‘The ‘Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science William H. Riker The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), 753-766. Stable URL: bhtp:flinks,jstor-org/sici?sici~0003-0554%28198212%2976%3A4%IC15 SBS ATTSADL3E2.0,COWSB2-B ‘Tae American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association, ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at htp:sseww jstor org/aboutiterms.html. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you hhave obtained prior permission, you may aot download an entie issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and ‘you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Please contact the publisher eegarding aay futher use ofthis work, Publisher contact information ray he abained at fpr jstoronpournal-apsa tt. 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Although this ase luon is perhaps mouvated by a desire co identify pottes with belles lures, may also have o vressonable foundation, in chat political insittions may change faster than Rrnawledge can be Cunmulcted. To investigate whether propositions about evanescent institutions Con be “clentifcaly Jalsfed and reformuleted, examine in ths essay the Rstry ofthe recent and nat wholly accepted ‘esbions ofthe propastionscaleetively called Duverger's aw: (hat the plualicy rule for sbiting the timer of elections favors the ewaparty sistem. The bady of the exp presents the scovery, reve ston, testing, and reformulation of sentences this eres ts order to demonstrate that Ma eat one Instance in poluical scence, Knowledge has been accuniulted amd o history ex, ‘One defining characteristic of science as distinct from belles Jeitres, criticism, and philosophic speculation is the accumulation of knowledge in the form of more or less verifiable propositions ‘about the natural world. fn the conventional view of science, propositions are verified deductively when they are inferred indisputably from an axiom system and verified empirically when they hhave survived repeated attempts at falsification (Popper 1963). In practice, however, scientific propositions are typically neither so theoretically indisputable nor 30 empirically unfalsfiable as the conventional view suggests. Rather, most ce ported tests of propasitions involve’ either dis- Crediting a theory o successful falsification, The triumphant scientist then replaces the prapasition he or she has falsified with a revised one, which ‘passes ce test thar the inical proposition failed, When I speak of a more or less verified propo tdon, therefore, { mean the one that isthe current end point of a seties of revisions and that is, at least provisionally, accepted by the relevant por tion of the scientific community (Riker 1977). By ‘This history was writen largely atthe instigation of students in my course on the scope of political science, where Ihave used cis Risky co lustre what U believe ‘Thomas Kuhn (1970) meant by “normal sience.” T have, of couse, benefitted geally fom thie comments 2 well as fram the coriments of my ealleague, Harold ‘Stanley, This paper was presented in an ear Form to the American Association for the Advancement of Se lene, Washington, D.C., 1982, an a panel ase bled bY ‘Steven Beams ard tothe International Politicl Seience ‘Association, Rode Janeiro, 1982, ona panel assembled ‘by David Apter, the phrase “accumulation of knowledge" we ‘mean not only that che corpus of propasitions is ‘growing, but also that each one of the series of revisions is more general or more precise than its predecessor, 4 this view, every branch of science has a his- tory which is a chronicle of the marginal revisions (oF propositions leading up co the currently ace ‘cepted ones, This is what Thomas Kuh (1970) ‘alls “normal science." Political science, which is ‘my concern in this essay, has, however, often been said to have no history, which is of course ‘merely a way of saying that it contains no ac- ‘cumulation of knowledge and that itis therefore not a branch of science. Many political scientists hhave been persuaded to believe this assertion, $0 ‘hat in despair they are inclined to abandan ‘the search for scientific generalizations. (This despair is, T believe, the root of the movement toward Phenomenology and hermeneutics and other ef- forts to tuen political science inca a belles-lettistie study.) ‘The rationale for the assertion that political science lacks a history is that political institutions, the main topic of generalizations in the field, are themselves so evanescent that the subject ‘and predicate classes of scientific propositions change more swiftly than the propositions can be per~ fected. It is indeed true that in comparison with the physical and biological sciences, which deal with the unchanging properties of matter, and even in comparison with psychological sciences, ‘which deal with the celatively more plastic proper” ties of the buman psyche, che habits and inst ons studied in the social sciences are swiftly changing. But generalizations are neither so hard (0 come by nor $0 hard to perfect as this erticiem 753754 implies. Many of the propositions of social set- ence involve an interplay between permanent psychological characteristics of humans aud ine stitutional structures, This feature implies some degree of permanence for the subject and pred cate classes of generalizations in social scien For example, the law of demand in economics— ‘hat, with