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Confidential FED Document On Gold Price Manipulation
Confidential FED Document On Gold Price Manipulation
IL )
Introduction
demonstrates the advantages that would exist if the United States had at its
r t inof eshort-term
ty
out of and into the Halted States. Such movements
a c i capital,
problems relating
e W toMshifts ia capital flows aad their impact on national
thof payments, together with the relationship of each international
r o m
balances
have not, aatU recently, operated ia the foreign exchange market, bat have
• 2 -
foreign monetary authorities who either mm^4 or acquire dollars for exchange
purposes. There can be little question that the intercon\ ertib lity of gold
and the dollar at a fixed price will have to remain the keystone of the
a m o u
l i s
other monetary and fiscal
il iass have recently bm&n executed respecting the
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sion of such operations
e
h could make the United States an important factor in the
Germantmark
such currencies and add to their usefulness in international trade and pay-
s e r v i c e s among countries.
• 3 •
Previous Experience
The three accounts are with the Bank of England, the Bank of France
and the Bank of Canada. The r e a s o n s for opening the various accounts
.
differ somewhat but maintenance of the accounts over recent y e a r s has
t ion
c
been largely a matter of courtesy.
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Co
The account with the Bank of England was opened in 191? and s u b -
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, y
sequently need for a number of transactions involving exchange operations,
i n
investments and the purchase and earmark of gold.
a et account at the
rt ciThe
y MthatSweo might establish a
ne ical for the stabilization of e x -
Bank of France was opened in 1918 in order
s
e tor
h
sight account for possible nee in transactions
c C His
M ri
change rates.
a letter fromW M
e
Mr. Harrison
h *The deposit was made for the s a m e purpose* essentially,
stated tthat
m
f
r o
F as the c r e d i t s which the Federal R e s e r v e Banks extended to foreign
central banks during 1931. It w a s made in lion of our having to respond
£
gyp t » aad
India which were opened in our name in order that the Treasury
have been c l o s e d .
Authority
.
Regulation N and to other rules prescribed by the Board of Governors a s
io n
ct
M
contained im the Statement of Procedure With Respect to Foreign
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Co
Relationships of Federal R e s e r v e Banks. M Under Section 12A of the
J r.
, was ygranted im a
Federal R e s e r v e Act, the investment of funds im the accounts are a l s o
i n
rt ciet
a
subject to decision by the FOMC. Basic authority
y M Soeach Federal R e s e r v e
e al
November 13 1936, resolution which authorized
t
i n c r etah
F
n
been reviewed regularly by the FOMC and, in each instance, the basic
authority has not been rescinded. Finally, it should be noted that n due
"The balances of the Bank of England, the Bank of France, and the BIS
they could not be increased (except for minor adjustments) without the
by the Federal R e s e r v e Bank of Mew York are possible with the approval
.
of the Board of Governors, the FOMC, and after participation has been
on
offered to the other Federal R e s e r v e Banks.
c ti
l e
A. Proposal
ol C
J r .
,
One approach would be for the Federal R e s e r v e Bank of New York
r t in orefrom
ty the Treasury
to purchase foreign exchange, either in the market
a oc i
y M S
in connection with the repayment of foreign
l
ne s eas of exchange in the market
official debt or a drawing on
r o m
Fcould be acquired by the R e s e r v e Bank against the credit of dollars to
the T r e a s u r e s account with the Federal R e s e r v e Bank in a manner
arrangements meed by the System i© the twenties and thirties might well
the proposed German debt repayment of some $700 million could be made
n .
io
ct
R e s e r v e Bank against dollar credit to the Treasury. This procedure
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Co
might s e r v e to m e e t any requirement that the United States r e c e i v e
J r.
dollars in connection with the payment of foreign debt while, at the same
i n, yoperations and
r ciet
time, furnishing foreign exchange r e s o u r c e s for tmarket
a
y M international
S o
l
adding leverage to the conduct of United States financial
s necould
ic athen be need to operate in
policy* The holdings of foreign money
h e tor
the exchange market, or, a s C
c H is warranted, to "buy out s o m e p o r -
occasion ?
