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3D 2009 Torts Digest
3D 2009 Torts Digest
Digested by:
IIID 2009-2010
Beadle: Jan Porter; Compilers: Diane Lipana, Chrissie Moral, Cheska Respicio, and Tel Virtudez
TABLE of C ONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1. Classes of Torts 2. Damage and Damages: Distinction 3. Culpa Aquiliana/Contractual/ Criminal : Distinction 1 BLTB & Armando Pon vs. IAC . 2 Aboitiz vs. CA 3 Dangwa Transport vs. CA. .. 4 Atienza vs. COMELEC .. 5 People vs. Bayotas .. 6 Elcano vs. Hill 7 DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU ... 8 Padilla et. al. vs. CA 9 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People .. 10 Manliclic vs. Calaunan 11 Air France vs. Carascoso and CA... 12 LRTA vs. Navidad. 13 Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. CA . 14 Natividad vs. Andamo Emmanuel R. Andamo vs IAC.. 15 Castro vs. People .. 16 Fabre vs. CA . 17 Calalas vs. CA 18 Padua and Padua vs. Robles and Bay Taxi Cab. 19 Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila Inc. vs. CA II. QUASI-DELICT 1. Elements 20 Vergara vs. CA .. 21 Natividad vs. Andamo Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. IAC.. 22 FGU Insurance vs. CA .. 23 Equitable Leasing Corp vs. Lucita Suyom et al .. 24 Cinco vs. Canonoy 2. No Double Recovery Rule 25 Virata vs. Ochoa ... 26 Jarantilla vs. CA 27 Atlantic Gulf vs. CA 28 Cancio Jr. v. Isip ... III. NEGLIGENCE 1. Concept of Negligence 29 Picart vs. Smith . 30 Citytrust Banking Corp. vs. IAC and Emme Herrero. 31 Metrobank vs. CA . 32 Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Querimit 33 Reyes vs. CA.. 34 Adzuara vs. CA . 35 Bayne Adjuster and Surveyor Inc v CA, 36 Samson, Jr. vs. BPI ... 37 UCPB v. Teofilo C. Ramos ... 38 FEBTC vs. Marquez . 39 Cusi v. PNR... 40 Gan vs. CA ... 41 Valenzuela vs. CA.. 42 Prudential Bank v. CA .. 2. Negligence as the Poximate Cause 43 Subido vs. Custodio... 44 Ridjo Tape and Chemical Corp. v. CA .. 45 Raynera v. Hiceta .. 46 Ermitao VS CA ... 47 BPI Express Card Corporation v Olalia 48 Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc vs. CA, 49 St. Marys Academy vs Carpitanos . 50 Adriano vs. Pangilinan ... 51 Vda. De Bataclan v. Mariano Medina ... 52 Umali v. Bacani . 53 Bacarro v Castao . 54 Phoenix Construction v IAC . 55 Smith Bell and Company v CA .. 56 Fernando v CA . 57 Austria vs. CA ... 58 Consolidated Bank vs CA.. 59 Philippine National Railway vs. CA ... 3. Proof of Negligence 60 PLDT vs. CA 61 Food Terminal Inc. vs. CA and Basic Foods.. 62 German Marine Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC . 63 Tan vs. Northwest Airlines ... 64 Collin Morris v CA, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) .. 65 Crisostomo vs. CA ... 4. Presumption of Negligence a) Res Ipsa Loquitur i 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
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173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 183 185 186 187 188 189 190 192 193 194 195
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365 366 367 368 369 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 384 385 386 388 389 390 391 392 393
xxx xxx xxx The Court reminded the petitioner that as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI CABIL WAS NEGLIGENT. PETITIONER SPOUSES LIABLE. The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. The fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was
Court a quo decision set aside. Case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the awards to the respondents constitute double recovery and thus, prohibited by the NCC. Petitioners: Article 2177 of the Civil Code states that: "the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" W/N the CA committed grave abuse in discretion by granting excessive damages HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI SC may not reverse a judgment on a Certiorari case under Rule 45. But CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it increased the damages
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The respondent judge erred in holding that the civil case should be suspended until after the final judgment is rendered in the criminal case. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against the respondents bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. The trial court erred in dismissing Cancios complaint for collection of the value of the checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of Res Judicata and forum shopping will not operate to bar the same.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, CITYTRUST NEGLIGENT Banking is a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The teller should have noticed that there were only seven numbers instead of eight. Besides, the use of numbers is simply for the convenience of the bank and the depositors name should still be controlling. To post a deposit in somebody elses name despite the name of the depositor clearly written on the deposit slip is indeed sheer negligence which could have easily been avoided if defendant bank exercised due diligence and circumspection in the acceptance and posting of plaintiffs deposit. Petitioner bank cannot disclaim liability for the negligence of its employees, because it failed to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage but it was not negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. (Go vs. IAC) The CA however erred in awarding nominal and temperate damages concurrently, the two are incompatible. Nominal damages are merely to recognize the violation of a right and not to indemnify. Temperate damages are designed to indemnify one for pecuniary loss the amount of which cannot be proved with reasonable certainty. Only nominal damages are warranted in this case.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Is FEBTC guilty of Negligence and liable for the amount in the deposit? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes failed to act due diligence. A Certificate of Deposit is defined as a written acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum in money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay the depositor to the order of the depositor (NEGO!!!) o A relation of debtor-creditor is created. The bank alleges that it paid the husband and did not ask for the surrender of the said certificate of deposit for Mr. Querimit was one of the senior managers of the bank. o Even though after Mr. Querimit retired, the bank did not show effort to collect the said certificates from him. o This accommodation as well was mad ein violation if the banks policies and procedure. FEBTC thus failed to exercise the degree of diligence required by the nature of its business o Since the business of banking is impressed with public interest, it should exercise the degree of diligence MORE than that of a good father of a family. They fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors requires them to treat the accounts with the highest degree of care.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N UCPB was negligent in causing the annotation on the title of Teofilo C. Ramos when he is not even a party to the loan entered into by ZDC, with Teofilo Ramos Sr as surety HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes Did the defendant in doing the negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Considering the testimonial and documentary evidence on record, we are convinced that the petitioner failed to act with the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation It should have acted more cautiously, especially since some uncertainty had been reported by the appraiser whom the petitioner had tasked to make verifications. It appears that the petitioner treated the uncertainty raised by appraiser Eduardo C. Reniva as a flimsy matter. It placed more importance on the MAGIC MOVIDO Page 40 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Victorino Cusi was negligent and such was the proximate cause of the collision HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances. Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing were manually operated; there were only 2 shifts of guards provided for the operation thereof one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, and the other, the 3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that precise hour, the warning devices were not operating for no one attended to them. Also, as observed by the lower court, the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus: "... he simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of blowing his whistle. That the train was running at full speed is attested to by the fact that
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the court should sustain the version of plaintiff or defendant W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of Valenzuela W/N Alexander Commercial Inc. can be held solidarily liable with Li JAN PORTER Page 44 of 528
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS (a) whether respondents were negligent, and if so, (b) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Ermitaos should NOT be billed the unauthorized purchases. For the cardholder to be absolved from liability for unauthorized purchases made through his lost or stolen card, two steps must be followed: (1) the cardholder must give written notice to BECC, and (2) BECC must notify its member establishments of such loss or theft, which, naturally, it may only do upon receipt of a notice from the cardholder. Both the cardholder and BECC, then, have a responsibility to perform, in order to free the cardholder from any liability arising from the use of a lost or stolen card. BECC states that, "between two persons who are negligent, the one who made the wrong possible should bear the loss." We take this to be an admission that negligence had occurred. From one perspective, it was not petitioners who made possible the commission of the wrong. It could be BECC for its failure to immediately notify its members-establishments, who appear lacking in care or instruction by BECC in proper procedures, regarding signatures and the identification of card users at the point of actual purchase of goods or services. For how else could an unauthorized person succeed to use Manuelita's lost card? The cardholder was no longer in control of the procedure after it has notified BECC of the card's loss or theft. It was already BECC's responsibility to inform its member-establishments of the loss or theft of the card at the soonest possible time. Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card. The questioned stipulation in this case, which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified all its member-establishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and unjust. The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly run against public policy
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS Which party is liable for damages in the instant case? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point between the service drop line and the service entrance conductor, which connection was only eight (8) feet from the ground level, in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code. By leaving an open live wire unattended for years, BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was bound to happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO. On the other hand, the owner of the jeep, Canave is not liable since he was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area, and there was no showing that any municipal law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act. In conclusion, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of BENECO, and it should be solely liable for damages to the heirs of Bernardo.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the St. Marys should be liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Capistranos. Whether the Capistranos are entitled to the award of moral damages. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No to both issues. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: 1. The school, its administrators and teachers. 2. the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Alcala Electric Company can be liable for TORT. o <Alcala Electric> I am not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death electrocution could not be due to any negligence on my part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.
The hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
The CA decision and resolution are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part. To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. Ordinary refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident. Page 80 of 528
YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.[25] While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. o fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. Here, petitioner-corporations evidence hardly included any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based on these circumstances, petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascuals car or its serviceability.
The court held that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar. In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were not present at the crucial moment. The driver of the jeepney who could have shed light on the circumstances is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge about the cause of the mishap are the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastians previous employee but his co-respondent in the case as well.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Cardaa? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Petitioner is liable. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position. The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Noras arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere. Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control. In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Noras baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Noras blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioners exclusive control. Third, the gaping wound on Noras left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own injury.
VIRON TRANSCO IS LIABLE EVEN IF THEY EXERCISED DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY IN SELECTING AND SUPERVISING THEIR EMPLOYEES. Transportation Co., Inc., as the registered owner of the bus involved in the vehicular accident originally brought the action for damages against Santos. We find that the counterclaim of Santos alleges the ultimate facts constituting their cause of action. It is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees, as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. As employers of the bus driver, the petitioner is, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primary liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows: o The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The CA decision and resolution are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI DR. GUTIERREZ NEGLIGENT. DR HOSAKA LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF HIS TEAM.
Petition partly granted. DLMSC absolved from liability. Drs. Guitierrez and Hosala solidarily liable.
Page 94 of 528
WHEREFORE, CMC is found liable to pay the corresponding damages CEO OCAMPO Page 95 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS WON erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the passengers was the negligence of the bus driver Pon, who recklessly overtook a car despite knowing that that the bend of highway he was negotiating on had a continuous yellow line signifying a no-overtaking zone. It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to act with diligence demanded by the circumstances. Pon should have remembered that when a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is special necessity for
Judgment affirmed. CARSON, J., dissenting: Foot passengers owe some duty to themselves, and it is utterly unreasonable to require the driver of a car to run at so slow a speed that he will always be able to bring the machine to a dead stop in time to avoid injury to any man under the influence of liquor, who may suddenly step out into the middle of the street and in front of the car. There is no evidence that Crame was driving on the extreme right hand of the street. Rather, he was a little right to the center. The accused offered a very reasonable explanation for this. While the rule of the road imposes a general duty upon drivers to keep on the left when passing other vehicles and in densely crowded streets, there is no rule requiring him to keep on the extreme left without regard to the condition of the road or street, and to the presence/absence of other vehicles or pedestrians on the highway. Where the street is more or less deserted, no danger of collision, the proper place on the road for a fast and moderately fast vehicle is well toward the canter, provided that the driver is at all times prepared to move to the left to avoid collisions. The rights and duties of pedestrians and drivers of vehicles are equal. Each may use the highway, and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand. The rule of the road is a rule of negligence, and the fact that a person was on the wrong side of the road when the collision took place does not per se make him liable for damages.
