RNC v. Jan 6 Cmte

Case 1:22-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 03/09/22 Page 1 of 29
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL )
COMMITTEE, )
310 First Street S.E., )
Washington, D.C. 20003, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. __________
)
NANCY PELOSI, in her official )
capacity as Speaker of the United States )
House of Representatives, )
1236 Longworth House Office Building )
Washington, D.C. 20515; )
)
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, in his official )
capacity as Chair of the Select Committee )
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the )
United States Capitol, )
2466 Rayburn House Office Building )
)
ELIZABETH L. CHENEY, in her official )
capacity as Vice Chair of the Select )
Committee to Investigate the January 6th )
Attack on the United States Capitol, )
416 Cannon House Office Building )
)
ADAM B. SCHIFF, in his official )
capacity as a member of the United States )
)
JAMIE B. RASKIN, in his official )
)
SUSAN E. LOFGREN, in her official )
23868397.5

)
ELAINE G. LURIA, in her official )
)
PETER R. AGUILAR, in his official )
)
STEPHANIE MURPHY, in her official )
)
ADAM D. KINZINGER, in his official )
)
SELECT COMMITTEE TO )
INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH )
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES )
CAPITOL, )
Longworth House Office Building )
Washington, D.C. 20515, )
)
)
)
Defendants. )
)
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiff, the Republican National Committee (“RNC”), brings this complaint seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the enforcement of an overbroad, unauthorized
subpoena issued by the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (the “Select Committee”) seeking non-public information
on Republican donors, volunteers, and supporters and the internal deliberative processes of the
RNC in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
2. The Select Committee’s subpoena to Salesforce.com (“Salesforce”), a key data and digital
communications vendor to the RNC, vastly exceeds Congress’ limited subpoena power and
infringes on rights of the RNC, its constituent members, donors, and other supporters. The RNC
and its millions of supporters face an unprecedented threat that will undoubtedly chill their First
Amendment rights and expose the RNC’s supporters to reprisals and harassment.
3. Digital communication has revolutionized how political parties and other non-profit
organizations exercise their core First Amendment rights of political speech and association. The
ability of the RNC and other political groups to interact virtually with millions of Americans
through media like email to recruit volunteers, persuade voters, convey political messages, and
fundraise has become a central and core component of their political activities.
4. To this end, organizations like the RNC now routinely engage vendors like Salesforce to
help develop and execute technical aspects of these digital communication strategies. In doing so,
political organizations across the political spectrum collect and maintain significant amounts of
data regarding these efforts, including confidential and sensitive information about private
individuals with whom the organizations have engaged.
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5. The Select Committee’s subpoena (“Salesforce Subpoena”) includes a staggeringly broad
and unduly burdensome set of requests “referring or relating to” RNC documents that have no
connection to the attack on January 6, 2021. Without any limitation to the events of January 6, the
Salesforce Subpoena demands production of sensitive and proprietary data over more than a two-
month period, which would give the Select Committee unprecedented access to the RNC’s internal
political strategies and to private, personal information regarding its supporters.
6. If forced to comply, Salesforce would disclose records regarding whether and how
individual RNC supporters have responded to emails (including at what time they opened such
emails), reacted to specific political messaging, signed any RNC petitions, completed any surveys
on specific issues and policy proposals, or responded to specific fundraising appeals. It would also
include information regarding individual voting habits, involvement in various coalition groups,
and even what political merchandise they liked best. “[T]he subject matter of these materials
represents the very heart of the organism which the [F]irst [A]mendment was intended to nurture
and protect: political expression and association concerning federal elections and officeholding.”
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Pol. League, 655 F.2d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
7. The Select Committee’s fishing expedition would only serve to chill the RNC’s and its
supporters’ First Amendment rights, while providing their political opponents with an all-access
pass to confidential RNC political strategies and the personal information of millions of its
supporters. Worryingly, the information targeted is universally for persons opposed to the political
party in control of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Select Committee.
8. If allowed to stand, this unprecedented sweep of a national political party’s donors’ and
supporters’ private information will surely chill constitutionally protected political activity and
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subject the RNC’s supporters to the risk of reprisals by those who disagree with their support of
the Republican Party and its candidates.
9. To be sure, this lawsuit is not intended to circumscribe Congress’ legislative power to
address the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Rather, the RNC has been forced to bring
this lawsuit in order to ensure that the events of that day are not used as a pretense to
indiscriminately rifle through the internal affairs and deliberations of one of the country’s two
major political parties by an irregularly composed Select Committee dominated by members of
the other.
10. Plaintiff RNC seeks immediate declaratory and injunctive relief to protect its legal rights
and prevent the Select Committee from obtaining information it has no legal right to subpoena.
PARTIES
11. The RNC is a national political party with its principal place of business at 310 First Street,
S.E., Washington D.C., 20003. In addition to managing the Republican Party’s business affairs at
the national level, the RNC represents over 35 million registered Republicans in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories. It is comprised of 168 voting members representing
state and territorial Republican Party organizations.1
12. Defendant Nancy Pelosi is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives and
Speaker of the House.
13. Defendant Bennie G. Thompson is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of
Representatives and Chairman of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
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The RNC is also a participant in the Trump Make America Great Again Committee
(“TMAGAC”), a joint fundraising committee, whose data are owned by the RNC and also
demanded by the Select Committee.
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the United States Capitol. The Salesforce Subpoena was issued on his authority as the Select
Committee Chairman.
14. Defendant Elizabeth L. Cheney is a Republican member of the U.S. House of
Representatives and member of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol.
15. Defendant Adam B. Schiff is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives
and member of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol.
16. Defendant Jamie B. Raskin is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives
Capitol.
17. Defendant Susan E. Lofgren is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives
Capitol.
18. Defendant Elaine G. Luria is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives
Capitol.
19. Defendant Peter R. Aguilar is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives
Capitol.
20. Defendant Stephanie Murphy is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of
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21. Defendant Adam D. Kinzinger is a Republican member of the U.S. House of
22. Defendant Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol is a select committee created by House Resolution 503 passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives on June 30, 2021.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because this action
arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
24. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Speaker Pelosi because she sponsored H. Res.
503 and oversaw its passage in the House. Her office is in Washington, D.C.
25. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Chairman Thompson because he presides over
the Select Committee and issued the Salesforce Subpoena from his office address in Washington,
D.C.
26. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Elizabeth L. Cheney, Adam B. Schiff, Jamie B.
Raskin, Susan E. Lofgren, Elaine G. Luria, Peter R. Aguilar, Stephanie Murphy, and Adam D.
Kinzinger because they serve as members of the Select Committee that issued the Salesforce
Subpoena from Washington, D.C.
27. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Select Committee because it is located and
operates in Washington, D.C.
28. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as a substantial part of the events giving rise to
the claim occurred in Washington, D.C.
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BACKGROUND
29. The RNC uses the Salesforce Marketing Cloud platform in support of various electoral and
fundraising activities, including during the period leading up to and following the 2020
Presidential Election through the Inauguration of President Biden on January 20, 2021.
30. The RNC, like many political organizations, relies on Salesforce to host and organize
campaign and donor information. This organization of campaign and donor data necessarily
involves the private information of donors, as well as organizational trade secrets related to
campaign strategy, fundraising, and donor relations.
31. By way of comparison, in a relatively recent lawsuit, the Democratic National Committee
alleged the Russian Federation hacked “thousands of emails and documents containing sensitive
data from the DNC including donor information, financial and economic information, proprietary
opposition research compiled from multiple sources, information regarding planned political
activities, and thousands of private confidential emails.” Second Amended Complaint at 105,
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Fed’n, 2019 WL 2488795 (S.D.N.Y.). Both major political
parties clearly recognize the importance of privacy for critical donor and other sensitive
information.
A. The Select Committee’s Salesforce Subpoena
32. On February 23, 2022, the Select Committee served the Salesforce Subpoena on
Salesforce. A true and correct copy of the Salesforce Subpoena is attached as Exhibit A.
33. The Salesforce Subpoena includes a sweeping set of document demands for RNC records
hosted on the Salesforce Marketing Cloud platform in support of various electoral and fundraising
activities of the RNC, including documents “referring or relating to” the following five categories:
a. All performance metrics and analytics related to email campaigns by or on behalf

of Donald Trump for President, Inc. (“Trump Campaign”), the Republican National
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Committee (“RNC”), or the Trump Make America Great Again Committee

