to legislature and, where properly
the SSS building preventing non-striking given delegated power, the
employees from reporting to work and SSS administrative heads of govt w/c
members from transacting business w/ SSS. fix the terms and conditions of
The Public Sector Labor-Management Council employment. And this is effected
ordered the strikers to return to work but the through statutes or
strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on administrative circulars, rules,
strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's and regulations, not through
demands. CBA's
Constitutional Law II
acts and utterances made in the exercise of It is likewise violated if the State favors
academic freedom. The lower court denied UP's all religions, for there may be atheists who are
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of not so favored.
action. Hence this petition.
1. Operation of sectarian schools
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the
complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays While the ownership, creation and
to be a distinct ethnic community, the lower management of educational institutions must
court is cautioned that the same is akin to a be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipino-
prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine owned corporations, sectarian schools and
citizenship which may not be granted in a those run by religious groups and missions
petition for declaratory relief. The complaint board are exempted from these requirements,
was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity provided the administration is in the hands of
and honor. Filipinos, who could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec.
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the 4(2).]
court to make pronouncements on matters
beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in
resolving the complaint for damages, the court 2. Religious instruction in public schools
may find congruence in what is justiciable and
what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it
is best to keep in mind that its proper role and Provided it is upon the written petition
function is the determination of legal issues. of the parents and it is at no cost to the State
(although this is not entirely possible, because
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION the use of classrooms and electricity are costs
in the State), religious instruction in public
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be elementary and secondary schools during class
made respecting an establishment of hours, by one approved by the authorities of the
religion; or prohibiting the free exercise religion of the child or ward is allowed. [Art.
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be integrated
of religious profession and worship, in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall 3. Anti-evolution laws
be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), the SC held that the teaching of the
A. Non-Establishment Clause Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be
prohibited from public shools by parents whose
The clause prohibits excessive religions finds the theory offensive.
government entanglement with, endorsement
or disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. Elizalde 4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967),
concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater the SC disallowed the conducting of an
Pittsburg ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).] interdenominational prayer before the start of
classes in public schools as, violative of the
The clause prohibits the State from Non- Establishment clause.
establishing a religion. In assessing the validity
of the law, the questions to be asked are: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
a. Is the purpose of the law religious,
or is it secular? F: The respondent Board of Education upon
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or the recommendation of the State Board of
advance religion? Regents, directed the School's District principal
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an to cause the recitation in public schools of a
excessive entaglement between the State and brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its
religious matters in religion? observance on the part of the students was
voluntary.
The Non-Establishment clause is
violated when the State gives any manifest RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New
support to any one religion, even if nothing is York, by using its public school system to
done against the individual. encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer
has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause. The prayer was
composed by govt officials as part of a
Constitutional Law II
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was
to petitioner is unconstutional for being in elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition
restraint of petitioner's right to free exercise of was filed against him on the basis of section
religion. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that "in nocase shall there be elected
HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
privilege is the power to control or suppress its soldiers in active service, persons receiving
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for
religious practice can make its exercise so public works." The CFI dismissed the petition on
costly as to deprive it of the resources the ground that the ineligibility has been
necessary for its maintenance. It is true that the impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971
price asked for the religious articles was in Election Code.
some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive.
that plaintiff was engaged in the business or Seven justices held that section 2175 is no
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for longer operative. Justice Fernando held that
profit. The mark up can only be treated as section 2175 imposed a religious test on the
contributions by the faithfuls to the religious exercise of the right to run for public office
cause. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution.
plaintiff society, for in so doing, it would impair Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious been repealed by the Election Code. Five
profession and worship, as well as its right to justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.
disseminate religious beliefs.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode
SCRA 54 (1974) and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of except upon lawful order of the court.
the Elizalde Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned Neither shall the right to travel be
from the respondent labor union on the ground impaired except in the interest of national
that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a security, public safety, or public health, as
member prohibits union membership. As the may be provided by law.
union demanded his dismissal from
employment pursuant to a closed shop
agreement, Victoriano brought this action for Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting
from the closed-shop contracts members of Right to travel
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any labor organization. The union This is not the first time petitioner Jovito
appealed. Salonga came to the SC by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a
HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first
association. It does not impair the obligation of case, Salonga v. Madella, the case became
contracts for not only are existing laws read into moot and academic. The present petition is
contracts in order to fix the obligation of the likewise moot and academic. In the motion to
parties but the reservation of essential dismiss filed by the Solicitor General, it was
attributes of sovereign power is also read into stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel
such contracts. Neither does the law constitute had been granted petitioner.
an establishment of religion. It has been held Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood
that in order to withstand objections based on that this Court may be faced again with the
this ground, the statute musr have a secular same situation, it is desirable that respondent
purpose and that purpose must not directly Travel Processing Center should exercise the
advance or diminish the interest of any religion. utmost care to avoid the impression that certain
Congress acted merely to relieve persons of the citizens desirous of exercising their
burden imposed by union security agreements. constitutional right to travel could be subjected
to inconvenience or annoyance. The freedom to
4. Disqualification from local government travel is one of the most cherished. xxx
office
Constitutional Law II