BUT, owner, Yu Khe Thai is not solidarily liable with his driver. Art 21841 is indeed the basis of a masters liability in a vehicular accident. Note however that the 2nd sentence of Art 2184 qualifies before the owner can be made solidarity liable with the negligent driver. This is because the basis of the masters liability is not RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR but rather the relation ship of PATERFAMILIAS. The theory is that, the negligence of the servant, is known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects the masters negligence if he fails to correct it order to prevent injury or damage. Test of imputed negligence in Art 2184 is necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held in a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he can own a motor vehicle. PROOF OF DUE DILIGENCE of Yu Khe Thai: o Bernardo has been his driver since 1937 and until this incident, he has not committed a traffic violation. Bernardo was an experienced driver for 10 years with Yutivo Sons Hardware prior to his service to Yu. Thus, he had reason to believe in the capacity of Bernardo. o Their car was running at a reasonable speed, thus no reason for the owner to be alarmed. o He saw the carretela about 12m away, but he could not have anticipated Bernardos sudden decision to overtake the carretela. o The time element before collision was so short that it would have been impossible for him to have reasonable opportunity to prevent it. He even said that sounding a sudden warning to the driver would only make the driver nervous and make the situation worse (I agree. Isipin mo, yun Nanay mo, biglang hysterically sisigaw, Annnnnak, sa kanan! Tapos sumobra ka ng kabig sa gulat. hasslehoff!!! But true.) o Taken altogether, due diligence required from Yu to avoid misfortune exists, thus he should not be held liable for the negligence, and the resulting damages caused by Bernardo.
Judgment modified. Affirm moral damages granted by TC to petitioners. Actual damages cannot be raised since only the petitioners medical expenses were supported by evidence. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability, but decision is otherwise affirmed with respect to BERNARDO DIANE LIPANA
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI 1.) No. Illusorio does not have a cause of action against MBC. o To be entitled to damages, Illusorio has the burden of proving negligence on the part of MBC for failure to detect the discrepancy in the signatures on the checks. It is incumbent upon Illusorio to establish the fact of forgery. Curiously though, he failed to submit additional specimen signatures as requested by the NBI from which to draw a conclusive finding regarding forgery. Illusorios contention that MBC was remiss in the exercise of its duty as drawee lacks factual basis. Consistently, the CA and the RTC found that MBC exercised due diligence in cashing the checks. Of course it is possible that the verifiers of MBC might have made a mistake in failing to detect any forgery -- if indeed there was. However, a mistake is not equivalent to negligence if they were honest mistakes and all precautions were taken. It was Illusorio, not MBC, who was negligent2. In the present case, it appears that Illusorio accorded his secretary unusual degree of trust and unrestricted access to his credit cards, passbooks, check books, bank statements, including custody and possession of cancelled checks and reconciliation of accounts. What is worse, whenever the bank verifiers call the office of Illusorio, it is the same secretary who answers and confirms the checks. Moreover, while the bank was sending him the monthly Statements of Accounts, he was not personally checking the same Illusorios failure to examine his bank statements appears as the proximate cause of his own damage3. Illusorio had sufficient opportunity to prevent or detect any misappropriation by his secretary had he only reviewed the status of his accounts based on the bank statements sent to him regularly. In view of Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, no recovery could be had for damages. Illusorio further contends that under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law a forged check is inoperative, and that MBC had no authority to pay the forged checks. However, Illusorio is precluded from setting up the forgery,
o o
2 Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. 3 Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
The Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable in this case The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. GINO CAPATI Page 122 of 528
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THE OVER SPEEDING OF THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE
Petition partly granted. DLMSC absolved from liability. Drs. Guitierrez and Hosala solidarily liable.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI DR. GUTIERREZ NEGLIGENT. DR HOSAKA LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF HIS TEAM. Dr. Gutierrez claim of lack of negligence on her part is belied by the records of the case. It has been sufficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of
The Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable in this case The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. GINO CAPATI Page 130 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether Zacarias should have an actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of last clear chance. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. The evidence indicates that it was rather Engineer Calibos negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Assuming there was an antecedent negligence on SATURDAY ALCISO Page 133 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Tanos alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the accident o <Tano (driver)> Deceased Monterola was contributory negligent, he even had the last clear chance to evade the collision o <Heirs of Monterola> Proximate cause was negligence of Tano when he did not wait for the dust to settle
FRANK TAMARGO
4 Q & A portion (TSN) show that he admitted that he could only see big vehicles but not small vehicles like Monterolas motorcycle through the dust which then has not yet fully settled.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, Tanos negligence is the proximate cause of the accident.
ISSUE: (a) whether respondents were negligent, and if so, (b) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not the last clear chance doctrine applies? Whether or not petitioner LADECO is solidarily liable with Deocampo. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies. Both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b) of RA 41365, Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the U-turn. Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The
(b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall approach such intersection in the lane for traffic to the right of and nearest to the center line of the highway, and, in turning, shall pass to the left of the center of the intersection, except that, upon highways laned for traffic and upon one-way highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane of traffic in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding.
Petition is DISMISSED.
ISSUE W/N Bayasen was negligent? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of the Bayasen because there is no evidence on record to prove or support the finding that the Bayasen was driving at "an unreasonable speed". It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault. No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the Bayasen. In fact, the moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road, parallel to the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play safe and avoid the embankment. Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, Bayasen who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the Bayasen had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of the Bayasen not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N PAL can establish the defense of force majeure. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. PAL can establish the defense of force majeure but it is still liable for damages. Petitioner theorizes that the hotel accommodations or cash assistance given in case a flight is cancelled is in the nature of an amenity and is merely a privilege that may be extended at its own discretion, but never a right that may be demanded by its passengers. Thus, when respondent Pantejo was offered cash assistance and he refused it, petitioner cannot be held liable for whatever befell respondent Pantejo on that fateful day, because it was merely exercising its discretion when it opted to just give cash assistance to its passengers. Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes petitioner liable for
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Cipriano could be held liable for damages despite the fire being a caso fortuito. HOLDING & RATION DECIDENDI YES. CIPRIANO LIABLE. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. His failure to insure the cars under his service and the service he renders under the DTI is a condition precedent for his operations. Although the fire is a fortuitous event, the circumstance given as neglect of duty cannot exempt petitioner from the loss.
7 Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. 8 Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. 6 Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Proof of Diligence is Essential: Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. They failed to rebut the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law. The Yobidos should have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier, such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicles parts.
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. GINO CAPATI
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI CARVAN NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES. CHRISSIE MORAL Page 161 of 528
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE DEED OF RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM WAS ILLEGAL AND VOID. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement of the claims of the employee, it is binding on the parties and may not later be KATH MATIBAG Page 164 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Court of Appeals was correct was correct in deciding that the petition [was] liable to the respondents for damages."8 HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents; house. Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right.14 Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated. In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
On the part of the hospital (DLSMC), since there was NO employer-employee relationship between the hospital and Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka established in this case, the hospital cannot be held liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. The contract of the hospital with its consultants is separate and distinct from the contract with its patients.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Libi spouses are subsidiarily liable in the instant case. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI CA wrongly interpreted the vicarious liability of parents. It must be primary using Article 101 of the RPC. If subsidiary only: the diligence of bonus pater familias will not lie since they will answer for the minor at any rate but if primary: it will be direct, hence the defense. In this case however, the parents as still failed to discharge themselves of any defense because evidence shows Wendell knew of the location of the keys for the Gunsafe, Libis do not know of his being a CANU agent and photography of Julie Ann was with the accused upon his death with the gun.
NB: The civil complaint was confused with the nature of liability to charge (103 or 2180). Court however clarified that the lower court erred when they adjudged that the civil action is barred by res judicata. The civil action from crim act and indep civil action are of different nature and purpose. The 2 cases affect different parties. In the indep civil action, subsidiary and vicarious liab were being established. Nevertheless, since 2180 of NCC and 103 of RPC was inapplicable, the action was still dismissed.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N there was negligence attributable to the school officials which will warrant the award of damages to the Castillo spouses; W/N Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar; W/N the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. Castillos: The death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. There was no negligence attributable to the school officials which will warrant the award of damages to the Castillo spouses. The school officials are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them. Consequently, they are not liable for damages. No. Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar. Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the Page 181 of 528
No. The award of exemplary and moral damages is improper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.9 Separate Opinion: Padilla, dissenting: Although the excursion may not have been attended by the appropriate school authorities, the presence or stamp of authority of the school nevertheless pervaded by reason of the participation not of one but of several teachers, the petitioners. As found by the court a quo, the excursion was an activity "organized by the teachers themselves, for the students and to which the student, NATURALLY, acceded." Having known of the forthcoming activity, petitioner Illumin, as school principal, should have taken appropriate measures to ensure the safety of his students. His silence and negligence in performing his role as principal head of the school that must be construed as an implied consent to such activity. As administrative head (principal) of St. Francis High School, petitioner Illumin acted as the agent of his principal (the school) or its representatives, the petitioners-spouses Nantes and Lacandula. Consequently, and as found by the respondent court. Article 2176 in conjunction with Article 2180,
9 Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the respondent appellate court erred in awarding nominal damages ans attorneys fees to private respondent. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Although this Court has consistently held that there should be no penalty on the right to litigate and that error alone in the filing of a case be it before the courts or the proper police authorities, is not a ground for moral damages, 9 we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, private respondent is entitled to an award of damages. Indeed, it would be unjust to overlook the fact that petitioners' negligence was the root of all the inconvenience and embarrassment experienced by the private respondent albeit they happened after the filing of the complaint with the constabulary authorities. Petitioner Go's negligence in fact led to the swindling of his employer. Had Go exercised the diligence expected of him as a bank officer and employee, he would have noticed the glaring disparity between the payee's name and
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the respondent appellate court erred in awarding nominal damages ans attorneys fees to private respondent. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Although this Court has consistently held that there should be no penalty on the right to litigate and that error alone in the filing of a case be it before the courts or the proper police authorities, is not a ground for moral damages, 9 we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, private respondent is entitled to an award of damages. Indeed, it would be unjust to overlook the fact that petitioners' negligence was the root of all the inconvenience and embarrassment experienced by the private respondent albeit they happened after the filing of the complaint with the constabulary authorities. Petitioner Go's negligence in fact led to the swindling of his employer. Had Go exercised the diligence expected of him as a bank officer and employee, he would have noticed the glaring disparity between the payee's name and
Petition GRANTED. Order REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Case REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
Nestor was not impleaded! Art 2180, Civil Code: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, and even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
11
10
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Was MMTC able to establish its due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees?
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, UNDER ART 2219 of NCC As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the CA, "recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the station, or a person who procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements. An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation. In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its broadcasters. FBNIs alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language" is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its broadcasters. Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industrys code of conduct, sufficient information on libel laws, and continuous evaluation of the broadcasters performance are but a few of the many ways of showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters. FBNI claims that it "has taken all the precaution in the selection of Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications." However, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNIs "regimented process" of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had Page 206 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Government is liable? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said: That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title BYRON PEREZ Page 210 of 528
12 Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the trial court, as upheld by the Court of Appeals, was correct in holding petitioner and respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. "solidarily liable" to respondent Vallejos W/N petitioner is entitled to be reimbursed by respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. for whatever amount petitioner has been adjudged to pay respondent Vallejos on its insurance policy. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI As to the First issue: NO As to the first issue, it is noted that the trial court found, as affirmed by the appellate court, that petitioner and respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. are jointly and severally liable to respondent Vallejos. The SC did not agree with the aforesaid ruling. It held instead that it is only respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc, (to the exclusion of the petitioner) that are solidarily liable to respondent Vallejos for the damages awarded to Vallejos. Respondent Sio Choy is made liable to said plaintiff as owner of the ill-fated Willys jeep, pursuant to Article 2184 of the Civil Code while the liability of respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. to plaintiff Vallejos, the former being the employer of the driver of the Willys jeep at the time of the motor vehicle mishap, is Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It thus appears that respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. are the principal tortfeasors who are primarily liable to respondent Vallejos. The law states that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidarily. On the other hand, the basis of petitioner's liability is its insurance contract with respondent Sio Choy. If petitioner is adjudged to pay respondent Vallejos in the amount of not more than P20,000.00, this is on account of its being the insurer of respondent Sio Choy under the third party liability clause included in the private car comprehensive policy. While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, such third persons can directly sue the insurer, 6 however, Page 229 of 528
As to the second issue, the Court of Appeals erred, in affirming the decision of the trial court which ruled that petitioner is not entitled to be reimbursed by respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. on the ground that said respondent is not privy to the contract of insurance existing between petitioner and respondent Sio Choy. The appellate court overlooked the principle of subrogation in insurance contracts. Subrogation is a normal incident of indemnity insurance Upon payment of the loss, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. Moreover, that right is not dependent upon , nor does it grow out of any privity of contract. It follows, therefore, that petitioner, upon paying respondent Vallejos the amount of riot exceeding P20,000.00, shall become the subrogee of the insured, the respondent Sio Choy; as such, it is subrogated to whatever rights the latter has against respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. Article 1217 of the Civil Code gives to a solidary debtor who has paid the entire obligation the right to be reimbursed by his co-debtors for the share which corresponds to each. In accordance with Article 1217, petitioner, upon payment to respondent Vallejos and thereby becoming the subrogee of solidary debtor Sio Choy, is entitled to reimbursement from respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc.. In sum, the SC held that only respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. are solidarily liable to the respondent Martin C. Vallejos for the amount of P29,103.00. Vallejos may enforce the entire obligation on only one of said solidary debtors. If Sio Choy as solidary debtor is made to pay for the entire obligation (P29,103.00) and petitioner, as insurer of Sio Choy, is compelled to pay P20,000.00 of said entire obligation, petitioner would be entitled, as subrogee of Sio Choy as TIN DINO Page 230 of 528
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the
Petition DENIED.