M wmmmt^m
ri
a m o u
illi w eirsesto be conducted by the Federal R e s e r v e Bank
tion of the Bundesbank dollar or to m e e t other objectives.
9
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If operations
e
th account, some provision would have to be made for protection
on its own
agreement under which the United States would hold the Federal R e s e r v e
J r.
tions. System operations in foreign exchange, by permitting
,
inbeneficial
closer
r t i e ty effects on
coordination a s to timing and amounts, could have
M a oc
o v e r - a l l System operations in relation to
e y the lmoneyS market.
n a
To illustrate the effect onerse s e r vreisc, a s s u m e , for example, a
C h isto
German payment of $3®0 million
Mc ri Hin DM equivalent to the Treasury. The
i a m msa rokus by the Treasury to the Federal fteserve
sale of these Deutsche
i l
l is
e
Bank would increaseW Mthe T r e a s u r y ' s balance at the R e s e r v e Bank and
h
perhapst reduce the need for calls upon tax and loam accounts, or n e c e s s i -
r o m
Ftate redeposits in C banks* Expenditures (or redeposits) by the
H n
n .
generally be subject to public analysis only with some delay.
ti
It i s , o
l ec
ol
therefore, n e c e s s a r y that published statements and data be appropriately
C
devised.
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Some thoughts should first be given, however, to the question
,
in ineconnection
r t i ty
a oc country a s well
of immediate publicity if foreign funds a r e acquired with
$30 million and $100 million. (On the consolidated statement for the
System, the item generally ranges between $125 million and $400 million. >
l l eof foreign
might be grouped into a broader category so that the net impact
C o
exchange dealings would not he so readily evident. Jr
.
in , y
a
Net operations would a l s o be reflected in et
rt thecistatements of condi-
C h isto
on earnings
i t s own account i s the foreign exchange market a r i s e s from the fact that
the Federal R e s e r v e Bank cam create dollars while the Treasury i s r e -
stricted to the use of fuads held by it. This does not mean that there
F r
- 11 -
.
practice would be available a r e approximately a s follows:
io n
(In Millions of Dollars)
t
c'Total
"" New York % % ^ ^ ^ ^ /
l le
Dollar* 17©.© t.S
r. Co 171. 5
Gold 94.7 0
J
, y
94. 7
Securities 26.5
i
25. ©
n
rt ciet
SI. 5 » '
Foreign Exefcaage 18.0
M a 0
o
I f . <&>
y S
3©§ • 2 26* 5 31Se ?
ne 335. l
a ?
Total R e s o u r c e s
L e a s Argentine p e s o s currently helde s ic
r 18.
h t o
s 31?.?
C(Argentina,
c H i
Mexico, M Chile)ri
L e s s Stabilization Commitments
m o u 122. §£^
illiaforisFund
s
Met Available R W e s o u r c eM
L e s s Working Balance 25.
the
s 170. 7
C/ Argentina can draw am additional $32 million, thus making total drawings
~ $50 million. Mexico and Chile cam draw $75 million mmA $15 million,
respectively.
to the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President. Use
the Stabilisation Fund by turning over to it, directly, official debt repayments
n .
from abroad.
ti
If, however, prepayments--particularly in local c u r r e n c i e s - -
o
l ec
ol
are contemplated, such prepayments might ha sufficiently attractive s o that
M a o
y S
c u r r e n c i e s could he readily handled. Operations could be either in the spot
ne haicsomel
a real advantage in favor
or forward market, although there would
s r
of forward transactions since C heoperations
i s t o
c
such tend to afford maximum u s e
Fund to hold e
th partial r e s e r v e adequate to c o v e r any possible l o s s in the event
a
Fund actually to buy spot marks far delivery to meet the contract at maturity.