appropriate qualifications, demand curves do not slope upward—is mainly psycho- logical in character and is indeed a better formu- lated and more thoroughly verified law of ‘behavior than any to be found in the science of pavchology itself, Even when the psychological ‘component is smaller and the institutional campo- nent is larger than in the law of demand, 25 is typical in political science, lasting generalization is still possible because many institutions (e8., Voting and decisions by forming coalitions) are, ‘when abstractly described, atleast as old as writs ten history. It should be the esse, therefore, that politcal science, ike any other science, has 2 history, even. i ic has not heretofore been chronicled. My inten- tion in this essay iso demonstrate dat a history. does exist, and my vehicle is a particular series of reformulations called Duverger’s law. T am not undertaking this demonstration out of chauvin- ism, merely to claim for students of politics the name and privilege of scientists, but rather to show that the accumulation of knowledge is pos sible even when dealing with such fragile and tran- sitory phenomena as political institutions (Riker 1979). This is also why I deal with Duverger's law, a not very well accepted proposition dealing with, institutions of only the last ewo hundred years. If it is demonstrated that knowledge has accumu lated, even in this not yet satisfactorily formulated law" about an ephemeral institution, theo will have demonstrated at least the possi accumulation of knowledge about polities. I Duverger’s law proposes that “the simple ‘majority single-ballot system favors the (wo-party system,” Duverget described this sentence by say~ ing: “OF all the hypacheses ip this book, this approacites most nearly pethaps to a true socio logieal law" (Duverger 196, p. 217), Related to this sentence is another, which Duverger did not elevate to the status of law: “the simple-majority ‘system with second ballot and proportional repre sentation favors multi-partyism”” (Duverger 1963, p. 239), [ will refer to the first proposition as the law and co the second proposition as the hypothe- sis, These propositions distinguish among three kinds of electoral systems, which, although fat From a complete lst of the systems in current use, are the only ones used widely enough to admit the ‘The American Political Science Review Vol. 76 cebservation of ther relationship with the number (of political parties: (1) Plurality voting —rather misleadingly called the simplesmajority, single-ballot system by Duverger—in which the unique winner isthe caa~ didate with dhe mast votes. With two or fewer candidates, the winner has a simple majority of the vores east; with three or more candidates, the Winner may have only a plurality. (2) Rux-off majority voting among three oF more candidates with two ballots, in witch atthe first balloc the winners are the (wo candidates with the largest and second largest number of votes, fand, at the second ballot hetween exactly these twa, the winner is the candidate with a simple majority. Coupled with the two-ballot system are various alternative vote methods in which eount- ing, rather than voting, occurs twice, using the same definition of winning as in the two-ballot system, (@) Proportional represenaation, in which the winners are those candidates who obtain some quota of vates, usually »/(s+ 1) oF (vAs+1))+ 1, ‘where v is the aumber of votes cast and s is the umber of winners 10 be selected. Since s>1, somie winners must have less tham a plurality. Although it is easy to clarify Duverger's tec~ rminology, its not at all easy to straighten out the ambiguity in his statement of the relationship be- tween dectoral ystenis and the number of parties. fs plurality voting a necessary condition of the two-party system? or a sufficient condition? or both? or neither? The claim that the relation is “2 sociological law" suggests causality or a necessary and sufficient condition, whereas the use of “tavors" suggests the relationship is at best prob» abilistic, not deterministic. I suspect the formula tion was deliberately ambiguous because the author was not himself entirely certain of what he ‘wanted to claim. Just what the claim ought to be is not immediately obvious, so I will settle the question as f survey che present stare of know!- edge about Duverger’s law. Duverger's sentences appeared in print in 1951, but a6 if usually the case with scientific laws, similar propositions had already been widely dis cussed and reformulated with some increasing degree of sophistication.’ Indeed, related propo~ siions appeared in popular diseussion almost as soon as methods other than plurality voring were "its customary to eal the lw by Duverger’s name, not because he Rad much 10 d0 with developing i but Father because he was the fits to dare to claim i was a law. The merianal honors, therefore, a tait of charac ter as much a4 scientific breakahrough.1982 proposed or adopted for legislative elections in Which large numbers of people were expected to vote. By “large numbers! I mean an electorate of approximately $ percent of the population, which {man era of primitive medicine and poor diet was perhaps 25 to 33 percent of the adult males, Such electorates were constituted in America in the eighteenth century and ia Western Eurape in the late nineteenth century. Once these large elec- (orates existed, there also existed a mative