h.

hD JL -
N AL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WO 2-4155
NEWS WASHINGTON, QL 20546 TELS WO $6925

.November 12, 1968

NlWS BRIEFING

ON

APOLIX) 8 MOON ORBITAL FLIGHT

PARTICIPANTS :

DR. THOMAS 0, PAINE, A c t i n g A d m i n i s t r a t o r , NASA

LT. GENERAL SA L 6 , PHILLIPS, Apollo Program
D i r e c t o r , NASA

MR. WILLIAM C. SC , Apollo Miasion D i r e c t o r , NASA

MR. ALIPR&D P, ALIBRANDoz Public Affairs O f f i c e r , NASA
 2

ALIBRANDQtGood ~ r n i n e ready t o begin

t h e press conference on t h e Apoll ion,

The part i e i p a n t s t h i
ill be D r . Thomas
Paine, Acting Administrator; Lt. General Samuel P h l l l l ~ s ,A P O ~ ~ O
Program Director; and B i l l Schneider, Apollo M i @ i o n Director.

Dr, Paine.
PAINE: Good morning. After a c a r e f u l and thorough
e x a s i n a t i o n o f a l l of t h e system and r i s k s involved, we
have concluded t h a t w e are now ready t o P l y t h e most advanced
m i s s i o n f o r o u r Apollo 8 launch i n December, t h e o r b i t around
t h e moon.

Frank Bornan and h i s crew and a l l of o u r engineerrs

are unanimously i n f a v o r of s e l e c t i n g t h i s mission.

W e have reached t h i s conclusion a f t e r a long series

of i n t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of t h e s t a t u s of o u r program, t h e
f l i g h t hardware, ground s u p p o r t equipment, s t a t
training.
The timing for t h e December 21 launch is conditioned
by t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e earth and t h e moon and t h e sun. It is
designed t o g i v e u s d a y l i g h t i n t h e launch area and t h e recovery
area and then designed t o g i v e u s t h e r i g h t kind of photographic
and o b s e r v a t i o n l i g h t on t h e s u r f a c e of t h e moon.

The outbound t r i p w i l l occupy about three d a g s , t h e

t i m e i n o r b i t around t h e moon w i l l be about a d a y i n v o l v i n g
t e n o r b i t a l swings around t h e moon, w i t h about a three-day
r e t u r n , a c t u a l l y adding up to something j u s t s l i g h t l y o v e r
s i x d a y s t o t h e recovery.
To t e l l you about t h e d e t a i l s of t h i s d e c i s i o n and
now t o i n t r o d u c e t h e Director of
n e r a l Samuel P h i l l i p s .

od morning, ladies a ntlemen. The

cided t o f l y w i t h Ap 8 is t h e mission
as designed. And i
it won't know t h e d i
a r landing mission.
 I

And respects t h e mission

f o r which t h e

The e x c e p t i o n i n t h e c 10 spacecraft,
of coume, is that there is not e aboard, and
t h e command and s e r v i c t r i p t o the
moon without having t h docked, and t h t h e exception,

i n most important respec of t h e

knowledge w i l l gain, it is t h e d e s i for the
Apollo-Saturn V space s y s t e m ,

Now, w e have concluded, as

t h e t o t a l Apollo space y s t e m w i l l be
a t t h e scheduled launch t i m e on the 21s

I would l i k e t o t e some t i m e t h i
marize t h e important elemen of t h e back
t o t h a t d e c i s i o n and t o d i s c u s s also t h e
clusian,

Let m e start w i t h when we flew

Ago110 4, which consisted o
and t h e 017 spacecraft, Th
being t h e f i r s t S a t u r n V f l i g h t ,
less mission. The launch v e h i c l e t ~ a completely
t ~ ~ all
of t h e maneuvers and perf0
t h e u l t i m a t e l u n a r landing

A s far t h e launch v s h i c
o u t its design mission,

The spacecraft 017 flew for n e a r l y 11 hou

on-board program c o n t r o l and under remote c o n t r o l f
ground, and performed flawles l y , Among i t many demonstrationrs ,
it demonstrated the high-speed r e e n t r y t h a t is r e q u i r e d f o r
t h e r e t u r n f r o m 8 l u n a r mission,

Now, you can draw many c o n c l m t h a t missfon,

but one of them is t h a t it showed t h Saturn V
design is a good design,
Now, i n A p r i l of t h i t h e second
S a t u r n V, No. 502, which carried t h e btpac t 020, t h e
 4

sister s h i p o e c d i t Apollo 60 I t w a s designed

i n most impor ect a r e p e a t of t h e Apollo 4 mission.
There were on t h a t m i s i o n s e v e r a l important techni-
cal f a i l u r e s and malfunctionsl. You w i l l recall t h a t during
t h e second-stage o engines failed. During t h e
o r b i t a l coast an t i o n for restart far t h e simu-
l a t e d trans n a r i n j e c t i o n , t h e upper stage f a i l e d t o restart
for the tra lunar injection.

I n t h e post-mission a n a l y s i s w e determined t h a t w e
had l o n g i t u d i n a l oscillations on that v e h i c l e which are cow
monly called POGO, W e observed also there w a s abnormal p e r
formance of t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n s y s t e m which c o n t r o l l e d
t h e d i v i s i o n of f u e l and o x i d i z e r i n t h e engine during t h e
p r o p u l s i v e maneuver.

We also d i s c u s s e d i n t h e b r i e f i n g t h a t fQl1QWed t h a t
mission an apparent s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e i n t h e spacecraft L?d
adapter area of t h e s t r u c t u r e , W e also o erved a t t h a t t i m e ,
I w i l l recall a g a i n , t h a t i n s p i t e of these d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
which were s u b s t a n t i a l and important, t h e spacecraft w a s cow
manded off i n t o an a l t e r n a t e mission by t h e f l i g h t control
o r g a n i z a t i o n and it f l 8 flawless a l t e r n a t e mission, re-
e n t e r i n g i n t h e P a c i f i c as intended.
Now, t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t one can raise t h e n from t h i s
series 501 and 502 r e a l l y concerns t h e t o t a l adequacy of t h e
design and of t h e proce 88s of manufacture and therefore of
t h e margins t h a t are a v a i l a b l e i n a piece of equipment,

A f t e r t h a t mission we very r a p i d l y a s s e s s e d t h e
t e c h n i c a l data, determined by t h e latter p a r t of A p r i l of
t h i s y e a r t h a t w e understood s u f f i c i e n t l y t h e reason f o r t h e
malfunctions t h a t occurred, t h a t w e f e l t w e could proceed
w i t h confidence t o p r e p a r e t h e next S a t u r n V, No. 503, to
carry o u t a manned f l i g h t i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h i s c a l e n d a r
year.

S i n c e t h a t t i m e there has been one of t h e most

a g g r e s s i v e , thorough and determined e n g i n e e r i n g tests and
e n g i n e e r i n g a n a l y s i s programs conducted t f have e v e r
seen. And i n t h e c o u r s e of these months have i d e n t i f i e d
 5

i n d e t a i l t h e rea for the difficulties, W

Oris e have designed
t h e correction^. We have tasted a t great l e n g t h t h e correc-
tions and, in parallel w i t h a l l t h i s , conducted a very elaborate
engineering a n a l y s i s .

This culminated week before last on the 7 t h of Novem-

b e r i n a design c e r t i f i c a t i o n review which concluded by v a l i -
d a t i n g and c e r t i f y i n g t h e S a t u r n V No. 503 as ready f o r
manned f l i g h t .

L e t m e recall also that l a s t August i n a press confer-

ence and briefing t h a t w e had on t h e 1 9 t h of August, t o be
specific, I o u t l i n e d t h e e v e n t s t h a t l e d u s t o t h e d e c i s i o n
t o drop LM 3 from t h e 503 f l i g h t which w a s being made ready
f o r f l i g h t i n t h e l a t e part of t h i s y e a r . That d e c i s i o n w a s
reached because w e were encountering d e l a y s i n t h e checkout
of t h e l u n a r module a t t h e Cape which i n o u r judgment w a s lead-
ing us t o a f l i g h t w e l l i n t o t h e s p r i n g of next y e a r i f w e
were t o w a i t u n t i l we r e s o l v e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t were de-
l a y i n g t h e checkout,

A t t h a t t i m e w 0 concluded that it w a s i n t h e best

i n t e r e s t of t h e progressl of t h e program t o prepare t h e 503
launch v e h i c l e t o f l y w i t h command s e r v i c e module 103 but
without t h e LM i n order t o get t h e Apollo-Saturn V s y s t e m
i n t o space o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e earliest t i m e and to m a k e t h e
gains toward o u r u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of a manned l u n a r l a n d i n g
by f l y i n g y e t t h i s year w i t h a command s e r v i c e module only.

That d e c i s i o n then i d e n t i f i e d a range of a l t e r n a t i v e

missions t h a t we would prepare to conduct w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n
t o be made after a l l of t h e pmgram e v e n t s had occurred, in-
c l u d i n g t h e f l i g h t of A p o l l o 7 , which would t h e n be t h e b a s i s
for a d e c i s i o n to select from among those range of a l t e r n a t e
missions, which included l o w earth o r b i t , high earth o r b i t ,
many thousands of m i l e s i n o r b i t , circumlunar or i n t o l u n a r
o r b i t and r e t u r n as t h e range of o p t i o n s .
Now, Apollo 7 , which of coup88 f l e w between t h e
1 1 t h and 22nd of October, w a s launched on a Saturn-IB and
carried t h e f i r s t Block I1 spacecraft, No. 101. That mission,
as we a l l know, m e t its o b j e c t i v e s , and I have classified i t
as a p e r f e c t mission.
 6

took off been reducing

t h e data from you know, w e carry many
hundreds of i n e l s aboard each of o u r
f l i g h t s i n or nalyze t h e performance down
s e v e r a l l e v e l s i n a l l of t h e important subsystems, That
a n a l y s i s h a s been i n g very hard a t t h e q u e s t i o n I asked
after 1 mentioned
design margi
501 and 502 sequence -- namely, a t t h e
e8 of i n c i p i e n t f a i l u r e s which
careful revi Is of t h e data might i n d i c a t e , and
a c a r e f u l re f t h e performance of t h a t spacecraft i n its
p r i m a r y mode p e r a t i o n such as t h e environmental c o n t r o l ,
where it w a s exercised thoroughly, as w e l l as looking care-
f u l l y a t t h e perfo nce i n t h e s e v e r a l what I w i l l c a l l
a l t e r n a t e o r backoff or degraded modes of o p e r a t i o n which w e
have b u i l t i n t o t h i s equipment through redundancy of design
and by providing backdown f e a t u r e s t h a t t h e crew can select
i n case any of t h e pieces of equipment i n d i c a t e abnormal per-
f ormance *

As I s a y , w e have concentrated many thousands of

e n g i n e e r s ' manhours i n s t u d y i n g t h a t data i n order t o assess
and understand d e s i g n margins and t h e possibilities of kncipi-
e n t f a i l u r e s . Bec e you recall, t h e way i n which t h i s pro-
gram h a s been organized from t h e beginning, w e have a l w a y s
known t h a t w e would never be able t o demonstrate in a classical,
s t a t i s t i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y s e n s e t h e performance of t h e equipment
and t h e r e l i a b i l i t y which r e q u i r e s t e n a o r even hundreds of
o p e r a t i o n s t o demonstrate,

So w e have b ad o u r program from t h e beginning on

c a r e f u l design, i n c o r p o r a t i n g redundancies and degraded mode
o p e r a t i o n , and t h e n a very, very e x t e n s i v e ground test pro-
gram culminated by a minimum of f l i g h t demonstrations t o
v a l i d a t e t h e design,

Now, 1% going t o d i s c u s s i n a few momenta two or

three of t h e f e a t u r e s of t h e work t h a t h a s been done s i n c e
that t i m e u s i n g some vu-graphs, so I won't s a y any more about
it r i g h t now.

How, we i n the Apollo Program have been working now

for many y e a r s toward t h e o b j e c t i v e of a manned l u n a r l a n d i n g
a t t h e earliest practical and safe t i m e , W e concluded back
i n August and have devoted much energy t o t h e p o i n t s i n c e
t h a t there is much t o g a i n by going as deep i n t o space w i t h
 7

t h e second manned Apollo f l i h t as w e would be able t o judge

prudent, W e are able by going i n t o l u n a r o r b i t t o make an
early f l i g h t d e ~ ~ t r a t i oofn t h e design mission of t h e
S a t u r n V and of t h e Apollo command and s e r v i c e module space-
craft and t o understand t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e spacecraft i n
t h e thermal environment of t r a n s l u n a r space and i n t h e environ-
ment surrounding t h e moon, t o assess o u r communications capa-
b i l i t y , and very importantly t o e v a l u a t e and work on o u r
navigation capability,

I n t h i s connection, o u r a b i l i t y t o i d e n t i f y and
track landmarks on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e is very important t o
t h e precise o r b i t d e t e r m i n a t i o n which w e expect t o be able
t o accomplish i n order t o w i t h s u f f i c i e n t accuracy make t h e
landing w i t h t h e l u n a r module and t h e n make t h e rendezvous
between t h e l u n a r module and t h e command s e r v i c e module a f t e r
t h e l u n a r landing,

W e are also very aware of t h e g a i n s t h a t w e can

make by e a r l y development and e v a l u a t i o n of t h e procedures
t h a t are i n v o l v e d l i n t h e l u n a r mission, those concerned w i t h
f l i g h t c o n t r o l i n o u r Mission C o n t r o l Center as w e l l as
around t h e w o r l d , and, very importantly, o u r i n f l i g h t pro-
cedures.
Now, w h i l e w e have known and given much a t t e n t i o n t o
t h e g a i n s t h a t can be made by proceeding o u t t o l u n a r o r b i t ,
w e have also recognized t h a t i n c a r r y i n g o u t such a mission
w e take on some a d d i t i o n a l r i s k s o v e r and above those t h a t
one exposes himeelf t o or t h e f l i g h t crew t o o p e r a t i n g i n a
l o w e a r t h o r b i t . B u t w e have been able to-- I t is o u r con-
c l u s i o n t h a t t h e progression of riskrr which w e have known
from t h e beginning t h a t w e have t o undertake as w e take on
more and more of o u r complex s y s t e m l e a d i n g t o t h e l u n a r
landing- W e have judged that t h e p r o g r e s s i o n of r i s k be-
tween t h e A p o l l o 7 mission which we have flown and t h e
Apollo 8 mission which w e have designed is a normal progres-
s i o n of r i s k s i n a l o g i c a l l y stepped development, f l i g h t test
program.
I n t h e case of t h e l u n a r o r b i t mission, you can
summarize these new r i s k s i n two categories. 3n t h e one
category, t h e spacecraft propul i o n s y s t e m m u s t operate p r o p e r
l y i n order t o propel t h e spacecraft back o u t of l u n a r o r b i t
and on its way back t o earth. And t h e other category of
r i s k s are those t h a t are i n h e r e n t i n being some three d a y s
away from t h e earth as oppoaed t o somewhere between a h a l f
 8
an hour and three hour i c h t h e crew is away from t h e
earth i n a l o w earth o

So i n t h i s case w e have t o place i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e

on t h e d e p e n d a b i l i t y of t h e l i f e s u p p o r t s y s t e m and t h e
electric power s y s t e m i n main.

Now, what I would l i k e t o do now is summarize for

you u s i n g some vu-graphs some of t h e high p o i n t s of t h e tech-
n i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l reviews which have gone on d a y after day
i n great d e p t h o v e r t h e last s e v e r a l months t o g i v e you some
feel f o r t h e depth of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t h a s gone i n t o
t h i s decision.

I * m going t o j u s t show two charts t h a t concern t h e

launch v e h i c l e . And l e t m e p o i n t o u t i n t h a t connection
t h a t t h e launch v e h i c l e per s0 is r e a l l y n o t involved i n t h e
d e c i s i o n procese of whether w e go i n t o earth o r b i t or carry
o u t a mission involving o p e r a t i o n s around t h e moon.
The d e c i s i o n that w e j u s t laat week v a l i d a t e d is t h e
one which s a y s t h a t t h e S a t u r n V is indeed r e a d y t o conduct a
manned f l i g h t . And t h e two most important t e c h n i c a l f a i l u r e s
on 502 were t h e f a i l u r e s of t h e 52 engine o n t h e second and
t h i r d stages and t h e l o n g i t u d i n a l o s c i l l a t i o n for POGO.
What w e d i d following that w a s t o set up a test program i n
which w e were able t o very precisely reproduce t h e c o n d i t i o n s
of t h e f a i l u r e o n t h e engines, which 681118 down to a f a i l u r e
of t h e s m a l l l i n e whiph feeds hydrogen i n t o t h e s t a r t e r cup
of t h e 52 engine.

This i a J t h e o l d l i n e deerign and t h e weakness w a s i n

two f l e x i b l e j o i n t s t h a t were g u t there to absorb v i b r a t i o n s
and t h e changes involved as t h e engine operated.
I t took some f a i r l y b r i l l i a n t d e t e c t i v e work t o
i d e n t i f y t h e fact that a f l o w v i b r a t i o n phenomenon w a s s e t
up i n these l i n e s under d r y vacuum c o n d i t i o n s which had n o t
been discovered i n t h e ground t e s t i n g , because i n t h e f i n a l
a n a l y s i s it turned o u t t h a t t h e ground test s e t u p conducted
i n either ambient a i r c o n d i t i o n s o r i n t h e blowdown t y p e
vacuum f a c i l i t i e s i n which one tests b i g engines allowed
m o i s t u r e f r o m t h e a i r t o freeze out on these f l e x i b l e j o i n t s
and t o change t h e s t i f f n e s s therefore t h e v b r a t i o n character-
istics.
 9

Operating i n t h e vacuum of pace, t h e m o i s t u r e

condensation on t h e extremely cold l i n e s d i d not occur.
The v i b r a t i o n characteristics were s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t . The
v i b r a t i o n caused c r a c k i n g , and under t h e p r e s s u r e s involved
i n feeding hydrogen i n t o t h i s u n i t , these j o i n t s cracked and
broke and r e s u l t e d then i n t h e f a i l u r e s of t h e engine and
t h e f a i l u r e of t h e restart of t h e 5-IVB stage.

