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Chapter 1 Objectives and Organisation of The WTO: 1.1 What Is The World Trade Organization?
Chapter 1 Objectives and Organisation of The WTO: 1.1 What Is The World Trade Organization?
Chapter 1 Objectives and Organisation of The WTO: 1.1 What Is The World Trade Organization?
After reading this chapter you will be able to: Understand the objectives and structures of the WTO Explain the main features of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism Describe how one NGO has used the Trade Policy Review Mechanism to raise its concerns Evaluate the human rights risks for a small country applying to join the WTO Explain why it is important to distinguish between the WTO Secretariat and its Members
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.
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3D / FORUM-ASIA realizing these aims consistently with sustainable development and environmental protection ensuring that developing countries, especially the least developed countries (LDCs), secure a proper share in the growth of international trade. However, since its creation the WTOs emphasis has slipped from concentrating on these public interest goals to seeing itself primarily as an organization for liberalizing trade, and declaring that the systems overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible.1 This has been the source of one of the fundamental tensions surrounding the mandate and activities of the organization. Some (such as developing countries and non-governmental organizations) would like to see added emphasis on the public interest goals, whilst others (private companies and some industrialized countries, for instance) favour faster removal of obstacles to free trade. Today, an increasing number of voices are being raised to underline that free trade should not be an end in itself, but rather a tool to achieve equitable development and a better world. That the WTOs public interest objectives remain out of reach of many has drawn criticism that the organization is dominated by rich countries, functions in a secretive manner, and helps feed the greed of the rich in the name of trade liberalization.
Higher objectives for the WTO Certain principles other than just fair market access must also be respected in order to make the global trading system fully fair to all. One such principle is that trade liberalization should not be enthroned as an end in itself. It is but a means for achieving ultimate objectives such as high and sustainable growth, full employment and the reduction of poverty. As such, trade policies should be framed with these ends in mind and be evaluated accordingly.
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All, 2003.
That the purpose of the world trade regime is to raise living standards all around the world rather than to maximize trade per se has never been controversial. In practice, however, these two goals promoting development and maximizing trade have come to be increasingly viewed as synonymous by the WTO and multilateral lending agencies, to the point where the latter easily substitutes for the former the net result is a confounding of ends and means.
Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really Mattered, 2001.
Asias experience [of gradual liberalization only after an initial period of high growth] highlights a deeper point. A sound overall development strategy that produces high economic growth is far more effective in achieving integration with the world economy than a purely integrationist strategy that relies on openness to work its magic. A relatively protected economy like Vietnam is integrating with the world economy much more rapidly than an open economy like Haiti because Vietnam, unlike Haiti, has a reasonably functional economy and polity.
Dani Rodrik, Trading in Illusions, Foreign Policy, March/April 2001.
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for ministers to decide upon during the Conference, usually leaving the most contentious issues to be determined at the ministerial level. In practice, only issues concerning the strategic directions of the WTO are decided there, the bulk of the WTOs work being carried out by councils and committees that meet throughout the year in Geneva. NGOs who can demonstrate genuine interest in trade are eligible for accreditation to Ministerials, which is not the case for other WTO bodies. Almost 800 NGOs including business groups were accredited to participate in the Cancn Ministerial Conference. However, unlike the UN, where the Credentials Committee of ECOSOC has clear procedures for granting NGOs consultative status, the WTOs selection criteria are not clearly defined, and remain ad hoc. Since the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, which saw unprecedented street protests, the WTO Secretariat has placed increasingly strict controls on the number of accredited NGO personnel that may attend. In Doha in 2001, each accredited NGO was allowed only two passes to enter the Conference site; in Cancn, NGOs were only allowed one.
Groups wishing to influence the content of Ministerials documents must start their work many months before the Ministerial Conference. See Chapter 7.3 for considerations as to whether it is worth while for your NGO to apply to attend a Ministerial.
Reports of General Council meetings are a good source of information on the progress of the current negotiations. For how to find minutes and Annual Reports of General Council meetings, see Chapter 8.3.
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3D / FORUM-ASIA Chairpersons of negotiating groups (names available at www.wto.org) under the Doha Work Programme, for instance, can be influential in organizing the negotiations, setting interim deadlines, and producing draft texts which can frame further discussions. it supervises the overall conduct of negotiations such as the Doha Work Programme (see Chapter 3.5). Since the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) was set up to carry out the Doha negotiations, the General Council has regularly reviewed its work under a standing agenda item. The TNC reports to each regular meeting of the General Council on the activities of its negotiating groups. The General Council also deals with systemic issues (such as selection of Directors-General and external transparency), and performs specific tasks assigned to it by the Ministerial Conference.