for politicians to attempt to devise appropriate methods 10 manipulate outcomes in elections, and hence niethods ocher than plurality voting were discussed and adopted. Natueally proponents and ‘opponents of alternative methods also thought deeply about the consequences of alternative ‘methods and thus began to discuss propesitions related to Duvergee’s law. ‘These propositions were to be expected, and it is quite likely that there is indeed some demen- strable relation between electoral forms and the structure of the party system. Whatever their ‘other ideological ot programmatic functions, political parties serve to organize elections. (For & Fecent elaboration, see Katz 1980:) Politicians and ‘candidates with some common interests—perhaps ‘only @ common desire to win or perhaps also a common ideology or a common identification with a group—appeal to voters under a common foanner, and thereby generate political partes. Since one motive for the common appeal is the desire co win, itis not surprising that the constitu tional definitions of winning have an effect an the patties thereby generated. If winning is defined as the most votes, that is, a5 a plurality, chen one ‘might reasonably expecta two-party system owing to the necessity under this definition of maximi2- ing votes. Since the best way, in the long rua, t© et the most votes is to get more than hall, each of ‘wo partes might be expected Co sicucture a coali tion in the hope, before the election, of getting a majority. Alternatively, if winning is defined as ‘more than half the votes ata runoff election, cane ‘idates do not necessarily have to maximize votes at the initial election—the second most votes ine itially may be enough to win in the end. And if winning is defined as the achievement of some number of votes less than Ralf (as is necessarily the case under proportional representation), then the necessity of maximizing disappears entirely. short, when the definition of winning forces can- didates to maximize votes in order to win (as in Plurality systems), they have strang motives to ‘reate a two-party system; but when the definition, of winning does not require them to maximize votes (as in runoff and proportional systems), then this motive for two partes is absent. ‘The twin conditions of a large electorate and Proposals for methods other chan plurality voting ‘The Two-party System and Duverger’s Law 758 Were met in Europe in the latter half of the nine- teenth century, but general public discussion on the subject did not appear until the 1850s. In 1886 Denmark, which then had a small electorate, adopted a form af proportional representation far over half the members of its unicameral leisla- lure, and at about the same time, Lord Jobn Russel’s unsuccessful refarm bills provided for what the British called “three-cornered" consti twencies, a rudimentary form of representation of ‘minorities in which each voter has two votes itt a (hree-memiber constituency. In 1859 Thomas Hare in The Election of Representatives set forth af elaborate method of proportional representation, the single transferable vote, and in (861 Jona ‘Stuart Mill popularized it in Considerations on Representative Government, which contained a philosophical justification of Hare's method. Mill believed Parliament should contain ‘not just the ‘wo great parties alone,” but representatives of “every minority . . . consisting of a sufficiently large umber,” which number he defined pre- cisely as the number of voters divided by the number of seats (Mill 1910, p. 263). Mill argued that the Hare method would bring about this result, so from the very beginaing of the discus- sion, "there was some dim appreciation of Duverger's hypothesis, although not necessarily of Duverger’s law, The appreciation was quite im, however, because in the parliamentary debate on cusulative voting in 1867, Mill ex- pressed himself ina way that clearly indicated that he thought proportional representation would not ‘upset the two great partes: ‘The right honorable gentleran sa one thing hat perfectly amazed me. He sai hat. itwas ‘wrong that che representation of any commonity should repesent con ina nae aspect, should Fepresent only one iacerst—only i Tory oF Liberal opinion; and he added that, at present, thls was not the case, but chat such 3 State of ‘tings would be produced by the adoption of| proposal. I apprehend that then, even more than Mow, each party would desire co be represented oy hase men wha would te most scceptabe {o the general body of the ennsttuences fully as ‘uch, f not more, than they do now (Hansard 1867, 3ed sees, vo. 188, pp. 1103-4). Clearly Mill expected the proposed system would produce Tory free traders and Tory carn faw sup~ Porters without upsetting the two-party system.” ‘About the same degree of appreciation was Leys (1989) has sai chat Mill understood Duverser's lay, altough what Leys and Ihave eiscused relates co the effec of proportional representation (Duverzer's hhypothess), not to. the effent of plualiy. voting (Duvergets law), In any event Leps's remark is bighly anachronistic. To say that Mill understood Duvergers156 shared by the opponents of change. Disraeli, for example, when speaking in the same debate against cumulative voting (which was, however, adopted in the form of the ‘limited vate” or two votes per voter in three-member constituencies) said: 1 have always been ofthe opinion with respect to this cumulative