Petition dismissed.
The motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The denial is final.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Sandiganbayan erred in holding Atty. Llorente civilly liable despite his acquittal? o Petitioner: The Sandiganbayan's Decision is erroneous even if the Sandiganbayan acquitted him therein, because he was never in bad faith as indeed found by the Sandiganbayan. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of duty be done with justice and good faith. The records show that the office practice indeed in the PCA was to clear the employee (retiree) and deduct his accountabilities from his gratuity benefits. There seems to be no debate about the existence of this practice (the petitioner admitted it later on) and in fact, he cleared three employees on the condition that their obligations should be deducted from their benefits. The Court quotes: Confronted with these evidence (sic), Atty. Llorente conceded, albeit grudgingly, the existence of the practice by the accounting division of not complying with Condition (a). He, however, claimed that he learned of the practice only during the trial of the case and that he must have Page 258 of 528
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of law under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered
NO, PETITIONER NOT GUILTY OF SEDUCTION The seduction contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code as one of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is the crime punished as such in Articles 337 & 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Where a woman, who was an insurance agent and former high school teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10 years older than the man, overwhelmed by her love for the man, had intimate relations with him, because she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy, it cannot be said that he is morally guilty of seduction. BON ARCILLA Page 261 of 528
No. To restore possession of the fishpond to him would entail violation of contractual obligations that the usufructuaries have entered into over quite a long period of time now. The Court may not supplant the right of the usufructuaries to enter into contracts over the fishpond through a Decision. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of the case, it is but proper that private respondent Crisostomo should be properly compensated for the improvements he introduced in the fishpond.
Damages: Art. 1168 of the Civil Code provides that when an obligation "consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his expense." o Petitioner Keh led private respondent to unwittingly incur expenses to improve the operation of the fishpond. By operation of law, therefore,
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No, the computation of indemnity should be based on the current market value of the apartment building Technically, Pecson could not be a builder in good faith as contemplated in the relevant provisions of the civil code for he built the building when he was still the valid owner of the lot. However, such provisions may be applied in analogy. The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. The said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. Case is remanded to trial court for proper determination of the current market value of the building. MARICE PACHECO Page 271 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Answer indicating willingness to accept amount due, failure to pay will result in rescission, ordering respondent to vacate and turn-over possession and asking for attorney's fees is equivalent to demand letter W/N Automatic forfeiture clause is binding on parties W/N Action for consignation will produce any effects without actual deposit in court of amount HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Notice either judicially or notarial act not needed in contracts to sell or installments concerning real property Automatic forfeiture clause is valid and binding however, petitioners cannot be rewarded for failing to accept payment Petitioners cannot enforce automatic forfeiture clause even without actual deposit Rescission cannot be effected because of the Maceda Law CHRIS PALARCA Page 274 of 528
Petitioner was in delay and in breach of contract. Clearly, the obligor is liable for damages that are the natural and probable consequences of its breach of obligation. In order to finish the project, the latter had to contract the services of a second construction firm for P11,750,000. Hence, MPC suffered actual damages in the amount of P4,604,579 for the completion of the project. Petitioner is also liable for liquidated damages as provided in the Contract. Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid in case of a breach. As worded, the amount agreed upon answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the completion of the project. Under Philippine laws, these damages take the nature of penalties. A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance.
MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION (MPC for brevity) is engaged in the business of real estate development. It entered into a contract with H.I. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. (HLC) to construct Phase III of a condominium complex called MARINA BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, consisting of townhouses and villas, totaling 31 housing units, for a total consideration of P38,580,609.00, within a period of 365 days from receipt of Notice to Proceed. The original completion date of the project was May 16, 1989, but it was extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period until November 30, 1989. The contract was signed by Jovencio F. Cinco, president of MPC, and Honorio L. Carlos, president of HLC. On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case for sum of money against not only MPC but also against the latters alleged president, [Respondent] Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and [Respondent] Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment of various sums with an aggregate amount of P14 million pesos, broken down as follows: a. P7,065,885.03 for costs of labor escalation, change orders and material price escalation;
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N H.L. is liable for actual and liquidated damages for failing to finish the construction it undertook to complete ( Which party was in delay) HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations. It could not totally pass the blame to MPC for hiring a second contractor, because the latter was allowed to terminate the services of the contractor. Either party shall have the right to terminate this Contract for reason of violation or non-compliance by the other party of the terms and conditions herein agreed upon. As of November 1989, petitioner accomplished only approximately 80 percent of the project. In other words, it was already in delay at the time. In addition, Engineer Miranda testified that it would lose money even if it finished the project; thus, respondents already suspected that it had no intention of finishing the project at all. MAGIC MOVIDO Page 280 of 528
NLRC resolutions set aside. Affidavit of Desistance declared null and void. Case remanded to POEA.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N St Louis Realty liable for damages HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, St Louis Realty liable for damages St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps. St. Louis Realty contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief". The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ". Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. FRANK TAMARGO Page 283 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N petitioner can still be held liable, or has double jeopardy set in? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. PETITIONER CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE AS DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS SET IN. double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, when there was mistrial. In such instances, the
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. THE VIOLATIONS MENTIONED IN ARTS. 26 AND 2219 ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE BUT ARE MERELY EXAMPLES AND DO NOT PRECLUDE OTHER SIMILAR OR ANALOGOUS ACTS. Damages are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. There is no question that Nestor suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting language. Petition DENIED. Court of Appeals decision AFFIRMED. DANI BOLONG
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence: (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. 14 Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 X X X X
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a municipality's governmental or public function or is it or a private or proprietary character? Fontanilla Heirs: Municipality liable for acts because fiesta is in exercise of its proprietary acts Municipality: As a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents
Liability of the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee. Article 27 of the Civil Code covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty. The municipal councilors(who passed the resolution) are absolved from any liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI MUNICIPALITY IS LIABLE BECAUSE TOWN FIESTA IS AN EXERCISE OF PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, THEIR DUTY TO SUPPRESS LAWLESSNESS IS NOT A BLANKET LICENSE WHICH IGNORED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: 1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention; 2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; 3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; 4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Petitioners could not be held liable for damages in the performance of their duty in Good Faith W/N Petitioners are entitled to an award of Damages HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT, CA DECISION AFFIRMED PD No. 1281gave powers to order arrest, even without warrant, of persons violation PD No. 463 or any laws being enforced by Bureau of Mines and seize tools used for the same in favor of the government and to deputize any PC, police agency, barangay or any person qualified to police mining activities. The petitioners contend that this grant of power is valid even in the Constitution The Constitution merely makes valid the grant of power to issue warrants but did not in any way exempt the agencies so empowered from the duty of determining probable cause as basis for the issuance of warrants. The real question is whether or not petitioner conducted any investigation at all. Court held that Obra did not conduct an investigation and was even going to hold the investigation to determine the veracity of Grybos allegations. The Court also
SEPARATE OPINIONS FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: o The separation of church and state shall be inviolable." The point, I wish to make, however, is that had there been no clear manifestation by both petitioners and respondents that the right to attend mass at St. Jude's Church would be respected, even if it is located in a security area but with due precautionary measures taken to avoid infiltration by subversive elements, this Court would have been called upon to rule and, if possible, to delineate with some degree of precision the scope of such a right to free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: o I vote to grant the petition on the ground that the right of free worship and movement is a preferred right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restraint except where there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evil sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly no such danger in this case. o Over and above all, public officials should ever be guided by the testament over half a century ago of the late Justice Jose Abad Santos in his dissenting opinion in People vs. Rubio 13 that the "commendable zeal. . if allowed to override constitutional limitations would become 'obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.' And if we are to be saved from the sad experiences of some countries which have constitutions only in name, we must insist that governmental authority be exercised within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters is not so much what the people write in their constitutions as the spirit in which they observe their provisions." To require the citizen at every step to assert his rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights Page 302 of 528
o MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: o The petitioners gave the assurance that they are marching towards St. Jude's Church only for the purpose of praying or attending mass therein; that they were and are going to march in an orderly manner without blocking the traffic and with the marshals policing and Identifying the marchers; that they are not armed and are not going to be armed with any kind of weapon; and that they are willing to be frisked. o With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents have adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence. ABAD SANTOS, J.,dissenting: o True it is that the free exercise of religion can be restrained under the clear and present danger principle. But I fail to perceive the presence of any clear danger to the security of Malacaang due to the action of the
Petition denied.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Can a public officer, in particular, BIR, be held liable for damages under Art. 32 of NCC for violating the respondents consti right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws, on the basis of the courts decision holding that the RMC issued by said official is defective, invalid and unenforceable? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. When what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. The remedy in this case is not judicial but political. The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing to the public collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to particular individuals, thus: 1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury. The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Page 306 of 528
Petitioners MR is GRANTED and the case pending in the RTC against the former (for damages under Art. 32) is DISMISSED.
ISSUE: Whether or not the partners Espejo and Zaldriagga are liable to Gilchrist for damages because of interference in the contractual relation between Gilchrist and Cuddy? HOLDING & RATIONALE: YES. The only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, that they are liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts. The liability of the Espejo and Zaldriagga arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such
2.
By advising Teodorica not to perform the contract, said corporation could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principle in the contract.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the petitioners are in bad faith so as to make them liable for damages? SATURDAY ALCISO Page 314 of 528
NO. THE EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE OFFENSE CHARGED. Because no reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action. However, the extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Since there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Opulencia, the civil action should be remanded to the CFI of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Opulencia. Petition denied. Civil action for related civil liability remanded to the CFI.
Petition DISMISSED.