T h i s l i n e was redesigned and I might Bay over-

designed i n t h e process, The flexible j o i n t s were t a k e n o u t ,
and bends i n t h e t u b e were s u b s t i t u t e d t o take up t h e motions.
These were s u b j e c t e d t o e x t e n s i v e overdesign t e s t i n g , were
v e r i f i e d as more than adequate t o correct t h e problem.

The new d e s i g n w also i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e oxygen

s i d e of t h e engine s t a r t s y s t e m , and it d i d f l y on t h e
S-IVB stage of launch v e h i c l e 205 which propelled Apollo 7
into orbit.
So i n a d d i t i o n t o e x t e n s i v e ground t e s t i n g , it has
now been used once i n manned f l i g h t .
The n e x t chart is a summary of t h e POGO s i t u a t i o n
i n one of t h e impcrtant ways i n which one measures t h e margins
of t h e equipment. And t h i s is one of t h e summar$es which w a s
u s e d i n t h e design c e r t i f i c a t i o n review on t h e 7 t h of November
t o summarize s e v e r a l hours of t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , and i t is
t h e r e s u l t of many thousands of manhours of work i n v o l v i n g
many companies t h a t w e called on t o h e l p us,

The mode that got u s i n t o d i f f i c u l t y on 502 w a s

t h e first l o n g i t u d i n a l mode of the v e h i c l e aa i t crossed t h e
W X l i n e frequency which w a s up very close, and a c t u a l l y o u t
around 90 seconds it became marginal as far as s t a b i l i t y is
concerned.
The c o r r e c t i o n t h a t h been made is t o use t h e pre-
v a l v e c a v i t i e s of t h e W X l i n e s 88 accumulators, and w e i n j e c t
helium i n t o those to provide a s p r i n g - l i k e characteristic
t o t h e UIX column, And those accumulators are i n c o r p o r a t e d
i n t h e f o u r outboard c o n t r o l engines on the f i r s t stage of
t h e S a t u r n V,

And by so doing, t h e first mode t a t got US i n t o

t r o u b l e on 502 is completely off t h i s chart. This ordinate
is t h e loop g a i n i n phase measured i n d e c i b e l s , and t h e
criteri a w e have set f o r o u r s e l v e s a f t e r the 502 f l i g h t W a S
J
 10

t o achieve a s t a b i l i t y margin of approximately 6 d e c i b e l s .

Now, a8 I s a i d , t h e mode t h a t got u s i n t r o u b l e

on 502 is completely off t h e chart. I t is more than 30 db's
of margin of s t a b i l i t y .
And w e p l o t t e d here a l l t h e h i g h e r modes up through
t h e n i n t h mode. And here is t h e s i x t h , s e v e n t h , e i g h t h and
n i n t h tract along here, The f o u r t h comes i n here a t t h i s
p o i n t . T h i s is f l i g h t t i m e i n seconds.

And as t h e v e h i c l e p r o p e l l a n t s deplete, t h e mode

gains change. And you can see here t h a t t h e t h i r d made comes
i n l a t e i n t h e f l i g h t and t h e n tailed o f f . And t h e second
mode starts up s i g h t a t t h e outboard engine c u t o f f , This
was t h e shutdown of t h e stage. T h i s s y m b o l is where t h e
S a t u r n engine c u t s off, and a t about 150 seconds t h e stage has
f i n i s h e d its job.

So by combination of much t e s t i n g t h a t w a s acccomp-

l i s h e d i n s e v e r a l facilities, a great deal of engineering
a n a l y s i s work, and f i n a l l y s y s t e m t e s t i n g on S I C test stage
No. 6 and 7 i n Mississippi, i n which t h i s d e s i g n change w a s
incorporated, w e have concluded beyond doubt t h a t w e have a
very adequate margin against POGO r e c u r r i n g on any subsequent
flight,

Now, I recalled t h a t one of our t e c h n i c a l d i f f i -

c u l t i e s on t h e 502 f l i g h t w a s an apparent s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e
i n t h e spacecraft Lllil adapter area of t h e ~ t r u c t u r e . That
s u b j e c t too has r e c e i v e d a great deal of test and a n a l y s i s ,
and w e have concluded beyond any doubt t h a t t h e cause of-
We have concluded beyond doubt that there w a s a sheet of
aluminum t h a t peeled o f f , t h a t that w a s one of t h e f a c i n g
sheets o f t h e bonded s t r u c t u r e , t h a t t h e r e w o n it peeled
off w a s because of an area on t h e o u t e r f a c i n g s h e e t where
t h e aluminum s k i n bond t o t h e honeycomb w a s not adequate,
an area of something e q u a l t o or greater t h a n about t e n
s q u a r e inches, and as t h e v e h i c l e climbs i n t o t h e upper atmos-
phere it is s u b j e c t e d t o aerodynamic h e a t i n g which raises t h e
temperature, and, of course, it i s s u b j e c t t o p r e s s u r e change
of t h e o u t s i d e air. And w e have concluded t h a t moist a i r
trapped i n t h e honeycomb heated as it climbed, t h a t there
w a s a p r e s s u r e rise i n s i d e t h e honeycomb aa you measure it
 11
t o t h e o u t s i d e ambient c o n d i t i o n , t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e rise
w a s s u f f i c i e n t to c a u s e f u r t h e r debonding, which had started
w i t h a s m a l l debonded s e c t i o n , and enough debonding occurred
t h e n that t h e aerodynamic forces peeled off a sheet of
aluminum.

You w i l l recall that the s t r u c t u r a l margins of

t h a t design were adequate even so, t h a t after some load relief
occurred when t h e f a c i n g sheet peeled o f f , t h e s t r u c t u r e re-
balanced itself and t h e v e h i c l e continued without subsequent
failure.

I t h i n k that is one of t h e meaeures, i n c i d e n t a l l y ,

.
of design margins t h a t w e b u i l d i n t o t h e s y s t e m i n many
waya
Since that tine, f r o m a great deal of t e s t i n g , w e
have now gone to an u l t r a a o n i c inajlpection of t h e honeycomb
s t r u c t u r e a t t h e Cape, v e r i f y i n g t h a t there are no debonded
areas i n that s t r u c t u r e t h a t are 88 b i g as one s q u a r e inch,
which is w i t h i n t h e t o l e r a n c e allowable. And i n a d d i t i o n t o
t h a t , w e have d r i l l e d q u i t e a number of holes on t h e i n n e r
f a c i n g sheet to vent t h e honeycomb. And i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t ,
w e have p u t a t h i n l a y e r of cork around t h e o u t e r s t r u c t u r e
t o minimdae t h e temperature rise. So I t h i n k that t h a t prob-
l e m is more t h a n corrected, and I won't s a y any more about it.

I would l i k e now t o go on t o diecussl a facet of

t h e Apollo 7 mission that is critical and important i n t h e
d e c i s i o n w e have made t o carry o u t t h e l u n a r o r b i t mission.
-- namely, g e t t i n g t o t h e margirw w i t h which w e b e l i e v e w e
have covered o u r s e l v e s i n o u r spacecraft sysltems.

The n e x t chart.

Many of you w i l l recall t h a t a t three t i m e s d u r i n g

t h e Apollo 7 f l i g h t there were r e p o r t s of AC bus dropoute,
This occurred a t something l i k e 19 hours i n t o the mission for
t h e f i r s t time. Of those three i n c i d e n t s of AC bus f a i l u r e s ,
i f you want t o use that term, in two cwes one bus dropped
off or failed, and i n one case both buses failed. In all
three cases t h e crew w a s able t o reset t h e breaker t h a t had
t r i p p e d , and t h e AC power came back on.

I w i l l only p o i n t o u t that t h e way the spacecraft

is designed there are two AC busses, bus No. 1 and bus No. 2.
 12

There are three i n v e r t e r s , Nos. 1, 2 and 3,

Now, t h e i n v e r t e r s are d r i v e n from t h e DC bus,

and t h e i r f u n c t i o n is t o c o n v e r t 28-volt DC i n t o t h r e e -
phase l l 5 v o l t AC. Any one of t h e three i n v e r t e r s can be
on either of t h e buses. The normal o p e r a t i o n is t o have one
i n v e r t e r on bus 1, a n o t h e r i n v e r t e r on bus 2, and a t h i r d
i n v e r t e r o f f t h e l i n e and i n standby s t a t u s .

These i n v e r t e r s power t h e r o t a t i n g machinery of

t h e s p a c e c r a f t , and a l l of t h e s y s t e m s t h a t are powered are
powered off of both buses. So you have got redundancy i n
terms of supply equipment from either bus and from a n y one
of three i n v e r t e r s .

The spacecraft can be operated w i t h only one bus

and only one i n v e r t e r , so you have got a three-mode degrada-
t i o n t h a t is possible here.

I would p o i n t o u t t h a t s e v e r a l c r i t i c a l system
operate o f f AC
system -0
-- f o r example, t h e s t a b i l i e a t i o n and c o n t r o l
and you do have t o be able t o stabilize and c o n t r o l
t o carry o u t t h e maneuvers t h a t are involved i n an earth
o r b i t a l mission o r i n any of t h e more ambitious missions,
The d r i v e for t h e gimbal motors on t h e spacecraft
engine is powered by AC, so you have got to have AC t o
c o n t r o l t h e spacecraft and t o carry o u t s e v e r a l of t h e kotat'ing
machinery d r i v e n f u n c t i o n s l i k e pumps and so on.

W i l l you put on t h e next chart?

Our people were able during t h e f l i g h t t o corelate

bus dropouts i n t h e AC s y s t e m w i t h s w i t c h i n g f u n c t i o n s of
t u r n i n g off t h e heat i n t h e cryogenic tanks. T h i s is
symbology that shows t h e cryogenic oxygen tank t h a t is carried
i n t h e s e r v i c e module. There are two tanks, and there is
redundancy. You have t o supply heat i n these t a n k s i n order
t o maintain t h e p r e s s u r e which expels t h e oxygen for u s e by
t h e f u e l cells and for d r i v i n g it up i n t o t h e command module
f o r l i f e support. The heat is s u p p l i e d by redundant means,
i n t h e one case by an electric heater which is powered off
of t h e DC bus, and t h e redundant s y s t e m is a f a n which also
can f u r n i s h heat. I t is p u t i n there t o avoid s t r a t i f i c a t i o n
of t h e cryogens, but i t also p u t s i n heat. Now, t h a t f a n is
u;; I

m
 13

d r i v e n off t h e AC bus.
In t h e automatic s y s t e m , which is t h e normal mode
of o p e r a t i o n and t h e mods t h a t Apollo 7 took off i n , a pres-
s u r e sensor i n t h e cryogenic tank s i g n a l s a motor switch
i f t h e p r e s s u r e drops below a c e r t a i n l e v e l . That motor
s w i t c h then closes and b r i n g s -- when you are i n t h e automatic
p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e cockpit
1- b r i n g s DC power off t h e DC bus
t o t h e heater, b r i n g s AC power off t h e i n v e r t e r bus t o power
t h e fan. This is t h e redundancy f e a t u r e s .

Now, when t h e p r e s s u r e is b u i l t up to prescribed

l e v e l , t h e motor s w i t c h is s i g n a l e d t o t u r n off and drops
t h e load both from t h e DC bus and from t h e i n v e r t e r .

Now, one of t h e f e a t u r e s of t h e AC s y s t e m is an
AC voltage sensor t h a t is p i c t u r e d here which powerre a t r i p
relay which i n t h e case of an o v e r v o l t a g e coming o u t of t h e
i n v e r t e r t r i p s t h e i n v e r t e r off t h e bus so you have an AC
f a i l u r e . And t h i s then is f e d t o t h e c a u t i o n and warning
panel so t h e crew is aware immediately of t h e AC bus f a i l u r e .

And i n t h e three e v e n t s i n Apollo 7 t h e crew re-

set t h e breaker and AC power picked up.

Now, t h i s c o r e l a t i o n W ~ E Imade during A p o l l o 7 , and

t h e s u s p i c i o n a t t h a t t i m e was t h a t as t h e AC load w a s dropped
off t h e bus, t h e o v e r v o l t a g e t r i p sensor s e n s i t i v i t y w a s such
t h a t t h e v o l t a g e r+se\that occurs when you drop load off t h e
bus w a s enough t o t r i p t h i s and drop t h e i n v e r t e r off t h e bus.

So for the balance of t h e Apollo 7 mission w e set

up such t h a t one of t h e systew was l e f t i n automatic, t h e
other w a s set up i n manual, so t h a t w e d i d n ' t have a dropping
of both loads a t t h e same time. And after s e t t i n g up t h a t
way, t h i s d i d not r e c u r i n t h e Apollo 7 mission.

Now, after t h e mission w e got back t o t h e command

module, of course, which included t h e i n v e r t e r and t h e s e n s i n g
c i r c u i t s , d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e motor s w i t c h or t h e cryogenic
tanks which are i n t h e s e r v i c e module and therefore d i d n ' t
come back t o us*

The n e x t chart shows a p o s t - f l i g h t test s e t u p where

w e took t h e 101 spacecraft a t Downey, set it up w i t h its
4

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i n v e r t e r s and its electrical s y s t e m i n a normal mode, put

a direct c u r r e n t pmer supply on of impedance characteristics
t o match t h e f u e l cell supply, and put t h i s motor s w i t c h , a
motor s w i t c h , i n t o a vacuum b e l l j a r , because it is i n
vacuum i n t h e f l i g h t environment, and s e t up a s t i m u l a t i o n of
t h e f a n and t h e heater.

W e were able i n t h i s test s e t u p t h e n t o f i n d t h a t

t h i s motor s w i t c h which is protected a g a i n s t m o i s t u r e i n t r u s t i o n
but is not vacuum protected, has t h e motor open t h e c o n t a c t s ,
i f t h e c o n d i t i o n s of o u t g a s s i n g were exactly r i g h t i n t h e
vacuum environment, would cause a r c i n g a t t h e switch c o n t a c t s ,
a corona discharge t y p e effect i n a n e a r vacuum, and under
c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s t h e a r c i n g would occur t o t h e case, put an
e x t r a load on t h e i n v e r t e r and thereby cause t h e dropout.

The next chart shows some of t h e r e s u l t s of t h i s

t e s t i n g where, depending on t h e d e t a i l s of t h e number of hours
t h a t t h e s w i t c h had been exposed t o t h e vacuum and therefore
t h e o u t g a s s i n g of t h e p r o t e c t i v e materials and therefore t h e
e x a c t state of t h e vacuum i n t h e case, i n one case a t one p a r
t i c u l a r l e v e l t h e t r a n s i e n t t h a t occurred w a s very small,
d i d n ' t h i t t h e o v e r v o l t a g e t r i p . Under a s l i g h t corona d i s -
charge there w a s a s l i g h t o v e r v o l t a g e and then recoverye
This is a t t h e time t h e corona discharge o c c u r s i n t h e s w i t c h
c o n t a c t s i n t h e case. I t d i d n ' t d r o p i t out.

But when the vacuum c o n d i t i o n s and t h e number of

molecules a t t h e switch case were j u s t r i g h t , t h e n a more
s e v e r e corona discharge occurred and cawed actually t h e
AC v o l t a g e i n t h e corona discharge t o t h e s w i t c h case t o
p u t on overload on t h e i n v e r t e r and t o drop I t off t h e l i n e .
Now, we're f o r t u n a t e i n this case t h a t w e were able
t o p r e c i s e l y reproduce t h e Conditions a9ter w e had got t h e
bulk of t h e hardware back from t h e f l i g h t . W e are also
f o r t u n a t e t h a t i t is no p r o c e d u r a l d i f f i c u l t y to not use
t h e automatic f e a t u r e of t h i s cryogenic tank h e a t i n g s y s t e m
t h a t these motor switches were p u t in there t o d r i v e . So
w e have introduced i n t o o u r procedures already for t h e sub-
sequent f l i g h t s manual c o n t r o l s of t h e p r e s s u r e of t h e heat-
i n g and therefore t h e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n of t h e cryogenic tanks
and have e l i m i n a t e d t h i s problem as a problem.

Now, other t h a n t h i s , which w a s s i g n i f i c a n t and

important, on which w e have been able t o reach an e n t i r e l y
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adequate t e c h n i c he i n v e r t e r s
and t h e AC s y s t
cated very
c o n t r o l chara

over t h a t one only t o s h o w you an example

of an abnormal c o n d i t i o n t h a t occurred on t h e Apollo 7
f l i g h t which ere able to c o r t h a t f l i g h t ' s pur-
n able t o reso ofar 88 t h e r e l i a b i l i t y
erations is eo

l d like to talk a t h e r class of t h i n g

which w e re ed i n great depth t an example, I
have mentioned, and it's o b v i o u ~ , t h a t t h e spacecraft engine,
t h e some 20,000 pound t h r u s t s e r v i c e propulsion s y s t e m engine
on t h e service module, is used t o provide t h e engine f o r
l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n and t h e n for transearth i n j e c t i o n t o
g e t u s back o u t of l u n a r o r b i t on t h e way home, If it
d i d n f t work t o g e t us i n t o l u n a r o r b i t , we would l i k e a l u n a r
pass, But once w e are i n l u n a r o r b i t i t has g o t to work t o
g e t us out,

In an earth o r b i t a l mission, as you know, we have

during most of Gemini, and w e d i d i n Apollo 7 , maintained
t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o provide retrograde energy for deorbit u s i n g
t h e reaction c o n t r o l s y s t e m . Once you get o u t i n l u n a r o r b i t ,
you don't have t h a t fallback or backup c a p a b i l i t y , and you are
depending on t h e s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m .
Now, from t h e beginning, t h e importance of t h i s
s y s t e m w a s recognized and was provided for i n t h e design,
The design is a simple design and is h i g h l y redundant, There
ie only one part of t h e engine which is r e a l l y a s t r u c t u r a l
part t h a t is n o t redundant, T h a t is t h e t h r u s t chamber and
t h e i n j e c t o r t h a t p u t s t h e p r o p e l l a n t s i n t o t h e t h r u s t chamber
and t h e engine nozzle, And because it's n o t redundant, it
has wide factors of s a f e t y and s t r e n g t h margins which have
been tested elaborately and e x t e n s i v e l y o v e r t h e y e a r s i n
many normal and many abnormal o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s ,

Now, t h e reat of t h e s y s t e m is h i g h l y redundant.