voting and other schemes having for their objec 10 epresent minorities, that they are admirable schemes for bringing erochetty men into this House—an inconvenience which We bave hitherto avoided, although 1 appears thet me now bave some few exceptions fo the seneral sate of things; IN-B.: Joho Stuact Mill, {hem sat on the other side ofthe Housel but Ido rot chink we ought co lepsate to increase the ‘umber of specimens (Hansard 1867, 3rd sees, vol. $88, p. 1112). Quite recently Dutt Spafford sent me what he and [ believe is the earliest known explicit state- ment of the law. Henry Droop, an English bar- ister, advocate of proportional representation and inventor of the Droop quota, weote in 1869 about plurality voting: ach elector has practically only a choice be: tween two candidates or ses of candidates. As succes depends upon abtaning amajority of the fagregate votes ofall the electors, an elecuon is nsually reduced to a contest beiween the (Wo ‘most popular candidates or sets of eandidaces, Even If other candidates goto the poll, the eee ors usually find out that dheie votes wil be theowa away, unless given in favour of one oF father of the partes Between whom the election really ies. Droop was apparently influenced by an observa tion in an address by Emest Naville, president of the Geneva Association for Reform, whieh Droop translated 26 follows: “When the majority alone + Naville meant “by the plurality rule") ‘chooses the representatives of all, the electors in- ‘evitably group themselves into two camps be- ‘cause, (0 arrive at representation, itis necessary 10 obtain the majority." Naville did not apparently ‘lieve that this force was sufficient for the two- party systems, and Droop’s position in 1869 is am iguous. But by 1881 he was prepared co argue “these phenomena [ie., two-party systems] T can- rot explain by any theory of a natural division between opposing tendencies of thought, and the only explawation which seems to me to account for them is that the two opposing partes into which we find politicians divided in each of these countries [United Kingdom, United States, ete.] law Is wbout like saving thatthe child with burnt Fingers Understands the chemical principles of eombustion, ‘The American Political Science Review Vol. 76 shave been formed and are kept together by major ity voring” lemphasis added; Droop means, of course, plurality voting. ‘This is the earliest explicit statement of Duver- get's law that have seen. By 1901 it was a.com. ‘monplace. In the controversy over proportional representation for the new Australian constitu tion, in their peeface to Proportional Representa- tion’ Applied ta Party Government: A New Etec ‘oral System, Ashworth and Ashworth (1901, pp. view) set up their problem thus: ‘The claim that every section ofthe people i en- tule representation appears. just that it seems intolerable chat a method should. have Teen ved «whi excludes the inary. Bul in view of the adage that its the excelence ‘of old institutions which preserves chen, itis Surely arash conclusion that che present method. fof ection hus no compensating melt. We believe thete ie such a marit—narnely, that he present method of election has developed the Dparty_spsuem lerphasis in orginal the party ‘Sem teerred tol, of course, dual. Once this truth e grarped, Iti gute evident thatthe Hare system would be absolutely destructive to party government... The object of this Book Is (0 Suggest areforen, whieh possesses the advancages, ‘of both methods and the disadvantages of either, Needless to say, the Ashworths failed 10 achieve this goal, but they do deserve credit for thie clear ‘enunciation of both Duverger's law and Duver- ‘ger's hypothesis. rity In the previous section I reported a gradual development culminating in a clear and unam- biguous statement of both Duverger’s proposi- tions owenty years after Hare and seventy years before Duverger. In the succeeding half century scholarly support became quite general, so that it ‘was indeed reasonable for Duverger to call one of them. a law. The general theme of this develop- sent is that of an initial skepticism followed by increasing acquiescence. ‘A. Lawrence Lowell, whose books on compara- tive politics dominated che field at the turn of the century, thought that the cwo-party system was ‘asential for effective parliamentary goverament He ateributed this system in Great Britain to the historical experience of the English people, but he also thought that the absence af it in France was ‘owing co the majority system and the second ballot (Lowell 1896}. Thus, in effect, he accented Duverger’s hypothesis but not Duverger's law. ‘Other prominent scholars of that period were less clear, Ostroporski, for example, was $0 eager to do away with politial parties by his own pet1982 teforms that he never quite diagnosed the causes of stcuctural features of parties. (Ostrogorski 1908, vol. 2, p. 705). Practical publicists, excited by the controversy over proportional representa- tion, which was considered or adopted in. most European countries between 1900 and 1925, fended to favor proportional representation if they belonged to partes wichout a majority and to ‘oppase ic if they belonged to parties with the ma- jority or close to it. Implictly, therefore, they bochaved as if they agreed with’ Duverger's law. One author who explicitly stated this belief was J. Ramsay MacDonald, later a Labour prime minister, who