2 Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization The Comprehensive Guide to the WTO, 2004.
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Panel Report
therefore only rule on other matters, such as environmental policy, human rights or social questions, if these arise in a dispute concerning a WTO rule, as was the case in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute (Box 1.5). Nevertheless, the concern remains that the broad reach of WTO rules and their implications for a wide array of domestic policies makes the DSM a particular threat because it ensures strong enforcement of rules designed to favour trade liberalization, rather than to promote well-being or respect for human rights.
To track WTO disputes chronologically, by subject or by country, refer to the Frequently Asked Questions in Chapter 8.3.
Panels
A panel is a quasi-judicial body which examines the evidence and decides on the merits of the case, according to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): A panel usually consists of three (but sometimes five) experts from different countries. Panellists for each case are chosen from a roster of qualified professionals3 or from elsewhere, in consultation with Members involved in the dispute. The Director-General can also appoint panellists if the parties cannot agree on the panel. In a dispute between a developed country and a developing country, the latter can request that at least one of the panellists be from a developing country. Panellists serve in their individual capacity and do not receive instructions from any government. In general, panellists are considered to be impartial and competent. Panels have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which they deem appropriate. In many disputes the panel has consulted scientific experts or appointed an expert review group to prepare an advisory report. However, the question of uninvited, non-governmental input into the dispute settlement process is a contentious issue (see amicus curiae briefs below).
Appellate Body
Either party to a dispute may appeal to the standing Appellate Body against a panels ruling on points of law and legal interpretation of WTO agreements. The Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings of a panel and its conclusion, but cannot re-examine existing evidence or examine new issues.
3 WTO, Indicative List of Governmental and NonGovernmental Panelists, WT/DSB/ 33, 6 March 2003.
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In favour of openness
In dispute settlement, panels and the Appellate Body must continue to accept amicus curiae briefs and they must, in my view, make greater use of such briefs in dispute settlement. The opportunity to submit amicus briefs can give those from the wider world the chance to have their say without in any way undermining the essential intergovernmental nature of such proceedings.
Speech by James Bacchus, former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body, to the US National Foreign Trade Council, 29 January 2004.
If an NGO wishes to submit an amicus brief, the best time to do so is before the first panel hearing. Since the dates of panel hearings are not announced publicly, the best way to follow this process is through the WTO External Relations Division directly or by contacting a Genevabased NGO that follows such issues (see Chapter 8). Another strategy is to ask a government involved in a particular dispute to submit an amicus brief on the interested partys behalf although some NGOs do not do this because they do not necessarily agree with that governments position.
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The Appellate Body consists of seven permanent members, and three of them hear each appeal case. Members of the Appellate Body are individuals recognized in the field of law and international trade, and not affiliated to any government. Members are appointed for a four-year term by the DSB, renewable once.
Case study of a dispute: India versus the EU The EU-India GSP dispute looked at whether industrialized country Members of the WTO could grant different tariff rates to products originating in different developing countries under so-called Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes. In particular, the dispute addressed whether countries granting trade preferences could condition access to their markets on labour and environmental standards, or efforts to combat illegal drugs. India brought the complaint to the WTO in 2002, arguing that anti-drug arrangements included in the EUs GSP were discriminatory, as the benefits the EU granted were available only to certain specified developing countries. In particular, India pointed out that Pakistans entry to the scheme and benefits under the GSP anti-drug arrangements had affected EUR 205 million of Indian exports, which faced higher tariffs than their Pakistani equivalents on the EU market. On 7 April 2004, the WTO Appellate Body released its report, where it ruled that WTO provisions did not prevent developed countries from differentiating among products originating in different developing countries under the GSP, provided that such differential treatment meets certain conditions (set out in the so-called Enabling Clause). In so doing, it overturned the earlier panel decision in the case, which had originally ruled in favour of India. However, the Appellate Body decision was not a clear-cut victory for the EU. The conditions included ensuring that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries that have the development, financial and trade needs that the treatment in question is intended to respond to. Looking at the EUs special arrangement for combating the production and trafficking of illegal drugs, the Appellate Body found that as the preferences granted under the drug arrangements were not available to all GSP beneficiaries similarly affected by the drug problem, they were not justified under the Enabling Clause. It therefore urged the EU to bring its GSP scheme into conformity with the Enabling Clause conditions. By contrast, the Appellate Body noted that the EUs GSP incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the environment, which were not at issue in this case, included detailed provisions setting out the procedure and substantive criteria that apply to a request by a country to become a beneficiary. This would seem to imply that these arrangements are WTO-compatible, provided they meet the relevant conditions. The process from notification of consultations to the release of the Appellate Body report took just under two years. But it is not over yet. On 10 August 2004, following a request by India, the WTO appointed an arbitrator to determine the reasonable period of time required for the EU to bring its measures into conformity with WTO rules. As such, it could be another year and a half before the EU either changes its GSP legislation or faces the threat of sanctions.