The Fund would have to have dollars to pay for tike spot m a r k s hat it would
between the original contract price and the spot rata on the day the purchase
would have to ha made. If the foreign central bank ware not under a parallel
• 13 *
proriso that the reserve would be adequate to cover total obligations under-
taken lor any given day. If no parallel contract was involved, a rmwmrvm
somewhat larger than 1® per cent would probably lie needed. Use of Fund
n .
ti
resources would then actually be expounded by »ome multiple of the amounto
l ec
ol
currently available. Thus, under parallel contracts, the $179 million noted
C
J r .
aa available in the table above might cover forward contracts of up to, say,
,
in ety
$1 billion*
a r t i
M c
o on occasion.
y l S
Spot operations would undoubtedly be necessary
s nethe i*******
c a by the dollar equivalent.
e tor
Obviously such purchases would deplete
h
Operations accordingly wouldcbe
H is to Hie amounts actually available
C restricted
M ri
a m o u
i
in the Fund no noted above.
l s
il is Fund Resources
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Supplementing Stabilisation
e
th foreign exchange resources might bo made available from a
Added
called the "Special Foreign Exchange Account, H with transactions being channeled
through the Stabilisation Fund and with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
direct allocation*
• 14 ~
period are also shown on a net basis in the detailed statements of income and
publication delay from the Treasury aide to meet requirements. With respect
n .
to Stabilisation Fund assets in the form of securities or foreign exchange,
ti o
l ec
ol
information in available only from the above sources with the noted delay;
r . C
these assets do not appear in data published by tibia Bank or the Board.
, J however, do r e -
Cur rest statements by this Bank and the Board,
r t in ety
flect Stabilisation Fund holdings of dollars and a i assets are
gold. cDollar
y M S o
l
ne icstatement
a
s
f
included in "Other Deposits" on our weekly and tike System s con-
h ecategory
t o r includes a range o£ other items
solidated statement. The over-all
c C His
M ri accounts, Regulation K reserves, deposit
m
each as nonmember bank clearing
a o u
l i
il IBRJD i s
s IDA, XFC IMF, QHN No. 1, etc. There i» some
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accounts of the IADB, f #
th e
nominal variation in tibia amount over weekly periods, but if net transactions
would be necessary.
one-month delay from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, which shows tike total
gold stock and so-called Treasury stock. Moreover, a gold sale or purchase
~ 15 ~
would be reflected in earmarked gold, bat again with about a month to a eix-
week delay (the February Federal Reserve Bulletin shews data for January
31, 1941).
figures would be net, and hence any individual transaction might be offset.
n .
ti o
1. Effect on Fund's foreign exchange account: would not appear 1st
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ol
Federal Reserve Bank or System data but would be reflected in the quarterly
r . C
J
data of the Treasury, with a six to eight-month delay.
,
indeposits"
y on our weekly
r t t
M
e
2. Fund's dollar account: the item Other
a ocalso i would be reflected
M
y lS
statement would show a decline, and the transaction
"swaps."
* 16 *
III. Conclusion
will run some risk of changes in currency values. To have effective pro-
would seem a relatively small price to pay* Once a basic choice is made
as between operations lor the account of the Federal Reserve Banks and
n .
io
ct
operations by the Reserve Bank for the Treasury a s fiscal agent* detailed
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Co
investigation of coordinating techniques and the requirements of secrecy
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can be made. It may bo that fiscal agency operations offer some advantages
n, distinct
r ti
i e ty benefits
a oc
in the way of speed and simplicity. However, Aero are
M
y lS
to be gained from Federal Reserve operations for its own account. Foreign
ne a
exchange operations by central banks
e o ic
s are rconsidered a normal part of their
Cbo
activities* and there is muchcto
h said
i stfor utilising resources that are not
M r i H
a m o ucash position.
illi iss
directly limited by a required
e W M
th
r om5, 1941
F
April