You obBerve here t h e pr0 ressurizes
t h e p r o p e l l a n t is redund s which
are each isolatable f r o m t h e other --
i s o l a t i o n valves.
U
 16

d check v a l v e s are a l l
e check v a l v e s are quad-
redundant.

This h e P i r i z ~ t i o ns y s t e m pre s u r i z e s t h e
f u e l tank by e area which p r e s s u r i z e s
and pushes fue and i n t o t h e engine,

t h e c o n t r o 1 s a l v e is also redundant, quad-

is e % e m p l i ~ i e dh e r s ,

schematic of the p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s y s t e m ,
dundant c o n t r o l v a l v e s which oper-
might p o i n t o u t here i n o u r
ne h i g h = t e ~ ~ e r ~ ct oun~d iet i o n
ator operated marginally,
T h i s w a s found some t i m e ago i n ground t e s t i n g , and
reason w e d i d change o u t the engine and its v a l v e sy
which is called i n t e ral on t h e 103 spacecraft, a f t e r o u r
d e c i s i o n t o prepare o ~ r s e l ~ e ~t h e range of o p t i o n a l m i s -
for
s i o n s t h a t 1 have described,
e -0 1 guss t h e most important
t f o n t h a t w e too , I t is the
cover o u r s e l v e s f o r a l l options,
h a t e d o u r i t u a t i o n back
i n August,
NQW, t h e s hieh controlled the
f u e l and o x i d i z e r i n t p t n j e e t o r and t h r u s t chamber are
series-redundant ih each e, and t h e n i n a loop t h a t i s n * t
shown here a n o t h e r p s ~a~~~~ for each f u e l and
o x i d i z e r , which therefore ad-redundant.

So you can s u ~ ~ vea rl v e failures of open or closed

i n t h i s quad-redundant s e h p and still be able t o e i t h e r
s t a r t or s t o p t h e engine,
Next chart,
"here is a 1 i t h t h i s engine now,
T h i s summarizes eng?lne n t o u n i t s of a l u n a r
o r b i t Gprima m i s s i o n where t
w i l l require for a lunar o
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On
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a minute i n duration.

we c o ~ d ~ c t e d

f l f g h t twtg -- three uni

In a ground ta ten we are
going to f l y e have 86 m
opesating t i

back into the Block I --

In the ground t a

s i g n i f i c a n t deaign chang
of 135 u n i t s of rniererion o p ~ ~ ~ t tii n
m eg,
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t h e SP8. Review of a l l the data from Apollo 7 indicate8

a b s o l u t e l y flawless performance, not an anoParly anywhere.
I n t h e unmanned test preceding Apollo 7 , w e had t h e
equivalcbnt of two and a q u a r t e r t i m a miesion d u ~ a t ~ o n .
fa I d e n t i c a l s y s t e m tmted on the ground, w e have
280 starter. And aimilar aystema which i n c o r p o r a t e t h e ap-
plicable parts of Block I experience, 517.

beginnang 0-
One of t h e messages here is --
what I 8 a i d i n the
that o u r design coneepts lean h e a v i l y on d
ing w i t h t h e necerssary redundancy and i n t e g r a t e d mode f
t h e n thorough testing on t h e ground, and minimum f l i g h t dentom-
s t r a t i o n . This e x e m p l i f i e s that.
Next chart now.
One oi t h e thin- about a rocket engine that one
ha# t o be a u r e of 16 aombustion e t a b i l i t y , We have in t h
spacecraft enginerr --
and 1 say "theme" becaw. it applies
a180 t o a l l of the launch vehiclerr 81 well arr the lunar
m d u l e engines -- demonstrated rutable engine.
I n r e c e n t montha we have conducted 167 bomb terrt
w i t h t h i s engine. "hie is t h e mean8 by which teeters i n t
dace pressure sp i n t o an engine rhAle it is running to
see whether o r he engine go- unutable or t h e premrrure
spike t h a t is i uced dmps itrelf Out, md if it dapaPr,
itself o u t in a m i l l i a e w n d s , which is t h e apecifi
then you have got a stable en$ine, became you t r y t o
it u n s t a b l e and it recover&8.
It under a variety o f t c w t c o n d i t
i v e chamber M Well M t h e .tee1 c
has been proven to be a mor
r
t'
--
r-nominal mixture ratlorr, t
and prerserures, and it l a a stable engins,

For t h i s reason w e don't have t o have a f l i g h t eo

bustion s t a b i l i t y monitor nor a rough cornbutution c u t o f f
s y s t e m i n thiru t ~ y s t e m ,

Next chart.
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 19

Now, that l a s t
a s to say Apollo

asion here t

receded t h i

control facil-

-- y sure
~ ~ ~ e ~ s ator be

hat X have s of t h e things

Dr. Pailne -- major functio

er computer

T h i s complex can
~ j @ c t i omna
the ~ i d c o u r
unctions invo
e nominal m
I t computes t
f l f g h t path, m
to p r o ~ 9i ~ ~r a~ free return

ye I t can p

moon. The lunar orbit

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 20

i n t h e ground-based comp
t h e spacecraft t o be exec
maneuvers .
8s. I t
h injee-
y maneuvers.

one has t o
w i l l have m
ccurately .
a l u n a r mission
Bill

spacecraft where t o p
for its own on-board p l a t

And i t can
s a r y it can par~sup t o t h e e
platform f o r i n e r t i a l space
doesn't have t o go through t

of t h e m i s -
s i o n using a v a r ~ e t yof d three-way
dopp ler da F l i g h t network.

Now, ve gone t h gh h a s been

in development I t h a s been r e f i n e d now for
u s e on t h e Gpr i s s i o n . Formal t e s t i n g w i l l
be complete on t h e 9 t h of D e c ~ b e r .

They have by t is t i m e completed s i m u l a t i o ~u s i n g

t h e computer complex and t h e acecraft and crew of a l l of
t h e maneuvers t h a t are i n v o ~ i n t h e l u n a r o r b i t mission.

The next -chart.

Now1 t h i s is t h e 8 a r y of t h e major f u n c t i o n a l
capabilities of the an-board computer program. T h i s is t h e
d i g i t a l program t h a t is tored i n t h e on-board guidance and
n a v i g a t i o n computer. W e c a l l it t h e Colossus Program. I n
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 21

t h a t program are the f e a t u r e s t h a t allow t h e crew on t h e i r

on-board d i s p l a y s t o monitor t h e launch, t o n i t o r t h e trans-
earth i n j e c t i o n maneuver, and t o be able t o
execute i f r e q u i r e d 0- t h i s is t h e inde
t h e spacecraft from t h e earth if fallbac
sary 0- t o execute and monitor midcours
maintain t h e p a t h t o t h e moon o r back,
on board t h e l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver^ p l a n , target,
and monitor for t h e t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n ,

So there is on-board c a p a b i l i t y i n ependent of t h e

ground t o compute g e t t i n g i n t o l u n a r o r b i t o r coming back
o u t of l u n a r o r b i t .

In a d d i t i o n , crews have chart block data l i k e

t h e y have carried on a l l t h e manned f i t h which inde-
pendent of computers t h e y can g e t a

The on-board computer can a e for reentry

guidance and for platform alfgnment u t a r s i g h t i n g and
f o r n a v i g a t i o n u s i n g s t a r o r horizon ngs and l u n a r
landmark t r a c k i n g ,

Now, t h e f l i g h t ropes t h e piece of mechan-

i s m t h a t a11 of t h i s d i g i t a l p
d e l i v e r e d t o t h e Cape on t h e 1 4 t h of
i n t e g r a t i o n test between t h e space v
f a c i l i t i e s w a s performed oh t h e 2 9 t h
f l i g h t r e a d i n e s s review and t h e c u s t
review were concluded s a t i s f a c t o r i l
So t h e on-board program has been d e v e r a long p e r i o d
of time and f u l l y checked out and d
Next chart.
Now, l e t m e j u s t supuaarize fore w e g i v e a
f u r t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e mission it a t w e have con-
cluded are t h e g a i n s t o be made toward our o b j e c t i v e of
a manned l u n a r l a n d i n g f r o m a l u n a r o r b i t mission,

As I said before, there are many t h i n g s w e c a n ' t

do i n earth o r b i t . W e have got to get o u t i n t o space and g e t
i n t o t h e l u n a r environment t o do many of t h e t h i n g s t h a t are
r e q u i r e d i n connection w i t h t h e l a n d i n g i t s e l f , One of these
is n a v i g a t i o n , going out,- i n o r b i t , and coming back. And
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 22
involved there are ' t h e l i g h t i n g c o n s t r a i n t s which are an
important element of determining o u r launch window,

I n other word@, w e need t h e l i g h t i n g on t h e l u n a r

surface where w e i n t e n d t o land a t a f a i r l y Xow s u n a n g l e
t o e v a l u a t e o u r on-board computation a b i l i t y of t h e guidance
and n a v i g a t i o n s y s t e m and o u r a b i l i t y t o track a c c u r a t e l y
t h e targets on either horizon o r s t a r o r on l u n a r surface,
These are a l l unction u i r e d i n t h e n a v i g a t i o n process.
a t l u n a r d i s t a n c e , It's t o
een t h e spacecraft and t h e
of s i g n a l g a i n , d i s ~ a n c e s ,point-
i n g a c c u r a c i e s , and so on.

And t h e nee of o u r h i ~ h a g a i nand of o u r non-

d i r e c t i o n a l antenn

ined, i n c i d e n t a l l y , and discussed

d do if t h e h i gain antenna d i d n ' t
e have had som evelopment d i f f i c u l t y
f i c i e n t s t a t e of

h t h i s mission w i t h cow
~ ~ e i nn tnh e ~case i t

nt, you will recall i n

e ~ ~ l u a tthee so-called
ng or tumblin
ate, insofar
only by o p e r a t i n g i n t h a t

experience t h a t is d i r e c t l y
ng mission t h a t w e o b t a i n and
p toward t h e more complex
ylng t h e l u n a r module and w i t h more
h, w e ' l l have less t i m e and less pro-
e margins and so on t o be able t o

very importantly v e r i f y t h a t o u r mission

~ ~ a n n i ,n g computer programs, t h a t o u r crew procedures
both on t h e ground and i n f l i g h t and o u r crew t i m e l i n e s
provide adequately f o r more complex operations ahead.

Next chart.
Now, as I have s a i d , there are added r i s k s as w e get
away f r o m proximity t o t h e earth. The minimum r e t u r n t i m e is
considerably l o n g e r t h a n it is f o r an earth o r b i t a l mission.
W e w i l l be of t h e order of three d a y s away from land as com-
pared w i t h t h e prior manned f l i g h t where w e have been of t h e
order of h a l f an hour t o three hours away f r o m r e t u r n t o
earth.

T h i s then places need for i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on

t h e p r i n c i p a l l y two major s u b s y s t e l i f e s u p p o r t , which
s u p p o r t s p r e s s u r i z a t i o n and oxygen for human s u r v i v a l , and
electrical power which provides for t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e
many systems aboard. And t h e s e r v i c e propul i o n s y s t e m which
must work t o come o u t of l u n a r o r b i t .
Next chart.
W e have done a caref of t h e r i s k s t h a t
are involved i n t h i s mission --
in
I have s a i d many t i m e s , and I r e m i
rds, t h e d e l t a r i s k .
a g a i n , t h a t on
ed f l i g h t there are r i s k s n ' t f o r some nu-
ars be able t o e rocket, t h e b e s t
r l d , without ha lved. I guess,
~ a ~ you t can't
e ~ r~ eally d your car and go
anymore without t a k i n g e But there is r i s k
in each ne of o u r f l i g h t s .

So w e have therefore d on rassessing t h e

d e m e n t s of i n c r e ed r i s k t o x t s t e p toward
o u r d e s i g n mission.

I p o i n t o u t h4re t h a t o u r spacecraft w a s designed

for t h i s mission. W e provided redundancy t o recognize t h e
f a i l i n g s of both people and equipment, and w e have had very
good experience i n o u r ground and f l i g h t test programs. Our
spacecraft When i t f l i e s h a s performed exceedingly w e l l .
Our ground test experience i n t e s t i n g a l l of t h e s e subsystems
has demonstrated t h e proper margin of design condition.
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Now, w e have got a large margin f o r unknowns o r

errors on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 6-prime mission. As B i l l Schneider
w i l l show you, w e have c o n s i d e r a b l e margins of consumables
aboard, and o u r s y s t e m s have design margi which w e w i l l
i n no way tax on t h i s mission. Because w e don't have a LM
aboard, w e have a very c o n s i d e r a b l e s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n
s y s t e m p r o p e l l a n t margin which can be used i n t h e event t h a t
w e have t h e o v e r n o m i n a l c o n d i t i o n t h a t would r e q u i r e e x t r a
p r o p e l l a n t f o r example.
W e t h i n k it is f o r t u i t o u s f o r u s t h a t w e are able
t o carry o u t t h i s f l i g h t and take one s i g n i f i c a n t b i t e o u t
of t h e w h o l e series of t h i n g s w e have t o do t o g e t u p t o
a f u l l l u n a r landing c a p a b i l i t y , b u t a b i t e t h a t d o e s n ? t in-
volve swallowing a t a l l . And t h a t b i t e involves one complex
spacecraft namely, command and s e r v i c e module w i t h which
--
0-

w e have c o n s i d e r a b l e experience now but without t h e l u n a r

module. W e t h i n k t h a t t h e added r i s k s t h a t are over and
above those t h a t w e undertake f o r any manned f l i g h t are e q u a l
t o those g e n e r a l l y i n h e r e n t in the progre s i v e f l i g h t test
program as you go from one s t e p t o t h e other, as w e d i d i n
Gemini, as w e are i n Apollo,

And w e know t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f o r
a l u n a r landing is enhanced by g e t t i n g t h i a element of crew
and o p e r a t i o n a l experience and t h i element of added demon-
s t r a t i o n and data g a t h e r i n g as regards, t h e n a v i g a t i o n and
performance of o u r whole s y s t e m .
Next chart.
F i n a l l y , w e have done i n designing
t h e G p r i m e l u n a r o r b i t mission af est possible
mission t o meet t h e o b j e c t i v e s t h a t w e have established.
W e w i l l launch i n d a y l i g h t . W e vi11 mai i n a l l t h e way
to lunar orbit i n s e r t i o n a free-return t ectory. Now, what
t h i s means is t h a t from t h e moment of tr lunar i n j e c tion
onward u n t i l w e reach t h e p o i n t of i n s e r t i n g t h e spacecraft
i n t o l u n a r o r b i t t h a t i f no f u r t h e r maneuvers are performed
w i t h t h e main spacecraft engine w e can m a i n t a i n the course
which w i l l f l y past t h e moon and come back t o t h e earth
w i t h small midcourse corrections which are w i t h i n t h e capa-
b i l i t y of t h e small thrusters, t h e c o n t r o l s y s t e m , f r e e - r e t u r n
trajectory. And t h a t tsmphwizes t h a t .
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Translunar midcourse c o r r e c t i o n can be accomplished
w i t h t h e small t h r u s t e r s and w i l l keep u s on a c o u m e t h a t
b r i n g s u s back t o an acceptable earth landing,
This mission is designed w i t h a two-burn e n t r y
i n t o l u n a r o r b i t , The f i r s t burn p u t s us on a 60 x 1 7 0 - m i l e
o r b i t around t h e moon, and t h e second burn t h e n c i r c u l a r i z e s
a t 60 m i l e s , Those are n a u t i c a l m i l e s ,

We have minimized t h e t i m e i n l u n a r o r b i t , t e n revo-

l u t i o n s , approximately 20 hours. W e have minimized t h e r e t u r n
t i m e . Our nominal mission d i s c u s s e d o v e r t h e y e a r s has con-
templated about 72 hours, about three d a y s , r e t u r n t o earth
from t h e moon. W e have s u f f i c i e n t p r o p e l l a n t margins on t h i s
f l i g h t because w e don't have a LM aboard and s u f f i c i e n t re-
s e r v e demonstrated i n t h e heat s h i e l d t o come back a l i t t l e
b i t faster, so w e have b u i l t t h i s trajectory t o 68 hours r e t u r n
t i m e , That minimizes t h e t i m e back t o earth from t h e moon.

There is a midcourse c o r r e c t i o n provided i n t h e t r a n s -

earth leg t o maintain e n t r y i n t o t h e r e e n t r y corridor. And
w e have provided for a short-range, non-skip r e e n t r y which
provides u s about three l e v e l s of backup for being able t o
make t h a t r e e n t r y r e t u r n , B i l l Schneider w i l l describe t h a t ,

Nay, w e can p u t t h e l i g h t s on now. What I have

t r i e d t o do is t o remind you of and summarise for you t h e
background of t h e last year t h a t h a s l e d us up t o a s t a t e of
r e a d i n e s s f o r a f l i g h t to l u n a r o r b i t and r e t u r n w i t h Apollo 8
and describe f o r you some of t h e more s i g n i f i c a n t technical
factors t h a t , w e have examined, many of them i n great depth,
i n t h e la$t severaS. months o r t h e last few weeks and s e v e r a l
days i n particular,

With t h a t I would l i k e t o t u r n i t o v e r to B i l l
Schneider who w i l l describe for you t h e Ago110 8 l u n a r o r b i t
mission. B i l l Schneider is t h e mission director f o r t h i s
mission.
B i l l,

SCHNIIEIDER: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

I would 1Ue t o take, t h e next few minutes t o describe f o r
you what we're going t o be doing on Apollo 8 mission, I
w i l l be s t e p p i n g through 8 l i t t l e b i t f a s t because it is a
 26

long mission. Of course, as f a r as w e are concerned, t h e

mission has just about begun.

If I may have t h e first s l i d e , please, j u s t t o

b r i n g you up to date and t o p o i n t o u t t o you what o u r a c t i v i -
t i e s are going t o be i n t h e upcoming d a y s , I prepared t h i s
s l i d e here t o show what t h e coming e v e n t s are, W e w i l l
s t a r t off o n t h i s F r i d a y , t h e 1 5 t h-- a s l i g h t error i n t h e
s l i d e here 0- w i t h o u r f l i g h t r e a d i n e s s test. T h i s is our
last b i g electrical test of t h e spacecraft and launch
v e h i c l e t o a s s u r e t h a t it is ready f o r f l i g h t .
T h i s is a crew p a r t i c i p a t i n g test, and t h e crew
sits i n t h e c a p s u l e i n t h e i r s h i r t s l e e v e s ,

W e t h e n have a reasonably l e i s u r e l y pace on through

o u r normal (checkout procedure u n t i l w e come t o o u r countdown
demonstration test, The countdown demonstration test is going
t o be run i n t h e same sequence t h a t w e r a n t h e Apollo 7 .
That is, w 0 w i l l f i r s t have a w e t countdown demonstration
test -- t h a t i s , a complete s i m u l a t i o n from beginning t o end
of t h e countdown without t h e crew. W e w i l l use a l l t h e pro-
p e l l a n t s on board and a l l of t h e procedures w i l l be just as
if t h e crew were there. However, t h e c a p s u l e w i l l be unmanned.