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), WTO Appellate Body: Differentiation Possible Under Preference Schemes, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 22 April 2004.
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To find out how to read the full text of the decision on the India-EU dispute, see Chapter 8.3.
To date, NGOs continue to submit amicus briefs by sending them to the WTO Secretariat, though no specific guidelines exist for admitting or refusing them, either at the panel or the Appellate Body level. This means that in practice it is still up to the individual panels and/or Appellate Body members to decide on acceptance or refusal. In the absence of rules, no record is kept of which dispute panels or Appellate Bodies actually received, accepted or used amicus briefs. Hence the process remains case-by-case.
Reviews of trade in China Following Chinas accession to the WTO in December 2001, the General Council began conducting an annual transitional review of Chinas implementation of its WTO commitments. Members insisted on putting this unique process in place due to the significant amount of change required in bringing such a large, centrally-planned economy into conformity with WTO rules. This annual review exercise is scheduled to end by 2010. It is a case in point where additional requirements, not applicable to existing members, are sometimes imposed on acceding members.
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The fiction of free trade, as seen through the TPRM lens I am not very hopeful that a TPR in a countrylike Madagascar wouldbring much to Madagascar. Or to anyone. Trade policy in Madagascar is set by the IMF and the World Bank, and as a result Madagascar has become, under most indicators, one of the most open economies in the world, as regards trade, certainly more open thanSouth Africa and Mauritius, let alone the EU, Switzerland and Japan! Even non-WTO members have goods entering here very freely. So I have no doubt that the OECD trade people who attend WTO meetings will give a favourable response to the TPR of Madagascar.
Source: Interview with a former UN official.
trade statistics. There is no agreed format or standard guidelines on what elements should be included, and Members are free to submit whatever information they deem appropriate. The 2004 US report mentioned labour standards but in general, reports tend to focus on narrowly-defined trade issues, usually ignoring the broader economic or social effects of a countrys trade liberalization. 2. a detailed report prepared independently by economists in the Secretariats Trade Policy Review Division. So far, the reports prepared by the Secretariat have not explicitly included issues related to human rights or to labour standards, even though there has been discussion in the TPRB of the latter. The reports, together with the TPRB chairpersons concluding remarks, are made public and available to the press after the review process. Minutes of the TPRB meetings are published four weeks later. The review process allows other Members to submit written questions in advance of the TPRB meeting and to raise oral questions at the meeting. A discussant is chosen among representatives of Members to stimulate the debate. In 2000, Canada proposed making the TPRM more transparent by opening it up to accredited observers from the public and webcasting its own trade policy review, declaring that live web feeds of the meeting would enhance the quality of discussions between Members and provide a progressive example of the WTOs openness to public. The proposal was resisted by a number of developing countries, including India, Pakistan, Argentina and Mexico, who argued that opening up the process could threaten the intergovernmental character of the WTO and set a precedent for other committees that they were not prepared to consider. Without agreement on the matter, the TPRB remains closed to outsiders.
There is no official procedure in place for NGOs to submit information or alternative reports to the TPRB. The only NGO to provide alternative reports* on a regular basis is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). These are given to its national affiliates and faxed to selected WTO missions in Geneva (those they consider most likely to raise labour issues at the TPRB, such as the US and the EU) prior to TPRB meetings. As NGO documents have no official status in the TPRM, it is up to individual Members whether to bring up issues raised in these reports during the review process.
* available at www.icftu.org
Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO the real world of international trade negotiations, 2003.
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