People v. Ojeda (2004) FACTS: Cora Abella Ojeda used to buy fabrics(telas) from complainant Ruby Chua.

For the threeyears approximately she transacted business with Chua,appellant used postdated checks to pay for the fabricsshe bought. On November 5, 1983, appellant purchasedfrom Chua various fabrics and textile materials worthP228,306 for which she issued 22 postdated checksbearing different dates and amounts.The 22 checks were all dishonored. Demandswere allegedly made to make good the dishonoredchecks, to no avail. Estafa and BP 22 charges werethereafter filed against Ojeda. The trial courtconvicted appellant of the crime of estafa as definedand penalized under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 ofthe Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentenced her toreclusion perpetua. The trial court also convictedappellant of violation of BP 22 for issuing bouncingchecks. However, the court a quo held her guilty ofonly 14 counts out of the 22 bouncing checks issued.

HELD: Under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 ofthe RPC, as amended by RA 4885, 20 the elements ofestafa are: (1) a check is postdated or issued inpayment of an obligation contracted at the time it isissued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof. Deceit anddamage are essential elements of the offense and mustbe established by satisfactory proof to warrantconviction. Thus, the drawer of the dishonored check isgiven three days from receipt of the notice of dishonorto cover the amount of the check. Otherwise a primafacie presumption of deceit arises.The prosecution failed to prove deceit in thiscase. The prima facie presumption of deceit wassuccessfully rebutted by appellant's evidence of goodfaith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check. Goodfaith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor'soffer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. Inthis case, the debtor not only made arrangements forpayment; as complainant herself categorically stated,the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount ofthe dishonored checks.It must be noted that our Revised Penal Codewas enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied byevil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. Theprincipal consideration is the existence of maliciousintent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligenceand intent which together make up the "criminal mind"behind the "criminal act." Thus, to constitute a crime,the act must, generally and in most cases, beaccompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facitreum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if themind of the person performing the act complained of isinnocent. As we held in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan:XXXThe rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana,although this case involved falsification of publicdocuments and estafa:"Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with anunlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facitreum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime whenthe criminal mind is wanting."American jurisprudence echoes the sameprinciple. It adheres to the view that criminal intent inembezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as tothe legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into,and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of theperson doing the act is innocent or if there is nowrongful purpose.The accused may thus prove that he acted ingood faith and that he had no intention to convert themoney or goods for his personal benefit. We areconvinced that appellant was able to prove the absenceof criminal intent in her transactions with Chua. Hadher intention been tainted with malice and deceit,appellant would not have exerted extraordinary effortto pay the complainant, given her own business andfinancial reverses