We w i l l t h e n recycle, and t h e next d a y we w i l l d r y

a t which t i m e t h e crew w i l l be i n t h e f i n a l test, W e
go throygh t b f i n 4 1 d a y \ w i t h o u t t h e p r o p e l l a n t s on

T h i s is 8 reasonably l e i s u r e l y schedule, We have

ample t i m e i n here t o accomplish a l l of these.

We do repergve t h e r i g h t for o u r s e l v e s t o s h u f f l e
dates around a l i t t l e b i t here and there, although I don't
a n t i c i p a t e t h a t there w i l l be anything major come up between
now and then.

However, on t h e 7 t h , i f w e f i n i s h on t h a t date,
w e then have a recycle t i m e --
may I have t h e next s l i d e ,
please for o u r countdown.
-0

Now, w e have a long countdown, which begins on

t h e 1 6 t h of December. You w i l l n o t i c e w e have about n i n e
d a y s i n cas0 w e come up w i t h any problems i n t h e countdown
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demonstration test before w e pick up o u r count. And it is
a long Apollo count, 101-hour count, which w i l l be picked
up about 9;45 p.m. on t h e 1 6 t h of December, and w e w i l l go
through a l l of t h e checks t h a t w e normally go through lead-
i n g up t o our f i n a l count.
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

This begins about 10:45 on t h e n i g h t of t h e 19th.

T h i s i s n ' t an empty space i n here, b e l i e v e me. I t j u s t 80
happens t h a t these are t h e only bars t h a t have been picked
out *
W e do e n t e r o u r no a l b u i l t - i n hold, a six-hour
hold, a t 4:45 p.m. on t h e 20 I p i c k i n g up a g a i n t h e count
a t minus n i n e hours a t about :45 p.m. t h a t evening, aiming
f o r a launch on the 21st a t

We have not completely determined t h e precise moment

of l i f t o f f as y e t . I t w l l l be a t 7:45 i n t h e morning,
g i v e or take a few minutes.
May I have the next slli

criteria for launch window@, f i r s t w e

have e s t a b l i s h n e r a l criteria. P r i m a r i l y , w e desire
a daylight lau That is, we would
launch, W e have set
ave a f r e e - r e t u r n trajectory,
i g h t i n g i n t h e Apollo
zones.
We are imuth
0- t h a t is,
d i r e c t i o n s from t can launch by range
safety and by per 108 degrees. And w e
w i l l i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y u t i l i z e t h i s f u l l range.
And w e have set up o u r launch windowa rjruch t h a t
w e have t w o o p p o r t u n i t i for any launch time for a trans-
l u n a r i n j e c t i o n , t h e first o p p o r t u n i t y being a t t h e second
r e v and t h e second o p p o r t u n i t y b e i n g one r e v later.
Looking a t t h e p r i m a r y windows t h a t w e are aiming
f o r , w e are p i c k i n g up, as I stated, t h e launch window on
t h e 21st a t about 7:45, and w e do have approximately a
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five-hour launch window, These are a l l E a s t e r n Standard
Times, I might add. W e have about a five-hour launch window
t h a t w e w l l l be aiming for t h a t day.

On s u c c e s s i v e d a y s t h e launch window moves down

through t h e time period as you can see here, w i t h on t h e 2 6 t h
here p i c k i n g up a t i t looks l i k e about f o u r o'clock,

We do desire, as I s a i d , a d a y l i g h t launch, both

p i c k i n g up t h e count and ending t h e count, If we do go on
t h e 2 l s t , w e w i l l be going f o r t h e Apollo zone, t h e e a s t e r n -
most Apollo zone, W e w i l l have a sun e l e v a t i o n a n g l e a t t h e
s e v e n t h l u n a r r e v o l u t i o n of about 6.7 degrees, which is j u s t
about what w e desire,
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please,

Looking a t t h e launch phase, I might s t a t e a g a i n

t h e launch of t h e S a t u r n V comes off from t h e pad 39A.
Nothing unusual i n o u r launch phase. I t ' s a t y p i c a l S a t u r n V
launch phase, and w e do have o u r normal abort capabilities
t h a t you're a l l f u l l y aware of i n case of malfunctions i n
t h e launch v e h i c l e on t h e way up,

W e do have a l t e r n a t e missions e s t a b l b h e d i n cases

where we have e a r l y t e r m i n a t i o n of t h r u s t on one of t h e stages,
and i n g e n e r a l t h e y lead t o an u l t i m a t e earth o r b i t a l mission,
although i f w e got an, e a r l y c u t o f f of t h e S-IVB j u s t prior
to i n s e r t i o n w e would probably hgve enough SPS c a p a b i l i t y t o
go on w i t h t h e mission, I'm s o r r y , I mean 5-11 stage. The
S - I n , of course, is needed for t h e t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n .

So i n g e n e r a l i f w e have an e a r l y c u t o f f and m u s t
use t h e SPS engine in going iqto a l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n ,
o u r first a l t e r n a t e miss$on t h e n is a repeat of t h e C mission,
approximately t e n d a y s i n earth o r b i t ,

Next s l i d e , please.
Just b r i e f l y summarizing w h a t t h e mission looks
l i k e , j u s t t o o r i e n t you before I go through t h e phases,
t h i s is an artist's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of what t h e mission looks
l i k e , I t begins, of c o u r s e , a t t h e Cape w i t h i n s e r t i o n ,
and t h e n w e go i n t o o u r one o r b i t for systems.checkout,
and f i n a l l y o u r second o r b i t for o u r l u n a r o r b i t i m e r t i o n --
26
 29
I ' m sorry
TLI burp -0
--t hfora t ois,u r tt rhaen ssecond
lunar insertion. W e do o u r
i g n i t i o n of t h e 5-IvB --
a t t h i s p o i n t ( i n d i c a t i n g ) and go on o u t on o u r coast,
midcourse corrections -- 1'11 go i n t o a l l of these i n a
l i t t l e more d e t a i l -- and t h e n f i n a l l y o u r l u n a r o r b i t in-
s e r t i o n on t h e back s i d e of t h e moon.

A s Sam s a i d , a two-phase l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , t h e
first being p u t t i n g us i n a 60 x 170, and t h e n f i n a l l y a
c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n a t 6 0 , Ten o r b i t s t h e n i n l u n a r o r b i t .
Followed t h e n by a tramearth i n s e r t i o n , come back, and t h e n
f i n a l l y s p l a s h down i n t h e Pacific.

A t each one of these p o i n t s w e do have s p e c i f i c

g o h o go p o i n t s and specific go/no go decisions, and w i t h i n
which w e have preplanned a l t e r n a t e s t h a t I w i l l be d e s c r i b i n g
t h a t w e w i l l u t i l i z e i f necessary a t these v a r i o u s p o i n t s .

May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

Turning t o t h e f i r s t phase, which is, of course, t h e

l i f t o f f , s y s t e m s checkout, and f i n a l l y t e r m i n a t i n g i n t h e
second S-IVB urn, t h a t p u t s u s i n o u r coast phase on o u t
t o t h e moon.
W e have an earth trajectqry t h a t looks l i k e t h i s
( i n d i c a t i n g ) , Now9 o u r g o h o go p o i n t is stet up o v e r Australia
for t h e large burn, and w e w i l l g i v e t h e "go" providing w e have
s u r a n c e t h a t t h e S-IVB w i l l satisfactorily complete its
nd burn -- t h a t is, p r o v i d i n g w e know of no f a i l u r e i n
t h e S I V B , p ~ o v ~ d ti h~a gt t h e consurmables i n t h e S-IVB are
s u f f i c i e n t t o not only start t h e burn but also t o f i n i s h
t h e burn, and t h a t w e have no known reason t h a t the S-IVB
would s h u t down.

Also on t h e s p a c e c r a f t s i d e , t h e "go1' d e c i s i o n w i ll
be given only i f t h e spacecraft is completely operable w i t h
a l l redundancies,
If w e have an e a r l y c u t o f f of t h e S-IVB a t t h i s
p o i n t i n t i m e , w e have some preplanned a l t e r n a t e missions t h a t
b a s i c a l l y take advantage of what are on t h e impulse w e have
imparted t o t h e spacecraft. If w e are on an o r b i t t h a t w i l l
lead to a 4,000-mile apogee before w e g e t premature c u t o f f
of t h e S-IVB, w e w i l l c o n t i n u e on o u t and do a high earth
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o r b i t a l mission, t h e n d e o r b i t --
t h a t is, up t o 4,000 miles,
s t a y there f o r two r e v s , then deorbit and s t a y up t e n d a y s
i n earth o r b i t , r e p e a t i n g those p o r t i o n s of t h e C mission
t h a t w e feel w e need to.

There are a series of other a l t e r n a t e s i f w e g e t on o u t .

S u f f i c e it Yo s a y i f t h e 5-IVB c u t s off prematurely

and o u r apogee is over 60,000 m i l e s , we w i l l assess t h e s i t u a -
t i o n and i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y go on a c i r c w l u n a r f l i g h t u s i n g
t h e SPS engine t o provide t h e a d d i t i o n a l impulse t h a t would be
necessary.

If w e f a i l t o i n j e c t a t t h i s p o i n t , w e w i l l i n j e c t
one r e v later over a t t h i s p o i n t here ( i n d i c a t i n g ) ,
Next s l i d e .

QUESTION: What p o i n t ?

IDER: One r e v later.

QUESTION: Over what p o i n t d i d you s a y ?

: I t would be roughly r i g h t around h e r e ,

B i l l , one rev later ( i n d i c a t i n g ) .

May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

Now, when w e m a k e t h a t t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n burn

w i t h t h e S-IVB, w e are as Sam has s a i d , on o u r way home.
That is, w e w i l l be i n s e r t i n g i n t o a f r e e r e t u r n trajectory.
We have set up o u r f l i g h t dynamics such t h a t a t a l l t i m e s w i t h
o u r s e r v i c e module RCS s y s t e m w e can p u t whatever impulse might
be necessary t o correct any deViatiQIW.3 f o r a free r e t u r n tra-
jectory t h a t would g e t u s back down t o t h e earth without any
need for t h e SPS engine.’

T h e o r e t i c a l l y , of course, w e are a t the end of

t h e first burn -- end of t h e 5-IVB burn --
theoretically we
are on a f r e e - r e t u r n trajectory without any c o r r e c t i o n what-
soever.
During t h i s t r a n s l u n a r coast period, as w e go on
o u t t o t h e moon, w e do have t h e p o i n t s a t which w e p l a n t o
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assess t h e s i t u a t i o n , and w e would abort --

t h a t is, w e would
come back either circumlunar or h i g h apogee i f w e lost re-
dundancy i n some of o u r on-board spacecraft s y s t e m s ,

S p e c i f i c a l l y , if w e lose redundancy i n t h e environ-

mental c o n t r o l s y s t e m , t h e s e r v i c e module and p r o p u l s i o n
s y s t e m or t h e electrical power s y s t e m , w e would elect t o
abort t h e mission. A l s o , i f w e lost selected portions of
t h e guidance and c o n t r o l s y s t e m , communication s y s t e m or t h e
sequential system,

May I have t h e n e x t s l i d e , please.

Looking a t how long it would take uet t o come home,

t h i s s l i d e here s h s t h e minimum t i m e Prom abort to landing
as a f u n c t i o n of t i m e , of elapsed t i m e , of making t h e d e c i s i o n
to abort, For example, if we decided a t 40 hours o u t t h a t w e
wished t o abort t h e mission, w e would be back i n something on
t h e order of 20 hours. S i m i l a r l y , i f w e go on o u t t o t h e
moon, t h i s p o i n t here, we'd and up doing a circumlunar mission
and not a h i g h a l t i t u d e abort.
We have, a ~ t h o u g hw e don't have t o uBe i t t o abort--
f l a b l e for abort during t h a t period of t i m e 10,000
r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m , and, as I
rt on o u r normal f r e e - r e t u r n

r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , after t h e l u n a r o r b i t
t o come home ra Nominally, as General
72-hour r e t u r n , For
h l y a 55-hour r e t u r n , If we decided t h a t
o g e t home fast and wanted t o use t h i s 4,000 foot
have a v a i l a b l e , w e could have r e t u r n times
running along t h i s l i n e here ( i n d i c a t i n g ) .

May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

One p o i n t t h a t I d i d n o t m a k e is roughly i n t h i s
tiane period here, approximately f i v e hours i n t o t h e mission,
w e w i l l do a p r o p e l l a n t dump on t h e S-IVB, which i n essence
p u t s us in -- t h a t is, a r8trOgrade dump which g i v e s u s
about 90 foot per second, which b a s i c a l l y p u t s t h e S-IVB
behind t h e spacecraft -- and because of f l i g h t dynamics and
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o r b i t a l mechanics and w e end up w i t h a s l i n g s h o t mode
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w i t h t h e S-IVB on a nominal trajectory going on out i n t o

solar o r b i t 0

A t t h i s p o i n t I would l i k e t o t a l k about communica-

t i o n s and p o i n t o u t to you t h a t w e do have preplanned i n our
mission t h e a b i l i t y t o provide t e l e v i s i o n back t o earth. W e
are providing f o r two methods of t e l e v i s i o n coverage i n our
f l i g h t p l a n , one a t about 31 hours and one about 55 hours i n t o
the flight.

Now, t h e TV does r e q u i r e t h e u s e of t h e high-gain

antenna. And, as General P h i l l i p s s a i d , t h i s is t h e f i r s t
f l i g h t for t h e high-gain antenna, and so there is a f i n i t e
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t w e might n o t be able t o g e t t h e TV for you.
However, as General P h i l l i p s d i d state, t h e u s e of t h e omni
antennas provides a l l of t h e communications t h a t w e need oper-
a t i o n a l l y . The loss of t h e high-gain antenna would cause us
t o lose Ty i n t h e o u t e r f r i n g e s as w e l l as biomedical data
and h i g h b i t rate data.

We r e t a i n a l l t e l e m e t r y data t h a t g i v e s us t h e w e l l -
being of t h e s y s t e m . We r e t a i n a l l v o i c e communications and
a l l track, but what we do lose, 88 I s a i d , i f w e lose t h e
s y s t e m , is TV, biomedical, and h i g h b i t rate.

We do have t h e d e c i s i o n pointsr f o r midcourse correc-

t i o n s . These come a t about s i x hours, 24 hours a f t e r TLI.,
and about 20 hours a t e i g h t hours before l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n .
W e have f o u r d e c i s i o n p o i n t s where w e w i l l decide whether or
n o t w e are going to m a k e t h e burn.

We w i l l m a k e a l l burns t h a t w e p o s s i b l y can u s i n g
t h e s e r v i c e module RCS s y s t e m .

Xf t h e ground computation t e l l s u s t h a t a delta-V

of less t h a n one foot per second is required, w e w i l l m a k e
no attempt t o make t h e burn. That is, w e w i l l n o t correct
that. If t h e ground t e l l s u s t h a t c o r r e c t i o n is more on
t h e order of f o u r feet per second, w e w i l l use t h e SPS
s y s t e m t o make t h e burn.

May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

e.
 33
How a c c u r a t e l y do w e know Where we are going?
T h i s s l i d e here shows o u r p r e d i c t i o n on p e r i l i n e or 3 sigma K
-- t h a t is a high p r o b a b i l i t y case
t h e mission.
-0 as w e go on o u t i n t o

Here w e have t i m e from a r r i v i n g a t t h e moon as a

f u n c t i o n 0 % u n c e r t a i n t y i n where you t h i n k you are going t o
be. You can see t h a t 70 hours
of t h e mission -0
-- t h a t is, a t t h e beginning
o u r 3 sigma Uncertainty is about 13 m i l e s ,
12 o r 13 m i l e s , and it r a p f d l y decreases down t o about f i v e
m i l e s , and then when w e g e t close t o t h e moon w e g e t down
t o t h e order of one m i l e .
The spacecraft, t h i s on-board s y s t e m , roughly h
an u n c e r t a i n t y of about s i x m i l e s , so w e know p r e t t y w e l l
where w e are going.

Next s l i d e , please.

The l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n burn, as w e stated, ias a

two-burn and is a burn for 60 x 170 followed by 60 x 60 burn,
both of which are on t h e back s i d e of t h e moon.

Our fixed a t t i t u d e burns-- And w e a g a i n have specific

g o h o go c r i t e r i a for conducting these burns. I n essence, w e
w i l l not conduct t h e burns if w e have had t h e loss of some
selected s y s t e m s . And there is a complete list of t h o s e s y s -
tems t h e loss o f which would r e q u i r e t h a t we not go i n t o l u n a r
o r b i t but do come back on a circumlunar f l i g h t .

A t y p i c a l example of t h i s is i f w e lost one e n t r y

b a t t e r y w e would elect not to go i n an W I burn.

Next s l i d e , please.
When w e get i n t o l u n a r o r b i t , t h i s is t h e t i m e l i n e - -
I'd better take a moment t o e x p l a i n what these are. This
chart o v e r here begins w i t h r e v 1 and goes through t o r e v 10
w i t h a d a y b i g h t cycle as you go on through, w i t h t h e a c t i v i -
ties t i c k e d off on bars down here.
T h i s chart o v e r here s t a r t s w i t h t h e W I first burn
a t t h i s p o i n t here. The earth is down i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . The
s u n is up i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . And t h e n t h e o r b i t t i m e l i n e
is d e p i c t e d i n t h e spiral.
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You recognize, of course, t h a t w e s t a y i n t h e
60-mile o r b i t throughout ,

I n g e n e r a l , t h e first pass, t h e first a c t i v e pass

here, is t a k e n up w i t h s e q u e n t i a l photographs --
t h a t is,
photographs wherein w e wish t o determine what t h e moon looks
l i k e , what o u r landing sites look l i k e ,

W e t h e n go i n t o a series of stereo photographs and

go on i n t o t h e mission w i t h some landmark t r a c k i n g .