(“TMAGAC”), including but not limited to delivery metrics (send rates and bounce
rates), engagement metrics (opens, open rates, click rates, and click-to-open rates),
time attributes, and message attributes.
b. All records related to login sessions by individuals associated with the Trump
Campaign or the RNC into Salesforce’s Marketing Cloud platform, including all
related metadata.
c. For the time period of January 1, 2021, to January 31, 2021, all documents and
communications concerning investigative reports or analyses conducted by
Salesforce regarding the protests, marches, public assemblies, rallies, or speeches
in Washington, D.C. on January 5, 2021, or January 6, 2021 (collectively, the
“Washington Rallies”).
d. For the time period of November 3, 2020, to January 31, 2021, all documents and
communications concerning investigative reports or analyses conducted by
Salesforce regarding the use of Salesforce’s platforms by the RNC or the Trump
Campaign and related materials.
e. For the time period of November 3, 2021, all communications between Salesforce
representatives and representatives of the RNC or the Trump Campaign concerning
the 2020 Presidential election, the continued use of Salesforce’s platforms by the
RNC or the Trump Campaign, the Washington Rallies, or any of the facts and
circumstances of the topics that are the subject of any of the above requests.
34. The Salesforce Subpoena commands Salesforce to produces documents that include
private and secure donor and campaign communications, as well as private financial information
of donors and other individuals who bear no relationship to the Select Committee’s investigation,
but who are in opposition to the political party whose members are in control of the House and the
Select Committee.
35. The Salesforce Subpoena directs Salesforce to produce all responsive documents by today,
March 9, 2022.
36. The Salesforce Subpoena also demands that Salesforce appear for a deposition to provide
testimony regarding the materials subpoenaed on March 16, 2022.
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37. The breadth and invasiveness of the Salesforce Subpoena is astounding. It seeks
information on vast numbers of Republican donors, volunteers, supporters, and coalition members.
All of this information is unquestionably political information of the RNC, without limitation to
the events of January 6, and with no apparent nexus to any potential legislative activity. By any
measure, the Salesforce Subpoena exceeds the scope of Congress’ limited subpoena power.
38. The Select Committee has demonstrated that it cannot be trusted to keep private
information secure. In at least one instance, for example, information regarding private
communications only available to the Select Committee was leaked to the Washington Post. See
Jacqueline Alemany, et al., Texting through an insurrection, Wash. Post (Feb. 16, 2022).
B. The Select Committee Lacks Authority to Issue the Salesforce Subpoena Because the
Subpoena was Issued in Pursuit of Non-Legislative Activities.
39. The Select Committee is not a typical Congressional committee. After failing to enlist the
U.S. Senate in a bicameral commission, Speaker Pelosi introduced H. Res. 503, “Establishing the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.” Two days
later, the House passed H. Res. 503 on a near party-line vote of 222 yeas and 190 nays. Only two
Republicans, Reps. Cheney and Kinzinger, voted in favor of H. Res. 503.
40. H. Res. 503 establishes three “functions” of the Select Committee: (1) to “investigate the
facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”; (2) to
“identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons learned from the domestic terrorist
attack on the Capitol”; and (3) to “issue a final report to the House containing such findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures described in subsection (c) as it may
deem necessary.”
41. H. Res. 503 provides that “[t]he Select Committee may not hold a markup of legislation.”
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42. The Select Committee’s investigation is led by Chief Investigative Counsel Timothy J.
Heaphy, former United States Attorney for the Western District of Virginia, and Senior
Investigative Counsel John Wood, former United States Attorney for the Western District of
Missouri. The Select Committee reportedly has more than a dozen former federal prosecutors on
staff. See Michael S. Schmidt & Luke Broadwater, In Scrutinizing Trump and His Allies, Jan. 6
Panel Adopts Prosecution Tactics, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/us/politics/january-6-committee.html.
43. Since the passage of H. Res. 503, Speaker Pelosi and members of the Select Committee
have made countless public statements explaining the purpose of the Select Committee is not
legislative.
44. For example, in an interview on December 29, 2021, Rep. Kinzinger stated, “We’ll be able
to have out on the public record anything Justice Department needs maybe in [sic] in pursuit of [a
crime].” Zachary Cohen & Annie Grayer, January 6 committee says it would make criminal
referrals if ‘appropriate,’ but that could be a long way off, CNN (Dec. 21, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/21/politics/january-6-committee-criminal-referrals/index.
45. As Chairman Thompson noted on October 24, 2021, “obviously we are pursuing evidence”
leading to “former President Trump or anyone else.” Transcript: Rep. Bennie Thompson on “Face
the Nation”, CBS News (Oct. 24, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-rep-bennie-
thompson-on-face-the-nation-october-24-2021/. Chairman Thompson also tweeted on January 6,
2022, “We have been working diligently to bring justice to [the tragedy of Jan. 6].” Bennie
Thompson (@BennieGThompson), Twitter, (Jan. 6, 2022 8:31 AM),
https://twitter.com/BennieGThompson/status/1479083311163232258.
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46. Rep. Schiff tweeted, “We will expose those responsible for Jan 6. No one is above the
law.” Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter (Nov. 12, 2021, 4:54 PM),
https://twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1459278425118625794.
47. Rep. Raskin has also affirmed the law enforcement purpose of the investigation when he
stated on multiple occasions that no privilege (neither attorney-client nor executive) “operate[s] to
shield participants in a crime from an investigation into a crime.” Hugo Lowell, Capitol panel to
investigate Trump call to Willard hotel in hours before attack, Guardian (Dec. 27, 2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/27/capitol-attack-panel-investigate-trump-call-
willard-hotel-before-assault. See also Jamie Raskin (@RepRaskin), Twitter (Dec. 2, 2021, 5:40
PM), https://twitter.com/RepRaskin/status/1466537815185891329 (“Exec. privilege doesn’t
cover criminal misconduct, like insurrections or coups . . . .”).
48. Perhaps unsurprisingly given its non-legislative purpose, the Select Committee has issued
hundreds of wide-ranging subpoenas for documents and the testimony of witnesses. It has also
demanded records and sent preservation notices to social media companies, telecommunications
companies, and banking entities. A recent press release suggests that the Select Committee has
interviewed more than 550 individuals. See Press Release, Bennie Thompson, Chairman, Select
Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Select Committee Demands
Information on Efforts to Send False “Alternate Electors” to Congress and Otherwise Interfere
with Election Certification (Feb. 15, 2021), https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-
releases/select-committee-demands-information-efforts-send-false-alternate-electors.
49. At least twenty-five individuals and corporations have filed civil actions challenging
subpoenas issued by the Select Committee. Many of these subpoenas challenged in court were
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issued discreetly by the Select Committee to third parties who hold individuals’ cellular or banking
data.
50. Public reporting has widely confirmed the Select Committee’s investigation aims to
produce criminal referrals. See Michael S. Schmidt & Luke Broadwater, Jan. 6 Committee Weighs
Possibility of Criminal Referrals, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/us/politics/jan-6-committee-trump-criminal-referral.html;
see also Josh Dawsey, Jacqueline Alemany & Tom Hamburger, Inside the Jan. 6 committee’s
effort to trace every dollar raised and spent based on Trump’s false election claims, Washington
Post (March 8, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/08/jan-6-
fundraising-trump/.
51. Tellingly, since its inception in July 2021, the Select Committee has held only one public
hearing.
52. With the Salesforce Subpoena, the Select Committee now seeks highly confidential,
sensitive information of the national political party opposed to the dominant political party of the
Select Committee for wrongful purposes.
C. The Select Committee Also Lacks Authority to Issue the Salesforce Subpoena
Because the Select Committee Was Not Formed in Accordance with H. Res. 503 and
Therefore Cannot Act in Accordance with H. Res. 503.
53. H. Res. 503 requires the chair of the Select Committee to consult with the “ranking
minority member” before issuing a subpoena. See Section 3(b)(1) of H. Res. 8. The Select
Committee, however, has no ranking minority member.
54. H. Res. 503 instructs the Speaker of the House to appoint thirteen members to the Select
Committee, only five of which “shall be appointed after consultation with the minority leader.”
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55. Speaker Pelosi appointed Chairman Thompson to serve as Chair of the Select Committee
and appointed six additional Democrat members: Rep. Zoe Lofgren of California, Rep. Adam
Schiff of California, Rep. Pete Aguilar of California, Rep. Stephanie Murphy of Florida, Rep.
Jamie Raskin of Maryland, and Rep. Elaine Luria of Virginia. 167 Cong. Rec. H3597 (2021).
56. House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy recommended five Republican members to
serve on the Select Committee, consistent with H. Res. 503: Rep. James E. Banks of Indiana to
serve as Ranking Member and Reps. Rodney L. Davis of Illinois, James D. Jordan of Ohio, Kelly
M. Armstrong of North Dakota, and Troy E. Nehls of Texas.
57. In what she acknowledged was an “unprecedented decision,” Speaker Pelosi refused to
appoint Rep. Banks, Leader McCarthy’s choice for Ranking Member, and Rep. Jordan to the
Select Committee. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Pelosi Statement on
Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the U.S. Capitol (July 21, 2021), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.
58. Instead, Speaker Pelosi appointed Rep. Adam Kinzinger and Rep. Liz Cheney— the only
two Republicans who voted in favor of H. Res. 503—and left the other seats vacant after Leader
McCarthy rescinded his recommendations in protest. See 167 Cong. Rec. H3805, H3819-H3820
(2021).
59. Neither Rep. Cheney nor Rep. Kinzinger were appointed as Ranking Member. Rather, on
September 2, 2021, Chairman Thompson announced in a press release that “he has named
Representative Liz Cheney (R-WY) to serve as the Vice Chair of the Select Committee.” See
Press Release, Bennie Thompson, Chairman, Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on
the U.S. Capitol, Chairman Thompson Announces Representative Cheney as Select Committee
Vice Chair (Sept. 2, 2021), https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairman-thompson-
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announces-representative-cheney-select-committee-vice-chair. H. Res. 503 does not mention a
“vice chair”, much less authorize the chair to appoint a “vice chair.” See generally H. Res. 503,
117th Cong. (2021).
60. House Rule XI(2)(d) instructs that a committee chair shall designate “[a] member of the
majority party . . . as vice chair of the committee.” Rep. Cheney is a member of the Republican
Conference of the House of Representatives. She is not a member of the current majority party.
61. Indeed, the Defendants have all but admitted there is no Ranking Member on the Select
Committee. In a court pleading filed on February 25, 2022, the Defendants described Rep. Liz
Cheney as the “Vice Chair” of the Committee and, according to Defendants, the “most senior
Republican Member of the Select Committee” “for purposes of consultation prior to issuance of
a subpoena under H.R. 503. Def. Mtn. to Dismiss, p. 18, Feb. 25, 2022, Flynn v. Pelosi, et al.,
Case No. 8:21cv2946 (M.D. Fla.), attached as Exhibit B.
CLAIM I
(The Salesforce Subpoena violates the First Amendment.)
62. Plaintiff restates the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
63. The First Amendment protects “a political party’s discretion in how to organize itself,
conduct its affairs, and select its leaders.” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 230 (1989); see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224
(1986) (“The Party’s determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure
which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution.”); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
64. This First Amendment protection extends to internal party deliberations concerning how
to advance a political message. See Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. Of Indus. Organizations v. FEC,
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333 F.3d 168, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[C]ompelled disclosure of internal planning materials,
though less direct than regulation of political group leadership or structure, will similarly frustrate
those groups’ decisions as to ‘how to organize themselves, conduct their affairs, and select their
leaders,’ as well as their selection of a ‘message and the best means to promote that message.’”)
(quoting Eu, 489 U.S. at 230–31) (alterations adopted). See also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591
F.3d 1147, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the chilling effect on “participation” and “the free flow
of information within campaigns” as result of “compelled disclosure of internal campaign
communications.”) (cert. denied).
65. The Salesforce Subpoena demands “[a]ll performance metrics and analytics related to
email campaigns,” including, but not limited to “delivery metrics,” “engagement metrics,” “time
attributes,” and “message attributes.” It also demands “[a]ll records related to login sessions. . .
into Salesforce’s Marketing Cloud platform,” Salesforce’s own investigative analysis, and “all
communications between Salesforce representatives and representatives of the RNC or the Trump
Campaign concerning the 2020 Presidential election.”
66. The Committee’s all-encompassing Salesforce Subpoena strikes at the very heart of the
Plaintiff’s internal deliberations and strategy to develop effective political strategies and, by doing
so, substantially burdens the Plaintiff’s associational autonomy.
67. The Committee has no legitimate purpose for seeking the protected information demanded
by the Salesforce Subpoena. This information will not meaningfully aid the Committee in any
valid pursuit.
68. Even if it had a valid reason to seek protected information, the Committee has put in place
no safeguards to protect the associational rights of the Plaintiff, its donors, volunteers, members,
and supporters. It provided Plaintiff with no notice of the Salesforce Subpoena and has provided
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them with no opportunity to assert claims of privilege or other legal protections over the demanded
information. The Committee has not established any provisions for a taint team or analogous filter
for privileged information. The entirety of the demanded information, including that which is
constitutionally or otherwise protected, will be turned over to the Committee to do with as it
pleases.
69. Courts have long looked askance at governmental demands for information of donors and
supporters of non-profit entities through which they associate, especially when those entities are
engaged in political or other controversial speech or activities.
70. While the name, address, employer, and occupation of donors who have contributed more
than $200 to the RNC in a calendar year are subject to public disclosure under the Federal Election
Campaign Act, other information likely included in the requested records, such as which digital
campaigns the supporters responded to, the coalitions they have joined, their volunteer activities,
their propensity for contribution, and their support of various political positions are not public. The
Salesforce Subpoena also would require Salesforce to produce information regarding individuals
who have contributed less than $200 in a calendar year to the RNC, and who therefore are not
subject to public disclosure under federal campaign finance law.
71. Moreover, not even the names of persons who volunteer for or merely support the RNC
and Republican candidates are typically subject to disclosure and would be included in the
requested data.
72. The release of this information exposes these donors, volunteers, members, and other
supporters of the RNC and Republican candidates to the risk of “economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility” by
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individuals opposed to their association with the RNC and Republican candidates. NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
73. The Salesforce Subpoena is therefore a transparent effort to chill the speech of the Select
Committee members’ political opponents.
74. The body that issued the Salesforce Subpoena is composed of nine members, seven of
whom belong to the political party opposed to Plaintiff, and none of whom were recommended by
Leader McCarthy, in violation of H. Res. 503.
75. While the Salesforce Subpoena serves no legitimate purpose given it has been issued by an
