CANLAS vs NAPICO HOMEOWNERS

GR No. 182795, June 5, 2008

Facts:Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig
City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is
about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.Petitioners claim that respondents hold
fraudulent and spurious titles. Thus, the petition for writ of amparo. The rule on writ of amparo is
a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings or disappearances.
Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.
Ruling: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened
demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the
enumeration of rights covered by the writ. Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim
to the land in question is not alleged at all in the petition.
DUNCAN ASS’N OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO, ET AL v. GLAXO WELLCOME
PHILIPPINES, INC 17 Sept 2004
Facts: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative, where he signed a contract of employment
which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to
inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of
interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with
the company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to
another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside
the company after six months.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals1[3] (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Even before they got married, Tecson
received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his
relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in
September 1998. Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a
conflict of interest. Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur
sales area. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

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The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as
valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor
companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid
distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts
the employees’ right to marry.

On the other hand, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having
a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
its management prerogative, and it likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per
se but only proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor companies,
and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. Glaxo also points out that Tecson
can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he signed his contract of
employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein.

Issue: WON Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

Held/Ratio: Yes. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the
assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our
laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law
also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.

As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case, it is a legitimate business practice to guard business

confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male
and female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor. The challenged company
policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed
only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when
the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or
involved in the wrongful private conduct.
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company
remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a
personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual. However, an employee’s personal
decision does not detract the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure
maximum profit and business success.
Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the
stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in
good faith. He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.

STAR PAPER vs SIMBOL GR No. 164774, April 12, 2006

Facts:Star Paper Corporation : engaged in trading, principally of paper products. Simbol, Comia
and Estrella were all regular employees of the company. Simbol : employed on Oct 27, 1993;
met Alma Dayrit at the company; married her on June 27, 1998; prior to the marriage, Ongsitco
(HR manager) advised that if they get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company
policy; Simbol resigned on June 20, 2008. Comia : hired Feb 5, 1997; met Howard Comia;
married on June 1, 2000; Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella : hired on July 29, 1994; met
Luisito Zuniga, a married man who got her pregnant; company alleged to have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign on Dec 21, 1999. The three signed a Release
and Confirmation agreement wherein it is also stated that they will release the latter of any claim
or demand of whatever nature. Art 136 of the Labor Code: “It shall beunlawful for an employer
to require as a condition of employment of continuation of employment that a woman employee
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned, dismissed…”
Issue: WON the employer’s policy of banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Consitution and deprives the respondents of their
right to property (i.e. their jobs).
Ruling: Respondent’s rights were violated.
RD: While it is true that the company policy takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment
policy, such policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of
management prerogative. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in
imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice employee’s right.

Ermita-Malate Hotel Operations vs. City of Manila

Facts: On July 5, 1963 the petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc.,
and Go Chiu, who is "the latter’s president and general manager" against the respondent Mayor
of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances." It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by
both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not
less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." It was then
alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the
time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. There was the assertion of its being beyond the
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels,
on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law. Sec. 1: It was
a violation of privacy and it was against self-incrimination and that is why it is unconstitutional
and void. Sec. 2: classifying rooms and prohibiting persons under 18 to be given any room
without the company of parents. On August 3, 1963 an answer was filed regarding the
respondent mayor that the petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity,
whether on statutory or constitutional grounds the petition did fail to state a cause of action and
that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers
not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the
dismissal of the petition.
Issue: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause
Ruling: The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and
void." Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel,
motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged,
call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x
x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.The attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success.
BABELO BERINA, MARILOU ELAGDON, ERNESTO ROBERTO and JESUS SORIAO, vs.
PHILIPPINE MARITIME INSTITUTE, TOMAS CLOMA and JAIME CLOMA,

Facts: petitioners are students of the Philippine Maritime Institute. they claim that PMI, five
weeks after school had started,a notice that there would be a 15% increase in tuition fees
retroactive to the start of the current semester; that the students met and took positive steps in
respect of the problem; that their representatives held dialogues with the school administration;
"that, in reaction to these legitimate student activities and without compliance with due process
respondents issued expulsion orders against petitioner and an indefinite suspension against
Marilou Elagdon;" that the penalties were imposed without due process and had the effect of
negating the petitioners' right to free speech, peaceful assembly and petition for redress of
grievances. The petitioners pray that the expulsion and suspension orders be annulled and that
while the case is pending resolution they be restored to their status as students of the PMI,

Issue: WON petitioner denied due process.

Held: The comment does not positively assert that in imposing the expulsion and suspension
orders there was observance of due process which simply means that the petitioners should have
been given an opportunity to defend themselves. It was only after the petitioners had said in their
reply that the respondents failed to traverse the denial of due process that the latter invoked the
legal presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed.

It is obvious from the expulsion and suspension orders that the petitioners were denied due
process, res ipsa loquitur. For the orders are bereft of the sides of the petitioners. Hence the legal
presumption of regularity cannot be availed in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the expulsion and suspension orders are hereby set aside
but without prejudice to the power of the respondents to formally charge the petitioners for
violation(s) of reasonable school rules and regulations and after due notice to hear and decide the
charge. No special pronouncement as to costs.