It is to be admitted that any state may, by its

consent, express or implied, submit to a

restriction of its sovereign rights. There may
thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character. That is the concept
of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the
succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of
a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-
restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence.
CONSTITIONAL LAW I& II
Its laws may as to some persons found within
ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE
its territory no longer control. Nor does the
matter end there. It is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the
Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no
Facts: A question novel in character, the
means follows that such areas become
answer to which has far-reaching implications,
impressed with an alien character. They retain
is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at
their status as native soil. They are still subject
one time a civilian employee of an American
to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
corporation providing technical assistance to
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is
the United States Air Force in the Philippines.
with the bases under lease to the American
He would dispute the payment of the income
armed forces by virtue of the military bases
tax assessed on him by respondent
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an
be foreign territory.
amount realized by him on a sale of his
automobile to a member of the United States
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE AND STATE
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken
POLICIES
place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga.
It is his contention, seriously and earnestly
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
was made outside Philippine territory and
FACTS:
therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to
The Manila International Airport Authority
tax.
(MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under
Issue: Whether or not the sale was made
Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as
outside the Philippine territory and therefore
amended. As such operator, it administers the
beyond our jurisdictional function to tax.
land, improvements and equipment within the
NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the
Held: The Court held that nothing is better
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued
settled than that the Philippines being
Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local
independent and sovereign, its authority may
Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the
be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA
portion there of that is beyond its power. Within
under Section 21 of its Charter.
its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein,
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax
and everyone to whom it applies must submit
already due. In June 2001, it received Final
to its terms. That is the extent of its
Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
the City of Parañaque for the taxable years
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it
1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently
were not thus, there is a diminution of its
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on
sovereignty.
the airport lands and buildings.

At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued
Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No. 061,
pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires
persons exempt from real estate tax to show
proof of exemption. According to the OGCC,
Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that
MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA,
thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
seeking to restrain the City of Parañaque from
imposing real estate tax on, levying against,
and auctioning for public sale the airport lands
and buildings, but this was dismissed for having
been filed out of time.
Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review,
pointing out that it is exempt from real estate
tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of
the LGC. It invokes the principle that the
government cannot tax itself as a justification
for exemption, since the airport lands and
buildings, being devoted to public use and
public service, are owned by the Republic of
the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of
Parañaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which
expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the
LGC.
It asserts that an international airport is not
among the exceptions mentioned in the said
law. Meanwhile, the City of Parañaque posted
and published notices announcing the public
auction sale of the airport lands and buildings.
In the afternoon before the scheduled public
auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the
issuance of a TRO to restrain the auction sale.
The Court issued a TRO on the day of the
auction sale, however, the same was received
only by the City of Parañaque three hours after
the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the airport lands and buildings
of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax?
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED.
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts
from real estate tax any real property owned
by the Republic of the Philippines. This
exemption should be read in relation with Sec.
133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the
exercise of the taxing powers of local
governments shall not extend to the levy of
taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities.
These provisions recognize the basic principle
that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely
delegated to local governments the power to
tax.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and
there must be clear language in the law
imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater
force when local governments seek to tax
national government instrumentalities.
Moreover, a tax exemption is construed
liberally in favor of national government
instrumentalities.
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of
the government.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of
the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by
the Republic. At any time, the President can
transfer back to the Republic title to the airport
lands and buildings without the Republic paying
MIAA any consideration. As long as the airport
lands and buildings are reserved for public use,
their ownership remains with the State. Unless
the President issues a proclamation
withdrawing these properties from public use,
they remain properties of public dominion. As
such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not
subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale,
and they are exempt from real estate tax.
However, portions of the airport lands and
buildings that MIAA leases to private entities
are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a
case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of
such portions for a consideration to a taxable
person.
EXECTUIVE PRIVILEGE
Neri vs. Senate
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vs.
Legislative Inquiry during Question Hour
Elements of Presidential Communications
Privilege
Exception to Executive Privilege
FACTS:
This is regarding the contract entered into by
DOTC with ZTE for the supply of equipment and
services for the NBN Project. In connection with
this NBN Project, Senate passed various
Resolutions and pending bills, which it then
used as basis for initiating an investigation.
One of the cabinet officials invited to appear
before the Senate during the investigation was
Petitioner, who was Director General of NEDA
at the time. During the 11-hour questioning,
Petitioner invoked executive privilege and
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether
or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed
him to approve.
In view of his refusal, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee issued a subpoena ad
testificandum, to which Petitioner replied that
he was willing to testify to other matters
besides those three questions covered by
“executive privilege” and that he wanted to be
furnished beforehand matters to be taken up
during the inquiry so that he may adequately
prepare therefor. Executive Secretary Ermita
also sent a letter to the Blue Ribbon, affirming
that indeed those three questions mentioned
were covered by “executive privilege” because
such information if disclosed might impair
diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the People’s Republic of China. As such, the
Office of the President has ordered Petitioner
not to answer those questions.
Nevertheless, the Blue Ribbon issued a show
cause Letter and a contempt Order against
Petitioner. Thus, this case.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject
three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
RULING:
IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Scope and Limitations
--
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change.
Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory
process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as
it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative
that it is done in accordance with the Senate or
House duly published rules of procedure and
that the rights of the persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials
and the only way for them to be exempted is
through a valid claim of executive privilege.
Is there recognized claim of executive privilege
despite revocation of E.O. 464? At this juncture,
it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O.
464 does not in any way diminish our concept
of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE:
1) The protected communication must relate to
a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Using the above elements, we are convinced
that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First,
the communications relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees failed to show a
compelling or critical need: xxx presidential
communications are presumptively privileged
and that the presumption can be overcome
only by mere showing of public need by the
branch seeking access to conversations xxxx
Here, the record is bereft of any categorical
explanation from respondent Committees to
show a compelling or critical need for the
answers to the three (3) questions in the
enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer
more towards the exercise of the legislative
oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI
rather than Section 21 of the same Article.
Senate v. Ermita ruled that “the oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is
conceded that it is difficult to draw the line
between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an
inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of
Congress. In this regard, much will depend on
the content of the questions and the manner of
inquiry is conducted.
EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
“Demonstrated, specific need for evidence in
pending criminal trial” (US v. Nixon) does not
apply --
In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding
where the information is requested and it is the
demands of due process of law and the fair
administration of criminal justice that the
information be disclosed. This is the reason
why the US Court was quick to “limit the scope
of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not
concerned here with the balance between the
President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality xxx and congressional demands
for information.” Unlike in Nixon, the
information here is elicited, not in a criminal
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this
regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the
validity of the claim of executive privilege
depends not only on the ground invoked but,
also, on the procedural setting or the context in
which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon,
the President did not interpose any claim of
need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive
national security secrets. In the present case,
Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims
executive privilege on the grounds of
presidential communications privilege in
relation to her executive and policy decision-
making process and diplomatic secrets.
Executive Privilege vis-a-vis Right of the People
to Information on Matters of Public Concern
The right to public information, like any other
right, is subject to limitation. The provision
(Section 7, Article III) itself provides the
limitations, i.e. as may be provided by law.
Some of these laws are Sec. 7, RA 6713, Art.
229, RPC, Sec. 3(k), RA 3019, and Sec. 24(e),
Rule 130, ROC. These are in addition to what
our body of jurisprudence clarifies as
confidential and what our Constitution
considers as belonging to the larger concept of
executive privilege. Clearly, there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality
of certain information. We find the information
subject of this case belonging to such kind.
Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vis-a-vis
Right of the People to Information on Matters of
Public Concern: More than anything else,
though, the right of Congress or any of its
Committees to obtain information in aid of
legislation cannot be equated with the people’s
right to public information. The former cannot
claim that every legislative inquiry is an
exercise of the people’s right to information.
xxx
The members of respondent Committees
should not invoke as justification in their
exercise of power a right properly belonging to
the people in general. This is because when
they discharge their power, they do so as
public officials and members of Congress. Be
that as it may, the right to information must be
balanced with and should give way, in
appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts
particularly those pertaining to delicate
interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review
by numerous decided cases.
NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
ABAKADA GURO V. ERMITA
 G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005
FACTS:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners,
ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al.,
insist that the bicameral conference committee
should not even have acted on the no pass-on
provisions since there is no disagreement
between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the
one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the
other, with regard to the no pass-on provision
for the sale of service for power generation
because both the Senate and the House were
in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale
of such service shall not be passed on to the
end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision
for sale of petroleum products, petitioners
argue that the fact that the presence of such a
no pass-on provision in the House version and
the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means
there is no conflict because “a House provision
cannot be in conflict with something that does
not exist.”
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act
No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional
imperative on exclusive origination of revenue
bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution when the Senate introduced
amendments not connected with VAT.
Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that
R.A. No. 9337’s stand- by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially
on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power. They
submit that the recommendatory power given
to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the
occurrence of either of two events using the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark
necessarily and inherently required extended
analysis and evaluation, as well as policy
making.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that
the input tax is a property or a property right.
Petitioners also contend that even if the right to
credit the input VAT is merely a statutory
privilege, it has already evolved into a vested
right that the State cannot remove.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat
Reform Act is constitutional?
RULING:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section
24 of the Constitution provides that All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
The Court reiterates that in making his
recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter
ego of the President or even her subordinate.
He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the
event upon which its expressed will is to take
effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that
he possesses all the facilities to gather data
and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His
function is to gather and collate statistical data
and other pertinent information and verify if
any of the two conditions laid out by Congress
is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its
finding that it is not a property or a property
right, and a VAT-registered person’s
entitlement to the creditable input tax is a
mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in
its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a
mere creation of law. More importantly, the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already
involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long
as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337
was passed, the means through which such end
shall be accomplished is for the legislature to
choose so long as it is within constitutional
bounds.
The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby
DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. V.
CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILS., G.R. NO. 158540, AUG. 3,
2005
(HOLY CRAP, CHECK OUT THE INTRO!!!! ^.^)

“Cement is hardly an exciting subject for
litigation. Still, the parties in this case have
done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of
their respective positions, throwing in
everything including the proverbial kitchen
sink. At present, the burden of passion, if not
proof, has shifted to public respondents
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
private respondent Philippine Cement
Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor),[1]
who now seek reconsideration of our Decision
dated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the
petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement
Corporation (Southern Cross).
This case, of course, is ultimately not just about
cement. For respondents, it is about love of
country and the future of the domestic industry
in the face of foreign competition. For this
Court, it is about elementary statutory
construction, constitutional limitations on the
executive power to impose tariffs and similar
measures, and obedience to the law. Just as
much was asserted in the Decision, and the
same holds true with this present Resolution.”
POWER OF PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE TARIFF
RATES: Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the
executive branch has no authority to impose
tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the
importation of foreign goods. Assuming that
Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the
enactment of the SMA by Congress would be
voided on the ground that it would constitute
an undue delegation of the legislative power to
tax. The constitutional provision shields such
delegation from constitutional infirmity, and
should be recognized as an exceptional grant
of legislative power to the President, rather
than the affirmation of an inherent executive
power.
QUALIFIERS: This being the case, the qualifiers
mandated by the Constitution on this
presidential authority attain primordial
consideration: (1) there must be a law; (2)
there must be specified limits; and (3)
Congress may impose limitations and
restrictions on this presidential authority.
POWER EXERCISED BY ALTER EGOS OF PRES:
The Court recognizes that the authority
delegated to the President under Section 28(2),
Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with
legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the
President, such as department secretaries.
Indeed, for purposes of the President’s exercise
of power to impose tariffs under Article VI,
Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of
Finance who acts as alter ego of the President.
The SMA provides an exceptional instance
wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary
who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities
as alter egos of the President, to impose such
measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no
inherent power, even as alter ego of the
President, to levy tariffs and imports.
TARIFF COMMISSION AND DTI SEC ARE
AGENTS: Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff
Commission under the SMA should be likewise
construed within the same context as part and
parcel of the legislative delegation of its
inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to
the executive branch, subject to limitations and
restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff
Commission and the DTI Secretary may be
regarded as agents of Congress within their
limited respective spheres, as ordained in the
SMA, in the implementation of the said law
which significantly draws its strength from the
plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed,
even the President may be considered as an
agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing
safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the
President, which possesses inherent powers to
impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative
authorization through statute, the President
has no power, authority or right to impose such
safeguard measures because taxation is
inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her
alter egos to impose safeguard measures under
the delineated conditions, the President or the
alter egos may be properly deemed as agents
of Congress to perform an act that inherently
belongs as a matter of right to the legislature.
It is basic agency law that the agent may not
act beyond the specifically delegated powers or
disregard the restrictions imposed by the
principal. In short, Congress may establish the
procedural framework under which such
safeguard measures may be imposed, and
assign the various offices in the government
bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the
imposition of such measures, the task
assignment including the factual determination
of whether the necessary conditions exists to
warrant such impositions. Under the SMA,
Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the
Tariff Commission their respective functions in
the legislature’s scheme of things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging
the legality of the limitations and restrictions
imposed by Congress under Section 28(2)
Article VI, and that is such limitations and
restrictions are themselves violative of the
Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or
noxious these limitations and restrictions may
seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold
their validity unless their constitutional infirmity
can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that
are material to the present case? The entire
SMA provides for a limited framework under
which the President, through the DTI and
Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard
measures in the form of tariffs and similar
imposts.