irregularly formed and non-legislative special committee, it is substantially likely that allowing a
partisan select committee of Congress to subpoena the private and proprietary political and donor
information of the opposition political party will chill current and future political party officials’
and donors’ associational and free speech rights.
76. Email campaigns are one of the most effective tools available to political organizations to
disseminate campaign messaging and build associational support among the electorate. The
prospect of producing internal deliberations, political strategy, and metadata connected to
recipients of email campaigns will frustrate Plaintiff’s ability to pursue political goals such as
winning elections and advocating for its policies by revealing to political opponents its activities,
strategies, and tactics.
77. Compelled disclosure also poses a substantial likelihood that the Committee’s dragnet for
sensitive campaign data will dissuade individuals from associating with the Plaintiff for fear of
intrusion into their private associations—or even reprisal. Am. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,
141 S. Ct. 2373, 2382 (2021) (citing NAACP, 357 U.S. at 464). The Committee’s overbroad and
cumulative Salesforce Subpoena is an unjustified intrusion into one of this nation’s most cherished
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liberties: free speech and association with a party of one’s choosing free from political vendetta or
coercion.
78. Because the Salesforce Subpoena strikes at the heart of the RNC’s and its supporters’ First
Amendment associational and speech rights and because the Salesforce Subpoena serves no
legitimate purpose, it violates the First Amendment.
CLAIM II
(The Salesforce Subpoena violates the Fourth Amendment.)
80. The Salesforce Subpoena instructs Salesforce to produce subscriber information and
campaign records.
81. The Committee provided no notice to Plaintiff of the information sought from the
Salesforce Subpoena.
82. The Salesforce Subpoena demands non-public, highly confidential, and sensitive
information regarding RNC donors and supporters.
83. The RNC and its donors and supporters have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information.
84. The Fourth Amendment enumerates the right of private individuals to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure by the government into their persons, houses, papers, and effects.
It also protects a person’s reasonable privacy expectations. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967).
85. The Fourth Amendment restricts the ability of the Select Committee to issue sweeping
subpoenas untethered from any valid legislative purpose. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 196 (1946).
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86. If the government, including the Select Committee, seeks to obtain documents or data
protected by the Fourth Amendment, it must do so by consent or as otherwise authorized by law.
Plaintiff has not provided its consent for Salesforce to produce its data related to its fundraising
and other political activities to the Select Committee. And for the reasons discussed above, the
Salesforce Subpoena is invalid.
87. “Congress has no enumerated constitutional power to conduct investigations or issue
subpoenas,” but rather each House has an implied “power to secure needed information in order
to legislate.” Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (citing McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (internal quotations omitted)). A congressional subpoena
is “justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process” and “must serve a valid legislative
purpose.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). An all-encompassing subpoena for personal,
nonofficial documents falls outside the scope of Congress’ legitimate legislative power. See Id. at
2040 (Thomas, J., dissenting.).
88. The Salesforce Subpoena is broad and indefinite as to exceed the purported lawfully
authorized purpose of the Select Committee. It contains no limitations seeking to preserve
applicable privileges or prevent violations of constitutional rights.
89. For the Select Committee to subpoena Salesforce for all of Plaintiff’s political supporter
records over a substantial period is entirely unreasonable. Such a request is so broad both
temporally and with respect to the collected data, that the Select Committee exceeds any lawfully
authorized purpose.
90. As the Salesforce Subpoena exceeds the lawfully authorized purpose of the Select
Committee, full compliance with such subpoena would violate Plaintiff’s and its supporters’
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Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure. The Salesforce Subpoena is
thus invalid and unenforceable.
CLAIM III
(The Salesforce Subpoena does not advance a valid legislative purpose.)
92. Congress’ investigative powers are at most ancillary to its legislative authority. Mazars
USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. at 2031. Because of this tie between the investigative and legislative powers,
Congress may only issue subpoenas that serve a “valid legislative purpose.” Id.
93. The legislative purpose inquiry analyzes whether a particular subpoena serves a valid
purpose, not whether an investigation as a whole serves a valid purpose. See Mazars USA, LLP,
140 S. Ct. at 2031.
94. The Salesforce Subpoena extends far beyond the scope of any legitimate legislative
purpose.
95. The Supreme Court has emphasized the need for specificity in Congress’ stated legislative
purpose. See Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. at 2036. And in cases concerning documents
purportedly sought to advance legislation that may raise constitutional issues, “it is ‘impossible’
to conclude that a subpoena is designed to advance a valid legislative purpose unless Congress
adequately identifies its aims.” Id.
96. The Select Committee has failed to consider or recommend any draft legislation related to
the topics provided in the Salesforce Subpoena, nor has it provided any explanation for how its
requests would further any valid legislative end. Any post-hoc rationalization will fail to justify
the sweeping Salesforce Subpoena.
97. The Select Committee members have at times suggested the Committee may eventually
make “recommendations” to “prevent” the events of January 6th from occurring again. See
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Jaqueline Alemany & Tom Hamburger, The Jan. 6 Committee: What it has done and where it is
going, Wash. Post (Jan. 4, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/04/january-6-committee-explainer/. Such
broad statements could not conceivably be more “vague” and “loosely worded.” Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 201 (1957).
98. The Salesforce Subpoena seeks private and proprietary political and donor information that
is both temporally and logically disconnected from the events of January 6, and irrelevant to any
conceivable legislation.
99. This information has no bearing on any contemplated legislation, any generalized
purported legislative purpose for RNC information held by Salesforce is entirely pretextual. It is
relevant only to serve the purpose members of the Select Committee have stated time and again:
to engage in ad-hoc law enforcement and harass its members’ political adversary. See supra ¶¶
31–43. Neither are permissible legislative purposes.
100. A desire to “expose for the sake of exposure” cannot sustain a congressional subpoena.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957). “Bringing information to light” for the sake
of bringing it to light is not a valid legislative end.
101. Nor are law enforcement and the punishment of perceived legal wrongs valid legislative
purposes. “Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of ‘law enforcement,’ because
‘those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.’” Mazars,
140 S. Ct. at 2032 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955)). To the extent
Congress seeks to utilize subpoenas to investigate and punish perceived criminal wrongdoing, it
unconstitutionally intrudes on the prerogatives of the Executive Branch.
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102. Yet again, the statements and actions of members of the Select Committee show the true
goals of its investigation are to provide “justice.” See Bennie Thompson (@BennieGThompson),
Twitter, (Jan. 6, 2022, 8:31 AM),
https://twitter.com/BennieGThompson/status/1479083311163232258.
103. The Select Committee has exceeded its authority to issue a subpoena while failing to offer
any explanation as to how RNC’s information in the custody of Salesforce may further its
legislative interests. Furthermore, any pretextual legislative purpose has been controverted by the
statements and actions of the Select Committee.
CLAIM IV
(The Select Committee lacks necessary congressional authorization.)
105. The composition of the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol is governed by Section 2 of H. Res. 503.
106. Speaker Pelosi has appointed only nine members to the Select Committee: seven
Democrats and two Republicans. None of these members were appointed from the selection of
five Republican congressmen put forth by Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy. No ranking
minority member was appointed to the Select Committee.
107. Authorized congressional committees have subpoena authority implied by Article I of the
Constitution. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). The Select Committee, however,
is not an authorized congressional committee because it fails to comport with its own authorizing
resolution, House Resolution 503. Congress’ failure to act in accordance with its own rules is
judicially cognizable. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963). This is particularly
significant where a person’s fundamental rights are involved.
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108. The Select Committee as it currently stands—and stood at the time it issued the Salesforce
Subpoena—has no authority to conduct business because it is not a duly constituted Select
Committee.
109. The Committee is unconstitutionally attempting to exercise law enforcement authority,
rather than engaging in lawmaking pursuits, in violation of fundamental separation of powers
principles.
110. Congress’ investigatory powers are ancillary to its legislative authority; it has no law
enforcement power. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020).
111. The Committee has exceeded the scope of its authorizing resolution by seeking campaign
information that does not have a reasonable relation to the Committee’s functions and purposes.
112. The Salesforce Subpoena is invalid and unenforceable.
CLAIM V
(The Salesforce Subpoena is excessively broad and unduly burdensome.)
114. The Salesforce Subpoena seeks information unrelated to any potential legislation.
115. The Salesforce Subpoena seeks Plaintiff’s campaign information including volunteer,
donor coalition member and organizational information.
116. The breadth of the Salesforce Subpoena is apparent in that it is in no way tailored to the
Select Committee’s purpose as articulated in H.R. 503. For example, the Salesforce Subpoena
requests “[a]ll performance metrics and analytics related to email campaigns by or on behalf of. .
. the Republican National Committee. . .” for the period of November 3, 2021 through January 6,
2022. It also requests “[a]ll records related to login session by individuals associated with the. . .
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RNC into Salesforce’s Marketing Cloud platform, including all related metadata” for the same
period.
117. Included within the sweep of these “all” requests would be voluminous emails and logins
associated with “get out the vote” efforts on the November 3rd Election Day, the Georgia U.S.
Senate runoff elections held on January 5, 2022, and other political activity of the RNC unrelated
to the presidential election.
118. This irrelevant information would not serve to inform any activity by the Select
Committee, let alone any valid legislative action. Indeed, one struggles to fathom how confidential
RNC political analytics would serve Congress in the permissible execution of its constitutional
function.
119. The Salesforce Subpoena would capture donor, volunteer and supporter information that
in no way “pertain[s] to presidential activities on or around January 6th, or surrounding the election
and its aftermath.” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2021). This might include, for
example, information related to Election Day itself, the 2022 Georgia Senate Runoff, and other
political activities of the RNC unrelated to the presidential election.
120. In addition to seeking information that could not possibly bear on the passage of any law,
the Salesforce Subpoena represents a novel and sweeping vision of Congressional investigative
authority.
121. The Select Committee has taken upon itself to subpoena a third-party corporation to
obtain minute information about RNC political activity analytics over a monthslong period. The
Salesforce Subpoena represents an attempt to extend Congressional fact-finding authority beyond
even the powers of the Executive Branch, which cannot obtain this kind of information without a
warrant. And it does so with merely a perfunctory attempt at identifying a legislative purpose.
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CLAIM VI
(The Salesforce Subpoena violates the Stored Communications Act.)
123. The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712, prohibits the Select
Committee from obtaining the subpoenaed records from Salesforce.
124. The Committee’s Salesforce Subpoena appears to seek the actual content of
communications stored on Salesforce’s servers by requesting the production “message attributes”
associated with Plaintiff’s email campaigns, as well as the private communications of Plaintiff’s
staff that are stored on Salesforce’s servers.
125. The production of such materials is unlawful because, under the Stored Communications
Act, Salesforce may “not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service” and may “knowingly divulge a record
or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any
governmental entity.” § 2702(a)(1) and (3).
126. Furthermore, Congress lacks the authority to subpoena those materials from an electronic
communication service. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) and (b). Although content can be
disclosed to a “governmental entity” under specific, narrow circumstances, Congress is not a
“governmental entity” because, as the legislative branch, it is not a “department or agency of the
United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4). And no other provision in the Act authorizes Congress to
access the content sought by the Salesforce Subpoena.
127. Section 2702(a)(1) therefore prohibits knowing disclosure of “the contents of a
communication” stored by Salesforce to the Select Committee absent an express statutory
exception outlined in Section 2702(b).
128. None of the statutory exceptions in Section 2702(b) apply to the Salesforce Subpoena.
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129. The Select Committee cannot obtain the subpoenaed records under Section 2702(c)(1)
because disclosure would not be “as otherwise authorized in section 2703.” 18 U.S.C. §
2702(c)(1). Specifically, on information and belief, the Select Committee has not obtained and
cannot obtain “a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure . . . by a court of competent jurisdiction,” as would be required to obtain records “in
electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred days or less.” Id.
§ 2703(a). Nor has the Select Committee provided Plaintiff or Salesforce with “prior notice” and
obtained either (i) “an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal
or State grand jury or trial subpoena” or (ii) “a court order,” as would be required to obtain records
“in electronic storage . . . for more than one hundred and eighty days.” Id. § 2703(a), (b)(1).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter judgment in its favor and against Defendants
and to order the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that the Salesforce Subpoena violates Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights;
b. A declaratory judgment that the Salesforce Subpoena violates Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights;
c. A declaratory judgment that the Salesforce Subpoena serves no valid legislative
purpose and exceeds the Select Committee’s constitutional authority;
d. A declaratory judgment that the Salesforce Subpoena is excessively broad and
unduly burdensome.
e. A declaratory judgment that Salesforce’s compliance with the Salesforce Subpoena
would violate the Stored Communications Act;
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f. A declaratory judgment that the Select Committee lacks necessary congressional
authorization;
g. A declaratory judgment that the Salesforce Subpoena is ultra vires, unlawful, and
unenforceable;
h. In the alternative, an order modifying the Salesforce Subpoena to seek only
unprivileged information that does not infringe on Plaintiff’s constitutional rights;
i. An injunction quashing the Salesforce Subpoena and prohibiting its enforcement
by Defendants;
j. An injunction prohibiting Defendants from imposing sanctions for noncompliance
with the Salesforce Subpoena;
k. An injunction prohibiting Defendants from inspecting, using, maintaining, or
disclosing any information obtained as a result of the Salesforce Subpoena;
l. An award in favor of Plaintiff for its reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees
and costs, incurred as a result of the Salesforce Subpoena; and
m. Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted this 9th day of March, 2022.
BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
By: s/ Christopher O. Murray