CHRISSIE MORAL
15 The Manchester doctrine requiring payment of filing fees at the time of commencement of the action is applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111 only when the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information.
o o
Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code o Preponderance of Evidence o Liability of employer is Direct and Primary subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. o Employer and employee are solidarily liable, thus, it does not require the employer to be insolvent.
o o
2. No. The CA and the TC erred in holding Dunca civilly liable, and Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto. IN SHORT, THE TC ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE AND IN DISMISSING THE CIVIL ACTION. o Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the heirs of Dy reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of Dunca. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of Page 320 of 528
Note: Dunca is guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property and not double homicide through reckless imprudence. There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. o In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Santiago erred in suspending the civil case? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes, Article 33 of the new Civil Code provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But respondent argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and therefore said term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the rules statutory construction In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question arises whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not the Lontocs non-reservation to file a separate action for damages is fatal to this action for damages Whether or not the judgment of acquittal of dela Cruz in the criminal case wherein through a private prosecutor, Lontoc presented evidence to prove damages is a bar to the institution of a separate civil action for damages against both the operator of MD transit and Taxi Co., Inc., and its driver, dela Cruz. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO RESERVE HIS RIGHT TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL CASE IS NOT FATAL
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against the respondents bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. The trial court erred in dismissing Cancios complaint for collection of the value of the checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of Res Judicata and forum shopping will not operate to bar the same.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N civil liability can be enforced against Ty Teck for non-payment of the goods notwithstanding the fact that the contract was between the Company, on behalf of Ty Teck, and Mansion Ang Chos Argument: when Ty Teck issued the worthless checks inducing Mansion to deliver the goods, 2 civil liabilities arose, arising from crime (Art. 100, RPC)and from tort or quasi-delict Ty Tecks Argument: they cannot be held liable for the Companys contractual obligations and that Ang Cho should file a separate case against it HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI TY TECK AND SIY GUI ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING FROM THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY THEY ARE REPRESENTING AS IT IS NOT THEIR PERSONAL LIABILITY The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by Mansion Biscuit to the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against Ty Teck because the said civil liability was not his personal liability to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation As held by the Court of Appeals: o Assuming that plaintiff-appellant has basis for his quasi-delict claim, the same must be addressed still against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation for the established facts show that the post-dated checks were issued by accused-appellee not in payment of his personal obligations but of the corporation's. Moreover the fraud allegedly committed by accused-appellee was merely incidental to the contractual obligation, not an independent act which could serve as a source of obligation. The cases cited by plaintiffappellant, to illustrate that the existence of a contract does not preclude an action on quasi-delict where the act that breaks the contract constitutes a quasi-delict, have no application because the acts complained of therein were performed to break an existing contract, whereas the alleged fraud herein was committed at the time of the creation of the contractual relationship and as an incident thereof Page 335 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Acquittal in the Criminal Case bars a Civil Action based on Quasi Delict HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO, the Acquittal in the Criminal Case does not Bar a Civil Action based on Quasi Delict. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted . NINA MEIJA Page 337 of 528
The exoneration of Sapiera was based on the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her and the other accused (de Guzman). However, Sapiera had admitted having signed the 4 checks on the reverse side. Hence, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof, and thus made herself liable for the payment of said checks. The dismissal of the criminal cases against Sapiera did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal is that the two liabilities are separate and distinct from one another. While it is just and proper for the purposes of imprisonment of the accused that the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt, there is no such evidence required for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. For the latter, only a preponderance of evidence should be required.
CHRISSIE MORAL
In a criminal case where the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Art. 2219 of the Civil Code o Correlatively, under Art. 21 of the said Code, in relation to Par. 10 of Art. 2219, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages Generally, the basis of civil liability is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable o In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof o Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist The dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage o There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist o Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action
NO. THE EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE OFFENSE CHARGED. Because no reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action. However, the extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Since there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Opulencia, the civil action should be remanded to the CFI of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Opulencia. Petition denied. Civil action for related civil liability remanded to the CFI.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Sandiganbayan erred in holding Atty. Llorente civilly liable despite his acquittal? o Petitioner: The Sandiganbayan's Decision is erroneous even if the Sandiganbayan acquitted him therein, because he was never in bad faith as indeed found by the Sandiganbayan. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of duty be done with justice and good faith. The records show that the office practice indeed in the PCA was to clear the employee (retiree) and deduct his accountabilities from his gratuity benefits. There seems to be no debate about the existence of this practice (the petitioner admitted it later on) and in fact, he cleared three employees on the condition that their obligations should be deducted from their benefits. The Court quotes: Confronted with these evidence (sic), Atty. Llorente conceded, albeit grudgingly, the existence of the practice by the accounting division of not complying with Condition (a). He, however, claimed that he learned of the practice only during the trial of the case and that he must have Page 344 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N subsequent filing of civil action for declaration of nullity of previous marriage constitutes prejudicial question to criminal case for bigamy. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its elements are: o the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and o the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. It does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
ISSUE Whether or not the pendency of the cases for "injunctive relief" and "damages and attachment" is a prejudicial question which justifies the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The pendency of the cases is not a prejudicial question. There lies no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in the case for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot.
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. The insolvency of the servant or employee is nowhere mentioned in said article as a condition precedent. In truth, such insolvency is required only when the liability of the master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment against the master. The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property is not be seized without first exhausting that of the servant.. Marquez v. Castillo cannot hold because it is a mere obiter.
Crispin Vallejo was the registered owner of a "jeepney" named "Jovil 11", with plate TPU-20948, that was operated by him in Bacolod City through driver Salvador Bobis. On 24 October 1948, through the driver's negligence, the "jeepney" struck a 3-year old girl, Damiana Bantoto, inflicting serious injuries that led to her death a few days later. The City Fiscal of Bacolod filed an information charging Bobis with homicide through reckless imprudence, to which Bobis pleaded guilty. He was, accordingly, sentenced to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the deceased girl's heirs (appellees herein) in the sum of P3,000.00. Batoto now was asking in his amended complaint that Crispin Vallejo be colodarily liable for damages, consisting of the civil indemnity required of the driver Bobis in the judgment of conviction, plus moral and exemplary damages and attorneys' fees and costs.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Vallejo is solidarily liable with Bobis, even if it was not stated that Bobis was insolvent. o Petitioner: Batoto posits that Vallejo is liable under art 103 of the RPC. o Respondent: The subsidiary liability of the master, according to the provisions of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, arises and takes place only when the servant, subordinate, or employee commits a punishable criminal act while in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service, and he is insolvent thereby rendering him incapable of satisfying by himself his own civil liability, since the complaint did not aver that Bobis was insolvent, then the complaint must be dismisse (citing Marquez v. Castillo) HOLDING & RATION DECIDENDI VALLEJO IS LIABLE
The master's liability, under the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes committed by his servants and employees in the discharge of their duties, is not predicated upon the insolvency of the latter. Article 103 of the Penal Code prescribes that: ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employees, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M., in Basak, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the latters instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his body.
17
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the CA erred in holding that the petitioner is neither an accused or a party in criminal case and he is not entitled to file a motion for reconsideration of the judgment of Subsidiary Civil Liability against him? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised penal Code. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination , in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship SATURDAY ALCISIO Page 358 of 528
Judgment appealed from MODIFIED. Defendant Manila Electric Company is required to pay plaintiff Arambulo P1,000 indemnity, with legal interest from the promulgation hereof.
Decision MODIFIED.
18 19
doubt is required, whereas in a purely civil action to recover the same damages under Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, only preponderance of the evidence is required. The court in that case held that the offended party seeking damages has the right to choose between a criminal action and a civil suit.
Connel Bros.: o At the time of the collision, on the back of Francisco Aduna's driver's license appear three entries of penalties and warnings. o TC: o The act of reckless negligence of Aduna causing the damage, is governed by Art. 109222 of the Civil Code. Arts. 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for the subsidiary liability of the employer for felonies committed by his servants or employees in the discharge of their duties, should be applied. Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co: The Electric Company was sued on the basis of its subsidiary liability, and said Electric Company was not allowed to prove and invoke the employment of the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the accident by carefully selecting its employees. Said defense is available not in cases covered by the penal code but only in those covered by the articles of the Civil Code such as Arts. 1903, 1902 and 1093 thereof. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the TC was correct in ruling that the negligence of Aduna causing the damage is governed by Art. 1092, and not Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. The TC was correct in ruling that the negligence of Aduna causing the damage is governed by Art. 1092, and not Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. In Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, the liability sought to be imposed upon the employer in that case was not a civil obligation arising from a felony or misdemeanor (crime committed by Pedro Fontanilla) but an obligation imposed by art. 1903 of the Civil Code because of his negligence in the selection and supervision of his servants or employees. In the present case, however, the plaintiffs have
22 Art. 1092. Civil obligations arising from the crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
DAMAGES WERE MODIFIED. CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH: P50,000 (basis, under jurisprudence PPL v Espanola). Fact death and accuseds responsibility merits such award; no further proof is necessary to determine award. ACTUAL DAMAGES is premised upon competent proof and best evidence obtainable. In this case, only the P200 is the only amount was sufficiently proven by prosecution. Actual damages were reduced to P200. The 178K valuation of jewelries prepared by Epifanio Sr (the husaband of victim) and the P47,600 burial expense prepare by Linda Alipio (sister-in-law of victim) were not proven, since both of them were not presented as prosecution witnesses. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES are awarded after proof that 1 or more aggravating circumstances (AC) attended the crime. Since only 2 AC were present, amount was reduced to P50,000. MORAL DAMAGES are awarded to compensate the victim (and/or the heirs) for injuries to their feelings; it is not awarded to enrich the heirs of the victim. Court reduced the amount to P100,000.
CA decision MODIFIED.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Court of Appeals erred in awarding actual and moral damages and attorneys fees in amounts that were excessive and exhorbitant. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. Whether there was preponderance of evidence to support an award of damages and whether the act from which liability might arise exists, are factual questions. However, the award of P1,000,000.00 as actual damages was not fully supported by evidence. The loss that respondent could only show was the $1,763.50 letter of credit and the remittance of $8,350.94 (totalling $10,114.44). the SC therefore reduced the award of actual damages to P200K.
YES. Captain Garcia found that the original motor number of the engine was tampered as shown by the presence of fragmentary numbers which appeared in the engine. Captain Garcia positively stated the fragmentary numeral to be a numeral or a number but in the absence of key portions, he could not positively identify the exact number. He discounted the possibility that such fragmentary numerals could be mere scratches. He also did not categorically state that any molecular pressure could have caused the fragmentary number. NO. The award of actual damages is not warranted by the evidence on record. The engine delivered was not brand-new. GAMI committed a breach of contract. The misrepresentation of the quality of the engine is tantamount to fraud or bad faith. The return of the purchase price with legal interest from the date of purchase is justified. The fact that the defendant does not dispute the amount of this kind of damages does not necessarily imply that the other party outright is entitled to the award of damages. Article 2200 of the Civil Code entitles the respondent to recover as compensatory damages not only the value of the loss suffered but also prospective profits. Article 2201 entitles the respondent to recover all damages which may be attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. However, in order to recover this kind of damages, plaintiff must prove his case. The injured party must produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated but for the defendants wrongful act, he is entitled to recover. In this case, the award of actual damages of P54,000.88 covers the probable income which respondent failed to realize because of the breach of contract. However, the evidence presented is insufficient to be considered within the purview of best evidence. The document merely shows that every time a truck travels, Yaptinchay earns P369.88. This is multiplied by the number of trips which the truck was unable to make. To prove actual damages, it would have been easy to present the average actual profits realized by the other freight trucks plying the Manila-Baguio route. Decision modified. The award of actual damages is deleted.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The computation for unrealized profits modified but all other awards affirmed. First, the court noted that the damages claimed by private respondents do not refer to claims which were already due from the can supply contract. The claims here are for damages caused by the fraudulent termination by petitioners of the can supply contract four (4) years before the end of its term and for such a short notice. Regarding the separation pay, evidence supports that the amount actually paid by Standard Can to the separated employee is P929,520.54 plus 10% production pay
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS W/N Rosa is entitled to conversion of benefits. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI It is true that the degree of Rosas physical condition at the time of her retirement was not considered as permanent total disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subsequently worsened after her head operation and consequent retirement. In fact, she suffered afterwards from some ailments like headaches, dizziness, weakness, inability to properly sleep, inability to walk without support and failure to regain her memory. All these circumstances ineluctably demonstrate the seriousness of her condition, contrary to the claim of petitioner. More than that, it was also undisputed that private respondent was made to take her medication for life. A person's disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause. This Court has ruled that "disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity." Rosas persistent illness indeed forced her to retire early which, in turn, resulted in her unemployment, and loss of earning capacity. Jurisprudence shows that disability is intimately related to one's earning capacity., "permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Is the petitioner liable for damages? If yes, up to what extent? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Petitioner is liable for damages. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the trial court was correct in convicting Balgos and in awarding civil damages to the complainant Criselle Fuentes HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. DIKKI SIAN Page 397 of 528
ON DAMAGES: The Court finally observes that while the trial court awarded moral damages, it did not award any indemnity ex delicto. A civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is automatically given to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of rape. Consistent, therefore, with present case law which treats the imposition of civil indemnity as being mandatory upon the finding of rape, accused-appellant should likewise be ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape. This civil indemnity is distinct from and awarded in addition to moral damages, the two being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. To curb the disturbing trend of a child being snatched from the cradle of innocence by some beast to sate its deviant sexual appetite, accusedappellant should likewise be made to pay exemplary damages, which, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, is pegged at P25,000.00, for each count of rape. All in all, Marquez was paid to pay: P150,000 civil indemnity, P150,000 moral damages and P75,000 exemplary damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not the damages awarded to Davila was proper? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI 1. The Indemnity for Jrs death. Yes this must be increased. The CFI fixed the indemnity for his death in the amount of Php 6,000. Pursuant to the current jurisprudence on the point it should be increased to Php 12,000. 2. For the loss of earning capacity. Yes. Jr. was getting his income from 3 different sources: (1) Php 8,400/year as manager of a radio station; Php 3,600/year as a lawyer and junior partner in his fathers law firm and Php 3,000/year from farming.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N, by way of legal interest, a judgment debtor should pay a judgment creditor twelve (12%) percent per annum. Reforminas: Central Bank Circular No. 416 includes the judgment sought to be executed in this case, because it is covered by the second phrase the rate allowed in judgments in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest ... " HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. By way of legal interest, a judgment debtor should pay a judgment creditor only six (6%) percent per annum. Central Bank Circular No. 416 was issued and promulgated by the Monetary Board pursuant to the authority granted to the Central Bank by P.D. No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. o Acting pursuant to this grant of authority, the Monetary Board increased the rate of legal interest from that of six (6%) percent per annum originally allowed under Section I of Act No. 2655 to twelve (12%) percent per annum.