POWER BELONGS TO CONGRESS: …the cited
passage from Fr. Bernas actually states, “Since
the Constitution has given the President the
power of control, with all its awesome
implications, it is the Constitution alone which
can curtail such power.” Does the President
have such tariff powers under the Constitution
in the first place which may be curtailed by the
executive power of control? At the risk of
redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI:
“The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the
Government.” Clearly the power to impose
tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the
President.
CAMID V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ET,AL.
FACTS:
• This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the
existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao
Del Sur
• This decision have noted the earlier decision
of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former
President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities
of Lanao Del Sur was considerd null and void
due to undue delegation of legislative powers.
• Among the annulled executive orders is
EO107 creating Andong.
• The petitioner herein represents himself as
resident of Andong (as a private citizen and
taxpayer)
• Camid contends/argues the following:
o Municipality of Andong evolved into a full
blown municipality (since there is a complete
set of officials appointed to handle essential
tasks and sevices, it has ist own high school,
Bureau of Post, DECS office etc. and 17
baranggays with chairman)
o He noted agencies and private grous
recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and
DENR Certification of land area and population
of Andong
• In the Certification of DILG, there is an
enumeration of existing municipalties including
18 0f the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez
Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion
and unequal treatment for Andong.
• Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of
EO107 arguing that in Municipality of San
Narciso v. Hon.Mendez, the court affirmed in
making San Andres a de facto municipal
corporation. San Andres was created through
an executive order.
• Thus this petition.
ISSUE: May the Municipality of Andong be
recognized as a de facto municipal corporation?
RULING:
NO. Municipal corporations may exist by
prescription where it is shown that the
community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough
to afford title by prescription.
- Camid does not have shown factual
demonstration of the continuous exercise by
the municipal corporation of its corporation of
its corporate powers as well as acquiescence
by the other instrumentalities of the state like
charters or the legislature’s action.
May the any action on the Certification be an
appropriate solution to Camid’s prayer?
- NO. The Certification has no power or it does
not bear any authority to create or revalidate a
municipality.
Should the case of Andong be treated same as
the case of San Andres?
- No. for the following reasons:
o There are facts found in the San Andres case
that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The
Executive Order creating San Andres was not
invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality
existed for 30 years before it was questioned
and (3) The municipality was classified as a
fifth class municipality and was included in the
legislative district in the House of
Representatives apportionment.
o Andong did not meet the requisites set by
LGC of 1991 Sec.442(d) regarding
municipalities created by executive orders. It
says:
 Municipalities existing as of the date of
the effectivity of this Code shall continue to
exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
o The failure to appropriate funds for Andong
and the absence of elections in the municipality
are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State
does not recognize the existence of the
municipality.
o The Ordinance appended in the 1987
Constitution (which apportioned seats for the
House of Reps to the different legislative
districts in the Philippines, enumerates the
various municipalities encompassed in the
various districts) did not include Andong.
Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the
33 invalidated municipalities are now
considered existing?
- No there was none. The DILG Certification and
the Ordinance in the 1987 Constitution
validates them. The fact that there existing
organic statutes passed by the legislation
recreating these municipalities is enough to
accord a different treatment as that of the
municipality of Andong.
SC DECISION: DISMISSED for lack of Merit.
RELEVANCE:
Note the following Sections with regards to
juridical personality of corporations in relation
to the reasons why San Andres have a different
treatment with Andong:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 8:
Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation
is an artificial being created by operation of
law, having the right of succession and the
powers, attributes and properties expressly
authorized by law or incident to its existence
Section 4. Corporations created by special laws
or charters. - Corporations created by special
laws or charters shall be governed primarily by
the provisions of the special law or charter
creating them or applicable to them,
supplemented by the provisions of this Code,
insofar as they are applicable.
Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code
with relation to Art. 45 of the New Civil Code,
those considered as juridical person includes
the State and its political subdivisions and
Other corporations, institutions and entities for
public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law. These two are
governed by the law creating them.
Since Andong has no law recreating it and that
it is not a recognized political subdivision, it is
not also considered a juridical person.
Note:
What happened with the people from Andong?
- The constituent barrios of the voided
town returns to its original municipalities
(Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are
recognized and still existing.
The solution to have Andong recognized is
through legislation and not judicial confirmation
of void title.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. L-23825:
From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President
(Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities – this is purportedly in pursuant
to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides that the President of the
Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-
province, municipality, [township] municipal
district or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised
therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces…The VP Emmanuel Pelaez
and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing
funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are
unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the
RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of
RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not
be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or
of the corresponding provincial board "upon
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected" and the "recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez
argues, accordingly: "If the President, under
this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can
he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?" The Auditor General countered
that only barrios are barred from being created
by the President. Municipalities are exempt
from the bar and that t a municipality can be
created without creating barrios. Existing
barrios can just be placed into the new
municipality. This theory overlooks, however,
the main import of Pelaez’ argument, which is
that the statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several
barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated
the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement
or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create
municipalities is eminently legislative in
character not administrative.
TWO TEST OF A VALID DELEGATION
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political
Law
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin,
founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the
case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the
petition published. After the hearing the
arguments between petitioners and opposing
parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the
oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On
December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 raising the following arguments,
among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended
by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law
passed by Congress, to which no such law has
yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an
enabling law on people’s initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative.
ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable
amendment of the Constitution by people’s
initiative?
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power
to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject,
in whole or in part, the Constitution" through
the system of initiative. They can only do so
with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed
laws sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that
R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum and for
Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
means that the main thrust of the law is
initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, it could
have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and
local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the
process in implementing initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, it
intentionally did not do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
People's Initiative
This is probable the best case there is on the
question of the people's right to directly
propose amendments to the constitution
through the system of initiative.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
Nature: Petition for prohibition; the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
constitution through the system of initiative.
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
Ma. Isabel Ongpin – petitioners
Jesus Delfin, Alberto & Carmen Pedrosa
(PIRMA), COMELEC – respondents
Raul Roco, DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN –
petitioners/intervenors
FACTS:
Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to
amend the constitution by People’s initiative.
His proposal is to lift the term limits of elective
officials and thus amending Sections 4 and 7 of
Art VI, Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In his
petition, Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue an
order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country; (2) cause the
publication of such order in newspaper of
general and local circulation; and (3)
instructing municipal election registrars in all
regions of the Philippines to assist him and his
volunteers in establishing signing stations. The
COMELEC then issued an order directing Delfin
to cause the publication of the petition and set
the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to
dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it
is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable
by the COMELEC. Thereafter, Senator Santiago,
et al., filed a special civil action for prohibition
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
The issues in the instant petition are the
following:
(1) Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court
to take cognizance of the petition when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC.
(2) Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefore, was intended to include or cover
initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
(3) Whether that portion of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative
on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(4) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
national and local officials, as proposed in the
draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or
an amendment to, the Constitution.
(5) Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance
of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c)
directing or causing the publication of, inter
alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that:
(1) The instant petition is viable despite the
pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin
Petition. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition filed by Delfin
and that it becomes imperative to stop the
COMELEC from proceeding any further. The SC
said that despite the pendency of the Delfin
Petition in the COMELEC, the SC had jurisdiction
over the Defensor-Santiago petition because
the petition may be treated as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, given the Roco motion filed with the
COMELEC seeking dismissal of the Delfin
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
(2) RA 6735 is inadequate to cover the system
of initiative to amend the constitution because
while Sec 3 mentions initiative on the
Constitution and Sec 5 restates the
constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of registered voters needed for a
proposal, the law does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution; while there are subtitles for
national and local initiatives, there is no
subtitle for the initiative on the Constitution;
thus, the law is incomplete, and this
inadequacy cannot be cured by empowering
the COMELEC to promulgate implementing
rules and regulations.
(3) It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It
does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by
the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C
of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient
standard" tests.
(4) Santiago’s petition contend that the
people's initiative is limited to amendments to
the constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a
revision and is, therefore, outside the power of
the people's initiative. Delfin in his memoranda
contend that the lifting of the limitation on the
term of office of elective officials provided
under the 1987 constitution is not a "revision"
of the constitution. It is only an amendment.
"Amendment envisages an alteration of one or
a few specific provisions of the constitution.
Revision contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document to determine how and to what
extent it should be altered. The Office of the
Solicitor General opined that extension of term
of elected officials constitute a mere
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision
thereof. In its amended petition in intervention
DIK and MABINI contend that the Delfin
proposal does not involve a mere amendment
to, but a revision of, the Constitution because,
in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas it would
involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that
accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it
can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State
policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is
limited to amendments.
(5) COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
Delfin Petition. It was held that COMELEC is
without jurisdiction to entertain the Delfin
Petition because it did not contain the
signatures of the required number of voters as
required by the Constitution.
The petition therefore is granted; R. A. No.
6735 is declared inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and for failure to provide
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
Those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution is declared
void; and the Commission on Elections is
ordered to dismiss the DELFIN petition.
Word of the Day:
Initiative is a form of direct legislation by the
people consisting of two parts: petition and
election. It does not become effective until
passed by voters and its availability does not
remedy the denial of the right to referendum.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Constitutional provision on People's Initiative is
not self-executory
Principle of Non-delegation of Powers,
Exceptions
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case sought to amend certain
provisions of the Constitution, specifically lifting
the limit of terms of elective officials, through
people’s initiative. Santiago et al. opposed on
the ground that the constitutional provision on
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress. There is no law passed yet and RA
6735, which provides for initiative on statues
and local legislation but not initiative on the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6735 adequately provided
for people’s initiative on Constitution
RULING:
Constitutional provision on people’s initiative is
not self-executory
Sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the Constitution...is not
self-executory. xxx
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that
right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress,
for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
Has Congress “provided” for the
implementation of the exercise of this right?
There is, of course, no other better way for
Congress to implement the exercise of the right
than through the passage of a statute or
legislative act. xxx
We agree that RA 6735 was, as its history
reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
But is RA 6735 a full compliance with the power
and duty of Congress to “provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?”
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative
answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public
respondents COMELEC, Sec. 2 of the Act does
not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. – The power
of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.
The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein
was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section,
which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution.
As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power
to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject,
in whole or in part, the Constitution” through
the system of initiative. They can only do so
with respect to “laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.”
Second. It is true that Sec. 3 (Definition of
Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions
it as one of the three systems of initiative, and
that Sec. 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must
submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of
the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Sec. 5, paragraph
(c) requires, among other things, statement of
the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be. It does not include, as among
the contents of the petition, the provisions of
the Constitution sought to be amended, in the
case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II)
and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative
on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as
to the latter simply means that the main thrust
of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended
RA 6735 to fully provide for the implementation
of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order
of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy
of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that
RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting
in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
“empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.”
Principle of non-delegation of power
The rule is that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
The recognized exceptions to the rule are as
follows:
Delegation of tariff powers to the President
under Sec. 28(2), Art. VI;
Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Sec. 23(2), Art. VI;
Delegation to the people at large;
Delegation to local governments; and
Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the
law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution is concerned, RA 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
INCORPORATION CLAUSE
TAÑADA V. ANGARA (1997)
FACTS:
 Petition for certiorari: State action to
enter into WTO
 April 15 1994 – DTI Sec signed in
Morocco the final act embodying the results
of multilateral negotiations regarding the
WTO
o Aug 12 – Senate receives letter
from President submitting the Uruguay Final
Act
o Aug 13 – president’ letter
submitting the Agreement establishing the
WTO, Ministerial Declarations, etc
o Dec 9 – PS 1083, immediate
adoption of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO
o Dec 14 – Senate Resolution No.