Christopher O. Murray
Julian R. Ellis, Jr.(pro hac vice forthcoming)
410 17th Street, Suite 2200
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303.223.1100
Fax: 303.223.1111
Email: cmurray@bhfs.com
jellis@bhfs.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Republican National

Committee
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Case 1:22-cv-00659 Document 1-1 Filed 03/09/22 Page 1 of 13
EXHIBIT A
(Subpoena)
EXHIBIT B
(Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss)
Case 8:21-cv-02956-MSS-SPF
Case 1:22-cv-00659 Document
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MICHAEL FLYNN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 8:21-cv-2956-MSS-SPF
)
NANCY PELOSI, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND.................................................................................................. 3
A. The January 6 Attack ......................................................................... 3
B. The Formation of the Select Committee ............................................. 3
C. The Select Committee’s Subpoena to Mr. Flynn ................................. 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................. 5
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 5
I. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction. .............................................. 5
A. The Speech or Debate Clause and Sovereign Immunity Preclude

the Relief Mr. Flynn Seeks. ................................................................ 5
B. Sovereign Immunity Independently Requires Dismissal. ................... 10
II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Which Relief Can be Granted. ................ 11
A. The Select Committee Has a Valid Legislative Purpose. .................... 11
B. The Select Committee is Validly Constituted. ................................... 12
1. The Rulemaking Clause Bars Federal Courts from

Considering Claims About the Select Committee’s Internal
Operations. ............................................................................ 12
2. The Select Committee is Properly Composed. ......................... 14
C. The Select Committee’s Subpoena Is Valid and Enforceable. ............. 18
D. Mr. Flynn Fails to State a Proper Constitutional Challenge to the

Subpoena. ....................................................................................... 20
1. The Subpoena Does Not Violate Mr. Flynn’s Fourth

Amendment Rights. ............................................................... 20
2. The Subpoena Does Not Violate Mr. Flynn’s Fifth

i
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3. The Subpoena Does Not Violate Mr. Flynn’s First

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 25
ii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................................................................................... 5
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) ........................................................................................ 12
Barenblatt v. United States,

360 U.S. 109 (1959) ........................................................................................ 24
Brock v. Loc. 375, Plumbers Int’l Union of Am., AFL-CIO,

860 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1988) ........................................................................... 25
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,

62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995)............................................................................. 8
Bryant v. Jones,
575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 6
Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976)....................................................................................... 24, 25
Budowich v. Pelosi,
No. 21-cv-3366 (JEB) (D.D.C., Boasberg, J.) ........................................ 12, 13, 14
Chapman v. Space Qualified Sys. Corp.,

647 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Fla. 1986) .................................................................8, 9
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund,

421 U.S. 491 (1975) ................................................................................... passim
Eastman v. Thompson,
No. 8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal., Carter, J.), ECF 43 (Jan.
25, 2022) ............................................................................................. 12, 14, 17
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel,

441 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1977) ...............................................................6, 9
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011,

670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 23
iii
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Gravel v. United States,

408 U.S. 606 (1972) .......................................................................................... 6
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,

515 U.S. 417 (1995) ........................................................................................ 14
Howard v. Off. of Chief Admin. Officer,

720 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................... 7
INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) ........................................................................................ 13
Kastigar v. United States,

406 U.S. 441 (1972) ........................................................................................ 22
Keener v. Congress,
467 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1972) ........................................................................... 10
Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880) ..................................................................................... 6, 10
Lane v. Peña,
518 U.S. 187 (1996) ........................................................................................ 10
Lawrence v. Dunbar,
919 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................... 5
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......................................................................................... 5
McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927) ........................................................................................ 10
McLean v. United States,

566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................... 10
McPhaul v. United States,

364 U.S. 372 (1960) ................................................................................... 19, 21
Metzenbaum v. FERC,
675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ....................................................................... 13
Nat’l Physicians Holding Co. v. Middlebury Equity Partners, LLC,

No. 7:09-CV-21, 2018 WL 1053538 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2018) ......................... 22
iv
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Rangel v. Boehner,
20 F. Supp. 3d 148 (D.D.C. 2013) ................................................................... 12
Rangel v. Boehner,
785 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015)............................................................................. 9
In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials Grand Jury No. 81-1, Miami,
833 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1987) .......................................................................... 7
Rockefeller v. Bingaman,
234 F. App’x 852 (10th Cir. 2007) ................................................................... 10
Sallah v. Worldwide Clearing LLC,

855 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2012) ............................................................. 22
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation v. Ferrer,

856 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 8
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,

140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020)....................................................................................... 8
Trump v. Thompson,
20 F.4th 10 (D.C. Cir. 2021), injunction denied, 142 S. Ct. 680 (2022),
cert. denied, No. 21-932 (Feb. 22, 2022) ....................................................... passim
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Okla. v. FCC,

933 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ......................................................................... 16
United States v. Argomaniz,

925 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1991) ........................................................................ 22
United States v. Brewster,

408 U.S. 501 (1972) .......................................................................................... 6
United States v. Durenberger,

48 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ......................................................................... 13
United States. v. Mitchell,

463 U.S. 206 (1983) ........................................................................................ 10
United States v. Ponds,

454 F.3d 313 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ......................................................................... 23
United States v. Rostenkowski,

59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ......................................................................... 13
v
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Vander Jagt v. O’Neil,

699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .................................................................. 14, 17
Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc.,

956 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................... 6
Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm’n of Investigation,

406 U.S. 472 (1972) ........................................................................................ 22
Other Authorities
167 Cong. Rec. H37, 117th Cong. (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2021) ..................................... 16
167 Cong. Rec. H5748-69, 117th Cong. (daily ed., Oct. 21, 2021) ......................... 15
167 Cong. Rec., H7667-76, 117th Cong. (daily ed., Dec. 14, 2021) ........................ 15
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ................................................................ 16
8 Cannon’s Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives, § 2172 ............................... 16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).......................................................................................... 5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).......................................................................................... 5
H. Rep. No. 109-377, 109th Cong. (2006)............................................................. 15
H. Res. 6, 116th Cong. (2019) .............................................................................. 16
H. Res. 437, 109th Cong. (2005) .......................................................................... 15
H. Res 503, 117th Cong. (2021) ...................................................................... passim
H. Res. 567, 113th Cong. (2014) .......................................................................... 17
H. Res. 730, 117th Cong. (2021) .......................................................................... 15
H. Res. 851, 117th Cong. (2021) .......................................................................... 15
H. Rule XI ..................................................................................................... 17, 18
Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select

Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol (July 21,
2021), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2 ....................................... 4
U.S. Const. art. I, 6, cl. 1 ....................................................................................... 6
vi
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U.S. Const., art. I, § 5, cl. 2 .................................................................................. 12
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INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit is yet another in a stream of attempts to prevent a lawfully
constituted Congressional committee from “investigating the single most deadly
attack on the Capitol by domestic forces” in order to determine the need for
legislation to “ensur[e] the safe and uninterrupted conduct of [Congress’s]
constitutionally assigned business.” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 41-42 (D.C.
Cir. 2021), injunction denied, 142 S. Ct. 680 (2022), cert. denied, No. 21-932 (Feb. 22,
2022). Plaintiff Michael Flynn claims that he can disregard the Select Committee’s
subpoena, and he argues that this Court should enjoin the Select Committee from
sanctioning him for doing so. ECF 1 (“Compl.”), Prayer for Relief. In addition, he
seeks an order prohibiting the Select Committee from “inspecting, using,
maintaining, or disclosing any information obtained as a result of” its subpoena. Id.
¶ i. Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, as well as long-established constitutional
principles, compel rejection of these claims.
First, the Speech or Debate Clause, as well as sovereign immunity, requires
dismissal of Mr. Flynn’s Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In particular, the
Supreme Court held in Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975),
that the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits a private party from bringing a civil
action to challenge the validity of a Congressional subpoena. Yet that is precisely the
focus of Mr. Flynn’s complaint. Indeed, Mr. Flynn simply ignores Eastland.
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Further, this Court lacks jurisdiction because the Defendants all have sovereign
immunity, which has not been waived.
Second, Mr. Flynn is wrong that the Select Committee lacks a legitimate
legislative purpose. Every court that has considered this argument has rejected it.
See, e.g., Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th at 35-42.
Third, Mr. Flynn’s claim that the Select Committee is invalidly constituted
fails because the Constitution’s Rulemaking Clause gives the House of
Representatives the exclusive right to make and interpret its own rules regarding the
composition and operation of its committees. And the text of the House’s governing
resolution, the applicable House Rules, and the indisputable facts surrounding the
appointments of the Select Committee’s Members all belie Mr. Flynn’s specific
contentions—that the Speaker did not appoint the authorized number of Members or
consult sufficiently with the Minority Leader.
Finally, Mr. Flynn has not demonstrated that he suffered any constitutionally
cognizable harm as a result of the Select Committee’s subpoena.
In short, the Complaint conjures a variety of flawed legal claims to thwart the
Select Committee’s legitimate and compelling efforts to understand fully, and to
prevent a recurrence of, the events of January 6. The Court should dismiss the
Complaint in its entirety.
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BACKGROUND
A. The January 6 Attack
On January 6, 2021, domestic terrorists seeking to stop the peaceful transfer of
power following the 2020 Presidential election launched a violent assault on the
United States Capitol. H. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021), Preamble. As Mr. Flynn
himself describes the event, a large group “entered the U.S. Capitol, breached
security, and disrupted the counting of Electoral College votes until order was
restored.” Compl. ¶ 24.
B. The Formation of the Select Committee
In response to that unprecedented attack, the House of Representatives
adopted House Resolution 503, “establish[ing] the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.” That resolution authorizes the
Select Committee to: (1) “investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to
the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”; (2) “identify, review, and evaluate the
causes of and the lessons learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”;
and (3) “issue a final report to the House containing such findings, conclusions, and
recommendations for corrective measures … as it may deem necessary.” H. Res.
503, § 4(a)(1)-(3).
To carry out those functions, House Resolution 503 authorizes the Speaker of
the House to appoint up to thirteen Members to the Select Committee, five of whom
“shall be appointed after consultation with the minority leader.” H. Res. 503, § 2(a).
Consistent with the Resolution, the Speaker initially appointed seven Democrats and
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one Republican and then consulted with the House Minority Leader, who
recommended five additional Republicans. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 33. The Speaker then
spoke with the Minority Leader, advised that she would appoint three of those he
had recommended, and asked the Minority Leader to recommend two other
Republicans. 1 After the Minority Leader declined and, instead, withdrew all five of
his recommendations, the Speaker named an additional Republican to the Select
Committee. Id. ¶ 35. Since then, the Select Committee has functioned with seven
Democrats and two Republicans.
C. The Select Committee’s Subpoena to Mr. Flynn
In furtherance of its responsibility to “investigate the facts, circumstances, and
causes” of the January 6 attack, the Select Committee served Mr. Flynn with a
subpoena on November 9, 2021, to produce documents and testify at a deposition.
Id. ¶¶ 4, 53. The subpoena topics all relate to (1) efforts to challenge the results of the
2020 Presidential election; (2) rallies that occurred in Washington, D.C. leading up
to the January 6 rally, and (3) the violent attack on the Capitol that followed. Id.
¶ 54. Although Mr. Flynn asserts that he retained counsel to engage with the Select
Committee, and a vendor to collect responsive documents, id. ¶¶ 58-59, he
acknowledges that he never produced a single document and that he refused to
1
Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives, Pelosi Statement on Republican
Recommendations to Serve on the Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6 Attack on the U.S.
Capitol (July 21, 2021), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2 (“Pelosi Press Release”).
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appear for a deposition. Id. ¶¶ 8, 58-59. 2 Instead, on December 21, 2021, he filed
this lawsuit.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), Mr. Flynn has the burden of establishing this Court’s jurisdiction. See Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In determining whether it has
jurisdiction, “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the
existence of its power to hear the case … no presumptive truthfulness attaches to
plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude
the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Lawrence
v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645
F.2d 404, 412-13 (11th Cir. 1990)).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Mr. Flynn must allege
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
ARGUMENT
I. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A. The Speech or Debate Clause and Sovereign Immunity Preclude the

Relief Mr. Flynn Seeks
2
Mr. Flynn’s deposition is now scheduled for early March; he is legally required to appear.
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The Speech or Debate Clause completely bars Mr. Flynn’s Complaint. See
U.S. Const. art. I, 6, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that this
provision was not included in the Constitution “simply for the personal or private
benefit of Members of Congress.” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972).
Rather, interpreting the Clause “broadly to effectuate its purposes,” Eastland, 421
U.S. at 501, the Court has held that the Clause is intended “to protect the integrity of
the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators.”
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972). To
that end, the Clause prohibits lawsuits that challenge all acts “generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.”
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
The Clause achieves these goals by providing “both an absolute immunity
from being questioned about legislative activities, and the inherent, implied power to
conduct legislative activity.” In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp.
1299, 1304-05 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (citing Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504-05). As the
Eleventh Circuit has recognized, “[t]he Clause is designed to reinforce the
independence of the legislative branch and ensure that it will be able to perform the
whole of the legislative function ceded to it by the Constitution free of undue
interference.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009).
Among its many protections, the Clause prohibits challenges to legislative acts
via civil actions against Members of Congress, Congressional committees, and
Congressional aides. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503; Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp.,
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Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 1992) (the Clause “protect[s] its national
legislators from suit for acts done within the realm of their legislative duties”). This
is because “a private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a
distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their
legislative tasks to defend the litigation.” Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503. Such actions
may delay and disrupt the legislative function and imperil legislative independence
by bringing judicial power to bear on Congress. Id. Accordingly, “once it is
determined that Members are acting within the ‘legitimate legislative sphere’ the
Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference.” Id.; see also In re Request
for Access to Grand Jury Materials Grand Jury No. 81-1, Miami, 833 F.2d 1438, 1446
(11th Cir. 1987) (the Clause forbids a court to place limitations on a Congressional
committee’s use of subpoenaed materials). In other words, when a plaintiff seeks to
challenge “legislative acts,” the “Speech or Debate Clause operates as a jurisdictional
bar.” Howard v. Off. of Chief Admin. Officer, 720 F.3d 939, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted).
The Speech or Debate Clause bars this action: the Select Committee’s issuance
of a subpoena is legitimate legislative activity for which the Clause “provides
complete immunity for … Members [of Congress].” Eastland, 421 U.S. at 507. As
Eastland held, “the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws” and
the power to issue subpoenas “has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress
of its power to investigate.” Id. at 504. Investigations and subpoenas are
“indispensable ingredient[s] of lawmaking.” Id. at 505. “Without information,

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Congress would be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate ‘wisely or effectively.’”
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (quoting McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927)).
Federal courts have repeatedly dismissed lawsuits against Members of
Congress challenging Congressional subpoenas. E.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504
(“Issuance of subpoenas … has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of
its power to investigate.”); Chapman v. Space Qualified Sys. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 551,
553 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (subpoena issued by General Accounting Office as part of
investigation that Member of Congress requested could not be challenged in civil
action).
The immunity afforded by the Speech or Debate clause is so broad that federal
courts have applied it to lawsuits or actions that merely threaten to interfere with
Congress’s ability to gather information. E.g., Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigation v. Ferrer, 856 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (the Speech or Debate Clause
“bars this court from ordering a congressional committee to return, destroy, or
refrain from publishing … subpoenaed documents”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Speech or Debate Clause
prohibited subpoena to Congressman by company for its own privileged, possibly
stolen documents because it could “provide clues as to what Congress is doing, or
might be about to do”). Courts in this Circuit have likewise recognized that, under
the Speech or Debate Clause, they cannot interfere with Congress’s “inherent and
implied power to obtain information needed in order to enact legislation.”

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Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. at 1305-06; see also Chapman, 647 F. Supp. at 553-54.
This doctrine applies fully against Mr. Flynn’s arguments that the subpoena
and the Select Committee are illegitimate and unconstitutional. That “argument—
made in almost every Speech or Debate Clause case—has been rejected time and
again.” Rangel v. Boehner, 785 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Ven-Fuel, 441 F.
Supp. at 1305 (“[N]either the motives behind the legislative activity, nor the final
product resulting from legislative activity may be questioned by the courts or the
executive branch.”). This broad protection stems from the fact that the Clause
provides for “absolute” protection. Id. at 1305.
Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Eastland that Members of Congress cannot
be subject to constitutional claims in relation to the issuance of Congressional
subpoenas as part of an authorized Congressional investigation. 421 U.S. at 509-11.
Rejecting an organization’s argument that a Congressional subpoena violated its
First Amendment rights and that the subpoena’s purpose was to “‘harass, chill,
punish, and deter’ them in the exercise of their First Amendment rights,” the Court
explained that the argument “ignored the absolute nature of the speech or debate
protection,” which “provides an absolute immunity from judicial interference.” Id.
at 510 n.16.
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The same logic compels dismissal here. As in Eastland and the cases
interpreting and applying it, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate challenges to
the validity of a Congressional subpoena. 3
B. Sovereign Immunity Independently Requires Dismissal
Mr. Flynn’s suit is separately barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
because “the United States may not be sued without its consent and … the existence
of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
212 (1983). That protection applies to Congress as well. Keener v. Congress, 467 F.2d
952, 953 (5th Cir. 1972); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, sovereign immunity “forecloses ... claims against the House of
Representatives and Senate as institutions, and Representative[s] and Senator[s] as
individuals acting in their official capacities.” Rockefeller v. Bingaman, 234 F. App’x
852, 855 (10th Cir. 2007).
A plaintiff seeking to sue the Federal Government bears the burden of
identifying an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity that is “unequivocally
expressed in statutory text.” Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (waiver “will not
3
The cases cited in the Complaint for the proposition that a Congressional subpoena “may still be
invalid if the contemplated legislation would be unconstitutional,” Compl. ¶ 79, do not hold that a
court may entertain a lawsuit against Members of Congress to enjoin an investigation or invalidate
its process. To the contrary, the cited cases support the contrary rulings of the Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals discussed above. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204-05 (because of the broad immunity
afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause, habeas petition from a witness who had been imprisoned
for refusing to comply with a Congressional subpoena cannot validly name Members of Congress);
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174 (warrant issued to compel a witness to provide testimony and documents
during a Congressional investigation of his brother, then the Attorney General, upheld because “the
power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function”).
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be implied”). Mr. Flynn does not and cannot point to any such waiver. Nor can the
Select Committee’s actions be considered ultra vires; after all, the Select Committee’s
investigation, and the subpoenas issued in connection with it, were clearly and
expressly authorized by the full House and are consistent with its standing rules. See
H. Res 503. Because no waiver of sovereign immunity applies, the Complaint must
be dismissed.
II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Which Relief Can be Granted
Even if Mr. Flynn could overcome these jurisdictional bars, his Complaint
does not state a claim.
A. The Select Committee Has a Valid Legislative Purpose
Mr. Flynn alleges that the Select Committee and its investigation are not
pursuing legitimate legislative goals, Compl. ¶¶ 75-88, an argument that federal
courts have uniformly rejected.
In Trump v. Thompson, a challenge brought by former President Trump to the
Select Committee’s ability to investigate the January 6 attack, the D.C. Circuit
recognized:
The very essence of the Article I power is legislating, and so there would seem
to be few, if any, more imperative interests squarely within Congress’s
wheelhouse than ensuring the safe and uninterrupted conduct of its
constitutionally assigned business. Here, the House of Representatives is
investigating the single most deadly attack on the Capitol by domestic forces
in the history of the United States.
20 F.4th at 35.
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit concluded that “the January 6th Committee
plainly has a valid legislative purpose and its inquiry concern[s] a subject on which
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legislation could be had.” Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme
Court summarily denied Mr. Trump’s request for an injunction pending review of
the D.C. Circuit’s decision and denied certiorari as well. See 142 S. Ct. 680 (2022);
No. 21-932 (Feb. 22, 2022).
Recently, additional courts have ruled that the Committee is pursuing
legitimate legislative purposes. See Budowich v. Pelosi, No. 21-cv-3366 (JEB) (D.D.C.,
Boasberg, J.), Jan. 20, 2022 Oral Arg. Tr. at 34; Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-
00099-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal., Carter, J.), ECF 43 at 9-12 (Jan. 25, 2022). No court
has ruled or suggested otherwise and Mr. Flynn offers no reason to depart from these
holdings.
B. The Select Committee is Validly Constituted
Mr. Flynn also alleges that the Select Committee is not validly formed or
authorized. Compl. ¶¶ 65-74. Under the Constitution’s Rulemaking Clause, federal
courts have no jurisdiction to review such claims. Regardless, Mr. Flynn is incorrect.
1. The Rulemaking Clause Bars Federal Courts from Considering