The law applicable to the said case is Article 2209 of the New Civil Code25. The above provision remains untouched despite the grant of authority to the Central Bank by Act No. 2655, as amended. To make Central Bank Circular No. 416 applicable to any case other than those specifically provided for by the Usury Law will make the same of doubtful constitutionality since the Monetary Board will be exercising legislative functions which was beyond the intendment of P.D. No. 116. Separate Opinion
24 WHEREAS, the interest rate, together with other monetary and credit policy instruments, performs a vital role in mobilizing domestic savings and attracting capital resources into preferred areas of investments;
WHEREAS, the monetary authorities have recognized the need to amend the present Usury. Law to allow for more flexible interest rate ceilings that would be more responsive to the requirements of changing economic conditions; WHEREAS, the availability of adequate capital resources is, among other factors, a decisive element in the achievement of the declared objective of accelerating the growth of the national economy
25 Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is six percent per annum.
By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law" the Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve (12%) per cent per annum. This Circular shall take effect immediately. (Italics supplied)
23
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the interest on the claim should commence from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 12% contra from the date of decision only at a rate of 6% HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI 6% from the decision When an obligation regardless of its source is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under the civil code regarding Damages govern the measure of recoverable damages. But, with regard to interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest is imposed as follows: o When the obligation is breached and it consists of the payment of a sum of money like a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due is what it was written in the stipulation. This interest shall ITSELF earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In absence of such stipulation, it is 12% o When an obligation NOT in breach of a loan or forbearance of money, an interest of said damages may be given at the discretion of the court, at 6% per annum. There will be no interest though until the claims are liquidated except when the demand can be proven with reasonable certainty, and this interest shall run from the time judicially or extrajudicially. But if there is no certainty, it will be counted from the date of the judgment id made When the judgment reaches FINALLITY, there shall be a interest rate of 12% until it is satisfied. This is equivalent to a forbearance
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N RESPONDENTS WERE PERMITTED TO RECOVER DAMAGES TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT? Petitioner: Affirmance of the judgment of the trial court granting damages for both the damage proper to the land and rentals for the same property runs afoul of the proscription in Article 2177.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO, THERE WAS NO RECOVERY OF DAMAGES TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the stipulated rate of interest at 5.5% per month on the loan in the sum of P500,000.00, that plaintiffs extended to the defendants is usurious. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No, it is not usurious. However it is unconscionable which makes the stipulation void. SC agreed with petitioners that the stipulated rate of interest at 5.5% per month on the P500,000.00 loan is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. However, SC can not consider the rate "usurious" because this Court has consistently held that Circular No. 905 of the Central Bank, adopted on December 22, 1982, has expressly removed the interest ceilings prescribed by the Usury Law and that the Usury Law is now "legally inexistent The interest at 5.5% per month, or 66% per annum, stipulated upon by the parties in the promissory note iniquitous or unconscionable, and, hence, contrary to morals ("contra bonos mores"), if not against the law. The stipulation is void. The courts shall reduce equitably liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the stipulation of the parties. Rather, SC agreed with the trial court that, under the circumstances, interest at 12% per annum, and an additional 1% a month penalty charge as liquidated damages may be more reasonable.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the rates of interests and surcharges on the obligation of petitioner to private respondent are valid? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. INTEREST RATES ARE INVALID. SC affirmed the CA ruling, striking down as invalid the 10% compounded monthly interest, the 10% surcharge per month stipulated in the promissory notes, and the 1% compounded monthly interest stipulated in another promissory note. The legal rate of interest of 12% per annum shall apply after the maturity dates of the notes until full payment of the entire amount due. The only permissible rate of surcharge is 1% per month, without compounding. SC upheld the award of CA of attorneys fees, reasonably reducing the stipulated 25% to 10% of the entire amount due. SC also equitably reduced the 3% per month or 36% per annum interest present in all four promissory notes to 1% per month or 12% per annum interest. SC based its decision on the Medel, Garcia, Bautista, and Spouses Solangon cases. An interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and reasonable. The 1% surcharge on the principal loan for every month of default is valid. This surcharge or penalty stipulated in a loan agreement in case of default partakes of the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the 8% and 10% MONTHLY interest rates imposed on the P1M loan obligation of petitioner to respondent are valid. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. SUCH RATES ARE INIQUITOUS AND EXORBITANT. INTEREST RATE REDUCED TO 12% PER ANNUM. Although the Usury Law is suspended, lenders have no authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a haemorrhaging of their assets. The stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are unconscionable. Stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests are contrary to morals, if not against the law. Under Art.1409 of the Civil Code, these contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived. The SC has already declared unconscionable interest rates of 5.5% per month and 6% per month in previous cases for being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant. In both cases, the interest rates were reduced to 12% per annum. In the present case, the present 8% and 10% interest rates are even higher than those previously invalidated by the Court. Accordingly, the reduction of the said rates to 12% per annum is fair and reasonable. The case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, laid down the following guidelines on the imposition of interest, to wit: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N CIC should be held liable to pay interest over and above its principal obligation under the surety bonds issued by it? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. CIC is made to pay interest not on the basis of the surety bonds it issued but on basis of its default in paying its obligation. It has been held that if a surety upon demand fails to pay, he can be held liable for interest, even if in thus paying, its liability becomes more than the principal obligation. The increased liability is not because of the contract but because of the default and the necessity of judicial collection. As a general rule, a suretyshould not be made to pay more than its assumed obligation under the surety bonds. However, CICs liability for the payment of interest is not by reason of the suretyship agreement itself but because of the delay in the payment of its obligation under the said agreement. CIC offered no valid excuse for not paying the balance of its principal obligation when demanded by RCBC. Its failure to pay is unreasonable. The appellate court is correct in imposing 12% interest. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Absence of stipulation, the reate of interest shall be 12%. CICs obligation consists of a loan or forbearance of money. No interest has been agreed upon in writing between CIC and RCBC. Rate of interest is 12% to be computed from the time the extrajudicial demand was made.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Moreta is liable for Damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. MORETA SHOULD PAY DAMAGES AMOUNTING P1000 ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION If it were true that the Moreta was coming from the southern part of Solana Street, and had to stop his car before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana street, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. [Solona and Real streets are perpendicular] But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred, if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside form the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left Moreta should have slowed down and honked his horn. If these precautions were taken, the boy could have survived. SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM; Compensation for Human Life: MORETA SHOULD NOT PAY P5000 BUT ONLY P1000 BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SHOW ENOUGH EVIDENCE THAT THE DEATH OF HER SON AMOUNTS TO P5000.
Judgment MODIFIED.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the damages for the loss of Borromeos left foot should be awarded? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, IT IS AN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO ALLOW ANYTHING FOR THE LOSS OF THE LEFT FOOT, WHICH INCAPACITATED BORROMEO FROM FOLLOWING HIS PROFESSION The Court accepts the finding of the trial court that Manila Electric is liable, and that Borromeos fall was due entirely to the car having been suddenly set in motion at the moment that he was about to board it, but without having gained a sure footing on the running board, and that the subsequent loss of his left foot was due to the carelessness and negligence of Manila Electric's employees in charge of car No. 203 as supported by the evidence The sum of P5,400 awarded by the trial court as damages is made up to the expense incurred for hospital, medicine, and physician's fees on account of this accident. Although Borromeo asks for more on this account, the Court believes, after an examination of the evidence, that this amount is really all that he is entitled to on this account However, the trial court has not allowed Borromeo anything for the loss of his left foot, which has incapacitated him from following his profession and the Court believes that this is an error. The obligation to indemnify for injury caused by
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the amount of damages awarded is proper? NINA MEIJA Page 420 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS _______________________________________________________________ W/N the award of damages if proper in this case. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO ACTUAL DAMAGE. HOWEVER, THE AWARD OF MORAL AND TEMPERATE DAMAGES IS IN ORDER. We affirm the award of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto to the Zuniga spouses. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for death without need of any evidence or proof of damages. The court likewise correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages because of their mental anguish and moral suffering caused by Arlene's death. The trial and appellate courts did not award actual damages, obviously because the victim's heirs failed to present proof of the expenses they incurred. However, it has been repeatedly held by this Court that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same, temperate damages may be fixed at P25,000.00.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the petitioners can recover moral damages from PAN-AM? If so, how to compute for the same? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI PAN-AM liable for moral damages. (also exemplary and attorneys fees) Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In addition to moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Lastly, a written contract for an attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. Senator Lopez was then
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CA erred, as a matter of law and applicable decisions of the SC, in awarding excessive damages for the death of the parents of respondent; excessive compensatory damages; and excessive moral damages to respondent, without the latter appealing the decision of the TC. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, PARTLY. It may be recalled that the trial court's judgment regarding the matter of damages was as follows:1) P8,000.00 for the death of Ramon Dagamanuel; 2) P8,000.00 for the death of Josefina Punzalan; 3) P4,000.00 as exemplary damages; 4) P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; and 5) Costs. The respondent did not appeal any portion of the decision of the lower Court, thus indicating that he is fully satisfied with the same. On the other hand, the driver of the ill-fated bus failed to perfect his appeal and consequently, as against him, the decision of the lower Court is already final. The lower Court rendered a decision against the driver of the bus and the two petitioners herein for the death of the parents of the respondent in the sum of P16,000.00 together with P4,000.00 exemplary damages. But notwithstanding the automatic exclusion of the driver from the effects of the appealed decision, the Court of Appeals, while reducing the death award to P12,000.00 increased the exemplary damages to P5,000.00 adding thereto P11,520.00 compensatory damages and P5,000.00 moral damages. MAGIC MOVIDO Page 423 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Farolan was illegally dismissed and entitled to damages HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the reduction of moral damages by the trial court was proper. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI PETITION IS PARTLY MERITORIOUS. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. No hard-and-fast rule in determining moral damages; each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are awarded to achieve a spiritual status quo, i.e. to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering undergone. The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination of the proper amount of the ward. Otherwise, the goal of enabling him restore the spiritual status quo may not be achieved.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CA erred in affirming the TCs award of MORAL DAMAGES and increasing the amount from P30,000.00 to P250,000.00. W/N the CA was justified in awarding in addition to moral damages, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00. Petitioner- CA and TC erred in awarding moral damages because moral damages are recoverable in breach of contract cases only where the breach was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. CA erred in awarding MORAL DAMAGES. Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides: To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
CA also erred in awarding EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. To warrant the award of exemplary damages, [t]he wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. NOMINAL DAMAGES awarded. The facts show that when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost. For such prevarication, petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customers anxiety and need of the hour. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. Page 426 of 528
Petition granted. CA reversed. Petitioner order to pay the cost of the wedding cake, nominal damages of P10,000.00, attorneys fees and the costs of litigation.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the grant of moral damages was proper HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No, the lower court erred in classifying the award of P50,000 as moral damages It is well established in jurisprudence that the award authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. The civil indemnity provided by the RPC for the crime of rape is in the nature of restitution, reparation, and indemnification. What the lower court awarded was a mandatory civil indemnity upon the finding of the fact of rape. It is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. The recent judicial prescription is that the indemnification of the victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. Held: P50,000 moral damages changed to P75,000 compensatory damages . MARICE PACHECO Page 430 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the appellate court was correct in awarding moral damages in favor of Lo. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The Appellate Court was not correct in awarding moral damages in favor of Lo Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Such damages must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit 1. there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant. 2. there must be a culpable act or omission factually established 3. the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant 4. the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in article 2219, death of a passenger under breach of carriage, when the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, culpa criminal, analogous cases, or malicious prosecution Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for award of attorneys fees, such filing is however, has almost been invariably been held not a ground for award of moral damages. The rationale for this rule
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages? Held Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N There is prescription? Award of Damages proper? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO PRESCRIPTION. AWARD OF DAMAGES PROPER. PLAINTIFFS MUST DEMOLISH THE DAM. Court finds no clear evidence of prescription for 20 years or more Del Valle was not content with reducing the water flow to defendants Hernandez and in fact increased height of dam in 1952 blocking it totally. Hernandez et al entitled to Moral damages P2000 each. Entitlement based on Art. 2220 of Civil Code. Equity and Justice dictate that Hernandez et al can recover attorneys fees in amount of P5000 according to Art. 2208 Civil Code.