wrote frequently against propor- onal representation and clearly explained the forees involved in Duverger’s law (MacDonald 1909, p. 137). As a socialist he though the plu ity system was 2 good discipline for new socialist parties like the Labour party, and furthermore, ‘when his party won, he wanted it co win the whole thing—His Majesty's Government—not just & chance at a coalition. On the other hand, most ‘minority publicists were not so feank; when they favored proportional representation, they typi- cally denied Duverger's hypothesis (on. the effect of proportional representation) and pointed out hat countries without proportional representa- ion often did not have two-party systems. (For an ‘example, [quote J. Fischer Williams, “In France, Italy, and Germany, there are more parties than with'us [Great Britain}... . But this is not the result of proportional representation” (Williams 1918, p. 68). Conversely, those opposed to pro portional representation were not quite sure. The authors of the Repare of the Royal Commission ‘on Electoral Systems remarked in puzzlement: “tt is asserted by some that small parties would spring up like mushrooms when the repressive influence ff the majority (Note: they meant plucalty] method was removed; by others that the two- party system would survive any change of mecha- fism whatever” (Royal Commission on Electoral Systems 1918, p. 31). ‘Two strands of intellectual development ce- moved the daubts. One was the spread of disstis- faction in the 1930s with proportional representa~ tion; the other was an increased scholarly exam- ination of the origins of the two-party system that characterized the successful American polity Since the dissatisfaction with proportional repre- sentation relates (0 Duverger’s hypothesis (that proportional representation caused multiple par- ties, the lesser of Duverger's two propositions), f vill skip over most af that debate, which was especially aimed at identifying the reasons for the initial suecesses of the German National Sccialst Party. An excellent example of the effect of that experience is observable in the (wo editions of a Fabian Society tract by Herman Finer, a promi- ‘The Two-party System and Duverger’s Law 187 ‘nent student of comparative politics. fn the inital edition (1924), he criticized proportional represen- tation in much the same way as had MacDonald fifteen years earlier, chat is, a8 a system that con- fused responsibility. [n the second edition (1938), however, he added a postscript in which he blamed proportional representation in Tealy and Germany for increasing the number of political parties. Then he attributed the weakness of execu ‘ives and the instability of governments 10 the ‘multiplicity of parties, and he explained the rise of Mussolini and become so distracted by fumbling governments, that they will acquiesce in any sort of dictator” ship. . 0” (Finer 1935, p. 16), Hermens's Demac- racy or Anarchy: A Study of Proportional Repre- ‘enaation (1941) constitutes the mest elaborate in dicement of tis electoral system for its encourage ‘ment of National Socialism, and allhough not Published until 1944, its evidence had been widely ‘circulated for several years before that. Although ‘many now recognize that Finer and Hermens had made too facile an atribution and inference, stil they were frequently quoted, and the collection of evidence on this subject by Hermes and others (e-g., Mellen 1943) liad, [ believe, 2 signifieant pecsiasive effect in support of Duverger's hhypothests ‘The scholarly study of the ewo-party system tended to increase the evidence for and scholadly certainty about Duverger’s law. Arthur Hol combe, a prominent American political scientist in the first half of the century, affirmed Duverger's law as carly as 1910: “the tendency under the system of plurality elections toward che establishment of che ewo-party system is. almost irresistible” (Holcombe 1910). Although fn a popular textbook published as ate as 1919 W. Monto attributed the two-party system to the “practical capacity of the Anglo-Saxon race" (Monro 1919, p, 329), and although authors of other popular textbooks of the next decade, ¢g., ‘Charles Merriam, E. M, Sait, and Frederic Ogg, avoided the subject entirely, by 1933 the nocion was wel established that plurality voting for exec- tives generated the American two-party system. Arthur MacMahon argued: “. . centrifugal ten- dencies lie., for many factions have been offset by the fact that in the face of the necessity of ‘choosing a single candidate, the alternatives apen to electorates have been sharply narrowed" (Mac- Mahon 1933). This example of presidential and gubernatorial elections proved extraordinarily Convincing, and within a decade the more general form of Duverger’s law was enshrined in popular American textbooks, Thus Carl Friedrich ob- served that the “single member district with plurality eleetions . . . forces the electorate 0 make up its mind between two clear-cut alterna758 ives" (Friedrich 1937, p. 290), and E. E. Schate= schneider wrate thatthe “single-member-distcict= system-plus-plurality-elections . . . discriminates ‘moderately lemphasis in. origivall against the second party, but against che third, fourth, and Fisth parties the force of this tendeney is moult plied tothe point of extinguishing their chances of ‘winning seats altogether,"” a Force that thereby guarantees exactly wwo parties (Schattschneider 