Claims About the Select Committee’s Internal Operations
Mr. Flynn’s contention that Members of the Committee were improperly
selected is not cognizable. Under the Rulemaking Clause, “[e]ach House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). That provision is a critical aspect of the Legislative
Branch’s constitutional design as it “grants the House the power to make its own
Rules about its internal proceedings,” Rangel v. Boehner, 20 F. Supp. 3d 148, 167
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(D.D.C. 2013), which “only empowers Congress to bind itself,” INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 955 n.21 (1983).
Courts have long emphasized the deference owed to Congress in determining
its own rules. “[J]udicial interpretation of an ambiguous House Rule runs the risk of
the court intruding into the sphere of influence reserved to the legislative branch
under the Constitution.” United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1306 (D.C. Cir.
1995). Thus, a court’s jurisdiction to interpret internal rules of a House of Congress
is limited to situations where such interpretation “requires no resolution of
ambiguities.” United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
“Where, however, a court cannot be confident that its interpretation is correct, there
is too great a chance that it will interpret the Rule differently than would the
Congress itself; in that circumstance, the court would effectively be making the
Rules—a power that the Rulemaking Clause reserves to each House alone.”
Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d at 1306-07; accord Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (“To decide otherwise would subject Congressional enactments to
the threat of judicial invalidation on each occasion of dispute over the content or
effect of a House or Senate rule.”).
Another court recently recognized the judiciary’s limited role in reviewing
Congressional rules in the context of the Select Committee’s composition. In
Budowich, supra, the court explained that it would reject arguments similar to those
Mr. Flynn makes here: the court would “have to defer to Congress in the manner of
interpreting its rules,” and would be “usurping Congressional authority” were it to

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hold that the Select Committee was not validly composed. Jan. 20, 2022 Oral Arg.
Tr. 34:1-5, 8-10, Budowich v. Pelosi, No. 21-cv-3366 (JEB) (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2022); see
also Eastman, ECF 43 at 9 & n. 12; Vander Jagt v. O’Neil, 699 F.2d 1166, 1175-77
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming dismissal of relief sought by 14 House Republican
members claiming discrimination regarding committee assignments and rejecting the
“startlingly unattractive idea, given our respect for a coequal branch of government,
for us to tell the Speaker” whom to appoint to committees). For the same reasons,
Mr. Flynn’s challenges to the Select Committee’s composition rest on arguments not
subject to judicial review.
2. The Select Committee is Properly Composed
Mr. Flynn’s challenges to the Committee’s composition are, in any event,
incorrect.
First, Mr. Flynn complains that the Speaker has appointed only nine Members
to the Select Committee, rather than the thirteen House Resolution 503 allows.
Compl. ¶ 66, 69; H.Res. 503 § 2(a) (“The Speaker shall appoint 13 Members . . . .”).
But the Resolution does not require that all thirteen Members be appointed at once
for the Select Committee to function, nor does the authorization to appoint thirteen
Members require the appointment of that precise number. See Gutierrez de Martinez v.
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995) (recognizing that “shall” sometimes means
“may”). Indeed, there is House precedent for such a select committee having fewer
than its full allotment of Members. In the 109th Congress, for instance, the House
created the Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
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Hurricane Katrina, which allowed for twenty Members, using similar language. See
H. Res. 437, § 2(a), 109th Cong. (2005) (“The select committee shall be composed of
20 members appointed by the Speaker ….”). House Speaker Dennis Hastert
appointed only eleven Members, all of whom were from the Republican majority
party. See H. Rep. No. 109-377, ii, 109th Cong. (2006) (listing Members appointed
by Speaker Hastert). In fact, the Resolution even contemplates the possibility of
“vacancies” but does not provide a specific timeline for filling them. H. Res. 503,
§ 2(c). Nor does the Resolution provide that the Select Committee becomes invalid
or that it must suspend all action when vacancies arise. Id.
The fact that the full House has affirmatively ratified actions of the Select
Committee confirms that the Select Committee is duly constituted. The full House
approved the Select Committee’s referrals of Steven Bannon and Mark Meadows for
contempt of Congress. See H. Res. 730, 117th Cong. (2021) (Bannon); H. Res. 851,
117th Cong. (2021) (Meadows). Both resolutions were reported by the Select
Committee and approved by the full House. See 167 Cong. Rec. H5748-69, 117th
Cong. (daily ed., Oct. 21, 2021); id. at H7667-76 (daily ed., Dec. 14, 2021). The full
House’s ratification of the referrals shows that Mr. Flynn’s objections to its
composition are meritless.
Second, Mr. Flynn complains that the Minority Leader did not recommend the
Republican Members of the Select Committee. Compl. ¶¶ 33-35, 66, 70. But the
power to appoint House Members to select committees rests exclusively with the
Speaker of the House. See House Rule I.11 (“The Speaker shall appoint all select,
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joint, and conference committees ordered by the House.”); 167 Cong. Rec. H37,
117th Cong. (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2021) (authorizing Speaker to “accept resignations and
to make appointments authorized by law or by the House”). This is consistent with
longstanding House precedent. See 8 Cannon’s Precedents of the U.S. House of
Representatives, § 2172 (citing “instances in which the majority declined to recognize
minority recommendations for committee assignments”).
House Resolution 503 is not to the contrary. Had the House intended a
binding role for the Minority Leader, it could have legislated one, as it has in the
past. See H. Res. 6, § 104(f)(1)(B), 116th Cong. (2019) (Select Committee on the
Climate Crisis); id. at § 201(b)(3) (Select Committee on the Modernization of
Congress).
In contrast, when creating the Select Committee, the House only required that
Members be chosen “after consultation with the Minority Leader,” H. Res. 503, § 2(a)
(emphasis added), which allows the Speaker greater authority regarding the
appointment of minority party Members. “Consultation” means to “seek[] advice or
information of.’” United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Okla. v. FCC, 933 F.3d
728, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “consultation” as “[t]he act of asking the advice
or opinion of someone”). This language is consistent with House practice and
precedent: The same language was used in the resolutions that created both the
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
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Hurricane Katrina, see supra, and the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding
the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, see H. Res. 567, § 2(a), 113th Cong. (2014).
Here, House Resolution 503 was followed: the Minority Leader was consulted.
Compl. ¶¶ 33-34 & supra nn. 1 & 2. Indeed, as Mr. Flynn admits, the Minority
Leader made several suggestions to the Speaker regarding minority party Members
to serve on the Select Committee, Compl. ¶ 33, and as the news articles referenced in
the Complaint note, the Speaker announced her intention to appoint three of the five
minority party Members recommended by the Minority Leader. See Compl. n.5.
The fact that the Speaker—using her authority under House Rules; the January 4,
2021 Order of the House; and House Resolution 503—made different selections as to
two Members, and that the Minority Leader subsequently withdrew his
recommendations, does not make the Select Committee improperly constituted, nor
does it invalidate any of its actions. There is no basis for a court to substitute its
interpretation of the terms “shall” and “consultation” for the House’s view. See
Barker, 921 F.3d at 1130; Eastman ECF 43 at 9 & n. 12; Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1175.
Third, Mr. Flynn complains that the subpoena is invalid because the Select
Committee lacks a “ranking minority Member,” who must be consulted before any
committee subpoena can issue. See Compl. ¶¶ 72-73. That argument is wrong.
House Resolution 503 does not require consultation with the ranking minority
Member before issuing a subpoena for documents; instead, it provides that the “chair
of the Select Committee may authorize and issue subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m)
of [House] rule XI.” See H. Res. 503, § 5(c)(4). In turn, House Rule XI.2(m) permits
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issuance of subpoenas for documents when the power to authorize and issue
subpoenas has been “delegated to the chair of the committee under such rules and
under such limitations as the committee may prescribe.” Id. Because House
Resolution 503 specifically delegates to the Chairman of the Select Committee the
power to authorize and issue subpoenas, it is consistent with House Rule
XI.2(m)(3)(A)(i). Finally, to the extent House Resolution 503 requires consultation
with the “ranking minority member” prior to the issuance of a deposition subpoena,
the Chairman satisfied that requirement by consulting Vice Chair Liz Cheney, who,
by virtue of the date of her appointment is the most senior Republican Member of
the Select Committee. That is sufficient for purposes of House Resolution 503. See
supra at 15 (noting that the full House has ratified actions of the Select
Committee). Here, the Chairman has determined that House Resolution 503 has
been complied with by consultation with Vice Chair Cheney. As previously
discussed, see supra at B.1, the Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution requires that
the judiciary defer to the House regarding the interpretation and application of the
House’s own rules and procedures.
C. The Select Committee’s Subpoena Is Valid and Enforceable
Mr. Flynn challenges the validity of the Select Committee and its authority to
issue the subpoena to him by arguing that it does not further any valid legislative
purpose or, alternatively, that this subpoena is not relevant to that purpose. Compl.
¶¶ 75-88. These claims are wrong. In determining the proper scope of a legislative
subpoena, this Court may only inquire as to whether the documents sought by the
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subpoena are “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose [of the Select
Committee] in the discharge of [its] duties.” McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372,
381 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The relevance of the records sought from Mr. Flynn is plain. As discussed
above, House Resolution 503 explicitly authorizes the Select Committee to
investigate “influencing factors that contributed to the domestic terrorist attack on
the Capitol.” H. Res. 503, § 4(a)(1)(B). One such potential influencing factor is the
desire of the January 6 protestors to overturn the results of the 2020 Presidential
election and their apparent belief (championed by Mr. Flynn) that the election was
invalid. The Select Committee must therefore obtain testimony and any evidence,
including communications, that Mr. Flynn—who was openly challenging the
validity of the election—possesses relating either to efforts to overturn or to discredit
the election or to Flynn’s involvement in the election. The subpoena seeks such
information. See Compl. ¶ 54 (noting subpoena requests for “[c]ommunications
referring or relating in any way to plans, efforts, or discussions regarding challenging,
decertifying, overturning, or contesting the results of the 2020 Presidential election”).
The remainder of the documents requested from Mr. Flynn concern his role in
events leading up to, on, and immediately after January 6, 2021. See id. (requesting,
inter alia, “[a]ll documents or communications relating to the January 6, 2021
attack”; “[a]ll documents and communications relating to protests, marches, public
assemblies, rallies, and speeches in Washington, DC on November 4, 2020,
December 12, 2020, January 5, 2021, and January 6, 2021”; and “[d]ocuments or
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other materials referring to or relating to the financing or fundraising associated with
the [rallies]”). Again, these requests are easily within the scope of the Select
Committee’s legislative purpose.
D. Mr. Flynn Fails to State a Proper Constitutional Challenge to the