97, senate concurring in the ratification by
the president of the agreement establishing
the WTO
o Dec 29 – present petition was
filed
 Petitioner argues for the
unconstitutionality of the WTO:
o WTO requires the Philippines to
place nationals and products of member-
countries at par with each other
o WTO limits, intrudes, impairs
the constitutional powers of both Congress
and the SC
o WTO violates the constitutional
mandate: to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to
qualified Filipinos and to promote
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods
 Petitioner specifically seeks:
o For the nullification of the
concurrence of the Senate with the
President’s agreement to join the WTO
o For the prohibition of the
enforcement and implementation of the
WTO
ISSUE/s:
 WON the petition presents a political
question
  WON the members of the Senate who
participated in the deliberations and voting
leading to the Senate Reso No. 97 are
estopped from impugning the validity of the
same, or the Agreement
 WON the provisions of the
Agreeement violate the provisions of Sec19,
Art 2, and Secs 10 and 12, Art 12 of the
1987 Consti
 WON the provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict, and impair the
sovereignty of the Phil Legislature
 WON provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power
 WON Senate acted with a grave
abuse of discretion in concurring only in the
agreement establishing the WTO
SC RULING:
 ISSUE # 1: MATTER OF JURISDICTION:
political or justiciable
o JUSTICIABLE because it seeks
the nullity of a senate resolution on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution
o An act of legislature is alleged
to have infringed the Constitution: judicial
review not just a matter of right but a duty
(within the court’s expanded jurisdiction)
o Application of a constitutional
provision
o Judiciary as final arbiter on
GADLEJ
o Judicial review for GADLEJ, not
review of the wisdom of a legislative or
executive policy, not upon the merits nor
propriety of govt policies, ONLY to
determine WON there has been GADLEJ
 WTO AGREEMENT AND ECONOMIC
NATIONALISM
o Economic nationalism: violated
by the parity provisions and national
treatment clauses in the WTO Agreement
o Economic nationalism in Sec
19, Art 2, Secs 10 and 12, Art 12 of the
Consti
o WTO: places nationals and
foreign products on the same footing as
Filipino and domestic products in
contravention of the FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
 Render meaningless
“effectively controlled by Filipinos”
 WTO: ensures conformity of national
economic laws, regulations, and
administrative procedures with its annexed
agreements and imposed obligations
o Negate the preferential treatment accorded
to Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods
 RESPONDENTS:
o Constitutional provisions are not self-
executing, merely policies
o Such nationalistic provisions must be read in
relation to: Art 12, Sec 1 and 13.
o Read properly, the cited WTO provisions do
not violate the Consti
o WTO agreement contains sufficient
safeguards for developing countries
• Declaration of Principles NOT SELF-
EXECUTING
o Article 2 is a mere declaration of principles
and state policies – basic political creed of
the nation
o Not intended to be self-executing
o Used as aids by the judiciary in adjudication,
or legislature in lawmaking
o Not self-executing provisions, a disregard of
which cannot give rise to a cause of action
in the courts
o Kilosbayan, Inc v. Morato: Do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but guidelines for legislation
o Basco v. Pagcor: broad constitutional
principles need legislative enactments to
implement them
• WHY? Because of basic considerations of
due process and the lack of judicial
authority to wade into the unchartered
ocean of social and economic policy making
(READ OPOSA- Feliciano’s concurring)
• ISSUE # 2: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
SHOULD NOT BE READ WITH OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES TO ATTAIN
BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY
o Sec 10 and 12 of Article 12 should be read
with relation to Sec 1 and 13 of the same
Article: ideals of economic nationalism does
not espouse an isolationist economy but a
self-reliant and competent economy, able to
compete in foreign markets, and trade
policies that uphold equality and reciprocity,
protection of Filipino enterprises from unfair
trade practices and overbearing foreign
competitions
o AND FURTHER, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution that allow the
Senate to ratify the concurrence with the
WTO agreement
• Need fore business exchange on the bases
of equality and reciprocity
 • Protectionist policy only against unfair trade
practices
Does not encourage entry of foreign goods
services, but does not prohibit them either
 WTO RECOGNIZES NEED TO PROTECT
WEAK ECONOMIES
o WTO has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing
countries
o Each vote by a member is
equal to one, equal to any other’s vote,
unlike in the Security Council where major
states have permanent seats and veto
powers
o Poor countries can protect their
economies through one-on-one negotiations
with developed countries
o Not mere practical alliances,
but real negotiations rooted in law
 SPECIFIC PROVISOS TO PROTECT
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
o Amount of tariff reduction,
period within which the reduction is to be
spread out (page 61)
o Export subsidy for agricultural
production (GATT)
o Anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures and safeguards
against import surges
 CONSTITUTION DOES NOT RULE OUT
FOREIGN COMPETITION
o Policy of self-reliance does not
necessarily mean no foreign exchange
allowed
o Not economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community
o Independence refers to
freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy
o WTO rules on most favored
nation, national treatment, and trade
without discrimination – rules of equality
and reciprocity applying to all members
 CONSITUTION FAVORS CONSUMERS
NOT INDUSTRIES OR ENTERPRISES
o WON the WTO/GATT will favor
consumers is a political question; wisdom of
legislative policy
 CONSITUTION DESIGNED TO MEET
FUTURE EVENTS AND CONTINGENCIES
 ISSUE # 3: WTO AGREEMENT AND
LEGISLATIVE POWER
o Petitioners: because each
member-country is required to conform to
the laws and regulations of the WTO, the
lawmaking body of Congress is limited to
this conformity
o Especially as WTO infringes on
the taxation power of Congress: when WTO
fixes tariff rates
 SOVEREIGNTY LIMITED BY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATISES
o All government authority is
inherently limited by the fact that it is a
member of a family of nations
o Doctrine of incorporation: the
country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of the
country’s laws
o Authority limited by principles
of international law and treaty stipulations
 UN CHARTER AND OTHER TREATIES
LIMIT SOVEREIGNTY
 ISSUE # 4: WTO AND JUDICIAL
POWER:
o In question: WTO TRIPS – Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights intrudes on the power of the SC to
promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedures
o Burden of proof on proving the
authenticity of a patent similar to something
else by another country
SC upholds said TRIPS, similar to RA 165,
Patent Law
 ISSUE#5: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN
THE WTO AGREEMENT AND NOT IN OTHER
DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT
o Assailed Senate Resolution
expressed concurrence in what the Final Act
required, concurrence of the Senate in the
WTO agreement
o Ministerial Declarations were
deemed accepted without being ratified, by
virtue of Article 25: Sec 1 of GATT
JUDGMENT: The validity of the assailed
resolution is upheld.
LIM V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR NO.
151445, APRIL 11, 2002
Facts: This case involves a petition for
certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-
in-intervention, praying that respondents be
restrained from proceeding with the so-called
"Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and
hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a
permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition
against the deployment of U.S. troops in
Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in
violation of the Constitution.
Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel
from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take
part, in conjunction with the Philippine military,
in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan"
exercises are the largest combined training
operations involving Filipino and American
troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the Philippines and the United
States in 1951.
The entry of American troops into Philippine soil
is proximately rooted in the international anti-
terrorism campaign declared by President
George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events
that occurred on September 11, 2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim
and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. They
were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist
organizations, who filed a petition-in-
intervention on February 11, 2002.
Held: The Court held that no doubt that the US
forces are prohibited / from engaging in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a
nagging question remains: are American troops
actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino
soldiers under the guise of an alleged training
and assistance exercise? The Court cannot take
judicial notice of the events transpiring down
south, as reported from the saturation
coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not
take cognizance of newspaper or electronic
reports per se, not because of any issue as to
their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the
simple reason that facts must be established in
accordance with the rules of evidence. It
cannot accept, in the absence of concrete
proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo
government is engaged in "doublespeak" in
trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an
offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil.
The petitions invite the Court to speculate on
what is really happening in Mindanao.
Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-
intervention were dismissed.
LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from
the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take
part, in conjunction with the Philippine military,
in “Balikatan 02-1.” They are a simulation of
joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the Philippines and the United
States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the
strategic and technological capabilities of our
armed forces through joint training with its
American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the
largest such training exercise directly
supporting the MDT’s objectives. It is this treaty
to which the VFA adverts and the obligations
thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim
and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise.
Issue:
Whether “Balikatan 02-1” activities covered by
the Visiting Forces Agreement?
Ruling:
To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the
VFA itself. The VFA permits United States
personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis,
in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was
left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed
on its definition is couched in the negative, in
that United States personnel must “abstain
from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of
this agreement, and in particular, from any
political activity.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing
interpretations of international agreements. It
clearly provides that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of
the text, which is presumed to verbalize the
parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise
dictates what may be used as aids to deduce
the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the
context of the treaty, as well as other elements
may be taken into account alongside the
aforesaid context.
It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity
surrounding the meaning of the
word .’activities” arose from accident. It was
deliberately made that way to give both parties
a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner,
visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine
territory for purposes other than military. As
conceived, the joint exercises may include
training on new techniques of patrol and
surveillance to protect the nation’s marine
resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief
operations, civic action projects such as the
building of school houses, medical and
humanitarian missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy
to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only
logical to assume that .’Balikatan 02-1,” a
“mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and
training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of
sanctioned or allowable activities in the context
of the agreement.
LAO ICHONG VS JAIME HERNANDEZ
Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws
in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who
entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) –
particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that it
contravened several treaties concluded by the
RP which, according to him, violates the equal
protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He
said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in
the business here in the country who helps in
the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or
supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a
generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally
accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause “does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no
longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ, 101 PHIL. 115
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and
on behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending among
others that: it denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives them
of their liberty and property without due
process of law; it violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; and its provisions against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business
thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or
entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines,
and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; (2) an exception from the above
prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged
in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engage therein, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with
the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for
ten years after the approval of the Act or until
the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of
citizens and juridical entities of the United
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and
labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business,
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually
engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a
verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of juridical entities;
and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six
months for purposes of liquidation.
Held: The Court held that the Act was
approved in the exercise of the police power. It
has been said that police power is so far-
reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and
as such it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential,
insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under
a modern democratic framework where the
demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions;
the field and scope of police power has become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become
almost all- embracing and have transcended
human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we
cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the
State seeks to attain or achieve public interest
or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not
define the scope or extent of the police power
of the State; what they do is to set forth the
limitations thereof. The most important of
these are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause
is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power, Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved;
or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely
an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power
and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of
legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power,
whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny.
Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the
State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law;
and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country
from such dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future; that the law
does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds
exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and
efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident — as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary — and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion
the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers
from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may
not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement. The Treaty
of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the
law in question. All that the treaty guarantees
is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the
nationals of China are not discriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon
the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law , and the same may never curtail or restrict
the scope of the police power of the State.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155;
L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by
Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
FACTS: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known
as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was
passed. The said law provides for a prohibition
against foreigners as well as corporations
owned by foreigners from engaging from retail
trade in our country. This was protested by the
petitioner in this case. According to him, the
said law violates the international and treaty of
the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional.
Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the
Philippines and China was violated according to
him.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a
valid exercise of police power.
HELD: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a
valid exercise of police power. It was also then
provided that police power can not be
bargained away through the medium of a
treaty or a contract. The Court also provided
that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and
actual danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control. If ever the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is
always subject to qualification or amendment
by a subsequent law and the same may never
curtain or restrict the scope of the police power
of the state.
STATE IMMUNITY
REPUBLIC vs. LIM
GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005
FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a
special civil action for expropriation of a land in
Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the
Philippine Army. The said lots were registered
in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon.
The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then
took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May
1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering
the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons
appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on
March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was
made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons,
filed with the National Airports Corporation a
claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied
knowledge of the matter." On September 6,
1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but
expressed willingness to pay the appraised
value of the lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the
lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons’
successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio,
filed with the same CFI an action for recovery
of possession with damages against the
Republic and AFP officers in possession of the
property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said
lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza
and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the
priority of the National Airports Corporation to
acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939
upon previous payment of a reasonable market
value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its
Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,
holding that they are the owners and have
retained their right as such over lots because of
the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of
P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were
ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of
the Republic.
They appealed the CFI’s decision to the
SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio
are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and
939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled
that they are not entitled to recover possession
of the lots but may only demand the payment
of their fair market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and
Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim,
herein respondent, as security for their loans.
For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he
had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot
title was issued in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a
complaint for quieting of title with the RTC
against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim,
declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive
owner of the lot with all the rights of an
absolute owner including the right to
possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003,
it sustained the RTC Decision saying: “...This is
contrary to the rules of fair play because the
concept of just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land, but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just"...”
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with
the SC a petition for review alleging that they
remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic has
retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation therefor
pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD: One of the basic principles
enshrined in our Constitution is that no person
shall be deprived of his private property
without due process of law; and in
expropriation cases, an essential element of
due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is
taken for public use.7 Accordingly, Section 9,
Article III, of our Constitution mandates:
"Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." The Republic
disregarded the foregoing provision when it
failed and refused to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
for Lots 932 and 939.
The Court of Appeals is correct in
saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to
the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar
to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the
compensation is not paid in a reasonable
time, the party may be treated as a
trespasser ab initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza,
this Court mandated the Republic to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the sum
of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of
the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did
not comply and allowed several decades to
pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. It is
tantamount to confiscation of private property.
While it is true that all private properties are
subject to the need of government, and the
government may take them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion
demands, however from the taking of private
property by the government under the power
of eminent domain, there arises an implied
promise to compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to
the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. So, how
could the Republic acquire ownership over
Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the
just compensation, required by law, for
more than 50 years? Clearly, without full
payment of just compensation, there can be
no transfer of title from the landowner to
the expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that
expropriation of lands consists of two stages.
First is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise. The second is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be
taken." It is only upon the completion of these
two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed In Republic v. Salem
Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the
process is not completed until payment of just
compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the
Republic to pay respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57
years rendered the expropriation process
incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special
circumstances prevailing in this case entitle
respondent to recover possession of the
expropriated lot from the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the
non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in
cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. After all, it is the
duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will,
to facilitate the payment of just compensation.
In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined
just compensation as not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the
property within a reasonable time. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just."
CIVILIAN SUPREMACY
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
REYES
[GR 159085, 3 February 2004]; also Social
Justice Society (SJS) Officers/Member [GR
159103], Suplico, et al., vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,
et al. [GR 159185]; Pimentel et al. vs. Romulo
et al. [GR 159196]
En Banc, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in result,
1 concurs in separate opinion to which 2 join, 2
file own separate opinions, 1 dissents in
separate opinion, 1 on leave
FACTS:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed
with high-powered ammunitions and
explosives, some three hundred junior officers
and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee
hours of 27 July 2003. Bewailing the corruption
in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among
other things, the resignation of the President,
the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). In the wake of
the Oakwood occupation, the President issued
later in the day Proclamation 427 and General
Order 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion”
and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress
the rebellion. By the evening of 27 July 2003,
the Oakwood occupation had ended. After
hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to
return to barracks. The President, however, did
not immediately lift the declaration of a state of
rebellion and did so only on 1 August 2003,
through Proclamation 435. In the interim,
several petitions were filed before the Supreme
Court challenging the validity of Proclamation
427 and General Order 4.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitions have been rendered
moot by the lifting of the declaration.