1942, p. 75). V. O. Key, Jr. (1949) even applied the idea of the law to the superficially one-party system of the states of the old Confederacy, ‘observing that where primary elections in the one ‘main party were conducted with che plucality rule, theee was bifactionalism, and where conducted With the runoff majority cule, there was multi= factionalism. However, Key was uncertain about the effect because he thought also that the main force for bifactionalism probably was the exis- fence of a serious Republican opposition. ‘Scholarly acceptance of both Duverger’s law and Duverger's hypothesis was therefore quite general by the time he formulated “them. ‘Duverger's own contribution was «wofold: Fist, he distinguished sharply between the law and the hypothesis, which previously had aften been mis- ‘akenly interpreted as duals of each other. ince plurality and proportional systems are only two ‘out of many, the absence of one does imply the presence of the other.) Second, he collected and systematically arranged a large amount of histori- ‘eal evidence in support of both sentences so that their Cull significance was apparent. Vv Of course, acceptance and utterance do tor rake statements true, The history of these sen- tenees in the next thirty years consists mainly in collecting evidence for and against their truth and revising their formulation and adjusting the ra- tional choice model within which they ft. Since it ig just exactly this activity that constitutes the daily life of science, the fact of 2 substantial amount of testing out and reformulating of Duverger's hypothesis and law is evidence of the accumulation of knowledge T am trying 10 describe. {start with Duverger’s hypothesis (hat propor sional representation and majority systems favor multiparty systems). Clearly Duverger himself was luneasy about the hypothesis, did not call it 2 law, sand asserted it only as a probabilistic association, fot a deterministic one. “The earliest attack on the hypothesis was, how- vet, entirely misdirected. Grumm asserted that the causal direction in the hypothesis was re- versed, that proportional representation did not cause multiparty systems but rather that multi- ‘The American Political Science Review Vol. 76 party systems caused proportional representation (Grumm 1958). His evidence was that five con- tinental governments that adopted proportional represeatation had more thao two patties when they did so. Presumably they acted to preserve the balance among existing parties. But a the time of adoption, all hose governments had either major~ ity systems (.e., second ballot) oF a history of catlier proportional representation or no experi- ence with democracy. Since Duverger coupled the majority system with proportional representation as a cause of multiple parties (as, indeed, tad Lowell (1896) and Holcombe (1910), itis entirely 10 be expected from the hypothesis that mul party systems occur in the five counties at the time they actually occurred, that Is, before pro- portional representation. So Grumm’s evidence Supports rather than refutes the hypothesis. ‘ncidentally, the few Buropean countries chat changed from plurality to proportional represen tation also changed from a two-party system to a ‘multiple-party system (Polyzoides 1927).) Entirely apart from Geumm’s error, however, ‘here are numerous counterexamples to Duver= ger's hypothesis. For a long time Australia has had the alternative vote, which can be interpreted cither a3 a rudimentary form of the Hare system for a version of the majority system, Its parties have indeed increased from two to three, and there the number has stabilized. Ifthe hypothesis were true, however, the number should continue (@ increase, It bas not, and indeed the third party is effectively an appendage of one of the twa partes, Austria has maintained both proportional Tepresentation and a two-party system since the end of the Second World War. There is n0 ap- ppareat feature of the electoral system that ac- ‘counts for ¢his fact, so it seems a true councer- ‘example. Despite partial proportional representa tion, since 1945 Germany has developed a system ‘with two major parties and a third small party allied continually with the same major party. This is not a goad counterexample, however, because the proportional system also has a ‘plurality feature intended by its authors to minimize the ‘number of parties in excess of two. Finally, Ireland provides a devastating counterexample, Despite the use of the Hare system, its parties have decreased sharply in number since @ high point in 1927, when there were seven parties plus fourteen independents. In 1969 there were three patties, one of them very small and one indepen- dent, This result was substantially reproduced in 1973 and in 1977, when one party obtained an ab- solute majority of the votes. Not unreasonably, ‘one student of Irish elections who initially seemed to accent Duverger’s hypothesis (O"Leaty 1961), hhas now specifically cejeted it (O" Leary 1979, pp. 112-13), Katz (1980, p. 40) cried to discount the1982 force of this counterexample by calling the Hare system 2 modified form of the plurality cule (because voting is for individual candidates, not parties), and by predicting then (p. 61), from Duverger’s hypothesis, that the number of parties in treland should be more than. the number in Britain (wie the unmodified plurality rule) and fewer than the number in [tly (ith the party-Tst system of proportional representation). ‘This is, however, too easy a way out. The Hare system is indubitably propostional, and it lacks entirely the main feature of the plurality cule, mamely the Force encouraging parties to maximize votes, Since there appears to be nothing in common among these four counterexamples, it seems imt= possible to save the hypothesis by modifying it and that is the lesson (0 be learned from Rae's ‘more general analysis of the cases (Rac 1971). He thas shown very neatly that for the development af a successful new patty, proportional representa tion is neither a necessary condition (see, or example, the British Labour party in a plurality system) nor a sufficient condition (se the absence ‘of successful third parties in Austria). Instead, Rae offered alist of seven variables, one of which fs the presence of proportional representation, that may be associated with successful new patties (pp. 151-58). Altogether Rae made an extremely strong case ‘that the hypothesis, at least as it related to proportional representation, cannot be mote than a probabilistic association, ‘The empirical evidence is not so conclusive in the case of the two-ballot majority. No one, aside from Duverger, has devoted much attention 10 party systems associated with this rule, Most con- tinental governments used it before they adopted proportional representation, and, as has already been remacked, Lowell (1896) and later some ad- vocates of proportional representation (e.g., Wile liams 1918) believed that the multiparty system developed as politicians’ rational response to this rule. Canon (J978) conducted the most impressive test of the relationship, He was inspired mainly by Key's (1949) uncertainty about the application of the “hypothesis to the multifactionalism ia southern states, Canon used as data the presence (of bifaetionalisin from 1932 to 1977 ia the Demo- cratic gubernatorial primaries in siteen southern, and border states. Ten of these states use the eun- off primary with a majority required for nomina- tion at either the first or second ballot, The other sixuse the plurality method with just ane primary, ‘Although Factionalism is not easy to measure, & reasonable index of it showed in fairly close ap- proximation of Duverger’s hypothesis that fac- tlonalism in all but one of the plurality primary states was lower—often much lower—than in all, the runoff primary states. For the one anomaly, ‘West Virginia, the index was only slightly higher, The Two-party System and Duverger's Law 759 Furthermore, the percentage of the primary vote for the top candidate (and for the top two can- didates) was much greatec in the plurality states than in the runoff states, which is exactly what fone would expect if the cwo-ballot system en- ‘courages multifactionalism. Still, longitudinal averages cover up significant deviations, Canon also noted that Alabama, a runoff state, has in the last decade developed something close to ifsc: tionalism, whereas West Vicginia, a plurality state, still had fairly evident multitzcrionatism in the earlier part of this period, Since these two exe ceptions are not fully explained at present, the ‘case is strengthened that Duverger's hypothesis is ‘no more than a probabilistic association. This is, 1 believe, what a theoretical interpreta tion, in terms of rational choices by polilsans, ‘would suggest. The rational choice theory, stand ing implicitly behind the hypothesis, is that pro- portional representation and the second allot ‘unoff both offer politicians an incentive for the formation of new parties and do not give them any disincentive, The incentive is that, given par- ticular configucations of potential "coalitions, ‘hese systems sometimes permit new parties (and hheretofore-excluded politicians) «0 get a bit of political influence with relatively few votes. That in these systems a new party docs not hav set the most votes to win, merely some indefinite number less than the most. Under proportional fepresentation, the candidate or list with the second most votes can always win seats and some- times so can candidates with the third or fourth ‘most votes, Indeed the purpose of the system is 10 ‘encourage this result. In the runoff majoriey system a candidate who initially has the second ‘most votes can ultimately win, provided the sup- porters of eliminated candidates vote for her oF him at the second ballot. Hence, if a group of politicians can see a chance to come in second or ic is often worthwhile to form a new party. urality system, on the other hand, this positive incentive is turned into a disinceative ‘because itis rare for the prospective builders of & ‘new party to see a chance to come in first past the post. This system, then, constitutes a real disincentive because the leaders of the new party are likely to be regarded as politically irrelevant, This disincentive is absent fcom proportional representation and runoff systems, however, because even leaders of failed parties are welcome in expanded coalitions of continuing parties, [Neither feature of this incentive system is strong ‘enough fo petit one to say for certain that these electoral systems favor multiple parties. The in- centive is weak because it operates only when peo- ple want to form new parties for other reasons. However, there are surely many configurations of potential coalitions, configurations lasting760 The American Polit