Subpoena
The Court should reject Mr. Flynn’s constitutional challenges to the subpoena
as foreclosed by Eastland. See supra I.A. Members of Congress are absolutely
immune from such challenges. Regardless, Mr. Flynn’s constitutional arguments fail
for the following additional reasons.
1. The Subpoena Does Not Violate Mr. Flynn’s Fourth

Amendment Rights
The D.C. Circuit recently held in Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th at 24, that
“Congress’s power to obtain information is broad and indispensable ... and
encompasses inquiries into the administration of existing laws, studies of proposed
laws, and surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the
purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.” (internal punctuation omitted).
“[T]he January 6th Committee plainly has a valid legislative purpose and its inquiry
concern[s] a subject on which legislation could be had.” Id. at 41 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In light of this holding, Mr. Flynn’s argument that the subpoena violates the
Fourth Amendment because it “is so broad and indefinite as to exceed the lawfully
authorized purpose of the Select Committee,” Compl. ¶¶ 97-100, is mistaken. A
subpoena is not impermissibly overbroad if its call for documents or testimony is
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within the scope of the Congressional inquiry at issue. See McPhaul, 364 U.S. at 382.
As described above, the Select Committee’s inquiry includes examining the January
6 attack as well as its “circumstances” and “causes,” to inform consideration of
“changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or regulations.” H. Res. 503 § (3)(1), 4(c).
Given that scope, the subpoena is appropriately tailored to meet the Select
Committee’s mandate and is not impermissibly broad. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509.
Specifically, Mr. Flynn objects to the subpoena’s request for documents and
communications relating to election security, political strategy regarding campaign
messages, and communications involving the 2020 election. Compl. ¶ 101. Each of
these topics involves facts relating to the motivations behind the January 6 attack and
the peaceful transfer of power. Given that an express purpose of the Select
Committee is to “investigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and causes ...
relating to the interference with the peaceful transfer of power,” documents relating
to discussions about unsubstantiated allegations of voter fraud and overturning the
2020 Presidential election are clearly within the ambit of its inquiry. See McPhaul,
364 U.S. at 382. Thus, the Subpoena is not overbroad and does not violate Mr.
Flynn’s Fourth Amendment rights.
2. The Subpoena Does Not Violate Mr. Flynn’s Fifth

Amendment Rights
The Complaint alleges that the subpoena violates Mr. Flynn’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Compl. ¶ 105. For
several reasons, that claim fails as a matter of law.
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First, Mr. Flynn’s blanket Fifth Amendment objection is improper. “It is well
established that a person may not make a blanket objection to testifying or producing
records based on Fifth Amendment privilege, but instead, must invoke the privilege
question by question or request by request.” Sallah v. Worldwide Clearing LLC, 855 F.
Supp. 2d 1364, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing United States v. Roundtree, 420 F. 2d 845,
852 (5th Cir. 1969)). “The ban on blanket Fifth Amendment objections prevents a
person from wholesale refusing to answer any questions or to produce any
documents without specifically considering whether the information sought may
actually raise a ‘substantial and real hazard of self-incrimination.’” Nat’l Physicians
Holding Co. v. Middlebury Equity Partners, LLC, No. 7:09-CV-21, 2018 WL 1053538, at
*2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2018) (quoting United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1353
(11th Cir. 1991)). Here, Mr. Flynn has refused to comply with the subpoena without
invoking the privilege on a question-by-question or document-by-document basis.
For this reason alone, his Fifth Amendment claim fails.
Second, Mr. Flynn has not pointed to any substantial, nonspeculative
possibility of self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment privilege protects disclosures
that a witness “reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could
lead to other evidence that might be so used.” Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
444-45 (1972) (emphasis added). The threat of self-incrimination must be a “real
danger[], not remote and speculative possibilities.” Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm’n of
Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972); see also Argomaniz, 925 F.2d at 1353. Mr.
Flynn’s Fifth Amendment claim appears to rest on a “current and active criminal
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investigation into a nonprofit General Flynn briefly served as a director.” Compl. ¶
54; see also id. ¶¶ 10, 57, 106, 108. But he points to no real, nonspeculative possibility
that he will be prosecuted.
Third, Mr. Flynn has not plausibly alleged that the act of producing
documents will convey some statement of facts that could be used against him in a
criminal prosecution. Courts have recognized a narrow Fifth Amendment protection
for “the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena” where it “may
implicitly communicate statements of fact.” United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 319
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Flynn alleges that his act of
producing documents could reveal “the persons with whom he communicated, the
times of those communications in relation to other events, and the frequency of any
such communications.” Compl. ¶ 106. But the relevant question is not whether the
“contents” of the documents are incriminating; it “is whether the act of production
may have some testimonial quality.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). Mr.
Flynn alleges his producing documents would violate the Fifth Amendment “to the
extent that admissions that certain records exist, that they are in his possession, and
that they are authentic may be used as evidence against him” in a criminal
investigation (Compl. ¶ 108), but that conclusory allegation fails to explain how the
production of these requested documents would convey such admissions in a way that
could be used against him. Mr. Flynn’s Fifth Amendment assertion fails.
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3. The Subpoena Does Not Violate Mr. Flynn’s First Amendment

Rights
Mr. Flynn also argues that the subpoena violates his First Amendment rights,
but this argument is squarely foreclosed by Eastland. There, the Supreme Court
rejected an organization’s argument that a Congressional subpoena’s purpose was to
“‘harass, chill, punish, and deter’ [it] in the exercise of [] First Amendment rights,”
explaining that the typical First Amendment balancing test “plays no part” when a
Congressional subpoena is involved, and the Speech or Debate Clause “provides an
absolute immunity from judicial interference.” Id. at 510 n.16. Mr. Flynn’s First
Amendment arguments against enforcement of the Select Committee’s subpoena
accordingly must be dismissed.
Even if Mr. Flynn’s claim were subject to a balancing test, it would still fail:
the balancing of “the competing private and public interests at stake” here plainly
favors the Select Committee. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
The Supreme Court has made clear that the public interest is extremely high when
the focus is on ensuring “the free functioning of our national institutions.” Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Select
Committee is doing precisely that by seeking testimony and records from Mr. Flynn.
Mr. Flynn, by contrast, fails to assert any First Amendment interest that could
outweigh the very grave public interest here. His conclusory assertions that “[t]he
Subpoena is also a clear effort to chill the speech of the Committee Member’s
political adversaries,” Compl. ¶ 91, and is a “massive infringement and chilling of his
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1st Amendment rights,” Compl. ¶ 94, are too amorphous to be actionable. Courts
require far more specificity, which is simply lacking here. 4
Even if Mr. Flynn were able to substantiate a legitimate interest implicated by
the subpoena, the Select Committee’s interest far outweighs his interest. The Select
Committee’s subpoena seeks records relevant to determining the root causes of the
January 6 insurrection that aimed to prevent Congress from carrying out its
constitutional responsibility to officially count the state electoral votes. This is a
paradigmatic example of the governmental interest in the “free functioning of our
national institutions.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to
state a First Amendment claim on which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should dismiss the Complaint in its
entirety.
4
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 (stating that showing an associational injury requires demonstrating a
“reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure” “will subject them to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties”); see also Brock v. Loc. 375, Plumbers Int'l
Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that courts have “emphasized in
each of those decisions … the need for objective and articulable facts, which go beyond broad
allegations or subjective fears.…[A] merely subjective fear of future reprisals is an insufficient
showing of infringement of associational rights.”).
25
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Douglas N. Letter

DOUGLAS N. LETTER
General Counsel
TODD B. TATELMAN
Principal Deputy General Counsel
ERIC R. COLUMBUS
Special Litigation Counsel
STACIE M. FAHSEL
Associate General Counsel
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
5140 O’Neill House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-9700
Douglas.Letter@mail.house.gov
John A. Freedman*
Paul Fishman*
Amy Jeffress*
David J. Weiner*
John M. Hindley*
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
601 Massachusetts Ave, NW
(202) 942-5000
John.Freedman@arnoldporter.com
Paul.Fishman@arnoldporter.com
Amy.Jeffress@arnoldporter.com
David.Weiner@arnoldporter.com
John.Hindley@arnoldporter.com
SHER TREMONTE LLP

Justin M. Sher*
Michael Tremonte*
Noam Biale*
Maya Brodziak*
Kathryn E. Ghotbi*
90 Broad Street, 23rd Floor
New York, New York 10004
(212) 202-2600
26
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JSher@shertremonte.com
MTremonte@shertremonte.com
NBiale@shertremonte.com
MBrodziak@shertremonte.com
KGhotbi@shertremonte.com
*
Appearing pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 5571(a).
27
CIVIL COVER SHEET
JS-44 (Rev. 11/2020 DC)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE NANCY PELOSI et al.
D.C.
(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF _____________________ D.C.
COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT _____________________
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED
(c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER) ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN)
Christopher O. Murray Douglas N. Letter, Office of the General Counsel
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP 2190 Cannon House Office Building
410 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2200 Washington, D.C. 20515
Denver, CO 80202
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX FOR
(PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY) PLAINTIFF AND ONE BOX FOR DEFENDANT) FOR DIVERSITY CASES ONLY!
o 1 U.S. Government o 3 Federal Question