HELD:
NO. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General
that the issuance of Proclamation 435,
declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased
to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule,
courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial
power being limited to the determination of
“actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will
decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
“capable of repetition yet evading review.” The
present case is one such case. Once before, the
President on 1 May 2001 declared a state of
rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP
to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation
38 and General Order 1. On that occasion, “‘an
angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and
other deadly weapons’ assaulted and
attempted to break into Malacañang.” Petitions
were filed before the Supreme Court assailing
the validity of the President’s declaration. Five
days after such declaration, however, the
President lifted the same. The mootness of the
petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying
cases precluded the Court from addressing the
constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent
similar questions from reemerging, the
Supreme Court seized the opportunity to finally
lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a
state of rebellion in the exercise of the
President’s calling out power, the mootness of
the petitions notwithstanding
RAMON GONZALES VS EXEC SEC RUFINO
HECHANOVA
G.R. No. L-21897
Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can
Repeal Executive Agreements
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered
into two executive agreements with Vietnam
and Burma for the importation of rice without
complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the Nat’l Economic Council
showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation
of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements.
Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction",
because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of
rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over
the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main
function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty
and a statute, the one which is latest in point of
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case
at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also,
insists that the contracts adverted to are not
treaties. No such justification can be given as
regards executive agreements not authorized
by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances which
are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive
or an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that
the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled it in the affirmative, by providing that
the SC may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction
to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or
the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question". In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.
GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA 9 SCRA 230
FACTS:
Respondent executive secretary authorized
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Ramon A.
Gonzales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo
palay and corn planters asso., filed and
averring that in making or attempting to make
importation of foreign rice are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because
RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of
rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration
or any government agency.
ISSUE:
Whether an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts.
HELD:
The power of judicial review is vested with the
supreme court in consonace to section 2 art.
VIII of the constitution. the alleged
consummation of the contracts with vietnam
and burma does not render this case academic.
RA 2207, enjoins our government not from
entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but
from entering rice, except under conditions
prescribed in said act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the
proposed importation would not compel our
government to default in the performance of
such obligations as it mat have contracted with
the sellers of rice in question because aside
from the fact that said obligations may be
complied without importing the said commodity
into the phils., the proposed importation may
still be legalized by complying with the
provisions of the aforementioned law.
IBP VS. ZAMORA G.R. NO.141284, AUGUST
15, 2000
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-
Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual
determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed
forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to
call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment
of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine
the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that
the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there
exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by
the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task
of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation
of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute
a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all
times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority
in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the
PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of
the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does
not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
IBP VS. ZAMORA, G.R. NO. 141284 G.R.
NO. 141284. AUGUST 15, 2000.
Facts: At bar is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order
seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the
order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine
Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols
around the metropolis. Formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed
the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,
called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of
Metro Manila through a sustained street
patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of
high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated
by organized crime syndicates whose members
include those that are well-trained, disciplined
and well-armed active or former PNP/Military
personnel.
Issue:
1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law
enforcement is in derogation of Article 2,
Section 3 of the Constitution;
2. Whether the deployment constitutes
incursion in a civilian function of law
enforcement;
3. Whether the deployment creates a
dangerous tendency to rely on the military to
perform civilian functions of the government
4. Whether the deployment gives more power
to the military than what it should be under the
Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are:
(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal
standing; (2) Whether or not the President's
factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review,
and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the
armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military and the
civilian character of the PNP.
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: The question of deployment of the
Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since
the same involves a political question; that the
organization and conduct of police visibility
patrols, which feature the team-up of one
police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier,
does not violate the civilian supremacy clause
in the Constitution.
In view of standing
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP
asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi The mere invocation by the IBP of its
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothe it with standing in this case.
National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present
action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any
form of injury as a result of the operation of the
joint visibility patrols.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically
assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional
cases brought before it even in instances that
are ripe for resolution. One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are
''political questions." The reason is that political
questions are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular act or measure being assailed.
Moreover, the political question being a
function of the separation of powers, the courts
will not normally interfere with the workings of
another co-equal branch unless the case shows
a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold
the law and the Constitution.
In view of abuse of discretion
The President did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in calling out the Marines.
President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, specifically, the power to call
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling
the armed forces is not proper for judicial
scrutiny since it involves a political question
and the resolution of factual issues which are
beyond the review powers of this Court.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility. When the
President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom.
In view of burden of proof on factual basis
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that
the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there
exist no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to
support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy
over the military.
The present petition is anchored on fear that
once the armed forces are deployed, the
military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in
peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether it
is the calling out of the armed forces alone in
order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or the
proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion
or rebellion), the exercise of the President's
powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof
— not mere assertion. 4 As has been pointed
out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic
exercise in the conceivable' . . . but
requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible
harm."
Because of the absence of such record
evidence, we are left to guess or even
speculate on these questions. Thus, at one
point, the majority opinion says that what is
involved here is not even the calling out of the
armed forces but only the use of marines for
law enforcement. We need to have evidence on
these questions because, under the
Constitution, the President's power to call out
the armed forces in order to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the
limitation that the exercise of this power is
required in the interest of public safety.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual
invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must
require it. These conditions are not required in
the case of the power to call out the armed
forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The
implication is that the President is given full
discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of
the power to call as compared to the two other
powers.
In view of the Courts concurrence
We do not doubt the veracity of the President's
assessment of the situation, especially in the
light of present developments. The Court takes
judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the
shopping malls, public utilities, and other public
places. These are among the areas of
deployment described in the LOI 2000. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute
a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police
forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers
on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines.
Considering the above circumstances, the
Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols. As such,
there can be no "insidious incursion" of the
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
Political questions are defined as "those
questions which under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of government." 2 They
have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to
be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity and (2) matters which have
been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular office of the
government, with discretionary power to act. 3
The exercise of the discretionary power of the
legislative or executive branch of government
was often the area where the Court had to
wrestle with the political question doctrine.
GONZALES et. al v. GEN. ABAYA
G.R. No. 164007, Aug. 10, 2006
The nature of the military justice system
Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of
War
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more
than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises
of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they
disarmed the security guards and planted
explosive devices around the building. They
then declared their withdrawal of support from
their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that
she resign as President of the Republic.
After much negotiation, the group finally laid
down their arms. Subsequently, an Information
for coup d’etat was filed against them with the
RTC, at the same time that they were tried at
court martial for conduct unbecoming an
officer. They question the jurisdiction of the
court martial, contending that the RTC ordered
that their act was not service-connected and
that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of
War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of
coup d’etat.
ISSUE:
Whether the act complained of was service-
connected and therefore cognizable by court
martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat
cognizable by regular courts
RULING:
The military justice system is disciplinary in
nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of
discipline in order to ensure the highest degree
of military efficiency. Military law is established
not merely to enforce discipline in times of war,
but also to preserve the tranquility and security
of the State in times of war, but also to
preserve the tranquility and security of the
State in time of peace; for there is nothing
more dangerous to the public peace and safety
than a licentious and undisciplined military
body. The administration of military justice has
been universally practiced. Since time
immemorial, all the armies in almost all
countries of the world look upon the power of
military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this
reason, the court martial has become invariably
an indispensable part of any organized armed
forces, it being the most potent agency in
enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.
The Court held that the offense is service-
connected. xxx It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the
duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the
military profession. In short, the charge has a
bearing on their professional conduct or
behavior as military officers. Equally indicative
of the “service-connected” nature of the
offense is the penalty prescribed for the same –
dismissal from the service – imposable only by
the military court. Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to
cleanse the military profession of misfits and to
preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
GUDANI v. SENGA
G.R. No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006
The ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does
not turn on executive privilege, but on the
Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief
to control the actions and speech of members
of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in
executive privilege.
FACTS:
On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several
senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before
the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security concerning the conduct of the 2004
elections wherein allegations of massive
cheating and the “Hello Garci” tapes emerged.
AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan and company from appearing before
the Senate Committee without Presidential
approval. Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan testified before said Committee,
prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected
to General Court Martial proceedings for
willfully violating an order of a superior officer.
In the meantime, President Arroyo issued EO
464, which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can prevent
military officers from testifying at a legislative
inquiry
RULING:
We hold that the President has constitutional
authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a that the officer has to choose the President.
consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, we also hold that any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official
whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If
the President is not so inclined, the President
may be commanded by judicial order to compel
the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the
land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.
Ability of President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress is based on
Commander-in-chief powers
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the
President may not issue a blanket requirement
of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on
executive privilege, and affirmed that the
privilege must be formally invoked on specified
grounds. However, the ability of the President
to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief
are not hampered by the same limitations as in
executive privilege.
RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President
could, as a general rule, require military
officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost
on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as
commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant
control over the armed forces in matters such
as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives
and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and
the chain of command mandate that the
President’s ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm
After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is
the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Remedy is judicial relief
At the same time, the refusal of the President
to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief.
The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is
ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come
to pass in this petition, since petitioners
testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has
the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may
soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and
legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to
attend legislative inquiries even if the President
desires otherwise, a modality which does not
offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the
courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal,
coordinate branch of government to the
legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule
that persons summoned to testify before
Congress must do so. There is considerable
interplay between the legislative and executive
branches, informed by due deference and
respect as to their various constitutional
functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this
relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort
that one branch seeks to compel the other to a
particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the
third coordinate branch of government, does
not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the
legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its
inability to originate national policies and
legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it
is the branch empowered by the Constitution to
compel obeisance to its rulings by the other
branches of government.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
CASES
WHO EXERCISES THESE GOV’T POWER
cases:
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOC., INC VS MAYOR OF
MANILA
G.R. No. L-24693
Police Power – Due Process Clause
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board
enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought
to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them
into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class
(taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled
hotels/motels to get the demographics of
anyone who checks in to their rooms. It
compelled hotels/motels to have wide open
spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their
patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of
the law averring that such is oppressive,
arbitrary and against due process. The lower
court as well as the appellate court ruled in
favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the
due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There
is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o
a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,
the presumption stays. As in this case, there
was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. This
is to minimize prostitution. The increase in
taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the lgu concerned.
And taxation is a valid exercise of police power
as well. The due process contention is likewise
untenable, due process has no exact definition
but has reason as a standard. In this case, the
precise reason why the ordinance was enacted
was to curb down prostitution in the city which
is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
mere singling out of the provisions of the said
ordinance alleged to be vague.
 POLICE POWER
On the legislative organs of the government,
whether national of local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot
be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. Police power is based
upon the concept of necessity of the State and
its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people.43 Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by
the State. These range from the regulation of
dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas
stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope
of police power is best demonstrated by the
fact that in its hundred or so years of presence
in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely
been denied.
May Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of Police
Power?
In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty or property of any person
is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
Two types of Due Process
Procedural Due Process: Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural
due process concerns itself with government
action adhering to the established process
when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice
given to the level of formality of a hearing.
Substantive Due Process: Substantive due
process completes the protection envisioned by
the due process clause. It inquires whether the
government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY,
G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil
580)
FACTS:
The case arises from the fact that defendant,
Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to
destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the
sole reason that such sign, signboard, or
billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight.
The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid
exercise of police power in this case?
HELD:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of
the police power of the Philippine Government
belongs to the Legislature and that this power
is limited only by the Acts of Congress and
those fundamentals principles which lie at the
foundation of all republican forms of
government. An Act of the Legislature which is
obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of
the purposes of the police power and interferes
with the ordinary enjoyment of property would,
without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where
the Act is reasonably within a proper
consideration of and care for the public health,
safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by
the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not
received a full and complete definition. It may
be said, however, to be the right of the State,
or state functionary, to prescribe regulations
for the good order, peace, health, protection,
comfort, convenience and morals of the
community, which do not ... violate any of the
provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the
improvement of social and economic
conditioned affecting the community at large
and collectively with a view to bring about "he
greatest good of the greatest number."Courts
have consistently and wisely declined to set
any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for
the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is
exercised from time to time as varying social
conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police
power extends to all the great public needs. It
may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by
usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly
and immediately necessary to the public
welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the
existence and sources of this police power than
to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to
its exercise."
ACEBEDO OPTICAL Co. v. CA
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
Police Power as exercised by LGUs, restrictions
and qualifications
Power of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke
business permits
Granting of business permits vs. granting of
permit to practice profession
FACTS:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City
Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit
was therefor issued, subject to certain
conditions like prohibition of putting up an
optical clinic, examining and/or prescribing
reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When it
was found that petitioner violated these
conditions, its business permit was cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of special
conditions by the public respondents were acts
ultra vires
RULING:
Police Power exercised by LGUs
Police power as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. The State,
through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local government
units, as agencies of the State, in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation. This
delegation of police power is embodied in the
general welfare clause of the Local Government
Code xxx
The scope of police power has been held to be
so comprehensive as to encompass almost all
matters affecting the health, safety, peace,
order, morals, comfort and convenience of the
community. Police power is essentially
regulatory in nature and the power to issue
licenses or grant business permits, if exercised
for a regulatory and not revenue-raising
purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
Power of city mayor to grant business permits
The authority of city mayors to issue or grant
licenses and business permits is beyond cavil.
It is provided for by law.