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS Whether or not there was bad faith on the part of PAL so as to entitle the Sps. Miranda to moral damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. Crucial to the determination of the propriety of the award of damages in this case is the lower court's findings on the matter of bad faith: found that the situation was aggravated by the following incidents: the poor treatment of the Mirandas by the PAL employees during the stopover at Mactan Airport in Cebu; the cavalier and dubious response of petitioner's personnel to the Miranda spouses' request to be billeted at the Cebu Plaza Hotel by denying the same allegedly because it was fully booked, which claim was belied by the fact that Dr. Miranda was easily able to arrange for accommodations thereat; and, the PAL employees' negligent, almost malicious, act of sending off the baggage of private respondents to Surigao City, while they were still in Cebu, without any explanation for this gross oversight. The Court has time and again ruled, and it cannot be over-emphasized, that a contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty and any discourteous conduct on the part of a carrier's employee toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages and, more so, where there is bad faith. *It is settled that bad faith must be duly proved and not merely presumed. The existence of bad faith, being a factual question, and the Supreme Court not being a trier of facts, the findings thereon of the trial court as well as of the Court of Appeals shall not be disturbed on appeal and are entitled to great weight and respect.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia W/N the Press Release is libelous
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the following facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino. On the press release there was marked For release under the date. It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in the same numerical order. The press release indicated that it came from Valencia The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the presence of the press The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and information he received about Antonino The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time constraint Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. W/N Tagunicar is PanAms agent, making the latter liable for the acts of the former. W/N PanAm is liable for its refusal to admit plaintiffs in its flight.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI 1. No. Affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, or for want of suggestion and inquiries. The circumstances under which said affidavit was prepared put in
CA ALSO ERRED IN AWARDING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. To warrant the award of exemplary damages, [t]he wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. NOMINAL DAMAGES awarded. The facts show that when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost. For such prevarication, petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customers anxiety and need of the hour. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. CA ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES. Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides: To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
Petition granted. CA reversed. Petitioner order to pay the cost of the wedding cake, nominal damages of P10,000.00, attorneys fees and the costs of litigation.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Lao can be held liable for damages and such sums may be satisfied by execution against employees property because St. Joseph is closed HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. LAO SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE AS HE HAD A VALID DEFENSE. HIS EMPLOYER FORCED HIM TO SIGN THE COMPLAINT. Elements to maintain action for damages based on malicious prosecution: The fact of prosecution and the further fact that plaintiff himself was the prosecutor and the action was finally terminated with an acquittal That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice Lao was only witness and not prosecutor in the Estafa case.Lao made the affidavit as an employee who had personal knowledge of the transaction. The prosecution for Estafa did not prosper but the unsuccessful prosecution may be labeled as libelous. Hence, the judgment against Lao is a nullity and should be set aside.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not Felipe and Lao are liable for malicious prosecution? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes, petitioners are liable. Indeed, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. To constitute malicious prosecution and hold defendant liable, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and that the prosecution was initiated with the deliberate knowledge that the charge was false and baseless. The elements of malice and absence of probable cause are present in the instant case. Lao knew that private respondent, with policemen, had taken the vehicle to the Sangandaan police station after the traffic incident. As pointed out by respondent appellate court, Rosario cannot validly claim that, prior to the filing of the complaint-affidavit for carnapping, she did not know the whereabouts of the vehicle. As to the absence of probable cause, it was established that there was clearly no intent to gain on the part of respondents and the police, which is essential for the crime of carnapping. The vehicle was turned over to the police station because it was in connection with the charge of frustrated homicide against Felipe. JR RUIZ Page 445 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N petitioner should be held liable for damages for malicious prosecution
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award of moral and exemplary damages in this case was proper? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. Such award must be deleted for being devoid of legal basis. Moral and exemplary damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of an employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or were done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party, which is the basis made by Madolid for claiming moral and exemplary damages in this case. There was also an issue of whether or not Madolid should be considered a regular or a project employee. The Court held that Madolids employment status was established by the Certificate of Employment dated April 10, 1989 issued by Audion Electric which certified that Madolida is a bonfide employee of the former from June 30, 1976 up to the time the certification was issued on April 10, 1989. The same certificate of employment showed that private respondents exposure was regularly and continuously employed by Audion in various job assignments from 1976 to 1989, for a total of 13 years. The Court reminded the parties of its ruling that where the employment of project employees is extended long after the supposed project has been finished, the employees are removed from the scope of project
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N petitioner Paguio is entitled to damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES Under Article 21 of the Civil Code, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The illegal transfer of petitioner to a functionless office was clearly an abuse by respondent PLDT of its right to control the structure of its organization. The right to transfer or reassign an employee is decidedly an employers exclusive right and prerogative. In several cases, however, we have ruled that such managerial prerogative must be exercised without
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS ________________________________________________________________ 1. 2. W/N respondent was constructively dismissed. W/N the payment of backwages and damages was in order.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. ALTHOUGH RESPONDENT CONTINUED TO HAVE THE RANK OF A SUPERVISOR, HER FUNCTIONS WERE REDUCED TO A MERE HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SALES AGENT OR DIRECT SALES AGENT. THIS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A DEMOTION. Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. In this case, private respondent might not have suffered any diminution in her basic salary but petitioners did not dispute her allegation that she was deprived of all
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. Which of the two conveyances by Justa Kausapin, the first in favor of Maxima Hemedes and the second in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes, effectively transferred ownership over the subject land. W/N R & B Insurance should be considered an innocent purchaser of the land in question (or a mortgagee in good faith), and if so, W/N R & B Insurance is entitled to moral damages.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI 1.) The conveyance made by Justa Kausapin in favor of Maxima Hemedes transferred ownership over the subject land. The SC held that Dominium and Enrique Hemedes have failed to produce clear, strong, and convincing evidence to overcome the positive value of the "Deed Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" a notarized document. In upholding the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes, the SC ruled that Enrique D. Hemedes Page 454 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Could ERHC demand moral damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No As a general rule, Corporations could not be awarded moral damages because being an artificial person; a corporation has no feelings, no emotions, and no senses. It cannot experience actual sufferings and mental anguish which is only experienced by a person having a nervous system. The statement in PP vs Manero is only an obiter dictum, stating that the good reputation of the company is debased, resulting in social humiliation, thus could recover moral damages. Assuming that they can, still the company did not present enough proof to warrant moral damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N respondent court erred in computing the awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor Padilla rather on the life expectancy of private respondent HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No, however there is error as to the computation of the proper indemnity to be awarded. Petitioner PAL relied on foreign law which states that the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter. However resort to foreign law even in the absence of local statute is only persuasive.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award for nominal damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and law? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. PETITIONERS RIGHT TO THE USE OF HIS PROPERTY WAS UNDULY IMPEDED. Private respondent Carrascoso may still e held liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code, which provides: o Art. 32. Any public officer, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; While private respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. Issue 1: (not important, regarding the loan itself) Issue 2: W/N the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees proper? o Respondents: Petitioner is guilty of bad faith as evidenced by its insistence on the payment of amortization on the loan even before it was released.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI ISSUE 2: MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES DELETED, AWARDED NOMINAL DAMAGES INSTEAD. ATTORNEYS FEES PROPER. As admitted by private respondents themselves, they were irregular in their payment of monthly amortization. Conformably with previous SC rulings, petitioner cannot be properly declared in bad faith. Consequently, the award of moral and exemplary damages must be ruled out. However, in the SCs view, petitioner was negligent in relying merely on the entries found in the deed of mortgage, without checking and correspondingly adjusting its records on the amoun actually released to private respondents and the date when it was released. Sich negligence resulted in damage to private respondents, for which
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award of NOMINAL damages was proper? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. Almedas refusal to pay the purchase price despite repeated demands and after they sold the properties to third parties constitutes a violation of Carinos right to the amount in their agreement. Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. Indeed, nominal damages are damages in name only and not
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not the court erred in awarding nominal damage? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages." In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals has adjudicated no such compensatory, moral and exemplary damages to respondent herein. There are special reasons why the P20,000.00 award in favor of respondent herein is justified, even if said award were characterized as nominal damages. It is true that said ticket was marked "W/L," but respondent's attention was not called thereto. Much less was he advised that "W/L" meant "wait listed." Upon the other hand, having paid the first class fare in full and having been given first class accommodation as he took petitioner's plane in Manila, respondent was entitled to believe that this was a confirmation of his first class reservation and that he would keep the same until his ultimate destination, Tokyo. Then, too, petitioner has not tried to explain or even alleged
LIABLE FOR ATTORNEYS FEES: Low income of the plaintiffs-appellants makes an award for attorney's fees just and equitable (Civil Code, Art. 2208, par. 11). Considering that the two cases filed were tried jointly, a fee of P3,500 would be reasonable. CFI decision reversed. MR DECISION: Award of moral damages was granted under Art 176426. Under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a carrier's negligence, the heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral damages, while, a passenger who is injured, but manages to survive, is not entitled to them. Art 1764, being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, this article prevails over the general rule of Art. 2220.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI UNDER THE ORGINAL DECISION: YES, the carrier is liable While the carrier is not insurer of the safety of the passenger, it should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws in its equipment if the flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law as the agent of the carrier and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer if the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him while the carrier usually has.