through many elections, that do not render it like- ly that new parties will come in second (probably the case in Austria) or even third (probably the case in Kceland). Similarly the absence of a dis- incentive for new parties within the system of pro- portional representation itself is not very impor- ant, Although tie existence of proportional representation prohibits the direct use of the dis- incentive inherent i plurality voting, there are ‘other kinds of efficacious disincentives that can be combined with proportional representation, as thas been done in Germany and pethaps Austria. So the incentive is not sufficient and the dis- incentive is not necessary. Hence the hypothesis cannot be deterministically valid, although doubs less there is a fairly strong probabilistic associa- tion between proportional representation or runoff elections on one hand and the multiparty system om the other. v ‘We can therefore abandon Duverger’s hypothe- sisi its deterministic form (although itis still useful for practical life) and proceed (0 the more interesting question of Duverger's law, relating plurality elections and two-party systems. The dit- ficulties with the law are less formidabie. There are indeed counterexamples, but not, I believe, definitive ones, s0 that the law may possibly sur- vive with appropriate revisions. If we can also fit it to an adequate theory, it may even be per- ‘The two most pressing counterexamples to Duverger’s law are in Canada and India, where despite plurality eletions there are distinctly more than two partes. In Rae's study of 121 elections in 20 countries, 30 elections were conducted under plurality cules and seven of these—all in Canada resulted in more than 10 percent of the votes for a third party. Rae attributed the Canadian devia- tion to the fact that, geographically, local parties survive as the main parties in some provinces ‘hile they are third parties nationally. Doubtless this situation derives from the extreme decent zation of Canadian government, whercin the ‘chance of provincial control is of iself enough to ‘motivate political action, ‘On the basis of the Canadian exception, Rae reformulated Duverger’s law from “the simple- majority, single-ballot system favors the two- party system’” co “plurality formulae are always Associated with two-party competition. excent Where strong local minority parties exist” (Rae 1971, p. 95), Rae commented that his revision produced a “‘much less dramatic proposition’* (Rae 1971, p. 96), although when he came co write about the long-range effeets of plurality formulas, he concluded by reaffirming Duverger’s prapos!- ical Science Review Vol. 76 tion, After nating the Canadian exception, Rae said, “insofar as the electoral law exerts a com trolling pressure, the singlemember district is likely to press the system toward two-party com- petiin™ (Rac 1971, p, 143), which is almost ‘exactly Duverger’s sentenee, with the vecb struc ture ‘likely (0 press the system toward” rather than “favors.” “The reason Rae fell nto this logical trap of both denying and then affirming Duverger's law is that like Duverger himself, he could not decide ‘whether the law was deterministic or probabilistic. So Rae's restatement of itis deterministic, but his actual use of it is probabilistic. {suspect the reason for his ambivalence is his belief that the revised deterministic law was less dramatic and less useful, but attaching conditions (oa law is, to ‘my mind, unexeeptionable. The elementary form of the law of demand is “demand curves do not slope positively,” but to state this Jaw accurately, fone must say: “holding other prices, income, and. tastes constant, demand curves do not slope positively," perhaps less dramatlo—if drama is ‘what one wants fram science—but certainly more Useful because it is more accurate. Similarly Rae's revision involves greater accuracy and greater utility. ‘The Indian counterexample is more difficult to deal with, India began plurality elections about the same time Duverger formulated his law, and ‘only once has something approaching a two-patty lection been held. Congress, the party of Neti and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, has been domi- rant during most of the thirty years since 1951, ‘even though Congress candidates have never ob- tained as much as 50 percent ofthe vote. Because of the large number of candidates in many consti- tuencies under this genuine multiparty system, Congress has usually translated an. electoral minority into a majority of legislative seats. It is an interesting puzzle why the numerous minor parties do net disappear or consolidate; they have decreased in number since 1951, but chece are stil at least four or five significant parties. One. ‘wonders why i is taking so long for Duverger’s law to work, "Two explanations have been offered for the delay. Weiner (1957, pp. 223, 262-68) argued that the minor parties were social groups providing ‘emotional satisfaction to activists, entirely apart from the goal of winning elections. Since activists presumably maximize the pleasures of member- ship rather than the rewards of office, in Weiner’s theory itis not ta he expected that they reduce the umber of political partes other than acciden- tally. Although T think that Weiner was on the righ track in looking at the motivation of poli clans rather than of voters, it was a serious mis take 10 lump all politicians together. Certainly the