However, the power to grant or issue licenses
or business permits must always be exercised
in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of all concerned to due
process and equal protection of the law.
But can city mayor cancel business permits or
impose special conditions? As aptly discussed
by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the
power to issue licenses and permits necessarily
includes the corollary power to revoke,
withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to
revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to
restrict through the imposition of certain
conditions.
Did the conditions or restrictions imposed
amount to a confiscation of the business?
Distinction must be made between the grant of
a license or permit to do business and the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice
of a particular profession. The first is usually
granted by the local authorities and the second
is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to
regulate the particular profession. A business
permit authorizes the person, natural or
otherwise, to engage in business or some form
of commercial activity. A professional license,
on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a
natural person to engage in the practice or
exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner
from respondent City Mayor is a permit to
engage in the business of running an optical
shop. It does not purport to seek a license to
engage in the practice of optometry as a
corporate body or entity, although it does have
in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to
practice optometry by the Board of Examiners
in Optometry.
MMDA VS BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
Date: March 27, 2000
Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority
Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc
FACTS:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-
Air Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-
profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road
inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received
from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice
dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA
was apprised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against
petitioner before the RTC a civil case for
injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance
of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining
the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial
court issued a temporary restraining order the
following day. After due hearing, the trial court
denied the issuance of preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the
merits of the case finding that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that
the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance.
ISSUE:
WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune
Road to the public
HELD: No
Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to
open Neptune Street to public traffic because it
is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
management which involves the regulation of
the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety,
convenience and welfare of the general public.
It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was
affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases
of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it
has police power, it is now urged that there is
no need for the City of Makati to enact an
ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.
Police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same. The power is plenary and its scope is
vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public
morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot
be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power.
The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body
composed of several local government units -
i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5)
municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,
Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig,
Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina,
Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the
municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros,
San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was
declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration
of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the
region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA.
The implementation of the MMDA’s plans,
programs and projects is undertaken by the
local government units, national government
agencies, accredited people’s organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector as well as by the MMDA itself.
For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to
enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement
and other cooperative arrangements with these
bodies for the delivery of the required services
within Metro Manila.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is
limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic
services. One of these is transport and traffic
management which includes the formulation
and monitoring of policies, standards and
projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements, the
use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe
movement of persons and goods. It also covers
the mass transport system and the institution
of a system of road regulation, the
administration of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metro
Manila for traffic violations. Under this service,
the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the
policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and
regulate the implementation of all traffic
management programs." In addition, the MMDA
may "install and administer a single ticketing
system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA
are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by
the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the
predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of
police power. The first Sangalang decision was
on the merits of the petition, while the second
decision denied reconsideration of the first case
and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v.
Court of Appeals.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two
Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at
bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances
passed by the municipal council of Makati and
the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the
proposed opening of Neptune Street is
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995
sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through
its president. The notice does not cite any
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as
the legal basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied
on its authority under its charter "to rationalize
the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the
safe and convenient movement of persons."
Rationalizing the use of roads and
thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within
the scope of transport and traffic management.
By no stretch of the imagination, however, can
this be interpreted as an express or implied
grant of ordinance-making power, much less
police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as
the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is
the forerunner of the present MMDA, an
examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No.
824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the
latter possessed greater powers which were not
bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive
Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The
powers and functions of the MMC were
devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed,
however, that not all powers and functions of
the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA’s
power was limited to the "delivery of basic
urban services requiring coordination in
Metropolitan Manila." The MMA’s governing
body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although
composed of the mayors of the component
cities and municipalities, was merely given the
power of: (1) formulation of policies on the
delivery of basic services requiring coordination
and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of
resolutions and other issuances, approval of a
code of basic services and the exercise of its
rule-making power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local
government units became primarily responsible
for the governance of their respective political
subdivisions. The MMA’s jurisdiction was limited
to addressing common problems involving
basic services that transcended local
boundaries. It did not have legislative power.
Its power was merely to provide the local
government units technical assistance in the
preparation of local development plans. Any
semblance of legislative power it had was
confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed
by the local legislative assemblies to ensure
consistency among local governments and with
the comprehensive development plan of Metro
Manila," and to "advise the local governments
accordingly."
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan
Manila became a "special development and
administrative region" and the MMDA a "special
development authority" whose functions were
"without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units." The character
of the MMDA was clearly defined in the
legislative debates enacting its charter.
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a
local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. It is not even a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the
Constitution. The creation of a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The
Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected
by the people, but appointed by the President
with the rank and privileges of a cabinet
member. In fact, part of his function is to
perform such other duties as may be assigned
to him by the President, whereas in local
government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is
not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A.
No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not
pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling. We desist from ruling on the other
issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light
of the MMDA’s noble efforts to solve the chaotic
traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday,
traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the
metropolis. Even our once sprawling
boulevards and avenues are now crammed
with cars while city streets are clogged with
motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become
a social malaise affecting our people’s
productivity and the efficient delivery of goods
and services in the country. The MMDA was
created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the
powers granted by its charter are limited. Its
good intentions cannot justify the opening for
public use of a private street in a private
subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of
law.
ART. 3 Sec. 1 SCOPE OF PROTECTED LIFE,
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
cases:
DUNCAN ASSOC. OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO
VS. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILS., INC.
438 SCRA 343
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical
representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates,
among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by the existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees with competing
drug companies and should management find
that such relationship poses a prossible conflict
of interest, to resign from the company.
Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides
the same with stipulation that management
may transfer the employee to another
department in a non-counterchecking position
or preparation for employment outside of the
company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's
products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
area and entered into a romantic relationship
with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's
competition. Before getting married, Tecson's
District Manager reminded him several times of
the conflict of interest but marriage took place
in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors
informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson
asked for time to comply with the condition
(that either he or Betsy resign from their
respective positions). Unable to comply with
condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the
Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
After his request against transfer was denied,
Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's
Grievance Committee and while pending, he
continued to act as medical representative in
the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was
valid...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical
company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of any competitor
company is valid
RULING:
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies,
and other confidential programs and
information from competitors. The prohibition
against pesonal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that
nature might compromise the interests of the
company. That Glaxo possesses the right to
protect its economic interest cannot be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of
the equal protection clause are addressed only
to the state or those acting under color of its
authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of US Supreme Court decisions that the
equal protection clause erects to shield against
merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after
repeated requests to the employee to comply
with the policy. Indeed the application of the
policy was made in an impartial and even-
handed manner, with due regard for the lot of
the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting,
an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is
demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain
by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are present
in the instant case.
HELD:
The challenged policy has been implemented
by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a
long period of time. In the case at bar, the
record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several
chances to eliminate the conflict of interest
brought about by his relationship with Betsy,
but he never availed of any of them.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit."
TWO KINDS OF DUE PROCESS
cases:
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO v. PALANCA
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction
over the property which is the subject of the
litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into the actual custody of the law, or it
may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions
of law, the power of the court over the property
is recognized and made effective.
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be
a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that nature and is substantially such.
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to
be in the possession of its owner, in person or
by agent; and he may be safely held, under
certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco
mortgaged various parcels of real property in
Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards,
Engracio returned to China and there he died
on January 29, 1810 without returning again to
the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted
foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a
non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also
directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in
Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless,
after publication in a newspaper of the City of
Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was
likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale
was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale,
a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested the
court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and
the judgment rendered thereon were void
because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
subject of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter of the action
Whether or not due process of law was
observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may
have reference (1) to the authority of the court
to entertain a particular kind of action or to
administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the parties,
or (2) over the property which is the subject to
the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a
court determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to
the actions which it may entertain and the
relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and
his submission to its authority, or it is acquired
by the coercive power of legal process exerted
over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the
subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of
the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over
the property is recognized and made effective.
In the latter case the property, though at all
times within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at all.
An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by
actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at
the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to
abide the final event of the litigation. An
illustration of what we term potential
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the
proceeding to register the title of land under
our system for the registration of land. Here the
court, without taking actual physical control
over the property assumes, at the instance of
some person claiming to be owner, to exercise
a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to
adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner
against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action
to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed
the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an
action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and
is substantially such. The expression "action in
rem" is, in its narrow application, used only
with reference to certain proceedings in courts
of admiralty wherein the property alone is
treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are
based. The action quasi rem differs from the
true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the
sale or other disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure,
or other form of remedy, are in a general way
thus designated. The judgment entered in
these proceedings is conclusive only between
the parties.
xxx
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if
the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a
personal action and is conducted as such. This,
however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action
is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles
governing actions in rem.
On Due Process
xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding,
however, it may be laid down with certainty
that the requirement of due process is satisfied
if the following conditions are present, namely;
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant
must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful
hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the
defendant shall have an opportunity to be
heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case
some notification of the proceedings to the
nonresident owner, prescribing the time within
which appearance must be made, is
everywhere recognized as essential. To answer
this necessity the statutes generally provide for
publication, and usually in addition thereto, for
the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his
residence is known. Though commonly called
constructive, or substituted service of process
in any true sense. It is merely a means
provided by law whereby the owner may be
admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent
upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to
protect it.
It will be observed that this mode of notification
does not involve any absolute assurance that
the absent owner shall thereby receive actual
notice. The periodical containing the
publication may never in fact come to his
hands, and the chances that he should discover
the notice may often be very slight. Even
where notice is sent by mail the probability of
his receiving it, though much increased, is
dependent upon the correctness of the address
to which it is forwarded as well as upon the
regularity and security of the mail service. It
will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of
our law relative to the mailing of notice does
not absolutely require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but only in
the case where the defendant's residence is
known. In the light of all these facts, it is
evident that actual notice to the defendant in
cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in
recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual
notice is apparently this: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in
person or by agent; and he may be safely held,
under certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to
defendant’s last known address constitute
denial of due process?
The observations which have just been made
lead to the conclusion that the failure of the
clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail
in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as
amounts to a denial of due process of law; and
hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved,
would not avoid the judgment in this case.
Notice was given by publication in a newspaper
and this is the only form of notice which the law
unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is
all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the
proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect
of this irregularity, it makes a difference
whether it be viewed as a question involving
jurisdiction or as a question involving due
process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction
there can be no distinction between the much
and the little. The court either has jurisdiction
or it has not; and if the requirement as to the
mailing of notice should be considered as a
step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction,
there could be no escape from the conclusion
that the failure to take that step was fatal to
the validity of the judgment. In the application
of the idea of due process of law, on the other
hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once
established, all that due process of law
thereafter requires is an opportunity for the
defendant to be heard; and as publication was
duly made in the newspaper, it would seem
highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail
the notice was fatal. We think that in applying
the requirement of due process of law, it is
permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the
provision which is supposed to have been
violated and the principle underlying the
exercise of judicial power in these proceedings.
Judge in the light of these conceptions, we
think that the provision of Act of Congress
declaring that no person shall be deprived of
his property without due process of law has not
been infringed.
SEC OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE RALPH LANTION
Due Process
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes
ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to
conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was
then wanted in the US. The US government,
pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty
requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint
against him as well as the extradition request
by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him
copy thereof advising that it is still premature
to give him so and that it is not a preliminary
investigation hence he is not entitled to receive
such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the
lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due
process.
HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower
court. The case against Jimenez refer to an
impending threat of deprivation of one’s
property or property right. No less is this true,
but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of
liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence
over property, for while forfeited property can
be returned or replaced, the time spent in
incarceration is irretrievable and beyond
recompense.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
322 SCRA 160 (2000)
Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the
Manila RTC
FACTS:
On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand
Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and
other supporting documents for said extradition
were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a
designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition
treaty which they found having matters needed
to be addressed. Respondent, then requested
for copies of all the documents included in the
extradition request and for him to be given
ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the
ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies
prior to the completion of the evaluation. At
that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of
evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US
Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by
the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the
DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of
unauthorized disclosure of the information in
the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna
convention on law of treaties such that every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus,
certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR
ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of
Justice was made to issue a copy of the
requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the
two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing
Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as
“the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or
the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government.” Although the
inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an
administrative agency due to the failure of the
DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it
primarily sets the wheels for the extradition
process which may ultimately result in the
deprivation of the liberty of the prospective
extradite. This deprivation can be effected at
two stages: The provisional arrest of the
prospective extradite pending the submission
of the request & the temporary arrest of the
prospective extradite during the pendency of
the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there’s
an impending threat to a prospective
extraditee’s liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. Because of such
consequences, the evaluation process is akin to
an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences
the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation
of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of
the nature of a criminal investigation. There are
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecution. But the
Court has ruled in other cases that where the
investigation of an administrative proceeding
may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or
property, the administrative proceedings are
deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture
partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at
bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings
which may result in the filing of an information
against the respondent, can possibly lead to his
arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus,
the extraditee must be accorded due process
rights of notice & hearing according to A3
§14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the
people to information on matters of public
concern & the corollary right to access to
official records & documents
The court held that the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation, having consequences which will
result in deprivation of liberty of the
prospective extradite. A favorable action in an
extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The
evaluation process itself is like a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have
the same result – the arrest and imprisonment
of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are
applicable in criminal, civil & administrative
proceedings. Non-observance of these rights
will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are
entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, & upon notice, may
claim the right to appear therein & present
their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3
cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate
action (preventive suspension in administrative
charges, padlocking filthy restaurants,
cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of
administrative action, & the respondent isn’t
prevented from enjoying the right to notice &
hearing at a later time (summary distraint &
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer,
replacement of an appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right
to exercise them had not been claimed.