We do have a t t h i s point- T h i s is t h e easternmost

Apollo landing s i t e . W e do have f o u r separate attempts or
f o u r separate t i m e s a t which w e w i l l track t h e Apollo landing
site. W e have scheduled also three a d d i t i o n a l sites on t h e
back s i d e of t h e moon t h a t w e wish t o track i n order t o see
what o u r a b i l i t y is t o track, both t o track on board as w e l l

.
as todetermine from t h e ground how good o u r t r a c k i n g accuracy
is
W e have a number of requests from s c i e n t i s t s t o con-
duct some s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s p r i m a r i l y looking a t t h e
solar corona, looking at d i m s k y . Most of these a c t i v i t i e s
take place i n these dark periods back here.

I n g e n e r a l , t h e crewmen w i l l be s l e e p i n g
i n g I guess I should s a y -- --
o r rest-
i n two-hour cycles throughout t h i s
period, l e a d i n g us then t o transearth i n j e c t i o n a t t h e appro-
priate t i m e ,

I might s a y r i g h t here t h a t w e are c a r r y i n g a number

0f photographic equipments on board. W e have two Hasselblat
cameras w i t h a number of r o l l s of black-and-white and color
f i l m , as w e 1 1 aa a 16 m i l l i m e t e r ( a u r e r ) camera,

We are planning hopefully

c i s e l y when r i g h t now 0-
--
and 1 c a n ' t t e l l you pre-
i f t h e high-gain antenna is up --
t o have some periods of W . And, of course, it w i l l have t o
be i n t h i s g e n e r a l area here i n order t o get the l i n e of s i g h t
back t o t h e earth. We are looking a t r e v s 1, 2 and 9, although
I c a n ' t specify for you which r e v o l u t i o n of t h o s e w e w i l l
select y e t ,

The l u n a r o r b i t phase would be aborted f o r c e r t a i n

specific losses of equipment, p r i m a r i l y for loss of redundancy
 35
i n t h e guidance and c o n t r o l s y s t e m s o r i n t h e electrical
buses o r i n any of t h e r e d u n ~ a n c i e son SPS s e r v i c e module
propulsion s y s t e m .
Next s l i d e , please.

Transearth i n j e c t i o n , w e said, is nominally a t

t h e end of t h e t e n t h r e v o l u t i o n . We do have t h e c a p a b i l i t y
t o maintain o u r s e l v e s i n l u n a r o r b i t f o r one or t w o more o r b i t s
if there is some overpowering reason f o r doing so. However,
t h e nominal p l a n t h a t w e w i l l attempt t o maintain is t o come
back a t t h e end of t e n r e v o l u t i o n s .

W e have targeted o u r landing l o n g i t u d e a t 165 degrees

west 0- t h a t is, almost i r e c t l y s o u t h of H a w a i i . And a l l of
o u r landing zone f o r a l l of o u r l i f t o f f times and a l l of o u r
l i f t o f f d a y s are on t h a t l i n e . W e do n o t c o n t r o l o u r l a t i -
t u d e u n t i l t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n . A t t h a t p o i n t w e d e c i d e what
l a t i t u d e w e w i l l be going to.
We are t a r g e t i n g f o r t h e m i d d l e of t h e corridor, and
w e are t a r g e t i n g f o r maintaining o u r c a p a b i l i t y w i t h a r e e n t r y
speed.

i d e j u s t sh ed w e d i d come back i n
o v e r Asia.

Next
rections. These ag
s e r v i c e module reae
t h e trajectory for Corr
9 e.
d , a g a i n have t h e c a p a b i l i t y
11 be conducting midcourse COP
obably be conducted u s i n g t h e
1 s y s t e m , and w e w i l l direct
n t r o l only, and w e w i l l maintain

Thoes corr w i l l be made a t t h e morat convenient

t i m e s , and t h e y s u b j e c t t o t h e same delta-V restrictions
I spoke about before.

May I have t h e n e x t s l i d e , please.

Just t o g i v e you an idea of what kind of u n c e r t a i n t y

w e have i n r e e n t r y f l i g h t p a t h a n g l e , t h i s chart w a s o r i g i n a l l y
set up f o r one of t h e longer r e t u r n t i m e s , and for o u r [iO-odd-
hour r e t u r n t i m e you j u t squeeze i t up a l i t t l e b i t .
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You can see t h e manned space f l i g h t network i t s e l f
without any assistance on board w i l l g i v e us a l i t t l e o v e r
a degree of u n c e r t a i n t y a t TEI, and t h i s very r a p i d l y con-
verges down t o t h e one degree which w e feel is most desirable,
very quickly comes down t o a very, very nominal l e v e l , m o s t
satisfactory f o r r e e n t r y ,

"he spacecraft i t s e l f , w e believe t h a t is a r e e n t r y

guidance u n c e r t a i n t y , 3 sigma, of about t h a t order of magni-
tude (indicating) -- w e l l , w i t h i n what is necessary. What
is necessary is something on t h e order of a degree,

May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

Entry itself looks something l i k e t h i s , T h i s is a

s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n from t h e skip r e e n t r y t h a t you may have
been familiar w i t h , i n t h a t w e are f l y i n g what w e are c a l l i n g
a c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y . We have d e c i d e d t o u s e only 1,350 m i l e s
of o u r nominal r e e n t r y range, although t h i s range is a v a i l a b l e
t o u s by our l i f t i n g r e e n t r y . W e d i d select t h i s short range
i n order to g e t t h i s t h i r d backup I might s a y -- mode of
c o n s t a n t g,
QUESTION: Is t h a t what w e called "footprint" i n
earlier f l i g h t s ?
: Yese And I w i l l go i n t o t h a t a l i t t l e
b i t further.

or weather avoidance, if w e aremore t h a n one day o u t

e r v i c e propulsion s y s t e m t o a d j u s t o u r nominal
e are less t h a n one day o u t , w e w i l l
retarget o u r e n t r y p o i n t and use o u r f o o t p r i n t for weather
avoidance.

This is what t h e trajectory w i l l look l i k e , Entry

i n t e r f a c e a t 400,000 feet, And w e do e n t e r S-band, w e e n t e r
t h e blackout region, and begin f l y i n g o u r c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y ,

In contrast to the skip reentry, which would nomin-

a l l y have t a k e n u s much f u r t h e r o u t i n t h e atmosphere and
t h e n come back i n , w e p u l l t h i s c o n s t a n t 4 g's, and do a
l i t t l e d i p , come o u t of blackout, and t h e n come on back i n .
This whole a c t i v i t y here takes about 14 or 15 minutes.
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QUESTION: How many g's, Bill?

SCHNEIDEFt: About 4 g t s scheduled.

One t h i n g I should mention a t t h i s p o i n t is w e are

going t o g i v e t h e crew "go" f o r t a k i n g off t h e i r s u i t a t
i n j e c t i o n i n t o o r b i t , back on one of t h e earlier slides, and
t h e y w i l l conduct t h e mission, t h e remainder of t h e mission,
without s u i t s . That is, r e e n t r y w i l l be without space s u i t s .

We have provided t h e crew w i t h heel r e s t r a i n t s and

a l s o w i t h a head r e s t r a i n t , which, if you recall, were t h e
two areas of concern on Apollo 7 .
QUESTION: Does t h a t i n c l u d e r e e n t r y then, B i l l ?

SCIINBIDER: Y e s sir.

Next s l i d e , plea80.

Footprint. This is o u r r e e n t r y coverage. We do

cone i n , as I stated, o v e r Asia. W e have very good t r a c k i n g
of Guam. W e have s t a t i o n e d a Mercury s h i p a t t h i s p o i n t ,
and then w e come down and touch down here. W e have t h e York-
town i n t h e recovery area.
A s I s a i d , recovery is along 165 l o n g i t u d e and f o r
a nominal mission w i l l be approximately a t t h i s p o i n t (indi-
cat ing 1.

Next S l i d e , please+
I would l i k e t o summarise for you t h e mission by
t i n e BO t h a t you w i l l get an idea of when t h i n g s occur. And
t h i s s l i d e o v e r here shows t h e nominal mission times t h a t
t h i n g s w i l l occur, plus delta times, for d i f f e r e n t l i f t o f f
d ay s . That is, nominally, for example, a nominal t o t a l mission
is s i x d a y s and four hours approximately. W e could conceivably
be as long as one day l o n g e r or f o u r hours shorter i f w e l i f t e d
off a t a d i f f e r e n t l i f t o f f t i m e .

I guess t h e b i g numbers t o p o i n t o u t are t h e TLI

burn, which is roughly about 311 seconds and s t a y s p r e t t y
close t o t h a t no matter what o u r t i m e is, and t h e f r e e - r e t u r n
circumlunar tine, which is a n o t h e r k e y number, is about 130 hours
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and 37 minutes. I t can i n c r e a s e some 17 hours or be as

l i t t l e as one hour shorter.

The fx)I burn is almost independent of l i f t o f f t i m e .

There are some d i f f e r e n c e s because you do a p l a n e c o r r e c t i o n
a t t h a t same t i m e , and t h e p l a n e change does change w i t h l i f t -
off day.

I guess t h e t r a n s e a r t h r e t u r n t i m e of 58 hours p l u s
nine minus two is t h e other important p o i n t ,

Again t u r n i n g t o t o t a l delta-V, as f a r as t h e launch

v e h i c l e is concerned, w e have p l e n t y of delta-V a v a i l a b l e ,
We use approximately 10,000 feet per second o u t of t h e
S-IVB f o r t h i s second, t h e TLI burn. W e have approximately,
if I remember correctly, about f i v e seconds of burn l e f t ,
very comfortable margin.

In t h e spacecraft, as I s a y , w e expect t o do most

of o u r midcourse burns u s i n g t h e SPS s y s t e m . W e have plenty-
I ' m s o r r y . Using t h e RCS s y s t e m . We have p l e n t y of SPS
s y s t e m a v a i l a b l e i f w e need it i n there. W e u s e approximately
7,000 feet p e r second. We have about 4,000 feet per second
f l o a t i n g around, and w e haven't used t h a t .

J u s t to show you where w e s t a n d i n consumables, may

I have t h e next chart, please?

RCS consumables. Those of you who have been follow

i n g manned space f l i g h t know t h a t consumables have a l w a y s been
something t h a t w e have had t o p l a y very c a r e f u l l y , and here
w e have a s i t u a t i o n where I t h i n k a t least i n RCS f u e l for
nominal mission w e have very l i t t l e w o r r y about t h e f u e l
q u a n t i t i e s . W e have a v a i l a b l e t h a t much, w i t h u n c e r t a i n t i e s
as shown up here, and you can see w e probably use about 30 p e r
c e n t of i t .
May I have t h e n e x t s l i d e , please,

The SPS budget runs l i k e t h i s . Beside these, as I

s a i d , we have about 4,000 foot per second l e f t over. These
are t h e k i n d s of d i s p e r s i o n s t h a t w e a n t i c i p a t e , 3 sigma d i s -
p e r s i o n s , You can see w e a n t i c i p a t e about 120 feet per second
3 sigma maximum d i s p e r s i o n for t h e midcourse corrections.
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And t h e contingencies. w e have run l i k e t h i s :
500 feet per second i n case w e wanted t o come home as soon
as possible, And w e have allotted these amounts of numbers,

.
d e l t a - V ' s a v a i l a b l e f o r weather avoidance and t h i n g s of t h a t
nature

Out of t h e 4,000 w e a g a i n appear to have no problem

there.

Looking a t t h e other consumables, electrical power,

food and a l l t h e rest of it seem i n very good shape.

Next s l i d e , please.

One p o i n t I would l i k e t o m a k e very c a r e f u l l y are

t h e g o h o go p o i n t s t h a t w e do have i n t h i s mission, and
t h e y are l i s t e d here, and you c a n see t h a t w e have a number
of d e c i s i o n p o i n t s t h a t w i l l be made, and d e c i a i o n p o i n t s
either t o do something o r n o t t o do something. And t h e y begin,
of course, w i t h o u r normal go/no go on launch where t h e F l i g h t
Director w i l l be making t h e u s u a l d e c i s i o n s w h e t h e r o r not w e
m u s t abort t h e mission o r go i n t o one of t h e contingency modes.
Then +e have o u r "go" after i n s e r t i o n , which is
rcgo'' for t h e first o r b i t , and t h e n so on throughout t h e
mission u n t i l f i n a l l y , as I s t a t e d , o v e r A u s t r a l i a we do g i v e
t h e "go" f o r t h e TLI burn.

We have some very quick d e c i s i o n p o i n t s t h a t w e w i l l

make -- namePy, one approximately t e n minutes a f t e r TLI, w i t h
a review of t h a t d e c i s i o n about 90 minutes after TLI, for a
q u i c k assessment of any d i s p e r s i o n s t h a t w e may have had, t o
see i f there is'any reason f o r not going on o u t .

W e t h e n have t h e d e c i s i o n p o i n t s 88 stated here

for midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , ' The first midcourse c o r r e c t i o n de-
c i s i o n p o i n t is p l u s s i x hours f r o m TLI.. And t h e n on here '
a t 24 hours f r o m TLI, And t w o a t LO1 minus 20 hours and W I
minus f o u r hours.

I n l u n a r o r b i t itself w e w i l l m a k e a conscious
g o h o go d e c i s i o n approximately one every hour,
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.
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touch on t h e a l t e r n a t e m i ~ r s 88
~ o I~went
through. I would l i k e t o q u i c k l y run t h
t h a t w e do have preplanned a l t e r n a t e mirs
we have established a philosophy that s a y s w e can do these
preplanned a l t e r n a t e s w i t h a minimum of a d d i t i o n a l work and
also t o g e t a maximum of r e t u r n t o the program. And these
are t h e g u i d e l i n e @ t h a t l e d uo3 up t o i f I might have t h e
-0

next s l i d e 0..d e c i s i o n t o come up w i t h these a l t e r n a t e missions.

If w e have an e a r l y s e p a r a t i o n for t h e S-IVB d u r i n g

t h e f i r s t i n s e r t i o n i n t o o r b i t burn, w e w i l l i n g e n e r a l r e v e r t
t o an earth o r b i t a l mission.

If w e have enough SPS f u e l on board, w e w i l l t r y to

go for a 4,000 m i l e elipse, And t h a t w i l l be a real-time
d e c i s i o n depending upon what k i n d of d e l t a 4 w e have had t o
u s e i n order t o get i n t o orbit.

If w e have XUD S-IVB i n j e c t i o n burn

&IVB first burn w a s Batisfactory but for some reason o r other
--
t h a t iaa, the,

w e i n h i b i t t h e second burn of t h e S-IVB --

w e w i l l use the
spacecraft SPS t o p u t u s i n t o a high-apogee orbit and remain
i n t h a t o r b i t for two to f o u r r e v o l u t i o n s and t h e n come baok
down and b a s i c a l l y do a m a x i m u m ten-day d u r a t i o n mission
t h a t is, repeat those elements of t h e C mission t h a t w e feel
--
necesssry t o do a t t h a t t i m e ,
If w e have an e a r l y c u t o f f of t h e 8-IVB
t h e S-IVB begim t o burn but for some r e a s o n or other w e
--
t h a t is,

are forced to c u t it off or it c u t s off itself w e have a

0-

number of mission a l t e r n a t i v e s whioh b a s i c a l l y Bay w e ' l l taka

advantage of whatever a l t i t u d e w e have.
If w e are i n t h i s range here up to 4,000 m i l e s , w e
go i n t o the high apogeer If we are 4,000 t o 22,000 m i l - ,
w e w i l l have t o come back i n as soon aa w e can- I'm @ o r r y e
Xf w e are 22,000 t o 60,000, w e w i l l have t o come back i n on

.
a direct reentry.
different
We don't have enough SPS t o do anything

If w e are o v e r 60,000, w e w i l l have t o come back

i n on a direct r e e n t r y . We don't have enough SPS t o do
anything d i f f e r e n t .

If w e are o v e r 60,000 m i l e s , w e w i l l do a circlua-

l u n a r f l y by.
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Again, a l l of these a l t e r n a t e plans w i l l be
real-time d e c i s i o n s , and t h e d e c i s i o n 88 t o which one w e
w i l l e x e r c i s e o r whether o r n o t w e w i l l exercise it w i l l
be dependent upon t h e circumstances a t t h a t moment.

However, w e do have these a l t e r n a t e s a v a i l a b l e .

May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

J u s t a brief reminder as t o who t h e crew is.

Frank BollDan, J i m Lovell, and Anders. Backup crew: Armstrong,
Aldrin and Fred b i s e .
I n a d d i t i o n to those you w i l l see t h e normal cast
of characters a t t h e Cape and a t Houston:

Rocco (Petrone) is a g a i n t h e Launch Director a t

KSC where a l l t h e a c t i v i t y is for t h e next month and a h a l f
or so, and h e is backed up by Paul Donnelly, Launch Operations
Manager .
C h r i s Kraft, t h e Director of F l i g h t Operations a t
Houston, has nominated C l i f f Charlesworth as t h e p r i m a r y
F l i g h t Director on t h i s f l i g h t . H e w i l l be backed up by
Glen (Lundy) and also by a new Flight Director, ( M i l t L i n d l e r ) .

The Department of Defense recovery forces and s u p p o r t

forces are headed up by General (Vince Huston). The DOD
manager f o r manned space f l i g h t w i l l be backed up by Rear

.
A d m i r a l (Bacudas) who is t h e Commander of Task Force 130,
P r i m a r y Recovery Force

Admiral (McManus) w i l l head up Task Force 140

i n t h e e a s t e r n recovery forces, w i t h General Jones, Davy
Jones, heading up t h e E a s t e r n T e s t Range.
The recovery v e s s e l , as 1 s a i d , is t h e YORKmWN.

Thank YOU.

QUESTION: On t h a t a l t e r n a t e mission, t h e circum-

l u n a r , how f a r o u t conceivably could t h e y go? They go beyond
t h e moon and how much farther beyond?