DIANE LIPANA
26 ART. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. ART. 2206. . . .
(3) The spouse, legitimate and eligimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CA erred in reducing the amount of temperate damages awarded? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The CA erred in reducing the award of temperate damages. Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages. In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that there are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act. As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an entrepreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them through. His actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers from double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as well as in social life. MIKHAIL MALANG Page 468 of 528
Decision MODIFIED.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the deletion of the damages for unfulfilled import of logs, moral damages and attorneys fees were proper HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE DELETION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS PROPER BUT THE MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES ARE NOT JUSTIFIED KATH MATIBAG Page 469 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not private respondents RBPG and Isabel Rodriguez are legally entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees Assuming that they are so entitled, whether or not the amounts awarded are excessive and unconscionable HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THERE IS NO MERIT IN MBTCS ARGUMENT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED NEGLIGENT, MUCH LESS BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF THE INADVERTENCE OF ITS BANK EMPLOYEE AS ARTICLE 1173 OF THE CIVIL CODE ONLY REQUIRES IT TO EXERCISE THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD PATER FAMILIAS The dishonoring of the RBPG checks committed through negligence by the petitioner bank and was rectified only nine days after receipt of the credit memo. Clearly, petitioner bank was remiss in its duty and obligation to treat private respondent's account with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable GINO CAPATI Page 470 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the amount of actual damages awarded is proper HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI IT IS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT ANY DOCUMENTARY PROOF. However, Article 2224 of the New Civil Code provides that temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. In lieu of Actual Damages, absent proof, the amount of P200.00 as temperate damages may be made in its place.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award of damages by the CA is proper. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI BPI ORDERED TO PAY P51,000 AS TEMPERATE DAMAGES FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE LEASE CONTRACT DUE TO DEFECTS IN THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT. The trial court ordered petitioner to pay damages of P136,608.75 representing unearned income for the period that respondent had to suspend a lease contract. We find a dearth of evidence to support such award. Respondent was able to establish through its witness testimony that the condominium unit suffered from defects. This testimony was confirmed by an inspection report. To recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but also be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. We agree with petitioner. While respondent may have suffered pecuniary losses for completion work done, it failed to establish with reasonable certainty the actual amount spent. The award of actual damages cannot be based on the allegation of a witness without any tangible document, such as receipts or other documentary proofs to support such claim. In determining actual damages, courts cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of loss. CHRISSIE MORAL Page 472 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N NPC is liable to respondent to pay damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NPC liable to pay temperate and exemplary damages. NPC's abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we cannot award moral damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it. We also cannot award attorney's fees in Pobre's favor since he did not appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of attorney's fees.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Court of Appeals erred in holding CBISCOs bond liable HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. A provision which calls for the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee's violation of any of the terms and conditions of the agreement is a penal clause that may be validly entered into. A penal clause is an accessory obligation, which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special presentation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled As a general rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance. In such case, proof of actual damages suffered by the creditor is not necessary in order that the penalty may be demanded (Article 1228, New Civil Code). However, there are exceptions to the rule that the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance with the principal obligation. They are first, when there is a stipulation to the contrary; second, when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the agreed penalty; and third, when the obligor is guilty of fraud (Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code). Page 475 of 528
ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the grounds relied upon by petitioners in their petition, the same is hereby DENIED and the decision dated June 15, 1988 and the resolution dated September 21, 1988, both of the respondent Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the penalty clause was iniquitous and imconscionable. o Petitioner: Pacific Milss insists that the additional charges must be reduced because the amount which the have to pay is already ridiculously high if you take into account all the rates and charges that PhilCotton stipulated in their joint manifestiaion o Respondent: Philcotton conteds that Pcaific Mills was already granted a reduction by the CA, ant a further reduction cannot merit serious consideration. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. THE PENALTY CLAUSE IS VALID. CHESKA RESPICIO Page 477 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the chattel mortgage is void for being ambiguous? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO.
27 11. In case the MORTGAGOR fails to pay any of the installments, or to pay the interest that may be due as provided in the said promissory note, the whole amount remaining unpaid therein shall immediately become due and payable and the mortgage on the property (ies) herein-above described may be foreclosed by the MORTGAGEE, or the MORTGAGEE may take any other legal action to enforce collection of the obligation hereby secured, and in either case the MORTGAGOR further agrees to pay the MORTGAGEE an additional sum of 25% of the principal due and unpaid, as liquidated damages, which said sum shall become part thereof. The MORTGAGOR hereby waives reimbursement of the amount heretofore paid by him/it to the MORTGAGEE.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the bank is entitled to the 3% monthly penalty HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, the penalty clause is the liquidated damages for the breach of an obligation A penalty clause is expressly recognized by law. It is an accessory obligation for the obligor to assume a greater responsibility upon breach of an obligation. It functions to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to provide for what could be the liquated damages for the breach of the obligation. The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. W/N CA erred in its decision in finding SIHI not entitled CA erred in reducing penalty charge as liquidated damages
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI CA did not err in both. CA not entitled to excess neither to penalty charge as damages clause 3% p.m. or 36%pa is unconscionable and iniquitous. Art. 2227 allows for reduction of liquidated damages as penalty or indemnity if iniquitous and unconscionable. Computation of difference by petitioner is erroneous, difference is only .575M and already these amounts were under the 36% p.a. charge Court allowed to temper interest rates Art. 1229 allows judge to reduce interest if obligation partly or irregularly complied with or if no performance if iniquitous or unconscionable
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. 3. W/N Octot can claim backwages W/N Octot can claim moral damages W/N Octot can claim exemplary damages
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No In the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion, Octot cannot claim backwages and damages. There was no bad faith in this case as the dismissal was due to law, PD 6. Also, LOI647 does not provide for payment of back wages No The delay in the reinstatement of Octot was due to his own fault. Also seeing as there was no Bad Faith involved and that it doesnt involve the situations under 2219 and 2220, moral damages cannot be claimed No Exemplary damages are not usually recoverable in a mandamus case unless the defendant patently acted with vindictiveness and wantonness. It is granted by way of example or correction for the public good. Requisites o They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N The award for damages was proper HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
ISSUE Whether or not the award of damages are sufficient? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The Court affirmed the ruling of trial court, finding that the accused Albior was indeed guilty of rape. However, the court modified the award of civil damages. The lower court failed to grant the necessary civil indeminity which is mandated by jurisprudence to be awarded to rape victims. An additional P50,000 was granted by the court, and this was held to be separate and distinct from that of the award of moral damages.
(Note: this is the only related pronouncement with regard to damages in this case).
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N petitioner should be held liable for exemplary damages HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, petitioner should be held liable for exemplary damages When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of carriage. Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. In this case, petitioners employees acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, warranted in this case. Bad faith was imputed by the trial court when it found that the petitioners employees at the Singapore airport did not accord the respondent the attention and treatment allegedly warranted under the circumstances. The lady employee at the counter was unkind and of no help to her. The respondent further alleged that without her threats of suing the company, she was not allowed to use the companys phone to make long distance calls to her mother in Manila. The male employee at the counter where it says: Immediate Attention to Passengers with Immediate Booking was rude to her when he curtly retorted that he was busy attending to other passengers in line. The trial court concluded that this inattentiveness and rudeness of petitioners personnel to respondents plight was gross enough amounting to bad faith. This is a finding that is generally binding upon the Court which we find no reason to disturb. FRANK TAMARGO Page 489 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N NPC is liable to respondent to pay damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NPC liable to pay temperate and exemplary damages. NPC's abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we cannot award moral damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it. We also cannot award attorney's fees in Pobre's favor since he did not appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of attorney's fees.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award of P60,000 in the concept of moral and exemplary damages is proper? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. Respondent Court found malice in De Leon's refusal to satisfy Dr. Tantocos lawful claim and in their subsequent filing of the present case against the latter, and took into consideration the worries and mental anxiety of latter as a result thereof. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. On the other hand, jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded, to wit: (1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages; and (3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolant manner. As a lawyer in the practice of law since his admission to the Bar in 1929, who has held several important positions in the government petitioner Fortunato de Leon could not have missed the import of the annotation at the back of TCT regarding the second mortgage for the sum of sixty eight thousand eight hundred twenty-four pesos (P68,824.00) of the property he was buying, in favor of respondent Cornelio Tantoco. The same annotation was transferred to the new TCT issued in the name of De Leon after the sale of the property was effected and entered in the registry of Page 491 of 528
TEL VIRTUDEZ
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether it is proper to increase the moral damages and exemplary damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted. We hereby fix it at P25,000.00. Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The award of moral damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the accused is further ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether UTTASCOs contention is correct. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. The SC DISMISSED the appeal by defendant-appellant Utility Assurance & Surety Co., Inc. for lack of merit, and AFFIRMED the judgment of the trial court. The objection has to be overruled, because as far back as the year 1922 SC held in Tagawa vs. Aldanese, 43 Phil. 852, that creditors suing on a suretyship bond may recover from the surety as part of their damages, interest at the legal rate even if the surety would thereby become liable to pay more than the total amount stipulated in the bond. 'The theory is that interest is allowed only by way of damages for delay upon the part of the sureties in making payment after they should have done. In some states, the interest has been charged from the date of the judgment of the appellate court. In this jurisdiction, we rather prefer to follow the general practice which is to order that interest begin to run from the date when the complaint was filed in court, . . . . ' Such theory aligned with Sec. 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was subsequently recognized in the Rules of Court (Rule 53, Section 6) and with Article 1108 of the Civil Code (now Art. 2209 of the New Civil Code). In other words the surety is made to pay interest, not by reason of the contract, but by reason of its failure to pay when demanded and for having compelled the plaintiff to resort to the courts to obtain payment. It should be observed that interest does not run from the time the obligation became due, but from the filing of the complaint. As to attorney's fees: Before the enactment of the New Civil Code, successful litigants could not recover attorney's fees as part of the damages they suffered by reason of the litigation. Even if the party paid thousands of pesos to his lawyers, he could not charge the amount to his opponent. However, the New Civil Code permits recovery of attorney's fees in eleven cases enumerated in Article 2208, among them 'where the court deem it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered' or 'when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.' This gives the courts discretion in apportioning attorney's fees. Now, considering, in this case, that the principal debtor had openly and expressly admitted his liability under the bond, and the surety knew it (p.123 R.A.) we can not say there was abuse of lower court's discretion in the way of awarding fees, specially when the indemnity agreement . . . afforded the surety adequate protection. (100 Phil. 681-682. (Emphasis supplied). JOY ADRANEDA Page 494 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N THE CA ERRED IN THE REDUCTION OF ATTORNEYS FEES? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, THE CA ERRED IN THE REDUCTION OF ATTORNEYS FEES There is no question that a court may, whenever it deems it just and equitable, allow the recovery by the prevailing party of attorneys fees. In determining the reasonableness of such fees, this Court in a number of cases has provided various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate thusly: o a) the quantity and character of the services rendered; o b) the labor, time and trouble involved; o c) the nature and importance of the litigation; o d) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy; o e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved; o f) the responsibility imposed on counsel; o g) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service; o h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer; o i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services; o j) the character of employment, whether casual or for establishment client; o k) whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS What is the correct redemption price? Petitioner: The redemption price should be P351,080.00. Since private respondent actually tendered P337,580.00 which is short by P13,500.00, this price was inadequate thereby rendering redemption ineffectual. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI DEDUCT P5,000 FROM THE P351,080.00 BEING CLAIMED BY PETITIONER BECAUSE ATTORNEYS FEES IS EXCLUDED FROM REDEMPTION PRICE. According to Section 6 of Art 3135, the redemption price of properties at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is fixed by Sec 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said Rule provides that in order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the redemption price composed of the following: (1) the price which the purchaser paid for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month; (3) the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Namit is entitled to more attorneys fees HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI AS TO THE $2.5K IT CAN BE AWARDED. AS TO THE P10K, SUCH HAS NO BASIS IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION Pimentel contends that absent any agreement on attorneys fees, the determination of the compensation for the lawyers services will have to be based on quantum meruit, such as but not limited to the extent and character of the services rendered, the labor, time and trouble involved, the skill and experience called for in performing the services, the professional and social
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. The Spouses Tarnate could still redeem the land as they tendered the redemption within two years. o Although there was no voluntary agreement between the parties and the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two years, the bank may not oppose the redemption as for two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that Ibaan Rural Bank consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, Ibaan Rural Bank misled the Spouses Tarnate to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, Ibaan Rural Bank is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Moreover, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of a property.