2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of
the legal commitments and obligation of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual
concern about the suppression and punishment
of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both
states accord common due process protection
to their respective citizens. The administrative
investigation doesn’t fall under the three
exceptions to the due process of notice and
hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of
Court.
3. WON there’s any conflict between private
respondent’s basic due process rights &
provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty

RULING:
No. Doctrine of incorporation under
international law, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to
national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal
statute and statute can repeal treaty. No
conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial.
Request should impose veil at any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While
the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is
not exactly a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary
investigation because it involves the basic
constitutional rights of the person sought to be
extradited. A person ordered extradited is
arrested, forcibly taken from his house,
separated from his family and delivered to a
foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy,
liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away
from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a
conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason,
he is entitled to have access to the evidence
against him and the right to controvert them.
Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve
guilt or innocence of an accused but the
interpretation of an extradition treaty where at
stake is our government’s international
obligation to surrender to a foreign state a
citizen of its own so he can be tried for an
alleged offense committed within that
jurisdiction.
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS:
cases:
SERRANO VS NLRC
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann
Department Store as the head of Security
Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure,
Isetann phased out its entire security section
and engaged the services of an independent
security agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter
ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish
that it had retrenched its security section to
prevent or minimize losses to its business; that
private respondent failed to accord due process
to petitioner; that private respondent failed to
use reasonable standards in selecting
employees whose employment would be
terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and
ordered petitioner to be given separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent
security agency by the private respondent to
replace its current security section a valid
ground for the dismissal of the employees
classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employer’s good faith in implementing a
redundancy program is not necessarily put in
doubt by the availment of the services of an
independent contractor to replace the services
of the terminated employees to promote
economy and efficiency. Absent proof that
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any of
the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the
employee should be reinstated and paid
backwages. To contend that even if the
termination is for a just cause, the employee
concerned should be reinstated and paid
backwages would be to amend Art 279 by
adding another ground for considering
dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed
for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282, the
in accordance with that article, he should not
be reinstated but must be paid backwages from
the time his employment was terminated until
it is determined that the termination of
employment is for a just cause because the
failure to hear him before he is dismissed
renders the termination without legal effect.
ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a
leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the lay off of members of
National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that
Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the
CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang
Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood.
That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he
favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new
trial as they were able to come up with new
evidence/documents that they were not able to
obtain before as they were inaccessible and
they were not able to present it before in the
CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due
process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new
trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the vario issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
MACIAS V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners are four members of the House of
Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental and Bulacan, and the provincial
Governor of Negros Oriental. They are
requesting that the respondent officials be
prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that
apportions representative districts in the
country. They alleged that their respective
provinces were discriminated because they
were given less representation. Furthermore,
they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional
and void because:
1. It was passed without printed final copies
which must be furnished to the members of the
HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the
return of the last census of the population
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the
number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella
(National Treasurer) contend that they
1. were merely complying with their duties
under the statute which they presume and
allege to be constitutional
2. petitioners have no personality to bring such
action
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the
personality to bring such action.
2. Whether or not the act conformed to the
printed form and 3 day requirement.
3. Whether or not the act of apportionment is
within the 3 year requirement.
4. Whether or not the apportionment of
members of the HOR is valid.
HELD:
The petitioners as voters and as congressmen
and governor of the aggrieved provinces have
the personality to sue. The passage of the act
did not conform to the printed-form and the 3
day requirement, and that there is no
certificate of urgency from the President was
received by the HO. The requirement that the
apportionment must be done within 3 year
following the last census is complied with. The
apportionment of members of the HOR is not
valid because it is not based on the number of
inhabitants a province has. Some provinces
were given more representation despite the
inferior in number of inhabitants. The Court
held that RA 3040 infringed the provisions of
the Constitution and is therefore void.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
cases:
UNITED STATES VS. LUIS TORIBIO
Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a
license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is
found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary
license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one
way or the other argued that the law
mandating that one should acquire a permit to
slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of
police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC
explained that it “is not a taking of the property
for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit
condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the
community.”
CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO LIM v.
JUDGE LAGUIO & MTDC
FACTS:
The petitioners seek to reverse the ruling
of the ruling of the RTC regarding the
unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783
which is entitled- AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Private respondent, Malate Tourist
Development Corporation (MTDC), contends
that the City Council has no power to prohibit
the operation of motels and that the Ordinance
does not constitute a proper exercise of police
power as the compulsory closure of the motel
business has no reasonable relation to the
legitimate municipal interests sought to be
protected.
The petitioners, on the other hand, argues that
the City Council had the power to "prohibit
certain forms of entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the
community" [Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local
Government Code] and that the Ordinance was
enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community
in conjunction with its police powers [Article III,
Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409].
Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of
the Ordinance. He also granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.
Hence, the appeal by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No.
7783 is constitutional
HELD: NO
There is a clear invasion of personal or property
rights, personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of owning, operating and patronizing
those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid
to those therein employed. If the City of Manila
so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses or
permits; it may exercise its authority to
suspend or revoke their licenses for these
violations; and it may even impose increased
license fees. In other words, there are other
means to reasonably accomplish the desired
end.
Police power legislation of such character
deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate
our support for it. But inspite of itsthe
judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the
Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional
authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies,
in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit
the operation of the enumerated
establishments or order their transfer or
conversion without infringing the constitutional
guarantees not even under the guiseof due
process and equal protection of laws of police
power.
The petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court declaring the ordinance
void is AFFIRMED.
YNOT VS. IAC
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS: (1) notice; (2) hearing;
exceptions
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest
requires government interference; (2)
reasonable means necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose
FACTS:
Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the
police for having been transported from
Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He
brought an action for replevin, challenging the
constitutionality of said EO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and
declined to rule on the validity of the law on the
ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its
decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this
petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos
amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property
without due process of law
RULING:
Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice
and Hearing
The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on
our judicial system that the jurisprudence of
this country is rich with applications of this
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We
have consistently declared that every person,
faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years
ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as
"the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of
every person are to be secured beyond the
reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or
plain arrogance, would degrade the due
process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
Exceptions to Notice and Hearing
This is not to say that notice and hearing are
imperative in every case for, to be sure, there
are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the
admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or
there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. There are instances when the need
for expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement
of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the
loose, which may be killed on sight because of
the immediate danger it poses to the safety
and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for
a criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country he
has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health
and bawdy houses to protect the public morals.
In such instances, previous judicial hearing may
be omitted without violation of due process in
view of the nature of the property involved or
the urgency of the need to protect the general
welfare from a clear and present danger.
Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power
The protection of the general welfare is the
particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as
the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is
described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three
inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual,
as a member of society, is hemmed in by the
police power, which affects him even before he
is born and follows him still after he is dead
from the womb to beyond the tomb in
practically everything he does or owns. Its
reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as
the activity or the property has some relevance
to the public welfare, its regulation under the
police power is not only proper but necessary.
And the justification is found in the venerable
Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call
for the subordination of individual interests to
the benefit of the greater number.
First Requisite of Substantive Due Process:
Interests of the Public Generally Require
Interference
xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak,
has a direct relevance to the public welfare and
so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No.
626. The method chosen in the basic measure
is also reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following
the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that
by banning the slaughter of these animals
except where they are at least seven years old
if male and eleven years old if female upon
issuance of the necessary permit, the executive
order will be conserving those still fit for farm
work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
Second Requisite of Substantive Due
Process: Reasonable Means Necessary for the
Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly
Oppressive Upon Individuals
But while conceding that the amendatory
measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter
of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age,
sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However,
if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not
to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the
means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction
that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being transported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction
of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
EO 626-A is unconstitutional
In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure
to produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded
that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there is
a justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such
pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per
se as to require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not
have been proved first in a court of justice, with
the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed penalty,
and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the
questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options
are apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and
by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they
and they alone may choose the grantee as they
see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission,"
a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
YNOT v. IAC
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which
prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO
626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A
as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that
the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid
exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it
indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated
a presumption based on the judgment of the
executive. The movement of carabaos from one
area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain
why the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
LUPANGO v. CA
FACTS:
PRC issued a resolution directing that no
examinee for the CPA Board Exam shall attend
any review class, briefing, conference or the
like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-
out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similars institutions during
the 3 days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.
HELD:
Such resolution is unreasonable. The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one
who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred from
taking future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each and
every examinee during the three days before
the examination period.
Administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of
rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules
and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which
they are authorized to be issued, then they
must be held to be invalid.
PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations, as
this will infringe n the examinees’ right to
libery.
Such resolution also violates the academic
freedom of the schools concerned. The
enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at
least minimized. What is needed to be done by
the respondent is to find out the source of such
leakages and stop it right there.
BALACUIT v. CFI
FACTS:
At issue in the petition for review before Us is
the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the
City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and
text of which are reproduced below
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP
OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION
ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING
ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER
PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR
OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN
BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS
OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS
INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE
ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan,
and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the theaters
and they attack the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the
grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Does this power to regulate include the
authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of
admission to these places of exhibition and
amusement whether under its general grant of
power or under the general welfare clause as
invoked by the City?
RULING:
No, the power to regulate and fix the amount of
license fees for theaters and other places of
amusement has been expressly granted to the
City of Butuan under its charter.
However, the ordinance is not justified by any
necessity for the public interest. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and
means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help
ease the burden of cost on the part of parents
who have to shell out the same amount of
money for the admission of their children. A
reduction in the price of admission would mean
corresponding savings for the parents;
however, the petitioners are the ones made to
bear the cost of these savings.
The ordinance does not only make the
petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it
likewise penalizes them for failure to comply
with it.
The ordinance does not provide a safeguard
against this undesirable practice and as such,
the respondent City of Butuan now suggests
that birth certificates be exhibited by movie
house patrons to prove the age of children. This
is, however, not at all practicable. We can see
that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not
unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners.
Further, there is no discernible relation
between the ordinance and the promotion of
public health, safety, morals and the general
welfare.
Furthermore, there is nothing pernicious in
demanding equal price for both children and
adults. The petitioners are merely conducting
their legitimate businesses. The object of every
business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of
his venture. In fact, no person is under
compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally
voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he
buys a ticket to such performances
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal
and property rights of petitioners WHEREFORE,
a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
cases:
INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING
[333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN
2000]
FACTS:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts
hired abroad, the local-hires of private
respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry
discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires
are paid more than their colleagues in other
schools is, of course, beside the point. The
point is that employees should be given equal
pay for work of equal value.
Private respondent International School, Inc.
(the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents
of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. To enable the School to
continue carrying out its educational program
and improve its standard of instruction, Section
2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School
to employ its own teaching and management
personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities,
such personnel being exempt from otherwise
applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or
will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits
not accorded local-hires. These include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School
justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to
endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and
(b) limited tenure.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the grants provided by the
school to foreign hires and not to local hires
discriminative of their constitutional right to the
equal protection clause.
RULING:
The foregoing provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the
School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not
adduced evidence that local-hires perform work
equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds
this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne
by logic and human experience. If the employer
pays one employee less than the rest, it is not
for that employee to explain why he receives
less or why the others receive more. That
would be adding insult to injury. The employer
has discriminated against that employee; it is
for the employer to explain why the employee
is treated unfairly.
While we recognize the need of the School to
attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be
used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-
hires. The local-hires perform the same
services as foreign-hires and they ought to be
paid the same salaries as the latter. For the
same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the
foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect
the rights of workers and promote their
welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The
State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and
capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good. Should such contracts
contain stipulations that are contrary to public
policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down
these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire
classification employed by respondent School
to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires
and local-hires.
Wherefore, the petition is given due course.
The petition is hereby granted in part. The
orders of the secretary of labor and
employment dated June 10, 1996 and march
19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside
insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondent school of according foreign-hires
higher salaries than local-hires.
FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No.147387
December 10,2003
FACTS:
Before the court is a petition to declare as
unconstitutional Sec.14 of RA 9006 (The fair
election act) insofar as it expressly repeals
Sec.67 of BP 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
filed by Farinas et al, minority members of the
minority bloc in the HR. Impleaded as
respondents are the Executive sec, Speaker of
the House etal.
ISSUE:
1. WON the effectivity clause which states
“This Act shall take effect upon its approval”
(Sec.16) is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution
RULING:
1. An effectivity clause which provides that
the law “shall take immediately upon its
approval” is defective, but it does not render
the entire law invalid, the law shall take effect
fiftten days after its publication in the OG or
newspaper of general circulation. In Tanada vs
Tuvera, the court laid down the rule: “The
clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself”… Publication is indispensable
in every case..
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS
G.R. NO. 132875-76, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-
fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction
for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a
motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and
the need for his constituents to be represented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of
House of Representatives
RULING:
Election is the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended
by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations. To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free
man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY INC. VS ORMOC
CITY ET AL
“Equal Protection”
FACTS:
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read:
“There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on
any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company
Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries.” Though referred to as a
“production tax”, the imposition actually
amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal
sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
For production of sugar alone is not taxable;
the only time the tax applies is when the sugar
produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the
tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the
same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: “It shall
not be in the power of the municipal council to
impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods
and merchandise carried into the municipality,
or out of the same, and any attempt to impose
an import or export tax upon such goods in the
guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage,
use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void.” And
that the ordinance is violative to equal
protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As
being liable for such tax impost for no other
sugar mill is found in the city.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a violation of
equal protection.