SCHNEIDER: We'd be t a r g e t i n g for 60 n a u t i c a l m i l e s

around t h e moon.
 e
X
0
e

Z
0
v)
v)
1
 42
farther t h a n t h e moon?

o i n g t o be s h i r t s l e e v e
a l l t h e wag?

e l i f t o f f phase. We go
t , and a t t h e same t i m e
'*go*' f o r i n e e r t i o n w e w i l l g i v e them
t t h e same t i m e , contingent
e had on ApoX10 7 ,

ALI : D r , P a i n s la t o l e a v e i n a few moment,

so if there are any q u e s t i o n s you w i s h t o direct t o him, w e
w i l l take those first.
Okay e e8 anyone have a q u e s t i o n for Dr. Paine?
B i l l Hines,

TXON: Y e s . I)r. Paine, w e have heard t h a t t h i s

was i n t h e t h i n k i n g stage and i n t h e review stage for a long,
long t i m e , and SO f o r t h , but when d i d you r e a l l y m a k e up your
mind t h a t t h i s was "go"?

PAXNB: F i n a l d e c i s i o n w a s made y e s t e r d a y a f t e r n o o n
about four o'clock, Bill,

QUESTION: What sort of 8 meeting d i d you have j u s t

prior to t h a t ?
PAINE: This w a s a c t u a l l y the clfraax of a series
of meetings, The meeting y e s t e r d a y w a s a rather large meeting
involving t h e e n t i r e e x e c u t i v e establishment a t NASA, both
manned and unmanned, and t h a t w a s fallowed by a srnaller
meeting i n which w e had t h e top people i n Manned Space F l i g h t ,
and George Mueller, Wernher Von Braun, t h e C e n t e r Directors,
and s e v e r a l of o u r c o n s u l t a n t s , Tomray Thompson, Eberhart Reese,
and t h e d e c i s i o n w a s made a t t h e conclusion of t h a t meeting
by Dr. Mueller and nyself and o u r Associate Administrator,
H o m e r Newell e

QUESTION: Hmms t h a t made? By t h e three of you

voting? O r by a consensus? What w a s t h e m ~ c h ~ ~ fi os rm t h e
f i n a l decision?
 43

y a v o t e , although t h e
ere unanimous t o go
f o r t h e l u n a r orbiter

TION: D r , Pains, has P r e s i d e n t Johnson and

President-Elect Nixon-- Have t h e y been t o l d and/or were
t h e y consulted before t h e d e c i s i o n ?

: Y e s , t h e y were informed y e s t e r d a y a t noon

a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n w a s made,

QUESTION: J u s t f o r t h e record, was t h a t v o t e

unanimous ?

ALIBRANDO: Any more questiona for D r . Paine?

QUESTION: Yes. I n view o f Zond 6 and whatever else

you may know about t h e Russian program, how do you feel now
about o u r chances o f being around t h e moon before t h e y are?

PAINE: I r e a l l y don't know whether t h e Russians

are going t o make a manned circumlunar attempt before December
o r not. T h i s d i d not p l a y any part a t all i n o u r d e c i s i o n on
t h i s flight.

QUESTION: S i n c e t h e earliest d a y s of t h i s program

there w a s a l w a y s a p l a n t o carry t h e l u n a r excursion module
on any m i m i o n which would involve a commitment for l u n a r
o r b i t on t h e t h e o r y t h a t you could u s e t h e engines of t h e LM
s y s t e m , i n case of one o f these s e r v i c e propulsion module
breakdowns, t o d r i v e t h e spacecraft back home.

Now you are goAng to commit t h e a s t r o n a u t s to l u n a r

o r b i t without 8 f u n c t i o n a l LM, Could you t e l l us why you
t h i n k t h a t w e should do t h i s i n December, when i f w e waited
u n t i l next s p r i n g w e would have a LM and w e would n o t be
p u t t i n g these a s t r o n a u t s i n t h i s p o s i t i o n where t h e y have
no redundancy f o r t h e i r s e r v i c e propulsion engine?
PAINE: I believe that adequately covered i n
o u r p r e s e n t a t i o n s , We feel t h a t t h e backup s tern redundancy
and t h e p l a t e a u manner i n which e are undert
mission, on a step-by-step b a s i s , g i v e u s a great deal of
 44

assurance, and t h ~ t , ct, I believe t h a t

w e a c t u a l l y have more t f l y i n g t h e LM o u t
t o t h e moon on t h i s m i i t h a l l t h e a d d i t i o n a l power
t h a t t h i s g i v e s u s on umables, so t h a t w e feel t h a t
a t t h i s t i m e w e are ready for t h e mission and t h a t t h i s w i l l
be w i t h i n t h e normal h ards of test pilotrs f l y i n g experimental
craft ,

QUESTION FROM ~ O U S ~ I n~ t:h e event t h a t you d i d

have reason t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o v i e t Union w
f l y a manned l u n a r f l i g h t i n December about t h e same t i m e we
are t r y i n g t o do so, or i n t h e event t h a t t h e y d i d s t a r t one
j u s t p r i o r t o t h e t i m e w e p l a n t o start one, would t h i s have
any impact on o u r own f l i g h t ?
PAINB: No.

ALIBRANDO: We w i l l proceed w i t h u e s t i o n s f r o m here.

QUESTION: Dr, Paine, can t h i s mission now be con-

s i d e r e d t o take t h e place of t h a F Mission?

ALIBRANDO: Dr. P a i n e has l e f t ,

W e are going t o proceed w i t h q u e s t i o n s from Washington,

QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s , if you are ready, you

are probably t h e most prominent s y s t e m s i n t e g r a t i o n manager
w e have, and I am s u r e t h a t you p l a y t h e odds a good b i t .
What do you t h i n k t h e odds are of t h e f u l l l u n a r o r b i t mission
t o be completed s u c c e s s f u l l y ?

PHILLIPS: 1% not going to t r y to c a l c u l a t e a

set of p r o b a b i l i t y numbers or odds for you. I feel t h a t
we're ready for l u n a r o r b i t mission and that we have every
reason t o expect t h a t w e w i l l be able t o carry o u t t h e f u l l
m i s s i o n and t o succeed w i t h i t , If I wasn't convinced of
t h a t , I wouldn't have recommended such a mission i n t h e first
place.

Q-TION: One other q u e s t i o n is how n e a r t o f u l l

space s i m u l a t i o n do you achieve on earth w i t h a l l of t h i s
SPS t e s t i n g ? What is the closest you t h i n k you g e t i n
earth t e s t i n g on t h e SPS t o s i m u l a t e t h e space environment?
 45
P f o u r s y s t e m s and
w i t h t h e SPS i n p a r t i c u l a r , w e are able t o s i m u l a t e t h e
environs on earth i t h one important 8x68 t i o n , and t h a t ' s
zero g f l i g h t of any s i g n i f i c a n t d u r a t i o n .

A s you know, w e can s i m u l a t e zero g f l i g h t f o r only

a matter of s e v e r a l seconds by 135 a i r c r a f t , and up t o about
30 seconds of ero g f l i g been performed. Of c o u r s e ,
w e c a n ' t test p ~ o p u ~ i n t h a t environment,
Except for t h e zero g environment, w e are able
t o s i m u l a t e a l l of t h e important environments I t h i n k rather
well.

QUBSTION: Would you plerise share your o p i n i o n on

Zone 6 w i t h us? And could it be t t i t is j u s t a r e p e t i t i o n
of No. S?

PHILLIPS: I d o n w t b e l i e v e I know any more about

Zond 6 t h a n you do from having read t h e news accounts, The
news accounts s a y t h a t it is an unmanned probe l i k e l y t o be
a f l i g h t s i m i l a r t o Zond 5. I r e a l l y don't know any more
about i t t h a n t h a t .

QUESTXON; When you m 8 t h i s accelerated r e t u r n ,

t h i s 58-hour or is it 5 S h o u r return-
1- Now, as I u n d e r
stood one of you gentlemen t o s a y , are you going t o be burning
your SPS engines t o get t h i s q u i a r e t u r n ? And what does
t h i s do t o your speed, t o your t r a n s l u n a r
earth speed?
--
coming back t o

PHILLIPS: Well, t h e r e t u r n t o earthp coming o u t

of l u n a r orbit- The energy is added by t h e s e r v i c e pro-
p u l s i o n s y s t e m engine. I n o t h e r words, you c a n f i n d y o u r s e l f
i n l u n a r o r b i t and t h e spacecraft p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m , t h e
s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m so-called, is burned t o add approxi-
m a t e l y 3,000 feet per second t o your v e l o c i t y i n l u n a r o r b i t ,
which adds t h e energy that take you on t h e way back t o earth.

The d u r a t i o n of t h a t m and therefore t h e energy

added, t h e number of feet per second t h a t is added t o v e l o c i t y ,
p l a y s t h e b i g g e s t part i n determining t h e r e t u r n t i m e .

A shorter burn would provide a lon eturn t i m e ,

and an even l o n g e r burn t h a n w e p l a n would a lish a
shorter r e t u r n t i m e .
 46

a1 r e t u r n t i m e , e get off on t i m e
on t h i s m i V e r y Close t o u r s . And t h e r e e n t r y
second . u t 36,300 feet per

QUESTION: Well, now, on your r e t u r n t i m e , is i t

going t o be 55 hours o r 58 hours?

IPS: The n o ~ i n a lr e t u r n t i m e , i f w e get o f f

ning of t h e 211st-- The r e t u r n t i m e I t h i n k
i n d e t a i l is 57.8 hours. So I have a i d approximately 58.
I t is a few minutes short of 58 hou

, i f you d i d n ' t burn your SPS, you

would be i n a roughly 80-hour or $&hour r e t u r n t i m e , wouldn't
you, and a f t e r you l e a v e l u n a r trajectory o r l u n a r o r b i t you
would more or less be going about 3,500 m i l e s p e r hour u n t i l .
you get i n p r e t t y close t o t h e earth and t h e g r a v i t y started
p u l l i n g you i n there?

Now, i n t h i s long h a u l between t h e moon and near

earth, do you know what i n m i l e s p e r hour your speed is going
t o i n c r e a s e to?

PHILLIPS: Y e s . 1 haven't r e a l l y broken i t down

i n my own mind i n s t a t u t e m i l e s per hour. W e tend t o m a k e
most of o u r measurements i n feet per second.

We e n t e r t h e earth's atmosphere a t about 400,000

feet a t a v e l o c i t y of about 36,300 feet per second. Now, if
somebody can t e l l you what t h a t is i n s t a t u t e m i l e s per h o u r -
I t h i n k it's about 25,500 s t a t u t e m i l e s per hour.

We l e a v e t h e moon's o r b i t -= I n other words, t h e burn

t h a t w e make t o t h e so-called t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n
I t h i n k w e have got it on a table here.
--
puts
u s a t a velocity--
I j u s t don't have t h e f i g u r e i n my head.

SCHNEIDm: YOU go on t o something else and 1'11 g e t

it.
PHILLIPS: Let US look t h a t up and come back.

ALIBRANDO: Can we have a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n ?

 47

Q 0 ter w i l l t h e y be r e e n t e r i n g
t h a n t h e y would t h e long t r i p back, t h e slower
t r i p back?

PHILLIPS: Well, it is a few hundred feet per

second. If you come back i n a y 90 hours, which is a very
long r e t u r n o p t i o n , your r e e n t r y v e l o c i t y is of t h e order
of 35,700 feet er second. If you come back i n l i k e 55 hours,
which is a l i t t l e faster t h a n w e are planning t o come back,
you would be a t l i k e 36,400 feet p e r second,

Sob you vary o v e r a few hundred feet per second i n

t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t i m e regime,

Q ~ S T I O N : And you can still f l y a c o n s t a n t g coming

down?
PRILLIPS: Yes.

QUESTION: So you are not overloading them because

of t h i s d i f f e r e n t speed?

PHILLIPS: No, Under any of t h e v e l o c i t y c o n d i t i o n s

t h a t w e would expect t o encounter, w e p l a n t h e 4 g, c o n s t a n t g ,
r e e n t r y deceleration,

: I guess I should state t h a t t h e r e e n t r y

p a t h t h a t w e are f l y i n g was a l w a y s one t h a t w e may have found
o u r s e l v e s i n i f that's what t h e computer had called for. I t
is j u s t t h a t ' s t h e one w e are t a r g e t i n g f o r a t t h i s t i m e .

I n response t o t h e q u e s t i o n of what o u r v e l o c i t y
is a f t e r your transearth i n j e c t i o n burn, nominally it w i l l
be 8,865 feet per second a f t e r w e have added t h e 3,520 foot per
second burn on w i t h o u r SPS, Of course, then o u r r e e n t r y speed
of 36,300.

QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s , g e t t i n g i n t o t h e area

of r i s k a g a i n , can you get i n t o t h e matter of a t t h e end of
t h e f l i g h t i f you m i s s t h e window can you t e l l us what happens?

PHILLIPS: The q u e s t i o n i if w e m i s s our launch

window what happens? AB w a s described here, t h e launch
window, which is set by --
 48

I mean t h e r e e n t r y windaw.
QUESTION: I n other
words, i f you bounce o u t o r if you f a i l t o come i n i n t h i s
corridor, what happens?

PHILLIPS: A l l r i g h t . The q u e s t i o n , a l i t t l e d i f -
f e r e n t , is if w e m i s s t h e r e e n t r y corridor. The corridor is
set on t h e upper l i m i t o r t h e high s i d e by t h e skip-out boundary,
and i f w e m i s s t h e corridor on t h e h i g h s i d e and i n fact s k i p
o u t , t h e n i t 8 s a s p a c e c r a f t and crew loss kind of s i t u a t i o n .

The trajectory t h a t t h e spacecraft w i l l follow i f

it d i d s k i p o u t is a large ellipse, a large e l l i p t i c a l tra-
j e c t o r y around t h e earth, and t h e t i m e back t o eaqth is a
matter of s e v e r a l hours depending on t h e d e t a i l s of t h e con-
d i t i o n or t h e s i t u a t i o n . And there is n o t s u f f i c i e n t electric
power nor oxygen on board t h e command module, because you no
longer have t h e s e r v i c e module w i t h you a t t h a t p o i n t t o sus-
t a i n l i f e nor t o provide f o r a subsequent r e e n t r y .

The lower l i m i t of t h e corridor is set by t h e h i g h

d e c e l e r a t i o n l i m i t t h a t t h e spacgcraft would be s u b j e c t e d t o
if it came i n too s t e e p l y . And i f t h e spacecraft e n t e r e d
below t h e low s i d e of t h e corridor, t h e decelerations would
exceed about 20 g's. The h e a t i n g rates w i l l be i n excess of
those for which t h e s p a c e c r a f t wz& designed, and there would
be a s t r u c t u r a l breakup and l o s s of t h e spacecraft and t h e
crew.
These r e e n t r y c o n d i t i o n s i n t h i s corridor have been
defined and described going way back s a r l y i n t o t h e program.
This r e e n t r y corridor was dsed on t h e S a t u r n V f l i g h t s , 501
and 502, because, i f you w i l l recall, there w e boasted t h e
spacecraft up t o an apogee of about 11,000 m i l e s , and it
w a s necessary for t h e s p a c e c r a f t w i t h its on-board guidance
and n a v i g a t i o n equipment t o e n t e r w i t h i n t h a t corridor or
it would have experienced t h e same t h i n g s t h a t I have de-
s c r i b e d here.

B i l l showed a couple of curves that showed what

w e have determined from o u r a n a l y s i s and test work is t h e
c a p a b i l i t y t o h i t t h a t corridor. We don't feel t h a t i n t h i s
respect there is r e a l l y any r i s k .

QUBSTION; I b e l i e v e t h e mean d i s t a n c e of t h e moon

t o t h e earth i s about 238,000 m i l e s . On t h i s f l i g h t w i l l t h e
 49
moon be on t h e close s i d e o r t h e f a r s i d e of t h a t mean
d i s t a n c e ? And does that d i s t a n c e have any weight i n your
determination for t h e December 2 1 launch?

PHILLIPS: The d i s t a n c e of t h e earth-moon s y s t e m

is n o t a p r i m a r y deciding factor on t h e launch window,
The deciding factors on t h e launch window are t h e l i g h t i n g
c o n d i t i o n s a t t h e Apollo landing s i t e o v e r whic'h w e i n t e n d
t o f l y where w e want l i g h t i n g a n g l e s of approximately or
less than seven degrees, by a requirement for a d a y l i g h t
launch, t h e requirement for a d a y l i g h t recovery, And a l l
of these c o n d i t i o n s taken together set up t h e t i m e of t h e
window t h a t w e have e s t a b l i s h e d ,
The d i s t a n c e between t h e earth and t h e moon is
i n c i d e n t a l i n t h i s set of c a l c u l a t i o n s ,

QUESTION: Do you have there a f i g u r e f o r t h e

elapsed t i m e f r o m l u n a r i n j e c t i o n from earth o r b i t u n t i l t h e
t i m e you a r r i v e i n l u n a r o r b i t approximately?

SCHNEIDER: W a s t h a t from TLI t o UII?

QUESTION: Right.

SCHNEIDER: You can do some s u b t r a c t i o n , TLI ends

a t 2 p l u s 55, and U)I 1 begins a t 69 plus 11.

QUESTION: If t h i s f l i g h t is completely s u c c e s s f u l ,
how much t i m e could it s a v e you i n your scheduling?