PTF DFT
o1 o1
PTF
o4 o4
DFT
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of this State Incorporated or Principal Place
of Business in This State
o 2 U.S. Government o 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State o2 o2 Incorporated and Principal Place o5 o5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of
of Business in Another State
Parties in item III) Citizen or Subject of a
Foreign Country
o3 o3 Foreign Nation o6 o6
IV. CASE ASSIGNMENT AND NATURE OF SUIT
(Place an X in one category, A-N, that best represents your Cause of Action and one in a corresponding Nature of Suit)
o A. Antitrust o B. Personal Injury/ o C. Administrative Agency o D. Temporary Restraining
Malpractice Review Order/Preliminary
410 Antitrust Injunction
310 Airplane 151 Medicare Act
315 Airplane Product Liability Any nature of suit from any category
320 Assault, Libel & Slander Social Security
may be selected for this category of
861 HIA (1395ff)
330 Federal Employers Liability case assignment.
862 Black Lung (923)
340 Marine
863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) *(If Antitrust, then A governs)*
345 Marine Product Liability
864 SSID Title XVI
350 Motor Vehicle
865 RSI (405(g))
355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Other Statutes
360 Other Personal Injury
891 Agricultural Acts
362 Medical Malpractice
893 Environmental Matters
365 Product Liability
890 Other Statutory Actions (If
367 Health Care/Pharmaceutical
Administrative Agency is
Personal Injury Product Liability
Involved)
368 Asbestos Product Liability
o E. General Civil (Other) OR o F. Pro Se General Civil

Real Property Bankruptcy Federal Tax Suits
210 Land Condemnation 422 Appeal 27 USC 158 870 Taxes (US plaintiff or 465 Other Immigration Actions
220 Foreclosure 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 defendant) 470 Racketeer Influenced
230 Rent, Lease & Ejectment 871 IRS-Third Party 26 USC & Corrupt Organization
240 Torts to Land Prisoner Petitions 7609
480 Consumer Credit
245 Tort Product Liability 535 Death Penalty
Forfeiture/Penalty 485 Telephone Consumer
290 All Other Real Property 540 Mandamus & Other
625 Drug Related Seizure of Protection Act (TCPA)
550 Civil Rights
Property 21 USC 881 490 Cable/Satellite TV
Personal Property 555 Prison Conditions
690 Other 850 Securities/Commodities/
370 Other Fraud 560 Civil Detainee – Conditions
Exchange
371 Truth in Lending of Confinement
Other Statutes 896 Arbitration
380 Other Personal Property
375 False Claims Act 899 Administrative Procedure
Damage Property Rights
376 Qui Tam (31 USC Act/Review or Appeal of
385 Property Damage 820 Copyrights
3729(a)) Agency Decision
Product Liability 830 Patent
400 State Reapportionment 950 Constitutionality of State
835 Patent – Abbreviated New
430 Banks & Banking Statutes
Drug Application
450 Commerce/ICC Rates/etc 890 Other Statutory Actions
840 Trademark
460 Deportation (if not administrative agency
880 Defend Trade Secrets Act of
462 Naturalization review or Privacy Act)
2016 (DTSA)
Application
o G. Habeas Corpus/ o H. Employment o I. FOIA/Privacy Act o J. Student Loan
2255 Discrimination
530 Habeas Corpus – General 442 Civil Rights – Employment 895 Freedom of Information Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted
510 Motion/Vacate Sentence (criteria: race, gender/sex, 890 Other Statutory Actions Student Loan
463 Habeas Corpus – Alien national origin, (if Privacy Act) (excluding veterans)
Detainee discrimination, disability, age,
religion, retaliation)
*(If pro se, select this deck)* *(If pro se, select this deck)*
o K. Labor/ERISA o L. Other Civil Rights o M. Contract o N. Three-Judge

(non-employment) (non-employment) Court
110 Insurance
710 Fair Labor Standards Act 441 Voting (if not Voting Rights 120 Marine 441 Civil Rights – Voting
720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations Act) 130 Miller Act (if Voting Rights Act)
740 Labor Railway Act 443 Housing/Accommodations 140 Negotiable Instrument
751 Family and Medical 440 Other Civil Rights 150 Recovery of Overpayment
Leave Act 445 Americans w/Disabilities – & Enforcement of
790 Other Labor Litigation Employment Judgment
791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act 446 Americans w/Disabilities – 153 Recovery of Overpayment
Other of Veteran’s Benefits
448 Education 160 Stockholder’s Suits
190 Other Contracts
195 Contract Product Liability
196 Franchise
V. ORIGIN
o 1 Original o 2 Removed o 3 Remanded o 4 Reinstated o 5 Transferred o 6 Multi-district o 7 Appeal to o 8 Multi-district
Proceeding from State from Appellate or Reopened from another Litigation District Judge Litigation –
Court Court district (specify) from Mag. Direct File
Judge
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE.)
Violation of the 1st & 4th Amendments; U.S. Const. Article I and Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701, et seq.)
VII. REQUESTED IN CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS DEMAND $ Check YES only if demanded in complaint
COMPLAINT ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 JURY DEMAND: YES NO ✘
VIII. RELATED CASE(S) (See instruction)
YES NO ✘ If yes, please complete related case form
IF ANY
3/9/2022
DATE: _________________________
/s/ Christopher O. Murray
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD _________________________________________________________
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET JS-44

Authority for Civil Cover Sheet
The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and services of pleadings or other papers as required
by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the
Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed.
Listed below are tips for completing the civil cover sheet. These tips coincide with the Roman Numerals on the cover sheet.
I. COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT (b) County of residence: Use 11001 to indicate plaintiff if resident
of Washington, DC, 88888 if plaintiff is resident of United States but not Washington, DC, and 99999 if plaintiff is outside the United States.
III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES: This section is completed only if diversity of citizenship was selected as the Basis of Jurisdiction
under Section II.
IV. CASE ASSIGNMENT AND NATURE OF SUIT: The assignment of a judge to your case will depend on the category you select that best
represents the primary cause of action found in your complaint. You may select only one category. You must also select one corresponding
nature of suit found under the category of the case.
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION: Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of the primary cause.
VIII. RELATED CASE(S), IF ANY: If you indicated that there is a related case, you must complete a related case form, which may be obtained from
the Clerk’s Office.
Because of the need for accurate and complete information, you should ensure the accuracy of the information provided prior to signing the form.
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12; DC 3/15) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
__________ District
District of __________
of Columbia
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE )

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Nancy Pelosi, in her official capacity as Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives
1236 Longworth House Office Building
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,
whose name and address are:
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP
410 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2200
Denver, CO 80202
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
ANGELA D. CAESAR, CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)

was received by me on (date) .
’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date) ; or
’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
’ I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is

designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date) ; or
’ I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or
’ Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Server’s signature
Printed name and title
Server’s address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:
Print Save As... Reset


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Bennie W. Thompson, in his official capacity as Chair of the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
2466 Rayburnouse Office Building
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Elizabeth L. Cheney, in her official capacity as Vice Chair of the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
416 Cannon House Office Building
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Adam B. Schiff, in his official capacity as a member of the United States House of
Representatives,
2309 Rayburn House Office Building
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Jamie B. Raskin, in his official capacity as a member of the United States House of
Representatives,
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Susan E. Lofgren, in her official capacity as a member of the United States House of
Representatives,
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Elaine G. Luria, in her official capacity as a member of the United States House of
Representatives,

Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Peter R. Aguilar, in his official capacity as a member of the United States House of
Representatives,
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Stephanie Murphy, in her official capacity as a member of the United States House of
Representatives,
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Adam D. Kinzinger, in his official capacity as a member of the United States House of
Representatives,
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District
of Columbia

)
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
)
)
Defendant(s) )
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
Longworth House Office Building
Denver, CO 80202
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address

RNC v. Jan 6 Cmte

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Case 1:22-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 03/09/22 Page 1 of 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

capacity as a member of the United States )

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the enforcement of an overbroad, unauthorized

RNC in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

individuals with whom the organizations have engaged.

5. The Select Committee’s subpoena (“Salesforce Subpoena”) includes a staggeringly broad

political strategies and to private, personal information regarding its supporters.

the Republican Party and its candidates.

9. To be sure, this lawsuit is not intended to circumscribe Congress’ legislative power to

major political parties by an irregularly composed Select Committee dominated by members of

state and territorial Republican Party organizations.1

Speaker of the House.

13. Defendant Bennie G. Thompson is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of

14. Defendant Elizabeth L. Cheney is a Republican member of the U.S. House of

United States Capitol.

20. Defendant Stephanie Murphy is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of

United States Capitol.

21. Defendant Adam D. Kinzinger is a Republican member of the U.S. House of

United States Capitol.

Representatives on June 30, 2021.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Subpoena from Washington, D.C.

operates in Washington, D.C.

the claim occurred in Washington, D.C.

campaign strategy, fundraising, and donor relations.

A. The Select Committee’s Salesforce Subpoena

a. All performance metrics and analytics related to email campaigns by or on behalf

Committee (“RNC”), or the Trump Make America Great Again Committee

testimony regarding the materials subpoenaed on March 16, 2022.

Republicans, Reps. Cheney and Kinzinger, voted in favor of H. Res. 503.

Panel Adopts Prosecution Tactics, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2022),

the Nation”, CBS News (Oct. 24, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-rep-bennie-

thompson-on-face-the-nation-october-24-2021/. Chairman Thompson also tweeted on January 6,

Thompson (@BennieGThompson), Twitter, (Jan. 6, 2022 8:31 AM),

PM), https://twitter.com/RepRaskin/status/1466537815185891329 (“Exec. privilege doesn’t

cover criminal misconduct, like insurrections or coups . . . .”).

with Election Certification (Feb. 15, 2021), https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-

Possibility of Criminal Referrals, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2021), available at

Post (March 8, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/08/jan-6-

Select Committee for wrongful purposes.

Committee, however, has no ranking minority member.

M. Armstrong of North Dakota, and Troy E. Nehls of Texas.

Attack on the U.S. Capitol (July 21, 2021), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.

Vice Chair (Sept. 2, 2021), https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairman-thompson-

announces-representative-cheney-select-committee-vice-chair. H. Res. 503 does not mention a

117th Cong. (2021).

Case No. 8:21cv2946 (M.D. Fla.), attached as Exhibit B.

(The Salesforce Subpoena violates the First Amendment.)

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).

of information within campaigns” as result of “compelled disclosure of internal campaign

communications.”) (cert. denied).

Campaign concerning the 2020 Presidential election.”

so, substantially burdens the Plaintiff’s associational autonomy.

constitutionally or otherwise protected, will be turned over to the Committee to do with as it

engaged in political or other controversial speech or activities.

subject to public disclosure under federal campaign finance law.

employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility” by

Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

Committee members’ political opponents.

Leader McCarthy, in violation of H. Res. 503.

and donors’ associational and free speech rights.