HELD:
The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC
noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had
already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec
2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs
to tax goods and merchandise carried in and
out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still
violative of equal protection. The ordinance is
discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the
time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in
terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
 TRILLANES IV VS. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
Justification for confinement with its underlying
rationale of public self-defense applies equally
to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat
in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the
2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate
with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court
that he be allowed to attend all official
functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his
case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case
is still pending resolution whereas that in the
Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not valid classification between
petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his
case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly
points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos
(Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his
conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion,
whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy
civil and political rights since the presumption
of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was
charged with crimes involving moral turpitude,
i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts
of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted
for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political
offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the
presence of noble causes in expressing
legitimate grievances against the rampant and
institutionalized practice of graft and corruption
in the AFP.
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise,
however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not
elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged
with a crime is taken into custody for purposes
of the administration of justice. No less than
the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape
and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within
the class of offenses covered by the stated
range of imposable penalties, there is clearly
no distinction as to the political complexion of
or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that
petitioner's application for bail and for release
on recognizance was denied. The
determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial
court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment
of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the
right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the
stage of the criminal action." Such justification
for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos
who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight
risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the
proper authorities and such can be proven by
the numerous times he was allowed to travel
outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary,
however. The assailed Orders augured well
when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went
past security detail for some reason and
proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel
to issue certain statements. The account,
dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"
proves that petitioner's argument bites the
dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to
be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause
for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability
of flight find relevance as a factor in
ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and
in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In
cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is
established that it is so, bail shall be denied as
it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
ART. 3 Sec. 2 RIGHTS OF UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
cases:
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National
Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of
the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9
July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to
submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots
fired in the air.
ISSUE:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates
the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures
RULING:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,
illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military, indeed, committed
specific violations of petitioners'' rights against
unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The
constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have
been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints
may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may not also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual’s right against
a warrantless search w/c is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by
the military is susceptible of abuse by the
military in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
PROBABLE CAUSE: (definition)
cases:
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL
E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners
Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime
of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde,
her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her
sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a
panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies
between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul
de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against
them without conducting the required
preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation
of their right to an impartial investigation. They
also assail the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise
gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with
the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon
and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest
against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them
their constitutional right to due process during
their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully
intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed
to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an
accused.
RULING:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention
because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did
not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest
cases, there must be a probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person
to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that “upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue
a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws
repudiate the submission of petitioners that
respondent judges should have conducted
“searching examination of witnesses” before
issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for
the panel to study the evidence submitted
more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies
on the faulty assumption that the decision
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the
sole prerogative of the courts and beyond
executive and legislative interference. In truth,
the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that
our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power is the right to
prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981
and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn
statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes
that these have been sufficiently explained and
there is no showing that the inconsistencies
were deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about
the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds
nothing in the records that will prove that the
tone and content of the publicity that attended
the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal
effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing.
LIM, SR. VS JUDGE FELIX
GR NOS. 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19, 1991)
FACTS:
-On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in
the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road
of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the
municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards
Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio
Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin. Dante Siblante another security
escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived
the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound.
-An investigation of the incident then followed.
-Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator,
Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal
Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon
Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing,
among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana
Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor
Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the
crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder
in connection with the airport incident. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
-After conducting the preliminary investigation,
the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989
stating therein that:
“. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers
given by the witnesses for the prosecution
during the preliminary examination in
searching questions and answers, concludes
that a probable cause has been established for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused in the amended complaint, namely,
Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon
Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio
Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim,
Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy
Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.”
- Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim
filed with the respondent court several motions
and manifestations which in substance prayed
that an order be issued requiring the
transmittal of the initial records of the
preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted
by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for
the best enlightenment regarding the existence
of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as
well as the determination of the existence of
guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of
the constitution that no warrant shall be issued
unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself
been personally convinced of such probable
cause.
- In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated
that the court conduct a hearing to determine if
there really exists a prima facie case against
them in the light of documents which are
recantations of some witnesses in the
preliminary investigation.
- It should also be noted that the Lims also
presented to the respondent Judge documents
of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies
were used to establish a prima facie case
against them.
-On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued
an order denying for lack of merit the motions
and manifestations and issued warrants of
arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein. The judge wrote, “In the
instant cases, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of
probable cause that the offense of multiple
murder was committed and that all the accused
are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed
upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who
properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four
separate informations for murder. Considering
that both the two competent officers to whom
such duty was entrusted by law have declared
the existence of probable cause, each
information is complete in form and substance,
and there is no visible defect on its face, this
Court finds it just and proper to rely on the
prosecutor's certification in each information…”
-Petitioners question the judgment of Judge
Felix (statement immediately preceding this
paragraph, italicized).
ISSUE:
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation
that a probable cause exists.
RULING:
The questioned Order of respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial
Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared
NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does
not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor
can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be necessary
documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's
bare certification. All of these should be before
the Judge.
We cannot determine beforehand how cursory
or exhaustive the Judge's examination should
be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances
of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion; after all, the personal determination
is vested in the Judge by the Constitution.
However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond
the Prosecutor's certification and investigation
report whenever necessary.
As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the
Lims presented documents of recantations of
the witnesses. Although, the general rule is
that recantations are not given much weight in
the determination of a case and in the granting
of a new trial the respondent Judge before
issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at
the very least, have gone over the records of
the preliminary examination conducted earlier
in the light of the evidence now presented by
the concerned witnesses in view of the
"political undertones" prevailing in the cases.
In making the required personal determination,
a Judge is not precluded from relying on the
evidence earlier gathered by responsible
officers. The extent of the reliance depends on
the circumstances of each case and is subject
to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the
Judge abuses that discretion when having no
evidence before him, he issues a warrant of
arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix)
committed a grave error when he relied solely
on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the
questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without
having before him any other basis for his
personal determination of the existence of a
probable cause.
CONDUCT OF CHECK POINTS:
cases:
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National
Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of
the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9
July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to
submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots
fired in the air.
ISSUE:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates
the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures
RULING:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,
illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military, indeed, committed
specific violations of petitioners'' rights against
unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The
constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have
been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints
may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may not also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual’s right against
a warrantless search w/c is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by
the military is susceptible of abuse by the
military in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO
234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994
FACTS:
Accused was charged and convicted by the trial
court of illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly
methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance
of the search warrant, which authorized the
search and seizure of an undetermined
quantity of methamphetamine and its
paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned
that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the
seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of
a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was
proper.
HELD:
No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically
provides that a search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. In
herein case, the only objects to be seized that
the warrant determined was the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s
therein. The seizure of the firearms was
unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the
accused is acquitted.
MANALILI V. COURT OF APPEALS
280 SCRA 400
FACTS:
Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and
chanced upon the accused in a cemetery who
seemed to be high on drugs. He tried to resist
the police officers and upon inquiry, found
that the accused was possessing what
seemed to be crushed marijuana leaves.
HELD:
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapons. It has been held as
one of the exceptions to the general rule
against searches without warrant.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA
288 SCRA 626
G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998
FACTS:
On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by
his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be
arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of
marijuana and assembled a team. The next
day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they
waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when
the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was,
the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello
asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her
bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They
found dried marijuana leaves packed in a
plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense
filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items.
In her testimony, the accused claimed that she
had just come from Choice theatre where she
watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to
cross the road an old woman asked her for help
in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later
on arrested by the police. She has no
knowledge of the identity of the old woman and
the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no
search warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in
violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the police correctly searched
and seized the drugs from the accused.
RULING:
The following cases are specifically provided or
allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing
jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the
elements of which are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must
still be satisfied before a warrantless search
and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a
crime, she was merely crossing the street and
was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom
agents to conclude that she was committing a
crime. There was no legal basis to effect a
warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there
was no probable cause and the accused was
not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a
search warrant and they did not do so. The
seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible
evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
Section 2. Court where application for search
warrant shall be filed. — An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction
a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already
been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to
effect search. — The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after
giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory
thereof to court; return and proceedings
thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof
duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search
warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no
return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of
this Rule has been complained with and shall
require that the property seized be delivered to
him. The judge shall see to it that subsection
(a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be
filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the
date of the return, the result, and other actions
of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute
contempt of court
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. vs.
SOLUTA
FACTS:
Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the
hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker
room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn,
she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw
five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to
recognize but she was sure were not
employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the
door of the union office. In the morning, as
union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open
the door of the union office, Loida narrated to
him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before
the Security Officer. And he fetched a
locksmith. At that instant, men in barong
tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started
hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio
thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open
the door, and the latter did. Once inside,
Panlilio and his companions began searching
the office, over the objection of Babay who
even asked them if they had a search warrant.
A plastic bag was found containing marijuana
flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of
marijuana in the union office and after the
police conducted an investigation of the
incident, a complaint against the 13 union
officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of
Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal,
the CA affirmed with modification the decision
of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent individual can recover
damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING:
Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and
(10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:
In the present case, petitioners had, by their
own claim, already received reports in late
1987 of illegal activities and Maniego
conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of
January 11, 1988, petitioners and their
companions barged into and searched the
union office without a search warrant, despite
ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company
stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of
individual respondents’ constitutional right
against unreasonable search thus furnishes the
basis for the award of damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the
lawful occupants of the office had the right to
raise the question of validity of the search and
seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or
person "directly or indirectly" responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor
alone who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the
case, petitioners, together with Maniego and
Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the
illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for
actual, moral and exemplary damages to
herein individual respondents in accordance
with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of
Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and
(10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases, among
others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and
action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
PACIS VS. PAMARAN
G.R. No. L-23996 March 15, 1974
Doctrine:
It is a well-settled principle that for violations of
customs laws, a warrant issued by the Collector
of Customs is conceded. It is not necessary, in
these cases, that the warrants be issued by a
judge, as what is required in the Constitution.
FACTS:
Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a
Mercury automobile, model 1957. It was
brought into this country without the payment
of customs duty and taxes, its original owner
Donald James Hatch being tax-exempt. On
June 25, 1964, respondent paid P311.00 for
customs duty and taxes.
Petitioner Pacis, on July 22, 1964 received from
the Administrator, General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National
Defense, a letter to the effect that the Land
Transportation Commission reported that such
automobile was a "hot car." By virtue thereof,
petitioner, through his subordinates, looked
into the records of his office and ascertained
that the amount collectible on said car should
be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such
discrepancy, petitioner instituted seizure
proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure
and detention and thus the subject automobile
was taken. Respondent requested for the
withdrawal or dissolution of the warrant of
seizure but petitioner denied it.
Thereafter, respondent Santos filed a criminal
complaint for usurpation of judicial functions
with the City Fiscal of Manila. As the
respondent Fiscal Pamaran was bent on
proceeding with the charge against petitioner,
an action for prohibition was filed with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitutional provision
which states that only a judge could issue a
search warrant applies to warrants issued in
lieu of violations of customs laws.
HELD:
In a recent decision of this Court, Papa v. Mago,
where the seizure of alleged smuggled goods
was effected by a police officer without a
search warrant, this Court, through Justice
Zaldivar, stated: "Petitioner Martin Alagao and
his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a component court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant in
the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on
board, or stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding
or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched
only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice
of the peace ... ." It is our considered view,
therefore, that except in the case of the search
of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect
search and seizure without a search warrant in
the enforcement of customs laws."
The plenitude of the competence vested in
customs officials is thus undeniable. No such
constitutional question then can possibly arise.
So much is implicit from the very language of
Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs Code. It
speaks for itself. It is not susceptible of any
misinterpretation. The power of petitioner is
thus manifest. It being undeniable then that the
sole basis for an alleged criminal act performed
by him was the performance of a duty
according to law, there is not the slightest
justification for respondent Assistant City Fiscal
to continue with the preliminary investigation
after his attention was duly called to the plain
and explicit legal provision that did not suffer
at all from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for
is granted and the successor of respondent
Manuel R. Pamaran, now a criminal circuit court
judge, or any one in the City Fiscal's Office of
the City of Manila to whom the complaint
against petitioner for usurpation of judicial
functions arising out of the issuance of the
warrant of seizure and detention, subject-
matter of this litigation, has been assigned, is
perpetually restrained from acting thereon
except to dismiss the same. No costs.
STOP AND FRISK RULE:
cases:
MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR 123595, 12 December 1997
FACTS:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m.,
allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform)
along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near
the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to
four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury
Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with “their eyes moving very fast.”
Yu and his companions positioned themselves
at strategic points and observed both groups
for about 30 minutes. The police officers then
approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized,
inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday,
25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu
saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate
a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found
a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the
latter’s “front waist line.” Yu’s companion,
police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended
Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver
was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an
“X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not
issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly
recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990,
Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9
October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel
de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat
denied the charges and explained that he only
recently arrived in Manila. However, several
other police officers mauled him, hitting him
with benches and guns. Petitioner was once
again searched, but nothing was found on him.
He saw the grenade only in court when it was
presented. In its decision dated 10 February
1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994,
the trial court ruled that the warrantless search
and seizure of Malacat was akin to a “stop and
frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest” and “whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more
information”; and that the seizure of the
grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful
arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty
of the crime of illegal possession of explosives
under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18
February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal
indicating that he was appealing to the
Supreme Court. However, the record of the
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals
(CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January
1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court. Manalili filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid,
pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.”