PHILLIPS: Well, t h e q y e s t i o n is i f t h e f l i g h t is
completely s u c c e s s f u l how much t i m e can t h i s s a v e u s i n o u r
schedule? That's a hard q u e s t i o n t o answer i n a b s o l u t e terms,
The mission sequence t h a t w e now p l a n is t h i s C-prime l u n a r
o r b i t mission on Apollo 8 , t h e so-called I) mission on
Apollo 9 -0 t h i s is 504, S p a c e c r a f t 104, and LM 3, which w i l l
p u t t h e e n t i r e spacecraft i n c l u d i n g t h e l u n a r module i n t o
earth o r b i t for e x e r c i s i n g a l l of its s y s t e m s , Now, beyond
t h e I) mission, w e p l a n for an F mission, which is a l u n a r
, o r b i t mission w i t h t h e e n t i r e spacecraft, i n c l u d i n g t h e l u n a r
module, i n c l u d i n g a descent t o about 50,000 feet, but n o t a
landing, rendezvous and r e t u r n t o earth.
And beyond t h a t w e feel t h a t w e ' l l be prepared for
t h e lunar landing itself,
 50

uence ahead is 6-prime,

D, F, and t h e n a l u t nimum sequence.

t l y how it goes,
n t f o r subse-
more t h a n one
i n earth o r b i t
re t o i n d i c a t e

thin^, I n t h e weeks
n t h e present
ave e v a l u ~ t eour~ mission
sequence t o c o n s i s t h a t w e can accomplish
i n C-prime, D, F nding itself have de-
c i d e d on t h e bas% eration t h a t ill not
e t o fly the mission w e
used t o c a l l a E mission,

as a mission i n
which t h e S a t u r n V bo r a f t i n t o earth
o r b i t , and t h e n t h e t s the e n t i r e
spacecraft i n t o an 4,000 miles1 where i n
conduct s e v e r a l
e v a l u a t i o n s i n ~ o l v i nt ~ t h e command
s e r v i c e module e n t l y and together,
We have L g and ~ Q ~ ~ ~t hee ob- r ~ n g
j e c t i v e s w e can acc met those t h a t w e can re-
program t o F o r t o n i t s e l f , concluded t h a t w e
w i l l n o t r e q u i r e an S m i s ~ i o n ,
I don't want to nclusion t h a t C-prime
s u b s t i t u t e s for E, ~ e c it.
a ~ ~n o t~ i n its t o t a l i t y ,
C-prime w i l l accomplish c b j e c t f v e s t h a t we
had planned for E, I t e r t a i n of t h e ob-
j e c t i v e s which w i t ave accomplished
u n t i l F,

~ d ~ up
~ a1
n g together has l e d u s
t o Pay o u t a mainline ~ i s s i o G p r i m e , D, F,
--
-11

l u n a r landing as t h e mini
So, when you ou can s a y
t h a t w e have s u b t r a c t e d one i o n from t viously
 51
planned sequence, t h e 16 mission, added a n o t h e r which is t h e
C o p r i m e , but t h e y are not d i r e c t l y a o n e - f o r o n e tradeoff.
O t h e r swaps of o b j e c t i v e s were involved i n t h e t o t a l process.

Now, if I could j u s t s a y one more word, I f e e l

w i t h the t e c h n i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l experience t h a t w e w i l l
g e t on t h e C - p r i m e l u n a r o r b i t mission t h a t w e w i l l , i n fact,
have shortened t h e t i m e t o a manned l u n a r landing by a m e a s u r
able amount, but it's very d i f f i c u l t t o demonstrate t h a t i n
temns of d a y s or weeks or months or discrete missions p l u s
or minus
QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s , presuming you g e t off
on schedule on December 21, what w i l l be t h e d i s t a n c e of t h e
moon from t h e earth a t t h e p o i n t of l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n ?
And w i l l t h e moon be going away from t h e earth or heading
toward i t ?

PHILLIPS: W e l l , t h e q u e s t i o n is how f a r w i l l t h e
moon be from t h e earth a t t h e t i m e of l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n
if we get off on t i m e ? And I ' m going t o have t o get somebody
t o look a t a chart and f i g u r e t h a t o u t .
SCHNEIDER: I ' l l g i v e you t h a t afterwards.

QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s , some Russian s c i e n t i s t s

have s a i d t h e y prefer t o see an animal go around t h e moon
before p e r m i t t i n g manned f l i g h t i n order t o check on r a d i a t i o n
l e v e l s once again. Is r a d i a t i o n , either local o r s o l a r , 8
specific r i s k i n t h i s mission?

PHILLIPS: Well, t h e q u e s t i o n bears on t h e r a d i a t i o n

l e v e l s t o be expected i n t h i s f l i g h t and t h e n e c e s s i t y for
an animal f l i g h t t o precede.

W e have a great deal of information, a l l t h a t w e

b e l i e v e we need t o understand t h e r a d i a t i o n environment of
t h e earth-hoon s y s t e m , and these r a d i a t i o n environments have
been t a k e n i n t o account i n t h e design of our equipment.
The command module, for example, provides a very
good s h i e l d a g a i n s t r a d i a t i o n , and as you p a s s through t h e
so-called Van Allen belts around t h e earth, for example, where
t h e r a d i a t i o n l e v e l 8 are f a i r l y high, t h e command module
by reason of t h e s t r u c t u r e and its heat s h i e l d i n s u r e s t h a t
 52

crew is exposed t o only v 11 ~ o u n t of

s radiation.

t h e v i c i n i t y of
h a t t h e numbers are.
There h a s been much t h e possibil-
i t y of solar f ~ a r e ~ ~ e n s e s a predictable
and i n some s e n s e s an u rce o f h i g h l e v e l s of
r a d i a t i o n energy,

een NASA a E ~ ~ Ao v,e r r e c e n t years and months,

we have developed a Live techniques t h a t w e
t h i n k are r e q u i r e d a r n i n g of r a d i a t i o n levels
from s o l a r f l a r e s t one t o do anything d i f f e r -
e n t l y f i n d i n g himse

A l l 02 t h e energy
s v e l s t h a t are concerned w i t h
s o l a r flares are of e u r s e l f o u t s i d e of
t h e spacecraft o r i n h as t h e l u n a r
module. Those t o which t h e crew would be exposed i n a command
module are not r e a l l y of concernc

So X guess t h e brie r is w e understand t h e

environment, our s y s t e m has psfovi for p r e d i c t i v e techniques
with s u f f i c i e n t arning t i m e solar f l a r e event
don't f e e l t h a t t * s ~ ~ ~ ~ nfrnaP s ~ t y pae frl
any way e v a l u a t e t h e e n v ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~

QUESTION: Bi d e r , could you te

t h e o r b i t a l speed aroun ill be and a t
t u d e above t h e m o ~ nwha ill It look l i k e t o t h e three crew
members -- t h e moon, t h a t i s 3

3. speed is a ut 5,300 feet

what it w i l l look
ending them o u t
11 look l i k e t h e Lunar
Orbiter pictures e

QUESTION: Canst you t uess, B i l l ? W i l l it

be too b r i g h t t o look a t , for i n W i l l t h e y have t o
use sunglasses?
you n o t i c e d o u r or
w e do have 8 t o look a t t
you are i n t h e sun r i g h t
 53

and also t o u n l i ~ h tmight

be a t t h e e k a t it from
t h e back as

i s h to accomplish
on t h i s m i tion

We ures, and t h a t is
t h e b e s t kno

like t o stress
which d i d n * t i ~ ~ of o ~
n to o u r navi-
ss c o n c e n t r a t i o n s
near the lunar s
- and much

The a b i l i t y L
i n a landing mi
know your posit
descent p l a y s a grs
And we are very
most concerned a ve t h e s u r f a c e
a t t h e t i m e we s
also i n t h e l a t e r jlth t h e naviga-
t i o n accuracy
vous w i t h t h e
life-critical

And i n t sned among

t h e variables also e know t h e
a l t i t u d e and the a
t navigation
t r a c k i n g accuracy
the a l t i t u d e to t h e or
want t o be

Now, by trac ce o v e r an
orbit -- in o t h e r the rates of
 54

change of t h e a n g l e can be computed such as t o determine

w e t h i n k q u i t e a c c u r a t e l y t h e a l t i t u d e of t h e o r b i t .

We also w i l l be making many measurements during

these t e n o r b i t s t o e v a l u a t e how a c c u r a t e l y w e can deter-
mine t h e local v e l o c i t y and v e l o c i t y change s i t u a t i o n s , a l l
of these being important.

Now, w e expect by t h e exercise t h a t w e w i l l be

c a r r y i n g o u t on t h i s mission t o r e f i n e s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e
techniques t h a t w i l l t h e n be a v a i l a b l e t o u s f o r l a t e r mis-
s i o n s , and w e w i l l be doing so on a mission where w e have
q u i t e a margin of p r o p u l s i v e c a p a b i l i t y , margin of t i m e i f
we need t o use i t , t o be able t o m a k e these k i n d s of measure-
ments.
On l a t e r missions, l i k e t h e F mission or t h e l u n a r
landing mission, w e ' l l need t o know these n a v i g a t i o n parameters
very a c c u r a t e l y , because t h e y w i l l be l i f e - c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s
at that t i m e . They are not l i f e - c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s on t h i s
mission,

But I t h i n k most of u s are convinced t h a t w e are

going t o be able t o r e f i n e o u r n a v i g a t i o n techniques i n very
important w a y s t h a t w i l l g i v e u s a great deal more confidence
a n d probably a great d e a l more c e r t a i n t y of c a r r y i n g o u t a
s u c c e s s f u l mission when w e go o u t there w i t h t h e f u l l space-
c r a f t and therefore have t o be able t o do these t h i n g s for
real

QUESTION: B i l l o r General P h i l l i p s , no r e f e r e n c e
was made t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a s t r o n g solar flare being
one reason for a b o r t i n g t h e mission. Is t h a t because you
have confidence i n t h e t h i c k s h e l l of t h e spacecraft being
able t o withstand even s t r o n g s o l a r event?

SCHN33IDER: W e w i l l have our solar event s y s t e m

up. I don't t h i n k t h a t w e a n t i c i p a t e anything t h a t would
be b i g enough t o abort. However, it is a l w a y s a p o s s i b i l i t y
t h a t it would be an abort cue,

QUESTION: W e l l , what l e v e l of t h r e a t e n e d r a d i a t i o n
would be involved?
SCHNFXDER: I'm a f r a i d I don't know r i g h t now. I
can g e t you t h e number. I don't t h i n k w e have a r u l e on it
 55

r i g h t now. I t h i n k t h e spacecraft is adequate, but I w i l l

have t o check t h a t for you.

QUXSTION: W i l l one of you gentlemen

l i t t l e b i t more t h e photographing of t h e easter
zone? Does t h i s i n d i c a t e , first of a l l , t h a t t h i s is t h e
most promising area f o r landing? And, number t w o , could
you c i t e any specific areas t h e y would photograph i n t h i s
zone?

PHILLIPS: W e l l , w e have selected f i v e sites across

t h e face, t h e earth s i d e , of t h e moon aa t h e Apollo landing
sites. You w i l l r e c a l l t h e Apollo landing zone is along
t h e e q u a t o r of t h e moon as you look a t i t from t h e earth
p l u s or minus 5 degrees i n l a t i t u d e , and from t h e c e n t e r

.
of t h e f r o n t of t h e face as i t s t a n d s o u t p l u s o r minus 45
degrees

These measurements were set up by t h e e a r l y require-

ments of f r e e - r e t u r n trajectories and communications and
navigation requirements.
The f i v e sites t h a t w e have picked are one t h a t is
very close t o t h e e a s t e r n edge of t h i s rectangle. It's very
near 45 degrees. And t h a t ' s t h e p o i n t o v e r which w e w i l l
fly on t h e s e v e n t h r e v o l u t i o n i n t h i s C - p r i m e mission,
There is a n o t h e r about 15 degrees toward t h e c e n t e r or t o t h e
w e s t , a n o t h e r very n e a r t h e c e n t e r of t h e moon, and then there
are t w o i n t h e west, one a l i t t l e above t h e e q u a t o r , and one
a l i t t l e below.

A s t h e year progresses, o u r v e l o c i t y s i t u a t i o n lets

u s g e t more r e a d i l y t o a l i t t l e n o r t h of t h e l u n a r e q u a t o r
on t h e w e s t q i d e t h a n t h e other h a l f of t h e y e a r when w e can
get more e a s i l y t o t h e s o u t h e r n s i t e on t h e w e s t s i d e .

Now, t h e photography t h a t w e w i l l be c a r r y i n g o u t
on t h i s mission i n c l u d e s photography on t h e back s i d e ,
i n c l u d i n g landmark tracking. One of t h e purposes of t h i s
is t o provide geodetic -- selenographic t h e r i g h t word --
t i e - i n of t h e geographic p o i n t s on t h e

O r b i t e r got a great deal of photography

and mapped t scales t h e e n t i r e ba
we don't h h e data w i t h which t o
v a r i o u s p o i n t s t o a map.
 56

Now, t h i s photogrRphy w i l l l e t u s do a great deal

more of t h a t . The photography i n c l u d e s stereo pairs and
a close-time c o r e l a t i o n as w e track v a r i o u s sites, We will
be t a k i n g a number of oblique photographs as w e l l .

As you know, i n o u r experience o r i n t h e operations

from O r b i t e r , w e got a s m a l l number of o b l i q u e s h o t s , but
on t h i s mission, w i t h t h e judgment and s e l e c t i v i t y of t h e
crew, w e ' l l be t a k i n g q u i t e a number of shots t h a t amount
t o t h e approach paeh or t h e o b l i q u e shots as you look forward
or s i d e w a y s or a f t , and t h i s w i l l be I t h i n k a n i n v a l u a b l e
a i d f o r t r a i n i n g f u t u r e crews i n what t o look f o r and what
t o expect,

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t , w e w i l l be g e t t i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e
photography o f t h e approach p a t h t o t h e moon. I have a l w a y s
thought t h a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r maneuver would be a f a i r l y e x c i t i n g
one i f you v i s u a l i z e t h a t t h e moon is moving around t h e earth
i n t h i s f a s h i o n ( i n d i c a t i n g ) , and you are coming a t it i n
t h i s f a s h i o n ( i n d i c a t i n g ) , and you are going to approach it
w i t h s e v e r a l thousand m i l e s per hour of v e l o c i t y d i f f e r e n c e ,
and you are aiming f o r a p e r i l u n e of 60 n a u t i c a l m i l e s which
you reach on t h e back s i d e of t h e moon. I t h i n k t h a t ' s going
t o be q u i t e an e x c i t i n g period i n t h i s mission,

And t h e crew on t h i s S l i g h t w i l l be t a k i n g photo-

graphy of how t h e moon looks as you come on down t h i s trajectory.
I t h i n k t h a t it's p r e t t y hard t o put a price on t h e
v a l u e of each of these elements of o p e r a t i o n a l experience and
on t h e r e t u r n t h a t w e w i l l be able t o b r i n g back i n t h e way
of photography t o make t h e way easier f o r eubsequent crews
who are going to be concerned w i t h doing a l o t more t h i n g s
l i k e g e t t i n g a LM checked o u t and s e p a r a t i n g and going down
with i t , a n d so on,

ALIBRANDO: Okay. We are going t o go t o Houston

now and come back here,

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: General P h i l l i p s , you covered

in some d e t a i l t h e SPS s y s t e m and t h e AC bus s y s t e m , A t t h e
end of Apollo 7 you mentioned t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e AC bus
f a i l u r e there w a s one other anomaly t h a t gave you some concern,
and t h a t was t h e b a t t e r y charger. Can you go over t h a t a b i t ?
 57

PHILLIPS: The q u e s t i o n is t h e battery charger

experience, Apollo 7 , I emphasized t h a t t h a t w a s one of
t h e many t h i n g s t h a t w a s covered i n great d e t a i l i n o u r
reviews of t h e l a s t weeks and d a y s , The a b i l i t y t o p u t
energy i n t o t h e batteries on t h e Apollo 7 mission w a s less
t h a n p r e d i c t e d , The charge r a t e i n amperes w a s lower t h a n
t h e planned charge rates.

I t was determined r e a l l y before Apollo 7 landed,

but then v e r i f i e d by t h e spacecraft itself, t h a t t h e imped-
ance of t h e t o t a l c i r c u i t involving t h e b a t t e r y and charger
i n t h e spacecraft, was a f r a c t i o n of an ohm h i g h e r
--
f o r g o t t e n t h e e x a c t number than expected, This hadn't
--
I have

been properly taken account of, and it was a p l a i n o l d Ohm's

l a w matter i n t h e end t h a t detemnined what t h e charge rate w a s ,

We subsequently have made t h e necessary adjustment

t o t h e charge rate such t h a t w e w i l l have no d i f f i c u l t y i n
maintaining t h e batteries a t a h i g h charge l e v e l on t h e
Apollo 8 mission,

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: General, what is t h e approxi-

mate t r a i n i n g time f o r a f l i g h t of t h i s n a t u r e , crew t r a i n i n g
t i m e , and approximately how does t h a t compare t o o p e r a t i o n
w i t h t h e l u n a r module?

PHILLIPS: The q u e s t i o n is what is t h e approximate

crew t r a i n i n g t i m e for t h i s mission as compared t o t h e mission
involving t h e l u n a r module, I t h i n k for t h e record I ' l l get
an a b s o l u t e number f o r you from Deke Slayton. As I recall,
f o r t h i s mission we set up approximately 200 haurs of command
s e r v i c e module s i m u l a t o r t i m e as t h e t r a i n i n g p l a n , and w e are
very close t o having accomplished a l l of t h a t planned t r a i n i n g ,

As I remember it, t h e increment t o provide f o r l u n a r

module is somewhere between 50 and 100 hours a d d i t i o n a l .

But let u s g e t i t from Deke and g i v e it t o you SO

you w i l l have i t a c c u r a t e l y .

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: How does t h a t break down

i n t o work-week t i m e ?
PHILLIPS: I d i d n ' t understand t h e q u e s t i o n .

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: How does t h a t 200 hours

work o u t i n terms of a work week?
 58

PHILLIPS: W e l l , t h e Apollo c has been working

six dags a week, and I t h i n k t h e i r number o f duty hours
per week has been running 65 or 70 hours. mat ' 8 not un-
usual. I t h i n k It i s t o be expected, I t is about t h e kind
of t r a i n i n g s c h e d u l e t h a t t h e crews through Gemini and OUT
crews i n t h e Apollo now have always followed,

I t h i n k t h a t t h e nwnber of- You me, t h e command

s e r v i c e module s i m u l a t o r t i m e per week runs about 20 hours
per week f o r t h e prime crew and about 20 hours per week for
t h e backup crew, if I remember* Wa are running to f i v e -
hour s c h e d u l e s a t t h e Cape i n t h e last weekrss, The crew
t r a i n e d from s i g h t i n t h e murning u n t i l one i n t h e a f t e r n o o n ,
t h e prime crew or t h e backup crew u s e s t h e s i m u l a t o r s , and
t h e n from one u n t i l six i n t h e a f t e r n o o n t h e other crew usee
t h e s i m u l a t o r s . And t h e y are on a sfxl-day schedule.

QUESTION FROM HOUS!ZDNt I would gather i n part from

t h a t you are g e t t i n g vary cloe3s t o t h e p i n t where you are
going to have to s t a r t t r a i n l n g crews for miemions p a s t
Apollo 10, Can you t e l l w what those crave w f l l be?