No. The CA may not award attorneys fees solely on the basis of the refusal of the bank to allow redemption. o o o The award of attorney's fees must be disallowed for lack of legal basis. Attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the Spouses Tarnate could still redeem the land as they tendered the redemption within two years. NICO CRISOLOGO Page 498 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CA erred when it awarded nominal damages and attys fees HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. Indeed, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right Petitioners have an unpaid balance on the purchase price of lots sold to them by respondents. Their refusal to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price despite repeated demands, even after they had sold the properties to third parties, undoubtedly constitutes a violation of respondents right Nor is there any basis for petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in awarding attorneys fees in favor of respondents. Under the Civil Code, attorneys fees and litigation expenses can be recovered in cases where the court deems it just and equitable. Thus, there is no reason to set aside the order of the trial court, as affirmed by the appeals court, granting to respondents attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00. Further, the case has dragged on for more than a decade. While the records reveal that respondents engaged the services of two lawyers, petitioners had a total of sixteen counsels starting from January 24, 1984 up to December 22, 1997. Of the sixteen, one lawyer served for more than 2 years, another for 8 days only, and still another entered his appearance and withdrew it only to re-enter his appearance after some time. The records show that most of the lawyers who entered their appearances either filed only motions to cancel hearings or motions for postponements, claiming to have misplaced the calendar of court hearings or to be staying abroad. These unduly delayed the disposition of the case in violation of the right of respondents to claim what is rightfully due them. This fact further justifies the award of nominal damages and supports the grant of attorneys fees. TIN DINO Page 500 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N respondent is entitled to attorneys fees for assisting petitioner as counsel in the labor case. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI While it is true that the retainer contract between the parties expired during the pendency of the said labor case, it does not follow that petitioner has no more obligation to pay respondent his attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner engaged the legal services of respondent and agreed to pay him accordingly, thus: "Anent the first issue, the Petitioner resolutely avers that he and the Private Respondent had agreed on the latter paying him the amount of P60,000.00 by way of attorneys fees for his professional services as its counsel in POEA Case No. 94-08-2370 the Petitioner relying on his Retainer Agreement in tandem with the Compulsory Counterclaim of the Private Respondent to the complaint of Isidro Felosopo. "We agree with the Petitioners pose. It bears stressing that the Retainer Agreement of the Petitioner and the Private Respondent (Exhibit A) envisaged two (2) species of professional services of the Petitioner, namely, those professional services covered by the regular retainer fee and those covered by separate billings. Petitioners services not covered by the regular retainer fee and, hence, subject to separate billing include: x x x 5. Services not covered by the regular retainer fee and therefore, subject to separate billing: a) litigation, quasi-judicial proceedings, administrative investigation, and similar proceedings legal in nature; x x x "x x x While admittedly, the Petitioner and the Private Respondent did not execute a written agreement on Petitioners fees in said case apart from the Retainer Agreement, however, the Private Respondent did categorically and unequivocally admit in its Compulsory Counterclaim embodied in its Answer to the Complaint, in POEA Case No. 94-08-2370, that it engaged the services of the Petitioner as its counsel For a fee in the amount of P60,000.00, Etc.: COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM Page 501 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the amount of P100,000 awarded to Atty. Moya as attorneys fees is reasonable? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE GAUGED ON THE BASIS OF THE LONG-STANDING RULE OF QUANTUM MERUIT. Quantum meruit means as much as he deserves. Where a lawyer is employed without agreement as to the amount to be paid for his services, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In such case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits of his services. Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
JOHN. FADRIGO
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N NLRC properly deleted the monetary awards? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, with respect to: Unpaid Salary no proof Reyes worked during those times. Moral/Exemplary Damages no basis, respondents not shown to have acted in bad faith. Car and life insurance only granted during the employment of the employee. Rental contractual obligation, not based of EER therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Regular courts have jurisdiction. Reimbursement for the services of a law firm no proof that the services of a law firm was needed and that he spent 200K as a consequence. NO, with respect to vacation / sick leave and Attorneys Fees. 2 concepts of Attys Fees: o Ordinary reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services. The basis is the fact of his employment.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. W/N the contracts to sell were validly rescinded or cancelled by Bricktown (TORTS RELATED) W/N the amounts already remitted by Amor Tierra under said contracts were rightly forfeited by Bricktown HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI VALIDLY RESCINDED K to SELL The cancellation of the contracts to sell by Bricktown accords with the contractual covenants of the parties, and such cancellation must be respected. It may be noteworthy to add that in a contract to sell, the non-payment of the purchase price (which is normally the condition for the final sale) can prevent the obligation to convey title from acquiring any obligatory force.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the grant of the writ of execution was valid. o Petitioner: IS claims that there is no good reason to grant the writ of executing, citing Ong v. CA, saying that the reason given is that the appeal is frivolous and dilatory is not a reason to justify the approval of an execution pending appeal. o Respondent: The spouses argue that ISM virtually admitted that the appeal appears to be dilatory and that it adopted the project Code Red: consisting of safety and emergency measure only after the death of their son, and that the delay has already affected them financially. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE WRIT OF EXECUTION IS NOT VALID. THE MERE FILING OF A BONG BY THE DEFENDANT IS NOT A GOOD REASON FOR ORDERING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. A combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution, the requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection of the defendant's creditor. Since we have already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify execution pending appeal, neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more, justify the same. Moreover, ISM could not be faulted for its withdrawal of its
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N they can be held liable under the said documents HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Judgment AFFIRMED.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CA erred in not mitigating the damages awarded under Article 2197 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding its finding that the banks negligence was only contributory. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES MITIGATED. SOLIDBANK LIABLE FOR 60%, L.C. DIAZ LIABLE FOR 40%. The trial court believed that L.C. Diazs negligence in not securing its passbook under lock and key was the proximate cause that allowed the impostor to withdraw the P300,000. For the appellate court, the proximate cause was the tellers negligence in processing the withdrawal without first verifying with L.C. Diaz. We do not agree with either court. CHRISSIE MORAL Page 513 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the filing fee should be based on the amount of damages although the same is not found in the prayer of the complaint? MAUI MORALES Page 514 of 528
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Petition granted. Lower Court orders are set aside. Civil case reinstated for determination and proper disposition of the respective claims and rights of the parties.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N TC incorrectly applied the doctrine in the case of Manchester v. CA. W/N TC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complaint expunged from the record although petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. Complaint reinstated. Manchester laid down the rule that all complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees; and that any pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be expunged from the record. While the body of the complaint was silent as to the exact amount of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, the prayer did specify the amount of not less than P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less than P50,000 as attorneys fees. These amounts are definite enough and enabled the clerk of court to compute the docket fees payable. Also, the principal amount sought to be recovered as missing money was fixed at P900,000. The failure to state the rate of interest demanded was not fatal not only
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the lower court should dismiss the case HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE COURT SHOULD EITHER EXPUNGE THE CLAIM FOR EXEMPLARY DAMES OR GIVE TIME FOR RESPONDENTS TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT. Docket fees should be computed on the amount of damages stated in the complaint. According to Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but not beyond prescriptive or reglementary period. Or if the claim is not specified in the pleading or is to be determined by the court then the filing fee would constitute as a lien of the judgment. However, in the case of Tacay vs. RTC of Tagum, the Court said that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading. Thus, in the case at bar, there was a need to specify the amount of the exemplary damages claimed. As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive period.
Manchester laid down the doctrine the specific amounts of claims of damages must be alleged both in the body and the prayer of the complaint, and the filing fees corresponding thereto paid at the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these requisites were not fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by the trial court; and that amendment of the complaint could not "thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court." Sun Insurance and Tacay affirmed the validity of the basic principle but reduced its stringency somewhat by providing that only those claims as to which the amounts were not specified would be refused acceptance or expunged and that, in any case, the defect was not necessarily fatal of irremediable as the plaintiff could on motion be granted a reasonable time within which to amend his complaint and pay the requisite filing fees, unless in the meantime the period of limitation of the right of action was completed. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure incorporated a new provision in light of this Court's Resolution of September 13, 1984 in Adm. Matter No. 83-6-389-0 requiring
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Court acquires jurisdiction over case even if complaint does not specify amount of damages HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI ODECOR failed to allege with specificity denying RTC of jurisdiction ODECOR prayed for unspecified amounts of damages and 25% of attorneys fees which will be proved at trial there is not enough to support a proper assessment of docket fees. Plaintiff must ascertain sums he wants even if not exact amount. Rule is TC now allowed to allow payment of fee within a reasonable time and within prescriptive or reglamentary period.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. W/N Judge was ignorant of the law by fixing monthly rental at P1500 W/N Judge was ignorant of the law by not acting on motions for extension W/N Judge was ignorant of the law in ordering the execution W/N Judge was ignorant of the law is designating a special deputy sheriff W/N Sheriff was ignorant of the law in enforcing writ of execution
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No IMC had no way of determining how much rent to charge Kaw as they had no preexisting lease contract and so they left it to the determination of the Judge. Also, it cannot be claimed that such was the amount set to evade payment of docket fees as the fee is a straight fee of P100 No Kaw was served the complaint with a warning the the 10 day period is nonextendible. Yes The fact that the MeTCs decision in ejectment cases is immediately executory does not dispense with the requirement for notice of the motion for execution. Yes The regular deputy sheriff was not shown to have been absent or on leave. The special deputy sheriff who was the deputy sheriff of the clerk or court could not be
Petition DISMISSED.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Manuel is entitled to recover damages through an independent civil action, and despite non-payment of filing fees. o Petitioner: Under the New RoC, it is only when the amount of damages other than actual has been specified in the information that the filing fees is required to be paid upon filing, and that since in this case the amount of damages stated in the information partakes firstly of actual damages and is not entirely other than actual, there is no need to pay such fees upon filing. o Respondents: The present petition is premature because there is a pending appeal of the conviction for libel before the CA, filed by respondents. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI MANUEL NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES UNDER AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION. The award of moral and exemplary damages by the trial court is inextricably linked and necessarily dependent upon the factual finding of basis therefore, i.e. the existence of the crime of libel. Since such fact is pending determination before the CA, this court cannot entertain the petition of Manuel, in order to avoid an absurd situation wherein the CA reverses the decision of the RTC but this court awards damages in favor of Manuel. Hence, Manuel should have brought the petition before the CA first.
CHRISSIE MORAL
The Manchester doctrine requiring payment of filing fees at the time of commencement of the action is applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111 only when the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information.
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ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N petitioners counterclaim is only permissive and requiring the payment of docket fees. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows: o 1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? o 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? o 3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim? o 4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? Another test is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. 2. Should the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure be applied retrospectively? Should PPIs appeal be dismissed due to non payment of appellate docket fees
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No to both. General Rule: Rules of Procedure apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage but this retrospective application only applies if no vested rights are impaired. The rules retrospective application will impair PPIs right to appeal because at the time they filed their appeal all that was necessary to perfect an appeal was to file a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment 15 days from notice thereof. Failure to pay proper appelate docket fees will not automatically result in dismissal of an appeal. The dismissal would depend on the discretion of the court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed by La Sallete? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. The appeal was filed out of time. In order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be complied with. o o o First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to be appealed; Second, such notice must be served on the adverse party; Third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the court that rendered the judgment or final order.
The payment of docket fees is necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. For this reason, and to secure a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding, the Rules on Civil Procedure mandates the payment of docket and other lawful fees within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the jurisdiction of the proper court to handle a case is adversely affected. In the present case, it was proven that the petitioners indeed did not fail the docket fees, and they have not shown any satisfactory reason to warrant the relaxation of the Rules.