HELD:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches
and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
effected without a validly issued warrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless
arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) has been denominated as
one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot
pursuit” arrest. Turning to valid warrantless
searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to
a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.” The
concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest must not be
confused. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search. Here, there could have been
no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on
the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had
just been committed, was being committed or
was going to be committed. Plainly, the search
conducted on Malacat could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand,
while probable cause is not required to conduct
a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
“stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk”
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer. Here, there are at least three (3)
reasons why the “stop-and-frisk” was invalid:
First, there is grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that
Malacat was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any
police report or record nor corroborated by any
other police officer who allegedly chased that
group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat’s
behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other
than that his eyes were “moving very fast” —
an observation which leaves us incredulous
since Yu and his teammates were nowhere
near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions
were merely standing at the corner and were
not creating any commotion or trouble. Third,
there was at all no ground, probable or
otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu,
for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
“discovered” “inside the front waistline” of
Malacat, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale
bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible
to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant
violations of Malacat’s rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III
of the Constitution.
WARRANTLESS ARREST
cases:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN
(SUBJECT: DELEGATION OF QUASI JUDICIAL
POWER; ESTOPPEL.
FACTS:
ON 18 MARCH 1986, ATTY. RAMIREZ AND
ATTY. ABELLA, PCGG AGENTS, ISSUED A
SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST THE
RESTHOUS THE SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IS
WHETHER OR NOT THE MARCH 18, 1986
SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST PROPERTIES
OF IMELDA IN LEYTE INCLUDING THE
RESTHOUSE AT OLOT. THEIR ORDER WAS NOT
SIGNED BY ANY PCGG COMMISSIONERS.
ISSUE:
IS THEIR ORDER VALID?
RULING:
NO. JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY
NOT BE DELEGATED. IN PCGG V. JUDGE PEÑA,
[1][17] THE COURT HELD THAT THE POWERS,
FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE PCGG
AMOUNT TO THE EXERCISE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS, AND THE EXERCISE OF SUCH
FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE DELEGATED BY THE
COMMISSION TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES OR
SUBORDINATES OR TASK FORCES BECAUSE OF
THE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT
JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT
BE DELEGATED.
PETITIONER REPUBLIC ARGUES THAT MRS.
MARCOS SHOULD BE DEEMED ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE SEQUESTRATION OF HER
OLOT RESTHOUSE BY HER ACTIONS IN REGARD
TO THE SAME. BUT A VOID ORDER PRODUCES
NO EFFECT AND CANNOT BE VALIDATED
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL. FOR THE
SAME REASON, THE COURT CANNOT ACCEPT
PETITIONER’S VIEW THAT MRS. MARCOS
SHOULD HAVE FIRST SOUGHT THE LIFTING OF
THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER THROUGH A
MOTION TO QUASH FILED WITH THE PCGG.
BEING VOID, THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE
POWER TO STRIKE IT DOWN ON SIGHT.
RULING OF THE COURT:
The Court’s Ruling
Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, an order of sequestration may
only issue upon a showing “of a prima facie
case” that the properties are ill-gotten wealth
under Executive Orders 1 and 2.[2][11] When
a court nullifies an order of sequestration for
having been issued without a prima facie case,
the Court does not substitute its judgment for
that of the PCGG but simply applies the law.[3]
[12]
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc. v.
PCGG,[4][13] the Court held that a prima facie
factual foundation that the properties
sequestered are “ill-gotten wealth” is required.
The power to determine the existence of a
prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG
as an incident to its investigatory powers. The
two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to
assure a collegial determination of such fact.[5]
[14]
Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a
prior determination of the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the sequestration
of the Olot Resthouse. The Republic presented
no evidence before the Sandiganbayan that
shows differently. Nor did the Republic
demonstrate that the two PCGG
representatives were given the quasi-judicial
authority to receive and consider evidence that
would warrant such a prima facie finding.
Parenthetically, the Republic’s supposed
evidence does not show how the Marcoses
acquired the sequestered property, what
makes it “ill-gotten wealth,” and how former
President Marcos intervened in its acquisition.
Taking the foregoing view, the resolution of the
issue surrounding the character of the property
sequestered – whether or not it could prima
facie be considered ill-gotten – should be
necessary.
The issue in this case is not new. The facts
are substantially identical to those in the case
of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Dio Island
Resort, Inc.).[6][15] There, the same Atty.
Ramirez issued a sequestration order on April
14, 1986 against Dio Island Resort, Inc. and all
its assets and properties which were thought to
be part of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
Alerted by a challenge to his action, the PCGG
passed a resolution “to confirm, ratify and
adopt as its own all the Writs of Sequestration”
that Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued “to
remove any doubt as to the validity and
enforceability” of their writs. Still, the Court
struck them down as void:
It is indubitable that under no circumstances
can a sequestration or freeze order be validly
issued by one not a Commissioner of the PCGG.
The invalidity of the sequestration order was
made more apparent by the fact that Atty.
Ramirez did not even have any specific
authority to act on behalf of the Commission at
the time he issued the said sequestration
order. x x x
Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez
had been given prior authority by the PCGG to
place Dio Island Resort under sequestration,
nevertheless, the sequestration order he issued
is still void since PCGG may not delegate its
authority to sequester to its representatives
and subordinates, and any such delegation is
invalid and ineffective.
Under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, PCGG is
the sole entity primarily charged with the
responsibility of recovering ill-gotten wealth. x
x x The power to sequester, therefore, carries
with it the corollary duty to make a preliminary
determination of whether there is a reasonable
basis for sequestering a property alleged to be
ill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of the
evidence adduced, the PCGG clearly has to use
its own judgment in determining the existence
of a prima facie case.
The absence of a prior determination by the
PCGG of a prima facie basis for the
sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal
defect which rendered the sequestration of
respondent corporation and its properties void
ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed non-
existent, as though it had never been issued,
The Court is maintaining its above ruling in
this case.
Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the
sequestration order in this case on March 18,
1986, before the passage of Sec. 3 of the PCGG
Rules, such consideration is immaterial
following our above ruling.
In PCGG v. Judge Peña,[8][17] the Court held
that the powers, functions and duties of the
PCGG amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, and the exercise of such functions
cannot be delegated by the Commission to its
representatives or subordinates or task forces
because of the well established principle that
judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be
delegated.
It is the Republic’s theory of course that
Commissioner Daza’s letter, directing Attys.
Ramirez and Abella to search and sequester all
properties, documents, money and other assets
of respondents, should be considered as the
writ of sequestration while the order issued by
Attys. Ramirez and Abella should be treated
merely as an implementing order.
But the letter did not have the tenor of a
sequestration order covering specific properties
that the lawyers were ordered to seize and hold
for the PCGG. Actually, that letter is of the
same kind issued to Attys. Ramirez and Abella
in Dio Island Resort. Consequently, there is no
reason to depart from the Court’s ruling in the
latter case where it said:
The invalidity of the sequestration order was
made more apparent by the fact that Atty.
Ramirez did not even have any specific
authority to act on behalf of the Commission at
the time he issued the said sequestration
order. Thus, the respondent Court noted:
Contrary to plaintiff’s representation, nothing
exists to support its contention that the Task
Force had been given prior authority to place
DIO under PCGG control. On the contrary, as
the text of the above letters clearly show,
Attys. Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella, had
acted on broad and non-specific powers: ‘By
authority of the commission and the powers
vested in it. x x x.’”[9][18]
Petitioner Republic argues that Mrs. Marcos
should be deemed estopped from questioning
the sequestration of her Olot Resthouse by her
actions in regard to the same. But a void order
produces no effect and cannot be validated
under the doctrine of estoppel. For the same
reason, the Court cannot accept petitioner’s
view that Mrs. Marcos should have first sought
the lifting of the sequestration order through a
motion to quash filed with the PCGG. Being
void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to
strike it down on sight.
Besides, the lifting of the sequestration order
will not necessarily be fatal to the main case
since it does not follow from such lifting that
the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten
wealth. Such lifting simply means that the
government may not act as conservator or may
not exercise administrative or housekeeping
powers over the property.[10][19] Indeed, the
Republic can be protected by a notice of lis
pendens.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition
for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the challenged
resolutions of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan dated February 28, 2002 and
August 28, 2002 in Civil Case 0002, which
granted respondent Imelda R. Marcos’ Motion
to Quash the March 18, 1986 Sequestration
Order covering the Olot Resthouse.
Further, the Court DIRECTS the Register of
Deeds of Leyte to immediately annotate a
notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title of
the Olot Resthouse with respect to the Republic
of the Philippines’ claim over the same in Civil
Case 0002 of the Sandiganbayan.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PADILLA V. CA
129 S 558 (1990)
Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion
against the mayor and policemen, they were
acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such
acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages
arising from the demolition of petition¬er's
market stalls. The acquittal on the ground that
their guilt has not been proven beyond
reasona¬ble doubt refers to the element of
Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the
stalls were not demolished.
Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of
penal action carries with it the extinction of
civil only if there is a declaration that facts from
which civil may arise did not exist. Also, Art. 29
of the Civil Code does not state that civil
liability can be recovered only in a separate
civil action. The civil liability can be recovered
either in the same or a separate action. The
purpose of recovering in the same action is to
dispense with the filing of another civil action
where the same evidence is to be presented,
and the unsettling implications of permitting
reinsti¬tuttion of a separate civil action.
However, a separate civil action is warranted
when (1) addition¬al facts are to be
established; (2) there is more evidence to be
adduced; (3) there is full termina¬tion of the
criminal case and a separate complaint would
be more efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA
did not err in awarding damages despite the
acquittal.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO
234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994
FACTS:
Accused was charged and convicted by the trial
court of illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly
methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance
of the search warrant, which authorized the
search and seizure of an undetermined
quantity of methamphetamine and its
paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned
that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the
seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of
a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was
proper.
HELD:
No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically
provides that a search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. In
herein case, the only objects to be seized that
the warrant determined was the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s
therein. The seizure of the firearms was
unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the
accused is acquitted.
VALIDITY OF A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE
JUDGE
cases:
PEOPLE v. TEE
"rights of the accused to speedy trial"
FACTS:
The case involves an automatic review of
judgment made against Tee who was convicted
for illegal possession of marijuana and
sentenced to death. The defense assailed the
decision of the court for taking admissible as
evidence the marijuana seized from the
accused by virtue of allegedly general search
warrant. They further contend that the accused
was deprived of his right to speedy trial by
failure of the prosecution to produce their
witness who failed to appear during the 20
hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial
procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substantive right of the
accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the
hearing of the case.
RULING:
The court ruled that the substantive right of the
accused for a fair and speedy trial was not
violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 provides that the trial period for the
criminal cases should be in general 180 days.
However, in determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial
is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and
secured; or (3) when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.
It was shown by the records that the
prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a
warrant to compel the witness to testify. The
concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative
where several factors are weighed such as the
length of time of delay, the reason of such
delay, and conduct of prosecution and the
accused and the prejudice and damaged
caused to the accused of such delay. The court
did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing
unreasonable length of time as to constitute
deprivation of the constitutional rights of the
accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact
that court trial may be always subjected to
postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In
the absence of showing that the reason for
delay was capricious or oppressive, the State
must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity
in prosecuting the accused.
PANGANDAMAN V. CASAR
FACTS:
The case originated in Lanao. The offended
party was ambushed in Lanao, but he survived.
Based on his description, there were around 50
persons who staged the ambush from both
sides of the hill. However, he could not
recognize anyone of the 50. But he filed a case
against all 50 ambushers, all “JOHN DOES”. So
the court issued a warrant of arrest against the
50 John Does.
ISSUE:
W/N the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court
issue a warrant of arrest against an unknown
accused?
HELD:
NO it is not valid. It is of the nature of a general
warrant, one of a call of writs long prescribed
as unconstitutional and once anathematized as
totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.
Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction
that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized.
The warrant as against unidentified subjects
will be considered as null and void.
EXAMINATION OF BANK ACCOUNTS/
DEPOSITS
cases:
PNB VS. GANCAYCO
G.R. No. L-18343 September 30, 1965
FACTS:
Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino
Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department
of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine
National Bank to produce at a hearing the
records of the bank deposits of Ernesto
Jimenez, former administrator of the
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Administration, who was then under
investigation for unexplained wealth. In
declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank
invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.
On the other hand, the defendants cited
Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in support
of their claim of authority,which allegedly
provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019
provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.
HELD:
Yes. The truth is that these laws are so
repugnant to each other than no reconciliation
is possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible
is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is
intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act
No. 1405 by providing additional exception to
the rule against the disclosure of bank
deposits.
W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares
bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it
nevertheless allows such disclosure in the
following instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the
subject matter of the litigation. Cases of
unexplained wealth are similar to cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty.
MARQUEZ VS. DISIERTO
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered
petitioner Marquez to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained
at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, where petitioner is the branch
manager.

The order is based on a pending investigation

at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019,
Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
Agreement between the Public Estates
Authority and AMARI.

Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how

she would comply with the orders without her
breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.

ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have
an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law
on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection
may be allowed, there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identified,
the inspection limited to the subject matter of
the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may
cover only the account identified in the pending
case