PHILLIPS! W e l l , w e have s e v e r a l crws who are

i n g e n e r a l t r a i n i n g beyond Apallo 10. You know w e have
three CSM s i m u l a t o r s , one a t Houston and t w o a t t h e Cape.
He? have two LM s i m u l a t o r s , one at Houstonand one a t t h e
Cape, And then there are a v a r i e t y of other t r a i n i n g d e v i c e s
-- t h e crew procedures s i m u l a t o r and several (Park) task
trainers on which o u r cram t r a i n ,
The crslrfs beyond ApoZlo 9 and there are s e v e r a l
I-

a- are t r a i n i n g for a l l of t h e elements t h a t c o n s l t i t u t e a

full l u n a r landing missfon,

We are, 88 you sayt very close t o t h e time when

specifgc mission t r a i n i n g beyond Apollo 9 i e going t o have
t o be undertaken aa a specific mission #et o f t r a i n i n g ,

w e a i 2 1 in t h e f a i r l y n e a r future be announcAng
So
t h e specific crew s e l e c t i o n for A p o l l o 101

TION FROM HllUElTQPit During Apollo 7 there

was some problem wfth t h e biomedical h a r n e s s t h a t caused
loss of data, and w e were told at t h a t t i m e i f a similar
 59

t h i n g happened during t h e mission t o t h e l u n a r v i c i n i t y

t h a t t h e mission would be aborted and t h e y ' d be called
back, And y e t today you t e l l u s t h a t i f you lose t h e high-
g a i n antenna, i n which case you could lose biomedical data,
t h i s would n o t be t h e basis for ending t h e mission.

And, number t w o , what f i x have you g o t t e n on t h e

biomedical harness?

PHILLIPS: L e t m e s a y first of a l l t h a t t h e d i f f i -
c u l t i e s w i t h t h e biomedical harness were mainly involving
w i r e breakage, The small leads from t h e s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n e r s
t h a t t h e crew wear around t h e i r b e l t up t o t h e t r a n s d u c e r s
t h a t are taped t o v a r i o u s parts of t h e i r upper anatomy were
I t h i n k o v e r d e s i g n e d i n terms of f i r e p r o t e c t i o n ,

W e redesigned t h e biomedical harness, among t h e many

t h i n g s t h a t w e redesigned, t o reduce any possible f l a m m a b i l i t y .
And t h e i n s u l a t i o n on t h e w i r e t h a t w e p u t i n t o t h a t r e d e s i g n
and t h e n e t by which t h e connections were made I t h i n k turned
o u t t o be an over-design i n reducing f l a m m a b i l i t y and i n t r o -
duced wire s t i f f n e s s t y p e s of problem. So t h a t w e had a
couple of i n s t a n c e s i n Apollo 7 where these wires broke.

Now, t h e d e s i g n of t h i s s y s t e m w a s e s t a b l i s h e d
such t h a t you c a n ' t get s u f f i c i e n t electrical energy i n t o
t h a t biomedical harness t o cause a f i r e problem. T h a t ' s been
v e r i f i e d and r e v e r i f i e d many t i m e s . So there is no real d i f -
f i c u l t y i n going back t o r e a l l y t h e Gemini t y p e harness which
is much more flexible. There is n o t a f i r e problem w i t h it.
And I t h i n k t h i s r e d e s i g n w e went through was r e a l l y much
more over-cautious t h a n w e needed t o be.

So w e have fixed t h a t w i r e breakage problem i n t h a t

way ,

The other t h i n g was Don E i s e l e r e p o r t i n g one of t h e

s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n e r s t h a t he had a t t h e b e l t w a s w a r m o r w a s
hot t o h i s touch. S i n c e t h a t t i m e w e have done a number of
t e s t s , h a v e concluded t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of moisture on a
resistor as one possible example could c a u s e a l i t t l e h i g h e r
amount of energy t o go i n t o t h a t s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n e r but
only t o raise its temperature by 10 degrees, and t h a t would
r a i s e it up t o something l i k e l l b o r s o degrees, which would
feel hot o r w a r m to your touch,

W e have r e v e r i f i e d t h a t you c a n ' t g e t enough energy

i n t o t h a t s y s t e m to cause a f i r e problem.
 60

So w e have changed t h e leads, W e have rev

t h e basic safety of t h e design features i n t h e harness and
i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t s y s t e m t h a t s u p p l i e s it.

Now, t h e biomedical data does come down on t h e FM

p o r t i o n of t h e u n i f i e d S-band s i g n a l , and i f t h e high-gain
antenna is not working w e would not expect t o be a b l e t o
r e c e i v e and adequately decode t h a t data,

I don't recall s a y i n g nor do I remember it being

s a i d t h a t w e would abort a mission i f w e d i d n ' t have bio-
medical data. W e have given t h i s very careful considera-
t i o n i n t h e previous d a y s and are c o m p l e t e l y s a t i s f i e d to
conduct t h i s mission w i t h v e r b a l communication w i t h t h e
crew t o determine t h e i r s t a t e of being, i f w e have t o f a l l
back on t h a t mode because w e don't have biomedical data,

And, accordingly, w e made t h e d e c i s i o n t o c a r r y it

o u t t h a t way i n case w e have d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e high-gain
antenna and therefore r e c e p t i o n and recovery of t h e bio-
medical data,

With t h a t summary, I guess B i l l wants to s a y some-

thing,

SCHNEIDER: Yes, 1 recall what you are t a l k i n g

about, and t h a t w a s a f l i g h t surgeon's recommended f l i g h t
r u l e on a l u n a r landing mission. And I h a s t e n t o add w e
haven't w r i t t e n those r u l e s y e t ,

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: Earlier, General P h i l l i p s ,

I b e l i e v e you s a i d t h a t t h i s mission i n t o t h e l u n a r v i c i n i t y
would s h o r t e n t h e t i m e f o r l u n a r landing by a measurable
amount. Could you t e l l u s what t h a t measurable amount would
be?

PHILLIPS: I t h i n k I have a l r e a d y t o l d you I don't

know how t o d e f i n e it i n dollars, c e n t s , d a y s , weeks, or
months ,
J u s t t o s a y a g a i n b r i e f l y , w i t h t h e t e c h n i c a l data
w e w i l l ob n on t h i s mission t h a t h a s t o do w i t h t h e per-
any of o u r s y s t e m s and maneuvers, w i t h t h e
n a v i g a t i o n information w e w i l l get, w e w i l l be able t o proceed
 61

w i t h much greater confidence and assurance w i t h each of t h e

missions ahead, where i n an F or G mission, for example, w e
don't expect t o have t h e margins of t i m e and p r o p e l l a n t s t o
be able t o do some of t h e e v a l u a t i o n s and o b t a i n some of
t h e data t h a t w e can o b t a i n here.

I t may be p a r t l y i n t u i t i v e or judgmental, but I am

convinced t h a t t h i s mission w i l l s h o r t e n up o u r series, and
I suppose i f I had t o p u t a t i m e on i t I ' d s a y by t h e order
of three months.

QUESTION FROM CAPE XENNEDY: This is t h e Cape. W e

have some q u e s t i o n s here. General P h i l l i p s , t h i s is Sue Butler.
Could you t e l l u s , please, whether o r n o t t h e a s t r o n a u t s i n
Apollo 7 monitored t h e e n t r y monitoring s y s t e m where t h e
range c a l c u l a t i o n w a s n o t working? D i d t h e y monitor? And
t h e n when you got it back and examined i t , j u s t what w a s
wrong w i t h i t and how d i d you f i x it?

PHILLIPS: The e n t r y monitor s y s t e m on Apallo 7 ,

t h e range-measuring f e a t u r e of i t , w a s n o t o p e r a t i n g p r o p e r l y
on t h e r e e n t r y on Apollo 7 0 I t turned o u t i n post-mission
e v a l u a t i o n t h a t t h e s c r o l l p o r t i o n of t h e e n t r y monitoring
s y s t e m w a s working properly. W e have had t h e 101 spacecraft
a t Downey under v a r i o u s s y s t e m tests involving being i n a
power d e p t h mode s i n c e w e got it back, and a t least as of
y e s t e r d a y w e had not y e t removed t h e e n t r y monitor s y s t e m
box from t h e spacecraft t o d i g i n t o i t and f i n d o u t i n
d e t a i l what t h a t malfunction t h a t w e reported before w e took
off r e a l l y w a s .

I expect w e w i l l f i n d t h a t it is an open of t h e
t y p e w e theorized before w e f l e w .

The s c r o l l can be t a k e n o u t of t h e EMS separately.

I t does look l i k e a t t h i s t i m e t h e scroll p o r t i o n was
working properly.

We have an e n t r y monitor s y s t e m i n t h e 103 space-

craft which is i n good condition. W e t h i n k one of t h e
reasons w e had t h e t r o u b l e w e d i d w i t h t h e 101 Elbps is be-
c a u s e i n t h e months preceding t h e f l i g h t there were q u i t e
a few m o d i f i c a t i o n s p u t i n t o i t , reworks, and w i t h complex
e l e c t r o n i c equipment one can m a k e problems w i t h m u l t i p l e
' reworks, and t h a t is one of t h e reasons w e t r y t o avoid i t .
 62

The one i n t h e 103 h a s n o t been reworked i n t h i s way. And,

b e s i d e t h a t , it h a s been checked o u t properly i n a l l t h e
checkouts, 60 w e t h i n k w e have got a good one.

But w e are s a y i n g now for some t i m e t h a t w e do n o t

require mandatorily t h e e n t r y monitor s y s t e m f o r 103 mission,
The p r i m a r y mode of r e e n t e r i n g is w i t h t h e spacecraft guid-
ance and n a v i g a t i o n s y s t e m , The f i r s t backup mode is w i t h
t h e e n t r y monitor s y s t e m , The t h i r d backup mode is optical
s i g h t i n g s and the c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y t h a t B i l l described.
With these series of backup modes w e are r e a l l y not concerned
on t h i s +prime mission whether t h e EMS works or not.

I don't want t o s a y t h a t too negatively. W e expect

i t to work. W e t h i n k t h a t t h i s one w i l l , W e are protected
a g a i n s t a f a i l u r e , however, i n case such a f a i l u r e occurs,

QUESTION FROM CAPE KENNEDY: Question for General

P h i l l i p s or B i l l Schneider. Two q u e s t i o n s a c t u a l l y , One,
I understand there is no s k i p r e e n t r y as you describe i t , but
the q u e s t i o n is why are you choosing t h i s r o u t e i n s t e a d of
what w e understood t o be a direct s k i p r e e n t r y ?

The other q u e s t i o n , you have mentioned s e v e r a l t i m e s

t h e high-gain antenna, t h i s being t h e f i r s t t i m e . Do you
t h i n k i t w i l l work o r h a s t e s t i n g shown you may have t r o u b l e
w i t h it?

PHILLIPS: Let m e answer t h e second q u e s t i o n first,

We have had some d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e electromechanical c o n t r o l
p o r t i o n s of t h e high-gain antenna i n our q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t -
ing a t t h e vendor's f a c i l i t y , These d i f f i c u l t i e s d i d lead
u s a 9ew months ago t o i n t r o d u c e some design changes t o over-
come those q u a l f a i l u r e s .

Those design changes were n o t a v a i l a b l e t o be p u t

i n t o the equipment t h a t is now aboard t h e 103 spacecraft for
t h i s mission,

The high-gain antenna and a l l of its c o n t r o l equip-

ment were i n s t a l l e d a t t h e Cape back i n September as I recall,
I t was checked o u t f u l l y i n a l l of its c o n t r o l modes as w e l l
as its RF modes. It worked properly. And a t t h a t p o i n t
t h e equipment w a s stowed, because, as you know, it takes
o f f i n s i d e t h e s k i r t of t h e s e r v i c e module. So i t w a s stowed.
The next t i m e we w i l l see t h a t equipment is a f t e r t r a n s l u n a r
 63

i n j e c t i o n when t h e spacecraft separates, and t h i s antenna

can be checked out.

We expect t h i s equipment t o work because it h a s

passed its checkout and w a s working properly a t t h e t i m e
w e stowed i t after checkout.

Now, w e are mindful of t h e p o a s i b i l i t y of f a i l u r e s ,

because w e d i d f i n d c e r t a i n small but important design de=
f i c i e n c i e s during t h e l a t t e r part of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n test-
i n g which are being f i x e d i n l a t e r models.

And a l l of t h i s is one of t h e reason63 why w e have

given c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t r a a t t e n t i o n t o t h e high-gain antenna
and have been able t o provide for an adequate and s a f e mission
all t h e way through t h e mission even i f i t doesn't work.

The o t h e r q u e s t i o n is why are w e f l y i n g a c o n s t a n t g

r e e n t r y ? I answered it i n part before --
namely, t h a t t h a t
provides us a simple, e f f e c t i v e , reliable t h i r d backup f o r
t h e guidance and c o n t r o l r e e n t r y mode or t h e e n t r y monitor
system r e e n t r y mode.

You know, i t is obvious as you proceed through

a major development program which is developing equipment
and o p e r a t i o n a l techniques t h a t you l e a r n a l o t . That is
one of t h e reasons you do i t , one of t h e reasons why w e go
through a l l of these p r o g r e s s i v e steps. I t h i n k one of t h e
t h i n g s t h a t w e have i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e reasonably r e c e n t p a s t
is t h a t w e have got a c o n s i d e r a b l e margin i n o u r r e e n t r y
system.

I won't g i v e you a n exact figure, but I t h i n k o u r

heat s h i e l d is capable of r e e n t e r i n g a t probably up t o o r
maybe even greater t h a n 40,000 feet a second. T h i s mission
is programmed a t 36,300 roughly. So there is a great deal
of margin there.

The r e e n t r y g's can go w e l l above 4 without r a i s i n g

.
any reason f o r concern. The design l i m i t as you know is
20

I t h i n k i n s t u d y i n g t h e e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n and t h e
r e e n t r y regime i n p a r t i c u l a r o v e r t h e last s e v e r a l months,
our people have come t o t h e conclusion t h a t t h i s c o n s t a n t
g r e e n t r y which gets you down t o s u b - c i r c u l a r speeds f a i r l y
 64

r a p i d l y so t h a t you c a n ' t s k i p o u t is maybe t h e way w e

w i l l go on a l l o u r missions.
The previous technique of s k i p p i n g -- w e l l , not
s k i p p i n g o u t but coming i n t o atmosphere t h e n going back
o u t for a period of c o o l i n g -9 r e a l l y i s n ' t required. So
w e are able i n t h i s mission t o i n t r o d u c e what w e on balance
feel is a t h i r d backup mode t o o u r t o t a l r e e n t r y s y s t e m
which doesn't b r i n g w i t h i t any other problems o r concerns,
and i n t h e whole p i c t u r e it's probably a safer r e e n t r y s y s t e m .

And it may w e l l be t h a t t h a t w i l l be what w e w i l l

u s e on a l l of o u r deep space r e e n t r i e s ,
QUESTION FROM CAPE KENNEDY: Question f o r General
Phillips. How long is t h e crew s u b j e c t e d t o t h a t 4-g environ-
ment, and are t h e y capable during t h i s t i m e period to manually
c o n t r o l t h e r e e n t r y i f necessary?

PHILLIPS: They are capable of manually c o n t r o l l i n g

the r e e n t r y a t any p o i n t d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e r e e n t r y . The
period a t which t h e y w i l l be a t 4 g's is of t h e order of one-
and-a-ha.lf minutes.
QUESTION*FROM CAPE KGNNEDY: If you for some reason
d e c i d e n o t t o go i n l u n a r o r b i t and you c o n t i n u e i n t o free-
r e t u r n circumlunar f l i g h t , how close w i l l you come t o t h e
moon? And a n o t h e r t h i n g I wasn't q u i t e clear on is how many
of t h e f i v e sites do you p l a n t o photograph?

PHXLLIPS: We p l a n t o photograph one of t h e f i v e

Apollo landing eites. You remember t h e l i g h t i n g f o r t h i s
mission w i l l be correct f o r t h e easternmost of these sites,
so w e w i l l photograph one.

I'm s o r r y I f o r g o t t h e first h a l f of your q u e s t i o n .

Would you repeat it?
QUESTION FFtOM CAPE KENNEDY: Y e s , If you c o n t i n u e
j u s t on f r e e - r e t u r n circumlunar f l i g h t , how close can you
come t o t h e moon?

PHILLIPS: S i x t y n a u t i c a l m i l e s is t h e p l a n f o r t h e
nominal approach d i s t a n c e on a circumlunar t y p e mission.
 65

I p o i n t o u t that- Well, t h a t would be t h e approach

d i s t a n c e or t h e closest w e would come i f , for example, t h e
d e c i s i o n were made t o n o t m a k e t h e l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n
burn as a last-minute d e c i s i o n , because t h a t would be t h e
p o i n t a t which you would approach,

But 1 would p o i n t o u t t h a t i f w e made t h e d e c i s i o n

some hours or many hours earlier, t h e t o t a l set of circum-
s t a n c e s might cause us t o raise t h a t p e r i l u n e t o some greater
h e i g h t which would be f a i r l y e a s y for u s t o do, So t h a t
f l e x i b i l i t y is one t h a t might be e x e r c i s e d i n real-time
depending on t o t a l circumstances,
ALIBRANDO: Okay. W e have been going f o r three
hours. Does anybody here have a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n ?

QUESTXQN: One quick one, What is t h e i n c l i n a t i o n

of t h e i r o r b i t around t h e moon?

SCHNEIDBR: Twelve degrees.

ALIBRANW: Okay. W e have a q u o t e from Frank Bornan
i n t r a i n i n g a t t h e Cape, If you w i l l bear w i t h us, w e w i l l
read t h a t . H e s a y s :

' W e have been t r a i n i n g very hard for t h i s f l i g h t ,

and wetre happy t h a t t h e performance of Apollo 7 and other
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t l e d t o t h i s d e c i s i o n permit u s t o go."
Okay, So much f o r t h e press conference. The
t r a n s c r i p t w i l l be a v a i l a b l e tomorrow morning i n t h e newsroom.
If you want i t mailed t o you, f i l l o u t an envelope, The
photographs showing t h e Apollo 8 o r b i t a l plannfng are a v a i l -
a b l e i n L e s Gaverts office,

(Whereupon, a t 1:10 p.m,, t h e press conference

was concluded.
***